Risk Communication on Climate Change

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Jan 22, 2004 - on deeper causes (e.g. culture, values, positions/views/needs of ...... Figure 8: Box Plot (modified from Hammer et al., 2001) . ...... The age categories of the respondents were as follows: 4. ...... climate variables, expressed as smoothed histograms or time series ...... Identifiable rather than anonymous victims.

Risk Communication on Climate Change Report number NWS-E-2004-120 ISBN 90-393-3934-1

J.A. Wardekker Contact Address: E-mail: [email protected] Supervised by: Dr. J.P. van der Sluijs Department of Science, Technology and Society Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovation Utrecht University Heidelberglaan 2 3584 CS Utrecht The Netherlands MSc. Thesis Utrecht University Utrecht, October 2004

Summary (English) A study on Risk Communication on Climate Change was done. The study used both existing scientific literature on the subject and new surveys and interviews. The first part of the study looked at information exchange between parties involved in climate change and differences in supply and demand of information. The second part looked at citizens’ views on climate change, problems with communication on climate change, and the resulting consequences and options for communication. This second part also looked at barriers to action that are related or influenced by communication. The main conclusions with respect to information supply and demand were: • More focus will need to be put on the more extreme scenarios of climate change. When possible technical difficulties can be overcome, more focus is also needed on deeper causes (e.g. culture, values, positions/views/needs of stakeholders), exposure (e.g. risk, damage, benefits of measures), and options. • There is too much information, too many sources, and information is often too complicated. A central information system providing references/links and summaries could be useful. Help with making summaries easier to understand could be useful as well (also to avoid media misinterpretation). • Modelling can provide useful tools to link changes in the environment to what this means for damage and options to prevent or adjust to climate change. • There are several ways, often graphical, to display the probabilistic nature of climate change and predictions, uncertainty, and risk. • Participation of stakeholders in research and communication is useful in creating relevance and trust, and finding attention points. • Communication through a trusted source is very important. Citizens seem to trust scientists. Stakeholders probably trust existing networks. • Internet and existing networks seem important media for communication with and among organized stakeholders. Television and newspaper seem the most important in communication to citizens. The main conclusions with respect to risk perceptions and communication barriers were: • Moral issues, especially effects on future generations, but also on nature and animals, and other world regions should receive much more attention. • More communication through the mass media is needed. Extreme weather events and moments of policy implementation, conferences, and appearances of studies are good moments for communication. • Communication through a trusted source is crucial for risk perceptions as well. Joint initiatives of scientists and institutes (consensus approach) are useful. • Climate change is often framed into other (environmental) problems, such as ozone depletion and normal air pollution, resulting in a multitude of problems. Communication should take this into account and avoid possible confusion.

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Communication on extreme weather events and especially the impacts of those are important to show impacts of climate change today and to illustrate interregional (in)equity. Communication on past climate change is important for discussion of humans as cause of climate change and possible impacts of climate change.

The main conclusions with respect to communication related barriers to take action were: • Communication should focus more on available options, instead of on the problem alone. Citizens often simply don’t know what they can do. Both costs and benefits should be communicated, including the financial side. Important barriers such as the need for comfort and preference for lifestyles can be lowered or overcome by clearly showing costs and benefits. • Climate change should specifically be connected to energy use and especially energy efficiency. People consider their energy use to be inelastic and usually overlook energy efficiency options. • Personal greenhouse gas calculators are useful to show relative effects, costs, and benefits of personal measures. • Communication efforts should also take the efforts taken by other households and sectors into account. People realize that it doesn’t make sense to act if no one else will (Prisoner’s Dilemma). Currently, people are very uncertain about contributions of others.

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Samenvatting (Nederlands) Een onderzoek werd gedaan naar Risicocommunicatie over Klimaatverandering. Het onderzoek richtte zich op de bestaande wetenschappelijke literatuur over dit onderwerp en hield ook nieuwe enquêtes en interviews in. Het eerste gedeelte van het onderzoek keek naar uitwisseling van informatie tussen bij klimaatverandering betrokken partijen en verschillen tussen de vraag en het aanbod van informatie. Het tweede gedeelte van het onderzoek keek naar mensen hoe mensen klimaatrisico’s zien, welke problemen er zijn in de communicatie over klimaatverandering, en wat voor gevolgen en mogelijkheden dit biedt voor communicatie. Dit tweede gedeelte keek ook naar welke barrières, die iets met communicatie te maken hebben, actie op het moment in de weg staan. De belangrijkste conclusies over vraag en aanbod van informatie waren: • Er moet meer gekeken worden naar de extremere scenario’s van klimaatverandering. Wanneer eventuele technische problemen overkomen kunnen worden, moet ook meer gekeken worden naar diepere oorzaken (bijv. cultuur, waarden, standpunten/kijk/behoeften van betrokkenen), blootstelling (bijv. risico, schade, voordelen van maatregelen), en opties. • Er is teveel informatie, teveel bronnen, en de informatie die er is, is vaak te ingewikkeld. Een centraal informatiesysteem die verwijst/linkt en samenvattingen levert zou handig kunnen zijn. Hulp om samenvattingen begrijpelijker te maken zou ook handig kunnen zijn (ook om verkeerde interpretatie door media te vermijden). • Modelleren is nuttig om veranderingen in het milieu te koppelen aan wat dit betekent wat betreft schade en mogelijkheden om klimaatverandering te voorkomen of er aan aan te passen. • Er zijn een aantal, vaak grafische, manieren om de natuur van klimaatverandering als kansprobleem, onzekerheden, en risico’s te laten zien. • Medewerking van betrokken partijen in onderzoek en communicatie is nuttig om relevantie en vertrouwen te creëren en aandachtspunten te vinden. • Communicatie door een bron die vertrouwd wordt is erg belangrijk. Burgers lijken wetenschappers te vertrouwen. Organisaties vertrouwen bestaande netwerken waarschijnlijk. • Internet en bestaande netwerken lijken belangrijk voor communicatie met en tussen betrokken organisaties. Televisie en kranten lijken het belangrijkst voor communicatie met burgers. De belangrijkste conclusies over de kijk van mensen op klimaatverandering en communicatieproblemen waren: • De morele kant van klimaatverandering, met name effecten op toekomstige generaties, maar ook op natuur en andere gebieden in de wereld, zou veel meer aandacht moeten krijgen.

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Er is meer communicatie door de massamedia nodig. Extreme gebeurtenissen in het weer, en momenten waarop beleid wordt geïmplementeerd, conferenties, en het verschijnen van belangrijke onderzoeksrapporten, zijn goede momenten voor communicatie. Communicatie door een bron die vertrouwd wordt is ook voor de kijk van mensen op een risico cruciaal. Gezamenlijke initiatieven van wetenschappers en instituten (consensus benadering) zijn nuttig. Klimaatverandering wordt vaak in termen van andere (milieu)problemen, zoals problemen met de ozonlaag of normale luchtvervuiling, geïnterpreteerd. Dit zorgt voor allerlei problemen. Communicatie zou hier rekening mee moeten houden en mogelijke verwarring moeten voorkomen. Communicatie over extreme gebeurtenissen in het weer en met name de effecten daarvan zijn belangrijk om de effecten van klimaatverandering vandaag de dag te laten zien en om (on)gelijkheid tussen verschillende wereldregio’s te laten zien. Communicatie over klimaatverandering in het verleden is belangrijk voor de discussie over mensen als oorzaak van klimaatverandering en de mogelijke effecten van klimaatverandering.

De belangrijkste conclusies over barrières, die met communicatie te maken hebben, die actie in de weg staan, waren: • Communicatie zou meer aandacht moeten besteden aan beschikbare opties, in plaats van aan het probleem alleen. Mensen weten vaak simpelweg niet wat ze kunnen doen. Zowel kosten als baten moeten gecommuniceerd worden, inclusief de financiële kant. Belangrijke barrières als comfort en de voorkeur voor bepaalde levensstijlen kunnen verlaagd of overkomen worden door kosten en baten duidelijk te laten zien. • Klimaatverandering moet specifiek gekoppeld worden aan energieverbruik en met name energie-efficiëntie. Mensen zien hun energieverbruik als niet elastisch en zien opties om efficiënter met energie om te gaan meestal over het hoofd. • Persoonlijke broeikasgas berekenaars zijn nuttig om de relatieve effecten, kosten en baten van maatregelen, die mensen zelf kunnen nemen, te laten zien. • Communicatie zou de moeite die andere huishoudens en sectoren nemen ook moeten laten zien. Mensen realiseren zich dat het weinig zin heeft iets te doen als anderen dit niet doen (Prisoner’s Dilemma). Op het moment zijn mensen erg onzeker over wat andere partijen doen.

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Preface Utrecht, July 2004 The recent movie “The Day After Tomorrow” seems to have refuelled the discussion on climate change. Some organizations seem to be glad with the movie’s appearance, while others express serious doubt on whether this is a good thing. While increased attention and discussion are no doubt very useful, the question remains if we should leave the communication on climate change in the hands of the filmmakers in Hollywood. It is questionable what the image of climate change, as communicated by the filmmakers, will do for the public’s understanding and view on the issue. It also raises the question of why risk communication on climate change as it is now isn’t living up to the job itself. Several studies have shown many problems in current communication. The present study looked at what people’s current views are, what is important to them concerning climate risks, what problems seem to hinder current communication, and of course how risk communication on climate change can be improved. Besides risk communication to the public, this study also looks at communication between organized stakeholders, such as companies, governments, non-governmental organizations, and scientists. Past studies have shown problems on interaction among those groups as well. The present document is the final report of this study. It is written as my MSc. Thesis and the final product of my final research period (“afstudeeronderzoek”). This study was done in the context of my study of Chemistry and the master programme Natural Resources Management, at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. Research was done at the Department of Science, Society and Technology, part of the Faculty of Chemistry and Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development, at Utrecht University. The research was supervised by Dr. Jeroen van der Sluijs. The study was done in the light of past and future research in the department and hopes to make a useful contribution to future research and research proposals. Arjan Wardekker

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Table of Contents Chapters SUMMARY (ENGLISH) ................................................................................................. 2 SAMENVATTING (NEDERLANDS) ............................................................................ 4 PREFACE.......................................................................................................................... 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. 7 CHAPTERS ........................................................................................................................ 7 TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 10 FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 11 1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION .............................................................................................. 11 1.2 THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS ............................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Communication theory..................................................................................... 13 1.2.2 Information characteristics.............................................................................. 14 1.2.3 Communication problems ................................................................................ 14 1.2.4 Communication chain ...................................................................................... 17 1.3 GOAL ....................................................................................................................... 20 1.4 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION .................................................................................... 21 1.5 SUB QUESTIONS ....................................................................................................... 21 1.6 DEMARCATIONS ....................................................................................................... 22 1.7 CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT ...................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER 2: METHODS ............................................................................................. 23 2.1 LITERATURE ............................................................................................................ 23 2.1.1 Types of literature used.................................................................................... 23 2.1.2 Choice of literature .......................................................................................... 23 2.2 QUESTIONNAIRES ..................................................................................................... 25 2.2.1 Benefits and drawbacks of method .................................................................. 25 2.2.2 Stakeholder Questionnaire............................................................................... 26 2.2.3 Citizen Questionnaire ...................................................................................... 28 2.3 STAKEHOLDER REVIEW ............................................................................................ 30 CHAPTER 3: STAKEHOLDERS: INFORMATION SUPPLY & DEMAND......... 31 3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 31 3.1.1 Definition of stakeholders ................................................................................ 31 3.1.2 Roles of stakeholders ....................................................................................... 31 3.1.3 Contents of this chapter ................................................................................... 32 3.1.4 Choice of literature .......................................................................................... 33 3.2 STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED ...................................................................................... 34 3.2.1 Different ways of grouping stakeholders ......................................................... 34 3.2.2 Information systems and grouping approaches............................................... 35

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3.2.3 Geographical regions ...................................................................................... 35 3.2.4 Sectors.............................................................................................................. 35 3.2.5 Organization types ........................................................................................... 36 3.2.6 Examples of stakeholder groups ...................................................................... 36 3.2.7 Research focus ................................................................................................. 37 3.3 SUPPLY OF INFORMATION ........................................................................................ 39 3.3.1 Supply: Content................................................................................................ 39 3.3.2 Supply: Form ................................................................................................... 43 3.3.3 Supply: Medium ............................................................................................... 44 3.4 DEMAND OF INFORMATION ...................................................................................... 48 3.4.1 Demand: Content ............................................................................................. 48 3.4.2 Demand: Form................................................................................................. 52 3.4.3 Demand: Medium............................................................................................. 53 3.5 STAKEHOLDERS: EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ..................................................... 57 3.5.1 Stakeholders: observed effects......................................................................... 57 3.5.2 Stakeholders: possible effects .......................................................................... 58 3.6 COMPARISON AND OVERCOMING THE DIFFERENCES ................................................. 59 3.6.1 Matching: Content ........................................................................................... 59 3.6.2 Matching: Form ............................................................................................... 63 3.6.3 Matching: Medium........................................................................................... 69 3.7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 74 3.7.1 Content............................................................................................................. 74 3.7.2 Form................................................................................................................. 75 3.7.3 Medium ............................................................................................................ 77 CHAPTER 4: RISK PERCEPTION, BARRIERS & COMMUNICATION............ 79 4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 79 4.1.1 Influences on problem view and intentions...................................................... 79 4.1.2 Influential factors and communication ............................................................ 80 4.1.3 Contents of this chapter ................................................................................... 81 4.1.4 Choice of literature .......................................................................................... 82 4.2 CLASSIC RISK PERCEPTION ....................................................................................... 83 4.2.1 History.............................................................................................................. 83 4.2.2 Risk perception factors .................................................................................... 84 4.2.3 Framing effects ................................................................................................ 86 4.2.4 Media coverage................................................................................................ 86 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases................................................................... 87 4.2.6 Trust ................................................................................................................. 89 4.3 CLIMATE CHANGE RISK PERCEPTION ........................................................................ 90 4.3.1 Risk perception factors and climate change .................................................... 90 4.3.2 Framing effects and climate change ................................................................ 92 4.3.3 Media coverage and climate change ............................................................... 92 4.3.4 Probability, heuristics, and biases and climate change .................................. 97 4.3.5 Trust and climate change................................................................................. 98 4.3.6 Perceived impacts .......................................................................................... 100 4.3.7 Perceived causes............................................................................................ 103 4.3.8 Perceived options........................................................................................... 106 8

4.4 BARRIERS & INHIBITORS ........................................................................................ 112 4.4.1 Cultural models.............................................................................................. 112 4.4.2 Dissonance and denial................................................................................... 116 4.4.3 Social dilemmas ............................................................................................. 120 4.5 IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR COMMUNICATION ............................................... 124 4.5.1 Risk perception............................................................................................... 124 4.5.2 Perceived causes and options ........................................................................ 127 4.5.3 Cultural models.............................................................................................. 131 4.5.4 Dissonance and denial................................................................................... 133 4.5.5 Social dilemmas ............................................................................................. 136 4.6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 138 4.6.1 Risk perception............................................................................................... 138 4.6.2 Barriers & inhibitors ..................................................................................... 141 CHAPTER 5: FINAL CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 143 5.1 COMMUNICATION: DIFFERENCE INFORMATION SUPPLY & DEMAND ....................... 143 5.2 COMMUNICATION: BARRIERS ................................................................................. 145 5.3 IMPLEMENTATION: BARRIERS ................................................................................ 147 CHAPTER 6: IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .............................................. 149 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... 151 LITERATURE .............................................................................................................. 152 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 163 APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS ............................................................................. 163 APPENDIX B: STAKEHOLDER GROUPS PER STAKEHOLDER SECTOR ............................. 164 APPENDIX C: DISCUSSION RISK DIAGRAM ................................................................... 169 APPENDIX D: CITIZEN QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS ........................................................ 170 D.1 Problem............................................................................................................ 170 D.2 Options ............................................................................................................. 176 D.3 Climate change information............................................................................. 179 D.4 Climate change and governments/organizations............................................. 186 D.5 Other ................................................................................................................ 193 APPENDIX E: COMMUNICATION EXAMPLES ................................................................. 194 E.1 GAS................................................................................................................... 194 E.2 CLEAR.............................................................................................................. 196

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Tables Table 1: Items in the Communication Process ................................................................. 13 Table 2: Information Characteristics ................................................................................ 14 Table 3: Questions to Stakeholders................................................................................... 26 Table 4: Questions to Citizens .......................................................................................... 28 Table 5: Stakeholder Sectors ............................................................................................ 36 Table 6: Organization Types............................................................................................. 36 Table 7: Stakeholder groups and their Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types ...... 38 Table 8: Classic risk perception factors ............................................................................ 85 Table 9: Media triggers..................................................................................................... 87 Table 10: Perceived effects of climate change ............................................................... 100 Table 11: Perceived causes of climate change................................................................ 104 Table 12: Perceived general options for climate change ................................................ 106 Table 13: Perceived personal options for climate change .............................................. 109 Table 14: Mediation factors between self and social context ......................................... 117 Table 15: Dimensions of attitude.................................................................................... 117 Table 16: Barriers of denial ............................................................................................ 118 Table 17: Interpretations reinforcing denial ................................................................... 118

Figures Figure 1: Successful Communication ............................................................................... 15 Figure 2: Difference supply - demand of information ...................................................... 16 Figure 3: Communication Barrier..................................................................................... 17 Figure 4: Communication Chain....................................................................................... 18 Figure 5: Citizens and media: used and useful ................................................................. 55 Figure 6: Citizens' information sources ............................................................................ 56 Figure 7: Number of reported disasters (IFRC, 2001)...................................................... 57 Figure 8: Box Plot (modified from Hammer et al., 2001) ................................................ 65 Figure 9: Radar Plot (Moss and Schneider, 2000)............................................................ 65 Figure 10: Time series of yields (Hammer et al., 2001) ................................................... 66 Figure 11: Time series of difference in yields, tactical and fixed (Hammer et al., 2001) 66 Figure 12: Time series of temperature in De Bilt and the world (KNMI, 2003).............. 67 Figure 13: Risk map of odds of freeze events with minimum -7 oC (Jagtap et al., 2002) 67 Figure 14: Risk diagram: risks associated with various temperatures (IPCC, 2001b) ..... 68 Figure 15: Example website structure (modified from Voinov and Costanza, 1999) ...... 72 Figure 16: Perceived effects of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire) ....................... 102 Figure 17: Perceived causes of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire)........................ 104 Figure 18: Perceived general options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire) ........ 107 Figure 19: Perceived personal options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire) ...... 110 Figure 20: Citizens' view on government action ............................................................ 123

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Chapter 1: Introduction Risk communication is considered to be an essential tool in climate change policy and research. In the past however, it has not been very effective in reaching its goals (e.g. creating a better and widely shared understanding among public and stakeholders, creating public participation and action, a sense of urgency, and sense of problem ownership). Research on this subject will therefore be necessary. This chapter will introduce the subject of Risk Communication on Climate Change and the research that has been done on this matter, during this project. The introduction will start with a problem definition (Paragraph 1.1 Problem definition), followed by a short discussion on information, communication and various problems associated with this (Paragraph 1.2 The communication process). This general discussion is followed by the goal of this research project (Paragraph 1.3 Goal), the main research question (Paragraph 1.4 Main Research Question), and the sub-questions that will need to be answered in order to come to a conclusion regarding the main research question (Paragraph 1.5 Sub Questions). Following these paragraphs, the demarcations of this research project will be listed (Paragraph 1.6 Demarcations) and the contents of this report will be briefly discussed (Paragraph 1.7 Contents of this report).

1.1 Problem definition Various studies have shown large problems in risk communication on climate change. One of these problems is that there are large differences in the information that various parties need and what they actually receive. There is a large difference in the supply and demand of climate change information. Furthermore, there seem to be large differences in risk perceptions among scientists, organized stakeholders, and the general public. There seem to be several misconceptions concerning climate change among the general public and several barriers inhibit climate change communication. Furthermore, many barriers to take action exist. Some of these are related to communication. These differences in risk perceptions, misconceptions, and barriers inhibit effective interaction among the various stakeholders. Many scientists consider climate change to be an important and urgent problem (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The problem however is complicated and, scientifically speaking, many uncertainties and controversies surround it (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Jaeger, 2000; Staats et al., 1996). In order to develop a better and widely shared understanding of the problem, citizen participation and the co-production of operational knowledge will be required (Van der Sluijs, 2003; Schlumpf et al., 1999). Besides science’s need for information, both science and policy will need an active view and involvement of citizens and stakeholders to justify and create public support for the research and policy concerning the climate change problem (Joyce, 2003; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Jaeger, 2000). Current citizen and stakeholder participation is low, due to a large number of reasons. There is a lack of a sense of urgency (Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Tickell, 2002; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001) and sense of problem ownership (Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Schlumpf 11

et al., 1999; Staats et al., 1996) among stakeholders and citizens. Diverging scientific assessments of climate change and the even more confusing discussions and articles in the mass media have confused the public understanding of climate change (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Furthermore, the effects of climate change are psychological remote, often seen as distant in both time and space (Klinke and Renn, 2002; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Schlumpf et al., 1999; Löfstedt, 1991) and there is a large distance between knowledge production and the public as well (Van der Sluijs, 2003). There is a lack of communication and exchange and integration of knowledge between the many stakeholder groups involved, such as scientists, policy makers, companies, NGOs, media, and the public (Van der Sluijs, 2003). Besides involvement of the public in research, their actions will also be important in mitigation of and adaptation to climate change through personal lifestyle choices and energy saving measures in the public sector (Kasemir, 2000; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Staats et al., 1996). Their involvement and interaction in this area will need to be improved as well (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Kempton, 1997; Staats et al., 1996). Risk communication is an essential tool for improving citizen and stakeholder involvement and information exchange and integration between various stakeholders, but it is currently hindered, not only by current differences in demand and supply of information, but by various communication barriers as well (Van der Sluijs, 2003; StollKleemann et al., 2001; Kempton, 1997; Staats et al., 1996).

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1.2 The communication process This paragraph contains a short introduction to the process of communication. Communication was seen in a very broad sense; as “information exchange”. The information can be between individuals and/or organizations. One could also see information exchange between stakeholders and environment or a model as communication. 1.2.1 Communication theory Literature on communication theory and communication process models shows a number of items in which communication can be divided. The first item is the nature of the external world; reality (Hackett et al., 1956). Someone perceives reality and wants to communicate this. This results in two items: the communication source, the sender of the information (Stead, 1972) and his perception of reality (Hackett et al., 1956). This information is encoded (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956), involving motor and verbal skills (Stead, 1972), abstraction and classification (Hackett et al., 1956). The resulting situation is a communication product, involving a message (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956), a medium and the process of transmission (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956), and the code of the message, e.g. linguistic aspects, how things are said (Hackett et al., 1956). This communication product is received (Hackett et al., 1956) and decoded (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) by the communication receiver (Stead, 1972). The receiver may respond to the message (Hackett et al., 1956), e.g. by giving feedback (Hackett et al., 1956) or by taking other actions. Summarizing, we find the following items in a communication process, as listed in Table 1: Items in the Communication Process: Table 1: Items in the Communication Process

Communication item 1. Nature of external world 2. Communication source 3. Perception of external world 4. Encoding 5. Message 6. Code 7. Channel / transmission 8. Communication receiver / receiving 9. Decoding 10. Response

Literature source (Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972) (Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) (Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) (Hackett et al., 1956)

Originally the idea of communication was seen through a “sender” perspective, with a strong focus on a sender wanting to convey a certain message and the receiver receiving and responding to it. However, communication is not exclusively sender (or supply)

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driven, but might also arise from a “receiver” (or demand) point of view. People might want certain information and possibly actively search for it, e.g. on the Internet (see e.g. Van Woerkum, 2001a; Van Woerkum, 2001b), 1.2.2 Information characteristics The information that is supplied to or received from a stakeholder can vary along several characteristics of the information. Three such characteristics will be used to describe “information” in this research project, as listed in Table 2: Information Characteristics. These characteristics correspond with items 5, 6 and 7 from Table 1: Items in the Communication Process as derived from communication theory. Table 2: Information Characteristics

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Content Form of content Medium

The Content (see e.g. Van der Sluijs, 2001; Cohen, 1997; Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956; De Boer, 1999) is an obvious characteristic, the most basic one. It deals with the subject of the information and what information is supplied. The Form (Hackett et al., 1956; Slovic, 1997; Slovic et al., 1984; Slovic et al., 1981) of content is much less obvious. It deals with in what manner or way the information is supplied (see e.g. Moss and Schneider, 2002; Hammer, 2001; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; De Boer, 1999). Form deals with different ways of showing information within a package of information. This includes the form of language (e.g. scientific jargon or common speech), communication strategies, communication techniques (e.g. the use of models in communication, use of text or graphics), and different approaches to techniques (e.g. different ways of saying the same (textual) thing, choice of words, different ways of graphical presentation). The Medium (see e.g. Jagtap et al., 2002; Voinov and Costanza, 1999; Cohen, 1997; Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956) is a less complicated characteristic. It deals with through what channels or media information is supplied. It deals with in what way information is supplied. Although this is similar to the Form characteristic, Medium deals with different ways of displaying or communicating a fixed package of information. This includes the initial source of the information (e.g. scientists, stakeholders, public, participation of those parties in another’s research), the source of communication (e.g. media, universities, governmental organizations), and the information carrier (e.g. internet, radio, television). 1.2.3 Communication problems The characteristics mentioned above can cause communication problems if the way they are used by the sender of the information has not attuned them to what the receiver would

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like, is used to, expects, or is able to cope with, etcetera. In most communication problems more than one characteristic is involved. This research project will discuss two major classes of communication problems: difference in supply and demand, and communication barriers. These problems are derived mainly from the available literature on communication and communication problems associated with of climate change. To illustrate these barriers, they will be briefly discussed as one-way information transfers between two parties, or actors. In an actual situation, communication is usually two-way, through feedback and the communication or action of the other actor, due to the first one’s communication attempts (see subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain). Note that the communicator in this case doesn’t need to be the one trying to communicate information on a certain subject (supply); it might also be that e.g. Actor 1 is communicating his need (demand) for information from Actor 2. In an effective transfer of information, one party sends a message, which is received by the other party. The other party understands the message and can use it effectively for decisions or actions. If the other party indeed acts based on that information and the information is used in a way consistent with Actor 1’s original intent, communication has been successful. The intent of Actor 1 will vary per actor. E.g. it might be that the intent is that the information is used to make a more informed decision (scientist intent), it might be that the information is translated into specific actions (possible government or NGO intent), or it might be that Actor 2 communicates information in responds to Actor 1’s message to Actor two that he needs that information (possible intent of any demander of information). This is illustrated in Figure 1: Successful Communication.

Figure 1: Successful Communication

A problem will arise if there is a difference in supply and demand of information (see e.g. Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001; Schlumpf et al., 2001; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The receiver of an information product might not be interested in what the supplier has to tell. This does not mean that the receiver is not interested in the subject at all, however. The receiver demands something different than what the supplier supplies, whether this is in subject or in the information supplied on that subject. Actor 2 might not be aware of its information demand. In such a case, the information may be ignored or may serve to raise awareness or enlightenment on an issue and therefore surprise (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). In any case, the information that is sent will be influenced by Actor 1’s perceptions of Actor 2’s information needs. Feedback on communication

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(Hackett et al., 1956) can change Actor 1’s perceptions to create a better match between supply and demand. In a situation of difference between supply and demand, one party sends a message, which is received by the other party. The other party may understand the message, but either can’t do anything with it or does the “wrong” thing with it, according to Actor 1’s original intent. This is illustrated in Figure 2: Difference supply - demand of information.

Figure 2: Difference supply - demand of information

The second major class that will be discussed is a communication barrier (see e.g. Van der Sluijs, 2003; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Kempton, 1991; Staats et al., 1993; Kempton, 1997). While the receiver of a communication product may be interested in both subject and the information on that subject, contained in the information product, the message as originally intended by the supplier is not understood by the receiver. Feedback or communication or actions in response to Actor 1’s communication (Hackett et al., 1956) by Actor 2 may lead to Actor 1 realizing that there is something wrong with the communication. Whether or not Actor 1’s attempts to improve the situation will be successful, will depend on if Actor 1 is aware of and understands the barrier involved. In a situation of a communication barrier, one party sends a message, which is physically received by the other party. The message that is received, however, is different from the message as originally intended by the first party. It is “transformed”, or rather misperceived, along the way. Similar to a situation of supply-demand mismatch, Actor 2 either can’t do anything with it or does the “wrong” thing with it, according to Actor 1’s original intent. This is illustrated in Figure 3: Communication Barrier. In communication literature, some examples can be found that show that the information that is supplied can be modified or communication prevented in the first place because of a communication barrier as well (Tran et al., 2004; Passik, 2002; Golen and O’Dell, 1996; Felson, 1980). Communication barriers in these studies include shame (Tran et al., 2004), fear of insulting (Felson, 1980), or not knowing of anything that can be done about a certain problem (Passik, 2002). In other studies, lack of trust, perceptual differences, information overload, technical jargon (Golen and O’Dell, 1996), cultural stereotypes and differences (Spencer-Rodgers and McGovern, 2002), and having a different meaning for key terms such as model, theory, authority, true, hard, etc. (Back et al., 1972) serve as communication barriers. Although these studies do not focus on climate change, many of these barriers may be applicable to climate change communication as well.

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Figure 3: Communication Barrier

These problems are certainly not the only problems that can arise in communication, but they are the most relevant to risk communication. One example might be a problem of physically getting the message to the receiver. A study on a Dutch mass media campaign on climate change for example, mentions that 25% of the people had not noticed any of the campaign elements, not even the ones intended only to draw attention (billboards, posters, and television commercials), 30% had read the informative advertisements and only 5% had actually fetched the information brochure (Staats et al., 1996). Various combinations of information characteristics may play a role in these other problems, but also other issues, such as the available time people have or are willing to spend on a subject. 1.2.4 Communication chain Rarely is an information transfer an isolated incident. More often, it is part of a chain of information transfer and communication. The full communication chain contains many actors, many lines and directions of communications and many barriers between them. To illustrate this, a simplified version, using only two actors. The resulting chain is shown in Figure 4: Communication Chain.

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Figure 4: Communication Chain

The process could start with a source of information or a process in that source (or general curiosity of an actor). For example, the process could start with “the environment”, or a change in atmospheric CO2 concentration. The source can be, and initially would be nature, or it could environment in general, also including things like working environment. For example, one might look at possible mitigation measures and their costs, deducted from one’s working environment. A model could also be constructed and used as information source. Within the communication chain, one might try to learn from either the source or another actor (Deduction) (Hackett et al., 1956). An example of deducting information from another actor could be to develop a perception of the knowledge needs of another actor (De Boer, 1999), or to see and try to explain whether or not communication to that actor was effective. This is related to items 1, 2, 3, and 10 from Table 1: Items in the Communication Process. One could also try to communicate to another actor and/or try to receive information from this actor as well (Communication) (Stead, 1972; Hackett et al., 1956). This is related to item 4 to 10 from Table 1: Items in the Communication Process. Furthermore, one might respond or act due to the information (Hackett et al., 1956) and change the source or the process due to one’s actions (Implementation). This is related to item 10 from Table 1: Items in the Communication Process. Whether or not there will be a communication chain resulting from a situation or a process in that source, depends on whether or not one or more actors become interested in it. This could be as basic a motivation as a question or curiosity, something often seen in science (Van der Sluijs, 1998). In this case, the communication process might start with one of the actors, instead of something happening in the source/environment. Often, interest is the result of an actor noticing a situation or process and considering it to be a problem (Van der Sluijs, 1998). This problem could then result in a need to learn more, change, or communicate on this issue.

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Three types of barriers can be distinguished in the communication chain: deduction barriers, communication barriers, and implementation barriers. Deduction barriers cause problems in deducting information from the source. Examples of this include inherit chaos or uncertainty and a lack of understanding (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Van der Sluijs, 1998), values and beliefs, risk perceptions. It influences the information that an actor extracts from the source or from another actor. Considering a definition of communication as information exchange, deduction can be seen as communication. It is passive however and the source (environment) has no choice in this matter (as is the case in the normal definition of communication as information exchange between parties or individuals). Communication barriers cause problems in how e.g. Actor 2 receives a message from Actor 1 and what actions Actor 2 considers to be required based on that information, compared to what Actor 1 actually meant to say and suggest (see e.g. Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). It has been discussed more extensively in the previous subparagraph (subparagraph 1.2.3 Communication problems). Examples of this include different (risk) perceptions, ways of thinking and of conceptualizing things, and values and beliefs. Implementation barriers are barriers to or in action (see e.g. Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Staats et al., 1996). They prevent Actor 2 from taking (effective) action or measures as should have been done considering the information they received and that was perceived. Basically, it is a reason for a difference in attitudes and intentions on the one hand and actions on the other hand. Examples include lack of funding or resources in general, failing policy, mismanagement, distrust, perceived cost and benefit, and to some extent risk perceptions as well. Some implementation barriers are related to communication. In the case of risk communication on climate change, the communication barriers will be relevant, in order to convey information to citizens. The implementation barrier will also be relevant, because it determines whether or not citizens will act. This barrier will be discussed for as far as it is caused by communication problems or can be solved through communication. The deduction barrier is not relevant with respect to trying to overcome it. However, it is relevant with respect to communication on this barrier, e.g. communication of climate change uncertainties.

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1.3 Goal The goal of the research project will be to give an overview of the stakeholders that participate in the societal process of coping with climate change and the information they demand and supply. Furthermore, the process of information transfer (communication) and specifically the factors that inhibit this process will be researched. These factors can be a difference between the information demand of the receiver and the information that is offered by the supplier or a communication inhibiter or barrier. Several strategies and considerations to overcome these barriers and facilitate better communication will be proposed. A communication example will be discussed to illustrate the results of the project. The major part of this research project consists of two main subjects, focussing on the two communication problems listed in 1.2.3 Communication problems: information supply and demand, and communication barriers. The Summary and Final Conclusion of the report will be accompanied by a Dutch version, to improve usability by Dutch stakeholders. Furthermore, the report will undergo an extended peer review by stakeholders willing to take part in this. More on the review can be found in Paragraph 2.3 Stakeholder review, of Chapter 2: Methods.

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1.4 Main Research Question To reach the goal mentioned in Paragraph 1.3 Goal, the following question will need to be answered: How can risk communication be improved, so that it will facilitate a better interaction between various stakeholders, including the general public, concerning the Climate Change problem?

1.5 Sub Questions The Main Research Question, as stated in Paragraph 1.4 Main Research Question, can be subdivided into the following list of questions, on which the report will give an answer in the main chapters: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand: 1. 2. 3. 4.

What are the various stakeholders involved in the Climate Change problem? What information do these stakeholders supply? What information do these stakeholders demand? What are the differences between supply and demand of information, in the communication processes between different stakeholders? 5. How can these differences be overcome? Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication: 6. What are the risk perceptions of the public? 7. What are the barriers or inhibitors of risk communication on the Climate Change problem? 8. What strategies and considerations can be taken, concerning risk communication on Climate Change, to deal with risk perceptions and to overcome barriers and inhibitors?

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1.6 Demarcations This study will be limited in several ways, due to a restricted amount of time. The project includes two surveys, one on stakeholders and the other on the general public. These two surveys will focus on stakeholders and citizens in The Netherlands. The Stakeholder Questionnaire will also be limited to two sectors. Subparagraph 3.2.7 Research focus will elaborate which two sectors haven been chosen and why. The Stakeholder Review will be limited to stakeholders participating in the survey and will therefore have the same limitations. The literature used in this report will go beyond The Netherlands and will include research anywhere in the world. This is due to the limited amount of literature available on these subjects. Literature on stakeholders will also go beyond the two sectors mentioned above, because research in literature usually deals with stakeholders in general and does not divide these into sectors. More information on used literature and the surveys will be listed in Chapter 2: Methods.

1.7 Contents of this report Chapter 2: Methods, the next chapter of this report, will discuss the research methodology. Following the Methods is the core part of the report, divided into two chapters. Chapter 3: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand deals with communication and information exchange between various stakeholders, differences in the demand and supply of information, and ways to overcome these differences. Chapter 4: Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication deals with communication towards the general public and the involvement and influence of risk perceptions, communication and implementation barriers and inhibitors, resulting consequences for communication, and the implications of classic risk perception studies for the risk of climate change in particular. Each of the two core chapters has its own introduction, intermediate paragraphs and conclusion. The concluding chapters will follow these chapters. Chapter 5: Final Conclusion will summarize the conclusions drawn in the core chapters. Chapter 6: Ideas For Further Research will list some additional thoughts and ideas for further research in the area of risk communication on climate change. Acknowledgements will list the stakeholders and citizens who participated in this project’s surveys and the stakeholder review and other people who deserve a word of thanks. Literature will list the various literature sources that have been used in this study and have been referred to in the report. Appendices will include a glossary of often-used terms in this report, a list of stakeholder groups in Stakeholder Sectors, the results of an online discussion, and the results of the Citizen Questionnaire. Furthermore, in Appendix E: Communication Examples two existing climate change communication products will be discussed according to the research presented in this report. 22

Chapter 2: Methods This chapter will describe the research methodology of this report: the types of information sources that have been used, the way they have been selected, and various other criteria concerning these sources. Three main methods have been used to obtain information. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs: various literature sources (Paragraph 2.1 Literature), questionnaires (Paragraph 2.2 Questionnaires), and an extended peer review (Paragraph 2.3 Stakeholder review). One of the stakeholders for the Stakeholder Questionnaire was interviewed instead of doing the questionnaire itself.

2.1 Literature 2.1.1 Types of literature used The main part of this project consisted of literature research. While the types of literature that were most often used are scientific articles and reports on conducted research, various other sources were used as well. The types of literature that were used include the following: 1. Articles 2. Reports 3. Readers 4. Editorials 5. Websites 6. Manuals 7. Guidelines and guidance papers 8. Project proposals 9. Presentations and speeches 10. Computer programs 11. A CD 2.1.2 Choice of literature To sufficiently answer the research questions on the matter of communication between stakeholders, literature needed to be found on the supply of information, the demand of information and on differences and barriers and ways to overcome these. However, the available literature on this matter is very limited. A handful of studies focus on stakeholders in climate change and information exchange between them. Therefore, these few studies were supplemented by studies that focus on specific topics in climate change and on more or less related matter that may hold some implications for the climate change field. These include studies on topics such as coastal adaptation to climate

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change, seasonal climate information and forecasts for application in agriculture, and watershed management on the web. The amount of available information remains very limited and the choice of literature may seem random due to the use of specific and related topics instead of actual research on this topic. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to draw conclusions from what is available. It is clear that there still is a lot of work to be done in research on this topic. To sufficiently answer the research questions on the matter of communication in a more general way and towards the general public, information needed to be found on risk perceptions in general and on climate change, public perceptions of causes and options for climate change, deduction barriers, communication barriers, implementation barriers, and risk communication in general and on external safety risks. A large amount of research has been done from the early 80 on, on risk perception and risk communication in general and on external safety risks. During the same period, a lot of research has been done as well on energy conservation and ways to communicate this, to get the public to participate, and on various problems arising with public energy conservation. More recently, global change risks have come to the attention of risk perception researchers, including prominent figures from the classic risk perception sciences such as Paul Slovic (see McDaniels et al., 1996). There is a lot of information available on public perceptions of climate change risk, impacts, causes, and options. A lot of research has been done on deduction barriers, especially on uncertainties. Although relevant, this research project will not aim to overcome these barriers (see Paragraph 1.2.4 Communication chain). An amount of literature is also available on communication and implementation barriers, although it is significantly less than the amount of literature on risk perceptions. The available information is more than enough to give a detailed picture of climate change risk perception and the most important barriers and inhibitors. Although there is more than enough information on risk communication on external safety risks, this will receive less attention, due to the limited time available.

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2.2 Questionnaires Besides the literature research, two questionnaires were conducted. One questionnaire was conducted among stakeholders and the other among the general public. The results were used both as new information and as illustration and confirmation for various topics that have been raised in literature. Both questionnaires contained a list of open essay-type questions. This approach has several benefits and drawbacks. These will be discussed first, after which the characteristics of each questionnaire will be discussed. 2.2.1 Benefits and drawbacks of method With respect to multiple-choice surveys: Open questions can uncover much more information than a normal multiple-choice questionnaire (for examples of multiple-choice surveys, see e.g. Van der Laan, 2003; Staats et al., 1996). It allows the respondent to further clarify his or her answers and can possibly show the reasons behind them. Furthermore, answers to open questions show the knowledge and views that the public has operational. In multiple-choice situations, the available answers might influence the respondent’s choice. The answers themselves might bring new ideas to the citizen, because they might seem likely to him, when pointed at them. The information provided to them, in the possible answers, is probably not available when making actual decisions. Most people have not thought about the issue of climate change at any length and cannot give meaningful responses (Kempton, 1997). Results of multiple-choice surveys are therefore often highly ambiguous (Kempton, 1997). On the other hand, people with little knowledge do have a view on climate change and options concerning climate change, although they may not have much knowledge. The way they think is still relevant, due to the need for their involvement in mitigation measures and support for policy. A large list of open-end questions may seem to be a challenge that is too large for them. Several respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire have confirmed this, saying they thought it to be very difficult. The questions are not difficult however and “don’t know” is a valid answer as well, but they seemed difficult. This may have resulted in a bias of the Citizen Questionnaire to the more informed or well-educated citizens or the citizens who are used to working with open questions, such as students and teachers. With respect to other types of gathering opinions: Surveys have the great benefit of taking far less time for both the researcher and the respondent than other techniques, such as interviews (for examples of interviews, see e.g. Kempton, 1991) or focus groups (for examples of focus groups, see e.g. Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Although an open question survey, such as was used in this research project, takes much more time to answer than a multiple-choice survey, it is usually still far less than the other techniques.

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Interviews and focus groups however allow the researcher to collect even more information and go even deeper into the reasons of the answers. A great benefit of those techniques is that they allow for follow-up questions and discussion. If a respondent doesn’t answer a question thoroughly enough, this might be corrected. 2.2.2 Stakeholder Questionnaire A list was drafted of specific stakeholders in the issue of climate change. For this purpose the Internet, general knowledge, scientific reports (Hisschemöller and Van de Kerkhof, 2001; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001), and project proposals (National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003; Van der Sluijs, 2003) were used. The listed stakeholders were all involved or somehow related to the sectors of Human Settlements and/or Agriculture and Food Security, either through their activities or through their listing in the reports and project proposals mentioned above (see Paragraph 3.2 Stakeholders involved for reasons and more information). The stakeholders were asked to answer 4 questions concerning their organization and 17 open questions on climate change information. The questions can be divided into four categories: general information, demand of information, supply of information, and other. The questions are listed in Table 3: Questions to Stakeholder. For a large part, these questions are based on the questions designed by De Boer (1999) for designing climate change information systems. The questions take the specific activities that an organization undertakes, that involve climate change, as a starting point. Table 3: Questions to Stakeholders

General information 1. Name 2. Organization 3. Stakeholder Sector 4. Organization Type 5. What kind of benefits, drawbacks, damage, opportunities, and other impacts would be possible for your organization, due to present and future climate change? 6. What activities does your organization undertake that involve the climate change issue? Demand of information 7. What information does your organization need with respect to the climate change issue? 8. What information is collected or received with respect to the climate change issue and from whom do you obtain this information? 9. In what form is the information supplied? 10. For which decisions or work processes do you use this information? 11. Which other parties are involved in these decisions or work processes, or have an

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interest in the information? 12. What requirements does the information need to meet for your purpose? 13. Is the information you collect sufficient? If not, what could be improved and how can that be realized? 14. If you haven’t mentioned it in the previous question: for which other parties do you see (or would like) a role in providing you with climate change related information? What information would you like to collect from these parties? 15. With respect to the previous question, if applicable: why hasn’t it come to this already? E.g. are there problems, barriers, etc. associated with this, and if so, do you have any ideas on how to solve these? Supply of information 16. Do you provide other parties with climate change related information? If so, which parties and what information? 17. In what form do you supply this information? 18. Have you observed any impacts on your sector or activity that may have been caused by climatic change? If so, mention these impacts. 19. Besides parties and information you mentioned in the previous questions (if any): what (other) climate change related information could you provide to other parties and to which (other) parties? Some example categories: - personal observations - personal estimates of vulnerabilities to climate change - solutions (adaptation and/or mitigation (prevention)) - scenarios, analyses, scientific knowledge - data relevant for analyses/research (e.g. emission data, efficiencies, etc.) - research interests (critical issues, priorities, etc.) - valuation of different kinds of impacts - adaptation and mitigation boundary conditions (e.g. existing (resource) management strategies, policies, etc.) 20. With respect to the previous question, if applicable: why hasn’t it come to this already? E.g. are there problems, barriers, etc. associated with this, and if so, do you have any ideas on how to solve these? Other 21. Is there anything else you would like to say with respect to communication on climate change related issues? A total of 78 organizations have been contacted for the Stakeholder Questionnaire. Of those organizations, 10 agreed to participate. This gives a response rate of 13%. One of those stakeholders considered the Questionnaire to take too much time. This stakeholder was interviewed instead. With regards to Stakeholder Sectors (see subparagraph 3.2.4 Sectors), a total of 70% (7) was involved in Human Settlements and 50% (5) in Agriculture and Food Security. Further specified, 30% (3) was involved only in Human Settlements, 10% only in

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Agriculture and Food Security, 40% (4) in both, and 20% in neither. The organizations involved in neither had a more general focus on climate change. With regards to Organization Types (see subparagraph 3.2.5 Organization types), a total of 50% (5) of the respondents were Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 20% (2) Companies, 20% (2) Government, and 10% (1) Research. The Stakeholder Questionnaire shows some bias towards the NGOs. The results of this survey are presented and analysed mainly in Chapter 3: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand. 2.2.3 Citizen Questionnaire The Citizen Questionnaire was placed online at an unrelated website (http://www.alcarin.com). Through the site’s main page and forums, citizens were referred to the survey page. Several printed versions have been handed out to family and acquaintances of the author as well. Citizens were asked to answer 6 questions concerning demographics and 21 open questions on climate change, climate change information, and their opinions on the actions of organizations that have to do with climate change. The questions can be divided into six categories: demographics, the problem of climate change, options to deal with climate change, climate change information, climate change and governments/organizations, and other. The questions are listed in Table 4: Questions to Citizens. Table 4: Questions to Citizens

Demographics 1. Name 2. Country 3. Gender (m/v) 4. Age category (0-17, 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+) 5. Profession 6. Level of education The problem of climate change 7. Do you consider Climate Change to be a serious problem? Why? 8. What is the problem and whose problem is it? 9. What do you consider to be the main causes of Climate Change? 10. What do you consider to be the main effects of Climate Change? Options to deal with climate change 11. What options do you see (and prefer) for dealing with Climate Change? 12. What do you think you can do yourself about Climate Change?

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13. Do you actually do those things or plan to do so? Why? Climate change information 14. Do you use information on Climate risks and if so, in what way, or for which decisions do you use it? 15. Through what kind of media do you receive your information on Climate Change (e.g. newspaper, radio, experts among your friends, etc.)? 16. Who sends that information (e.g. scientists, government, environmental pressure groups, etc.)? 17. What media (including ones you didn’t mention in question 15) do you consider to be the most useful for information on Climate Change? Why? 18. What requirements does the information need to meet for your purpose? 19. Are you satisfied with the information you receive? Why? 20. For as far as you haven’t mentioned it in the previous questions, what are the strong points and weak points of the information that different senders (scientists, government, etc.) provide? Climate change and governments/organizations 21. Do you think your government is doing enough to solve the problem? Why? 22. Do you think the world community is doing enough to solve the problem? Why? 23. What would you advise policy makers, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? 24. What would you advise scientists, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? 25. What would you advise environmental pressure groups, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? 26. What would you advise other involved parties, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? Other 27. Is there anything else you would like to say on the subject of Climate Change? If so, you can do so here. A total of 25 people responded to the Citizen Questionnaire. All respondents were from The Netherlands. Of the 25 respondents, 68% (17) were male and 32% (8) were female. The age categories of the respondents were as follows: 4. Age category (Leeftijdscategorie): 0-17

4.0%

18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59

(1) 52.0%

4.0% 16.0% 20.0%

(13) (1) (4) (5)

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60+ TOTAL

4.0%

(1) 100.0%

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Not surprisingly, looking at the age categories, a total of 40% (10) respondents noted to be student. One specified this to be a student in forest and nature conservation, and another specified this to be a student in veterinary support. A further 20% (5) respondents noted to work in education. One respondent specified be an adjunct director of a primary school, one specified to be an IT teacher, and another specified to be retired. Further, 12% (3) noted to be a housewife, and 8% (2) noted to work in care as well. Other professions were reported by only 4% (1) of the respondents. These professions were: bank employee, job agency consultant, barber, medical analyst, retailer, or none. A total of 4% (1) of the respondents had a lower education, 20% (5) medium education, 48% (12) higher education, 4% (1) higher education plus additional education, and 24% academic level education. The Citizen Questionnaire shows a bias towards well-educated young men. Most of the respondents are involved in the education sector, either as student or as teacher. The results of this survey can be found mainly in Chapter 4: Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication. The parts dealing with supply and demand of climate change information however can be found in Chapter 3: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand.

2.3 Stakeholder review Along with the introduction letter for the Stakeholder Questionnaire, stakeholders were asked if they would be willing to participate in a review of this report, as a so-called “extended peer review”. In earlier research, Dutch stakeholders considered extended peer review to be a useful way to improve communication and dialogue (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Only one of the stakeholders, Dr. O.A. Abbink (TNO-NITG), agreed to participate. The results of this review are integrated into the report.

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Chapter 3: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand 3.1 Introduction 3.1.1 Definition of stakeholders Stakeholders play an important role in the climate change issue. It would therefore be important to define who is a stakeholder and who is not. Although the term stakeholder is widely used in environmental decision-making, there is no consistently used definition. In a study by Yosie and Herbst (1998), interview respondents defined stakeholders in three categories: those who want to be involved in the process, affected parties, and anyone with an interest in the project or activity. A widely cited definition is the one used by the World Bank. The World Bank defines stakeholders as those who are directly or indirectly affected by a process or activity and who could affect the outcome of a proposed Bank intervention or are affected by it (Yosie and Herbst, 1998). The Bank’s indirect stakeholders include non-governmental organizations, governments, and shareholders. Other indirect audiences that are often not considered are internal audiences, such as employees (Yosie and Herbst, 1998). The Encarta World English Dictionary defines stakeholder as a person or group with a direct interest, involvement, or investment in something, for example, the employees, shareholders, and customers of a business concern. The EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) noted that anybody that wants to learn about and provide input should be able to. They defined stakeholders into three categories as well: direct, indirect and general public. The greater the stakeholder’s interest in a project or activity, or the greater the potential impact of that project or activity on the stakeholders, the more involvement they should have (Yosie and Herbst, 1998). If stakeholders are narrowly defined as those individuals or parties who want to be involved or who have an interest, then the process potentially excludes parties who may be outside of traditional boundaries or who are not currently aware of the activity. Similarly, including only affected interests could exclude those that could conversely impact or affect the project. (Yosie and Herbst, 1998). In the context of this project, a fairly broad definition will be used, similar to the definition of the World Bank: those organizations or population groups that are or could be directly or indirectly affected by climate change, climate change policy and/or climate change research; or could, might like to, or are affecting one or more of these. 3.1.2 Roles of stakeholders Various groups of organized and unorganized stakeholders participate in some way in the societal process of coping with climate change. Their involvement ranges from being part of the cause of anthropogenic climate change to being able to influence cause to being subjected to the impacts to being able to influence the impacts.

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Stakeholders can play a role in adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. This role does not limit itself to taking direct measures to adapt or mitigate, but can also include indirect ways to influence the issue. Indirect influences include the following: •

• • •

• • • • •

Improving relevance, problem formulation and defining critical issues in research and policy (Joyce, 2003; Van der Sluijs, 2003; Hammer et al., 2001; National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003; Cohen, 1997). Delivering scenarios, knowledge and observations to be used in research and assessments (Van der Sluijs, 2003; Klein et al. 1999; Cohen, 1997). Being involved in quality control of research and policy and improving the quality as a result (Joyce, 2003; Van der Sluijs, 2003; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Converting research results into practical applications; generating new possibilities and options for adaptation, mitigation, costs and benefits, and implications for other issues (Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001; National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003). Provide bridging between stakeholders, policy and science (Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001). Providing infrastructure for information delivery and research (Jagtap et al., 2002). Influencing and legitimizing science, policy and management through public support or resistance (Klein et al., 1999; Jagtap et al., 2002). Creating credibility for research and modeling (Hammer et al., 2001). Creating and maintaining a public sense of urgency (National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003).

Stakeholder involvement, including that of citizens, is considered to be a key element in various activities surrounding the climate change issue (Van der Sluijs, 2003; Joyce, 2003; Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001; Klein et al., 1999; Cohen, 1997). These influences can only be optimal if communication between the various stakeholders involved is present and not hampered. Practice however, shows that there are various communication and participation barriers that hamper communication and citizen and stakeholder participation, and that there is a lack of communication, exchange and integration of knowledge between these stakeholders and citizens (Van der Sluijs, 2003; Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Klein et al., 1999; Cohen, 1997). 3.1.3 Contents of this chapter This chapter aims to give an overview of the field of stakeholders and stakeholder communication on climate change in a broad sense. Discussed information will range from impacts of present day and future climate change on various sectors of the economy to adaptation of society to decrease its vulnerability to climate changes and mitigation of

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the causes of climate change (prevention) to opportunities, such as those arising from emission trading systems. Paragraph 3.2 Stakeholders involved presents an overview of the stakeholders involved in the climate change issue and presents a way to divide stakeholder groups into different categories. Paragraph 3.3 Supply of information gives an overview of what kind of information is available (supply) within these groups. Paragraph 3.4 Demand of information gives an overview of what kind of climate change related information is needed (demand) by different groups in society. Paragraph 3.5 Stakeholders: effects of climate change lists climatic changes as observed by stakeholders participating in the Stakeholder Questionnaire and possible supply and/or demand issues Paragraph 3.6 Comparison and overcoming the differences lists what kind of barriers might result in a mismatch of supply and demand and prevent effective communication amongst these groups and lists ideas on how to solve these barriers and better balance supply and demand of information. Paragraph 3.7 Discussion & conclusion lists and discusses the conclusions that can be drawn on the matter of communication between stakeholders. 3.1.4 Choice of literature To sufficiently answer the research questions on the matter of communication between stakeholders, literature will need to be found on the supply of information, the demand of information and on differences and barriers and ways to overcome these. However, the available literature on this matter is very limited. A handful of studies focus on stakeholders in climate change and information exchange between them. Therefore, these few studies will be supplemented by studies that focus on specific topics in climate change and on more or less related matter that may hold some implications for the climate change field. These include studies on topics such as coastal adaptation to climate change, seasonal climate information and forecasts for application in agriculture, and watershed management on the web. The amount of available information remains very limited and the choice of literature may seem random due to the use of specific and related topics instead of actual research on this topic. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to draw conclusions from what is available. It is clear that there still is a lot of work to be done in research on this topic.

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3.2 Stakeholders involved A vast amount of organizations and groups of citizens are in some way involved in the climate change issue. To get a clearer overview of the field and to tailor research and information supply, these organizations and groups of citizens will need to be grouped into several categories. This approach is expected to result in greater relevance for the stakeholders and citizens involved. The central question in this paragraph will be: “What are the various stakeholders involved in the Climate Change problem?” 3.2.1 Different ways of grouping stakeholders Grouping stakeholders into categories can be done in several ways. One could look at various sectors of the economy (Hisschemöller and Kerkhof, 2001), at various impact sectors (IPCC, 2001b), various geographical regions (Joyce, 2003; Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001; IPCC, 2001; Cohen, 1997), and organization type, such as government, NGO, private, knowledge institution, etcetera (National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003; Petersen et al., 2003). The different approaches improve relevance and communication in different ways. The approaches of sectors of the economy and impact sectors type will group stakeholders and citizens who are or will have similar needs and will be experiencing similar types of relevant impacts, both physical and policy impacts, such as regulations or adaptation and mitigation strategies. They are dealing with the same subject and what climate related impacts are affecting that subject. The organization type approach will group organizations and citizens that have a similar line of thought and similar interests and goals. E.g. most companies tend to think from a profit perspective, while pressure and interest groups tend to think from the well being of a certain group or subject. The geographical regions approach will group organizations and citizens with a similar set of specific impacts and needs, unique to a certain region, instead of a nation or world averaged set of impacts. All in all, concerning communication, the sectors of the economy, impact sectors, and geographical region approaches seem to be related mainly to what is communicated; the information content. E.g. the causes and impacts discussed, scale, and parameters. The organization type approach seems more related to the way the information is communicated; the form of the content and the medium of the content. E.g. level of detail, presentation in the form of calculations, tables or models, relevance, manner of speech (scientific language, common language, etcetera), and stress or focus put on various parts of the subject. Since these different approaches all have benefits in the parts they discuss and that others do not, no “best approach” can be defined. Sectoral approach may include the same stakeholder groups or even individual stakeholders multiple times. E.g. national government and the ministry of environment in particular being included in both an “ecosystems” sector and “human settlements” or “industry and energy” sectors, or

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environmental groups and scientists participating in those sectors as well. Nevertheless, stakeholders continue to stress the importance of sectoral and regional situations (Joyce, 2003; Cohen, 1997). An organization type approach will improve the usability and understandability of an information product for a user, but can also lead either to a considerable degree of aggregation or an enormous amount of information, should everything be discussed. 3.2.2 Information systems and grouping approaches For the design of an information product or system, the organization type approach will be most relevant. Nevertheless, it would be a good idea not to lose sight of the needs with respect to information content. If many topics are discussed within an information system, the organization type approach can be used while still keeping in mind that not all subjects will be useful to users. One could simply make lists of links per sector or region to the most relevant subjects. This would result in links to a certain subject from multiple sectors, but not to a large increase in work needed to design the information system. 3.2.3 Geographical regions A number of studies have focused on the regional scale. Regional was interpreted in different ways, ranging from continents to parts of countries. The IPCC report listed impacts for Africa, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Europe, Latin America, North America, and the Polar region (IPCC, 2001b). Smaller scale studies, on national level, were done in the United States (Joyce, 2003), and Zimbabwe, Australia, and Argentina (Hammer et al., 2001). Even smaller scale studies focused on Florida (Jagtap et al., 2002), the Patuxent watershed near Washington, DC in the United States (Voinov and Costanza, 1999) and the Mackenzy Basin in Northwest Canada (Cohen, 1997). This study focuses on The Netherlands, for the Stakeholder Questionnaire only, and therefore is somewhat regionally oriented. Due to the difficulty of finding literature on stakeholders, the literature part of this study focuses on stakeholders in general. 3.2.4 Sectors A study using a sectors of the economy approach, uses the following sectors: Human Settlements, Industry & Energy, Agriculture & Food Security, and Traffic & Transportation (Hisschemöller and Kerkhof, 2001). A study using an impact sectors approach, uses the following sectors: Hydrology and Water Resources, Agriculture and Food Security, Terrestrial & Freshwater Ecosystems, Coastal Zones and Marine Ecosystems, Human Health, Human Settlements and Energy and Industry, and Insurance and other Financial Services (IPCC, 2001b). Concerning a sectoral approach, I propose the following list of sectors, further referred to as Stakeholder Sectors. These sectors include economy, causes, impacts, possible

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mitigation or adaptation strategies, and various other components related to climate change in a broad sense. Table 5: Stakeholder Sectors

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Human Settlements Industry & Energy Agriculture & Food Security Traffic & Transportation Hydrology & Water Resources Ecosystems Human Health Insurance and other Financial Services Cross-sectoral

3.2.5 Organization types A project plan using the organization type approach, lists the following organization types: Ministries (National Government), Government, Knowledge Institutions, NonGovernmental Organizations, Private Partners, and International Partners (National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003). The International Partners will not be relevant for this study, considering that this study focuses on a national level only. The RIVM/MNP Guidance for uncertainty assessment and communication (Petersen et al., 2003) uses the organization type approach and lists the following organization types: Cabinet and Ministries (national), Parliament (national), Governmental Advisory Councils, Other Governmental Actors, Other National “planning offices”, Research Institutes/consultancies, Scientists/universities, Sector-specific stakeholders/actors, Umbrella Organizations, Environmental and Consumer Organizations, Unorganized stakeholders/civilians, Media, and Other (Petersen et al., 2003). Based on these documents, I propose the following list of organization types: Table 6: Organization Types

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Pressure & Interest Groups Companies Government Research Population Groups General Public Media

3.2.6 Examples of stakeholder groups

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Using various studies and documents, using or listing stakeholders, at hand (National Bsik Consortium “Klimaat voor Ruimte – Ruimte voor Klimaat”, 2003; Petersen et al., 2003; Van der Sluijs, 2003; Hisschemöller and Kerkhof, 2001; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001), internet and brainstorm, a list of stakeholder groups and their corresponding Stakeholder Sectors (Table 5: Stakeholder Sectors) and Organization Types (Table 6: Organization Types) can be derived. This list does not aim to be complete, but provides an overview of the most relevant stakeholder groups. Results are listed in Table 7: Stakeholder groups and their Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types, on the next page. In Appendix B: Stakeholder Groups per Stakeholder Sector a list of stakeholder groups per Stakeholder Sector, subdivided into Organization Types, can be found. 3.2.7 Research focus In this study, the literature research will cover as many stakeholders as possible, because the amount of available literature on this subject is limited. Available literature also focuses on information exchange between scientists and stakeholders only, with the scientists as information supplier and the stakeholders as information receivers. Stakeholders are also treated as one amorphous group, instead of being divided into separate organizations, groups, Stakeholder Sectors or Organization Types, as described above. Available literature will not be able to show whether or not the division and the information requirements for those different groups (Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types), as hypothesized above, are valid. The literature part of this chapter will therefore be more general in nature, with regard to the stakeholders involved, and focus on the supply of information by scientists to stakeholders. The Stakeholder Questionnaire is intended to give a broader view on the various stakeholders involved and both their information demand and their information supply. An attempt will be made to validate the structuring of stakeholders as shown above. The Stakeholder Questionnaire will limit itself to the Stakeholder Sectors of Human Settlements and Agriculture & Food Security. This is due to the limited time frame of the study and the large amount of time needed to do a questionnaire among a representative group of all of the stakeholder groups mentioned in Table 7: Stakeholder groups and their Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types. Within these Stakeholder Sectors, the Organization Type Media and the stakeholder group of scientific research will not be addressed either. These two Stakeholder Sectors will be the focus of this research project because of their wide range of involved organizations and Organization Types. These sectors include both organizations that are a cause of climate change and those that are impacted by climate change, or both. Furthermore, there are plans for research in the area of climate change and spatial use of land. Both these sectors are highly related to this subject and may therefore be useful for this possible future research as well. The Citizen Questionnaire will provide information on the information need of the general public.

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Table 7: Stakeholder groups and their Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types

Human Settlements

Industry & Energy Agriculture & Food Security Traffic & Transportation

Hydrology & Water Resources Ecosystems

Human Health Insurance & other Financial Services Crosssectoral

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Pressure & interest groups House owner org. Branch org. appliances Branch org. project development and construction Branch org. housing corp. Branch org. waste Other Environmental gr. Branch org. industry Other Environmental gr. Farmer interest gr. Other

Companies

Environmental gr. Unions Employer org. Motorist interest gr. Other Environmental gr. Branch org. water transport Farmer interest gr. House owner org. Branch org. fishery Environmental gr. Nature conservation org. Branch org. tourism Branch org. industry Branch org. fishery Patient org. Branch org. health Branch org. tourism Branch org. insurance and finance

Transport comp. Construction comp. Communication comp.

Environmental gr. Sector or branch exceeding interest org. Consumer org. Political parties

Government Local Regional National Advisory Waste disposal org. Sewage (cleaning) org. Local National Advisory

Research

Academic Governmental Corporate

Consumers

Local Regional National Advisory Local Regional National Advisory

Academic Governmental Corporate

Farmers Consumers

Academic Governmental Corporate

Motorists

Water comp. Sailing/shipping comp. Housing corp. Energy comp. Fishery comp. Tourism comp. Industrial comp. Fishery comp.

Local Regional National Advisory Water boards Local Regional National Advisory

Academic Governmental Corporate

Consumers Farmers Sailors House owners Fishers Tourists Fishers

Hospitals Pharmaceutical comp. Tourism comp. Insurance comp. Reinsurance comp. Banks

Local National Advisory

Academic Governmental Corporate

National Advisory

Academic Governmental Corporate

National

Academic Governmental

Domestic appliances prod. Energy comp. Construction comp. Project developers Housing corp. Waste disposal comp. Industrial comp. Fuel comp. Energy comp. Banks Food comp. Banks Other

Academic Governmental Corporate

Academic Governmental Corporate

Population groups House and land owners

Any, esp. poor, weak, and elderly Tourists Any

Any

General Public Various

Media Various

3.3 Supply of information In this paragraph, the following research question will be the focus of attention: “What information do the various stakeholders, involved in the Climate Change problem, supply?” The amount of literature on this subject is very limited, as was mentioned in subparagraph 3.1.4 Choice of literature. For as far the supply of information was concerned, two studies could be found on stakeholders in the climate change issue in general: the studies of Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) and Cohen (1997). In order to obtain more information, this paragraph will also take a look at a study on a specific sector of climate change, coastal management (Klein et al., 1999) and two studies on seasonal climate forecasting for use in agriculture (Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001). The most relevant conclusions of the studies in literature and the outcome of the Stakeholder Questionnaire will be mentioned, structured according to Paragraph 1.2 The communication process into three characteristics of information: content, form, and medium. Although the primary intention of this paragraph is to give an overview of the available information among stakeholders, some biases and critiques may already come to light. 3.3.1 Supply: Content Literature According to a study on stakeholder perspectives on climate change, most of the climate risk assessments were at a global scale. Few of them assessed climate change at a continental or regional scale, because uncertainty increases exponentially with decreasing scale level (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001) Studies usually used a temporal scale with 2100 as time horizon. Assessments of effects of climate change with a very large potential impact, e.g., require longer time scales (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Climate change assessments usually focused on the middle part of the causal chain: the choice of technologies and practices, emissions, and changes in the environment. Relatively little attention was given to deeper causes, such as culture, and values and demand for goods and services, and to exposure (the connections between changing environment and damage resulting from it) (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Effects with poorly known probabilities and high impacts, such as the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet or regime shift in the Thermo Haline Circulation, and methane release due to permafrost thawing, are under-addressed (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). In assessments that involve consensus building, such as the IPCC report, this is due to strategic treatment of such problems; issues on which no consensus can be achieved are under-addressed or ignored (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). This under-addressing leads to a bias towards moderate climate projections (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001).

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Research on the climate change issue has generally focused on uncertainties in climate projections and calculation of mitigation costs (Cohen, 1997). In literature, there seems to be a lot of effort being put in dealing with uncertainty (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Much of the discussion on policy options in the Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC is focused on the cost of mitigation options, especially how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Comparatively less information is provided on the benefits of avoiding impacts, the consequences of failing to control emissions and on adaptation options (Cohen, 1997). Due to the global scale focus of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), regional adaptation has received considerably less attention as well (Cohen, 1997). This gives rise to a considerable degree of aggregation, possibly resulting in missing some regional scale environmental and social processes, such as the direct and indirect links between climate and forest fires, landslides in permafrost regions, non-market values, subsistence lifestyles, trans-boundary flows of goods, etc. (Cohen, 1997). Integrated Assessment models need to address water issues as well as other multiobjective concerns, such as forest sustainability, environmental security, etc. (Cohen, 1997). A study on scientist-stakeholder collaboration in research noted that perhaps a focus on basin specific policy instruments, such as water management agreements, would be a way to characterize the issue for large basins that could be represented in global scale models (Cohen, 1997). Coastal managers noted that the IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations and it’s elaboration in the UNEP Handbook on Methods for Climate Change Impact Assessments and Adaptation Strategies put much greater emphasis on the assessment of impacts than on that of adaptation measures and adaptive capacity (Klein et al., 1999). They mentioned two possible reasons for this: that the generic guidelines for impact assessment are easier to interpret in terms of concrete methods than those for adaptation, and that more experience has been gained with impact assessment (Klein et al., 1999). The categorization of response options was strongly oriented towards implementation, and especially to pre-implementation evaluation (Klein et al., 1999). Other aspects of adaptation planning, the need to collect information, raise awareness and to conduct postimplementation monitoring and evaluation, were not discussed. The relationship of coastal adaptation to climate change with other coastal management issues was not considered either (Klein et al., 1999). The Technical Guidelines can be used to readily develop information on the anticipated impacts of climate change and the anticipated trends of other stresses, such as population increase and land-use changes (Klein et al., 1999). Due to data deficiencies and the absence of concrete guidance for the assessment of interactions between climate change and non-climatic stresses and of expected autonomous adjustments, obtaining information on these factors has proven difficult (Klein et al., 1999). There is also an incompatibility of the time-horizons over which climate related impacts are assessed with those over which socio-economic developments can be projected (Klein et al., 1999). These practical problems result in considerable uncertainty and coastal managers will therefore need to rely on imperfect information (Klein et al., 1999).

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Initial research studies on the application of climate forecasts in agriculture, mostly related to El-Niño, have focused on possibilities in relation to crop rotation and crop marketing decisions. After interactions with farmers, this focus has quickly shifted towards feasibility of various management options, using various modeling techniques (Hammer et al., 2001). Feasibility was considered more relevant than possibility. A similar initial bias can also be seen in the climate change issue, were the initial focus was on change in environmental qualities such as temperature, instead of the direct implications for farmers and what they might be able to do about it, for as far as management options are concerned. Direct implications of and feasibility of management options in the face of climate change will be more relevant to farmers as well, as the study of Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) also concluded. Websites by the Netherlands Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment (VROM) and the Milieuloket, provide general information on climate change. The major part of the information on their websites is on climate policy and causes and effects are mentioned only briefly. VROM does provide a large amount of information on mitigation measures for the general public, such as green energy and energy saving options, as well. The monetary gains of taking these measures are listed. The climate change dossier on VROM’s website however does not directly mention these items in the text; links to separate pages are shown in the sidebar. NUON’s energy saving website provides an interesting list of options and the savings due to these options as well. An indication is also given on how much effort each measure takes, so a comparison between effort and resulting savings can be made. The sites of VROM and NUON do not list the costs or investments associated with these measures. See paragraph 3.3.3 Supply: Medium for links and more information on these sites. A study on an intensive mass media campaign by VROM mentions that advertisements and brochures provided information on the causes, consequences and possible ways of solving the climate change problem. An emphasis was put on energy saving as a key solution (Staats et al., 1996). Other government related sources on climate change include the Climate Report of the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute, the KNMI (KNMI, 2003) and the climate change parts of the Environmental Data Compendium of the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, the RIVM (RIVM, 2001). The Natuurkalender (Nature’s Calendar) Network studies the times of reoccurring natural phenomena (phenology), such as the blossoming of trees and breeding times of birds, in relation to climate change. A large network of citizens provides the data used for this research. Scientists integrate this information and communicate the results back to the public. The studies are mostly on a global scale and there is a strong focus on the middle part of the causal chain. The deeper (societal) causes and direct impacts and implications of the problem are under-addressed. All in all, the focus of climate change research and information seems to be mostly on issues on which consensus is easily obtained. Issues

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that involve more discussion are neglected or at least under-addressed, while these may be far more relevant and/or damaging. Interesting point is that scientists directly or indirectly, provide most information, either to stakeholders or to other scientists. Indirect information is first made suitable for other users by other organizations such as governments and environmental organizations. Exceptions to this are information on energy saving measures (government and companies to public) and phenology data (citizens to science followed by scientists to citizens). Research on stakeholder information demand and supply seems biased in the sense that it focuses only on information supply by scientists to other stakeholders. Questionnaires In the Stakeholder Questionnaire, stakeholders mentioned very little actual information they could supply. Perhaps this is because they misinterpreted the question, or because the information was too broad (e.g. climate change in general) or because it was too much work to fully describe it. Most did note to supply information. Government stakeholders mentioned to supply policy documents on climate and energy policy and wind energy, and related information to municipalities and parts of provinces. Another stakeholder mentioned to communicate energy use information to governments. Stakeholders communicate information to governments and policy makers, climate modelers, companies, NGOs, the general public, to different departments in one’s own organization, to customers, and to other contacts. One stakeholder mentions that they could supply all of the information mentioned in the examples of question 19 of the Stakeholder Questionnaire (personal observations, estimates of vulnerabilities to climate change, solutions, scenarios, analyses, scientific knowledge, data relevant for analyses/research, research interests, valuation of different kinds of impacts, and adaptation and mitigation boundary conditions) to government institutes, universities, ministries, and insurance companies and related organizations. Furthermore, he mentions that they could provide information to NGOs and the general public, raising awareness. Another stakeholder also mentions raising awareness among colleagues. Other things mentioned by stakeholders are that they could improve monitoring, supply more numbers and better estimates, provide an overview of the problems, provide points of attention for sectors and policy, and to provide boundary conditions (policy, subsidies budget, projects with municipalities and companies, and improved granting of permits). One respondent also noted they could provide information on the reasons why people live in an area, on situations in practice, and therefore reveal the vulnerability of people and society in a particular area to climate change. The main problems associated with the possible supply of information are a limited exchange of information among scientists, a difficulty to create a bridge between various scientific disciplines, policy makers, and affected parties, a limited capacity, limited priority, difficulties in measuring, lack of knowledge, and a lack of interest. Furthermore, the liberalization of the energy market hinders communication of energy data, for

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competitive reasons. One respondent also noted that they do a lot but don’t write everything down. All in all, scientists seem to communicate information regarding climate research to governments (policymakers). Governments seem to communicate policy information to companies, other governments, and other departments of the same government. NGOs seem to communicate general information and information regarding climate impacts to the general public, to clients, and sometimes to other departments of the larger international organization (if present) and participate in dialogues with governments and companies. 3.3.2 Supply: Form Literature The study of Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) mentioned that risk assessment studies of climate change can be grouped into several categories: the IPCC Report; probabilistic approaches; extreme events, non-linear feedbacks and surprise; integrated assessment models; and decision analytic approaches (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The majority of the assessment studies use a risk concept where effects are specified and often quantified, but the probability of the effect is not quantified nor is the plausibility expressed (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Plausibility has to do with causality, especially reducibility and attributability of certain phenomena to anthropogenic climate change and with imaginability (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). However, the study concluding this reviewed the IPCC Second Assessment Report, the Third Assessment Report does give an indication of the probability (IPCC, 2001d). One type of study, Delphic Monte Carlo, does give quantified estimates of probabilities (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). None of the integrated assessment models used a participatory approach. The models exclude the “unmodellable” and do not use qualitative information (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The study had distinguished three groups of risk dimensions: dimensions that specify and/or qualify the nature and size of undesired consequences (e.g. potential degree of harm or fatality, reversibility), dimensions that qualify the probability and plausibility of undesired effects (e.g. probability of undesired consequence, controllability, attributability), and other dimensions that underlie perceived level of risk (e.g. voluntariness of exposure, social distribution of damage). It concluded that climate risk assessment studies most extensively addressed the first group and least addressed the second and third group (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Significantly lower attention was given to dimensions related to probability and plausibility than to nature and size of effects (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Weakly addressed dimensions with respect to nature and size of undesired effects are reversibility of consequences and social extent of damage. Weakly addressed dimension with respect to probability and plausibility were experience with, familiarity with consequences, directness of effects and attributability of consequences (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The studies that did address attributability only addressed it for changes in

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temperature and sea level rise. None addressed attributability of consequences of climate change (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). A study on scientist-stakeholder collaboration in research noted that climate change used to be a science issue and is now expanding as a policy issue as its human dimensions become recognized. However, climate change seems still to be perceived primarily as an environmental issue (Cohen, 1997). One of the respondents in the Stakeholder Questionnaire also notes this. Although this observation is not really part of the form characteristic of information, it is mentioned here because of its implications on the form of information products. There may be a bias on the environmental impacts of climate change in current communication or at least the human side will need to be stressed more intensively than currently is the case. In a study on the application of climate forecasts in agriculture, the main available information from science is a probabilistic statement about the coming season (Hammer et al., 2001). The study of Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) indicates that effects are specified and often quantified. Probability and plausibility, including attribution of climate change to human activities, is under-addressed. The study of Hammer (2001) does show probability, but probability of seasonal climate changes due to El-Niño may be easier to calculate than probabilities in climate change. Various other, sometimes less or not quantifiable, dimensions are under-addressed as well. Questionnaires The Stakeholder Questionnaire revealed little on the forms of the information supplied. Most of the stakeholders interpreted the question of in what form they supply information as through what medium they supplied information. One respondent however noted to communicate numbers (numerical data). Another respondent mentions that they could make energy issues clearer by providing standard values, e.g. on energy use, or on the CO2 reduction achieved by a certain measure. This however is hindered by the liberalization of the energy market. Data are often not made public for competitive reasons. 3.3.3 Supply: Medium Literature In a study on the use of climate forecasts in agriculture, a weather network was mentioned. In addition to its original services, providing weather information and forecasts, this network has expanded its services with climate information and forecasts. This was considered to be a valid option, because of the fact that farmers, the most prominent users of the network, didn’t make any distinction between weather and climate (Jagtap et al., 2002; see also Bostrom et al., 1994). The network, the Florida Automated

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Weather Network (FAWN), delivers both prognostic and diagnostic climate information, through the Internet. FAWN was created at the request of various grower organizations, after the US National Weather Service stopped providing specialized frost and freeze warnings (Jagtap et al., 2002). FAWN provides real-time weather data, a weather data archive, management aids, educational materials and training programs (Jagtap et al., 2002). Due to cooperation with the Florida Consortium (FC), a research group working on the application of climate forecasts in agriculture, FAWN now includes a new home page, providing climate forecast information, such as graphs of mean monthly temperature and precipitation anomalies at 88 different sites, and probabilistic presentations of monthly climate variables, expressed as smoothed histograms or time series plots (Jagtap et al., 2002). Although not directly mentioned in literature on stakeholder information supply and demand, the largest part of the available information on climate change comes in the form of scientific reports, articles, and other publications in various scientific magazines, including various specialized climate change magazines. While these information sources are a very good way to distribute information among scientists, their use and usefulness among stakeholders is probably very limited. These reports and articles tend to be directed at a specialist audience and are full of scientific jargon. Several organizations have however published more general reports, focused on a wider audience. One such report, probably the most important of all, is the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC. This report consists of a series of documents on the Scientific Basis (IPCC, 2001a), on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (IPCC, 2001b), on Mitigation (IPCC, 2001c), and a Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2001d). The documents are directed at various audiences. The Synthesis report covers all three of the subjects and is intended to give a full picture of climate change to a general scientific (non-expert) audience. Besides the full-length detailed report, each of the documents also has two subdocuments, directed at specific audiences: a technical summary (TS) directed at the specialists in the field of climate change, and a summary for policymakers (SPM) directed at policymakers. The summary to policymakers is written in a clear and understandable way, so that policymakers can easily understand and use it. Besides policymakers, various stakeholders and the general public can also easily understand this summary. The Netherlands Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment (VROM) has published several reports and brochures on climate change and what to do about it. While many reports are mainly focused on policymakers and large stakeholders, the brochures are intended for the general public. VROM also conducts media campaigns on climate change, including TV commercials. A past campaign by VROM included billboards, posters, and television commercials, designed to attract attention to climate change and potential impacts (Staats et al., 1996). Furthermore, the campaign included advertisements and a brochure, to provide information to the public (Staats et al., 1996).

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The RIVM has published an Environmental Data Compendium, containing facts and data on various environmental subjects. This book is directed at professionals in the area of nature and environment. Another interesting medium, developed as a cooperation between Arcade/Indisc, Tony Scot, VROM, Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Dutch Railway), World Wide Fund for Nature, Omniversum/IMAX-theater, and the Postbank, is a CD on the greenhouse effect, with information contained in both the lyrics and a small booklet included with the CD (Scott et al., 1992). The KNMI has also published several reports on climate change in specific. Especially important is the Climate Report KNMI, which is similar to the Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001d) in that it discusses various aspects of climate change. It seems to be intended for a general audience. Another interesting source of climate change information is the Internet. Several organizations have set up climate portals and information websites. The Netherlands Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment (http://www.vrom.nl) has included a dossier system on various subjects, including climate change. The RIVM has an online version of its Environmental Data Compendium (RIVM, 2001): http://www.rivm.nl/milieuennatuurcompendium/ (Dutch) or http://www.environmentaldata.nl (English). The KNMI has a special public education page on climate change (KNMI, 2003), http://www.knmi.nl/reindex.html?/voorl/klimaat, in Dutch only. This includes various reports such as the Climate Report KNMI, factsheets, overviews, speeches and links. Interesting section is a list of recent press releases and climate news, including comments of KNMI or recent news. While there is a lot of information on the KNMI site, it is ordered in different source types, such as news, speech, publications, etcetera. This makes the site rather hard to navigate. An ordering on specific subject (e.g. science, impacts, options) would have been easier to use, that is, it would be easier to find information on a subject if it would have been ordered in such a way. Furthermore, there are sites like the Milieuloket (http://www.milieuloket.nl/), providing general information on environmental issues to the general public. Other sites include those of environmental organizations, such as WWF (http://www.wwf.nl/) and Greenpeace (http://www.greenpeace.nl). These sites are directed at the general public as well. Another interesting source of information, for the general public as well, is a site on energy saving, by NUON, a Dutch energy company (http://www.online-energieadvies.com/overzicht_besparen.php). Particular interesting here is the source. An energy company could hardly be seen as having an interest in people making less use of their product. From the viewpoint of trust, this may be very useful. Furthermore, there are several sites providing links to various sources and organizations that have to do with climate change, e.g. http://klimaat.pagina.nl/ and http://www.climateark.org/. Radio is also used in communication. The Natuurkalender (Nature’s Calendar) Network (http://www.natuurkalender.nl or http://www.phenology.org.uk for a similar English

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initiative) for example uses the radio, Internet, and member magazines of various organizations to communicate research findings to the public. Citizens provide information used for research through the Internet or telephone. Movies also seem to be important as a medium. The recent movie “The Day After Tomorrow” illustrates this well. This movie, dealing with a very abrupt climate disaster, has refueled the discussion on climate change. Images from this movie have no doubt had their effect on people’s image of climate change. In any case, the movie has had a large impact, which the vigorous reactions of national meteorological services and governments (see e.g. Deutscher Wetterdienst, 2004; Met Office, 2004; Van Dorland, 2004a; VROM, 2004) easily show. Other TV series and movies, sometimes not even dealing with climate change or somewhat related to them, also effect public opinion. Examples include: Walking with Dinosaurs/Beasts, Jurassic Park, Twister, Volcano, and Deep Impact. A respondent to the Stakeholder Questionnaire notes on these movies: “The subjects don’t all concern climate change, but they do contribute to an image, through their large impact. I see policymakers using images from them in the creation of their own image of climate change.”

The media used in communicating climate change information vary greatly. Internet can be and is used to provide data on climate. In the case of Florida, this is done through FAWN, a weather network. The same strategy might be applied for climate change information. Ministries, governmental research institutes, environmental organizations and environmentally responsible companies provide information through the Internet as well. Most of this information is directed at the general public. Ministries and governmental institutes also provide various reports for use by policymakers. One important example would be the Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001d). Other used media include radio, billboards, posters, television commercials, advertisements, and brochures. Many scientific sources also provide a wealth of scientific articles and publications, directed at other scientists. Questionnaires The respondents to the Stakeholder Questionnaire mentioned a large number of different media they used to communicate information to other stakeholders. They noted to communicate through policy documents, reports, websites, electronic newsletters, e-mail, dialogues, meetings, lectures, oral communication, advises, press releases, newsletters, articles, and brochures. One stakeholder noted to be working on a television show on the risks of climate change in a broad sense. One respondent specifically notes that they supply information both actively (send information) and passively (on demand). One respondent noted a difficulty in communication due to the fact that they publish a lot in society, but not in the scientific community. Overall, oral forms of communication, such as dialogues and lectures in existing networks are mentioned most often. Internet, reports and articles are often used as well.

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3.4 Demand of information In this paragraph, the following research question will be the focus of attention: “What information do the various stakeholders, involved in the Climate Change problem, demand?” The amount of literature on this subject is very limited, as was mentioned in subparagraph 3.1.4 Choice of literature. For as far the demand of information was concerned, three studies could be found on stakeholders in the climate change issue in general: the studies of Joyce (2003), Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) and Cohen (1997). In order to obtain more information, this paragraph will also take a look at a study on a specific sector of climate change, coastal management (Klein et al., 1999) and two studies on seasonal climate forecasting for use in agriculture (Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001). The most relevant conclusions of the studies in literature and the outcome of the Stakeholder Questionnaire will be mentioned, structured according to Paragraph 1.2 The communication process into three characteristics of information: content, form, and medium. 3.4.1 Demand: Content Literature In the study of Joyce (2003), stakeholders demanded that assessments would be responsive to climate related issues most important for a region and that the needs of the region or sector were taken into account. An example would be the need for reliable seasonal climate projections for water systems managers and farm operators (Joyce, 2003). They also mentioned a need to have access to ongoing, accurate, accessible information and technology about the changing climate and environment (Joyce, 2003). Research on stakeholder perspectives on climate change shows that, when stakeholders evaluate climate risks, uncertainty is not an important criterion to judge the relevance of information. Uncertainty must not be considered equivalent to relevance. The degree of uncertainty does not shape risk assessment needs (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Stakeholder values are considered to be more important than scientific uncertainty. Reduction of uncertainty is not likely to reduce policy conflicts (Cohen, 1997). Potential users of climate risk assessments seem to be interested in information on developments of the climate system and climate change impacts that are at the same time destructive and controllable. They appear to ask for information on risk seriousness, on controllability of risk, and on causality, i.e. on anthropogenic causes and on the effectiveness of human action (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Information on mitigation options is preferred over information on adaptation options (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Stakeholders also want to know about the impacts of interventions on other fields including their own and they want to evaluate the benefits of

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interventions in the context of other fields and generally accepted norms. A statement that a solution is technically possible is not considered to be very relevant. In informing about feasibility and desirability, many aspects might be taken into account, such as cultural and emotional, political, system change, markets, social and demographic (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Important criteria to evaluate the relevance of climate risk assessments, according to stakeholders, relate to seriousness of risk, controllability and plausibility. Controllability includes the effectiveness in addressing the climate issue (prudence), opportunities to reduce risk by human intervention, and placement in the context of other issues (nesting). With respect to nesting, a wide range of aspects is taken into account. Plausibility has to do with causality, especially reducibility and attributability of certain phenomena to anthropogenic climate change and with imaginability (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Other criteria could relate to monitoring policy effectiveness, ethicality of intervention and increasing actors’ knowledge (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Coastal managers called for a framework that would consider the full process of adaptation, because it would better integrate adaptation to climate change with coastal management (Klein et al., 1999). There is also a need for a more complete coverage of all types of climate related information: anticipated impacts of climate change, anticipated trends of other stresses, interactions between climate change and non-climatic stresses, and expected autonomous adjustments. For these four categories, both data and guidance on how to obtain this data is needed (Klein et al., 1999). Besides climate related information, knowledge on the present state of the coastal zone is required, including beach profiles, tide-gauge data, aerial photographs and satellite imagery (Klein et al., 1999). Another need for coastal management was for the public to be supplied with information on the potential impacts of climate change and the consequent need to take action. Without this information, adaptation strategies might face resistance, especially when they interfere with people’s daily lives of when scarce resources are being spent without apparent need or result (Klein et al., 1999). Resulting from this need is the need for information on and analysis of the public’s perception and views on climate change and the need to adapt to it. These factors are important for a country’s adaptive capacity (Klein et al., 1999). Research on the use of climate information in agriculture, mostly on the application of El-Niño forecasts, indicates that there is need for climate information to optimize agricultural management strategies to the expected climate (Hammer et al., 2001). Farmers showed to be interested in feasibility studies, such as studies on optimizing crop choice, cropping intensity and crop management (Hammer et al., 2001). Similar to this, in climate change research, stakeholders called for scientists to communicate the policy meaning of the knowledge, and not what scientists believe stakeholders should know to scientifically understand the problem (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The information of most relevance relates to likely outcomes in the target systems of viable decision options. A probabilistic statement about the coming season is often too far from the implications on decision options (Hammer et al., 2001).

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Interest seemed greatest in predictions on to anomalies in precipitation (Jagtap, 2002; Hammer, 2001) and freeze and frost events (Jagtap et al., 2002). Farmers require local climate information and knowledge of how probabilistic forecasts might affect their risks if they use them for making decisions (Jagtap et al., 2002). Because many growers are sensitive to price impacts of increasing globalization, growers also wanted forecasts for their competitors regions (Jagtap et al., 2002). This call for competition relevant information was also heard among stakeholders in climate change. A stakeholder noticed that for the industry information on the competitive position of the industry was most relevant (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). Industry was therefore also interested in information on the measures that would be taken, on the policy, and not so much on the problem of climate change itself (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). Stakeholders in climate change called for assessments and information that would be responsive to climate related issues most important for a region and that the needs of the region or sector were taken into account. Stakeholder values are considered to be very important. They also asked for information on the relation between climate change and other issues, concerning impacts, other stresses, and effects of policy measures. Stakeholders are more interested in information on mitigation than on adaptation. They call for information on risk seriousness, controllability, public perception, effects on competitors’ regions, and other effects on the competitive position, such as expected policy. Questionnaires Respondents to both the Stakeholder Questionnaire and the Citizen Questionnaire listed many subjects of information they require. The subjects vary a lot and will be thoroughly discussed in below. Despite of the variation, some general topics can be seen, as will be discussed in the summarizing paragraph below. Stakeholders noted that they need information on energy use (in human settlements and large scale users), options in construction (both old and new), options for energy infrastructure, barriers to options, information on energy storage and exchange. Information on which technical options are successful and in which parties have an interest and which barriers there are in which the stakeholder could play a role to solve them, was considered needed as well. Another stakeholder mentioned that a clear picture was needed on what we really can do (e.g. if our efforts are not wasted by other factors). Furthermore, a stakeholder mentioned a need for information on possible projects and wishes of municipalities. Respondents to the Stakeholder Questionnaire also noted a need for information on climate policy and related policies, and policy support data. One stakeholder needed an overview of the stakeholders and the specific needs of endusers of self generated information. Perhaps similarly, one stakeholder requested information on the positions and activities of companies on the climate change issue and the knowledge and views of the general public. Science input data, such as paleo-data, data on CO2 sequestration, and climate model validation, was also needed.

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Other stakeholders mentioned a need for information on the consequences of climate change, here and elsewhere, now and in the future. Information on regional effects and regional extremes was needed. On the effects on agriculture, water supply, health, and risks in human settlements. Information on the speed of climate change is also needed (see also Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). One of the respondents to the Stakeholder Questionnaire notes that the information supplied on adaptation in the IPCC report (IPCC, 2001a-d) is very weak, while it is a very important subject. This criticism is similar to that of coastal managers, as noted in previous paragraphs and (Klein et al., 1999). Summarizing, four categories of demanded information can be distinguished: options (and barriers to those options) and policy, risk and consequences, science input data, and information regarding end-users of self-generated or supplied information and other stakeholders positions. Stakeholders need this information for activities such as emission trade and other environmental financial products and services, financing of environmentally friendly or sustainable activities, energy saving measures, adaptation measures and reducing vulnerability to climate change, educative and awareness programs, climate policy development and execution, design of spatial plans, design of activity plans, subsidy arrangements, supply of permits, advises to other organizations and customers, strategy development, cooperation, dialogue and information supply with and to companies and governments, research, policy support, design of technical solutions (e.g. for geo-hazards or for CO2 sequestration), and validation of climate models. A respondent also noted that information was used in a more general, abstractly guiding way. Roughly, these activities can be grouped into four groups: design and facilitation of options, financial services (sometimes linked to options), policy development and implementation, research, and communication activities. Stakeholders note that there are problems in meeting the demand of information. Most of the respondents to the Stakeholder Questionnaire note to be not really satisfied or at least have some comments on the information they obtain. These include a lack of awareness, financial barriers, a lack of interaction between provinces and companies (small and medium size), and a lack of foundation of financial risks, loss of value, costs of damage, and costs of policy per sector. Furthermore, energy companies don’t supply specific numbers anymore, due to the liberalization of the energy market and the resulting company secrets related to competition. Information coming from research may also not be relevant to society. A stakeholder notes that science often works for it’s own merits, and does not always take social relevance and political context into account. Of the respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire, 44% noted to use information on climate risks and 52% said they didn’t. The citizens who used the information, used it to make decisions surrounding personal options. A total of 44% of the respondents noted to be satisfied with the information. Another 32% said not to be satisfied and 12% gave more doubting responses. With respect to the content of the information, the main criticism

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was that there was too little information on the available options (see also subparagraphs 4.3.8 Perceived options and 4.5.2 Perceived causes and options). As one citizen notes: “They are not always objective. They do not provide ways to deal with the problem, they show what the problem is and where it's (possibly) headed.”

Summarizing, citizens strongly demand (more) information on the available options. The same demand was seen among organized stakeholders, who also requested information on barriers to implement these options and policy related to those options. Information regarding climate risks, impacts, and damage was needed, in line with demands in existing scientific literature, as discussed above. Information regarding (end-)users of self-supplied information and positions of other stakeholders was needed as well. 3.4.2 Demand: Form Literature Another demand among stakeholders was that complex issues should be addressed in ways that the public could understand, because this would lead to more confidence in information generated by assessments, greater understanding of the incomplete nature of and uncertainty in existing information, leading to more public support for future research initiatives, and greater understanding of the need to make decisions in the face of uncertainty (Joyce, 2003). Involvement of local communities in policy development for climate change was seen as critical to the success of adaptation and mitigation strategies (Joyce, 2003). Stakeholders are suspicious of “black boxes” and there is a need to improve transparency (Cohen, 1997). Stakeholders tend to trust local knowledge more than science, because local knowledge has been acquired in order to survive, rather than as a product of curiosity. However, stakeholder knowledge may not be so transparent either, because people tend to underestimate their uncertainties for personal reasons, especially if opinions are given in an adversarial process (Cohen, 1997). Stakeholders call for a form of information that the public can understand. They consider involvement of local communities and stakeholders and inclusion of their local knowledge important, in order to improve transparency and trust. Questionnaires The main demands that stakeholders put forward in their replies to the Stakeholder Questionnaire are reliability, mentioning its sources, understandability, relevance, high quality, and validated and proven data. One stakeholder noted that this differed per information type (newly gathered data, general information, etcetera). Another stakeholder noted not to set demands on information, because they had no clear goals (e.g. as in the covenant packaging materials and energy, where some clear goal is set). Furthermore, a stakeholder mentioned that the information had to be cheap or for free. 52

Citizens in the Citizen Questionnaire mention various similar requirements. The most often heard relate to objectivity and reliability, mentioning its sources, and clarity of the information. Citizens generally consider information from scientists to be the most reliable, but also the most complex and difficult to understand. They call for more clarity. This does not need to mean they call for simplicity, as there is a difference between explaining something in an understandable way (e.g. by not using a lot of scientific language) and simplifying or over-simplifying a problem. Another stakeholder reported to need information in the form of digital data sets. One of the greatest problems (mentioned by practically all stakeholders) for stakeholders’ demands for climate change related information is the incredibly large amount of available information and sources. This results in a difficulty in finding information that is useful for the stakeholder, that is specific, and to get this operational and to understand the trend. It is also difficult to find information that is understandable and appeals to the target audience and normal people. On the other hand, it is also difficult to establish an overview of the stakeholders and specific end-users in The Netherlands. The citizens in the Citizen Questionnaire differ greatly in opinion on the amount of information supplied. Some consider it to be too little; others say it is too much: “Ik vind de informatie nog te weinig.” “… there is too much info, wildly spread, with no real line. Everybody has an opinion, but which info is true”

Others give a moderated response, noting that there is much information supplied, but that there is even more to be obtained if one actively looks for it: “Op zich krijg je veel voorgeschoteld, maar als je meer wilt weten zul je toch zelf verder moeten zoeken.”

Probably, this difference in opinion is either related to the extent to which people have actually searched for information and to the content of the information supplied. People who actively look find an incredible amount of information and people who do not actively look receive much less. Furthermore, people might be supplied with a lot of information on the problem itself, but not on the more relevant personal options (see previous paragraph). Summarizing, the main demand for the form of the information are reliability. Large problems seem to arise in that there is too much information, too many sources, and the information is too complex. 3.4.3 Demand: Medium

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Literature The study on application of climate forecasts in agriculture in Florida showed that end users trust information communicated by a trusted source. Feedback from interactions with farmers and agribusinesses overwhelmingly indicated that they had strong relationships with extension and that they trusted their extension contacts to provide sound information to them (Jagtap et al., 2002). Stakeholders trust information coming from a trusted source, with which they have strong relationships. Questionnaires The participants to the Stakeholder Questionnaire and Citizen Questionnaire offer a much better view on the demanded media than the scientific literature does. Stakeholders currently obtain their information from open (scientific literature), Internet and other digital media, reports, newsletters, newspapers and other magazines, verbal sources and meetings, project proposals. One stakeholder also mentioned to self-generate part of the needed information. Important sources include research institutes such as the RIVM, KNMI, and universities. International sources such as IPCC, UNFCCC, and the EU were mentioned as well. Furthermore, municipalities and ministries were mentioned. Several respondents noted to obtain information from general sources (mass media), sometimes using this as only source. Information was also obtained through participation in research programs. Many stakeholders mentioned to obtain information from various networks in science, policy, and companies. Summarizing, the main media used by stakeholders are meetings, conferences and other verbal sources, and electronic media such as websites and electronic newsletters. The main sources are scientific institutes and governments. Existing networks of those sources seem to be of particular importance. This also seems related to the demand for a trusted source, as mentioned in literature. Stakeholders have strong relations with parties within these networks and will therefore probably trust them. Several other organizations were noted that have an interest in their climate change related activities and decisions, or the information that is needed for them. These include universities, government agencies (KNMI, RIVM), ministries, provinces, municipalities, insurance and finance companies, housing corporations, companies, civilians, project developers, consultancies, humanitarian organizations, internal departments, and colleague organizations. A stakeholder mentioned NGOs and the public to be able to supply information on natural archives. Energy companies were considered to be able to supply specific numbers on energy use, but the do not do this due to competition and company secrets. VROM, companies offering technologies, and companies capable of implementing

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technologies were also seen as capable of providing useful information, but this was inhibited due to the lack of interaction between provinces and companies. With respect to the media used, respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire noted television, newspapers, friends, radio, Internet, and school as the media through which they received information on climate change. Television and newspapers, and to some extent radio and school, were considered to be the most useful. These results are visualized in Figure 5: Citizens and media: used and useful. 80 76

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Figure 5: Citizens and media: used and useful

TV and newspapers were considered to be useful because they reach a large audience, and result in people actually noticing and paying attention to it. Some similar points were mentioned for radio and schools. TV was considered useful because of its audio-visual nature and because it captures the attention. Newspapers were considered useful because many people read the paper and because they can choose to read it anytime they want and they are able to give more information. As source of the information, citizens mainly reported scientists, government, and environmental groups. Journalists and “various” were mentioned to some extent as well. These results are visualized in Figure 6: Citizens' information sources.

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Figure 6: Citizens' information sources

Environmental groups and the government were considered to be very unreliable and scientists to be trustworthy, but overly complicated and to provide too much information in their communication (see also subparagraph 4.3.5 Trust and climate change). As a result of the large number of people considering environmental groups and governments to be a major source, they usually considered communication to be very biased. Scientists were considered to be the most useful and reliable source of information. Perhaps a well-known face with which citizens already have a strong relationship, with regards to weather and predictions, is the KNMI, the Dutch Meteorological Office. One stakeholder also specifically called for the KNMI to provide more information regarding climate change to the public. Overall, organized stakeholders seem to prefer Internet (websites, electronic newsletters, and e-mail) and existing networks of organizations as media to receive their information from. The networks are probably related to the call for a trusted source as medium. Citizens prefer television and newspapers as media, because they easily reach people (without the need to go and look for information on the internet). The demand for a trusted source is also very strong here. Citizens don’t really trust pressure groups and governments, but put more faith in the scientists.

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3.5 Stakeholders: effects of climate change As part of the Stakeholder Questionnaire, the participating stakeholders were asked if they had observed any effects on their sector or activity that may have been caused by climate change, and what the possible effects would be possible for them due to present and future climate change. These questions are relevant to both the supply of information because it is an observation or expectation that could be relevant to other parties. It is also relevant to demand of information, because this effect may trigger a demand for a certain kind of information. 3.5.1 Stakeholders: observed effects With respect to observed impacts of climate change today, stakeholders noted various ecosystem impacts, such as coral bleaching, shifting of climate zones, changes in ecosystems, melting of a part of the ice of the North Pole. Others noted an increase in disaster and extreme weather related effects, such as diseases, droughts, floods, a general increase in the occurrence of weather related disasters, and changes in the type and severity of geo-hazards. This is in line with conclusions of both insurance companies, aid organizations, and scientists that weather is becoming more extreme (KNMI, 2003), stormier in some places (Met Office Hadley Centre, 2003), has larger impacts (Munich Re, 1999), and that not only the financial and economic damage of weather related disasters is increasing (Munich Re, 1999), but also the number of weather related disasters per year and the number of people affected (IFRC, 2001; IFRC, 2002; IFRC, 2003; Van Aalst and Helmer, 2003). An example graph of the increase in number of weather related disasters was shown on the website of the Red Cross / Red Crescent Climate Centre (http://www.climatecentre.org). This graph is shown in Figure 7: Number of reported disasters (IFRC, 2001), below as well.

Figure 7: Number of reported disasters (IFRC, 2001)

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Stakeholders also noted less cold winters and related decrease of energy use, and warmer springs and summers and related higher gains for the food sector. Furthermore, there is an increase in awareness and perceived importance of energy issues and conservation. Effects among insurance, reinsurance and other financial companies were noted as well, as was also noted in scientific literature (Munich Re, 1999; Salt, 2000). Overall, companies seem to mention mainly financial effects, NGOs ecosystem effects, and other organization types mainly disaster and extreme weather related effects. 3.5.2 Stakeholders: possible effects Stakeholders noted various possible effects, both drawbacks and benefits, due to present or future climate change. With respect to drawbacks of climate change, with respect to ecosystems, stakeholders noted shifts in climate zones, upsetting of nature, extreme rain resulting in erosion, overly rapid sea level rise resulting in loss of coastal wetlands, and non-linear effects. Stakeholders also noted disaster and extreme weather related effects, including damage to buildings, dykes and agriculture, droughts, floods, and plagues. These effects were also related to the financial impacts of those, especially on provinces and national government. Other financial impacts were also noted, ranging from the costs of making policy (also in terms of manpower and effort) to higher credit and insurance risks, costs of emission reduction measures. Stakeholders also mentioned possible difficulties with transport demands, higher cooling demands, the need to raise dykes, and the need to change spatial planning and the difficulty of doing so. Benefits were also mentioned. These included new options for products and services, possibly more room for nature due to flood risks, a more serious approach and more opportunities for sustainable energy and energy conservation, and a higher priority among government and public servants. Several effects that were less well definable as drawback or benefit were also mentioned: changes in crop use and yield that can either increase or decrease, the creation of tradable emission rights, cooperation with other parties, and the creation of natural archives preserved in the geological record. The topics mentioned per stakeholder type are less definable than in the previous subparagraph. Almost all organization types mentioned financial impacts due to various reasons. This could indicate a broadly carried high relevance of financial information.

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3.6 Comparison and overcoming the differences This paragraph will try to give an answer on the questions: “What are the differences between supply and demand of information, in the communication processes between different stakeholders?” and “How can these differences be overcome?” The amount of literature on this subject is very limited, as was mentioned in subparagraph 3.1.4 Choice of literature. For as far the demand of information was concerned, two studies could be found on stakeholders in the climate change issue in general: the studies of Van der Sluijs et al. (2001) and Cohen (1997). In order to obtain more information, this paragraph will also take a look at a study on a specific sector of climate change, coastal management (Klein et al., 1999), a presentation on uncertainty communication (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001), a study on uncertainties in climate change (Moss and Schneider, 2000), two studies on seasonal climate forecasting for use in agriculture (Jagtap et al., 2002; Hammer et al., 2001), and a study on watershed management and the web (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The most relevant conclusions of the studies in literature and the outcome of the Stakeholder Questionnaire will be mentioned, structured according to Paragraph 1.2 The communication process into three characteristics of information: content, form, and medium. 3.6.1 Matching: Content Literature Although most studies focus on a global spatial scale, because of the increasing uncertainty with decreasing scale level, assessment of vulnerability to climate change to a wide range of regional climate change scenarios is possible at any spatial scale. This seems the best way to proceed with climate risk assessment (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). After the presentation of the IPCC Third Assessment Report, stakeholders were asked to write down the most salient or striking observations they had made with respect to the (policy) relevance of the information. One of the major observations were that climate risk assessment was biased in several ways: non-linearity and surprise were under-addressed, worst case scenarios were not included, possible impacts beyond 4 oC and below 0 oC were not addressed, assessments do not look past 2100, the focus is on the state of the climate while the trajectory of accelerated climate change is more important, and normative, ethical and emotional dimensions of climate risks are not addressed while the policy relevance of these dimensions was considered high (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Furthermore, assessments failed to clearly address causal links by which extreme weather events, including intense precipitation and droughts, are linked to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). There also is a problem in communicating the high sense of urgency among scientists to society. On the other hand, stakeholders don’t put much effort in informing themselves (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001).

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Criticism on scientific substance of the IPCC assessments by “opponents” in nonscientific forums is not adequately dealt with (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). A sample of Dutch stakeholders considered it a key task to publicly refute scientifically indefensible arguments and to balance biased views on climate change as a few greenhouse skeptics put them forward. (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). At the same time they argued that, scientists need to be more open in the communication of uncertainties (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Extreme events and worst-case scenarios should get a more prominent role in risk communication (van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The effectiveness of measures needs to be better addressed (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Although uncertainties in climate projections for use in agriculture are important, within the issue of climate change they seem less relevant. Uncertainty is not equivalent to relevance (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Stakeholder values are considered more important (Cohen, 1997). Stakeholder support for climate policy does not require the elimination of scientific uncertainty (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). However, being cognizant of uncertainty still seems important (Cohen, 1997) and the communication of uncertainty is considered to be critical in policy formulation (Joyce, 2003). Therefore, although the issue of uncertainty should not be considered to be a primary issue, it should still be taken into account. Uncertainty is a relevant issue when considering, designing and implementing flexible strategies, that can be adjusted to include new knowledge and insights (Klein et al., 1999). Information that is considered relevant, relates to controllability and seriousness of impacts. Stakeholders prefer information on impacts that are both destructive and controllable (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). A presentation on communication of uncertainty noted that several points should be considered. While scientists often consider uncertainty a weakness, it’s actually a normal characteristic of scientific work. There should be a statement of uncertainties, the implications for policy and social context should be noted, the relation with risk (consequences for different risk management strategies) should be noted, other studies (if any) should be cited, and the background of the results (e.g. references, background documents, etc.) should be noted as well (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001). Scientific propaganda should be avoided, as communication of uncertainty is not the same as creating public understanding of science (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001). Metaphors and explanatory frameworks are helpful but may be misleading, “crystal balls” should be avoided, and audience and issues should be taken seriously (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001). More focus will need to be put on the consequences of failing to control emissions (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Cohen, 1997). However, the economic and social costs of impacts and the benefits of adaptation measures are difficult to determine. This difficulty usually results in stakeholders focusing on mitigation alone, without recognizing the cost of inaction (Cohen, 1997). This leap from an initial indicator of stress, such as rising temperatures, to mitigation, allows “opponents” to do the same. It enables them to focus their attacks on uncertainties in temperature projections, rather than to face the broader and more numerous interests associated with potential impacts of scenarios of climate

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change and other changes (political, economic and technological), such as lifestyle and policy shifts required to reduce vulnerabilities and achieve sustainability (Cohen, 1997). Better information on climate change damage is of higher economic value than similar improvements in information on mitigation, the temperature-CO2 relation and the carbon cycle (Cohen, 1997). The desired attributes of an assessment of a “what if” question might be: impacts described by science in an interdisciplinary framework, forward looking but cognizant of uncertainties, includes direct and indirect impacts of current climate and climate change scenarios and a more holistic assessment of the costs of inaction, focuses on places and issues instead of disciplines and tools, and includes input from stakeholders in planning and research (Cohen, 1997). In order to realize this, awareness and understanding need to be raised among regional stakeholders and social scientists and a useful approach needs to be found for incorporating local knowledge into the assessment (Cohen, 1997). Desired attributes of a “so what” or “what should be done” question would be: defined by stakeholders in a multi-objective framework, forward looking but cognizant of current policy instruments and tools, focuses on places and issues including those that may represent obstacles to response, and includes input from scientists as part of a new dialogue with stakeholders (Cohen, 1997). Largest problem with these questions is that the leap from initial indicator to mitigation needs to be overcome. Furthermore, the leap of sustainability advocates, who propose measures that might increase vulnerability to climate change especially increased use of renewable resources, needs to be addressed (Cohen, 1997). Computer-based models, although limited in their ability to describe how regions and people relate to climate change, can serve to integrate the various direct and indirect impacts. People will react to the combined effects of climate change on land and water resources (Cohen, 1997). In the process of the assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change, as described in the IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations and it’s elaboration in the UNEP Handbook on Methods for Climate Change Impact Assessments and Adaptation Strategies, several elements were considered missing. These elements were: the interaction between climate change and other pressures in determining impact potential, public perception and awareness of climate change and its impacts, spatial and temporal planning of adaptation measures, mechanisms for public involvement, non-technical (i.e., economic, legal, institutional) aspects of adaptation, and tools and procedures to evaluate adaptation performance (Klein et al., 1999). Assessing those elements will give a more complete picture of a country’s adaptive capacity. However, there is little guidance on how to obtain information on those elements. This can be accomplished if researchers and policymakers will work together to further develop and test the framework for assessment and adaptation (Klein et al., 1999). The studies on application of climate information in agriculture showed the need for information related to feasibility of various options. Initial studies only focused on possibilities. Professional advisers have played a key-linking role in this iterative process of balancing supply (possibility) with demand (feasibility) (Hammer et al., 2001).

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In order to provide this information, model simulations can be done and the outcomes of these analyses can be used as basis for discussions of scenarios being considered by farmers. Scenario analysis converts raw climate data into likely outcomes of decisions and in that way provides the key link between forecast and its application. A probabilistic statement about the coming season is often too far from the implications on decision options (Hammer et al., 2001). The analysis proves to be a useful and significant input to the discussion, but must be placed in context of other factors (Hammer et al., 2001). Simulations can be prepackaged by awareness and anticipation of key issues, but this requires close interaction with farmers and advisers. Where greater flexibility is required, such as in rotational issues or applications in specific fields, simulations must be tailored to meet the requirements (Hammer et al., 2001). Another study however claims that farmers, ranchers, and extension advisers had good ideas of how to vary management if they had good forecasts, although the interest in climate forecasts varied from highly optimistic to skeptical (Jagtap et al., 2002). Interactions with stakeholders also showed that there was a considerable diversity among farmers in the lead-time requirements of climate forecasts and perceived flexibility to adjust management in response to those forecasts (Jagtap et al., 2002). Interest seemed greatest in predictions on to anomalies in precipitation (Jagtap, 2002; Hammer, 2001) and freeze and frost events (Jagtap et al., 2002). The studies show a need for a more regional approach. Impacts, interactions with other issues, and feasibility of management options will need more attention. Current studies are also very focused on issues on which consensus can easily be reached, while more controversial issues can be much more policy relevant. Stakeholders mentioned the need for science to counter “opponents” of climate change policy, who dominate the media with scientifically indefensible arguments. Questionnaires The Stakeholder Questionnaire and Citizen Questionnaire noted several things, with respect to content, that could use improvement. Many supply and demand related problems seem related to a lack of awareness or priority. These things could be improved if climate change receives a more prominent position on the public agenda. One way to do this is to improve media attention for the issue. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4: Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication. One stakeholder notes that there is a lack of clear and consistent government policy, and therefore no clear goal. Due to that nothing can be improved about the demand. Another stakeholder notes that financial risks, loss of value, costs of damage, and costs of policy per sector need a much better foundation. Furthermore, as was also mentioned in the literature part of this study, scientific information is often much too general (global averages instead of regional) and on a

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much too long time scale. Although difficult, further improvement on these issues will be important. With regards to citizens, communication will need to put a much larger focus on the available options. Information to citizens seems to focus most of all on the issue itself. For citizens, the available options may be more relevant. For organized stakeholders, information on options and barriers to options is also very important. Overall, more information on options and policy, risk and impacts/damage, and other stakeholders is needed. 3.6.2 Matching: Form Literature In a discussion following the presentation of the IPCC Third Assessment Report, stakeholders and scientists considered risk communication to be the major area of improvement in climate risk assessment (van der Sluijs et al., 2001). A large part of this deals with communication in general and to the public. This part it is discussed in Chapter 4: Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication. The fact that most climate risk assessment studies are published in English hampers the dissemination of scientific knowledge amongst Dutch stakeholder communities (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Due to the international nature of science, assessments are published in English. Dutch studies, especially regional ones, could however include a summary and perhaps the major conclusions of a report in Dutch as well. For summaries, this is already a practice in PhD theses. According to policymakers, scientists should communicate the policy meaning of the knowledge instead of what they think policymakers should know to scientifically understand the issue. Scientists should contribute to the process of attributing policy meaning to research findings and actively engage in the social debate. They should not make only objective statements of what they know, but also normative statements of what they think and feel about the risks of climate change (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). A presentation on uncertainty communication notes that, in order to avoid information divide, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation, several aspects will need to be taken into account considering the language used to communicate uncertainty (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001). Language as considered in that presentation is part of the form characteristic as used in this report. These aspects are that information should be jargon free or “jargon explained” as much as possible, that there should be consistent guidelines to facilitate clear and consistent use of terms, that the style of communication should be value explicit and indeterministic, and that ignorance should be acknowledged instead of being vague (Guimarães Pereira and Corral Quintana, 2001). A paper by Moss and Schneider (2000) describes several ways to communicate uncertainties and the state of knowledge on issues. One way to do this, is to use

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probability distributions, graphs showing the likelihood of various things. For easy comparison, these distributions can be converted into “box plots” (Figure 8: Box Plot (modified from Hammer et al., 2001)), basically a probability distribution seen from above. In a box-plot, the ranges are visualized where an outcome is 95% likely to be in, the range where its 50% likely to be in, the average outcome and the median, the most probable outcome. Plots can easily be shown together, allowing for a quick comparison (Moss and Schneider, 2000). Another graphical approach is a “radar plot” or “snowflake chart” (Figure 9: Radar Plot (Moss and Schneider, 2000)), which displays an increasing area with an increasing amount of knowledge or certainty. Knowledge and certainty are shown on several criteria, such as theory, observations, consensus, and model results, (Moss and Schneider, 2000). A verbal approach is an option as well. One could fix a percentage of chance to a particular likelihood. For example, very likely is 90% or more chance, practically certain is more than 99% chance, etc. One could use this approach to describe chance, confidence in a particular conclusion, consensus on an issue, or the state of knowledge on an issue. Combinations are possible as well, e.g. an issue with high consensus and a large amount of evidence can be called “established”, while the opposite would be “speculative” and low consensus but a lot of evidence “competing explanations” (Moss and Schneider, 2000). Verbal representations of uncertainty and state of knowledge have been used extensively in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001d). A sample of Dutch stakeholders noted that they considered a verbal representation in terms of “confidence” clearer than one in terms of “likeliness” (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). Recent research has shown problems with the use of specific language to describe uncertainty and probability ranges, possibly resulting in miscommunication (Patt and Schrag, 2003). The problem with the verbal representation as used in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a-d), is that it uses these words differently from the way users typically do. Intuitively, people use language such as “likeliness” to describe both probability and magnitude of risk, and they expect communicators to do the same (Patt and Schrag, 2003). This results in readers biasing the probability of low magnitude effects upwards and of high magnitude effects downwards and may overall result in an underestimation of the overall risk of climate change (Patt and Schrag, 2003). Another approach is to use scenarios. One could do this verbally by e.g. describing possible effects for both a best case and a worse case scenario (and possibly a best guess scenario) and by using models (see Schlumpf et al., 2001; Pahl-Wostl, 2000). The last approach can also show the various reasons of those uncertainties and the relative effect of those on the outcome.

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Figure 8: Box Plot (modified from Hammer et al., 2001)

Figure 9: Radar Plot (Moss and Schneider, 2000)

A point mentioned in the agriculture research, was the need to stress the probabilistic nature of climate predictions. Hammer (2001) notes that a gap exists between researchers’ and farmers’ concepts of the probabilistic nature of climate forecasts and decision outcomes. Management optimized to the predicted climate in the coming season, will not always result in higher yields. Adjusting management will pay off in the long run, but not on every occasion. A prediction isn’t a certain thing, but a shift in the odds. If this point is not understood, farmers might get disappointed and lose trust in forecasts if the yields are worse than expected (Hammer et al., 2001) This problem should be communicated in a clear, simple, and transparent way, that is relevant to the decision maker. A way past this communication problem would be to use representations of the forecast that are inherently probabilistic. One could plot a time series of yields, showing that although the yield in a certain season, using certain

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management options and crops, is usually, but not always, above average (Figure 10: Time series of yields (Hammer et al., 2001)). Another and probably even clearer way is to plot the difference between a tactical strategy (optimizing strategy to the seasonal forecasts) and a fixed overall best strategy (Figure 11: Time series of difference in yields, tactical and fixed (Hammer et al., 2001)). This graph clearly shows higher than average yields in most years, although sometimes the yield is significantly below average (Hammer et al., 2001). Box plots were also used to show probability of various yields and their uncertainties, under certain management conditions, for various El-Niño phases (Hammer et al., 2001).

Figure 10: Time series of yields (Hammer et al., 2001)

Figure 11: Time series of difference in yields, tactical and fixed (Hammer et al., 2001)

A possible use of this type of graph could be to show the probabilistic nature of yearly temperature: that an average warming does not mean it is warm every year. An example of this could be Figure 12: Time series of temperature in De Bilt and the world (KNMI, 2003), showing the yearly average temperature, deviation from the average over 19611990, and a line for the 10-year average. Other examples could include the number of yearly or decadal outbreaks of diseases, hot spells, and insurance damages (see e.g. Munich Re, 1999). This graph could be extended with a future scenario, showing a line in a different color for the expected average temperature, and an example yearly average. It will need to be stressed that it is an example yearly average, not a calculated one. Such an approach, comparing local and world average temperatures might also be used to show that it is much easier to predict decadal world average than to predict day-to-day regional temperature. Skeptics sometimes state that one “cannot tell the weather accurately day to 66

day, no less than a year or a decade in advance”, relating to normal weather forecasting (Martin, 2000).

Figure 12: Time series of temperature in De Bilt and the world (KNMI, 2003)

The studies on application of climate information in agriculture also stressed the importance of including all stakeholders, including farmers, advisers, analysts/modelers, and researchers, in the process of analysis and discussion. This helps in defining critical issues as seen by decision makers, introduce new possibilities, and to generate credibility for results from modeling and analysis (Hammer et al., 2001). The study in Florida presented a forecast and advisory, including a color-coded map showing the risk for freeze events with a minimum of –7 oC during a neutral year, compared to La Niña and El Niño years (Figure 13: Risk map of odds of freeze events with minimum -7 oC (Jagtap et al., 2002)) of varying thresholds, a short discussion of the forecast and the general winter jet stream patterns associated with the different phases of the El-Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The form of this forecast was based on input from extension advisers and growers on what information is useful and easily understood (Jagtap et al., 2002).

Figure 13: Risk map of odds of freeze events with minimum -7 oC (Jagtap et al., 2002)

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This color-coding approach to present risks has also been used in the Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001b) to indicate the level of risk associated with various temperatures (Figure 14: Risk diagram: risks associated with various temperatures (IPCC, 2001b)) in the climate change issue. This approach gives an easy and quick overview of risks and can be used in a variety of ways, including geographical representations of the spread of risk over an area, as in Figure 13: Risk map of odds of freeze events with minimum -7 oC (Jagtap et al., 2002). A respondent to the Stakeholder Questionnaire noted that these vulnerability maps are in use already. The respondent also noted that these maps however do not show why people live in those areas, and that that question will need to be answered in order to get a clear view on how to improve the resilience of people in that area to climate change. Discussions with citizens on the usefulness of this figure (see Appendix C: Discussion risk diagram) did point out that the amount of lines in the graph was too much to be easily understood. Better was to draw only a best case and worst case scenario.

Figure 14: Risk diagram: risks associated with various temperatures (IPCC, 2001b)

The studies show several points for improvement and options. Most reports are in English, which can hamper communication with stakeholders whose native tongue is another language. It might be good idea, especially for national or regional issues, to at least include a summary and perhaps the major conclusions of a research project in the native tongue. Scientists should communicate policy meaning instead of what they think policymakers and stakeholders should know to scientifically understand the subject. The probabilistic nature of climate, models and forecasts, and uncertainties associated with them should be well communicated. Options for this include probability distributions, box-plots, radar plots, verbal representations, time-series, and color-coded risk maps.

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Questionnaires The Stakeholder Questionnaire and the Citizen Questionnaire noted important problems, with respect to form, that will need to be overcome. The most important problem to be faced concerning climate change information seems to be the overly large amount of information and sources. Stakeholders would be helped if they were provided with an easy to use overview of information that is relevant to them. Perhaps one central information system could be set up, but this would require a very large amount of effort. A system containing links to relevant sources would be an easier and less costly option. Such a system would require the information to be easily searchable using keywords, or to list information in various categories, subjects, and forms of display. While such as system can’t be hand-tailored to the individual needs of users, it will need to be easily and quickly navigable. Perhaps a standard set of immediately displayed subjects could be provided, e.g. per stakeholder type and/or sector, which the stakeholders can modify themselves. Providing summaries of information that are easy to read and use by the end-users and general public, will be a useful development with respect to this issue as well, also to prevent misinterpretation by mass media. Some help on this for scientists would be very useful, as was also suggested in (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Providing specific numbers on energy issues, e.g. the amount of energy that is used or the amount of CO2 reduction achieved by measures, would help to clarify energy issues. However, problems for obtaining such numbers, such as current company secrets, may not be overcome through communication. Citizens consider it important for information to be reliable and to clearly mention its sources. Regarding the current perception that the information is largely biased, this seems to be an important point to improve. Clarity of the information (not necessarily simplicity), as supplied by scientists, is another point that deserves a lot of attention. With regard to the citizens, opinions differ on the amount of information supplied. Considering the perceived lack of information on options, one can conclude that the relevance of the information supplied to citizens will need to be improved. Summarizing, the most important problem with respect to form, is that there is too much information, too many sources, and the information is too complicated. Researchers will need to be assisted to improve this. 3.6.3 Matching: Medium Literature Communication of research findings and uncertainties by scientists towards stakeholders and society was perceived as poor (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Suggestions put forth by stakeholders included to train scientists in communication and empathy, and to employ

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intermediates specialized in risk communication to communicate findings and policy meaning (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Communication can be further improved by further development of extended peer review (involving non-experts, stakeholders, etc. in various stages of the research), initiating comparative assessments on specific topics, and inviting specific target groups to articulate and interactively discuss their information needs in small settings (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). In participatory integrated assessment, steering committee composed of scientists and stakeholders could facilitate communication between both scientists and stakeholders (vertical integration) and scientists of various disciplines (horizontal integration) (Cohen, 1997). Such a steering committee could also define critical issues, critical regions within a study area, identify scenarios, and review and rank research proposals for subprojects (Cohen, 1997). If stakeholders are not part of the early stages of the research, such as the selection of scenarios and study area boundaries, choices made by study leaders can arouse suspicion among stakeholders who may have different visions of the future or the processes operation at their scale of a sector or region (Cohen, 1997). The entry of new ideas into the policy agenda is facilitated by processes that allow for discussion of a wide variety of perspectives. This is best met through participation of all interested parties in research priority setting, conduct, communication and application (Cohen, 1997). Regional scientist-stakeholder collaboratives are more likely to describe the indirect implications of climate change, which may be more costly than the direct impacts. This approach could provide a valuable source of information for global scale Integrated Assessment Models as well (Cohen, 1997). Regional scale integrated assessment can identify climate related concerns that may be hidden at continental or global scales (Cohen, 1997). Stakeholders proposed several things to improve communication between scientists and stakeholders: production of “plain language” reports, establishment of a regionally based structure to serve as information source on global environmental issues, support for community based monitoring programs, and encouragement of efforts to facilitate collaboration between research projects in different regions (Cohen, 1997). The importance to communicate the information through a trusted source, the extension advisers in the case of the study on application of climate forecasts in agriculture in Florida, was stressed. With a source, trusted by the end users, as an intermediate in communication, a much larger impact can be realized (Jagtap et al., 2002). Jagtap (2001) concluded that the active and early involvement of agencies with strong established relationships and trust with end users is required to improve chances of delivering operational applications of climate information. Involvement of the trusted source in research and communication served a variety of purposes, both in research and in communication itself: the trusted source serves as a successful resource for transferring research findings into practical technologies and could serve as a model (Jagtap et al., 2002), the trusted source provides an infrastructure for obtaining research and interview contacts and other interactions with end users, for delivering information, and for evaluating the effectiveness of the information delivery (Jagtap et al., 2002), the trusted source will help legitimize research and research findings in the eyes of end users (Jagtap

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et al., 2002), and interactions with the trusted source will provide an iterative bridging process between researchers and end-users, improving research priorities and understanding of the perspective of decision makers and what influences those perspectives (Jagtap, 2002; Hammer, 2001). The Internet can be a tool in providing climate forecast information. As shown in the case of the Florida Automatic Weather Network (FAWN), a weather site can be used to provide climate forecast information, such as graphs of mean monthly temperature and precipitation anomalies, and probabilistic presentations of monthly climate variables, expressed as smoothed histograms or time series plots (Jagtap et al., 2002). Information can be provided through real-time weather data, a weather or climate data archive, tactical and strategic management and decision aids for general or specific commodities or clientele, educational materials, and training programs for both the users and their advisers (Jagtap et al., 2002). The Voinov and Costanza study (1999) considered the Internet to be a promising medium for research, policymaking, and providing information to the public. Internet is a medium with a large audience is relatively cheap (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). It can be used to communicate data and modelling results to stakeholders and to solicit, process, and organize feedback from citizens (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The efficacy of interaction can be seen as a function of the information that is shared and used by all stakeholders. It often depends not as much on the quality and amount of information available, but rather on how well this information is distributed, shared and used. The Internet can play a large roll in this (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The Internet is open, interactive, fast, spatially distributed, hierarchical, and flexible (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). Users can interact with it either indirect, via e-mail, or direct through forms, and modify content and format, order excerpts form databases, provide scenarios for model runs, post summaries of their own activities, or provide additional information in response to published requests or as representation of their own findings, opinions and concerns. A website can also represent substructures, e.g. going from global to national to regional levels or sectors and sub-sectors, by grouping these into various user-groups or folders (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The same concept can be applied to e.g. different organization types. Structuring in such a way, information and interaction can be regulated, some of it open to all, some read-only, some readable or modifiable only by specific groups. This provides for the necessary extent of privacy and discretion (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The structure of a website could be as show in Figure 15: Example website structure (modified from Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The website can be used to list activities and concerns of all the various stakeholders and allow them to represent themselves on separate stakeholder pages. In this way, all the varying concerns can be summarised at one website, which could play an important part in the process of building consensus (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). Discussions can be held online, using a bulletin board. They can be open to the public and other stakeholders, who can follow them and participate, and participants don’t need to travel to meetings (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). In order to make a case, participants

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can use social, physical, and ecological data from a database and use online modelling tools or data processing techniques (Voinov and Costanza, 1999).

Figure 15: Example website structure (modified from Voinov and Costanza, 1999)

The study by Voinov and Costanza (1999) does show considerable inertia among web users and a very limited participation of the public. One of the reasons they mentioned for this was that the efforts to guide stakeholders to the site were inadequate (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). Commercial websites are advertised and cross-referenced on a multitude of media outlets, increasing the number of visitor to those sites. No advertising had been undertaken for this website, resulting in the stakeholders hardly being aware of its existence (Voinov and Costanza, 1999). The studies conclude that peer review and stakeholder and citizen participation in research can improve communication between scientists and stakeholders and citizens and scientists of different disciplines. These collaboratives are also more able to describe regional impacts. Communicating through a trusted source is seen as important, because the strong relations and trust between this source and the stakeholders or citizens will improve the effectiveness of the communication. Internet is a useful tool in research and communication, but a website’s existence will need to be well communicated and advertised through various media. Questionnaires

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The Stakeholder Questionnaire and Citizen Questionnaire show several problems and implications with respect to medium. Lack of interaction is another major problem for successful communication. Perhaps this could be improved through regional initiatives, such as regional assessments and public and stakeholder participation in these initiatives. This might improve perception of each other’s available and needed information, as well as point out that there currently is an interaction problem and raise awareness among stakeholders in general. Perhaps existing networks could help to improve interaction, or maybe more regional networks will have to be created. A province notes in the Stakeholder Questionnaire that there should be much more contact with the parties in the market that supply technologies and that can implement measures. Companies of small and medium size currently deal mainly with the municipalities, because they are the authorities supplying environmental permits to them. The province is not a natural partner for communication. Larger companies, for whom the province is the permit supplier, do have good contacts with the province. Contacts with the municipalities seem good as well. The ministries send information with a much higher aggregation level. An option mentioned by stakeholders was that the municipalities and permit suppliers should supply information on interested companies. However, these organizations have many environmental problems to focus on and energy does not top this list. Another stakeholder notes that the knowledge is located mainly among a few people. This results in an importance to retain this knowledge when such an employee leaves. With regard to the citizens, television and newspapers seem the most useful media, especially for initial communication. They reach a large audience and attract attention. Such initial communication products should provide useful information (especially newspaper articles) and possibly point to sources for more information, e.g. on the Internet. Considering citizens’ large distrust for environmental groups and government, there will be an important task for scientists in the communication process. They will however need to work on their clarity and the amount of information they supply. Overall, stakeholders most often use existing networks and oral communication in those networks, and Internet as useful media. These will therefore be the most useful for communication. Television and newspapers are good (initial) media for communication with citizens. Communicating through a trusted source is crucial. Citizens consider scientists the most reliable. Stakeholders probably trust the networks they are currently involved in as trustworthy.

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3.7 Discussion & conclusion Although only a limited amount of literature is available on the demand and supply of information among and to stakeholders, some conclusions can be drawn. The research questions that were meant to be answered in this chapter were: 1. What are the various stakeholders involved in the Climate Change problem? 2. What information do these stakeholders supply? 3. What information do these stakeholders demand? 4. What are the differences between supply and demand of information, in the communication processes between different stakeholders? 5. How can these differences be overcome? The first question can be adequately answered by Table 7: Stakeholder groups and their Stakeholder Sectors and Organization Types. The remaining questions will be discussed here in an integrated manner, due to the strong connection between these questions. Again, the split of information into three characteristics, content, form, and medium, as was discussed in Paragraph 1.2 The communication process, will be used. 3.7.1 Content Several studies called for a wider consideration of the climate change issue, concerning things like the relation between climate stress and other potential stresses on systems. Labour and market conditions, as well as present management techniques, laws and policy will need to be taken into account as well. The normative, ethical and emotional dimensions of climate change will need to be better addressed. Stakeholders, and especially the general public, call for information on (personal) options. Governments also call for information on barriers to those options and where they can help. Furthermore, information on other stakeholders, their positions on climate change and their information needs, are needed. Scientists are interested in information on stakeholders and end-users of their products and their specific needs. Furthermore, the modeling studies that have been done have a narrow focus. Studies do not look at possible impacts beyond 4 oC and below 0 oC, assessments do not look past 2100, and the focus is on the state of the climate while the trajectory of accelerated climate change is more important. Stakeholders also call for a greater emphasis on extreme events, including intense precipitation and droughts, scenarios with low probabilities but a high potential impact, and worst-case scenarios. It is difficult to achieve consensus on these issues and they are therefore often neglected, but their relevance to policy, stakeholders and public is high. The intense precipitation and droughts might also serve to improve imaginability of climate change. There is some discussion on the use of uncertainty information. While uncertainty does not equal relevance and will not be a problem for policy, it is important to be cognizant of it. It can be used to develop flexible policy. Citizens’ call for openness also implies a large importance for openness. Implications of uncertainties for policy and society are required, as well as consequences for risk management strategies. Citation of other

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studies and noting the background, such as references and background documents, is important in communication on uncertainties. An important point in overcoming the leap from initial indicator of stress to strategy is to give more attention to the consequences of failing to reduce emissions and the benefits of adaptation measures. Better information on climate change damage is of higher economic value than similar improvements in information on mitigation, the temperature-CO2 relation and the carbon cycle. Interesting point is that scientists directly or indirectly, provide most information, either to stakeholders or to other scientists. A few sources, such as governments and environmental organizations, provide policy information and general information to the general public, to (other) governmental organizations, and in some extent to companies. Other information streams between various stakeholders and information streams to scientists from other stakeholders were not found in literature. Research on stakeholder information demand and supply seems biased in the sense that it focuses only on information supply by scientists to other stakeholders. The Stakeholder Questionnaire Overall, provided information is biased in two ways: there is a narrow focus on issues on which consensus is easily reached, and there is a narrow focus on the middle part of the causal chain. The bias of the narrow focus is in principle possible to be overcome by communication on these issues, although the reasons for absence or difficulty of establishment of consensus will need to be taken into account. The narrow focus on the middle part will be much less easily overcome, because this is due mainly to technical issues. Deeper cause such as culture and values are difficult to model and exposure and resulting damage requires highly detailed regional modeling, which is still problematic at the moment as well. Still, noticing that this problem exists is the first step to solving it and the process of solving it will no doubt require much more communication among stakeholders as well. 3.7.2 Form Several studies considered the use of computer models a useful technique. Model simulations can be done in order to provide information related to feasibility of various management or policy options and a discussion can result from those modeling results. Computer-based models, although limited in their ability to describe how regions and people relate to climate change, can serve to integrate the various direct and indirect impacts. People will react to the combined effects of climate change on land and water resources Simulations can show the stakeholders what the effects of climate change will be for them and allows them to design useful and effective adaptation and mitigation strategies. It is a key link between a forecast of future climate and the implications. This leap is too large to take intuitively. Furthermore, this leap from an initial indicator of stress, such as rising temperatures, to mitigation or adaptation, allows “opponents” to do the same. It enables them to focus their attacks on uncertainties in temperature projections, rather than

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to face the broader and more numerous interests associated with potential impacts of scenarios of climate change and other changes. However, a study using participatory integrated assessment (Cohen, 1997) noted that during the discussion of the results, stakeholders were reacting to information provided by the separate physical, biological and socio-economic studies, instead of to the integrated modeling exercises. Three possible explanations were mentioned: the methods were not well understood by stakeholders and researchers, some models used only limited amounts of information from the mono-disciplinary studies, or results from the integrated modeling exercises were similar to what stakeholders could already get from a qualitative assessment of the sectoral studies. There are also possibilities in using models on websites, to be used for online discussions. The study on this subject (Voinov and Costanza, 1999) did note that it remained unclear to what extent the modeling and other analytical tools needed to be made available to the public, because the full model was clearly too complex for the average user to operate and interpret the results meaningfully. For public use, the model would need to be simplified or aggregated in time, space and/or structure and decomposed into separate units that can be better explained and are simpler to handle. Several studies stressed the need to emphasize the probabilistic nature of climate projections. Although these studies focused on El-Niño events and seasonal climate forecasts, the same principle could be applied in climate change communication. Through statistics on temperature, precipitation, occurrence of extreme events, yearly insurance damage, etc. presented as time-series, one could show an incline in occurrence or magnitude and at the same time note that this needs not be the case for every year, but that it is the general trend that matters. Another good way of displaying climate change related risk and uncertainty information is the use of risk maps, either regional or as function of temperature or precipitation change. These maps however don’t take into account why people live there; a point that will be very relevant to risk communication. Other options include time series, probability distributions, box plots, radar plots, verbal representations, and scenarios (both verbal and through modeling). The verbal representations however may cause problems through different interpretations of the terms they use. In communication of uncertainty, information should be jargon free or at least explained, the use of terms should be consistent, information should be value explicit and indeterministic, and ignorance should be acknowledged rather than to remain vague. The greatest problem mentioned by stakeholders in the Stakeholder Questionnaire seems to be the huge amount of available information and sources. Furthermore, the complexity of the information that is supplied by scientists is a problem to both organized stakeholders and the general public. A possible solution might be a central information system providing either the information itself or references or links to it, and to include summaries that are easier and quicker to use by stakeholders. General help for scientists in making summaries easier to understand would be very welcome. Overall, modeling and decision support systems are seen as useful. They can help to link environmental change to the implications for policy and management. There are various

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useful graphical ways to display and visualize the probabilistic nature of climate change, risk, and uncertainty. Uncertainty can also be visualized through verbal ways and verbal and modeling scenarios. A major task will be to provide a more easy way to navigate the complex and huge amount of available information and sources. A central information system with summaries and references may help. 3.7.3 Medium Virtually all studies call for a greater input from stakeholders and public into the research. This can serve to improve the relevance, improve communication through discussions on what information stakeholders need and through extended peer review, creating research questions, defining critical issues, defining study area boundaries, and creating public support and preventing resistance to management and policy measures with large consequences for the public. One of the studies expressed the urgent need to involve a trusted party to serve as an intermediate in communication and research. Information is put to better use if the source of the information is such a trusted party. Additionally, it could serve as an example and role model for communication. In the case of the Florida research, this was the extension service and its FAWN weather network. In the case of The Netherlands, the KNMI, the Dutch met office, might be a suitable actor to fulfill this role. The Citizen Questionnaire also shows a great importance for communication through a trusted source. Citizens often specifically mention to ignore information coming from sources they don’t trust. Distrust was displayed for environmental groups and also for the government as they were considered to communicate information provided by pressure groups only. More trust was displayed for scientists. An important role in communication may therefore be for them, although the clarity of their communication will need to be improved. The Internet seems to be a good candidate to provide climate change related information. Stakeholders already use Internet sources such as electronic newsletters and websites. A newsletter could be set up providing clear summaries of recent developments. A website could be initiated to host both stakeholder discussions, public or private; provide information in several degrees of difficulty, ranging from easy to read general information to expert level scientific knowledge; serve as online facility for modeling and data processing and various other uses. For effective use, it would be well advised to integrate everything, instead of providing a variety of different sites on various topics and from various sources. Having scattered information on scattered locations will confuse interested parties and limit their use of such facilities. It is possible to use different sites or servers, but in that case an umbrella website would need to be constructed to serve as interface, integrating all of the separate sites. In order to make stakeholders and public aware of a website and create (public) participation, the existence of the site would need to be well communicated, using both Internet advertising and search engines as well as other (mass) media.

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Furthermore, as point of discussion, one might ask whether or not the stand-alone use of a website as communication and information tool would be useful. Citizens indicate that they most often use media such as television and newspapers. They consider them to be the most useful as well, because they reach a large public. A website alone will probably not suffice for research and communication. In research, the social interaction between the stakeholders will not be present and it will be hard to motivate the stakeholders to participate. Gaining commitment for research will probably require things such as discussions in groups, not just offering stakeholders the chance to go to that site. It can however be used as one of an assortment of tools in the project. In communication, such a website would be more effective if its existence is well communicated, but even there advertising through other media and the incorporation of the site in a larger communication program, including things like television and radio shows and articles in magazines, would greatly improve its effectiveness. Ministries and environmental organizations also provide a lot of information to citizens through the Internet. Other often-used media are reports, such as the Third Assessment Report, including technical summaries and policymaker summaries, newspaper articles and press releases, and scientific articles and publications. Besides public participation in research and policymaking and the Internet, mass media such as television and newspapers will be the most important media for communication with citizens. For communication among organized stakeholders, the existing and often used networks will be a very important medium as well. Overall, participation and extended peer review are can be very useful media to improve research, information and communication. A trusted source is seen as very important in communication. Internet can be a very useful medium if used in combination with other methods. Television and newspapers will be important media for communication with citizens and existing networks may be important for communication among organized stakeholders.

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Chapter 4: Risk Perception, Barriers & Communication 4.1 Introduction This chapter focuses on a number of factors that influence risk perception and communication. It deals with research questions 6-8 as mentioned in the general introduction of this report in paragraph 1.5 Sub Questions. The introduction to this chapter will provide an overview of what influences risk perception and risk communication. 4.1.1 Influences on problem view and intentions Several factors have a large influence on how people perceive and frame environmental issues and on what intentions people develop towards those issues. O’Connor et al. (1999) have deducted four somewhat independent, although related, factors. These factors are: risk perceptions, knowledge, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables (O’Connor et al., 1999). Risk perceptions can be reflected in expectations that the problem will or is happening, expectations that negative consequences are likely for self and others, and knowledge of the causes of the problem (O’Connor et al., 1999). Risk perceptions can vary along various dimensions, such as dread and unknown (Slovic, 1987), impacts on species and impacts on humans (McDaniels et al., 1996), and nature and size of undesired consequences and probability or plausibility of undesired consequences (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). Environmental knowledge may increase or decrease perceived magnitude of risk and modify general environmental values (O’Connor et al., 1999). O’Connor et al. (1999) conclude that knowledge of the causes of climate change is a powerful predictor of behavioural intentions, independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Staats et al. (1996) however come to a different conclusion, stating that knowledge has hardly any effect on the intentions. While knowledge may not be the only factor influencing problem perception and intentions, it will be required to identify and implement successful options to adapt to or prevent climate change (O’Connor et al., 1999; Kempton, 1991). General environmental beliefs, as defined by O’Connor et al (1999), are “non-issue specific cognitive orientations”, including values, beliefs, attitudes, and paradigms. These views influence how people frame environmental issues (Liberatore, 1995). They are the bedrock of support for environmentally friendly or hostile behaviour and are the basis of environmental risk perceptions (O’Connor et al., 1999). This general orientation reflects awareness and concern, while risk perceptions focus this concern on specific negative outcomes (O’Connor et al., 1999).

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Values characterize a general position toward general issues, such as environmentalism, materialism/post-materialism, and social responsibility (Henschel and Wiedeman, 1993). Environmentalism has three varieties: altruistic (focus on impacts on others), egoistic (focus on impacts on self), and biospheric (focus on impacts on nature and ecology) (O’Connor et al., 1999). Beliefs refer mainly to a cognitive component (Henschel and Wiedeman, 1993). Other examples of how various scholars classify values and beliefs include the “Myths of Nature” and groupings of people from Cultural Theory. The Myths of Nature deal with whether people perceive Nature to be benign (kind or not vulnerable), tolerant, capricious (unpredictable) or ephemeral (short-lived or vulnerable) (Schwartz and Thompson, 1990). The groupings of people in Cultural Theory are egalitarian, individualist, hierarchist, and fatalist (Schwartz and Thompson, 1990). Demographic variables, such as age, gender and education, can play a role in the perception of environmental issues and development of intentions as well (O’Connor et al., 1999). Women are more likely to perceive the world as risky and would therefore be more willing to take steps. Male environmentalists are less likely to take voluntary steps (O’Connor et al., 1999). Better educated, older, men are more willing to support government policies to impose public sacrifices (O’Connor et al., 1999). This may be due simply to the tendency of men to feel comfortable with the political world and women to prefer personal approaches to public problems (O’Connor et al., 1999). While most of the influential factors mentioned above focus mainly on attitude, it is important to note that attitude is only part of the factors influencing people’s intended actions. Besides attitude, the behaviour and expectations of one’s social surroundings and one’s perception of the possibility to take actions is critical in this matter as well (Kortland et al., 2002). With respect to these influential factors, knowledge will play a role as well, since the person might not be fully aware of the actual behaviour and expectations of the social surroundings and the possible options for action. Furthermore, feedback from attempts to take action, such as the effectiveness and required effort, will influence both these factors and attitude (Kortland et al., 2002). 4.1.2 Influential factors and communication The factors that influence how people perceive risks and environmental problems and their influence on people’s willingness to take steps is obviously relevant for communication. Demographic variables and general environmental beliefs may be very hard to change. Of course any communication might slightly raise the general education level and slightly modify the general environmental beliefs. These things however be modified through the general education system. The goal of this project is not to modify this system, although the results may be relevant for it as well, and therefore these things will not be taken into further consideration. Risk perceptions and knowledge (of the causes of climate change, options, and behaviour and expectations of the social surroundings, or other relevant information) are important

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in any communication attempt. As mentioned in subparagraph 4.1.1 Influences on problem view and intentions, knowledge will be required to determine effective options for mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, it seems to be interwoven with risk perception. In Paragraph 4.2 Classic risk perception, perceptions people have of risks and climate change in particular will therefore be discussed in two main parts: risk perception, that is perception of the actual risk and impacts, and perceived causes and options. Risk perceptions and knowledge have an influence on all of the communication problems mentioned in subparagraph 1.2.3 Communication problems and the barriers in the communication chain mentioned in subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain. They might lead to a difference in supply and demand if there is a difference between risk perceptions and/or knowledge between the actors. E.g. should citizens see a problem as very threatening, they might demand information, while this might not be offered by scientists if they consider a problem not to be very risky. In reverse, if scientists consider a problem to be very threatening and urgent, as is the case with climate change, and citizens may not, this might be an information demand that citizens are not aware of or it might reflect a difference in how scientists and citizens value different aspects of the climate change issue. It might also lead to a barrier in the communication process. Different risk perceptions and knowledge will lead to a different communication message. E.g. if scientists consider the “chance of death” to be the most important aspect of a risk, this information will be communicated. If citizens have a different risk perception, this information will not be very satisfactory or relevant in the eyes of those citizens, because it fails to address the aspects that are important in their risk perception (Van de Vusse (ed), 1993; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981). This goes for all three of the barriers (deduction, communication, and implementation). Present risk perceptions and knowledge influence the way incoming information, whether coming from nature or another actor, is perceived and framed and whether it is considered relevant and reliable (Slovic et al., 1984; Slovic et al., 1981). This influences both the deduction and communication barriers. The implementation barrier can be influenced by an actor’s risk perception and knowledge, because they determine if, what, where, who, when, etc. something should be done. If a problem is not seen as risky, an actor could decide not to do anything. If climate change is seen as being caused by CFC’s alone, the proposed action will be to ban those, which should be done by the government, or not to use spray cans (see e.g. Kempton, 1997; Kempton 1991). In the coming chapter, risk perceptions and knowledge of impacts, causes and options, and communication and implementation barriers will be discussed. Deduction barriers, such as (communication on) uncertainty, have already been briefly discussed in Paragraph 3.6 Comparison and overcoming the differences. 4.1.3 Contents of this chapter This chapter aims to give an overview of the influences on and problems with communication towards the general public. Discussed information will range from

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certain communication problems to their underlying causes to ways to deal with these problems. Paragraph 4.2 Classic risk perception gives an overview of risk perception in general. Paragraph 4.3 Climate change risk perception focuses on risk perceptions of the issue of climate change in particular and the use of classic risk perception on this issue. Paragraph 4.4 Barriers & inhibitors gives an overview of the most important problems associated with climate change communication. Paragraph 4.5 Implications and options for communication gives an overview of strategies to overcome communication problems and lists options to improve communication as a whole. This paragraph deals with both risk perception and barriers and inhibitors. Paragraph 4.6 Discussion & Conclusion lists and discusses the conclusions that can be drawn on the matter of risk perception, barriers and communication. 4.1.4 Choice of literature To sufficiently answer the research questions on the matter of communication in a more general way and towards the general public, information will need to be found on risk perceptions in general and on climate change, public perceptions of causes and options for climate change, deduction barriers, communication barriers, implementation barriers, and risk communication in general and on external safety risks. A large amount of research has been done from the early 80 on, on risk perception and risk communication in general and on external safety risks. During the same period, a lot of research has been done as well on energy conservation and ways to communicate this, to get the public to participate, and on various problems arising with public energy conservation. More recently, global change risks have come to the attention of risk perception researchers, including prominent figures from the classic risk perception sciences such as Paul Slovic (see McDaniels et al., 1996). There is a lot of information available on public perceptions of climate change risk, impacts, causes, and options. A lot of research has been done on deduction barriers, especially on uncertainties. Although relevant, this research project will not aim to overcome these barriers (see Paragraph 1.2.4 Communication chain). An amount of literature is also available on communication and implementation barriers, although it is significantly less than the amount of literature on risk perceptions. The available information is more than enough to give a detailed picture of climate change risk perception and the most important barriers and inhibitors. Although there is more than enough information on risk communication on external safety risks, this will receive less attention, due to the limited time available.

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4.2 Classic risk perception In this and the next paragraph, citizens’ risk perceptions will be discussed. “Classic” risk perceptions, from research from the early 80s on, will be the focus of this paragraph. The central research question of this and the next paragraph will be: “What are the risk perceptions of the public?” 4.2.1 History From the early 80s on, a lot of research has been done on risk perception and risk communication (see e.g. Slovic et al., 1981; Slovic, 1987). During those times, industrialists and regulators noticed a perception among the public that they face more risk today than in the past and that future risks will be even greater than today’s (Slovic, 1997; Slovic, 1987). These perceptions and the opposition to technology that accompanied them have puzzled and frustrated them and they argued that the apparent pursuit of a “zero-risk society” would threaten political and economic stability (Slovic, 1987). Some risks, such as those of nuclear and chemical technologies, have been stigmatised and were seen as entailing unnaturally great risks and few benefits, in contrary to what experts believed (Slovic, 1997; Slovic, 1987). In the meanwhile, natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes (Slovic, 1997), relatively mundane risks such as car accidents (Slovic, 1997), and the risks of small dams (Slovic, 1987) were not perceived as very risky, despite of experts’ repeated warnings. At first, risk communication efforts had an emphasis on “public misperceptions of risk”, which tended to treat all deviations form expert estimates as products of ignorance or stupidity (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Initially, attempts were made to “put risks into perspective” by providing long lists of various risk comparisons, such as “living near a nuclear power plant for x years is equally risky to smoking y cigarettes” (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic 1987). These comparisons often proved to be misleading, not very satisfactory, threatening to the credibility of the risk communicator or at least very difficult to use responsibly and effectively (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981). Risk comparisons can even be counterproductive if misused (Freudenberg and Rursch, 1994). Later on, researchers noted that lay risk perceptions might not be necessarily unpredictable and unreasonable (Department of Health (UK), 1997) and that there was wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and perceptions (Slovic, 1987). Therefore, research turned to investigation of what actually does cause concern and why (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987). Researchers noted that lay people sometimes lack certain information about hazards, but that their basic conceptualisation of risk is much greater than that of experts (Slovic, 1987). This conceptualisation reflects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk assessments (Slovic, 1987). This research resulted in various “risk perception factors”, as mentioned in (Department of Health (UK), 1997), (Vlek, 1996), (Slovic et al., 1981), and (Slovic, 1987). Furthermore, several other factors have been identified that

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influence risk perceptions, such as framing effects (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997; Slovic et al., 1984; Slovic, 1981 et al.), media coverage (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Van de Vusse (ed), 1993; Tonn, 1990; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981), culture (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001; Department of Science, Technology and Society, 2000), professional and informal networks (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987), difficulty in understanding probability (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987), and various heuristics and biases (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). Besides those things, risk communication efforts can be hampered by strong initial impressions or opinions (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1984). The next step in risk communication was the realization that risk communication should be structured as a two-way process, instead of a simple one-way information transfer (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987). Initially, the reason for this was that both expert and lay perspectives had something useful to contribute and should therefore inform each other (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1987), it was not until late in the 90s that another important influence on risk perception and communication was recognized. This was the role of trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997). 4.2.2 Risk perception factors Initial work on risk perception, such as (Slovic et al., 1981) and (Slovic, 1987). This work on how people perceive risks showed that those risk meant much more to people than just “estimated annual fatalities (Slovic, 1987). Lists of hazards were compared on various characteristics, many of which are correlated. These characteristics could be represented by a total of three factors: dread risk, unknown risk, and the number of people exposed to the risk and one’s personal exposure (this factor will be referred to as exposure). Dread risk seemed to be the most important reason why a risk was considered as high, why people want a risk reduced, and why they call for strict regulation (Slovic, 1987). This factor is composed of risk characteristics such as controllability, dread, global/notglobal catastrophic, fatal/not-fatal consequences, equity (fair distribution of costs and benefits), catastrophic/individual, high/low risk to future generations, easily/not-easily reduced, risk increasing/decreasing, and voluntary/involuntary (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981). Unknown risk is a factor composed of characteristics such as observable/not-observable, known/unknown to those exposed, effects immediate/delayed, old/new risk, and risks known/unknown to science (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981). A more recent study produced a number of risk dimensions that were understood as “basic dimensions underlying the perceived riskiness of an activity or situation” (Vlek, 1996). These dimensions are potential degree of harm or fatality, physical extent of damage (area affected), social extent of damage (number of people involved), time distribution of damage (immediate and/or delayed effects), probability of undesired consequences, controllability (by self or trusted expert) of consequences, experience/familiarity/imaginability of consequences, voluntariness of exposure (freedom of choice), clarity and importance of expected benefits, social distribution of risks and benefits, and harmful intentionality (Vlek, 1996).

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In (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001) these dimensions are grouped into dimensions that specify and/or qualify the nature and size of undesired consequences, dimensions that qualify the probability or plausibility of undesired consequences and other dimensions that underlie perceived risk. Most of these dimensions have already been mentioned in (Slovic, 1987) and (Slovic et al., 1981), except for: probability of undesired consequences, clarity and importance of expected benefits and harmful intentionality. The health risk communication guidance by the British Department of Health also lists a number of “fright factors” (Department of Health (UK), 1997). These fright factors are: involuntary of exposure, inequitably distributed, inescapable by taking personal precautions, unfamiliar or novel source, man-made rather than natural sources, hidden and irreversible damage (e.g. through the onset of illness many years after exposure), particular danger to small children, pregnant women or future generations in general, threaten a form of death/illness/injury arousing particular dread, identifiable rather than anonymous victims, poorly understood by science, and contradictory statements from responsible sources (or worse, from the same source) (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Most of these have already been mentioned in (Slovic, 1987) and (Slovic et al., 1981), except for: inescapable by taking personal precautions, man-made rather than natural sources, identifiable rather than anonymous victims, and contradictory statements from responsible source(s). These risk perception factors are summarized in Table 8: Classic risk perception factors, grouped into dread and unknown risk perception factors. This grouping is chosen over the nature/size and probability/plausibility approach because dread and unknown is a grouping due to similarity in perception and not due to similarity in a more technical way of describing types of factors. Table 8: Classic risk perception factors

Dread Risk 1. Controllability 2. Dread 3. Global/not-global catastrophic 4. Fatal/not-fatal consequences 5. Equity (fair distribution of costs and benefits) 6. Catastrophic/individual 7. High/low risk to future generations 8. Easily/not-easily reduced 9. Risk increasing/decreasing 10. Voluntary/involuntary 11. Clarity and importance of expected benefits 12. Harmful intentionality 13. Inescapable by taking personal precautions 14. Man-made rather than natural sources

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Unknown Risk 15. Observable/not-observable 16. Known/unknown to those exposed (including experience, familiarity, and imaginability) 17. Effects immediate/delayed 18. Old/new risk 19. Risks known/unknown to science 20. Contradictory statements from responsible source(s) Exposure 21. Number of people exposed to the risk 22. Personal exposure 23. Identifiable rather than anonymous victims Other 24. Probability of undesired consequences

4.2.3 Framing effects Risk can be “framed” in different ways, in terms of how available risk information is mentally arranged (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997; Slovic et al., 1984; Slovic, 1981 et al.). Subtle changes in the way a risk is expressed can have a major impact on perceptions (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1984; Slovic et al., 1981). Probably the best-known example of this is a research on people’s preferences on cancer therapies (McNeil et al., 1982). This study asked participants to choose between two cancer therapies with different probabilities of success and failure. If a therapy was displayed in terms of chance of surviving, the therapy was chosen significantly more often than if it were displayed in terms of chance of dying (McNeil et al., 1982). Other examples of different reference points are a bottle being half full or half empty, setting a maximum level of pollutant being legitimisation of a risk or protection of the public (Department of Health (UK), 1997), lives saved or lives lost, restoring lost quality or improvement from the current level (Slovic, 1997), and probabilities of dying in a car crash expressed per person-trip or over 50 years of driving (Slovic et al., 1981). One should not assume the recipient’s framework to be the same as the sender’s. Such as situation should be taken into account and not left to chance, when designing a risk communication product (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Consultation and two-way communication can be used to investigate and create awareness of framing of specific issues (Department of Health (UK), 1997). 4.2.4 Media coverage Media coverage plays a major role in both risk perception in general and how specific issues are initially framed (Department of Health (UK), 1997). It strongly influences the

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public agenda an indirectly forms public awareness of risks and environmental problems (Löfstedt, 1991). Media attention is the most important factor in risk perception (Tonn, 1990). Because people often don’t have personal experience with a particular risk, the information they gain through the media determines their image of reality (Van de Vusse (ed), 1993). While the media tend to focus on dramatic effects and not so much on associated benefits, it is not only the positive or negative attention that determines risk perception. Especially the amount of attention is important: the more attention, the more an issue is perceived as serious (Van de Vusse (ed), 1993). However, the media are not all-important. They do not create the public’s interest in dramatic mishaps, but amplify it (Department of Health (UK), 1997). A good story in one in which public and media interest reinforce each other (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Several factors can be listed that have an influence on whether or not a story will take off (Department of Health (UK), 1997). These are listed in Table 9: Media triggers. There is some evidence that the most important factor is blame, particularly in keeping a story running for a long period of time (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Table 9: Media triggers

1. Questions of blame 2. Alleged secrets and attempted cover-ups 3. Human interest through identifiable heroes, villains, dupes, etc. (as well as victims) 4. Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities 5. Conflict 6. Signal value: the story as a portent of further ills (“What next?”) (see also e.g. Slovic, 1987) 7. Many people exposed to the risk, even at low levels (“It could be you!”) 8. Strong visual impact (e.g. pictures of suffering) 9. Links to sex and/or crime 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases People have difficulties in understanding probabilities and probabilistic processes (Van de Vusse (ed), 1993; Slovic, 1987). As noticed in subparagraph 3.6.2 Matching: Form, probabilistic processes are often seen as sure things, and predictions on those processes are expected to come true every time. There are also problems with combining separate probabilities (Department of Health (UK), 1997). E.g. if 2% of a population has a certain disease and a test to this disease gives a negative result with 90% of the people without the disease, and people are asked to estimate the chance of a person with a positive test result to actually have the disease, estimated chances are seriously overestimated. This is because people put too much weight on the higher percentage, the reliability of the test, and not enough to the small prevalence of the diseased: baseline probability (Department of Health (UK), 1997). This tendency to forget the baseline probability also results in a problem when risks are framed in different ways (Department of Health (UK), 1997). The perceived message of communication on a risk depends critically on whether risks are give in absolute terms 87

(chance was 2% and is now 4%) or in relative terms (the chance has doubled) (Department of Health (UK), 1997). The absolute chance sounds more dangerous and newsworthy, but it can be seriously misleading (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Another problem is that the brain tends to manipulate probabilities, to employ simplified ways of managing information (heuristics), in order to reduce difficult mental tasks (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). Although they are valid and useful in most situations, they can lead to large and persistent biases with serious implications (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). The most relevant heuristics and biases are the availability, confirmation, and overconfidence. Due to the availability heuristic, people judge an event as likely or frequent if instances of it are easily brought to mind (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). While this is often appropriate, because frequently occurring events are generally easier to imagine than rare events, availability is also affected by numerous factors unrelated to frequency of occurrence (Slovic et al., 1981). Memorable events, a recent disasters, or even vivid films can increase imaginability and therefore seriously bias judgements (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). An example of this is that people tend to overestimate rare causes of death and underestimate common causes of death. Rare causes are often dramatic or sensational, while common causes tend to be unspectacular (Slovic et al., 1981). People’s personal experiences can also bias views due to the availability heuristic: people take risks time after time without mishap and therefore often consider themselves personally immune. Moreover, indirect experience through the media shows that when accidents happen, they happen to others (Slovic et al., 1981). A particular important implication of availability is that by discussing risk its imaginability and therefore its perceived riskiness may be increased, regardless of what the evidence indicates (Slovic et al., 1981). This would explain the fact that the amount of media coverage enhances perceived riskiness, as was mentioned above. The confirmation heuristic results in a situation where, once a view has been formed, new evidence is generally made to fit (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Strong initial impressions structure the way that subsequent information is interpreted (Slovic et al., 1984). New evidence will appear reliable and informative if it is consistent with one’s initial belief and it is seen as “proof positive” (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1984). Contrary evidence may be seen as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative, and therefore filtered out (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1984). Ambiguous data may be interpreted as a confirmation (Department of Health (UK), 1997). As a result, strongly held views will be extraordinarily difficult to change by informational presentations (Slovic et al., 1981). One’s own actions can also make these expectations self-fulfilling (Department of Health (UK), 1997). The overconfidence heuristic implies that people typically have too much confidence in their own judgements (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic et al., 1981). This appears to affect almost all professions as well as the lay public (Department of Health (UK), 1997). The few exceptions are people who receive constant feedback on the accuracy of their predictions, such as weather forecasters (Department of Health (UK), 1997). The psychological basis for this unwarranted certainty seems to be insensitivity to the weaknesses in assumptions upon which judgements are based (Slovic et al., 1981).

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4.2.6 Trust One of the more recent additions to the list of influences on risk perception is the role of trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997; Van de Vusse (ed), 1993). In most circumstances, messages are judged first and foremost not by content but by source: who is telling me this, and can I trust them (Department of Health (UK), 1997)? If there is no trust in the source, any message is likely to be disregarded, no matter how well intentioned and well delivered (Department of Health (UK), 1997). There is some evidence that well-presented arguments from distrusted sources actually have a negative effect, as if people conclude that the sender is not only untrustworthy but also cunning (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Distrust is strongly linked to the perception that risks are unacceptably high and it has also been linked to political activism aimed at reducing those risks (Slovic, 1997). Various studies have shown that there is extreme distrust in many of the individuals, industries, institutions, and governmental departments and organizations responsible for risk management (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997; Van de Vusse (ed), 1993). There also is a decline in trust in scientific expertise (Department of Health (UK), 1997). These perceptions can however depend on the issue at stake (Department of Health (UK), 1997). In The Netherlands, trust seems to be higher and governments and even companies that clearly have interests in the issue are seen as trustworthy (Van de Vusse (ed), 1993). Trust has been shown to be multi-faceted, with relevant factors including perceived competence, objectivity, fairness, consistency, and goodwill (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Particular sources may score differently on these dimensions. E.g. industrial and commercial sources are usually seen as competent, but potentially biased (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Actions are an important factor in the forming, losing, and maintenance of trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997). This doesn’t only apply to the actions actually being taken to deal with a risk, but also to the manner adopted: the organizational “bodylanguage” (Department of Health (UK), 1997). E.g. appearing to act only under pressure can be fatal for trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Emotional tone, both in words and in actions, is also important (Department of Health (UK), 1997). E.g. in engaging with an outraged audience, it is important to acknowledge the outrage, instead of supplying “cold, detached” scientific findings (Department of Health (UK), 1997). Openness is an important factor in building trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997). This applies to both the aspects of the risk and the decision process. It involves not only supplying information, but also giving a candid account of the evidence underlying decisions (Department of Health (UK), 1997). People want to know what is going on, how decisions are reached, who gets to contribute, and at what stage. There is a reluctance to trust any system that is seen as a “closed shop” (Department of Health (UK), 1997). People need to know that their concerns and understandings of the problem are heard and taken seriously (Department of Health (UK), 1997).

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4.3 Climate change risk perception The present paragraph will focus on risk perceptions of the issue of climate change in particular and the use of classic risk perception on this issue. The use of classic risk perception (see paragraph 4.2 Classic risk perception) will be discussed first. The central research question of this and the next paragraph will be: “What are the risk perceptions of the public?” 4.3.1 Risk perception factors and climate change Most of the risk perception factors mentioned in Table 8: Classic risk perception factors (subparagraph 4.2.2 Risk perception factors) seem to apply to the climate change issue. There are however differences in perceptions of to what extent factors apply, e.g. to what extent climate change is controllable, to what extent it is observable, and to what extent responsible organizations are contradicting each other. With respect to the last notion: discussions erupting between organizations and/or scientists sometimes seem to contradict with respect to important issues such as whether or not climate change is caused by humans or by CO2, while there actually is no discussion about that, but about certain details surrounding that issue (see e.g. Tiscali/Novum, 2003; Steitz et al., 2003; Toet, 1992). A study among stakeholders, (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001), investigated the creation of “constructs” dealing with the risk perception factors identified by (Vlek, 1996). This study did not find the factors experience/familiarity/imaginability of consequences (16), voluntariness of exposure (10), clarity of expected benefits (11), and harmful intentionality (12) being applied by the stakeholders (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The experience/familiarity/imaginability of consequences was reflected in other things found in the study. Of the other three, possible explanations were posed that they might not be relevant to the climate change issue or did not play a role in the climate debate (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). In a global issue such as climate change, exposure is involuntary. Since there is no question of whether or not it is involuntary, this factor will probably not be very relevant to the debate. However, this doesn’t mean that the factor is not relevant to the issue or to the perceived risk. The clarity of expected benefits in the issue of climate change may be a problem factor. Climate change seen as having very few benefits and quite risky (McDaniels et al., 1996). The main causes of anthropogenic climate change are however seen as having a lot of benefits and not very risky (McDaniels et al., 1996). The perceived impacts of causes and effects are as different as well. Possible explanations for this as mentioned by (McDaniels et al., 1996) were the absence of a connection between causes and effects and a different (emotional) rating of the two. Anthropogenic climate change is not seen has having benefits, but its causes are (McDaniels et al., 1996). This factor does seem to be quite relevant to the issue of climate change.

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Harmful intentionality may be of less importance. No one is intentionally trying to change the climate. This factor may be of some relevance with respect to putting economic interests first. People may apply this factor with respect to countries not taking part in the international efforts to prevent climate change. The relevance to debate and risk perception are probably very low, but it may have some influence on the perceived effectiveness of personal and national action (see subparagraph 4.4.3 Social dilemmas). With respect to the other dimensions, citizens emphasise the moral dimensions of the climate change issue (Jaeger et al., 2001; Kempton, 1991). Values such as protecting animals, but especially keeping the world healthy for next generations are very important (Kempton, 1991). Respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) note: “Veel diersoorten zullen hierdoor uitsterven.” “Als gevolg zullen er dus vele mensen sterven. En elk mens die sterft is er één teveel.” “Because its our duty to protect the earth for people and all what is living at the earth, also for them who are coming after us”

Economic impacts don’t seem to be present in citizen discussions (Jaeger et al., 2001). In the Citizen Questionnaire, only one respondent notes economic impacts: “The results are highly unpredictable, but have a high probability of causing enormous environmental and economical damage.”

Furthermore, climate change is seen as a global issue and regional impacts are not necessarily in the foreground of the discussion (Jaeger et al., 2001), although citizens did note appreciation for the focus on regional impacts (Schlumpf, 2001). These notions place importance on risk perception factors such as equity (5) and risks to future generations (7), while clarity and importance of expected benefits (11) and personal exposure (22) might be seen as less important. With respect to mitigation, many studies note a lack of connection between anthropogenic climate change and its causes, a lack of perceived ability to take action, and a lack of perceived action of various parties (see e.g. Kempton, 1997; Staats et al., 1996; Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; McDaniels et al., 1993; Kempton, 1991). This places importance on risk perception factors such as controllability (1), easily/noteasily reduced (8), and inescapable by taking personal precautions (13). In climate change, several other risk perception factors play an important role. (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001) names the ecological extent of damage, impact sector, attributability (extent to which effects can be related to climate change, the extent to which climate change can be related to human activities, etcetera), reversibility (both whether or not humans can reverse consequences of their actions and whether nature itself can reverse the consequences), and directness of effect. A study on risk perceptions of global change reveals five risk perception factors: impacts on species, human benefits, impacts on humans, avoidability, and knowledge of an item (McDaniels et al., 1996). Impacts on species seems to be the most important factor in 91

perceived ecological risk, followed by human benefits and impacts on humans (McDaniels et al., 1996). Knowledge of an item in this case is different from the Unknown Risk, mentioned in subparagraph 4.2.2 Risk perception factors, as it deals only with personal knowledge, and not the absence of knowledge among scientists as is included in Unknown Risk. While the absence of knowledge, both of scientists and of a person, in classic risk perception heightens the perceived risk (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1981), with personal knowledge of a global change item an increase of knowledge seems to heighten the perceived risk (McDaniels et al., 1996). Absence of knowledge, or uncertainty, among scientists is still a reason for heightened perceived risk (Jaeger et al., 2000). As a respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire notes: “And since we cannot grasp the effect, I consider it serious.”

4.3.2 Framing effects and climate change As with any risk, the climate change issue can be framed in various ways. A situation as with the cancer example in subparagraph 4.2.3 Framing effects, showing the difference between expressing a risk in chance of survival or chance of death, is probably less relevant to the climate change issue. In similar situations, such as when discussing alternative ways of spending money, such as spending it on solving today’s problems versus spending it on preventing climate change or adaptation versus mitigation, it may make a difference if the issue is discussed in terms of chance of survival or death or lives saved or lost. Furthermore, it could make a difference whether chances in climate change are discussed in chance it is true, or chance it isn’t true. Another situation when framing effects would start to play a role, is when chances of something happening, e.g. the chance of flooding, are discussed in terms of chance per year or over a number of years. The same chance could also be expressed in terms of additional floods over a period of time. One could also discuss climate change mitigation or adaptation in terms of damage prevented to ecology or future generations, or improvement of the expected situation with continued trends. The last notion would be a similar approach as the one mentioned in (Van Woerkum, 2001a; Van Woerkum, 2001b). Here it is mentioned that people have problems enough and that a better way to communicate on an issue might be to frame solving an issue as improving quality of life instead of solving a problem. 4.3.3 Media coverage and climate change Media coverage is as important to the issue of climate change as it is to any risk, and maybe even more important, due to the absence of personal experience with global climate change. Focus groups in Sweden, noticing a lack of knowledge on climate change, suggested that this was due to a lack of public debate (Löfstedt, 1991). The public agenda is strongly influenced by the mass media and public awareness and knowledge of environmental problems, such as climate change, also comes indirectly from the mass media and related sources (Löfstedt, 1991). Several studies also note the

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importance of media coverage in improving the public knowledge of climate change and removing common misperceptions (Jaeger et al., 2001; Kempton, 1991; Löfstedt, 1991). The Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results and subparagraphs 3.3.3 Supply: Medium and 3.4.3 Demand: Medium) also shows that most people get and prefer their information from the mass media. As noted in 4.2.4 Media coverage, the amount of media coverage is very important for risk perception. Past research on Dutch media coverage has shown that there has been very little media coverage on climate change between 1970 and 1991 (Toet, 1992). Only in 1989 and 1990 a lot of articles were published in the issue, probably due to the publication of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP) and a political argument on it resulting in the fall of the Dutch cabinet in 1989, and international conferences in both years (Toet, 1992). During the same years, but starting in 1988, the American media attention increased strongly as well, probably due to the remarkably dry and hot summer in the US in 1988 (Fairman, 1991). The average amount of articles in the US press was less than in Dutch newspapers (Toet, 1992). In 1991, Dutch media attention had declined, but whether or not this was a permanent decline could not be determined, since the study did not look beyond that year (Toet, 1992). Another study in the same period notes very little attention on climate change in Northern Sweden and a lack of both public debate and knowledge in the area (Löfstedt, 1991). The same study also notes much more coverage by the US press and by international news agencies such as Reuters (Löfstedt, 1991). Whether or not this actually led to more knowledge, can be doubted, since today, Americans are among the most misinformed people in the world, with respect to climate change (Lynn, 2003). In The Netherlands, most coverage dealt with possible policy options and the discussion surrounding those (Toet, 1991). Impacts received medium attention, but it was not very extensive, usually only noting rising temperature and sea level (Toet, 1991). Unfortunately, no information was found on media coverage beyond 1991. Of the Media triggers, influencing media attention, mentioned in Table 9: Media triggers, only trigger 9: Links to sex and/or crime seems not relevant to the climate change issue. The trigger posing the largest problem is trigger 1: Questions of blame. Trigger 3: Human interest is closely related to this. Since climate change is largely self-inflicted and no direct relation between one person’s actions and another’s damage can be established, the issue lacks the familiar villain-victim polarity, and no true blame can be assigned to anyone (Marshall and Lynas, 2003; McDaniels et al., 1996). It is however exactly this factor that is very important in keeping a story running for a long period of time (Department of Health (UK), 1997). A story on an issue such as climate change, a process that occurs over years or centuries, is very hard to report very often, and without the (villain-victim) polarization and a beginning and end, it may become “yesterday’s story”, as a British editor puts it (Tickell, 2002). Nevertheless, people still attempt to create these polarities, blaming Bush or the US, oil companies, drivers, cars, and industry (Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Citizen Questionnaire).

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Another possible problem is the fact that the scientific community and governments agree on issues such as the attribution of climate change to human activities and that climate change is a serious problem (see e.g. Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Tickell, 2002; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Brown, 1999). This lack of conflict, media trigger 5, may make the issue less interesting for the media. It may also cause the attention that is present to look for conflict (for an example of an argument/discussion being created by the media, see Henderson-Sellers, 1998) and focus on people who have a different message. The media are largely dominated by a handful of “greenhouse sceptics”, creating a public misunderstanding of climate change and climate risks (Schneider, 2004; Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Van der Sluijs, 1999). Usually their criticism is of minimal scientific level and a substantial part of it is scientifically indefensible (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). It also has a strong tendency to persist, even when the arguments are outdated, have long been proven wrong, or are irrelevant (see e.g. Duyndam, 2004; Schneider, 2004). This material isn’t published in peer-reviewed scientific magazines, except for a few accidents, but the mass media lack a scientific quality control mechanism. Scientists don’t offer much resistance to these critics (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). This seems to be the case both for the non-scientific publications as the material that was accidentally published in scientific magazines, such as (Soon and Baliunas, 2003), which the scientific community deemed “not deemed worthy of response” due to the shaky science behind it, until the politicians and media made a big issue of it (Schneider, 2004; Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Sanchez, 2003). The public has no means of determining which information is true, scientifically valid, and up-to-date. As a respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire answers to the question if he/she is satisfied with the information he/she receives: “No, there is too much info, wildly spread, with no real line. Everybody has an opinion, but which info is true”

One way to deal with this is to provide good references to sources and other scientific material and research by neutral sources. The citizens in the Citizen Questionnaire repeatedly and strongly call for this. Having a lot of references however does not mean that the information is true and the references are correct. As (Schneider, 2004; Marshall and Lynas, 2003) note on the response of the scientific community to (Lomborg, 2001), a non-scientific source often referred to by sceptics, is that it appears convincing by aggregating voluminous references, which are however one-sided and out of context. While the scientific community may realize this and react to it (it has been officially declared as “violating scientific honesty”), citizens have no means of determining whether or not a reference is justified. The continued reference to such sources (see e.g. Duyndam, 2004) doesn’t make it easier for citizens. People have no way of determining the credibility and knowledge of a source either. As one respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire notes: “In de krant is nog weleens iets te lezen over de mening van een wetenschapper.”

While “a scientist” may give his opinion in a newspaper, who’s to say that his opinion is justified, unbiased, represents the opinion of the scientific community in any way, or even if he is knowledgeable on the subject? Practically all climate sceptics have no 94

training in a relevant field at all and/or have strong ties to energy and industry and antienvironmental groups (see e.g. Schneider, 2004; Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Although a scientific background is nowadays no assurance for trust (Department of Health (UK), 1997), having a “Dr.” or “Prof.” in front of one’s name may suggest knowledge. Working for a respected university or institute, such as Harvard in the case of Soon and Baliunas, may strengthen this notion, although it is not said that the university or institute supports as scientist’s claims (see e.g. Sanchez, 2003). The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire seem to consider scientists as reliable and also seem aware of biases in media communication: “Scientists, they are the most reliable” “… I don't blindly accept what the news tells me” “I tend to ignore the larger part of the information of pressure groups. Their information is very colored and often only part of all the information is presented by them … Scientific information in the end is the most important information, provided they are not linked to one of the pressure groups.” “Often it is influenced by pressure groups to a large extend.”

Most of the perceived bias is directed at “pressure groups”. It may be that this usually means “environmental pressure group”, although the “pressure groups” are considered to have a large influence on the government (similar to what was mentioned in StollKleemann et al., 2001). The individual sceptic may not be perceived as potential bias. Anti-environmental pressure groups may not be perceived either, as they are far less visible than environmental groups, of which the more radical have received a lot of negative public attention lately. Information coming from environmental groups and scientists working for those groups is usually clearly visible as such, although the respondents seem to believe that most information coming from the government is coming from pressure groups as well. Sceptics rarely advertise ties to energy and industry and anti-environmental groups, and most of those groups pose as scientific institutes or organizations (e.g. the Marshall Institute and the European Science and Environment Forum), rather than as anti-environmental group. Citizens will probably have difficulty in noting these ties. One respondent however did note: “Scientists have to be honest about the changing. Don't be influenced by industry and the concerns which are paying the projects.”

The media also tend to want to view both sides of an issue (Schneider, 2004). This may be a noble point of view and useful in many situations. However in science, balancing mainstream science and well-established consensus with the views of a handful of extremists would result in a misrepresentation of the situation (Schneider, 2004). To the uninformed, both views seem equally credible (Schneider, 2004). However, when the extremists are heard more often or more “markedly” than the mainstream, the extremist view might be seen as the most credible or likely view and might even be confused with the mainstream point of view, by means of the availability heuristic (see subparagraph 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases). Such non- or unscientific material and references to it the mass media strongly influence the societal debate and public understanding (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001),

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maybe especially if a broadly carried and strong response in those media from the scientists is absent. With respect to what draws media attention to the issue of climate change, several things can be said. The publication of controversial studies and resulting scientific action, political discussions and cover-ups, as noted above, is one of these issues. Important international conferences, publications, and policy developments attract attention as well (see e.g. Schneider, 2004; Toet, 1992). Another attention drawer along these lines is the publication of studies dealing with large impacts. The recent study on species extinction due to climate change (Thomas et al., 2004) received quite some attention. This study, published in Nature, predicted that 1835% of species would become committed to extinction (although that was the average of three methods and two dispersal scenarios (whether or not species can freely migrate), separately predicting 7-52% extinction; using IUCN Red Data Book criteria predicted 1158% extinction). Another high-impact study that attracted a lot of attention was the Pentagon report, dealing with a possible collapse of the Thermo Haline Circulation (THC) somewhere between 2010 and 2020, resulting in worldwide havoc (Schwartz and Randall, 2004; for comments see Schneider, 2004; Van Dorland, 2004b). This report predicted major impacts on world stability and security, resulting in war, disease and famine. Part of the report’s media attention may be explained by this, as safety/security and health are high profile issues (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001) and would therefore appeal to media trigger 4: Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities. Along similar lines as the Pentagon report, a movie on THC collapse titled “The day after tomorrow” has recently entered the cinemas (for comments see Schneider, 2004). This movie also deals with THC collapse, causing immense damage and disasters all around the world. Other studies that are probably just as, or even more remarkable, from a scientist point of view, have not received much attention in the media. As one of the stakeholders in the Stakeholder Questionnaire notes on a recent Nature study dealing the heat waves of the summer of 2003 (Schär et al., 2004): “The heat wave and temperature of the past summer have caused a shock in climate land. Wellknown scientists said that the models predicted this for the end of the century. According to the Nature article this could happen once every 46000 years. Statistically, this shouldn’t have happened at all. I find it remarkable that this article has received hardly any attention.”

Perhaps this media interest for high-impact cases is simply due to it appealing more to the public imagination and being more entertaining than statistical analysis. The possibility of major climatic impacts ignites the public imagination, according to (Jaeger et al., 2000). In popular science in magazines and on television, climate change also seems to focus a lot on “imaginary abrupt events” such as THC collapse. Perhaps this relates to media trigger 8: Strong visual impact, even though it needs not always be visible, but rather a strong “imaginable” impact. Furthermore, extreme weather events, such as extremely heat waves, droughts, extreme rain and floods, storms, El Niño events, etcetera also attract media attention (see e.g. Henderson-Sellers, 1998; Toet, 1992). These serve as a clear image and improve the visibility and imaginability of climate change (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001; Van

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der Sluijs et al., 2001). The availability heuristic also applies here (see subparagraph 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases). A respondent to the Stakeholder Questionnaire notes: “Regional climate extremes, such as France experiencing heavy rainfall, heat waves and the worst drought in 100 years, are the daily face of climate change. KNMI used to be very hesitant to link these to climate change, as there have always been weather extremes. This is starting to change: the trend is linked now.”

The problem with this is that no single extreme event can be directly attributed to climate change (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). The Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI) has always said that it was uncertain that extreme weather events are caused by climate change (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). While this is true, this leads to an apparent contradiction with the IPCC’s statement that climate change leads to extreme weather events, and therefore public confusion (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). The connection between extreme events and climate change can appeal to media triggers 3: Human interest, 6: Signal value, 8: Strong visual impact, perhaps somewhat to 7: Many people exposed to the risk, and sometimes to 4: Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities. 4.3.4 Probability, heuristics, and biases and climate change Climate change is a stochastic process. As noted in subparagraphs 3.6.2 Matching: Form and 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases, people have difficulty grasping probability and probabilistic processes. Besides grasping the idea of changed probabilities, as discussed in 3.6.2 Matching: Form, people have a tendency to forget baseline probability. It makes a lot of difference whether risk increases are expressed in absolute or relative terms. In the climate change issue, this could apply to e.g. increases of risk of flooding. Heuristics and resulting biases also apply to climate change in various ways. Although this paragraph will note a few examples, the coming paragraphs will refer to the heuristics when applicable Availability seems to be the heuristic that is used most often in the climate change issue. It applies to e.g. imaginability of climate change and its impacts through media coverage and actual events in nature, the belief in sceptic points of view (see subparagraph 4.3.3 Media coverage and climate change) and to the magnitude of risk of climate change compared to other risks. Confirmation generally serves to keep one’s original point of view. When established, points of view are very hard to change and incoming information is interpreted to fit one’s views. E.g. If one beliefs that storms are becoming more frequent, experiences with weather and storms are fit in so that one perceives this change to take place. Another example is that misperceptions created by sceptics may be very hard to change, due to the fact that one looks specifically for confirmation of one’s views when communicating. Another example is that people perceive their own actions to be ineffective and endangering personal comfort, resulting in the same problems with incoming information as with the sceptic viewpoints. Overconfidence may further strengthen the belief in one’s own ideas. This heuristic, based on insensitivity to weaknesses in assumptions that form the basis of judgements, 97

would also apply to various predictions and estimates. Examples of these are as the estimated likeliness of or confidence in various statements. This of course applies both to sceptics and mainstream scientists, as well as the public. 4.3.5 Trust and climate change Trust is an important factor in risk communication, as was discussed in subparagraph 4.2.6 Trust. In subparagraphs 3.4.3 Demand: Medium and 3.6.3 Matching: Medium it was noted that this is the case for issues such as climate and climate change as well. For weather related information people are most dependent on the KNMI and would probably have the most trust in them, or at least look to them first, with respect to climate and climate change related information as well. Little actual research has been found dealing with which specific organizations people trust most. The research among farmers showed that they had high trust in extension services with respect to climate predictions and management advice. Research on energy conservation noted a higher trust in a government agency than in the energy company, with respect to energy conservation options (Craig and McCann, 1978). Research on general groups of organizations however has shown a general distrust, in government, also with respect to climate change, although in The Netherlands the trust seems to be reasonably high (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Department of Health (UK), 1997; Slovic, 1997; Van de Vasse (ed), 1993). This strengthens the idea mentioned by (Department of Health (UK), 1997) that trust is dependent on the issue at stake and with respect to climate change may also be dependent on the sub-issue at stake. The research in trust in groups of organizations also noted low trust in industry and a declining trust in scientific expertise. The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) generally didn’t seem to trust the government. They seemed to believe that the information they provide was handed to them by pressure groups and that they didn’t communicate the full picture: “Information by the government is often handed over to them by pressure groups and so is only a little more valuable [than that of pressure groups].” “De overheid regelt de tv-reclame, geloof ik en milieuorganisaties werken hier ook aan mee” “government and environmental pressure groups are very unreliable” “the government should try to make sure that they do not only communicate the knowledge provided by pressure groups, but provide the "full" picture.” “Wees meer open en eerlijker . Nu komt het wel eens over dat dingen worden verzwegen”

Only one respondent noted, in reply to the question of what media he/she considered to be the most useful: “Overheid, omdat ik van mening ben dat die er geen commerciële voordelen uit het verstrekken van die informatie hoeft te halen.”

The trust in scientists seemed to be high, provided that they had no “links”:

98

“Scientific information in the end is the most important information, provided they are not linked to one of the pressure groups.” “Scientists, they are the most reliable” “Die [scientists] zouden het zelf het beste moeten weten” “… a proper source, like scientists or an independent organization.” “Scientist ... Don't be influenced by industry and the concerns which are paying the projects.”

The last quote is the only quote dealing with the industry, noting a potential bias. This doesn’t necessarily mean that industry in perceived as untrustworthy. The largest distrust was expressed for “pressure groups”. Discussions afterwards indicated that the apparent public frustration with (environmental) pressure groups is mainly directed at the more radical groups. Although “pressure groups” may include industrial, energy and anti-environmental pressure groups, most comments seem to deal with environmental pressure groups. Pressure groups are perceived to usually communicate the part of the information that is “practical” for them and to be too extreme in their communication: “I tend to ignore the larger part of the information of pressure groups. Their information is very colored and often only part of all the information is presented by them.” “Environmental pressure groups have the tendency to exaggerate” “... milieuorganisaties … soms wat extreem.” “... de meesten [information] zijn van Greenpeace en die zijn vaak irritant.” “Milieuorganisaties vind ik te incorrect en vaak teveel belust op het goedpraten van hun bestaan.” “Zwak: soms is het een beetje eenzijdig belicht. Vooral milieuorganisaties hebben daar een handje van.” “[Advise to environmental pressure groups:] Don't overreact, but act and help where possible” “I would advise all pressure groups to stop abusing science to prove their point and start doing some real research and provide people with information about all the facts, not just the facts that happen to be practical for them.”

Furthermore, a few respondents commented on journalists and mass media: “TV: I don't know exactly where they get their info from” “... de krant ... het is niet altijd duidelijk of ze wel deskundig zijn.”

The effect of having a source of higher credibility be the originator of the communication is quite significant. Subparagraphs 3.4.3 Demand: Medium and 3.6.3 Matching: Medium already mentioned that with respect to climate predictions and management options. In energy conservation, the effect is significant as well (Craig and McCann, 1978). The message dealt with ways to conserve energy used for air conditioning and therefore save money. Both the message from the high and low credibility source had an effect on energy consumption, but the high credibility source had a significantly larger effect (Craig and McCann, 1978).

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4.3.6 Perceived impacts Most people consider climate change to be a serious and threatening problem (StollKleemann et al., 2001; Jaeger et al., 2000; McDaniels, 1996; Staats et al., 1996; Bostrom et al., 1994; Löfstedt, 1991). Of the respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) 84% considered climate change to be a serious problem. Of the people that didn’t consider it to be a serious problem, for 8% this was due to the person not considering climate change to be caused by humans. Another 4% didn’t consider it a serious problem because this warming, although probably caused by humans, was perceived to have happened before (see also Jaeger et al., 2000). The same respondent did call for more action to prevent climate change, however. A further 4% thought the warming was caused by humans but would be a trend that would repeat itself after a while, with cooling following the warming and warming after that. Respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire generally consider climate change to be “everybody’s problem”, although one respondent notes: “…and at first especially the poor people will suffer from it.”

People also consider large future climate change impacts to be highly likely and consider the climate to have changed significantly already (Kempton, 1997; Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991; Löfstedt, 1991), although citizens in (Jaeger et al., 2000) seem to think differently on both notions. While people consider climate change to be a serious problem, the emotional concern over climate change is only little above average (Van der Laan, 2003; Staats et al., 1996). One study in Sweden noted that climate change is only low on the list of important environmental problems (Löfstedt, 1991). For both cases this may be due to the fact that people consider major impacts of climate change to be very distant in time (see e.g. Van der Sluijs, 2003; Jaeger et al., 2000; Löfstedt, 1991). One of those studies (Löfstedt, 1991) however also notes that 52% of the respondents thought that climate change would adversely affect them or their families. (Van der Sluijs, 2003) also notes a perceived distance in space. Such things could explain the difference in perceived seriousness and emotional concern, as they do not take away moral concerns for the rest of the world and next generations (see Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991 and subparagraphs 4.4.1 Cultural models and 4.5.3 Cultural models). The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire listed a total of 23 effects of climate change, which can be compared with effects from other studies, as listed in Table 10: Perceived effects of climate change. The Questionnaire results are also shown in Figure 16: Perceived effects of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire), in which “Effect #” refers to the numbered effects in the table. Table 10: Perceived effects of climate change %

(Löfstedt, 1991)

Country:

SE

100

(Bostrom et al., 1994) USA

(Löfstedt, 1996) UK

(Staats et al., 1996) NL

(Van der Laan, 2003) NL

Citizen Questionnaire NL

Respondents: Method: 1. Higher temperatures 2. Sea level rise 3. Melting glaciers / poles 4. Floods 5. Weather change / extreme weather 6. Ecosystem impacts 7. Species extinction 8. Precipitation pattern change 9. Ozone layer destroyed 10. Financial / economic damage 11. Don’t know 12. Droughts 13. Ecosystem shift 14. Lack of fresh water 15. Lack of food / starvation 16. Ocean currents / ice age 17. Human health 18. Agricultural impacts 19. Thinner atmosphere 20. Lower temperatures 21. Increase of pole ice 22. Avalanches 23. Earthquakes 24. Human death 25. Mudflows 26. Increased solar heat trapping 27. Desertification 28. Seawater expansion 29. Increased earth heat trapping 30. Shifting of poles 31. Photosynthesis 32. Changed seasons 33. Changed heating / cooling demands

100 Open 54

37 Open 89

Unknown Unknown 46

30 54 46 30

704 Closed 86 81

24

25 Open 72 48 40

67 77

81

32 32 28 12 8

86 41

1054 Closed

21

45

41

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

17

83 59

19

4 4 54 7

4

6

4 4 4 4 4

61 59 50 42 38 35 32 22

101

80 70 60

%

50 40 30 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Effect #

Figure 16: Perceived effects of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire)

The most readily perceived impact of climate change is the rise in temperature (1), as is also noted in (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Maybe this is due to citizens considering climate change to mean nothing more than “warmer temperatures” and the use of global warming as synonym for climate change (see subparagraph 4.4.1 Cultural models). Another interesting set of often perceived impacts are melting poles/glaciers (5), sea level rise (8) and floods (11). Citizens, especially in the Citizen Questionnaire seem to consider this to be a causal chain, together with the rising temperature. Due to the warmer temperatures the poles melt. Due to the melting poles, sea level increases (although in fact, the expansion of seawater due to it warming is the most important contributor to sea level rise (IPCC, 2001a)). Due to the sea level increase, there are floods. This can be illustrated by the following responses to the Citizen Questionnaire: “De temperatuur stijgt, daardoor smelt er te veel ijs van de gletsjers en van de poolkappen af. De zeespiegel stijgt en dat is voor Nederland niet zo gunstig.” “The greenhouse effect, it is getting hotter and hotter and the North- and South Pole are melting and because of that the sea level is rising.” “… the earth is heating up. That means for example that ice on the north and South Pole will melt and the sea level will rise, which can cause floods” “Het probleem is (volgens mij) voornamelijk dat het ijs smelt, waardoor de zeespiegel stijgt en grote delen land zullen verdrinken.”

Citizens in (Jaeger et al., 2000) apply similar causal relations in their discussions. (Staats et al., 1996) does note 50% of the respondents agreeing to the statement that climate change causes seawater to expand. The results from the various studies and especially the Citizen Questionnaire however suggest that melting of polar ice is seen as the main cause of sea level rise. The focus on flooding due to sea level rise may shift the perceived impacts to the future as well, as people don’t see the sea level rising very quickly. Floods, and droughts, due to extreme weather events and increased storm activity and intensity (see e.g. IPCC, 2001b), which have a more immediate effect, may be perceived less often. Respondents in (Van der Laan, 2003) seem also divided over the question whether or not water shortages and excess of water are related (e.g. through climate change). The exact implications and 102

vulnerabilities of various areas to sea level rise and extreme events (see e.g. IPCC, 2001b; Brown, 1999) may not be perceived either, although no data has been found on this issue. This focus on the “melt water model” might also go past the notion that the trajectory and speed of climate change are more important than the final situation. The effect of climate change (sea level rise and therefore floods) will be perceived to be proportional to the rise of temperature, regardless of its speed. Other perceived effects include weather change / more extreme weather (9), ecosystem impacts (20), destruction of the ozone layer (22), and human health effects (27) (mostly UV/ozone related (see Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994)). (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994) also note a perception of agricultural problems and starvation in many places in response to a closed-form question. (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991) do note a lack of perceived impacts on ecosystems, in contrary to the results mentioned above. The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire do apply these impacts fairly loosely, often not going further than a general notion. Furthermore, even the more informed respondents only dealt with ecosystem shifts and the resulting shift of species. The importance of habitat fragmentation and species being unable to migrate to cope with the changing climate (see Thomas et al., 2004) was not perceived. Except for (Bostrom et al., 1994) and the Citizen Questionnaire, no other surveys mentioned ecosystem effects and both surveys had fairly few respondents. One may therefore question whether or not these results can be generalized. Various other effects such as decreased water availability, decreased water quality, malnutrition, spreading of diseases, conflicts, migration problems, effects on insurance, energy supply, etcetera (see e.g. Doyle, 2003; IPCC, 2001b, Schlumpf et al., 2001; Brown, 1999) seem to be not perceived or at least not readily “operational” (a person might not come up with the answer when asked in an open question, but may find it logical when pointed at it by an information product or closed question). 4.3.7 Perceived causes Most people consider current climate change to be caused (usually only) by humans (Van der Laan, 2003; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Kempton, 1997; Löfstedt, 1996; Staats et al., 1996; Bostrom, 1994; Read, 1994; Kempton, 1991; Löfstedt, 1991). The results of the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) confirm this. A total of 88% of the respondents held this opinion. A further 4% perceived the causes to be unknown, but that humans probably have a part in it. Only 8% didn’t believe that humans caused climate change. A recent survey for the WWF (Van der Laan, 2003) showed that 73% of the respondents believed that human activity has caused temperature to rise. A total of 19% disagreed and 8 % didn’t know. The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire listed a total of 15 causes, which can be compared with causes from other studies, as listed in Table 11: Perceived causes of climate change. The Questionnaire results are also shown in Figure 17: Perceived causes of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire), in which “Cause #” represents the numbered causes in the table.

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Table 11: Perceived causes of climate change %

(Löfstedt, 1991)

Country: Respondents: Method: 1. Automobiles 2. Industry 3. Pollution 4. CO2 5. Ozone depletion 6. Fossil fuels 7. Natural causes 8. Greenhouse / warming 9. Other greenhouse gasses 10. Aerosol cans 11. Chemicals 12. Emissions 13. CO 14. Aircraft 15. Consumption 16. Ignorance of countries 17. Deforestation 18. Acid rain 19. Energy consumption 20. CFC’s 21. Space exploration 22. Nuclear power/weapons 23. Don’t know 24. Overpopulation

SE 100 Open

12 14

(Bostrom et al., 1994) USA 37 Open 70 68 86 19 95 30

(Read et al., 1994)

(Löfstedt, 1996)

USA 171 Open 41 32 30 14 27 18 14

UK Unknown Unknown 35 35 8

70

8

67

70 30

26 18

40

27 74 28

22

43 30 24 27

57 51 20

16 11

27

15

19 11

35 30 25

%

Citizen Questionnaire NL 25 Open 36 36 24 20 16 16 16 12 8

40

20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Cause #

Figure 17: Perceived causes of climate change (Citizen Questionnaire)

104

(Staats et al., 1996) NL 704 Closed

29

4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Both respondents (8%) who didn’t believe climate change to be caused by humans listed natural causes. A further 8% (2 respondents) also listed natural causes, indicating a notion of multi-causality, with both human and natural sources contributing to warming. One listed only natural causes (climate itself), probably because the question asked for the main causes. The other mentioned volcanic eruptions and considered these to cause warming (instead of cooling, which is the actual effect; (see e.g. Schneider, 2004; IPCC, 2001a)). The same respondent also noted “global dimming” and the resulting cooling. The question however, asked for the main causes. Whether or not people perceive the idea of multiple causes can’t be determined from these answers. If this notion is in fact absent, it might contribute to people’s doubts on human influence. It could raise questions on why this change is caused by humans, while in the past nature caused the changes and had a large effect on climate. Seen over all surveys, the most commonly perceived causes are deforestation, ozone depletion and aerosols/CFC’s (which are apparently considered to be more or less the same, at least in effects), pollution, industrial emissions, and automobile emissions, as is also confirmed by (Kempton, 1997; McDaniels et al., 1996; Kempton, 1991). To a minor extent, fossil fuels, emissions in general, chemicals and, CO2 were mentioned. The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire perceived mainly pollution, industrial emissions, and automobile emissions. To a minor extent, they perceived ozone depletion, fossil fuels, CO2, the greenhouse effect or global warming, and natural causes. Deforestation was not perceived as a cause. Energy consumption was not seen as a major cause in any of the surveys. Deforestation seems mainly related to a tree’s ability to absorb CO2 and also to its ability to clean air, connecting it to pollution (Kempton, 1997; Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). Ozone depletion and aerosol/CFCs are often confused with climate change. This may be due to frequently seeing these things discussed together (Read et al., 1994), because of intensive media coverage and the resulting establishment of the ozone issue in the public’s perceptions (Kempton, 1997; McDaniels, 1996; Kempton, 1991), or because of the fact that both involve the atmosphere (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). One of the respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire also noted in a discussion that he defined climate as the general environmental factors, and therefore increased radiation as a worsening of the climate. Pollution, industrial and car emissions, emissions in general and fossil fuel use are related to people perceiving greenhouse gasses as a form of “normal” air pollution (Kempton, 1991). The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire however might connect it to energy use, considering the fact that the most often mentioned general option to deal with climate change are renewable/alternative energy sources. Perhaps they simply blame industry and cars for the largest part of the energy consumption. As one respondent noted to what he/she could personally do: “Niet zoveel. Ik denk dat ik persoonlijk een dusdanig kleine invloed er op heb, dat dat verwaarloosd kan worden. Maar ik denk dat de taak in deze bij de overheid en de bedrijven ligt.”

Chemicals, like insecticides/herbicides, batteries, cleaning agents, etcetera, may be related to pollution as well or they could be the result of people taking a more generalized approach to environmental problems instead of focussing on specific problems. As (Jaeger et al., 2000) also notes; people have the strong tendency to see climate change as 105

one aspect of the general environmental disruption caused by the reckless behaviour of mankind. The important sets of perceived causes will be further discussed in subparagraph 4.4.1 Cultural models. 4.3.8 Perceived options Citizens and scientists/analysts have very different ideas on what options would be effective to deal with climate change (see e.g. Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). These can often be related to the perceived main causes and risk perceptions of climate change (O’Connor et al., 1999; Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire listed a total of 12 general options, which can be compared with causes from other studies, as listed Table 12: Perceived general options for climate change. The Questionnaire results are also shown in Figure 18: Perceived general options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire), in which “General option #” represents the numbered options in the table. Table 12: Perceived general options for climate change %

(Löfstedt, 1991)

Country: Respondents: Method: 1. Renewable energy / fuel 2. Don’t know 3. International action / treaties 4. Reduce consumption / change lifestyles 5. Reduce automobile emissions 6. Reduce industrial emissions 7. Legislation / laws / politics 8. Nothing 9. Reduce emissions 10. Increase awareness / education 11. Financial incentives / subsidies 12. Irrigation 13. Move to higher grounds 14. Raise dykes/dunes 15. Stop deforestation 16. Clean / stop / limit pollution 17. Reduce CFCs / aerosols 18. Reduce driving 19. Recycle 20. Facilitate public transport 21. Save energy 22. Plant trees

SE 100 Open

106

(Read et al., 1994) USA 169 Open 13

30 19 11 11

2 24 33 23

34 31 28 14 13

6

Citizen Questionnaire NL 25 Open 24 16 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 4

30 25

%

20 15 10 5 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

General option #

Figure 18: Perceived general options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire)

There seemed to be far more doubts and far less agreement on the general options than on impacts and causes. A total of 16% didn’t know any options and 8% said that nothing could be done. Another Dutch study mentioned that 54% thought that nobody could do anything about changes in nature (Van der Laan, 2003). A total of 44% disagreed and 2% didn’t know. Some doubts could be placed on the results of (Van der Laan, 2003) with respect to that question. The statement “Nobody can do anything about changes in nature” can be interpreted in two ways: either preventing changes from occurring or doing something about the changes when they’ve already occurred. This can be illustrated by a response to the similar question in the Citizen Questionnaire, “What options do you see (and prefer) for dealing with Climate Change?” One of the most informed respondents, who mentioned several personal options, answered: “Geen, je kunt er niet mee om gaan.”

Apparently, the respondent interpreted the question in terms of “how can we live with climatic changes”. Similarly, the respondents in (Van der Laan, 2003) might have interpreted the question in various ways. As could be expected from the perceived causes of climate change, measures to reduce pollution, prevent deforestation, reduce the use of aerosols and CFCs were listed in the studies. The respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire however mainly mentioned renewable and alternative sources of energy as an option. This could be interpreted as that they perceive energy use to be the main cause of climate change, but that industry and vehicles are the main users of that energy. Another interpretation might be that they consider these alternative fuels, specific examples mentioned hydrogen and fuel cells, to be less polluting than fossil fuels. Other studies have shown much support for preventing deforestation (O’Connor et al., 1999; Staats et al., 1996; Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991), planting trees (Kempton, 1991), stricter pollution controls (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991), improving car fuel efficiency (O’Connor et al., 1999; Kempton, 1997), ozone/aerosol/CFC measures (Staats et al., 1996; Kempton, 1991), using energy conservation measures (Bostrom et al., 1994), higher energy saving measures (Staats et al., 1996) stopping use of fossil fuels (Bostrom 107

et al., 1994), reserving areas as floodplains (Van der Laan, 2003). Although there may be support for these options and they may even be seen as helping to solve climate change if specifically asked for if they would work, the connection with climate change may not be perceived or readily operational. Policy measures that scientists/analysts often consider being very effective, such as raising gasoline prices (Jaeger et al., 2000; O’Connor et al., 1999; Staats et al., 1996) and taxes on energy (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991) are considered to be ineffective and unfair. They are not supported. Several reasons can be named for this. First, people usually do not perceive the link between energy use and climate change (Kempton, 1997; McDaniels, 1996; Kempton, 1991). Second, people usually do not perceive their own everyday activities to be a major contributor to climate change (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; McDaniels et al., 1996). And third, people see their fuel and energy consumption as inelastic (Kempton, 1991). Taking these notes, fuel and energy taxes are seen as a punishment that has no effect at all on climate change. However, when those taxes are framed in terms of a way of raising money, with the revenues used directly to help prevent climate change, people are willing to accept them (Kempton, 1997; see also Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Another notion of importance is that people consider energy use to be inelastic. They usually consider energy conservation to be the same as decreasing energy services; saving energy by undertaking less energy requiring activities (doing less) (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Kempton, 1991). Conservation makes people think of limitation and sacrifice, rather than improved equipment and management (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Kempton, 1991). The idea of energy efficiency (doing the same but using less energy for it) seems almost absent. People do not understand what energy efficiency is because they have had very little direct contact with it (Kempton, 1991). Support for energy efficiency options such as higher car fuel efficiency, when clearly visualized, was very high (Kempton, 1991). Adaptation doesn’t seem to be considered to be an option either. Only 8% of the respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire, the ones who didn’t consider climate change to be caused by humans, mentioned adaptation measures. People broadly and very strongly oppose adaptation without prevention (Kempton, 1991). They perceive adaptation as postponing or avoiding decision-making (Kempton, 1991). Adaptation without prevention can be suggested as a way to deal with uncertainty (in the extent of damage of climate change), the argument that our children would be better off if we invest in productive technology and capital and have them adapt rather than spending the same money on prevention, and as a result of “economic discounting” (costs in the future are considered to be less important than the same costs today, which considering the long timeframe of climate change would greatly reduce the “value” of those costs today). Economists tend to favour these strategies. However, techniques such as discounting apply to corporate planning and do not reflect economic decisions that involve passing on an intact environment to descendants (Kempton, 1991). Adaptation without prevention doesn’t take into account moral considerations such as intergenerational equity, regional equity (the poor receive the most damage; while we can

108

adapt, they cannot and get stuck with the damage caused by the developed countries), and damage to nature (Kempton, 1991; see also (Schneider, 2004) on (Lomborg, 2003)). However, even with prevention measures taken, climate change cannot be completely avoided or reversed and adaptation methods will always be needed. It remains questionable if and to what extent citizens know this. As one respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire notes to the question of whether or not the world community is doing enough: “Nee, anders zou het het effect (het oplopen van de temperatuur) reeds gestopt zijn en zou het geen probleem meer zijn.”

Geoengineering options, such as fertilizing the ocean, putting dust into the stratosphere, and making more clouds (cloud seeding), in order to prevent further climate change, were strongly rejected as well (Read et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). Literature mentions four possible reasons for this. One is that people consider it to be morally wrong for humans to attempt to change the weather/climate; it is a natural system with special cultural meaning (Kempton, 1991). Another, connected to the first, is that Geoengineering seems unnatural or possibly even dangerous, as it increases rather than decreases human impact on the world (Read et al., 1994). Furthermore, people may not perceive the direction of the change, and think it will increase warming (Read et al., 1994). This point is strengthened by peoples’ perception that loss of ozone and volcanic eruptions increase warming, rather than decrease it (see above and Citizen Questionnaire), and by the notion that perceived unnatural and immoral human activities cause warming (see Kempton, 1991). A more “natural” form of geoengineering such as planting trees is accepted. The fourth possible reason is fragmentary knowledge leads people to reject unfamiliar options (Read et al., 1994). The respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire listed a total of 18 options they personally could take, which can be compared with causes from other studies, as listed in Table 13: Perceived personal options for climate change. The Questionnaire results are also shown in Figure 19: Perceived personal options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire), in which “Personal option #” represents the numbered options in the table. Table 13: Perceived personal options for climate change % Country: Respondents: Method: 1. Reduce driving 2. Not much 3. Save energy 4. Less heating 5. Separate / collect garbage 6. Reduce aerosol use 7. Reduce packaging material use 8. Renewable energy / fuel 9. Personal awareness 10. Recycle

(Read et al., 1994) USA 157 Open 43 11 16 25 20

Citizen Questionnaire NL 25 Open 44 20 20 16 16 12 12 12 8 8

109

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Less consumption Nothing Pay attention to environment in general Reduce chemical use Use more efficient appliances Use public transport Political action Don’t know Raise awareness Reduce flying Use less water “Green” consumption

34

8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 4 4 4

12

50 45 40 35

%

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Personal option #

Figure 19: Perceived personal options for climate change (Citizen Questionnaire)

In line with seeing automobile emissions as a major cause of climate change, people see “driving less” as a possible personal solution. (Read et al., 1994) also mentions political action, general awareness, and recycling as important personal options. A total of 20% of the respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire also mention saving energy as a personal option. Less heating was mentioned by 16% as well. This could be due to the strong focus of government campaigns on “turning the heating down”, although these commercials generally don’t clearly spell out the connection with climate change. Collecting or separating garbage was another option mentioned in the Citizen Questionnaire. This, together with some notions of respondents that they thought being aware of the environment in general, might be another sign of people preferring to focus on the environment in general, instead of focussing on specific subjects. In general, most people noted that they didn’t know what they could do (4%), that they could do nothing at all (8%) or very little (20%). Respondents noted to their own options: “Niet zoveel. Ik denk dat ik persoonlijk een dusdanig kleine invloed er op heb, dat dat verwaarloosd kan worden. Maar ik denk dat de taak in deze bij de overheid en de bedrijven ligt” “Not very much, but maybe I can use other sorts of energy and always cycle instead of taking the car” “weinig, een land kan niets doen moet heel de wereld doen”

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“I try to, but it's difficult, and sometimes I think like: " well, this small amount won't do it, so why not?"” “Not enough. Especially when it's cold outside, or raining. And I guess the problem doesn't seem personal to me” “Nee, omdat ik denk dat het toch niets uithaalt. Die kilometers die ik rijd met een auto of die paar dingen die ik koop, zullen het effect echt niet beïnvloeden.” “Not really, I think I will need a car once in a while”

While many respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire noted renewable energy sources as a general option, only 12% noted this as personal option. Perhaps this is due to the blaming of industry mentioned before, but considering that people themselves drive cars and that they considered this to be a main cause as well, there might be a different reason. It could be that they consider it a task for the government to implement renewable energy centrally, instead of citizens themselves taking this option. A third possible reason is that they considered it enough to have mentioned it in the general options question. A total of 44% of the respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire noted straightforward to actually take the actions they mentioned were possible. A total of 12% said they didn’t do so. Furthermore, 36% gave more doubtful responses. These doubtful responses usually did display a positive intent. These results illustrate the ideas that citizens mainly blame industry and cars, that they rarely perceive energy efficiency options (noted by only 8% of the respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire), that they consider their contributions to climate change to be inelastic, and that they consider their own contributions to be minimal or even negligible. The goodwill and intention to act seem present in almost all results however. Other studies show support for buying cars with a higher fuel efficiency (Kempton, 1996), using heating and cooling sparsely (O’Connor et al., 1999; Staats et al., 1996), not buying environmentally unfriendly spray cans (Staats et al., 1996), bringing old refrigerators to dismantling stations (Staats et al., 1996), separating small chemical waste (Staats et al., 1996), turning the light off when leaving the room (Staats et al., 1996), installing more insulation and weatherising homes (O’Connor et al., 1999), and replacing older appliances with more energy efficient models (O’Connor et al., 1999). Although there may be support for these options and they may even be seen as helping to solve climate change if specifically asked for if they would work, the connection with climate change may not be perceived or readily operational. Citizens generally mentioned it to be unlikely that they would carpool and drive less by using public transport or already were doing this (O’Connor et al., 1999; Staats et al., 1996). Citizens only slightly above averagely noted that they bought energy saving light bulbs (Staats et al., 1996)

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4.4 Barriers & inhibitors The present paragraph will focus on the most prevalent of the various barriers and inhibitors, besides current risk perceptions, that are currently hampering communication on climate change. The research question that will be the focus of this paragraph is: “What are the barriers and inhibitors of risk communication on the Climate Change problem?” 4.4.1 Cultural models Paragraph 7.3 Climate change risk perception shows that there are various misperceptions in the public’s view on the causes, consequences, and options for mitigation of anthropogenic climate change. Some of these misperceptions may be due to a simple lack of (up to date) knowledge, but others have a background that is more solid and therefore harder to change through conventional communication. One such background is the concept of “cultural models”. Cultural models are conceptual models of the fundamental ways in which the world works that are shared by most of the people in a culture (Holland and Quinn, 1987). Cultural models play a role in the forming of people’s opinions on climate change in two ways. First, people apply concepts drawn from their understanding of other environmental problems (Kempton, 1997). Climate change is incorporated into four existing concepts: air pollution, ozone depletion, plant photosynthesis and respiration, and weather and temperature (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). And second, people appeal to more general concepts about the environment, observations about the weather, and broad environmental values (Kempton, 1997). People use these cultural models to understand a complex new problem. New information is actively fit into pre-existing cultural models and concepts (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Doing so, people can come to terms with complex situations fairly quickly. Although this works well for simple issues, it might lead to people applying wrong models to new and complex issues, such as climate change (Kempton, 1997). This mechanism is essentially a heuristic, as mentioned in subparagraph 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases, resulting in the same problems. The (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991) studies have researched these models for the US public, but they appear in various other studies in the US and Europe as well (Citizen Questionnaire; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Löfstedt, 1996; Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; Löfstedt, 1991). They identified five cultural models: air pollution, ozone depletion, plant photosynthesis and respiration, temperature and weather, and general (environmental) values. The Citizen Questionnaire identified a sixth cultural model: the melt water model. Air pollution is one of the cultural models applied to climate change. People view greenhouse gasses as a form of air pollution (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). This cultural model has four elements: pollution consists of artificial chemicals rather than natural substances, these chemicals are toxic to humans and other forms of life,

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automobile and industrial emissions are the primary sources, and pollution can be prevented by installing more filtering equipment (Kempton, 1997). The answers in the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) clearly showed this model being applied: “I think there is too much pollution by industry and all kinds of traffic” “uitstoot giftige stoffen van fabrieken en voertuigen” “Pollution of all kinds.”

Several problems can arise from this model. It leads to a suggestion that traditional endof-pipe pollution controls such as filtering would be the solution to climate change, and it obscures the role of less visible sources such as farming, clearing land and using energy inefficiently (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). While greenhouse gasses can be treated as pollution and end-of-pipe solutions can be applied (e.g. pumping CO2 into depleted gas fields), these measures are easier said than done. They are different from the usually relatively easy options such as filtering. Furthermore, a traditional pollutant like soot does play a role in climate change (see e.g. Steitz et al., 2003; IPCC, 2001a), however focusing on this alone provides far from the full picture. Ozone depletion is another often used cultural model (Kempton, 1997; Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). There are two ways in which this model is applied. One way is that climate change is often seen as a result of the destruction of the ozone layer, and the cause of climate change being the use of aerosols or CFCs (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). The other way is that the ozone layer is being destroyed because of greenhouse gasses (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Related to the second way, people sometimes confuse stratospheric ozone depletion (ozone layer) with urban tropospheric ozone pollution (summer smog) (Kempton, 1991). “Breaking of the ozone layer” “ozonlaag” “liever een pot gel dan een fles haarlak” “don't use products containing aerosols”

The answers in the Citizen Questionnaire clearly showed this model being applied. The most important problem of this model is that people consider banning CFCs and reducing the use of aerosol spray cans to be the most important options to prevent climate change (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). This leads people to invest energy in futile activities (even for the ozone problem, since ozone depleting CFCs have been banned for non-essential uses such as spray cans for years) and leads them to believe that the problem is being solved while it is not (Read et al., 1994). It also does unnecessary damage to companies producing these products. The stratospheric/tropospheric confusion might lead to end-of-pipe solutions. However, it could also be that people simply consider the problems with the ozone layer to be a very important problem. This might result in people mentioning it when asked about other problems as well, as was suggested by (Löfstedt, 1991).

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Plant photosynthesis and respiration are used as cultural model as well (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). People know the process of photosynthesis, where trees absorb CO2 and produce oxygen. Furthermore, the media reported that deforestation is raising the level of CO2 in the atmosphere. These things lead some people, as many as 77% of the US population according to (Kempton, 1997), to believe that deforestation would exhaust all of the oxygen in the atmosphere, resulting in humans and other beings to be unable to breathe (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Another perceived result of deforestation seems to be the loss of the plant’s ability to clean air (Bostrom et al., 1994), connecting it to the pollution model mentioned above. The answers in the Citizen Questionnaire did not show this model being applied. This cultural model leads to unnecessary fears, because deforestation will not lead to the atmosphere running out of oxygen. Furthermore, it shifts the focus of mitigation options from reducing fossil fuel use to preventing deforestation and planting trees, which is a helpful but less effective option (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Nevertheless, there are many other good reasons to prevent deforestation, such as preventing habitat destruction, species extinction, or human related reasons (forests as source of potential medicines, income, etcetera). These reasons will surely play a part in citizens’ preference for this option. Temperature and weather are applied to climate change as cultural models as well (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). Three things might be noted with respect to this model. First of all, with respect to temperature change, people do not perceive a change of 1.5-6 oC as very threatening or involving large effects (Jaeger et al., 2000; Martin, 2000; Kempton, 1991). This is mainly the result of experiences from travel and local temperature cycles such as day-night and seasonal differences (Kempton, 1991). People do not understand the significance of higher average temperatures (Kempton, 1991). This leads to the second notion, that people often consider climate change to simply mean “hotter weather” or to confuse climate change with “weather” (Kempton, 1997; Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). The result of this hotter weather is mainly associated with the discomfort people feel on hot summer days (Kempton, 1997). Some people also use literal interpretations of concepts like the greenhouse effect as involving increased steaminess (Bostrom et al., 1994). The results of such a global average change, as a series of various weather related, geophysical, and ecosystem effects is not perceived (Kempton, 1997; Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). As a respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire notes when asked about climate change: “Bedoeld zal zijn de verhoging van de gemiddelde temperatuur op aarde.”

One might also wonder whether people know or perceive that global warming will mean cooling in some places and at certain altitudes (anthropogenic climate change results in warming in the troposphere but cooling in the stratosphere) and warming in other places and at other altitudes, instead of (equal) warming everywhere. However, no research has been found exploring this point. The third notion is that people seem to have and have always had a tendency to believe that weather has changed (Kempton, 1991), and that human activities (especially those that are considered unnatural or immoral, such as space shots, atom bomb testing and pollution) are a major factor in weather change (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). 114

The answers in the Citizen Questionnaire showed this model being applied. The most important problems arising from this model are that the impacts of climate change seem hardly worth mentioning and that the most important impacts are overlooked. A further cultural model was identified in the Citizen Questionnaire (see 4.3.6 Perceived impacts). This cultural model, the “melt water model” is a cause-effect chain from rising temperatures that result in melting poles and glaciers that result in rising sea levels that result in floods. Citizens: “The greenhouse effect, it is getting hotter and hotter and the North- and South Pole are melting and because of that the sea level is rising.” “Het probleem is (volgens mij) voornamelijk dat het ijs smelt, waardoor de zeespiegel stijgt en grote delen land zullen verdrinken.”

While sea level rise is mainly caused by the expansion of the water due to it heating, the main problem that may arise from this model is that it puts a lot of focus on sea level rise as a cause of floods. Sea level rise is a fairly slow going process and may therefore set the perceived time of impact far in the future. Floods due to extreme weather events and increases in storm frequency and activity, which have effects much sooner in time, may not be perceived. This is also important to keep in mind when interpreting survey results. The “melt water model” might also go past the notion that the trajectory and speed of climate change are more important than the final situation. The effect of climate change (sea level rise and therefore floods) will be perceived to be proportional to the rise of temperature, regardless of its speed. General (environmental) values can be considered to be a cultural model as well. The strongest (environmental) value among the public is to preserve the environment for future generations, and the well being of these future generations in general (Kempton, 1991). This includes securing resources and opportunities (Kempton, 1991). An important part of citizen support for environmental protection is local: to preserve local recreational and scenic places and to protect one’s own health (Kempton, 1991). With respect to one’s personal situation, however, people think ten years ahead at maximum (Kortland et al., 2002), strengthening the importance of the future generations value in the climate change issue. Most environmental values are centred on human use (e.g. crop damage and loss of potential medicines). Other environmental values relate to religious reasons, intrinsic value of nature, and empathy with animals (Kempton, 1997; Kempton, 1991). While there is no real established species preservation value, the foundations for that seem to be there (Kempton, 1991). People have knowledge of species interdependence and also respect it, but do not yet understand that small changes in average global temperature can cause massive biological changes (Kempton, 1991). The answers in the Citizen Questionnaire show these models/values being applied: “Ik wil wel graag dat mijn kinderen en in de toekomst kleinkinderen ook een gezond en leuk leven hebben.”

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Furthermore, the results of the Questionnaire and several discussions with respondents afterwards, suggest a value that is strongly against damaging human interference in nature. Climate change is considered to be a problem only if it is actually caused by humans. If it is natural, then it is not considered to be a problem (even though that does not take away the effects). This is related to the Dread Risk factor “Man-made rather than natural sources”; risk perception factor 14 in Table 8: Classic risk perception factors. Values differ from the other cultural models in that they should not be considered as communication barriers themselves. Rather, communication that does not take them properly into account might run into problems. 4.4.2 Dissonance and denial A participatory integrated assessment study of climate change in the Alps (CLEAR) noted that participating citizens were alarmed about the consequences of high-energy futures and mollified by images of low-energy futures (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). They generally perceived climate change to be a serious issue (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). However, they erected a series of psychological barriers to justify why they should not act either individually or through collective institutions to mitigate climate change (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). The reason for this is that they considered the consequences of shifting away from preferred consumption patterns and comfortable lifestyles to be discouraging (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Citizens understand the reality of the problems, but refuse to accept the implications (Marshall and Lynas, 2003) Citizens’ often are in a state of “cognitive dissonance”, with respect to personal action towards climate change mitigation: a lack of cognitive consistency between attitudes and behaviour (Marshall and Lynas, 2003; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; McDaniels et al., 1996). The resulting search to re-establish a sense of consistency, and therefore inner calm, resulted in citizens creating a number of socio-psychological denial mechanisms. These mechanisms heightened the perceived cost of shifting away from comfortable lifestyles, set blame on the inaction of others, and emphasised doubts regarding the immediacy of personal action when the effects of climate change seemed uncertain and far away (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Dissonance and denial are barriers to action and therefore part of the Implementation Barriers, mentioned in subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain. However, social psychological research also indicates that both the encoding and the retrieval of information are often guided by personal desire to maintain cognitive consistency (StollKleemann et al., 2001; Taylor and Fiske, 1981), similar to the confirmation heuristic mentioned in subparagraph 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases. They can therefore also be considered to be Communication Barriers, as described in the same subparagraph. Attitudes help people mediate between the inner demands of the self and signals arising from the outside world. External signals may arise from influences of social networks and views of the appropriateness of lifestyle and consumption behaviour (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Social and cultural norms, personal experiences, and “certainty arrays” of coordinated beliefs that are formed to assist in response to complex and possibly

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intimidating requirements, provide significant biases for attitudes (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Mediation between self and social context is assisted by four functions, as listed in Table 14: Mediation factors between self and social context (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Pennigton et al., 1999). Table 14: Mediation factors between self and social context

1. 2. 3. 4.

Adaptation Self-expression Ego-defensiveness Knowledge processing

Adaptation is dependent on forming positive associations with persons or outlooks with which the individual shares a sense of common identification. The relevance of this factor in climate change is the influence of society and societal values and norms and public figures on a person’s attitudes and behaviour and the establishment and change of lifestyles. Self-expression is displayed in the need to show others about one’s values or feelings. One aspect of this is the expression of self-identity; the wish to be in a state of inner control, yet externally appreciated. This factor relates to climate change on the society and lifestyle issue as well (externally appreciated), but also influences one’s need for comfort (see below). Ego-defensiveness serves to protect people from their own inconsistencies and negative feelings towards other people. It serves to maintain self-image. In respect to climate change, its relevance is that it creates various forms of denial (see below). Knowledge processing allows people to process and order information into coherent and organised patterns in order to simplify and understand complex and possible conflicting issues (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Knowledge processing is similar to the heuristics discussed in subparagraphs 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases and 4.3.4 Probability, heuristics, and biases and climate change and the cultural models discussed in subparagraph 4.4.1 Cultural models. Attitudes can differ from behaviour for a number of reasons. One explanation is that attitudes to climate change relate to a general societal norm (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Henschel and Wiedermann, 1993), while behaviour rests with specific individual responsibility (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Another interpretation is that attitude covers a vast array of cognitive processes and compositions that remain chaotically in conflict for the most part, except when contradictions have to be confronted (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). A number of dimensions of attitude, as listed in Table 15: Dimensions of attitude, contribute to environmentally dependent behaviour (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Table 15: Dimensions of attitude

1. Need for personal comfort 2. Belief in technological solutions 3. Belief in personal contribution to mitigation 117

4. Demand for a justifiable relationship between personal costs and social gains 5. Acceptance that there is indeed a crisis 6. Loss of trust in government generally as well as in its capacity to deliver effective policy measures When there are differences between attitude and actual behaviour, people experience unease and look for cues to justify continued behaviour in the face of a socialised moral norm to the contrary (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). In the case of climate change, this happens when there is a difference between the (perceived) need to respond effectively to climate change mitigation strategies and personal preferences for a particular lifestyle, consumption habits, or behavioural choices. Research has suggested nine ways, nine “barriers of denial”, in which this denial can take place in the case of climate change, as listed in Table 16: Barriers of denial (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Table 16: Barriers of denial

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Metaphor of displaced commitment (“I protect the environment in other ways”) To condemn the accuser (“You have no right to challenge me”) Denial of responsibility (“I am not the main cause of this problem”) Rejection of blame (“I have done nothing so wrong as to be destructive”) Ignorance (“I simply don’t know the consequences of my actions”) Powerlessness (“I am only an infinitesimal being in the order of things”) Fabricated constraints (‘There are too many impediments”) “After the flood” (“What is the future doing for me?”) Comfort (“It is too difficult for me to change my behaviour”)

Common in these denial processes are well known dilemmas, such as the Tragedy-of-theCommons dilemma (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Hardin, 1968; Goetze, 1994), in which consuming a resource gives benefits, the resource is large, and the person only consumes small quantities and therefore has little impact by himself, while the total impact by a community of consumers proves disastrous. Results from the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) illustrate this when respondents reply to the question whether he or she actually takes personal measures: “I try to, but it's difficult, and sometimes I think like: " well, this small amount won't do it, so why not?"” “Nee, omdat ik denk dat het toch niets uithaalt. Die kilometers die ik rijd met een auto of die paar dingen die ik koop, zullen het effect echt niet beïnvloeden.”

Denial can be reinforced by four “interpretations”, as listed in Table 17: Interpretations reinforcing denial (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Table 17: Interpretations reinforcing denial

1. Comfort interpretation: unwillingness to give up customary habits and favoured lifestyles, which are closely associated with a sense of self-identity 2. Tragedy-of-the-commons interpretation: construction of attitude and behaviour

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connections that regard any cost to the self as greater than the benefits to others 3. Managerial-fix interpretation: lack of acceptance that climate change is as serious as made out and a belief that it can be resolved by technological and regulatory innovation 4. Governance-distrust interpretation: underlying lack of faith in the capacity of government to deliver its side of the bargain In both the barriers of denial and interpretations that reinforce denial, comfort is the most important factor (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). This can be illustrated by several answers from the Citizen Questionnaire to the question whether he or she actually takes actions to mitigate: “Ehm, sometimes. Not enough. Especially when it's cold outside, or raining.” “Ja, hoewel het meestal bij goede voornemens blijft. Het laatste. Gemakzucht.” “Yep, although sometimes I skip things out of laziness.”

With a lack of confidence and loss of trust in governments and the democratic process, e.g. 11% of the Americans and 20-40% of the Europeans have faith in their legislators, governance-distrust proved to be an important factor as well (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). The role of trust in climate change has been discussed in subparagraph 4.3.5 Trust and climate change and will be discussed in more detail in subparagraph 4.4.3 Social dilemmas. As was shown in (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001) and also shows up in quotes of citizens in (Kempton, 1997), there is a general distrust in the government’s ability to deliver its end of the bargain. The idea that individual behaviour change will not be matched by a reliable governmental response and even less through leadership was very evident and was still an excuse for inaction (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Either the government was regarded as not being able to deliver or it was thought that various lobbies would interfere with any substantial strategy (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Furthermore, there was a suspicion that the government would use environmental or carbon levies as excuse to raise taxes for unrelated political promises (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Nevertheless, people in the past have acted time and time again by appeals to their sense of nationhood, responsibility to their children, and ideas about historical destiny (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). People have also been willing to pay a heavy financial price to defend against threats when perceived (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Besides the factors mentioned above, several other things could be mentioned that cause climate change to be more of a problem with respect to taking action to a perceived threat. These factors seem to come from our evolutionary heritage (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). We can mobilise rapidly in response to clear and immediate dangers, but as a threat becomes less certain or causally complex, it becomes harder to find the urgency to tackle them (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). One of these factors relates to our natural tendency to identify rival social groups as threats. As subparagraph 4.2.4 Media coverage describes, this is also an issue in the creation of media attention, involving questions of blame, human interest, and conflict (Table 9: Media triggers). Climate change however is largely self-inflicted (Marshall 119

and Lynas, 2003); there are no well-defined perpetrators and victims (McDaniels et al., 1996). Although there are degrees of responsibility, no direct linkage between someone’s emissions and another’s damage can be made. Still attempts are made to make climate change fit familiar perpetrator-victim polarities (Schneider, 2004; Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Another factor relates to the natural tendency to diffuse responsibility (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). This is the “Passive Bystander Effect”, after the phenomenon that violent crimes can be committed in a crowded street without anyone intervening. Everyone is waiting for someone else to act first. The more people involved, the less individual responsibility is felt. This is amplified by the fact that everyone is perpetrator, victim, and bystander simultaneously (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Probably the most important other factor relates to the fact that we find a globally warmed future impossible to imagine (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Throughout history, humans have relied on past experiences to guide future behaviour. However in climate change, there is no historical parallel for what is happening (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). This does not mean that people consider it to be a less serious problem though, on the contrary, as can be illustrated by a quote from the Citizen Questionnaire: “And since we cannot grasp the effect, I consider it serious.”

The fact that the lack of historical parallel results in a lack of imaginability is also directly related to the availability heuristic discussed in subparagraph 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases. Besides being unable to react to the threat, we also consider it less likely to actually happen. Despite of all of the reasons for the public to resort to inaction, it needs to be said that even extreme measures, such as a 100% energy tax (in US context, since European taxes are even higher), may be supported if properly framed and if people know that the gains of that tax help to solve the problem (Kempton, 1991). People do seem to be prepared to act, if they know that their actions will have effect. 4.4.3 Social dilemmas A dilemma closely related to the Tragedy-of-the-Commons dilemma and Passive Bystander Effect mentioned in subparagraph 4.4.2 Dissonance and denial, is the wellknown “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (see e.g. Goetze, 1994; Soroos, 1994; Bonacich, 1970). According to this dilemma, it doesn’t make sense to act if no one else does. This is very much the case with climate change. One person only causes a small part of the problem and can therefore also only make small contributions to solving it. The belief in personal contributions to mitigation (Table 15: Dimensions of attitude), condemning the accuser, denial of responsibility, and powerlessness (Table 16: Barriers of denial) play a large role in this situation. Personal contribution would make sense if others would contribute as well

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Prisoner’s Dilemma can be illustrated by an answer from the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results), to the question whether he or she actually takes actions to mitigate: “To a degree. It is very hard to take drastic measures when most others do not (prisoner's dilemma).”

The three dilemmas might be summarized in the so-called “social dilemma”, a situation in which individual and collective welfare are at odds (Staats et al., 1996; Dawes, 1980). People’s behaviour in a situation of a social dilemma follows the Goal-Expectation Theory (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). This theory predicts that people will sacrifice personal interests in favour of collective interests when they share the goal to promote the collective interest and, at the same time, have the expectation that other people will also contribute (Staats et al., 1996; Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). Social dilemmas can be barriers to action, part of the Implementation Barriers as discussed in subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain. As was mentioned in subparagraph 4.4.2 Dissonance and denial, the desire to maintain cognitive consistency can influence the way information is interpreted. Since social dilemmas in general involve a difference between attitude and behaviour, these can serve as Communication Barriers as well. An analysis of the climate change issue with respect to the Goal-Expectation Theory reveals two aspects. First, people’s orientation towards shared collective goals is inhibited by “environmental uncertainty”, and second, people’s expectations of the contributions made by other parties suffer from “social uncertainty” (Staats et al., 1996). Environmental uncertainty in this case means that there is uncertainty about the form the negative consequences of climate change will take, and when they will manifest themselves (Staats et al., 1996). Uncertainty on whether climate change is really caused by humans, whether scientists agree on this, and even whether or not it is changing at all seems to be present among some citizens as well (see e.g. the Citizen Questionnaire; subparagraph 4.3.7 Perceived causes; Duyndam, 2004; Martin, 2000). Furthermore, people are faced with immediate positive rewards of ecologically unsound behaviour, while negative consequences are delayed in time (Klinke and Renn, 2002; Staats et al., 1996). When asked about how uncertain people were about the characteristics, causes, and consequences of climate change, 75% indicated that they were very uncertain (Staats et al., 1993). Social uncertainty in this case means that there is uncertainty on whether personal cooperative actions to prevent climate change will be matched by the actions of others (Staats et al., 1993). Personal contributions to prevent a collective disaster are futile unless a substantial number of other parties involved will behave similarly. Individuals will therefore only be willing to sacrifice self-interest if other parties do the same, even though they might be very concerned about the collective consequences of their behaviour (Staats et al., 1993). Decisions to behave cooperatively therefore depend on the trust that others will do the same (Staats et al., 1993). In the climate change issue, factors that normally develop this trust are absent (Staats et al., 1993). These factors include direct interactions revealing motives and intentions (Liebrand et al., 1992; Messick and Brewer, 1983), and the 121

possibility to presume shared common values, attitudes and goals (such as in small homogeneous social groups) (Wit et al., 1992). Global societal social dilemmas such as climate change however involve various parties with differential resources and differential interests extended in space and time (Staats et al., 1993). When asked about how uncertain people were about whether they believed other Dutch households were really contributing to prevent climate change, 65% indicated that they were very uncertain (Staats et al., 1993). There was a strong positive relationship between the expected contributions of other households and self-reported behavioural contributions (Staats et al., 1993). Furthermore, 70% doubted contributions by the agricultural sector, 81% doubted contributions by the transport sector, and 83% doubted contributions by the industrial sector (Staats et al., 1993). A positive relationship was also found between the expected contributions from these parties and self-reported behavioural contributions (Staats et al., 1993). Under circumstances of distrust in the contributions of other parties, people do not change their own behaviour, but rather call for support the implementation of superimposed policy measures (Staats et al., 1993). The Structural Goal-Expectation Theory (Yamagishi, 1988; Yamagishi, 1986) therefore states that people who, out of concern about the collective consequences of ecologically unsound behaviours, have the goal to achieve mutual cooperation, but at the same time doubt whether other parties contribute sufficiently to help preventing the collective problem, opt for structural solutions. As was mentioned in subparagraph 4.4.2 Dissonance and denial, the trust in government generally as well as in its capacity to deliver effective policy measures, matching individual behaviour change with a reliable response, is an important issue as well. Noticing this preference for structural solutions, this importance will be even greater. As was shown in (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001) and also shows up in quotes of citizens in (Kempton, 1997), there is a general distrust in the government’s ability to deliver its end of the bargain. Either the government was regarded as not being able to deliver or it was thought that various lobbies would interfere with any substantial strategy (StollKleemann et al., 2001). A recent survey by TNS-NIPO for the Dutch department of the World Wide Fund for Nature, showed that 43% of the Dutch believe that the government is not doing enough to counter the problems with climate (Van der Laan, 2003). The results from the Citizen Questionnaire show even more people not satisfied with current government action. A total of 72% said they that they did not think that the government was doing enough. However, the Citizen Questionnaire was an open question survey and a significant portion of that group expressed a “soft no”, saying that the government was doing a lot, but not enough, or could do better. The people who expressed a “hard no”, saying that the government was really not doing enough, made 44% of the respondents. The (Van der Laan, 2003) survey was a multiple-choice survey and did not make a finer distinction. These findings are summarized in Figure 20: Citizens' view on government action. Citizen Questionnaire A shows the answers interpreted as “yes”, “no”, or “don’t known” and Citizen Questionnaire B shows the answers interpreted into a finer distinction between “hard no” and “soft no”.

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Is the government doing enough to solve the problem?

(Van der Laan, 2003)

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Citizen Questionnaire A

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Citizen Questionnaire B

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0%

43

0 16

72

44

20%

40%

04

28

60%

80%

yes no could do better don't know

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100%

Figure 20: Citizens' view on government action

For the point of view of citizens, the international contributions will be important as well. Especially in a small (although industrialized) country such as The Netherlands, producing only about 1% of the total global CO2 emissions (Van der Sluijs, 1999), this will be the case. It might be tempting to point at larger countries, such as the USA, who are emitting much more and are not committing to international treaties. One might also point at the “world community” as the cause of climate change, depersonalising it and using it as an excuse to do nothing by trivializing personal and national influence. Answers in the Citizen Questionnaire on the question of whether the Dutch government is doing enough can illustrate this: “Het probleem is mondiaal, dus onze regering kan er niet zoveel mee.” “More or less. They know the threat, and are trying to deal with it, but as a country on your own, you can't do much about it.”

The answers from the Citizen Questionnaire on if the world community is doing enough show a much more negative response than the question on the government. None of the respondents said that the world community was doing enough. A total of 96% responded outright negative to the question. One respondent (4%) noted that some countries were doing enough but others not. Another one just mentioned the thought that climate change was not an issue for a lot of countries, because they had other problems, and noted an understanding that people in these countries would not be interested in climate change.

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4.5 Implications and options for communication This paragraph will give an overview of the implications of risk perceptions and barriers for risk communication on climate change and options to deal with and overcome them. The central research question in this paragraph is: “What strategies and considerations can be taken, concerning risk communication on Climate Change, to deal with risk perceptions and to overcome barriers and inhibitors?” 4.5.1 Risk perception Citizens consider the moral dimensions of the climate issue to be very important. This goes for both a regional and an intergenerational perspective. Issues such as equity, risks to future generations, and impacts on species are considered to be very important (see also subparagraph 4.4.1 Cultural models). Impacts in other world regions are of importance besides local impacts. In current risk perceptions, the perceived impact on species is fairly low (McDaniels et al., 1996). This might therefore be an important issue for risk communication to address, because it is both a major impact and of concern to citizens. Moral issues receive fairly little attention at the moment, with discussions focussing more on economic impacts (Kempton, 1991). Economic impacts seem less of a concern to citizens (see Jaeger et al., 2000 and subparagraph 4.3.6 Perceived impacts). These moral dimensions of climate change should therefore receive much more attention than is currently the case. Another important task for risk communication and the scientific community as a whole is to improve communication in the mass media. Events relevant for media attention, such as important conferences, policy developments, study releases, and extreme weather events should be used to gain media attention. Especially the extreme weather events offer good opportunities to discuss the general trends caused by climate change, to put more focus on impacts that are currently absent in citizens’ perceptions but relevant to them, to improve its imaginability, and to show citizens the impacts that occur today and are relevant to them, bringing climate change from the distant future to today. People generally don’t look more than ten years ahead with respect to their personal situation (Kortland et al., 2002). This limits the usefulness of information on impacts in the future, except for when it affects future generations. Extreme weather events might also be a good moment for communication on interregional equity. During such an event, it could be shown that while the developed countries can take those impacts to some extent, developing countries are far more vulnerable and the same impacts on those countries could have far greater effects than they would have here. While this notion doesn’t seem to be common in citizen’s image of climate change at the moment, it is relevant to them, as noted above. The appearance or publication of studies dealing with large impacts is also a possible moment for communication. However, care will need to be taken. While “apocalyptic”, and in scientific perspective overblown (Schneider, 2004), scenarios such as in the Pentagon report (Schwartz and Randall, 2004) and the movie The day after tomorrow

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ignite public imagination, they may be overdone. These scenarios could make climate change an even more depressing than it is already. As one respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire notes: “Bovendien is het een deprimerend onderwerp waar veel mensen niet over na willen denken.”

While low probability, high-risk events such as collapse of the Thermo Haline Circulation are relevant to communication (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001), it is difficult to communicate them in a scientifically sound and responsible fashion (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). Therefore, although they should be communicated, care needs to be taken not to put too much emphasis on these things or to exaggerate them. Too much fear inhibits the acceptability of a message (Kortland et al., 2002), as might be illustrated by the smile on the newsreader’s face when announcing the Pentagon’s conclusion that Den Haag might be submersed by 2010. Furthermore, such things could create a large “contrarian backlash” and might lead people to confuse scientists with alarmists, merely trying to scare the people (see Schneider, 2004). A recent (26 May 2004) item in NOVA, a Dutch television show, on the movie “The day after tomorrow” featuring climate denier Simon Rozendaal claiming it to be nothing but another attempt to scare the public, might illustrate this. That there is a key task in risk communication for the scientists, rather than e.g. the government or environmental groups, is clear due to the large amount of faith put into them, as expressed in the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results). One respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire specifically notes as advise to scientists: ”Meer inzenden in kranten, tijdschriften, op tv, hier zelf ook achterna gaan om steeds nieuwe informatie te verstrekken en dit vooral ook eerlijk te doen.”

An especially large role should be reserved for the most trusted organization(s). While no literature was available on which organizations are trusted, one might argue that a “familiar face” and perceived weather expert, such as the KNMI, would be highly trusted. Strong input by scientists in the mass media is also needed to refute non- or unscientific material and references to it published there (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001). The mass media strongly influence the societal debate and public understanding (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001; Van de Vusse (ed), 1993; Löfstedt, 1991) and without scientists balancing this material, its likeliness will be increased by means of the availability heuristic (see subparagraphs 4.2.5 Probability, heuristics, and biases and 4.3.4 Probability, heuristics, and biases and climate change). The media will have interest scientists refuting such material, as it allows for nice headlines (see e.g. Schneider, 2004; Harris, 2003; Nesmith, 2003) and appeals to various media triggers, such as 5: Conflict, 2: Alleged secrets and attempted cover-ups (e.g. the Bush Administration’s attempts to tamper with important climate reports, and scientists public commenting on Bush’ policy (see Schneider, 2004; Harris, 2003)), 3: Human interest, and 4: Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities (Bush, various politicians, Nobel-prize winning scientists, economy, energy, etcetera).

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Two approaches to risk communication could be taken: a “consensus approach” to risk communication and an “individual approach”. In the “individual approach”, scientists or institutes communicate on their own. This will probably appeal more to the conflict media trigger, as “pro” and “con” advocates are compared in the media, and therefore attract more media attention than a situation where everyone agrees with one another. Such an apparent disagreement among scientists also heightens the perceived risk of climate change, rather than diminishing it. However, such an approach does create the misperception that the views of the “extremist” are just as valid as the mainstream views, while that may not be the case. This might leave too much room for confusion and keep currently established misperceptions intact, because of the confirmation heuristic. The “consensus approach” might be a better solution. Here, scientists and institutions unite under one flag, to produce one information product that is carried by all of them. Some respondents in the Citizen Questionnaire specifically mention this as a requirement for information: “Dat de informatie niet van een bron komt” “door velen gedragen”

In any case, it will be important to provide references to one’s sources for a communication product and to use a lot of sources. While this doesn’t mean that a source is quoted correctly, it will still be necessary. A key task therefore is to quickly and publicly respond to misquotes of one’s research. Respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire also consider references to sources important: “A weak point is that the information often does not mention its sources.” “To give proper sources” “… believable (for instance, references to scientific studies by a neutral party).”

The question whether or not climate change is a problem and how big a problem might be another issue. While this is often a matter of values, some things can be said. Some people who do not consider it to be a problem at all seem to think this because they don’t perceive climate change to be caused by humans. Apparently, regardless of the consequences, it is only a problem if humans are the cause. This notion also surfaced in discussions after the Citizen Questionnaire. Others think that warming such as this had happened before and therefore consider it not to cause much of a problem. Furthermore, the temperature differences caused by climate change seem to be relatively small in the eyes of citizens. All three of these notions call for greater focus on climatic changes in the past, the differences with the current situation, and why scientists have concluded that the change is caused by humans. The issue of how big a problem climate change is, is even more influenced by values. While some comparisons can be made with past climatic events and other environmental problems (usually on specific issues, e.g. (Thomas et al., 2004) compares expected extinction due to climate change with that of global habitat losses), these cannot take into account different valuations of different impacts and impact sectors, and interactions between various problems. However, citizens are interested in how climate change compares to other global and regional problems (Schlumpf et al., 2001). Citizens also 126

expect information products to take a clear position (threat or not?) and make normative statements, and seem somewhat uncomfortable in having to make their own assessment, as was the case in the IMPACTS module (Schlumpf et al., 2001). One respondent in the Citizen Questionnaire also specifically notes: “Try too keep it simple, and clear. But make a statement.”

With the last statement, it remains important to note that while a message should be clear and simple, it should never be oversimplified. People can understand complex problems, but they will need to be clearly explained. There is a difference between explaining something in an understandable way (e.g. by not using a lot of scientific language) and simplifying or over-simplifying a problem. 4.5.2 Perceived causes and options While risk perception is a predictor of people’s willingness to act on climate change, so is knowledge about the causes of climate change (O’Connor et al., 1999). It is a powerful predictor of behavioural intentions, including both voluntary actions and voting intentions with respect to possible policy measures (O’Connor et al., 1999). Taking that notion, it would make sense to discuss these issues together. However, this would be true mainly for mitigation options, which were the only options discussed in (O’Connor et al., 1999). Mitigation measures are after all intended to affect the cause of a problem. Adaptation and geoengineering options are a different story, because they deal with the effect instead of with the cause. While it would be a good idea to integrate causes and mitigation options, adaptation and geoengineering options should be treated differently. One could discuss them together with impacts, but this may put too large a focus on them before discussing mitigation. It would probably be best to give them a separate place. Citizens consider a wide range of things to be the cause of climate change. As was noted in subparagraphs 4.3.7 Perceived causes and 4.4.1 Cultural models, pollution, ozone depletion, and deforestation were considered to be the main causes. This resulted in pollution controls (e.g. more filtering), aerosol and CFC measures, and reduced driving, and banning deforestation to be seen as main options. Energy conservation and energy efficiency options were generally not perceived, and if connected to climate change, people considered their energy consumption to be inelastic. Besides giving these cultural models separate attention, as will be discussed in subparagraph 4.5.3 Cultural models, it will be very important to connect climate change to energy consumption and energy efficiency (Kempton, 1997; McDaniels et al., 1996; Kempton, 1991). While these connections are often not made by citizens and many citizens lack a clear understanding of what energy efficiency is, these things can be made clear without much difficulty and further conceptual hurdles (Kempton, 1991). Another important cause-option situation, one that became apparent from the Citizen Questionnaire, was that people generally blame industry and traffic for causing climate change. The result of this was that the responsibility to implement options was mainly put with companies and the government. People perceive very few personal options. They may not know that certain common everyday activities directly contribute to climate

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change (McDaniels et al., 1996) or that they are a significant cause, compared to e.g. industrial activities. The first step is to improve the understanding and to clearly spell out cause-effect links in people’s “mental models” of climate change. One way to do so, is mentioned by (McDaniels et al., 1996), who refers to an unpublished source (Atman and Bostrom, 1994) that shows that risk communication materials based on “influence diagrams” (see e.g. Kim and Park, 1997; Smith, 1989) are much more effective than other approaches at building understanding of cause-effect linkages regarding climate change. Influence diagrams display key concepts (e.g. CO2 production, energy use, and energy efficiency) and show in what way they are related and influence each other by connecting them with arrows. This graphically spells out the cause-effect chain and its relations, and point out various options for intervention in the chain. The next step would be to discuss how much various parties, including citizens, contribute to climate change compared to other parties and how effective actions by various parties would be. This step is necessary to link the various scales and parties to society as a whole. Considering the perceived small influence of an individual, this would also be an important step to show the relative importance of citizen action. One way to do this is simply to show a pie chart of contributions to climate change by various parties, such as citizens, industry, agriculture, etcetera. The central question when making such a diagram is what emissions to attribute to which party? E.g. while industry and agriculture contribute, this is party due to citizens’ consumption. The energy production sector is a similar case. While this sector contributes, the direct reason is the energy demand of citizens, industry and other parties. The attribution will mainly depend on the intentions a communicator has with the diagram. If the intention is to connect climate change to energy consumption, for example, it might be best if the contributions of the energy sector are attributed to the parties consuming this energy. This will place focus on energy conservation measures that can be taken by parties. The question can than be posed to any party what sense it would make for one party to mitigate and for the other to do nothing. Another option is to include the effects of individual choice into a model of the energy consumption of a country, in order to detach personal choice from personal lifestyle, as was done in the OPTIONS module of the CLEAR project (see Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). Energy scenarios in such a model could include e.g. average number of cars per person and trend scenarios on how this number is expected to change on average (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). The third step would be to discuss options and the desirability of those options. One could discuss these options in the frame of a scenario or vision of the future, such as a low energy society or a renewable energy society. In the CLEAR project, the scenario of a low energy society is discussed (see Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000; PahlWostl et al., 2000). To do so, one would need to address three things (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000): • The desirability of a low energy society as an image of future society • The presence of a plausible and desirable path to get there

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• The presence of attractive options for different societal groups Discussion other scenarios, such as a renewable energy scenario, would require similar things to be discussed. Research within the CLEAR project has shown that citizens already consider a lowenergy society to be a desirable situation (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000). In fact, citizens consider a high-energy society to be very undesirable and frightening, even nightmarish (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000). This is not only because of the relation with climate change. Citizens also couple a high-energy society to various other environmental and social problems, such as water quality and quantity problems, air pollution, environmental disruption, toxic waste, unemployment, inequity, social conflict, negative stress, drugs, emigration, violence, death of humans and animals, war, and catastrophes and various other things (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000). A lowenergy society is seen in a romantic way, with pristine ecosystems and people living happily together (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kasemir et al., 2000). It is clear that citizens strongly favour a low-energy future, regardless of whether or not it is coupled to climate change. However, perceived options on how to reach this differ strongly between experts and citizens, as has been noted before. A renewable energy scenario would probably be seen as a good situation as well, because it represents an easier situation for citizens. It merely requires a step from one energy source to the other without requiring major lifestyle changes. As was noted in subparagraph 4.3.8 Perceived options, respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire strongly favoured renewable energy as a general option. Such scenarios, although useful for framing and discussing options do seem rather narrowly focused on one type of solution, e.g. using less energy or shifting to renewable energy. A more integrated scenario, a “sustainable scenario”, may be more suitable. In any case, the scenario will need to be coupled to a path of measures. Two questions will need to be posed (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000): • Can a combination of measures reach this goal? • What are the costs on short- and long-term for different social groups? The OPTIONS module of the CLEAR project uses a small economic model to show the effects of an energy tax and how much of that is invested in energy technology on energy use, employment, economic growth, and economic output (see Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). However, the effects and costs of combinations of measures are not easy to calculate and would therefore require a more subjective discussion (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). OPTIONS does this by simply listing a catalogue of possible measures, while providing information on the state of the public discussion and the anticipated effects on energy consumption and economic growth. Citizens can use this catalogue and judge different measures on what they consider feasible and desirable (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000). However, because many people simply don’t perceive the connection between energy and climate change, as was noted in subparagraphs 4.3.7 Perceived causes and 4.3.8 Perceived options, the effect on (and connection with) climate change, rather than just energy consumption will need to be made explicit. Of course, not every citizen is looking for an extensive discussion on policy measures and the possible effects of those on society and economy. Most citizens will be mainly

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interested in measures that affect them, such as energy taxes. While such taxes are often argued to have a large effect on energy consumption, citizens consider them to be ineffective and unfair and strongly oppose them (Kempton, 1991). Considering the perceived inelasticity of energy and fuel consumption, such measures will indeed be ineffective, unless citizens find or see options to lower their energy consumption. Anyone advocating and communicating this measure to the public will therefore need to communicate on options to lower energy consumption as well. Besides viewing these personal options in the light of larger policy measures, they should be communicated for their own sake as well, as citizens are willing to act to mitigate. The current perception and implementation of options is usually hampered either because of a lack of perceived options, a lack of perceived effect, or because of comfort or laziness related reasons. The lack of perceived effect has been discussed before. With respect to perceived options, respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results), and also in the Stakeholder Questionnaire, repeatedly and strongly called for communication to show what citizens could do: “Zwakke punten: kan helderder en concreter - er kan keihard ingewreven wat MOET gebeuren om klimaatproblemen tegen te gaan.” “They do not provide ways to deal with the problem, they show what the problem is and where it's (possibly) headed.” “Duidelijk aangeven wat de bevolking zou kunnen doen” “Duidelijk inwrijven hoe we een leger kunnen vormen TEGEN klimaatsproblemen; hoe we samen verantwoordelijk zijn en er samen tegen strijden (en dan natuurlijk ook vermelden HOE dit moet!)” “Make it personal, so that everyone realizes that he/she can make a difference.” “Provide good alternatives, and (more important) make the people enthusiastic about it.” “Concrete aanwijzingen geven wat eraan te doen.”

Information packages dealing with personal options will need to answer four important questions: • How much am I contributing to climate change and is that a lot? • What options are available? • How much effect do these options have, relative to other options and with respect to climate change as a whole? • How much effort are these options going to take? The CLEAR project’s personal CO2 calculator (Schlumpf et al., 1999) comes a long way in doing this, in combination with the OPTIONS module. The OPTIONS module, as has been mentioned before, shows the effectiveness of personal options with respect to national energy use. The personal CO2 calculator shows how much CO2 a person is producing and compares this to average use in other world regions. Doing so, it provides an answer to whether or not it is a lot and also takes into account regional equity, which is very important to citizens, as has been noted before. The calculator shows available options with respect to lifestyle choices and energy consumption. It also shows the effectiveness with respect to other options and one’s energy consumption in general, by providing direct feedback upon changing a parameter. Another calculator, the GAS Greenhouse Gases Meter, Gas-Explorer and Day Planner (Guimarães Pereira, 2001) does

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the same, but expands the available options and effectiveness by looking at other greenhouse gasses and some energy efficiency options as well. An interesting field of tension between both of the calculators is the simplicity. The CO2 calculator is very small, using only a few parameters, and prevents users from getting bored by providing them with results quickly. GAS is much more complete, but also takes more time to use. It overcomes this difficulty by its larger entertainment value. Perhaps splitting a calculator in two could solve this field of tension: a “front screen” with basic measures and inputs could be used, providing a first result very quickly, and the rest of the calculator using much more options and inputs. None of the two calculators shows the amount of effort required for an option. An example of an information system doing just this is a site on energy saving by NUON, a Dutch energy company (http://www.online-energie-advies.com/overzicht_besparen.php). This site shows the relative effort required by assigning one to three bars to an option. Furthermore, examples from practice such as (McManus, 2000) may be very useful to illustrate required efforts. One point that might be important considering the required effort, is the required financial effort, and together with that the associated financial benefits of an option. Early research in energy conservation has shown that only price consciousness is related to energy use (Heslop et al., 1981). Neither social responsibility nor energy and environmental consciousness are related to energy conservation behaviour (Heslop et al., 1981). Later research specifically dealing with climate change has also noted that people save energy mainly to save money (Löfstedt, 1991). This study focused on Sweden, where energy prices are very low. Still this is regarded as the primary reason to save energy (mentioned by 41%). Less people mentioned they saved energy to help national economy (28%), even less for environmental reasons (21%), and still less for moral reasons (20%) (Löfstedt, 1991). Considering the lack of a perceived link between energy consumption and climate change, the still reasonable percentages mentioned by (Löfstedt, 1991), and the willingness of people to act towards mitigation climate change, it seems overblown to consider people to care only about the financial part. However, it does illustrate the importance of the financial side of the options and it would therefore be a good idea to incorporate it into communication products. Some communication products, such as the website of VROM (http://www.vrom.nl) do mention expected financial benefits, but do not show expected costs and payback time. While this may improve the promotion of such activities, it seems a somewhat one-sided approach. Citizens are interested in the required efforts, which also includes required investment and payback time. In the present situation, citizens will need to put more effort into finding out about these things, which may actually decrease the amount of people taking a certain measure. 4.5.3 Cultural models Communication efforts on climate change should specifically address pre-existing cultural models and concepts and not assume to be writing on a blank page (Kempton,

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1997). Communication with the public is more effective when it addresses these preexisting models than when it is based on general principles alone (Morgan et al., 1992). While “normal” communication could be effective over many years, through science education in schools and media coverage, the process can be greatly accelerated by specifically targeting the gaps (Kempton, 1991). This targeting of cultural models should not lead to the old “convincing” type of risk communication. In people’s perceptions of impacts, causes and options, many other things can play a role that may be very important to them, while not necessarily (tightly) coupled to climate change. These should not be ignored. One important point with respect to the cultural models is the need to connect climate change to energy consumption and energy efficiency (Kempton, 1997; McDaniels et al., 1996; Kempton, 1991). Examples of this include the OPTIONS module and the personal CO2 calculator in the CLEAR project (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000; Schlumpf et al., 1999) and the GAS greenhouse gas meter (Guimarães Pereira, 2001). While these connections are often not made by citizens and many citizens lack a clear understanding of what energy efficiency is, these things can be made clear without much difficulty and further conceptual hurdles (Kempton, 1991). Communication efforts should clearly and explicitly state the preferred solutions, because current models will lead to ineffective solutions (Kempton, 1997) (although there may be other very good reasons for those options). A point should be made that measures to improve energy efficiency help prevent anthropogenic climate change and often pay for themselves in a short period of time (Kempton, 1997). Often, careful wording can make a lot of difference as well (Kempton, 1997). Communication should portray the cause of anthropogenic climate change as using too much fossil fuel or energy and producing greenhouse gasses, instead of using terms that are associated with pollution, such as burning too much fossil fuel, emitting greenhouse gasses or man-made gasses. Often, climate change is also explained by showing pictures of industry and traffic emitting dark clouds of smoke, which form a cover around the earth, preventing heat from escaping. This would also clearly invoke the pollution model. References to ozone should be avoided as well. Popular articles often discuss both climate change and ozone depletion together and even when writers clearly distinguish the two effects, frequently hearing about them simultaneously may lead people to form an association between them (Read et al., 1994). Some explaining pictures prominently show the ozone layer in a picture on the greenhouse effect, overemphasize CFC’s as greenhouse gas, and seem to have the ozone layer trap heat instead of all greenhouse gasses causing this (see Figure 5 in (Read et al., 1994)). It might be a good idea to drop terms such as global warming and the greenhouse effect. It should be made very clear that the problem is climate change, not just warmer temperatures, but rather the more important changes in ecosystems, species extinction, sea level rise, crop losses, etcetera (Kempton, 1997). It should be made clear that small changes in global average temperature could have large geophysical effects and that the living world is very sensitive to climate conditions (Kempton, 1991). People are often

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very surprised to hear about the small temperature difference with an ice age; only 4 oC lower than present globally averaged temperatures for the last ice age (Van der Sluijs, 1999). Drawing parallels with situations and processes in the distant past may therefore help citizens visualize the consequences. This point is further discussed at the end of the next subparagraph (4.5.4 Dissonance and denial). Considering the time scale of the issue, it will be important to take short-term effects into account as well. Current perceptions focus mainly on long term damaging effects, while short-term damaging effects are not perceived. However, these are important to citizens, not only for personal economic or safety reasons, but also for their (much larger) effects in other world regions. With respect to values, especially the care for descendants, (Kempton, 1991) notes surprise that these have not played a more central role in public debate, research, and communication. It would be a good idea to give more thought to these issues, since they are important to citizens. Citizens want decisions not to be based on costs and benefits alone, but also on one’s responsibility to leave a healthy planet for one’s descendants (Kempton, 1991). 4.5.4 Dissonance and denial Dissonance and denial are not easily set aside unless the perception of gains and losses is substantially reversed (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). The sophisticated sociopsychological reactions that form the basis of denial will prove difficult to alter unless very wide-ranging policy responses are integrated over a prolonged period of time. Prolonged and progressive packages of information tailored to cultural models (see subparagraph 4.5.3 Cultural models), coupled to greater community based policy incentives may help to widen the basis of personal and moral responsibility (StollKleemann et al., 2001). This would involve the mediation functions adaptation and selfexpression (Table 14: Mediation factors between self and social context). Interactive models could be used to help citizens visualise the consequences of their actions, possibly combined with “interactive storytelling” in schools and community forums. Issues such as denial of responsibility, rejection of blame, and ignorance (Table 16: Barriers of denial) would be dealt with using these techniques. These things might be used in classrooms, at home and in other places where communities meet, to develop a whole citizen learning and new social identity and accepted lifestyle (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). This would result in a gradual dissipation of dissonance and denial (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). The Passive Bystander Effect and Prisoner’s Dilemma stop operating as soon as sufficient people break ranks and become involved (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). While this might seem to be very difficult or at least to take a lot of time, it may not be far away The Netherlands. The Dutch, together with the Swedes and the Germans, have the reputation of being one of the most environmentally conscious peoples in Europe (Löfstedt, 1991). Furthermore, mitigation options such as energy conservation have been an issue since the oil crises in the 70s (see Henschel and Wiedermann, 1993; Heslop et al., 1981; Craig and McCann, 1978). It may

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already be more of a lifestyle or at least close to one than it might seem from (StollKleemann et al., 2001). As one of the respondents of the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results), someone who did not believe climate change to be caused by mankind and who believed it to be a hype, answered to the question whether he or she actually takes actions to mitigate: “Of course. It is a part of our life style”

Furthermore, by giving people get a clearer view on the possible options and the associated costs and benefits, hurdles like the demand for a justifiable relationship between personal costs and social gains (Table 15: Dimensions of attitude) and fabricated constraints (Table 16: Barriers of denial) might be overcome. Furthermore, the barrier of the comfort interpretation could be lessened if there are clear financial benefits to take action. As is noted in (Jaeger et al., 2001): people pursue their comfort as long as there is no catastrophe that has approached enough, unless there are financial incentives. Another way to deal with denial might be when climate change is converted to a more common struggle between competing “tribes”, such as direct conflicts over emissions or wars over diminishing environmental resources (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). The exact implications of this notion for communication are unclear, but such issues might help to make the consequences of climate change more visible. In any case, they would be considered to be important and are therefore worth communicating about. Furthermore, although there is no real historical parallel in human history, one might use situations from the distant past as examples of what the consequences might be and how serious these might be. People seem to try to draw these parallels as well (see e.g. Jaeger et al., 2000 and the Citizen Questionnaire). For example, citizens don’t see a temperature change of 1.5-6 oC as very threatening or involving large effects (Jaeger et al., 2000; Kempton, 1991). Drawing a parallel with an ice age and explaining that temperatures during ice ages were only about 4 (last ice age) (Van der Sluijs, 1999) to 6 oC (Schneider, 2004) below present day average temperatures. Many people are surprised to hear this (Schneider, 1988). Another example would be to refer to the “post-apocalyptic greenhouse”; a global warming episode 250 million years ago, when a 6 oC warming wiped out 95% of all species (Marshall and Lynas, 2003). Care might need to be taken with respect to how this is said; that a clear distinction is made between these natural events and anthropogenic warming and the present day situation. Using those comparisons creates the risk that people conclude that this situation is the same as it was in the past and therefore is not caused by humans. Furthermore, some comparisons might create confusion if not used carefully. For example, an oftenused comparison is to compare the effects of a collapse or weakening of the ThermoHaline Circulation, or Conveyor Belt, to an ice age. This can however lead people to believe that anthropogenic climate change will cause an actual ice age cancelling global warming, instead of a “miniature ice age” (local/regional) cooling down Europe, while the rest of the world continues to warm (see e.g. Schneider, 2004; IPCC, 2001a). The Citizen Questionnaire illustrates possible confusion when people are asked if they consider climate change to be a problem:

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“Ik zie het als een zeer serieus probleem, omdat ik vrees dat de hele aarde er eens aan zou gaan in een nieuwe ijstijd.” “Nee, persoonlijk denk ik dat het een trend is die zich over een aantal jaren zal herhalen. De ene zegt dat de aarde opwarmt, de andere weer dat er een nieuwe ijstijd aan komt.”

People might also consider it to be a contradiction, as the last quote shows. In a recent (26 May 2004) item in NOVA, a Dutch Television show, science journalist and climate denier Simon Rozendaal noted that we should “make up our minds” and “choose between warming or cooling”. Apparently, the notion that both could happen at the same time, with large regional differences across the globe, has not gotten through to the public. It would be an important point to make, especially when looking at regional equity and impacts on nature. The relevance of climatic changes in the past also comes into play when discussing attributability of climate change to humans and the severity of impacts. Reactions in the Citizen Questionnaire show: “Nee, dit is al vaker geweest in de eeuwen dat de aarde bestaat” “No, I don't think so. There has been changes in our climate all the time” “Het klimaat zelf, het klimaat verandert sowieso, volgens het schema hadden we nu al in een ijstijd moeten zitten.” “I’m not certain. The global warming will have something too do with it, but if it’s the only cause, I don't know. Ice ages happened by natural cause, and were a fact in a relative short time” “To my knowledge, we have not been able to explain all the major climatic changes in the past, like the begin and end of the various ice ages. However, I have a strong feeling that the factors that may have caused those, are also causing this climatic shift.”

However, perceptions of climate change in the past vary greatly. As quoted above, a respondent thought we should be in an ice age already. Furthermore, one respondent noted in a discussion afterwards that he thought that around the year 1000 it had been a few degrees warmer than today, and a few hundred years later it had been a few degrees colder. As noted in subparagraph 3.3.3 Supply: Medium, movies and TV series (e.g. The Day After Tomorrow, Walking with Dinosaurs/Beasts, Jurassic Park) will probably have had a large influence on the image of past climate change. Images of climate in the past usually encounter two problems: 1. Timescale (proportion of 1000 years and 1 million years) 2. Variability and rate of change While climates in the past differed significantly, they usually did so over a huge period of time. Present day climate change deals with large differences over a much shorter period of time. Furthermore, the actual temperature differences with e.g. ice ages are often perceived to be very large, while the difference is “only” a few degrees. Furthermore, an important aspect of present day climate change is that it goes much faster than was usually the case in the past. This influences the ability of life forms to adapt to the change or to migrate to another place. Considering the importance of past climatic changes to both the perceived severity of impacts and the attributability of climate change to human activities, it will be very important to communicate on them. Differences between natural and anthropogenic 135

climate change, in causes, impacts, rate of change, magnitude of change, and other variables, should be clearly shown and even emphasised (e.g. as in Staats et al., 1996). Furthermore, it should be stressed that knowledge of past climate (“paleo-data”) is used to validate predicting climate models and that these models therefore are not “just made up”. Models should be able to “predict” climate in the past if they are to produce reliable predictions of climate in the future. 4.5.5 Social dilemmas Most communication products on climate change tend to focus on reducing environmental uncertainty, trying to promote knowledge, problem awareness and favourable attitudes among the public (Staats et al., 1996). Social uncertainty appears to be a neglected issue (Staats et al., 1996). Communication focused on environmental uncertainty alone, runs the risk of discouraging rather than encouraging contributions. If people take a pessimistic view of the issue and doubt whether others will contribute, it is unlikely that they themselves will contribute, even if they consider the issue at hand to be serious and threatening (Staats et al., 1996). It might also cause a feeling of hopelessness, if people see a threat that is not being dealt with effectively and where their own contributions (assuming they perceive any options; see subparagraph 4.3.8 Perceived options) will prove futile considering the inaction of others. This might also cause citizens to lose interest, because they consider it to be a depressing issue (being strengthened by social uncertainty). As one participant in the Citizen Questionnaire (see Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results) notes: “Bovendien is het een deprimerend onderwerp waar veel mensen niet over na willen denken.”

The social dilemma therefore works as a serious Communication Barrier (see subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain) interacting with a difference in supply and demand (see subparagraph 1.2.3 Communication problems). The contributions of other parties will need to be communicated as well, dealing with the social uncertainty. There seems to be a large demand for this information. If citizens see that other parties are contributing, they will be more motivated to contribute themselves (Staats et al., 1996). Some reactions in the Citizen Questionnaire as advise to policymakers show: “Goed laten zien hoe het beleid hier op wordt aangepast” “Duidelijk inwrijven hoe we... er samen tegen strijden” “… make sure that your civilians know what you are doing”

With respect to households, one could show the measures implemented such as the amount of households using green energy, using energy saving light bulbs, etc. as well as the benefits of this in terms of CO2 reductions (compared to e.g. the total amount, to give an idea of how much it is). Stories of people succeeding in reducing emissions with a significant portion and how they did that, such as (McManus, 2000) might be useful as well, in showing that the issue is being dealt with by others too, as well as showing that 136

there are relatively easy options for action. With respect to parties such as traffic, industry and agriculture, their efforts should be noted (see e.g. Tickell, 2002; Brown 1999). With respect to the national government, one might show what the government has done so far, what their intentions are and how they relate to goals such as those mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol. A lot more has been turned into policy than perceived by the public (Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). With respect to the world community, the same could be done, showing efforts so far, but also expectations with regard to endorsing the Kyoto Protocol by countries such as the USA and Russia. Furthermore, the results of successful local, national and international initiatives to promote cooperation could be a focus of intention as well (Staats et al., 1996). Perhaps the notion of a social dilemma could be used in a reverse way as well. While citizens wonder if sectors such as industry, traffic, and agriculture are actually participating, these sectors are often forced to do so by government regulations. These sectors may then wonder when the “man in the street” is finally going to be set to action (see e.g. Kloprogge and Van der Sluijs, 2001). A similar notion comes from one of the stakeholders in the Stakeholder Questionnaire, in that we should not resort to partial solutions, where one group has to endure the pain. Maybe citizens could be pointed to the question why these sectors would mitigate if the citizens themselves do nothing, perhaps by showing a pie diagram of the contributions of sectors and citizens. Of course, this will still need to be accompanied by information that the various sectors are in fact taking action to mitigate, in order to show citizens that their actions will have effect as well. One option other than including these things in traditional mass media campaigns is to reframe climate change in terms of smaller issues. Local programs to tackle large-scale issues might be a promising alternative (Staats et al., 1996). For example, the Global Action Plan for the Earth uses “EcoTeams” of citizens that set clear goals with respect to achievements on various terrains of environmentally relevant behaviour and they keep track of them. These achievements are then aggregated and feedback is provided on them (Staats et al., 1996). From a social dilemma point of view, such an approach sets clear goals, dealing with environmental uncertainty, while providing feedback on one another’s contributions, dealing with social uncertainty (Staats et al., 1996). These direct interactions also generate trust (Liebrand et al., 1992; Messick and Brewer, 1983). A similar approach is to channel money obtained from regulatory regimes and pricing mechanisms into local sustainability charities. Local citizens can use these pools of money to act out their own mitigation efforts (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Risk communication efforts could also stress that collective action by local, regional, and national governments can have greater impact if they encourage action by others too (McDaniels et al., 1996). For citizens and companies, this might be the same. Actions by citizens might encourage actions by other citizens and companies. E.g. the more people take part in those efforts, the more others it will attract. Also, if people buy environmentally friendly, this will encourage companies to produce them, and if people will buy only from environmentally conscious companies, the companies will be encouraged to develop this environmental consciousness.

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4.6 Discussion & Conclusion In the present paragraph discussions will be drawn on risk perception, barriers, and communication. The central research questions that were to be answered in this chapter were: 6. What are the risk perceptions of the public? 7. What are the barriers or inhibitors of risk communication on the Climate Change problem? 8. What strategies and considerations can be taken, concerning risk communication on Climate Change, to deal with risk perceptions and to overcome barriers and inhibitors? First of all, risk perceptions will be discussed and after that the barriers and inhibitors. The implications and options for communication are integrated into these two things. 4.6.1 Risk perception In citizens’ risk perceptions of climate change, moral issues are the most important parameters. These moral issues concern impacts on future generations, on species, and on people in other world regions. They also concern equity with regard to impacts and efforts to deal with climate change. Current risk communication gives far too little attention to these issues, focusing mainly on economic impacts. With regard to impact in the future (more than 10 years), the future generations become the most important factor, although other world regions and species remain very important. With regard to impacts today or in the near future, impacts on species and especially on other world regions, such as developing countries, will be the most important factor in risk perception and communication. The problems with interregional equity can be clearly visualized when dealing with extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts. These offer both a good opportunity to communicate on their trends, focus on near term impacts, and show that while we can adapt, others cannot. Impacts on species are perceived to be fairly low. This will be an important point for risk communication as well, as experts consider this to be one of the most important impacts. One point that will need to be made is that species will need to migrate to other places to deal with the warmth, but often cannot because of landscape boundaries and more importantly, habitat fragmentation. Media communication remains one of the most important influences on people’s risk perception. Important moments for media communication are extreme weather events, implementations of important policy measures, large international conferences, and the appearance of important studies dealing with large impacts. Care needs to be taken not to put a too large a focus on extreme cases.

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Currently, sceptics, who are confusing the public debate, dominate the mass media. This calls for a much larger input of the scientific community into the mass media. A choice will have to be made with respect to communication strategies: either an “individual approach”, with single scientists or institutes communication on their own, or a “consensus approach”, with a single statement publicly supported by a large number of scientists and institutes. The media will probably favour the first option, because it creates the impression of a debate. The second option however is more capable of dealing with this impression of debate and the resulting uncertainty. This uncertainty results in a large number of people favouring the sceptics’ point of view. Therefore, the consensus approach seems the best approach in the current situation. In any case, it is important to provide good references to one’s sources. As was the case with communication among stakeholders in Chapter 6: Stakeholders: Information Supply & Demand, communication through a trusted source is crucial and often called for by citizens. There seems to be a widespread distrust of communication efforts from (environmental) pressure groups. Whether citizens perceive the presence of anti-environmental pressure groups is not known, but it seems unlikely. The government is seen as communicating material provided by pressure groups, and is therefore seen as barely more trustworthy. There seems to be quite a lot of trust in scientists. Few studies have been done on the issue of trust and it is not known which specific institutes and organizations are considered to be trustworthy. One likely candidate however is the KNMI, which is a familiar face and weather expert. Most people consider climate change to be a likely, serious and threatening problem. However the emotional concern is only little above average. Citizens perceive warmer temperatures, melting of poles and glaciers, rising of the sea level, and floods as impacts of climate change. This seems to be one causal chain, with sea level rise and resulting floods due to the melting of the poles. Considering the fact that melting and sea level rise is fairly slow, major impacts are perceived to be only far in the future. This would also explain the difference in perceived seriousness and emotional concern, as future impacts do not take away moral concerns for future generations but do not result in people getting worried. More focus will need to be put on impacts that happen today or in the near future, such as extreme weather events and changes in precipitation patterns, and the resulting impacts (floods, droughts, desertification, human health, refugees and migration, etcetera) on developed countries, developing countries, and nature and species, well taking moral concerns into account. Most people consider climate change to be caused by humans, although a significant minority does not. The fact whether or not climate change is caused by humans also determines whether or not climate change is seen as a problem at all. People who perceive climate change not to be caused by humans don’t consider it to be a problem and, the other way around, people who perceive climate change to be caused by humans consider it a problem, regardless of if they expect serious consequences. This significant minority still calls for communication on why scientists consider present day climate change to be caused mainly by humans. This communication could specifically take sceptics’ arguments, such as that sun would have caused this climate change or that

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climate is too complex to tell whether or not this change is caused by humans, into account. Citizens perceive pollution, industrial emissions, automobile emissions, ozone depletion and aerosol/CFC use, and deforestation to be the main causes of climate change. To a minor extent, fossil fuels, emissions in general, chemicals, and CO2 were seen as causes. Not surprisingly, citizens perceive pollution controls, reducing driving, banning aerosols and CFCs, preventing deforestation, and planting trees as general options. Respondents to the Citizen Questionnaire only mentioned renewable energy as important general option. Citizens perceive driving less, political action, and general awareness as personal options. To a minor extent, they perceived reducing aerosol use (e.g. spray cans) and saving energy as personal options. Energy consumption related causes and options were generally not perceived. For both general and personal options, most citizens seem divided on what works and they often simply don’t know any options. They also place serious doubt on to what extent they can realize personal options. Three situations, or possible conclusions, seem to exist with regard to perceived causes. First, people do not connect climate change to energy use. Second, people mainly blame industry and automobiles. And third, people are trying to take a more generalized look, also focussing on other environmental problems instead of just climate change, even when specifically asked about climate change. With regard to possible options, it is also important to note that citizens consider their energy consumption to be inelastic. They consider energy conservation to be the same as reducing energy services (doing less) and that energy efficiency (doing the same with less energy) is not perceived. The main challenges here are to connect climate change to energy use, e.g. by just specifically mentioning this fact, or by using influence diagrams to visualize this connection. Furthermore, it will need to be made clear who contributes to what extent; who should bear the responsibility and to what extent. Options for this are to simply show a pie chart visualizing contributions of various sectors. This would involve a question of attribution of greenhouse gas production, e.g. should energy production be seen as a separate sector or the produced energy be attributed to industry, consumers, etcetera. Another option is to use a simple model showing the effect of changing of energy related parameters, such as the average amount of cars per citizen. In any case, citizens strongly and repeatedly call for options. Considering the lack of perceived options, this will need to be one of the key points of communication. With regard to general options, one could provide a catalogue of the various possibilities with their state of public discussion and their possible costs on short- and long term for different social groups and their effects. With regard to personal measures, the model above could be used, as well as personal greenhouse gas calculators. Communication products discussing personal options would need to mention how much one is contributing to climate change and whether or not that is a lot, what options are possible, how much effect these options have related to other options and climate change as a whole (also taking into account interregional equity), and how much effort is required for these options. People also consider the financial side of energy conservation to be important. Therefore, the financial effort, including costs, benefits, and payback time, should be communicated as well.

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Furthermore, for both impacts and options, climate change in the past seems to be a very important issue. Often, people who don’t think humans have caused climate change or who have doubts about this, refer to past changes. They note that major events have happened before due to natural causes. The few people who consider climate change to be caused by humans but don’t consider it to be a problem often also seem to come to this conclusion due to the idea that this “has happened before”. Communication on past climate changes and what sets this change apart will therefore be a very important task. The notion of multi-causality may also help. Furthermore, it should be stressed that knowledge of past climate (“paleo-data”) is used to validate predicting climate models and that these models therefore are not “just made up”. Models should be able to “predict” climate in the past if they are to produce reliable predictions of climate in the future. 4.6.2 Barriers & inhibitors Many of the perceived impacts, causes, and options that seem odd in the eyes of the experts, can be explained by the presence of so called “cultural models”. Cultural models are conceptual models of the fundamental ways in which the world works that are shared by most people in a culture. People use these models to understand a complex new problem. New information is actively fit into pre-existing cultural models and concepts. The cultural models that seem to be used with respect to climate change are air pollution, ozone depletion, deforestation, temperature and weather, and general (environmental) values. Furthermore, the Citizen Questionnaire indicates a sixth model: the “melt water model”, indicating the perceived causal chain of warmer temperatures resulting in melting of the poles, with melt water resulting in higher sea levels, with higher sea levels resulting in floods. These cultural models will specifically need to be addressed. Climate change will need to be connected to energy consumption, and preferred options will need to be explicitly stated, as current models often lead to ineffective solutions. Often, careful wording can prevent the wrong models from being applied. Any references to the wrong models will need to be avoided. Some models are in principle correct, but shift the focus with regard to impacts, causes, and options to a less effective or relevant notion. These models can be addressed by noting why it is less effective or relevant. This leaves room for people to take other values into account; e.g. while focus on deforestation may be less effective for climate change; people may prefer this option because of other reasons as well. General values, such as the care for one’s descendants and moral concerns with respect to intergenerational and interregional equity and the environment should become much more of a communication issue than is currently the case. Even people who consider climate change to be a serious problem that will need to be dealt with often fail to act themselves. As mentioned above, this is partly due to a lack of perceived options, to a lack of perceived ability to actually implement these options, and to considering industry to be the main cause and industry and government to be the ones responsible for solving the issue. There are however other reasons that result in people

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experiencing “cognitive dissonance” and “denial”. Cognitive dissonance is a lack of cognitive consistency between one’s attitude and one’s behaviour (“say yes, but do no”). Such barriers to action can be formed by perceiving taking action as costing too much comfort, by lack of trust in the government or democratic process, lack of a well-defined perpetrator-victim polarity, diffused responsibility (passive bystander effect), by a difficulty of imagining climate change, and by the small impact of one person’s actions with regard to a very large resource (tragedy of the commons). Dissonance and denial have a sophisticated and deeply rooted psychological basis and are not easily set aside unless perception of gains and losses is substantially reversed. While financial incentives such as subsidies for energy saving measures, and the actual large impacts of climate change, such as disasters, mass migration, and conflicts over diminishing resources would certainly help to overcome these barriers, there are several options for communication as well. The most important option is the same as was mentioned in the previous paragraph: clearly show the options and their associated costs and benefits. Current perceptions focus on options that are highly costly with respect to comfort, such as reducing driving and turning the heat down, and providing a more complete view of the possibilities would certainly help. As has been mentioned before, providing a surrogate historical parallel by discussing past climate change and similar past impacts (but also clearly the differences with current changes), might help to increase imaginability. Regardless of all of the reasons for dissonance and denial, people to appear to be willing to act if they know that their actions will have effect. However, similar to the passive bystander effect and the tragedy of the commons, people also experience prisoner’s dilemma. They realize that it doesn’t make sense to act if no one else does. In these so called social dilemmas, people will sacrifice personal interests in favour of collective interests if they share the same goal and the expectation that other parties will contribute as well. In the present case, there is uncertainty on both. There is environmental uncertainty on the form of the negative consequences, when they will manifest themselves, and among a significant majority of the population on the issue of whether or not climate change is caused by humans and whether scientists agree on this as well. There is social uncertainty as well. People are very uncertain on the contributions of other households and of other sectors such as industry, transport, and agriculture. Furthermore, there is distrust in the government and democratic process, as mentioned above, and there is uncertainty surrounding government action and policy. Besides providing information towards decreasing environmental uncertainty, there will be a key task for risk communication to decrease social uncertainty. Communication efforts should stress what has been done and is being done already on various terrains and on various issues and important developments, also those expected in the near future. Cooperative local initiatives could decrease social uncertainty as well. Furthermore, the issue of social dilemmas could be used in a reverse way as well; posing the question to one group on why others should act if they do not. This would however require a clear representation of to what extent various groups contribute, as has been mentioned before.

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Chapter 5: Final Conclusion This chapter will summarize the conclusions drawn in this study. These conclusions have already been noted and discussed in the separate conclusion and discussion paragraphs of the two main chapters (paragraph 3.7 Discussion & conclusion and 4.6 Discussion & Conclusion). See these two paragraphs for more detailed conclusions and discussions. The conclusions will be noted along the framework of paragraph 1.2 The communication process. Two types of problems were defined (subparagraph 1.2.3 Communication problems): a difference in supply and demand of information, and a barrier. Three steps in the communication chain were defined (subparagraph 1.2.4 Communication chain): deduction, communication, and implementation. This study focussed on both types of problems in the communication step and on barriers in the implementation step that are related to or can be influenced by communication. The final conclusions will follow those three focus points. Doing so, the main research question will be answered: How can risk communication be improved, so that it will facilitate a better interaction between various stakeholders, including the general public, concerning the Climate Change problem?

5.1 Communication: difference information supply & demand Several studies called for a wider consideration of the climate change issue, concerning things like the relation between climate stress and other potential stresses on systems. Labour and market conditions, as well as present management techniques, laws and policy will need to be taken into account as well. The normative, ethical and emotional dimensions of climate change will need to be better addressed. Stakeholders, and especially the general public, call for information on (personal) options. Governments also call for information on barriers to those options and where they can help. Furthermore, information on other stakeholders, their positions on climate change and their information needs, are needed. Scientists are interested in information on stakeholders and end-users of their products and their specific needs. Furthermore, the modeling studies that have been done have a narrow focus. Stakeholders call for a greater emphasis on extreme events, including intense precipitation and droughts, scenarios with low probabilities but a high potential impact, and worst-case scenarios. It is difficult to achieve consensus on these issues and they are therefore often neglected, but their relevance to policy, stakeholders and public is high. The intense precipitation and droughts might also serve to improve imaginability of climate change. Information on uncertainty is important to citizens, because of their preference for openness. Uncertainty does not equal relevance and will not be a problem for policy, but it is important to be cognizant of it. Citation of other studies and noting the background, such as references and background documents, is important in communication on uncertainties. 143

An important point in overcoming the leap from initial indicator of stress to strategy is to give more attention to the consequences of failing to reduce emissions and the benefits of adaptation measures. Better information on climate change damage is of higher economic value than similar improvements in information on mitigation, the temperature-CO2 relation and the carbon cycle. Several studies considered the use of computer models a useful technique. Model simulations can be done in order to provide information related to feasibility of various management or policy options and a discussion can result from those modeling results. Computer-based models, although limited in their ability to describe how regions and people relate to climate change, can serve to integrate the various direct and indirect impacts. People will react to the combined effects of climate change on land and water resources. They can provide a key link between a forecast and the implications. Several studies stressed the need to emphasize the probabilistic nature of climate projections. Through statistics on temperature, precipitation, occurrence of extreme events, yearly insurance damage, etc. presented as time-series, one could show an incline in occurrence or magnitude and at the same time note that this needs not be the case for every year, but that it is the general trend that matters. Another good way of displaying climate change related risk and uncertainty information is the use of risk maps, either regional or as function of temperature or precipitation change. These maps however don’t take into account why people live there; a point that will be very relevant to risk communication. Other options include time series, probability distributions, box plots, radar plots, verbal representations, and scenarios (both verbal and through modeling). The verbal representations however may cause problems through different interpretations of the terms they use. In communication of uncertainty, information should be jargon free or at least explained, the use of terms should be consistent, information should be value explicit and indeterministic, and ignorance should be acknowledged rather than to remain vague. The greatest problem mentioned by stakeholders in the Stakeholder Questionnaire seems to be the huge amount of available information and sources. Furthermore, the complexity of the information that is supplied by scientists is a problem to both organized stakeholders and the general public. A possible solution might be a central information system providing either the information itself or references or links to it, and to include summaries that are easier and quicker to use by stakeholders. General help for scientists in making summaries easier to understand would be very welcome. Virtually all studies call for a greater input from stakeholders and public into the research. This can serve to improve the relevance, improve communication through discussions on what information stakeholders need and through extended peer review, creating research questions, defining critical issues, defining study area boundaries, and creating public support and preventing resistance to management and policy measures with large consequences for the public.

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One of the studies expressed the urgent need to involve a trusted party to serve as an intermediate in communication and research. Information is put to better use if the source of the information is such a trusted party. The Citizen Questionnaire also shows a great importance for communication through a trusted source. Citizens often specifically mention to ignore information coming from sources they don’t trust. Distrust was displayed for environmental groups and also for the government as they were considered to communicate information provided by pressure groups only. More trust was displayed for scientists. An important role in communication may therefore be for them, although the clarity of their communication will need to be improved. The Internet seems to be a good candidate to provide climate change related information, especially to organized stakeholders. Stakeholders already use Internet sources such as electronic newsletters and websites. The existence of such sources will need to be well communicated in order to succeed. Furthermore, organized stakeholders often use existing networks for obtaining and supplying information. Citizens indicate that they most often use media such as television and newspapers. They consider them to be the most useful as well, because they reach a large public. These media will therefore be important in communication with organized stakeholders and general public respectively.

5.2 Communication: barriers In citizens’ risk perceptions of climate change, moral issues are the most important parameters. These moral issues concern impacts on future generations, on species, and on people in other world regions. They also concern equity with regard to impacts and efforts to deal with climate change. Current risk communication gives far too little attention to these issues, focusing mainly on economic impacts. The problems with interregional equity can be clearly visualized when dealing with extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts. These offer both a good opportunity to communicate on their trends, focus on near term impacts, and show that while we can adapt, others cannot. Impacts on species are perceived to be fairly low. This will be an important point for risk communication as well, as experts consider this to be one of the most important impacts. One point that will need to be made is that species will need to migrate to other places to deal with the warmth, but often cannot because of landscape boundaries and more importantly, habitat fragmentation. Media communication remains one of the most important influences on people’s risk perception. Important moments for media communication are extreme weather events, implementations of important policy measures, large international conferences, and the appearance of important studies dealing with large impacts. Care needs to be taken not to put a too large a focus on extreme cases. As was the case in the previous paragraph, communication through a trusted source is crucial and often called for by citizens. A “consensus approach” to communication,

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through a joint initiative of scientists and institutes, seems to be the most useful approach. This will probably be considered to be trustworthy and is better capable of dealing with uncertainty caused by sceptics, than an “individual approach”. Many of the perceived impacts, causes, and options that seem odd in the eyes of the experts, can be explained by the presence of so called “cultural models”. Cultural models are conceptual models of the fundamental ways in which the world works that are shared by most people in a culture. People use these models to understand a complex new problem. New information is actively fit into pre-existing cultural models and concepts. The cultural models that seem to be used with respect to climate change are air pollution, ozone depletion, deforestation, temperature and weather, and general (environmental) values. Furthermore, the Citizen Questionnaire indicates a sixth model: the “melt water model”, indicating the perceived causal chain of warmer temperatures resulting in melting of the poles, with melt water resulting in higher sea levels, with higher sea levels resulting in floods. These cultural models will specifically need to be addressed, in order to prevent confusion. Climate change will need to be connected to energy consumption, and preferred options will need to be explicitly stated, as current models often lead to ineffective solutions. Often, careful wording can prevent the wrong models from being applied. Any references to the wrong models will need to be avoided. Some models are in principle correct, but shift the focus with regard to impacts, causes, and options to a less effective or relevant notion. These models can be addressed by noting why it is less effective or relevant. This leaves room for people to take other values into account; e.g. while focus on deforestation may be less effective for climate change; people may prefer this option because of other reasons as well. Most people consider climate change to be a likely, serious and threatening problem. However the emotional concern is only little above average. The “melt water model” might be the cause of this. Considering the fact that melting and sea level rise is fairly slow, major impacts are perceived to be only far in the future. Future impacts do not take away moral concerns for future generations but do not result in people getting worried. More focus will need to be put on impacts that happen today or in the near future, such as extreme weather events and changes in precipitation patterns, and the resulting impacts (floods, droughts, desertification, human health, refugees and migration, etcetera) on developed countries, developing countries, and nature and species, well taking moral concerns into account. Climate change in the past seems to be a very important issue. Often, people who don’t think humans have caused climate change or who have doubts about this, refer to past changes. They note that major events have happened before due to natural causes. The few people who consider climate change to be caused by humans but don’t consider it to be a problem often also seem to come to this conclusion due to the idea that this “has happened before”. Communication on past climate changes and what sets this change apart from those in the past will therefore be a very important task. The notion of multicausality may also help. Furthermore, it should be stressed that knowledge of past climate

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(“paleo-data”) is used to validate predicting climate models and that these models therefore are not “just made up”. In any case, the significant minority of people considering climate change not to be caused by humans or having doubts about this calls for communication on why scientists consider present day climate change to be caused mainly by humans. This communication could specifically take sceptics’ arguments, such as that sun would have caused this climate change or that climate is too complex to tell whether or not this change is caused by humans, into account.

5.3 Implementation: barriers For both general and personal options, most citizens seem divided on what works and they often simply don’t know any options. They also place serious doubt on to what extent they can realize personal options. It is also important to note that citizens consider their energy consumption to be inelastic. They consider energy conservation to be the same as reducing energy services (doing less) and that energy efficiency (doing the same with less energy) is not perceived. The main challenges here are to connect climate change to energy use, e.g. by just specifically mentioning this fact, or by using influence diagrams to visualize this connection. Furthermore, it will need to be made clear who contributes to what extent; who should bear the responsibility and to what extent. Options for this are to simply show a pie chart visualizing contributions of various sectors. This would involve a question of attribution of greenhouse gas production, e.g. should energy production be seen as a separate sector or the produced energy be attributed to industry, consumers, etcetera. Another option is to use a simple model showing the effect of changing of energy related parameters, such as the average amount of cars per citizen. In any case, citizens strongly and repeatedly call for options. Considering the lack of perceived options, this will need to be one of the key points of communication. With regard to general options, one could provide a catalogue of the various possibilities with their state of public discussion and their possible costs on short- and long term for different social groups and their effects. With regard to personal measures, the model above could be used, as well as personal greenhouse gas calculators. Communication products discussing personal options would need to mention how much one is contributing to climate change and whether or not that is a lot, what options are possible, how much effect these options have related to other options and climate change as a whole (also taking into account interregional equity), and how much effort is required for these options. People also consider the financial side of energy conservation to be important. Therefore, the financial effort, including costs, benefits, and payback time, should be communicated as well. Even people who consider climate change to be a serious problem that will need to be dealt with often fail to act themselves. As mentioned above, this is partly due to a lack of perceived options, to a lack of perceived ability to actually implement these options, and

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to considering industry to be the main cause and industry and government to be the ones responsible for solving the issue. There are however other reasons that result in people experiencing “cognitive dissonance” and “denial”. Cognitive dissonance is a lack of cognitive consistency between one’s attitude and one’s behaviour (“say yes, but do no”). Such barriers to action can be formed by perceiving taking action as costing too much comfort, by lack of trust in the government or democratic process, lack of a well-defined perpetrator-victim polarity, diffused responsibility (passive bystander effect), by a difficulty of imagining climate change, and by the small impact of one person’s actions with regard to a very large resource (tragedy of the commons). Dissonance and denial have a sophisticated and deeply rooted psychological basis and are not easily set aside unless perception of gains and losses is substantially reversed. While financial incentives such as subsidies for energy saving measures, and the actual large impacts of climate change, such as disasters, mass migration, and conflicts over diminishing resources would certainly help to overcome these barriers, there are several options for communication as well. The most important option is the same as was mentioned in the previous paragraph: clearly show the options and their associated costs and benefits. Current perceptions focus on options that are highly costly with respect to comfort, such as reducing driving and turning the heat down, and providing a more complete view of the possibilities would certainly help. As has been mentioned before, providing a surrogate historical parallel by discussing past climate change and similar past impacts (but also clearly the differences with current changes), might help to increase imaginability. Regardless of all of the reasons for dissonance and denial, people to appear to be willing to act if they know that their actions will have effect. However, similar to the passive bystander effect and the tragedy of the commons, people also experience prisoner’s dilemma. They realize that it doesn’t make sense to act if no one else does. In these so called social dilemmas, people will sacrifice personal interests in favour of collective interests if they share the same goal and the expectation that other parties will contribute as well. People are very uncertain on the contributions of other households and of other sectors such as industry, transport, and agriculture. Furthermore, there is distrust in the government and democratic process, as mentioned above, and there is uncertainty surrounding government action and policy. Besides providing information towards decreasing environmental uncertainty, there will be a key task for risk communication to decrease social uncertainty. Communication efforts should stress what has been done and is being done already on various terrains and on various issues and important developments, also those expected in the near future. Cooperative local initiatives could decrease social uncertainty as well. Furthermore, the issue of social dilemmas could be used in a reverse way as well; posing the question to one group on why others should act if they do not. This would however require a clear representation of to what extent various groups contribute, as has been mentioned before.

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Chapter 6: Ideas For Further Research The present study has revealed several problems and options, or possible options, to improve risk communication on climate change. The amount of available literature, or rather the lack of it, has shown that there still is much to be researched in this field. This chapter will present several questions and ideas that have come to mind considering the outcome of this study. The field of communication between stakeholders is one in which there is a very large lack of research. Only two studies (Van der Sluijs et al., 2001; Cohen, 1997) have been found dealing with stakeholders’ information needs on climate change. This study usually had to make use of similar research in related topics or very specific information. Furthermore, research that did exist only focused on what information stakeholders needed from scientists. No studies were found on exchange the other way around, what non-scientist stakeholders could supply to scientists, and on information exchange between (non-)scientist stakeholders. This study tried to find some answers among stakeholders in Human Settlements and Agriculture and Food Security. However, response was fairly low and stakeholders didn’t supply much info on what information they could supply. This still leaves the question of what stakeholders can supply and demand (especially from each other) and how the interaction between them can be improved, open. One thing that was noted in the Stakeholder Questionnaire, was that there was too much and too complex information and too many sources. This brings up the question of how this overflow can be made easier to oversee and use by stakeholders. Answering this question will probably need to be done in cooperation with stakeholders. The issue of the trusted source appeared as an important factor in both information supply and demand, and in risk perception and barriers. Studies have shown low trust in pressure groups and government, and a reasonably high, but declining trust in scientists. No studies have been found on which specific organizations or groups of organizations (joint initiatives) are trusted, and on which subjects. This will be an important and interesting question to be answered. Subjects could be climate change, or even more specific, such as energy use, impacts, adaptation options, etcetera. Moral issues appear to be dominant in citizens’ discussions of climate change. Considering their importance, one of the major questions to be answered is how they can be incorporated into risk communication on climate change and what effect this has. Morals might be one of the greatest options for risk communication, but it could also be one of its greatest challenges. No doubt, views on moral issues differ greatly per country, region, culture, etcetera. Another interesting question would therefore be how moral issues, relative importance of those, and communication effects differ per country and culture.

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Related to those cultural differences, are the cultural models. Some of the models seem more present in the US than in Europe, as might be noted from the results of various surveys discussed in this study. However, this study used a too limited amount of surveys to be able to draw this conclusion. No doubt, more surveys on these issues exist. It would be interesting to see if there are any differences between countries and cultures regarding the use and effects of these models. Furthermore, the question of how risk communication can best cope with these models could be researched further. One new cultural model was discovered in the Citizen Questionnaire. This “melt water model” seems to result in climate change to be far away in time. Therefore it results in a low emotional concern, but still a high perceived seriousness. It would be interesting to see to what extent this model indeed influences the perceptions of climate change and what the effects of such a model are with respect to e.g. willingness to take certain measures. The related question of how risk communication should deal with this model is of course the next step. As noted in this study, the communication of extreme weather events and their impact is probably a good approach. The effects of such communication would be interesting to research. The mass media are an important factor in people’s risk perceptions. This study used a MSc. Thesis (Toet, 1992) on media attention in two major Dutch newspapers in 19701991. It would be interesting to do a similar study on more recent media attention, and on other media than only newspapers as well. One of the most important questions would be to find out what triggered the attention. Considering the importance of past climate change in citizens’ perceptions on impacts and attributability of climate change to human activities, it would be interesting to see how past change can be incorporated into risk communication and what the effects of such communication are. Citizens perceive very little (personal) options for mitigation and adaptation. Risk communication would therefore need to significantly increase communication on options. While communicators could communicate on the most effective options, it might be better to first research which options citizens favour. Especially when it comes to personal options, the question of what measures citizens are willing to take becomes important. Based on this, the question rises on what packages of options, that have a chance of actually being considered and implemented by citizens, should be incorporated into communication. As a closing suggestion, the social dilemma of climate change could be researched further as well. How does the communication on the efforts of others affect willingness to take measures and how should these efforts be incorporated into communication? Social dilemmas, such as well-known themes like Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons, already have been the focus of much research and experimental gaming in social psychology. No doubt, many of these results can be applied to climate change.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Jeroen van der Sluijs for supervising this project and providing useful criticism, comments and ideas. I would like to thank Dr. O.A. Abbink (TNO-NITG) for participating in the Stakeholder Review and providing useful comments to the concept version of this report. I would also like to thank Dr. O.A. Abbink (TNO-NITG), Daan Dijk (Rabobank), Cindy de Groot (Provincie Zuid-Holland), Madeleen Helmer (Red Cross / Red Crescent Climate Centre) Ronald Kalwij (Royal Cosun), David Renkema (Stichting Oikos), Sible Schöne (WNF), Onno van Rijsbergen (Woonbond), Jasper Vis (SNM), and Jaklien Vlasblom (Provincie Utrecht) for their participation in the Stakeholder Questionnaire. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dick Assink, Jan Willem van den Brink, J.W. van den Broek, H. de Fluiter, Ron de Groot, Hoekstra, H. van Huis, Marten van Hooidonk, Janet, Ben van Laar, Wim van Laar, B. Luigjes, R.J. van Meerveld, Dirk van Pijkeren, Ineke van den Pol, Schellart, Dirma Schuit, M.R.M Spruit, Barbara Versluys, Tiny Versluys, Bert Wallet, J.W. Wardekker, Margreet Wardekker, Wouter van de Zandschulp, and Maarten Zwart for their participation in the Citizen Questionnaire.

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Appendices Appendix A: Glossary of terms Actor: someone who takes part in something. Anthropogenic: related to or resulting from the influence humans have on the natural world. Attribute: to think of something as caused by a particular circumstance. Climate: the average course, condition, or variability of the weather at a particular place over a period of many years. Deduction: the process of drawing a conclusion from available information. Causality: the relation between a cause and its effect. Equity: fairness; a fair distribution of costs and benefits. Feasibility: the degree to which something can be carried out or achieved. Heuristic: a simplified way of managing information. Implementation: the execution or realization of something. IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. KNMI: Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut; Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute. Mitigate: to make something less harsh, severe, or violent. In climate change: preventing further anthropogenic climate change from occurring. Plausibility: the soundness of reasoning and evidence as to why something can be true, usually in the absence of absolute proof. In climate change, it has to do with causality, especially reducibility and attributability of phenomena to human induced climate change, and imaginability. Precipitation: rain, snow, or hail, all of which are formed by condensation of moisture in the atmosphere and fall to the ground. Dutch: neerslag. Probability: chances of something happening. RIVM: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu; Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment. SAR: Second Assessment Report of the IPCC. Stakeholder: definition varies; see subparagraph 3.1.1 Definition of stakeholders. In this report: those organizations or population groups that are or could be directly or indirectly affected by climate change, climate change policy and/or climate change research; or could, might like to, or are affecting one or more of these. TAR: Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. THC: Thermo Haline Circulation. Thermo Haline Circulation: a worldwide ocean current that transports warm water from the southern hemisphere to the northern hemisphere, warming northern regions such as Europe and North America. Also called: Conveyor Belt. The Warm Gulf Stream is part of this circulation. VROM: Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu; Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.

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Appendix B: Stakeholder Groups per Stakeholder Sector 1. Human Settlements a. Pressure & interest groups i. House owner organizations ii. Branch organizations appliances iii. Branch organizations project development and construction iv. Branch organizations housing corporations v. Branch organizations waste vi. Other b. Companies i. Domestic appliance producers ii. Energy companies iii. Project developers iv. Construction companies v. Housing corporations vi. Municipal waste disposal companies c. Government i. Local ii. Regional iii. National iv. Advisory councils v. Municipal waste disposal organizations vi. Sewage and sewage cleaning organizations d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. House and land owners f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 2. Industry and Energy a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental groups ii. Branch organizations industry iii. Other b. Companies i. Industrial companies ii. Energy companies iii. Fuel companies iv. Banks c. Government i. Local ii. National

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iii. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Consumers f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 3. Agriculture and Food Security a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental groups ii. Farmer interest groups and organizations iii. Other b. Companies i. Food companies ii. Banks iii. Other c. Government i. Local ii. Regional iii. National iv. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Farmers ii. Consumers f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 4. Traffic and Transportation a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental Groups ii. Unions iii. Employer organizations iv. Motorist interest groups v. Other b. Companies i. Transport companies ii. Construction companies iii. Communication companies c. Government i. Local

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ii. Regional iii. National iv. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Motorists f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 5. Hydrology and Water Resources a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental Groups ii. Branch organizations water transport iii. Farmer interest groups and organizations iv. House owner organizations v. Branch organizations fishery b. Companies i. Water companies ii. Sailing/shipping companies iii. Housing corporations iv. Energy companies (hydropower) v. Fishery companies (freshwater) c. Government i. Local ii. Regional iii. National iv. Water boards v. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Consumers ii. Sailors iii. Farmers iv. House owners v. Fishers (freshwater) f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various

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6. Ecosystems a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental groups ii. Nature conservation org. iii. Branch organizations tourism iv. Branch organizations industry v. Branch organizations fishery b. Companies i. Tourism companies ii. Industrial companies iii. Fishery companies c. Government i. Local ii. Regional iii. National iv. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Tourists ii. Fishers f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 7. Human Health a. Pressure & interest groups i. Patient organizations ii. Branch organizations health iii. Branch organizations tourism b. Companies i. Hospitals ii. Pharmaceutical companies iii. Tourism companies c. Government i. Local ii. National iii. Advisory councils d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Any, but especially the poor, weak, and elderly ii. Tourists f. General public i. Various g. Media

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i. Various 8. Insurance and other Financial Services a. Pressure & interest groups i. Branch organizations insurance and finance b. Companies i. Insurance companies ii. Reinsurance companies iii. Banks c. Government i. National ii. Advisory councils iii. Central Bank d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental iii. Corporate e. Population groups i. Any f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various 9. Cross-sectoral a. Pressure & interest groups i. Environmental groups ii. Sector or branch exceeding interest organizations iii. Consumer organizations iv. Political parties b. Companies c. Government i. National d. Research i. Academic ii. Governmental e. Population groups i. Any f. General public i. Various g. Media i. Various

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Appendix C: Discussion risk diagram This discussion deals with the risk diagram in Figure 14: Risk diagram: risks associated with various temperatures (IPCC, 2001b). An online discussion was done on the use of this picture in communicating risks. The left part of the diagram shows different scenarios for the change of global average temperature during the coming century. The right part shows the risks associated with a rang of temperatures, for different groups of risk, such as the risks to unique and threatened systems, the risks from extreme climate events, the risks from future large scale discontinuities, etc. The online forum agreed that the risk bars, the right part, where a nice way of showing risks in one look. Risks and their relation with temperature can be easily and quickly shown in this manner, with a white to red gradient, without having to refer to large amounts of confusing numbers, such as chances, percentages and the like. Of course, the color is used in a fairly subjective way. There is no fixed chance or risk associated with a certain degree of red. The forum did not note this however. Some concerns where expressed on the density of information. It was noted that this was true especially for older people. Although young people can process a large amount of information in a single graph, older people cannot. A participant related this to the experience of younger people with media that use information in similarly dense ways, such as Internet. The largest problem with large information density is the left part of the diagram. The large amount of lines representing the different scenarios, the gray field representing the area where all SRES models can be found, and the arrow pointing at it, caused some confusion. A suggestion was made, to include only two scenarios: a best case and a worst case. A colored field could be used to indicate the range of possibilities (currently the gray field). This would simplify the graph and cause less confusion. It might also serve to make a clear statement: if we do nothing at all, we’ll be in trouble (very red on the risk bars), but if we do something about it, we’ll be ok (yellow or white on the risk bars).

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Appendix D: Citizen Questionnaire results D.1 Problem Climate Change: is it a (serious) problem, what is the problem and what are its main causes and effects, to your knowledge? The questions are put in this way to allow for easy processing. Depending on how extensive your answers are, you may have answered a following question already. If so, you can just skip it. The same applies to the other question groups in this survey. (Klimaatverandering: is het een (serieus) probleem, wat is het probleem en wat zijn de belangrijkste oorzaken en gevolgen? De vragen worden op deze manier gesteld om makkelijk verwerkt te kunnen worden. Afhankelijk van hoe uitgebreid u antwoord geeft, heeft u een volgende vraag mogelijk al beantwoord. Mocht dit zo zijn, dan kunt u de vraag overslaan. Hetzelfde geldt voor de andere groepen vragen in deze enquête.) 7. Do you consider Climate Change to be a serious problem? Why? (Ziet u Klimaatverandering als een serieus probleem? Waarom?) # Response 1 Als het zo doorgaat, ziet het er over 50 jaar niet zo best uit ( met Nederland). 1 Bedoeld zal zijn de verhoging van de gemiddelde temperatuur op aarde. Dit is een serieus probleem voor ons in Nederland. Vanwege de verwachte zeespiegelstijging lopen we grotere kans op "natte voeten". Wereldwijd of op andere continenten mogelijk een gebrek aan zoet water. Voor de natuur biedt het nieuwe kansen in Nederland. 1 I consider the change in earth climate to be a serious matter. The changes that will come, eventhough hardly noticeble at the moment, will effect all live on this planet. And since we cannot grasp the effect, I consider it serious. 1 I do consider is to be a serieus problem because there are signals that there really IS global warming wich is rather inconvinient for our offspring. Ecological will it change much, and because it's nature mankind can't do much about the consequences but to move. 1 I suppose so 1 Ik zie het als een zeer serieus probleem, omdat ik vrees dat de hele aarde er eens aan zou gaan in een nieuwe ijstijd (alhoewel we dat nog wel kunnen overleven, maar dat is wel koud!) of dat we door problemen met de ozonlaag gewoon allemaal dood gaan. Ik hou ook niet zo van zaken als dat het steeds warmer wordt en dergelijke, omdat ik graag dingen bij het oude wil houden. 1 ja omdat de stijging van de waterspiegel ons leven bedreigt 1 Ja wel degelijk,omdat alles erdoor veranderd. en we moeten proberen ons aan te passen om dat tegen te gaan 1 Ja, het klimaat is een directe factor voor onze overleving 170

1 Ja, omdat dat het leven op aarde beïnvloed. 1 Ja, omdat het een bedreiging gaat vormen voor onze leefomgeving 1 Ja, want overstromingen en langdurige droogtes zijn toch duidelijk serieuze problemen. Veel diersoorten zullen hierdoor uitsterven. 1 Ja. Vanwege de nadelige gevolgen. 1 Jawel, de effecten van een klimaatverandering zullen zo groot zijn dat het voor grote problemen zal zorgen. Zoals: Overstroming en hongersnoden. Als gevolg zullen er dus vele mensen sterven. En elk mens die sterf is er één teveel. 1 nee , dit is al vaker geweest in de eeuwen dat de aarde bestaat 1 Nee, persoonlijk denk ik dat het een trend is die zich over een aantal jaren zal herhalen. De ene zegt dat de aarde opwarmt, de andere weer dat er een nieuwe ijstijd aan komt. Feit is dat momenteel de aarde opwarmt, maar wie weet is dat niet iets wat over een aantal jaren weer de andere kant op gaat en zich in de loop van de tijd weer zal herhalen? Mocht het toch een definitieve opwarming zijn, dan vind ik het wel bijzonder verontrustend. Daar grote delen land onder water zullen komen staan en vele dieren zullen sterven. 1 No, I don't think so. There has been changes in our climate all the time. 1 No. From what I have seen, there is only a indication that the climate is changing, but the big issue here is: Are "we" (i.e. humans) causing this, or is this simply a climatic change that is caused by factors that we can not influence. 1 Yes I do. Because it can have serious consequences. 1 Yes, because the climate is something that 'bothers' us all. A lot of things depent on the climate. 1 Yes, I do. Because its our duty to protect the earth for people and all what is living at the earth, also for them who are coming after us 1 Yes, the change caused by us could threaten us all. 1 Yes. Climate change is one of the major problems resulting from bad behaviour and care for the environment by humans. Although climate change is considered "not Proven" by some people and studies, other people and studies concider it as a fact. In my opinion it is a fact that people should be more aware of their environment and their world, and as a result of that also the possibility of climate change 1 Yes. If the climate changes too fast, the nature won't be able to deal with it. This can cause big disasters by weather, and the extinction of species. If is goes slower, a lot of species will have to migrate as well, which will change most eco-systems (however, this doesn't need to be bad). And also for the agriculture can the climate-change prove to be disastrous, when certain agricultural species won't be able to produce anymore in a certain area 1 Yes. The results are highly unpredictable, but have a high probability of

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causing enormous environmental and economical damage. 8. What is the problem and whose problem is it? (Wat is het probleem en wiens probleem is het?) # Response 1 It is the problem for us and all living beings in the future. 1 Dat -iedereen- meewerkt aan de vervuiling, wat klimaatverandering tot gevolg heeft. Het is een probleem van ons allen. 1 de stijging van de temperatuur ons allen 1 De temperatuur stijgt, daardoor smelt er te veel ijs van de gletsjers en van de poolkappen af. De zeespiegel stijgt en dat is voor Nederland nioet zo 1 Global climate change (duh) changing wheather conditions, average temperature/humidity/light levels in a region, sea level, etc., etc. Everyone's 1 Het broeikaseffect, it is getting hotter and hotter and the North- and Southpole are melting and because of that the sealevel is rising. 1 Het is in wezen een probleem van iedereen waar ook ter wereld. al vraag ik me af en toe af of het ook zo gezien word door iedereen 1 Het probleem is (volgens mij) voornamelijk dat het ijs smelt, waardoor de zeespiegel stijgt en grote delen land zullen verdrinken. Het is een probleem 1 Het probleem is dat de wereld niet een blok vormt. Er moeten keiharde regels worden gesteld waar elk land zich aan moet houden. Ook burgers 1 Het probleem is dat we de aarde verknoeien met veel uitlaatgassen en energie en industrie. Dit probleem reken ik vooral de doorgedraaide 1 Het wordt steeds warmer op de wereld. Het is een probleem van ieder mens. 1 If the climate is changing and we are causing it, then we have a problem and humanity should try their best effort to stop this change. However as 1 In short: the problem is the changing in temperature, which will change the climate of the world.

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1 In short: the problem is the changing in temperature, which will change the climate of the world. 1 milieurampen. Van iedereen. 1 onbekent, maar wij zullen wel ons deel der aan hebben 1 Onoplettendheid, onverschilligheid. Van iedereen. 1 Probleem is dat o.a. door het 'gat'en het broeikaseffect de temperatuur stijgt, waardoor bijvoorbeeld weer hele gedeeltes ijs smelten en de zeespiegel stijgt. Zo loopt er op den duur land onder. Ik denk ook dat de relatief vele rampen die zich in de natuur voordoen, vaak een link hebben met dit geheel. ( overstroming...) De natuur is minder rustig. 1 Rising of the temperature and its a problem of everyone 1 The problem is that people are to easy. And with people I do not just mean the consumer, government aswell. It is the problem of all humanity and should be adressed by this community as such. 1 The problem is that the climate is changing, the earth is heating up. That means for example that ice on the north and south pole will melt and the sealevel will rise, which can cause floods. It is 'our' problem. 1 The problem is the change caused by humans. It's everyone's problem. Or at least, it should be. 1 The problem is the change of climate happens over so many years, and it could als be mistaken for an eventuality. Problem is that probably nothing will happen until it is too late. It is the problem of everyone, but it is the problem of the government and experts too make people aware of it, and convince other economicly ocused countries of it 1 The problem is the global warming wich will change the habits of people (water gets to warm, no fish, no fishers) And the melting of the northpole, and at first aspecially the poor people will suffer from it. 1 There is not a real problem, and if there is one it will be the problem for every citizen in the world. 1 Toenemende concentraties CO2/CO en stikstofoxiden in de atmosfeer is een probleem van ons allemaal. 9. What do you consider to be the main causes of Climate Change? (Wat beschouwt u als de belangrijkste oorzaken van Klimaatverandering?) # Response 1 Breaeking of the ozonleire 1 de uitlaatgassen van auto's en (verontreinigde) rook uit fabrieken e.d. 1 De uitstoot van schadelijke stoffen. 1 Fabriekuitstoot, uitlaatgassen. 1 Het klimaat zelf, het klimaat verandert sowieso, volgens het schema hadden 1 I think the greenhouse effect. The CO2 emmission by cars, factory's, etc. 173

1 I think the greenhouse effect. The CO2 emmission by cars, factory's, etc. 1 I think there is too much polushion by industry and all kinds of trafic, too much use of materials. 1 I'am not certain. The global warming will have something too do with it, but if its the only cause, I don't know. Iceages happened by natural cause, and were a fact in a relative short time 1 is al genoemd. 1 luchtverontreiniging dus uitstoot van allerlei verschillende stoffen 1 Opwarming door te veel verbrandingsgassen, industrie en verkeer 1 ozonlaag 1 Pollution of all kinds. The ignorance of some of the worlds largest countries. 1 temperatuur ozonlaag 1 The changes of the circling of the planets. There are little changes in the routes of the planets, and this effects each other and also mother earth. 1 The discharge of carbon dioxides, mostly by machines (working on benzine or diesel or oil) 1 The use of fossil fuel. And thus the CO2 comes in the air faster. 1 The use of fossil fuels and vulcanic eruptions. 1 To my knowledge, we have not been able to explain all the major climatic changes in the past, like the begin and end of the various ice ages. However, I have a strong feeling that the factors that may have caused those, are also causing this climatic shift. 1 Uitlaatgassen van auto's en van fabrieken en spuitbussen. 1 uitstoot giftige stoffen van fabrieken en voertuigen. bespuiting van gewassen kunstmest en mest 1 Uitstoot van CO2 door het gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen. 1 Uitstoot van CO2/CO, stikstofoxiden en zwavelverbindingen door industrie, verkeer en luchtvaart. 1 Vervuiling door de instudrie en het verkeer. 10. What do you consider to be the main effects of Climate Change? (Wat beschouwt u als de belangrijkste effecten van Klimaatverandering?) # Response 1 An unhealthy environment. 1 dat de ozon laag minder snel de verkeerde kant opgaat. en de warmte minder 1 geen idee 1 global warming, global dimming and the main effects of those (rise of sea 1 Global warming.

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1 Global warming. 1 Het klimaat veranderd, het wordt warmer, minder koude winters, onnatuurlijke temperaturen die de natuur parten spelen. 1 het zelfde. 1 I'm not sure, you don't see much of the effects. It gets warmer, so probably the pole-ice will melt, but you don't actually see it happen. 1 it becomes hotter and the sealevel is rising 1 Klimaatverandering en het smelten van het poolijs, wat op den duur een groot deel van Nederland onbewoonbaar maakt. 1 Ontbossing: modderlawines. Temperatuur aarde hoger: ijskorst smelt; zee of waterniveau wordt hoger; overstromingen. Sneeuw smelt: sneeuwlawines. Aardbevingen: scheuren in de aardkorst. 1 Opwarming -> smelten van gletsjers en poolkappen. 1 Opwarming van de temperatuur. 1 Rising of the temperature 1 stijging van de zeespiegel en extreem weer 1 Temperatuur verandering en alle indirecte gevolgen daarvan 1 Temperatuursteiging. 1 The first and most obvious change that is going to effect us, is going to be the rise in sea level and the increased amounts of rain that we are going to see. The last effect is going to cause more floodings along rivers. A more dramatic, but less visible effect is going to be that huge numbers of plants and animals are going to disappear, due to the fact that their habbitat is going to "move" across the globe. However a other option that most people do not take into considiration is that some new plants and animals will start to appear as niche's are created due to the fact that habitats are moving. 1 The problem is that temperature and the sealevel is changing; there will be a shortage off food and fresh air; the natural wood will bedestroyed. 1 the shifting of 'macro-ecosystems' (like desert or toendra) 1 Verandering van weer, m.n. droogte en overstromingen. 1 Weather changes, more extreme rainfall, but overall less water. Higher sealevels as a result of melting glaciers and poles.... Which could result in two things, More global warming, or an ice age as a result of sea stream changes and more rain and so on the poles 1 Weather changes. parts of the world getting to dry and some parts will get to wet. 1 weersveranderingen

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D.2 Options Options for Climate Change. What should, can, or do we want to do? (Opties voor Klimaatverandering. Wat moeten, kunnen en willen we doen?) 11. What options do you see (and prefer) for dealing with Climate Change? (Wat voor opties ziet u (en hebben uw voorkeur) om met Klimaatverandering om te gaan?) # Response 1 Development of (economic) alternative fuel sources. Global treaties for the reduction of harmful emissions. 1 Dijken/duinen verhogen, proberen de negatieve gevolgen uit te stellen 1 Gebruik van alternatieve brandstoffen. Beloningen geven op het gebruik van alternatieven. 1 geen 1 geen idee 1 Geen, je kunt er niet mee om gaan. 1 Global!!!! changes in dealing with industrial and car emitions, and more important, making people aware of the problem 1 I haven't thought about it yet 1 In the Netherlands, the government needs to do more to improve general awareness. This might cause people to pay attention to it themselves. It will also make it easier to take other measures, like making new laws. Worldwide, countries need to acknowledge the problem and deal with it. 1 Ingrepen in uitstoot van industrie en verkeer. 1 One of the options is to do nothing in the sense that we are not going to battle the change, but instead react to it. If the sea rises, find higher grounds to build houses. If some areas become too dry, try to solve this by irigation. 1 Schonere werkwijze. Bijv. de opwekking van de schone energie: windmolens enz. 1 Somethings that we might want, won't happen anyway. Such as people using their cars less. So then the hydrogen-fuelcell would be a solution, that doesn't emit CO2, if the hydrogen is synthesised without emiting CO2 of course. 1 To diminish the discharge from igniting fossil fuels, by replacing them with energy-suppliers such as wind-mills, dams (stuwdammen?) and hydrogencells. For the rest I am afraid that we have to bend. 1 Try to do what can be done but there will be a lot what can't be done 1 Uit welke opties kan ik kiezen? 1 Uitstoot tegengaan en ook de overconsumptie van deze maatschappij zou minder kunnen, waardoor er weer minder geproduceert hoeft te worden en er weer minder uitstoot hoeft te zijn. Waarom moet iedereen 15 paar schoenen

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hebben en 3 auto's en elke week nieuwe kleren etc. 1 Use other resources, less use of fossil fuels. 1 We don't have to to accept this changing. We have to change our way of living. Try to have influence uppon the politicians. 1 wereld wijd alles echt beter gaan aanpakken en niet ene land wel andere niet want het raakt iedereen daar zijn geen grenzen die het tegen houden 1 wet ik niet 1 zorgen voor minder verbrandingsgassen 1 Zuinig met consumptie en met water. 12. What do you think you can do yourself about Climate Change? (Wat denkt u dat u zelf kan doen aan Klimaatverandering?) # Response 1 Don't use the car too much for example. 1 Erom denken dat bij alles wat je doet.als iedereen zich meer bewust is van die dingen zou het al aardig begin zijn lijkt me 1 Fiets nemen. Verwarming een graadje lager. 1 Groene stroom, minder auto, verwarming lager zetten, etc. 1 Hopefully with my work I can help, and make people aware, and also in my private life 1 I dont really know yet 1 I hardly never use a car. Don't use aircraft. Use not sprayed food. Use public trafic. 1 I try to be inviromentel consious. I have to admit me and my fiancé both drive a car, but helas that is nececary for our jobs. We use 'Spaarlampen' and 1 in t klein: liever een pot gel dan een fles haarlak ( niet dat ik dat doe), minder verpakkingsmateriaal, meer herbruiken. 1 Just pay attention to the environment in general. This is something that can easily be done at home, on a small scale, but also on the job when I've 1 Kleine dingen zoals afval in afvalbakken, met openbaar vervoer reizen, verwarming niet te snel aan, altijd een tas mee nemen bij inkopen, etc. 1 Minder meedoen aan de vervuiling. Bijv. de auto zoveel mogelijk laten staan. 1 Minder schadelijke gassen produceren. Dus zo weinig mogelijk met de auto. Zuinig stoken in huis. Dus een HR-ketel, de kachel niet al te hoog. Geen spul 1 Niet teveel stroom en water verbruiken, niet teveel afval veroorzaken, uitkijken met uitlaatgassen van auto's, niet te veel consumeren omdat 177

uitkijken met uitlaatgassen van auto's, niet te veel consumeren omdat fabrieken dit produceren. Alles wat minderen. 1 Niet zoveel. Ik denk dat ik persoonlijk een dusdanig kleine invloed er op heb, dat dat verwaarloosd kan worden. Maar ik denk dat de taak in deze bij de overheid en de bedrijven ligt. 1 niks 1 No, because I still am not sure if the climate is changing and if the climate is changing, I have the strong feeling that this is due to factors that have little to do with, for instance our energy consumption. I still think the major factor behind the climatic shift might very well be something that has nothing to do with what we are doing. 1 Not much. Of course you can spare energy or split your carbage, but climate changes will always be there, whatever we do. 1 Not so much. Driving less, maybe. When they are available at a normal price I could buy a car which drives on hydrogen (waterstofgas; brandstofcellen) or so. Using less electricity, allthough it's quite difficult to decrease it with a substantial amount of electricity. 1 Not very much, but maybe I can use other sorts of energy and always cycle instead of taking the car. 1 Use less energy (fuel, electricity, etc.), don't use products containing aerosols, etc. 1 Use less energy, and vote political 'green'. 1 weinig, een land kan niets doen moet heel de wereld doen 1 Zo laag mogelijk autogebruik, aanschaf luxeproducten zo weinig mogelijk, gebruikte artikelen zoveel mogelijk recyclen. 1 Zo weinig mogelijk de auto nemen (fietsen) Afval scheiden (glas - papier g.f.t. - textiel enz.) oude medicijnen en batterijen terugbrengen naar de leverancier/apotheek zo weinig mogelijk chloor en andere zwaar chemische middelen gebruiken. 13. Do you actually do those things or plan to do so? Why? (Doet u deze dingen ook daadwerkelijk of bent u van plan om ze daadwerkelijk te doen? Waarom?) # Response 1 Dat doen we al maar het kan beter. 1 Deze dingen doe ik daadwerkelijk. 1 Ehm, sometimes. Not enough. Especially when it's cold outside, or raining. And I guess the problem doesn't seem personal to me, just like in question 1 het laatste wel... das nog wel te doen, ... beetje zuinig ook 1 I try to, but it's difficult, and sometimes I think like: " well, this small 178amount won't do it, so why not?"

1 I try to, but it's difficult, and sometimes I think like: " well, this small amount won't do it, so why not?" 1 I will vote a political rather conservative party. But I might use less energy, but don't count on it. 1 Ik doe er nog vrij weinig aan, maar heb er wel mooie praatjes over. Ik hoop wel om verscheidende redenen wat consumeren betreft zuiniger aan te gaan doen. 1 Ik wil wel graag dat mijn kinderen en in de toekomst kleinkinderen ook een gezond en leuk leven kunnen hebben. dus ben er wel degelijk bewust mee bezig 1 Ja 1 Ja, hoewel het meestal bij goede voornemens blijft. Het laatste. Gemakzucht. 1 Ja, redelijk veel, om zodoende mijn steentje hierin bij te dragen 1 Ja, waarom niet, anders vernietig je je eigen leefomgeving 1 Jawel, want ik hou wel van fietsen en de verwarming een graadje lager is ook niet dodelijk. Het bespaard ook nog eens geld. 1 nee 1 nee, omdat ik denk dat het toch niets uithaalt. Die kilometers die ik rijd met een auto of die paar dingen die ik koop, zullen het effect echt niet beïnvloeden. 1 Not really, I think I will need a car once in a while, but maybe I will use an other sort of energy later. 1 nvt 1 Of course. It is a part of our life style 1 Partially. At home, I already pay attention to some things, and I doubt that it will improve a lot. In the working field I doubt if I have a lot to say about those things. 1 To a degree. It is very hard to take drastic measures when most others do not (prisoner's dilemma). 1 Yep, although sometimes I skip things out of lazyness. 1 Yes, The future of the world is important enough to do some things 1 Yes. I find it very importand for the future.

D.3 Climate change information Climate Change information. What do you get and are you satisfied with that? (Informatie over Klimaatverandering. Wat krijgt u en bent u daar tevreden mee?) 14. Do you use information on Climate risks and if so, in what way, or for which decisions do you use it? 179

(Gebruikt u informatie over Klimaatverandering en zoja, op welke manier of voor welke beslissingen gebruikt u het?) # Response 1 Bij het aanzetten van de verwarming. Je kunt net zo goed een extra trui aantrekken. 1 Helaas neen. 1 I don't use information on Climate risks, I just attend life sciense at school. 1 Ik kijk naar reclame erover en neem in mij op wat volgens hen helpt dit tegen te gaan. Dan tracht ik er in het dagelijks leven wat rekening mee te houden. 1 ik probeer wel bewust te leven. dus als we dingen aanschaffen hou ik er wel degelijk rekening mee. stroom kun je schoon kopen 1 Ja, door je gedrag te verander en het op een andere manier te doen. 1 Ja, kleine alledaagse dingen. 1 Ja. Beperken van het autorijden. Gebruik van groene stroom. Kopen van een nieuwe verwarmingsketel. 1 Jawel, voor gebruik zie vraag 11. 4 Nee 1 Niet direct, omdat ik vind dat het effect dat ik er op uit kan oefenen te verwaarlozen is. 3 No 2 No I don't 1 No, I don't 1 Only general information, in deciding what products to buy (no aerosols). 1 Well, I have some general knowledge from my study, which I use on a dayly basis 1 Yes, I do. We get information by the polital party and "Zeeuwind" and "Milleu defentie" We use it for the decision for not using a car or a plane, and by using food what is not sprayed. Use as less material as possible. 1 Yes, I get information on this subject at school. It's used to decide on which products we use when designing a building. 15. Through what kind of media do you receive your information on Climate Change (e.g. newspaper, radio, experts among your friends, etc.)? (Door welke media ontvangt u uw informatie over Klimaatverandering (bijv. krant, radio, experts onder uw vrienden, etc.))? # Response 1 All of the abouve 1 de krant en de T.V., radio 1 Krant of tv. 1 krant radio tv 180

1 krant radio tv 1 krant, tv, internet 1 Krant, Tv, Radio en internet. 1 Krant, tv. 1 Krant, vrienden, boeken, internet, tv. 1 krant,tv,vrienden onder elkaar 1 Kranten, televee, radio, studenten 1 Media, especially when your more focussed on it Friends, in discusions Study and articels (especially water related) 1 Mostly the tv ('Jeugdjournaal' in my youth). And I got some at my study. 1 Newspaper, radio, greenpeace, mileudefece, Zeeuwind, political party 1 Newspaper, Radio, Television, Friends, Internet. I used to gather a lot of information from more expert sources like specialized documentation. 1 Newspaper, Television 1 Newspaper, tv, internet, friends. 1 Reclame op tv, reclame in kranten, informatie van een vriend van mij. 1 School 1 School. (Algemene natuur wetenscappen en biologie) 1 Sometimes television, or the newspaper. And experts among my friends of course :D 1 tv 1 TV and newspapers, and some guy who want me to fill in this quesionnaire. Schoolbooks pay attention to it too. The internet, in some small amount. 1 TV, krant 1 TV, radio, WNF blad, verschillende bladen, krant/ 16. Who sends that information (e.g. scientists, government, environmental pressure groups, etc.)? (Wie stuurt deze informatie (bijv. wetenschappers, overheid, milieuorganisaties, etc.))? # Response 1 allemaal 1 allerlei belangstellenden 1 Allerlei instanties. 1 De overheid regelt de tv-reclame, geloof ik en mileuorganisaties werken hier 1 Diverse. 1 envinmental pressure groups, politacal party

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1 envinmental pressure groups, politacal party 1 Environmental groups, United nations, Scientists 1 I guess the government. 1 I tend to ignore the larger part of the information of pressure groups. Their information is very colored and often only part of all the information is presented by them. Information by the government is often handed over to them by pressure groups and so is only a little more valuable. Scientific information in the end is the most important information, provided they are not linked to one of the pressure groups. 1 It depends. That's why I don't blindly accept what the news tells me. Environmental pressure groups have the tendency to exaggerate 1 Journalisten 1 journalisten, wetenschappers 1 Journalists, scientists, government, environmental pressure groups. 1 Media 1 Milieuorganisaties (maar dat negeer ik meestal) Overheden Media 1 overheid 1 Overheid en wetenschappers. 1 overheid millieuorganisatie 1 scientists 1 Scientists, researchers, the government, environmental pressure groups. 1 Study: scientists (sort of) TV: I don't know exactly where they get their info from 1 Wetenschappers, helaas vaak tevergeefs. Overheid, milieuorganisaties. De laatste soms wat extreem. 17. What media (including ones you didn't mention in the question 15) do you consider to be the most useful for information on Climate Change? Why? (Welke media (inclusief media die u niet in vraag 17 genoemd hebt) beschouwt u als de meest nuttigen voor informatie over Klimaatverandering? Waarom?) # Response 1 De krant. Hier staat nogwel eens een wat uitgebreider stuk informatie 1 I dont't really know, I'm not focused on the subject 1 I listen to all kinds of "experts" and have my own idea about it 1 In principe maakt dat niet uit, zolang het maar effectief is. 1 Krant en tv en radio, omdat die de meeste mensen bereikt. 1 Krant, en TV. Vanwege het volgende: Veel mensen lezen wel een krant en 1 krant.

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1 krant. 1 kranten en tydschriften, als ze de waarheid spreken 1 Overheid, omdat ik van mening ben dat die er geen commerciële voordelen uit het verstrekken van die informatie hoeft te halen. 1 radio, t.v., krant, damesbladen 1 School is rather usefull because one is young and easily influenced. 1 Scientists, they are the most reliable 1 Something with a proper source, like scientists or an independant organisation. 1 Study and articles, They can be compared and have too mention results of some kind of reseach which can also be self interpreted 1 Televisie; deze grijpt mijn aandacht het beste. 1 Television (because a lot off people are looking television), radio (because a lot off people can listen, perhaps they change their minds while listening to this program in the file) the news paper (because you can read the information) 1 The internet, as that is the place where it is simplest to find information that is complete and independent of pressure groups. 1 TV 1 TV and radio, because most people will notice it then. Newspapers, because people will not only notice it, but also pay attention (or skip the article). Teachers, because students will take notice and pay attention. 1 tv en krant 1 Tv, radio, newspaper, internet. They reach a large audience. 1 TV: you can reach a very lot of people with it Newspaper: you can also reacht a lot of people with it, and they can read it when they want to and they are able to give more info. 1 wat je zelf misschien ontgaat kun je op die manier van andere toch horen en het is belangrijk het te weten 18. What requirements does the information need to meet for your purpose? (Welke eisen stelt u aan de informatie, om aan uw doel te voldoen?) # Response 1 Betrouwbaarheid, juistheid, volledigheid en tijdigheid. 1 Betrouwbare bron en wetenschappelijk verantwoord en onderbouwd. 1 Clear, believeable (for instance, references to scientific studies by a neutral party). 1 Dat de informatie niet van een bron komt, dat er wat meer op de details wordt ingegaan. 1 dat ik me beter bewust bewust ben bij alle dingen die ik doe 1 Dat ze (zonder al teveel geleerde termen) voor een zo groot mogelijk publiek

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1 Dat ze (zonder al teveel geleerde termen) voor een zo groot mogelijk publiek toegankelijk zijn. En dat ze wijzen op je verantwoordelijkheid. 1 Dat ze objectief zijn en niet verdraaid in het voordeel van de zender, zoals dat bij bepaalde organisaties net iets te vaak het geval is. 1 door velen gedragen, kan altijd beter maar moet wel in begrijpelijke taal 1 Duidelijk, praktisch, zodat ik weet wat ik concreet kan doen om klimaatverandering tegen te gaan. 1 I don't really need information. 1 Independent. 1 It has to be objective 1 It must be objective and reliable. 1 It needs to be reliable 1 n.v.t. 1 Niet irritant. 1 Niet te ingewikkeld, dat ze ook in de praktijk te brengen zijn. 1 niks 1 Not too difficult, and with nice pictures of course 1 Pakkend, niet te langdradig. 1 The information has to be short and clear. Without a lot off emotion. 1 There will have to be a lot of facts. 19. Are you satisfied with the information you receive? Why? (Bent u tevreden met de informatie die u krijgt? Waarom?) # Response 1 I am satisfied, yes. 1 Ik vind de informatie nog te weinig. Het moet ook eenvoudig uitgelegd 1 Ja hoor, het informeert mij afdoende. 1 ja, doe er niks mee 1 Ja, het is voldoende om een besluit te nemen over wat ik er zelf aan kan doen 1 ja, op zich wel, het kan wel harder gebracht worden. Echt beelden zien van 1 Nee, de meesten zijn van greenpeace en die zijn vaak irritant. 1 Nee, er is meer bekend achter de schermen dan dat het publiek weet. 1 Neen. De kracht zit in de herhaling. Het moèt tot de mensen doordringen. 1 niet altijd. ik heb af en toe het idee dat we niet alles horen hoe het echt is. 1 Niet helemaal; bij het invullen hiervan merk ik dat ik niet precies weet hoe

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dit alles zit. 1 No, their is too much info, wildly spread, with no real line. Everybody has an opinion, but which info is true 1 Not really, it is not objective sometimes. But if I would search for proper information, I think I can get something reliable. 1 Often it is influenced by pressure groups to a large extend. However since I know about this, I tend to look for "a second opinion" if I think that is a important option. In general I am satisfied, because I know what to expect, but I sometimes feel very unsatisfied, as many people simply digest the information they recieve without thinking any further. 1 redelijk, maar ik zit ook niet om die info te springen. 1 Tot op zekere hoogte. Op zich krijg je veel voorgeschoteld, maar als je meer wilt weten zul je toch zelf verder moeten zoeken. 1 Untill now, yes. It provides me with enough information to have the feeling to understand the basic of the problem. 1 Yes, because it is mostly very reliable 1 Yes, I choosed my own sources. 1 Yes, there are a lot of so called experts. 1 Yes. I have access to more than I need. 1 Yes. If I wasn't, I would be able to get more. 20. For as far as you haven’t mentioned it the previous questions, what are the strong points and weak points of the information that different senders (scientists, government, etc.) provide? (Voor zover u dit in de vorige vraag nog niet genoemd hebt, wat zijn de sterke en zwakke punten van de informatie die verschillende zenders (wetenschappers, overheid, etc.) leveren?) # Response 1 A weak point is that the information often does not mention its sources. 1 dat ze nooit het achterste van hun tong laten zien. en dat juist wel zou 1 Milieuorganisaties vind ik te incorrect en vaak teveel belust op het 1 scientists: the information is complicated government and environmental 1 Sterk: - Het is kort en krachtig. Zwak: - Er moet meer op het gevoel van de 1 Sterke punten: duidelijk, grappig, confronterend. Zwakke punten: kan

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klimaatproblemen tegen te gaan. 1 They are not always objective. They do not provide ways to deal with the problem, they show what the problem is and where it's (possibly) headed. 1 They don't really know whats going on, like fifty years ago they said energy would be up by now, and we've got plenty. 1 Tv is te vluchtig maar wel goed als eerste bericht, wetenschappers zijn me te uitgebreid maar wel compleet, de krant staat daar wat tussenin, maar het is niet altijd duidelijk of ze wel deskundig zijn. 1 veel te weinig 1 Weak points.. see previous question Strong points.. The possibility of the problem is taken seriously 1 Zie de twee vorige antwoorden. 1 Zwak: opdringerig, niet effectief. Sterk: Inspelen op basis emoties. (bijv. zorg voor kinderen) 1 Zwak: Soms is het een beetje eenzijdig belicht. Vooral milieuorganisaties hebben daar een handje van. Net alsof de uitstoot makkelijk is terug te dringen terwijl dat natuurlijk niet zo makkelijk is. Sterk: Het is vaak wetenschappelijk goed onderbouwd, waardoor je er ook daadwerkelijk wat aan hebt. 1 Zwakke punt is het eigenbelang van de zender. D.4 Climate change and governments/organizations Climate Change and governments & organizations. Are they doing enough and what would you advise them? (Klimaatverandering en overheden & organisaties. Doen ze genoeg en wat zou u ze adviseren?) 21. Do you think the government is doing enough to solve the problem? Why? (Vindt u dat de regering genoeg doet om het probleem op te lossen? Waarom?) # Response 1 Dat geloof ik niet. In Nederland zijn ze nog redelijk goed bezig, alhoewel ook hier de economie nog steeds voor gaat en de aarde misbruikt wordt. In 1 De regering doet wel van alles, maar of dat genoeg is, denk ik niet. 1 I don't know 1 I don't think so, they tried something, but not enough. I don't think you can stop the problem, only prevent it becoming worse and the government 1 I think the Dutch government is trying, but could do more. Certainly about industrial poluters. And they could encourage separted garbagem, like in 186

industrial poluters. And they could encourage separted garbagem, like in Germany. 1 Ik denk dat de regering doet wat in haar vermogen ligt. Het is ook meer een wereldprobleem. 1 Ik denk het wel. Volgens mij is Nederland netjes bezig met terugdringen van de uitstoot. 1 Ja, maar... een beter milieu... Het probleem is mondiaal, dus onze regering kan er niet zoveel mee. Het is bovendien niet 'op te lossen' maar onze regering werkt voornamelijk preventief, wat m.i. ook beter is. 1 More or less. They know the threat, and are trying to deal with it, but as a country on your own, you can't do much about it. 1 nee , alles wat mogelijk er tegen aan kan gaan word te niet gedaan 1 nee , niet echt.het is een beetje vreemd soms is het erg belangrijk om vervolgens weer precies het tegen over gestelde toe handelen dat is in mijn ogen behoorlijk dubbel 1 nee schuiven het vooruit 1 Nee, een goede economie gaat voor. 1 Nee, geld. 1 Neen, niet genoeg: geld gebrek, gebrek aan publieke medewerking. 1 No I don't, I think they are afraid to do that. They will lose vootes. In the shortterm it is to expensive and not popular. 1 No, In most cases the economics go first, although the Netherlands are doing more than most other countries 1 No, the governments are not doing enough to stop our influence on the climatic changes. Taken the position that we do cause the climatic change, governments should decide that the enviroment is more important than economics. Thus they should hold to the kyoto protocol and force other country's to do the same. 1 No. The government should do more to increase awareness and decrease polution etc. in the Netherlands. 1 Nope. Most studies agree that drastic measures are necessary to stop the problem. No government is willing to take sufficient measures. 1 Nouja, ik kan daar geen goed oordeel over vellen, maar ik denk dat ons land er op zich genoeg aan doet. Maar misschien ligt er bij onze regering ook wel de taak om andere landen te stimuleren er ook genoeg aan te doen. En ik denk dat ze op dat punt tekort schieten. 1 Our Government is doing more than enough. The Netherlands are always trying to be the "best kid in school". 1 The government is not doing enough in my opinion. They're not reducing the energylevel in comparison to the agreement. Fact is that they don't have

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much money or spend it wrong. 1 They can do better. (But of course the government can always do better). The governments of different countries have meetings about this problem, but then one country doesn't agree so the solution is rejected. That way we'll get nowhere. For of course the government wouldn't use measures that are negativily influencing their economy, if other countries don't. 1 Ze doen wel veel, maar net niet genoeg. De regering is niet alleen verantwoordelijk, maar de mensen zelf ook. 22. Do you think the world community is doing enough to solve the problem? Why? (Vindt u dat de wereldgemeenschap genoeg doet om het probleem op te lossen? Waarom?) # Response 1 Absolutely not. Most studies agree that drastic measures are necessary to stop the problem. No government is willing to take sufficient measures and 1 De westerse wereld (inclusief mijzelf) zeker niet. Wij verbruiken allemaal veel en leveren dus veel afval. 1 Guess not, some country's dont't think that its importent enough 1 I don't thing the world community is doing enough to solve the problem. The rich country's don't give a.. thing and the poorer country's can't afford it to do 1 I think that there are a lot of countries for wich climate changes is not an issue. They have other problems. I can understand that people in these 1 nee zitten niet op 1 lijn 1 Nee, althans niet alle landen doen genoeg. Vooral een paar heel grote industrielanden doen er vanwege hun economie veel te weinig aan. 1 Nee, anders zou het het effect (het oplopen van de temperaturr) reeds gestopt zijn en zou het geen probleem meer zijn. 1 Nee, economie, geld verdienen. 1 nee, er moet meer overeenstemming in de regels op dit gebied zijn. 1 Nee, geld. 1 Nee, niet alle landen doen er genoeg aan. Er worden b.v. veel te veel bomen gekampt. (ontbossing) 1 Nee, verdrag van Kyoto is nog steeds niet operationeel. 1 nee, werelden worden nog steeds stuk gemaakt, zie alleen maar amerika 1 Nee, zoals ik ergens al eerder zei: Er is eigenlijk geen sprake van een 188wereldgemeenschap. Men heeft geen verantwoording tegenover elkaar. 1 Neen: gebrek aan interesse. Men ziet de ernst van het probleem niet voldoende in.

1 Neen: gebrek aan interesse. Men ziet de ernst van het probleem niet voldoende in. 1 No, definataly not. Countries like The Netherlands are getting with the program. But big poluters shrug their shoulders and continue the way they have always done. 1 No, Especially in a time of economic regression everything is focussed on other things, and environment comes last. Countries as America should not be allowed by the international community too exit the Kyoto treaty and so 1 No, most people don't take it personal. They might say that 'we' need to decrease driving in cars, but they actually mean 'you'. They won't change there personal habbits, because the problem doesn't seem that personal. 1 No, the world community is maybe even doing less than our own government. 1 No, they don't, They make other decisions. They prefer economy. 1 No. See the results of the Treaty of Kyote (I believe that it was there) when the leaders tried to make agreements to slow down the process. First of all Amerika didn't agree, and now is Russia doubting either. The agreements did have to be quite soft, because most countries do value their economy higher than the climate. 1 No. Especially some large countries that are the main cause of these problems do far too little. In fact, compared to them, the Dutch government is doing a fine job. 1 Sommige landen wel andere niet. voorbeeld.Mijn broer is naar de U.s.a geweest voor 9 mnd (trekkend met camper en motor) als ik dan hoor dat ze daar bij de benzine pomp gewoon alle olie op de straat laten lopen dan snap ik het niet meer.en dat de benzine zo goedkoop is. je moet ergens beginnen. dus hier zijn we dan verder dan daar op veel fronten.in Belgie kunnen ook dingen die hier niet mogen 1 Taken the position that we cause a problem, then we as a world do not do enough to solve this problem. However the first action for us to take is educate the people in those country's that are not aware there is a problem pending. Doing this should be a carefull operation, where we do not tell them only the result, but also what we are doing to change the world. 23. What would you advise policy makers, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? (Wat zou u beleidsmakers adviseren wat betreft het probleem van Klimaatverandering en de communicatie erover?) # Response

1 Be aware of climate changes but also be aware of the fact that the information to the public can be overdone. Dont'push it to hard. 1 Communicatie is geen elk-probleem-oplossend middel 189 1 Drastischer ingrijpen bij de hoofdveroorzakers!

1 Duidelijk aangeven wat de bevolking zou kunnen doen, Duidelijker de ernst van het probleem aangeven. Goed laten zien hoe het beleid hier op wordt aangepast 1 Duidelijk inwrijven hoe we een leger kunnen vormen TEGEN klimaatsproblemen; hoe we samen verantwoordelijk zijn en er samen tegen strijden (en dan natuurlijk ook vermelden HOE dit moet!) 1 eerlijk zijn 1 Go over the borders, do international researchers but be sure to communicate a lot, and follow the agreements. 1 I have no idea, at least be more hounest 1 I would advise them to first do more research that is focussing on the cause of the climatic changes in the past. Furthermore, the government should try to make sure that they do not only communicate the knowledge provided by pressuregroups, but provide the "full" picture. 1 Maak duidelijk wat er met de mensen zelf kan gebeuren. 1 Make people aware. Without public support nothing will happen 1 See previous questions. 1 They should be objective, and bring the problem to the individual, make it personal, so that everyone realizes that he/she can make a difference. 1 Think long term. 1 Try to be honest about the real consequences off our way of life. Let people pay the price for polution, perhaps they will understand what is happening. 1 Try to get the world at one line about it, and make sure that your civilians know what you are doing. 1 wees meer open en eerlijker . nu komt het wel eens over dat je dingen worden verzwegen. en openheid werkt alleen mar in voordeel 1 Zie vorige antwoorden 1 Zorg ervoor dat de wereld een blok vormt en elkaar helpt. 1 Zorgen dat landen met veel uitstoot worden aangepakt, of worden geholpen met het terugdringen er van. Uitstoot zul je altijd houden en de oplossingen er voor, hebben ook veel nadelen (zoals waterstofauto's enzo), maar je kunt het wel proberen te minimaliseren. 24. What would you advise scientists, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? (Wat zou u wetenschappers adviseren wat betreft het probleem van Klimaatverandering en de communicatie erover?) # Response

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1 As a scientist, I do not see the climatic change as a problem. It might be a challenge, but much more, it (might be) is something that is happening. Thus it is a great oppertunity for learning more about the macro proccesses on our planet. Scientist should realy try to find out if it is "us" that cause the change and if they come to the conclusion there is no doubt about that, they might as well try to understand what is happening and see if they can find a way to reverse the process. 1 Die zouden het zelf het beste moeten weten. Ik zou zo zeggen: zorg dat je meer vat op de politiek krijgt. 1 Doen wat in hun vermogen ligt om het probleem te lijf te gaan. Hierover in heldere taal communiceren 1 Duidelijker en beknopter zijn, de meeste informatie die je ontvangt is saai en heeft het formaat van een kleine thesaurus. Bovendien is het een deprimerend onderwerp waar veel mensen niet over na willen denken. 1 ga door met het belangrijke werk, het is echt nodig! en door de communicatie andere landen ook zo ver weten te krijgen dat het wereld wijd ook echt word nagestreeft het te veranderen. want het is een kostbaar goed daar moeten we zuinig op zijn 1 Ga opzoek naar alternatieven. 1 Get a strong lobby group to assist you. 1 Hier weet ik niks zinnigs over te zeggen. 1 Keep it simple stupid. Duidelijkheid en eenvoudigheid van de boodschap. 1 Keep on with your investigations, and give your results to those people who are in the position to change things. 1 Meer inzenden in kranten, tijdschriften, op tv, hier zelf ook achterna gaan om steeds nieuwe informatie te verstrekken en dit vooral ook eerlijk te doen. 1 Provide good alternatives, and (more important) make the people enthousiast about it. 1 Scientist have to be honest about the changing. Don't be influenced by industry and the concernces which are paying the projects. 1 See point 23. 1 tell about it in less difficult terms 1 They would have to give a lot of facts, showing they're not biased. They'd also have to say thing in laymens terms. 1 Try too keep it simple, and clear. But make a statement 1 zie 23 25. What would you advise environmental pressure groups, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? (Wat zou u milieuorganisaties adviseren wat betreft het probleem van Klimaatverandering en de communicatie erover?)

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#

Response

1 be a bit more realistic 1 Bij overheid en publiek blijven aandringen tot gedragsverandering 1 Do solid research, so your reputation is beyond doubt. Try to get the public in action (very hard, I know). Lobby among politicians. 1 Don't make yourself rediculous by being politically involved. 1 Don't overreact, but act and help where possible 1 Eerlijk inforeren over uitslagen van onderzoeken. Duidelijke, originele, grappige maar ook heldere boodschappen over aanpak tegen klimaatsproblemen verstrekken. 1 Geen geweld gebruiken. Concrete aanwijzingen geven wat eraan te doen. 1 Hou je mond en laat je niet leiden door subjectieve argumenten. De rest van de wereld ziet het probleem ook wel. 1 I would advise all pressure groups to stop abusing sience to prove their point and start doing some real research and provide people with information about all the facts, not just the facts that happen to be practical for them. 1 Laat goed zien wat er met het milieu gebeurd. 1 Make sure that people know that is something to be concerned about. 1 niet altyd overal tegen aan schoppen 1 Op indringende wijze aan ieder duidelijk maken wat er gebeurt als economische belangen blijven prevaleren 1 Probeer niet zo irritant te zijn. 1 See question 24. 1 Stop pushing, People are working on it. 1 To give proper sources and not to exaggerate 1 Try to be honest and don't use violence and wrong emotions. 1 wees duidelijk naar de mensen toe. eerlijkheid en openheid goede informatie 1 Wordt eens objectief, op hef jezelf op. 26. What would you advise other involved parties, concerning the Climate Change problem and concerning the communication on it? (Wat zou u andere betrokken partijen adviseren wat betreft het probleem van Klimaatverandering en de communicatie erover?) # Response 1 A combination of the above, if applicable. 1 Be more open about results and so 1 De individu: Denk even na voordat je iets doet ten opzichte van de uitstoot 1 Duidelijk zijn. Communicatie is geen Haarlemmer olie (zie vraag 23).

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1 Duidelijk zijn. Communicatie is geen Haarlemmer olie (zie vraag 23). 1 Eerlijk inforeren over uitslagen van onderzoeken. Duidelijke, originele, grappige maar ook heldere boodschappen over aanpak tegen klimaatsproblemen verstrekken. 1 eerst eens goed na denken 1 Luister naar elkaar en probeer samen tot een oplossing te komen. 1 Make yourself heared. 1 Neem verantwoordelijkheid. 1 Same as 23 1 See question 24. 1 Vooral eerlijk zijn in de informatie. 1 Zie vorige antwoorden 1 zoals ik al eerder aangaf. niet alleen praten , maar ook daad wereklijk doen D.5 Other Other comments. (Andere opmerkingen.) 27. Is there anything else you would like to say on the subject of Climate Change? If so, you can do so here. (Is er nog iets anders wat u wilt zeggen over het onderwerp Klimaatverandering? Zoja, dan kunt u dat hier doen.) # Response 1 De mensen ervan doordringen, dat voorzorgsmaatregelen in hun eigen belang zijn. Hun gebied moet tenslotte bewoonbaar blijven. 1 Er moet echt iets gedaan worden anders ga je zelf kapot. 1 Het is jammer dat het al zo ver heeft moeten komen, maar het is nog niet te laat. 1 I don't know how serious the problem is, but something needs too change because of the environment 1 ik vind het allemaal niet zo interessant. 1 Ik vind het een zeer goed en belangrijk onderwerp en hoop echt dat je in je verdere carriere er veel succes mee zal hebben 1 Ik wens de mensen van dit onderzoek er veel succes en sterkte mee. Verder hoop ik dat we ooit eens wat verstandiger en bedachtzamer met de wereld om zullen gaan springen. 1 To my opinion climate change has become a hype. Let us all try to keep our world clean, but climate changes will be there for ever. 1 Voor de meeste mensen is het klimaat een ver van hun bed show.

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Appendix E: Communication Examples The present chapter will discuss two existing examples of (risk) communication on climate change and will give some comments on them according to the results of the this study. These examples include GAS, a personal greenhouse gas calculator, and CLEAR, a platform discussing climate change as a whole. E.1 GAS The GAS Greenhouse Gases Meter, Gas-Explorer and Day-Planner (Guimarães Pereira, 2001) is a personal greenhouse gas calculator. GAS was developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission. While there is no online version of GAS on its homepage, http://alba.jrc.it/gas, it can be obtained free of charge by e-mail request. GAS is available in English and in four other languages. Unfortunately, Dutch is not one of them. Nevertheless, the developers have made an attempt to provide the program in native languages, which is a good approach. Another important property of GAS is that it doesn’t only deal with carbon dioxide (CO2), but also with other greenhouse gases, namely methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Besides energy use, other lifestyle related pressures (like diet) are included as well. These are often forgotten, but they are important. This provides a more full picture than a CO2 and/or energy-only calculator. However, a relative importance of the gases is not given. This does seem to be a missing point. It might be a good idea to add a more general graph of “greenhouse pressure”, combining all of these other gasses, or at least to provide some information on their relative importance. GAS is divided into three programs: the Gases Meter, the Gas-Explorer, and the DayPlanner. The Gases Meter models emissions due to consumption and lifestyle on a yearly basis. The Gas-Explorer can then be used to discover options, also on a yearly basis. The Day-Planner allows for a view on one’s day-to-day performance. While this method is very complete and detailed, it also takes quite a lot of time. It also requires one to save files in between and load them in the other programs, which also requires extra effort. Over the whole program, GAS is very detailed, including lots of influences and lots of options. Again, this takes a lot of time. It also takes a lot of time before one gets a first picture of one’s emissions and before one can start to compare influences. All of this requires a lot of patience from the user. The program makes up a lot by its entertainment value however. It has beautiful graphics and easy to use and understand user interface. Moral issues with respect to interpersonal and interregional equity are taken into account by comparing one’s personal emissions with that of one’s country and the world.

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However, there is no direct comparison with other world regions (which would show equity issues even clearer). GAS clearly shows the benefits of measures and choices with respect to reduced gas emissions. Other benefits and costs of options are also shown in a sort of radar plot, “The Aleph”. Both benefits and costs are plotted in one graph, which provides a clear and useful overview of the various effects of an option. Additional explanations of effects are written in a field below the graph as well. While GAS offers a lot of different options, almost all of them concern lifestyle. Some energy efficiency options, like energy saving light bulbs, are included, but these are few. Lifestyle is an important factor in emissions and it can make the user more aware of the fact that his or her lifestyle effects the world. However, lifestyle options are also the hardest to take. They often conflict with high preference for one’s lifestyle and the need for comfort. Energy use is therefore often considered inelastic, also because energy efficiency options usually aren’t perceived at all. Furthermore, financial benefits of options only concern the one who pays the bill. They have no message for other residents, e.g. one’s children. Energy efficiency options can be taken centrally. They can be taken by the bill-payer, but the energy use by non-payers is also affected. In this way, reduction of energy use of non-payers is not only dependant on environmental and moral consciousness. The more easy to take and effective energy efficiency methods such as high-efficiency boilers and efficient versions of electrical appliances should be included as well (see e.g. also McManus, 2000). Other options that could be taken into consideration are green energy and energy efficient driving, and simple awareness options like turning off the light when not in the room and not leaving appliances on standby. GAS also mentions options that the government could take. This seems like a good idea, because personal options should be put in the context of other options and other actors. It might also be a good idea to provide some information here on what options are actually taken by others. Some additional comments include that some of the appliances have a fixed time of use per day, while they can vary greatly. While this may be necessary to keep some limit to the amount of work for a user, some of those fixed values seem highly underestimated. For example, home computers are said to be used only 30 minutes per day. In reality, this is probably much more. With the introduction of cable internet, people often just let their computers on all day. Even if this would not be the case for a user, 30 minutes is very little time.

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E.2 CLEAR CLEAR (CLimate and Environment in Alpine Regions) is a research project by the Swiss National Research Foundation. The project was a trans-disciplinary study of issues that relate directly to climate-related change in the Alpine region. Part of the project was to present the results to citizens, and to get a clear view on their ideas on climate change in their region considering the results of the research project. The discussions with citizens used so-called ICITs, Integrated Citizen Information Tools. These ICITs used a variety of methods, like storytelling, scenarios, modelling, etcetera to provide a full picture of climate change and its uncertainties. The total package of communication tools, “CLIMATE FACTS – Climate Change in Alpine Regions” can be found online at http://clear.eawag.ch/. CLIMATE FACTS consists of three main modules: IMPACTS (Schlumpf et al., 2001; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000), OPTIONS (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2000), and the ECO2 Calculator (Schlumpf et al., 1999). Later, the SURE? module, an educational module on uncertainties in scientific results and how to deal with them, was added. First, some general things will be discussed on CLEAR and then IMPACTS, OPTIONS, and the ECO2 Calculator will be discussed separately. The CLEAR modules are in the native language of their intended users, which is a good thing. For international users, IMPACTS is also available in English and French, and OPTIONS is also available in French. For the platform itself, this is probably not a problem. It mainly looks at the Alpine Region, which limits the use for international users anyway. All in all, the CLEAR platform has a good approach. Both the risk (IMPACTS) and the, often called for, options (OPTIONS and the ECO2 Calculator) are taken into account. Furthermore, the science behind climate change, and its uncertainties are taken into account as well. It also gives the user the advantage of having control over what information he or she reads, similar to a newspaper. If someone is not interested in knowing more on one of the subjects, he or she can choose to skip that part. E.g. most people have already heard a lot on the basic scientific principles, and are mainly interested in options. Those people could look at options without having to go through the rest as well. CLEAR also provides extensive additional information in the form of question-mark buttons with many statements. These buttons are very useful to provide more information to those who need it, while not bothering those who do not. A further good point of the CLEAR platform is that it provides many references, improving trust. The major downside of an approach such as CLEAR is that it is Internet based. Therefore, it attracts only readers who are actively looking for more information. Citizens consider television and newspapers more useful, among others because it reaches more people. In any case, for such an approach to be successful as a communication program,

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its existence and usefulness will need to be well communicated, both on the Internet and through media such as television and newspapers. E.2.1 IMPACTS Overall, IMPACTS is a very user-friendly and accessible module. It’s easy to understand and use. It’s also very entertaining and visually attractive, through the combination of pictures, texts, and gadgets such as small movies or small models. The use of a sort of research questions at the beginning of each subject is also useful to keep focus on the main lines and intentions of a piece of text, helping in dealing with the still fairly large size of those texts, and to stimulate active reading. Such approaches are also used in education and didactics (see e.g. Kortland et al., 2002). The language can be somewhat technical, but the creators have done a quite reasonable job in keeping this limited, also considering the great difficulty of dealing with certain scientific terms. IMPACTS does a very good job on one of the major issues that appeared in this study: taking moral issues into consideration. Impacts are not only discussed in monetary terms, but also in terms of change in the natural, economic and social system with regards to aesthetic and ethical considerations. The module discusses regional impacts, which is a benefit in itself because it is very relevant for the user. It doesn’t forget the global impacts however and also discusses impacts in other world regions, taking interregional equity into account. Unfortunately, the global impacts do not consider impacts on the natural environment, while these are very important as well. Regional impacts do consider impacts on the natural environment. With regards to cultural models, IMPACTS does invoke several of them. Especially the pollution model is invoked fairly often. IMACTS discusses “emissions” of CO2, while a term like “production” would have been better. Other terms strongly linked to traditional air-pollution, such as “caused by man” and “burning” fuels also invoke the pollution model. Furthermore, an explanatory picture features smokestacks from houses, cars, trucks, and factories. IMPACTS does discuss the importance of energy use, but it might be useful to stress this a little bit more. Energy efficiency and renewable energy are also included, which is a good thing. References to ozone and aerosols are not dominant and there is no discussion on ozone depletion. Therefore, IMPACTS does do not invoke the ozone model. The deforestation model is not invoked, although the effects of deforestation are mentioned. This is not a bad thing, as it is a cause of climate change, but it should not be overstressed. The melt water model is somewhat invoked by the prominent first place of sea level rise in the list of global impacts. In the discussion of sea level rise, melting of glaciers and poles is mentioned prominently. It might be more stressed that current sea level rise is mainly due to expansion of water. However, IMPACTS discusses a broad range of impacts, which are clearly visualized and are also noticed by the users (see Schlumpf et al., 2001). This effectively prevents the melt water model from causing large problems. Furthermore, the term “climate change” is used consistently, instead of “greenhouse effect” and “global

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warming”. Therefore, the temperature and weather model is avoided. Mentioning a large range of possible impacts also contributes to this. IMPACTS also discusses extreme weather events. Examples are used, but they aren’t really recent, with the exception of hurricane Andrew. The damages caused by those events are somewhat under discussed. Especially the effects on other world regions, developing countries in particular, should receive more attention. Other impacts, such as nutrition, water resources, and migration do a better job at this. Uncertainties play a major role in IMPACTS. They are taken into account through models and scenarios. Citizens find this salutatory because of openness and trust related issues, but they also have problems dealing with them. They don’t consider this very useful and call for a more directive approach. Probably, the current situation focuses too much on the uncertainties. It is made so explicit for research purposes. It would probably be a good idea to at least include a best guess scenario and statements on what the general expectations are. Furthermore, the texts could use a small conclusion (to the question posed on the introduction page of an subject), to improve the directive approach and to help in reading the still fairly large amount of text. The size of IMPACTS also seems a problem to most citizens. There is a lot of information and a lot of text. Other citizens on the other hand said that they already knew everything. This is similar to what has been noted in this study on climate information as a whole. Perhaps it would be a good idea to provide a more general overview first, which can be read by those not willing to put a lot of time into reading everything. The other information could be included under a “more information” heading, as additional background for those interested in knowing more on a particular subject. This would allow citizens to not only choose which subjects they read about, but also how much they read about it. Large pieces of text will scare away people with less time to spend on this. It does remain important to note that comments of citizens on that they already know everything don’t always mean that they actually do. People may find a set of consequences to be very logical when told and therefore they may think they already knew that. It does not mean however, that they actually did. At least, they may not have that knowledge “operational”. That is, they don’t use that information and don’t think of it in practise, but they might remember it or find it logical when specifically pointed at it (e.g. as in IMPACTS). Therefore, it is still important to keep pointing those things out. There is also some communication on climate changes in the past. This is a very good point, as it is important for people’s view on impacts and causes. However, IMPACTS doesn’t discuss the differences between past climate change and the current one, and doesn’t mention that our knowledge of past change is used to make predictions of future change. Changes (e.g. in temperature) and impacts due to those past changes could be discussed more as well. E.2.2 OPTIONS

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OPTIONS includes some basic information on climate change and its effects and links to the IMPACTS module for further explanation. This is useful as a short introduction (with options to read more) or reminder. The OPTIONS module shows the trends and options do change those trends. Trends in energy use are shown for the world and for Switzerland (for the user’s region in the CLEAR project). The old regional model also included individual choice, e.g. the number of appliances and fuel efficiency of cars, and showed its effects on regional emissions or energy use. That model was also fairly simple and easy to use by and relevant for citizens. It also succeeded in connecting the individual scale to the regional or societal scale. The new model, which includes large lists of regional parameters, none of them having anything to do with the citizen. While it may give a better picture of regional trends, the model seems more focused on experts than on citizens. The world energy trend model and the old regional one clearly showed that energy efficiency is one of the major options available. This is a good thing. Renewable energy was shown as an option as well. A second model shows the relation between energy use and the economy. It clearly manages to communicate that even costly options such as a high energy tax can have a positive effect on economy, rather than a negative one. An initial investment is required, but the effects on the longer run are very good for the economy. This shows that there are not only options to deal with climate change, but also that they are achievable and desirable even from an economic point of view. This is a very good point as well. Furthermore, a catalogue of possible policy measures is discussed. This is done in a qualitative way, because the effects of combinations of measures can’t be calculated very well. Users are then left to make up their own minds on what measures and sets of measures they consider to be desirable. Discussions on options include a short summary, which is very useful, some information on its history, possible effects of an option, the current state of discussion on an option, and references. The discussion of the current state of discussion on an option is especially useful, as it also includes the efforts already taken by the government and by other sectors. This is essential for dealing with social dilemmas, such as Prisoner’s Dilemma. E.2.3 ECO2 Calculator The ECO2 Calculator (formerly called the “personal CO2 calculator”) is a personal greenhouse gas calculator, like GAS. The original version is described in the references mentioned above. It is a very simple and very quick calculator. The version that is currently online is much more recent, more sophisticated, and more appealing to the eye. This however also means that it takes a bit more time to fill out. However, it is still fairly quick. Compared to GAS, it contains much less options, which makes it less complete, and it is less appealing to the eye and less entertaining.

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One great benefit except for its overall speed, is that it immediately shows a colourful bar chart of either CO2 production or energy use. The energy use is divided into different categories, such as heating, living situation, transport, etc. This gives an easy and quick comparison of the contributions of those categories to the overall picture. Changes that the user implements in his situation are also immediately visualized in the bar chart. This also provides a quick and easy overview of the relative importance of that change. Like in GAS, moral values concerning interpersonal and interregional equity are taken into consideration by comparing emissions. Unlike GAS, it also compares one’s emissions to those in other world regions (instead of only world average). This is again an important benefit of the ECO2 Calculator. The ECO2 Calculator also includes energy efficiency options. Its limited size however does result in these options remaining rather vague. E.g. one’s appliances being energy efficient, instead of providing various energy efficient appliances. Nevertheless, it does point out energy efficiency as an option. One of the major downsides of this calculator is that it shows only benefits of options in terms of reduced emissions. Benefits of avoided damage and costs of options, and the financial side of the picture, are not included. These things are however very important. Furthermore, the ECO2 Calculator only deals with energy use and CO2. Other gases and personal influences on emissions other than energy use are not taken into account. Like GAS, efforts taken by others are not included in this module either. Unlike GAS, possible options for e.g. governments are not included, but this program is embedded in the larger context of CLEAR, where these things are considered.

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