romanian review of political sciences and ...

R O MAN IA N RE VI E W OF P OL IT I CA L S C IE NC E S A N D I NT E RNAT I O N AL RE L AT IO NS VOL. XII

No. 1

2015

CONTENTS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CIPRIAN NICOLAE RADAVOI, Factors Countervailing Immigrant Phobia: A Paradoxically Successful Case of Chinese Migration ...................................... ANDREEA-PAULA IBÃNESCU, A Transversal Analysis on Turkey’s Re-Quest for Central Asia and Geopolitical Playoff ........................................................ SANDA CINCÃ, The Evolution of the European Security Complex After the End of the Cold War ................................................................................................. LUCIAN-ªTEFAN DUMITRESCU, MIRIAM CIHODARIU, Mackinder’s Theory. Some Consequences of Too Much Geography in the Field of Geopolitics .....

3 21 31 48

POLITICAL IMAGE, THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY ION GOIAN, Notes Concerning “Eliade File”....................................................... HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, Local Identity: A Constellation of Stirring Social and Political Multiplicities ..................................................................... MARIA-ANA TUPAN, Dracula and the Topos of Mirror Civilizations ............... ANA MARIA NEGOIÞÃ, The Mudejar City. Elements of Islamic-Christian Synthesis within Urban Planning ......................................................................

59 78 91 100

IN FOCUS GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU, Interview: William J. Connell – On The Prince ......

107

POLITICAL SCIENCE REVISITED GIORGIO BARUCHELLO, The Inconceivable Failure of Free-Market Liberalism ......................................................................................................... VIORELLA MANOLACHE, A Religious Treatment of Economic Dysfunctions: Religious Economics......................................................................................... IAN BROWNE, Kuhn, Lakatos and the Paradigm Change in British Political Economy in 1979 ..............................................................................................

132

SCIENTIFIC LIFE ............................................................................................

155

BOOK REVIEWS.............................................................................................

172

REVIEW OF REVIEWS ..................................................................................

181

THE AUTHORS ...............................................................................................

183

Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 1–184, Bucharest, 2015.

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R E VU E RO U MAI NE DE S CI E NC E S P O L IT IQ U E S E T R E L AT I ON S I N T E RNAT I ONA L E S TOME XII

No. 1

2015

SOMMAIRE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES CIPRIAN NICOLAE RADAVOI, Facteurs compensant la phobie des immigrés: un cas de succès paradoxal de la migration chinoise ...................................... ANDREEA-PAULA IBÃNESCU, Une analyse transversale sur la quête turque de l´Asie Centrale et du playoff géopolitique ................................................. SANDA CINCÃ, L’évolution du complexe de sécurité européenne après la fin de la Guerre Froide ................................................................................................ LUCIAN-ªTEFAN DUMITRESCU, MIRIAM CIHODARIU, La théorie de Mackinder. Quelques conséquences de l´excès de géographie dans le domaine de la géopolitique ..............................................................................................

3 21 31 48

IMAGE POLITIQUE, THEORIE ET PHILOSOPHIE ION GOIAN, Notes concernant le „Fichier Eliade“ .............................................. HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, L’identité locale: une constellation de l’agitation sociale et des multiplicités politiques .............................................. MARIA-ANA TUPAN, Dracula et les topos au mirroir des civilisations ............ ANA MARIA NEGOIÞÃ, La ville de Mudéjar. Eléments de synthèse islamochrétienne au sein de l’urbanisme ....................................................................

59 78 91 100

IN FOCUS GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU, Interview: William J. Connell – Du Prince .............

107

SCIENCE POLITIQUE SOUS ENQUETE 113

GIORGIO BARUCHELLO, L’inconcevable du libéralisme du marché libre ..... VIORELLA MANOLACHE, Un traitement religieux des dysfonctionnements économiques: économie religieuse ................................................................... IAN BROWNE, Kuhn, Lakatos et le changement de paradigme dans l’économie politique britannique en 1979 ...........................................................................

132

LA VIE SCIENTIFIQUE ..................................................................................

155

COMPTES RENDUS........................................................................................

172

REVUE DES REVUES ....................................................................................

181

AUTEURS.........................................................................................................

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Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 1–184, Bucharest, 2015.

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I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S

FACTORS COUNTERVAILING IMMIGRANT PHOBIA: A PARADOXICALLY SUCCESSFUL CASE OF CHINESE MIGRATION CIPRIAN NICOLAE RADAVOI*

Abstract. The purpose of the research was to reveal the hidden ingredients that can make migration successful in a European society prone, to immigrant phobia. The case of the Chinese migration to Romania was studied as an apparently paradoxical one: with all the factors that normally trigger immigrant phobia in place, the coexistence of the dominant and migrant group is peaceful. The study was conducted as a quantitative research meant to test the hypothesis that the positive attitude of Romanians towards Chinese migrants is influenced by their early and exclusive contact with the Chinese imported goods, during the Communist dictatorship of Ceausescu. In turn, the hypothesis was derived by using theories, secondary data and the author’s previous knowledge. Data on both independent and dependent variables were collected by a poll financed with the author’s own funds and done by a specialized institute, and then analyzed using SPSS to test the degree of correlation and signification. The results proved relevant and they are further discussed in a socio-psychological analytical frame, leading to the conclusion that previous contacts with trade as a vector of a culture soften the interaction with migrants linked to that culture. Keywords: China, Romania, migration, immigrant phobia, dominant group, trade.

Introduction The European Context In the post-Cold War era, breakouts of the growing tension between host societies and immigrant groups have often inflamed parts of Europe. Even more worrisome is the hidden side of the iceberg, as shown by the various polls ———————— * Doctor of Law, Lecturer in Law at the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing; [email protected]. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 3–20, Bucharest, 2015.

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CIPRIAN NICOLAE RADAVOI

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conducted in Europe on the host societies’ feelings towards immigrants. Results of the last Global Advisor survey (Global Advisor, 2011) confirm that seven in ten (71%) Britons say there are too many immigrants in the country; other countries with similarly high levels of agreement are Russia (77%), Belgium (72%), Italy (67%), and Spain (67%). On the other hand, European Union needs migrants to counterbalance its demographic stagnation. While Muslims have lived in Europe for centuries, being already accepted and somewhat integrated, the increased number of Chinese raises new challenges for the governments and the host societies in general. It is a widespread belief among societies and researchers that Chinese are inassimilable; voicing that belief, Marsot states that ‘however long they remain in a foreign country, and even if they settle for good… they mingle with the host peoples without ever becoming indistinguishable from these ... The inassimilable character of these Chinese colonies inevitably posed problems for local authorities’ (1993:103). Given this claimed inassimilable character, the Chinese migration to Europe deserves particular attention, thus the research subject of the present study is the interaction between the dominant group and the growing Chinese community in Romania – a country with a steady and dramatic decrease of population between 2001 and 2012 and a decreasing trend expected for the next decades (Eurostat, 2013), thus expected to allow more immigrants in general in the years to come. Recent political evolutions, such as premier Li Keqiang visit to Romania for the summit China-Eastern European Countries, in November 2013, followed by a sharp increase of Chinese investments in Romania, suggest that a large proportion of this increased migration to Romania will be accounted by Chinese. The Research Problem A huge amount of literature has been written on socio-cultural interaction between host societies and immigrant groups, and within this framework, many studies aimed to explain the immigrant phobia. As far as the latter is concerned, the existent literature focuses on the causes of hostility towards immigrants, especially in Europe and USA. Drawing upon the reasons of hostility and conflict, Alexseev (2005) develops a “security dilemma” model to describe anti-immigrant feelings of host societies all around the world. Similarly, O’Connell (2005) designs the realistic conflict theory, emphasizing considerations of economic well-being, while Paxton (2006) prefers the social identity theory, claiming that societies react to the danger of their cultural identities being altered by large influxes of immigrants. To sum up, all the authors give main prevalence to the racial, the cultural or the economic aspects, in different proportions. There are however cases of low immigrant phobia even when the above listed perceptions are high. Such is the case of Romania, where as emphasized in the next chapter, all the factors that theoretically might trigger a high immigrant phobia are in place; in spite of this, the lack of any violent incident suggests a normal cohabitation between the Chinese migrants and the dominant group.

3

A PARADOXICALLY SUCCESSFUL CASE OF CHINESE MIGRATION

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When the causal factors identified by the theory of immigrant phobia are absent in a particular country, the peaceful cohabitation with the migrant group appears as logical and generally valid; on the contrary, if the causes for hostility are there but the migration is still successful, explanations should be looked for in the specificities of each dominant group – migrant group binomial. Therefore this study will scrutinize the Romanians – Chinese relation, focusing on the post 1968 period, when bilateral contacts, either direct or indirect, took off as explained in the next chapter. Research Question and Design of the Study This study attempts to emphasize the major role played by the host society’s previous contact with vectors of the immigrant group’s culture. In doing so, the study will focus on the contact of the Romanian people with the Chinese imported merchandise prior to 1989, the year that marked the end of the Communist rule in Eastern Europe; the peculiar conditions of the Romanian market, as shown in the next chapter, make these goods very strong vectors of the Chinese culture in the country led iron hand by Ceausescu and his Communist Party between 1965 and 1989. Given all these, the research question is as follows: How Does the Early Contact with Markers of a Culture (Consumer Goods, in our Case) Influence the Late Contact with Migrants from that Country? What Are the Socio-Psychological Mechanisms of this Process? This study’s aim was testing a hypothesis – the one that early contact with Chinese merchandize positively shaped the attitude of the Romanians towards the Chinese migrants. Thus, we will check the correlation between the following variables: 1. Independent variable: perception of the quality of Chinese goods imported before 1989 2. Dependent variable: degree of tolerance towards the Chinese migrants today The study used primary data collected through a nationally relevant poll conducted in Romania on questionnaires designed by the authors. 1230 persons answered the questionnaire in 226 check points across the country. Chapter 2 explains why Chinese migration to this Romania can be seen as a paradoxical success. Various possible explanations provided by the Romanian context are reviewed, and the one that seems the most plausible is selected, thus becoming the hypothesis of the quantitative study. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the statistical analysis of the survey’s findings, while Chapter 4 further discusses these results, in a socio-psychological analytical frame.

Chinese in Romania Background The communist regimes of China and Romania established diplomatic relations in 1949. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the Party and state leaders of the two countries exchanged frequent visits, with the contacts reaching a peak in late

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1960s – early 1970’s, for reasons to be found in the international political situation. As openly opposing the 1968 Soviet Union’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia, Romania feared a military aggression from its huge Eastern neighbor; since the Sino – Soviet relations were on their turn at a very low level, strengthening ties with China appeared as a logical step. The good political relation was mutually beneficial, as Ceausescu – at that time, the spoiled child of the Western democracies – played an important role in negotiating the normalization of the Sino – American relations. For instance, President Nixon saw Ceausescu as “the most useful of all the intermediaries” in the process of Sino-US rapprochement (Times, 26 July 1971). Economic, the 60 million US dollars credit granted by China to Romania in 1972 was welcome for a country that was already experiencing economic problems due to excessive centralization. To be noted that half of the loan was in goods – mainly cheap consumer goods – that flooded a market dominated by the low quality indigenous products. The economic relations kept developing and by 1980, Romania was China’s most important trade member in the CMEA1, with the 1980 volume of trade reaching 1,200 million US dollars, 50 per cent more than the Sino – Soviet trade (Tanjug, 16 March 1983). Romania was delivering to China oil equipment, other machinery and plants, metallurgical and chemical products, products of the timber industry, while China was delivering oil and again consumer goods – which in early 1980’s had become a scarcity as Romania was deeply affected by isolation and the Ceausescu’s forced savings policy. As far as cultural relations are concerned, it is relevant that from 1980 to 1983, about 4,000 Chinese specialists in political affairs, economics, technology, science, culture, and tourism have visited Romania (Radio Beijing, 3 May 1983). At the same time, Romania was actively promoted in the official media in Beijing as a “sister nation”, which can explain why it became a preferred destination for migration in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. By 1999, according to unofficial estimates, around 20,000 Chinese migrants had come to Bucharest – one percent of the Romanian capital city’s population (Adevarul, 1 August 2005). More recent official statistics provided by the General Inspectorate for Immigration show a lower figure, 7,000 (Ziua, 24 May 2013), but official figures counting legal residents are usually significantly lower than the actual number of migrants. Although not as impressive as in other European capitals, the number of Chinese migrants is expected to grow, in spite of the more restrictive immigration norms adopted by Romania after the accession to the European Union. Romania will most likely follow the European trend, which shows a significant increase in Chinese immigration for the last decade (Council of Europe, 2001); under these circumstances, with the phenomenon expected to take proportions, it is important to evaluate the host society’s response. ———————— 1 Also known as COMECOM, the Council for Economic Assistance was created in 1949 by Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, East Germany and initially Albania.

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A Paradoxical Success Theories on Prejudice against Immigrants A diverse set of theories on animosity towards immigrants has been generated by scholars, completing and sometimes competing with each other. Quilian for example (1995: 587) sees the individual-group dichotomy as comprehensive in explaining prejudice against immigrants, which he defines as “antipathy accompanied by a faulty generalization”. He identifies three main streams of individual prejudice theories. The first one seeks the causes of prejudice as the psychological displacement of fear or anxiety onto others. A second stream of research focuses on individual features, as attitude surveys show that people from the working class, from older cohorts, and who have less education express more prejudice. Finally, the selfinterest theory postulates that individuals develop negative affects and rigid stereotypes toward individuals with whom they are in competition and conflict. As far as the group level theories are concerned, it is to be mentioned Blumer’s ‘Racial Prejudice as a Function of Group Position’, in which he sees prejudice as a defensive reaction against challenges to the dominant group’s exclusive claim to privileges. Moving the analysis one step forward, Bobo creates the model of realistic conflict theory, which posits that the subordinate group is “a threat to real resources” of the dominant group (Bobo, 1983: 1197). Focusing on competing economic interests as source of tension, the realistic group conflict provides explanation for immigrant phobia in periods of scarcity in a country’s history. Consistent with this theory is for instance the documentation by Dollard (1938) of the growth of anti-immigrants feelings in an American town, proportionally to the deepening of the economic crisis. More dramatically, Dollard’s research was confirmed in his times by the rise to power of the Nazi, in the context of the deep crises of the 1930’s. Seventy-five years afterward, the voting patterns in Europe still confirm the theory of realistic group conflict: in constituencies experiencing high unemployment and economic problems, the far-right gets high scores with a strong antiimmigrant discourse. This was the case in Romania, where in 2000 the candidate of the far right, Vadim Tudor, leader of the ‘Greater Romania’ Party, scored very high in the presidential elections and was defeated only in the second round by the highly popular leader of the 1989 anti-Ceausescu coup – Ion Iliescu. At that time, Romanian economic performance was one of the lowest in Europe. However, as O’Connell (2005: 62) observes, the conclusions of sophisticated research in the last decade have become increasingly skeptical about economic forces having a direct, unproblematic and unidirectional effect on attitudes towards immigrants and related behaviors, including voting patterns. Thomas Pettigrew for instance makes the distinction between the old-fashioned form of prejudice, centered on competition for resources, and the new type, based on perceived threat to the culture norms and values. Blatant prejudice is the traditional form; it is hot, close, and direct; (…) Subtle prejudice is the modem form; it is cool, distant, and indirect. It taps the perceived

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threat of the minority to traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences with the minority, and the absence of positive feelings toward them (Pettigrew, 1998: 83). Furthermore, elaborating on quantitative analysis undertaken in six Western European countries, O’Connell (2005:63) gets to the conclusion that the right-wing extremism was facilitated by rising levels of immigration but not by a declining national economy, which was actually found, on the contrary, to correlate with a dampening down of the extremism. To sum up, while the classical theory points to the new comers as a threat to the jobs and more generally to the economic well being of the dominant group, the newer theory sees the threat to the national identity as the ultimate explanation for the immigrant phobia. Romania, as we show in the following, is an interesting case at the borderline between the two theories, offering grounds for the validity of both. Prior to that, it is worth over viewing the newest of the theories explaining immigrant phobia, which blends the previous ones with a very fashionable concept nowadays: security. In his ‘Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma’ published in 2005, Mikhail Alexseev develops a security-based model to describe anti-immigrant hostility in host societies. This model takes into account the following perceptions in the host society: anarchy, which relates to the host population’s perception of their government’s ability to secure their borders and protect the host population from excessive immigration intent of the migrant population; groupness, which relates to the immigrant population’s resistance to assimilation and also to their visual and perceptual distinctiveness of the migrant population; intent of the migrant population, referring to the host’s society perception of whether the immigrants are integrating into society, and whether they maintain loyalties to their sending state; socio-economic impact, including impact on income and jobs, education, the environment, and crime. Alekseev (2005) posits that the level of these perceptions and their interaction will determine the level of threat experienced by the host population, and consequently the level of prejudice. Romania and the Failure of the Theories In light of the above listed theories, Romania gives enough ground for the realistic conflict theory. With the highest score in EU in people at risk of poverty in 2011 (Eurostat 2013), with large inequalities and deep social frustration against corrupt and inefficient governments, with a large share of the GDP growth covered by privatizations and remittances from the Romanian emigrant workers (3 billion in 2010, a peak year of the financial crisis, according to Ziarul Financiar, 8 June 2011) – it is easy to see the immigrants as the scapegoat. The nationalistic parties, constantly credited with around 20% intention of vote in the first decade of the new century, were doing a ‘good’ job catalyzing animosities against minorities on grounds of affecting the economic well being of the indigenous people.

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Even more corrosive is the activity of these parties in light of the “modern” theory on immigrant phobia – the one that touches upon national culture and identity. Although the Chinese are not under target yet, frequent verbal attacks on Jewish and Gypsies show the potential of the nationalistic current, rooted in Ceausescu’s era, when the personality cult was blended with theories on the Latin purity of the Romanian blood. As for Alekseev’s ‘security dilemma’, in theory, the four triggers of immigrant phobia perfectly apply to Romania: • Anarchy relates to the host population’s perception of their government’s ability to protect it from excessive immigration – which in Romania is very low, because of the corrupted administration and inefficient bureaucracy; • The intent of the migrants refers to the host’s society perception of whether the immigrants are integrating into society; Chinese are seen as inassimilable and maintaining strong ties with the mainland; • Groupness relates to the immigrant population’s visual and perceptual distinctiveness, evident in the case of Chinese. In support of this aspect, one may also refer to the distance theory which posits that the more unknown is a culture, the more difficult it proves bridging with another; • Perceptions on socio-economic impact were discussed above; on the social side, to be added that in early 90’s, homicide within the Chinese community was one of the favourite subject of mass media, due to its frequency and bloody character. In spite of all these, neither blatant nor subtle prejudice against Chinese developed in the Romanian society. A case of violence against a Chinese was never reported, let alone group conflicts. The welcoming character of the Romanians can be ruled out as an explanation; at times, violent conflicts occurred when it comes to Hungarian or Gipsy minorities, or to Arab immigrants. As for the subtle prejudice, the graph (part of our survey that is the foundation of the next chapter) bellow, showing the positive answers to the question: ‘Would you agree to have as neighbor a person/family belonging to the following nationality…’ clearly emphasizes the lack of hard feelings towards the Chinese immigrants, if not in an absolute manner, at least as compared to other ethnic groups.

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‘Would you agree to have as neighbor a…?’ Explanations of such an evident misfit between what theories suggest and what practice shows is to be found in the peculiarities of the Romanian sociocultural and historical context. Possible Explanations There is a variety of contextual explanations consistent with the Romanian socio-historical circumstances. First of all, given the above mentioned frequent conflicts with Hungarians and Gypsies living in Romania, one could say that Romanians ‘invest’ all their resources of group conflict and racism in the relation with these scapegoats. The scapegoat theory can provide an explanation also when seen in an international context: after the attacks on 9/11, Europe is so focused on Muslims that it might ‘neglect’ the non-Muslim immigrants. This second aspect seem to be confirmed to some extent by the graph above, which shows that Romanians are more reluctant to people coming from the Middle East than to other immigrants. Another line of reasoning could lead us to the migration of Romanians to Western Europe as explanation for our case; indeed, countries which are both sending and receiving migrants rarely experience conflicts among the dominant and subordinate groups. However, the phenomenon of Romanian labor force migration is relatively new, having taken amplitude only after Europe opened its borders to Eastern-European workers, which makes it an unlikely reason for low prejudice against immigrants. A tempting explanation lies in the size of the Chinese immigrant group, which one may say has not reach a critical mass yet. Blalock (1967) outlines two reasons for a connection between intergroup relative size and prejudice. First, competition for resources increases with the size of the minority group; second, large immigrant group size can increase the potential for political mobilization and result in a greater threat to the dominant group. However, a two-fold argument stands against the size of the Chinese migrant group size as explanation for low prejudice among Romanians. Firstly, after reviewing the literature on the topic, Quilian (1995: 189) argues that these studies do not conclusively support the relation between increased size of the subordinate group and increased discrimination. This relation may be a valid explanation for prejudice against African Americans in USA, but as far as Europe is concerned, as Quilian’s study emphasize, size of migrant group is of little relevance. Secondly, putting our case in a different analytical frame, we will find that far from being a reason for low prejudice, small size of the migrant group could on the contrary have a negative influence. Indeed, small size of the migrant group means low contact with the dominant group – and contact is beneficial for reducing prejudice. As McLaren (2003: 929) posits in the conclusion of his multivariate analysis study, “contact does matter for reducing hostility toward immigrants to Europe”. Not having the opportunity of direct, physical contact with the Chinese, the

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Romanians’ perceptions on the new comers were shaped through the filter of mass media, which as shown in the previous chapters focused mainly on the negative aspects. Some of the above discussed factors undoubtedly play a positive role in shaping the attitude of Romanians towards Chinese migrants, but none of them seems to be the ultimate cause. Given that, this study adds a new one, provided by the recent past of Romania. It is possible, we argue, that Romanians do not show prejudice against Chinese migrants because their image of China and the Chinese was built in the 1970’s, through the Chinese consumer goods that flooded the country at that time. Indeed, tables on the evolution of trade of Romania between 1966-19702 show that at time, USSR and China were the main trade partners of Ceausescu’s regime; however, while in the imports from USSR, food accounted for 1 percent and consumer goods for 3 percent, in the imports from China, food accounted for 17 percent and consumer goods for 34 percent. What made them strongly imprinted in the collective memory, as we will argue, is the fact that they had monopoly on the Romanian market as far as imported goods were concerned. With the Western ‘imperialist’ products practically forbidden, with a very low trade with other Eastern European communist countries (except for USSR which is a special case), with most of the indigenous production being poor quality – the high quality going to export in order to pay the country’s debt – Chinese toys, school supplies, tools or clothes where a delight for a deprived population. For over a decade, it was the only contact of the ordinary consumer with the outside world; as for the quality, it was incomparably higher than the local products’ one. Correlations. A Quantitative Study Operationalization of the Variables The hypothesis we test is that immigrant phobia against Chinese is inversely proportional to the favorability of the vectors evaluations of the Chinese culture – in our case, the consumer goods made in China. To operationalize the research, the two variables were identified as follows: – Immigration phobia, the dependent variable, was defined by two basic concepts, derived from the discussion in Section 2.2.1: perceived threat and hostility towards migrants. Accordingly, the respondents were asked whether they see the Chinese migrants as having good or bad intentions, on the one hand, and whether they would agree to have as neighbor a Chinese person/ family, on the other hand. – Favorability of the evaluation of the Chinese culture’s vectors, the independent variable, was on its turn operationalized on three axes: satisfaction with using the consumer goods made in China, the qualities attributed to these goods, and the qualities attributed to Chinese in general. ———————— 2 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034 CA05-96B6-175C-9D1E985BB79D8B4B&sort=Collection&item=Romania%20in%20the%20Cold %20War.

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Key Findings of the Survey Strong correlation perceived threat / qualities attributed to Chinese TABLE 1 Chinese migrants – good or bad intentions? Spearman's rho

Chinese migrants: good or bad intentions?

Diligence

Inventiveness

Discipline

Devotion

Correlation Coefficient

1,000

Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N

. 1230

Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N

,650(**)

,611(**) ,000 1230 ,623(**) ,000 1230

,000 1230 ,684(**) ,000 1230

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Data revealed a strong correlation between the perceived characteristics of Chinese people and the nature of the Chinese migrants’ intentions, in the Romanians’ view. The correlation coefficient is similar for the qualities listed in the questionnaires; however a higher correlation is found for inventiveness and devotion. Relevant correlation between hostility and the qualities seen as attached to Chinese made goods (only for urban segment, more than 200,000 inhabitants) The research found good correlation between the qualities seen as specific to Chinese made goods and the hostility against Chinese, but only for cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants. This is due by the fact that vectors of Chinese culture, be them movies or consumer goods, did not penetrate the rural market.

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TABLE 2 Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbour? Spearman’s rho

Would you agree to have a Chinese as neighbor?

Good quality

Durable

Ingenious

Minutely worked

Complicated

Efficient

Attractive

Nice

Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N

1,000 . 279 ,203(**) ,001 279 ,224(**) ,000 279 ,216(**) ,000 279 ,182(**) ,002 279 ,179(**) ,003 279 ,181(**) ,002 279 ,210(**) ,000 279 ,213(**) ,000 279

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Conclusions of the Survey Both of the basic concepts used to define immigrant phobia showed relevant correlations with the independent variable, and high statistical significance. However, only the first one, namely the perceived threat, proved relevant at the national level; hostility only showed a relevant correlation at the urban level. The explanation is twofold. On the one hand, hostility was operationalized as the

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degree of acceptance of a Chinese neighbor, which is hardly conceivable in the rural area, while perceived threat was operationalized as the intentions of Chinese, a more abstract concept that allowed more freedom for respondents. On the other hand, the contact itself with the Chinese culture’s vectors was very limited in the rural areas prior to 1989. Items like Chinese made toys, clothes or food were only available in the urban supermarkets before 1989 – not to speak about movies, as the villages didn’t have movie theatres. The results of the poll show a sum of the ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Don’t answer’ answers roughly equal to the rural population of Romania, around 50%, allowing us to assume that it was the urban population who actually experienced the contact with the Chinese goods. The split results on national/ urban, far from affecting the relevance of the survey all together, on the contrary confirm the correlation between the independent and dependent variable. As far as the cities’ inhabitants are concerned, the survey results confirm beyond doubt the correlation between the good memories on this contact and the good attitude towards Chinese migrants today. The next chapter further explains this correlation by using concepts and theories of social psychology.

Socio-Psychological Considerations Affective Attitude and the Resilience to Attitude Change In social psychology, attitude is defined as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly, 1992: 693). The entity in this case – or ‘the object of attitude’, as referred to in the literature – are the Chinese in general and the Chinese immigrants in particular. As for the process of ‘evaluation’, as Fazio et al. (1986: 230) note, it is seen in a very broad sense, ranging in nature from a very hot affect (the attitude object being associated with a strong emotional response) to a colder, more cognitively based judgment toward the object. Depending on the role played by emotions in knowledge acquisition, the attitudes are affective or cognitive – a classification with important consequences as far as the present study is concerned. For affect-based attitudes, affective reactions exert a primary and powerful influence on the individual, and the attitude is initially acquired with minimal cognitive appraisal. Relevant information that is acquired subsequent to these affective reactions may serve to confirm or bolster the initial attitude. The cognitive structuring that takes place is likely to be in service of the affect and does not constitute the basis of the attitude. For cognition-based attitudes, domain-relevant information is acquired first, and affective factors come into play only after, and as a result of, considerable cognitive appraisal. Although affective processes often occur in cognition-based attitudes, their role in shaping attitude development is minimal (Edwards, 1990: 204). The explanation for the low effectiveness of the counter-attitudinal factors in the case of Romania may lay in the nature of the attitude’s origin; we argue that the primacy of the affective factors in shaping the Romanians’ attitude in the late 60’s – early 70’s made it resilient to change.

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The explanation is two-fold. On the one hand, the tensions at the Russian border, after Ceausescu’s opposition to invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, gave Romanians a tremendous feeling of insecurity, increased by the mobilization of the Army decided by Ceausescu. The country feared a war with the huge Eastern neighbor, with zero chances of winning; in these circumstances, the perceived support from China was seemed as vital, even though China has never shown any intention to get involved. It was mere propaganda and the propagandistic effect of the many visits of Ceausescu to China that made this country “the protector from the shadow” and persuaded the Romanians to credit it for the happy end of the story. On the other hand, the access to the Chinese imported goods, at a time when no other imports were allowed, contributed to the positive attitude toward China and the Chinese. In the dark decade that followed the relative opening up of the early 70’s, owning Chinese products was almost a prize for a deeply deprived population. These are two strong arguments that the origin of the Romanians’ attitude was mainly affective. One may identify cognitive elements as well, especially in the first factor – feeling of support and protection against Russia. Actually, as Edwards (1990: 204) emphasizes, the distinction between affect and cognition based attitudes is not dichotomical; that is to say, it is unlikely that we ever form pure affect based and cognition based attitudes. In reality, the author explains, attitudes are positioned along a continuum, according to the primacy and the relative contribution of affect and cognition in their acquisition and further development. In our case, deeper reasoning would have told Romanians that is unrealistic to expect open support from China in a military conflict with Russia. Similarly, a comparison of the Chinese goods with Western ones would have revealed the actually poor quality of the former. Instead, affective factors were at work – mainly gratification and perceived support against threats, which are pointed by the above quoted author as main contributors to affect based attitudes.

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Correctly identifying the type of attitude is important as it casts an influence on its ability to withstand counter-attitudinal information. As affect based, the Romanians’ attitude towards Chinese was, in the light of Zajonc’s work (1980), expressed with more conviction and more resilient in time. Affect based attitudes are difficult to change, Zajonc claims, because the counter-attitudinal information tends to be discounted or at least assimilated. Zajonc’s work was consistent with Festinger’s dissonance theory: people experiencing cognitive dissonance are likely to avoid exposure to information they have reasons to believe may increase dissonance (Festinger, 1957: 163). In light of these theories, it is to be mentioned that, when it came to identifying the origins of Ceausescu’s change of leadership style after 1970, Romanians avoided putting the blame on Chinese. Most of the authors agree Ceausescu’s Eastern Trip (China and North Korea, 1971) opened his eyes to the use of ideological mobilization of the masses and the cult of personality (see Almond, 1988, and Deletant, 1999). However, although in 1971 Ceausescu visited China and North Korea, anybody in Romania would tell you that he turned to the far-East style of communism, with the personality cult, after having visited North Korea; nobody would mention China. The mechanism was further explained by Edwards (1990), whose empirical studies led to valuable conclusions on the influence of the various factors of persuasion to different types of attitudes. The graph (from Edwards, 1990) shows that affect based attitudes are difficult to change by cognition, while affective pressures are conducive to attitude change. In the Romanians’ case, the counter-attitudinal factors that came into place after 1990 – the ones identified in the immigrant phobia theory as triggering hostility against migrants – were cognitive factors. Be it fear of losing jobs, of altering the cultural identity of the nation, or of rising criminality, these were reason based factors with little impact on an affect based attitude. Factors Limiting the Impact of Counter-Attitudinal Information There is in the socio-psychological literature a substantial body of empirical work on attitude change, with many different possible factors of change being put under the researchers’ microscope. Aside from the affective versus cognitive character of the knowledge acquisition, already discussed, the researchers focused on the implicit/ explicit type of attitude (Rydel and McConnell, 2006), on the source credibility (Wu and Shaffer, 2006) the prior contact with the attitude object (Fazio et al., 1986), the attitude importance (Holbrook et al., 2005), or the amount of persuasive information (Davidson et al., 1985). A brief overview of the mechanisms by which some of these factors work shows they perfectly fit as explanations for our case. Personal importance, for example, has been recognized as related to the strength of one’s attitude. Holbrook et al. (2005: 750) explore the two mechanisms of this effect: personal importance lead people to selectively expose themselves to attitude-relevant information, and on the other hand, once exposed

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to such information, personal importance instigate people to process it more deeply and richly, thereby facilitating later retrieval. According to Holbrook’s findings, people are better able to remember information relevant to important attitudes. Since he defines as important the attitudes that bring at stake people’s material interests, security interests or simply their values, we can conclude that Romanians’ attitude towards China were important in early 70’s. During Ceausescu’s honey-years with China, information about this country was abundant in the Romanian media, allowing elaboration and encoding in the longterm memory of the Romanians, thereby equipping them to resist persuasion. Information from mass media, referred to above, was an indirect and, in the light of the previous paragraph, a selectively cognitive way to acquire attitude. At this point we can describe the acquisition and development of the Romanian’s attitude towards China and Chinese from the late 60’s until the 80’s by the following model: Mainly affective, direct, based on contact with the Chinese made goods (Late 1960s) Mainly affective, indirect, based on feeling of support against the Russian threat (Late 1960s)

Cognitive, indirect, through selectively acquiring and encoding information from media (Late 1960s – present)

Prior contact with the attitude’s object – in our case, the direct contact with the Chinese goods pointed in the triangular model – also plays an essential role, as emphasized in the literature. Wu and Shaffer (1987), building upon Fazio et al. (1986), find that direct-experience attitudes are on one hand more affectively charged than indirect-experience attitudes, and on the other hand, they bear a higher influence on an attitude relevant persuasive appeal. Specifically, directexperience attitudes are found to trigger negative reactions to counter-attitudinal factors, and more positive to pro-attitudinal ones. Again, theory and empirical findings of scientific research support the assumption that immigrant phobia factors activated after 1989 failed to alter the good perception on Chinese due to the circumstances in which the initial attitude was acquired. Finally, strength of the attitude is a concept that has to be evoked, as especially important when it comes to the automatic activation of attitudes. Attitudes, as Fazio et al. (1986: 229) explain, can be either spontaneously activated, without any conscious effort from the subject, or on the contrary, activated through a more reflective process, by weighting arguments. The three experiments presented and discussed in the above quoted study point to the idea that automatic activation of attitude is far more likely when the association between object and evaluation is strong, that is to say, when it comes as the result of a previously

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well learned set of associations, and equally important, Fazio et al stress (1986: 236), when it is an affective attitude. Both of these conditions are fulfilled in our case, which can explain the automatic activation of Romanians’ attitude towards Chinese after 1990, and consequently why they construed the available information on the object in a selective way. Upon the mere exposure to the subject, the key word “Chinese” activated the affective linkages and blocked the further reasoning that normally should have led to immigrant phobia.

Conclusions The starting point of the paper was the apparent misfit between the trend in Europe and the situation in Romania, as far as immigrant phobia is concerned. Using historical and statistical data, author’s pre-existent knowledge as someone having grown up in Romania in the 1970s and the results of a poll designed by the author, the study argued that Romanians have a positive attitude towards Chinese immigrants, in spite of all the conditions for immigrant phobia being fulfilled. The study then tried to identify and explain the motives beyond this apparent paradox. After having ruled out some other possible causes, the author focused on the previous contact with vectors of Chinese culture that have occurred in the communist recent history of Romania. The poll conducted nationwide confirmed the correlation between the contact with Chinese made goods between the late 1960s – late 1980s and the positive attitude today. Using an analytical frame derived from social psychology, a model explaining the link was designed; it came out that it was a combination of factors in the initial acquisition of attitude towards China and the Chinese that made it resilient in time and resistant to counter-attitudinal information available after 1990. The affective character of all the components of attitude’s acquisition was the key ingredient that made it difficult to change in spite of its exposure to factors that otherwise would have triggered the immigrant phobia. Although the findings of this thesis were heavily influenced by the very specific conditions of the host society – immigrant group interaction, there is still enough room for generalization to make it relevant for policy makers anywhere. Basically, the study found that in the direct (although mediated through products) – indirect (‘told’ by others, through mass media) communicational binome, the bias is on the former when it comes to attitude acquisition. This suggests than rather than focusing on mass media in their strategies to fight immigrant phobia, governments should turn to media. BIBLIOGRAPHY Alekseev, Mikhail, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Almond, Mark, Decline without Fall: Romania under Ceausescu, London: Alliance Publishers, 1988; Blalock, Hubert M., Toward a Theory of Minority – Group Relations, New: York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967;

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Blumer, Herbert, ‘Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position’, Pacific Sociological Review 1: 3-7, 1958; Bob, Lawrence, ‘Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45: 1196-1210, 1983; Davidson, Andrew R; Yantis, Steven; Norwood, Marel and Montano, Daniel E., ‘Amount of Information about the Attitude Object and Attitude-Behavior Consistency’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49(5): 1184-1198, 1985; Deletant, Dennis, Romania under Communist Rule, Jassy: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999; Eagly, Alice H., ‘Uneven Progress: Social Psychology and the Study of Attitudes”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(5): 693-710, 1992; Edwards, Kari, ‘The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59(2): 202-216, 1990; Fazio, Russ; Sanbonmatsu, David M; Powell, Martha C. and Kardes, Frank R., ‘On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50(2): 229-238, 1986; Festinger, Leon, A theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford University Press, 1957; Fraser, Colin, ‘Attitudes, Social Representations and Widespread Beliefs’, Papers on Social Representations 3(1): 1-138, 1994; Hainmueller, Jens; Hiscox, Michael J. and Margalit, Yotam, ‘Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes towards Immigration in Europe’, International Organisation 61(2): 399-442, 2007; Holbrook, Allyson L; Berent, Matthew K; Krosnick, Jon A; Visser, Penny S. and Boninger, David S., ‘Attitude Importance and the Accumulation of Attitude Relevant Knowledge in Memory’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88(5): 749-769, 2005; Kenworthy, Jared B. and Miller, Norman, ‘Attributional Biases about the Origins of Attitudes: Externality, Emotionality and Rationality’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82(5): 693-707, 2002; McLaren, Lauren M., ‘Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perceptions and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants’, Social Forces 81(3): 909-936, 2003; Millar, Murray G. and Tesser, Abraham, ‘Effects of Affective and Cognitive Focus on the AttitudeBehavior Relation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51(2): 270-276, 1986; Moliner, Pascal and Tafani, Eric, ‘Attitudes and Social Representations: A Theoretical and Experimental Approach’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27(6): 687-702, 1997; O’Connell, Michael, ‘Economic forces and anti-immigrant attitudes in Western Europe: a paradox in search of an explanation’, Patterns of Prejudice 39(1): 60-74, 2005; Olson, James M. and Zanna, Mark P., ‘Attitudes and Attitude Change’, Annual Review of Psychology 44: 117-154, 1993; Paxton, Pamela and Mughan, Anthony, ‘What’s to Fear from Immigrants: Creating an Assimilationist Threat Scale’, Political Psychology 27(4): 549-569, 2006; Pettigrew, Thomas F., ‘Reactions toward the New Minorities of Western Europe’, Annual Review of Sociology 24: 77-103, 1998; Recent Demographic Development in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001; Rydell, Robert J. and McConnell, Allen R., ‘Understanding Implicit and Explicit Attitude Change: A Systems of Reasoning Analysis’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 9951008, 2006; Quilian, Lincoln, ‘Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrantand Racial Prejudice in Europe’, American Sociological Review 60(4): 586-611, 1995; Snidermann, Paul M; Hagendoorn, Louk and Prior, Markus, ‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities’, American Political Science Review 98(1): 35-49, 2004; Wu, Chenghuan & Shaffer, David R., ‘Susceptibility to Persuasive Appeals as a Function of Source Credibility and Prior Experience with the Attitude Object’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52(4): 677-688, 1987; Zajonc, Robert B., ‘Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Interferences’, American Psychologist 35: 151-175, 1980.

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INTERNET SOURCES Global Advisor Survey of Attitude towards immigration in EE, http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-global-advisor-wave-22-immigration-july-2011.pdf; Eurostat, Statistics 2013, Population Projections, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do? tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00002&plugin=1; Eurostat, Statistics 2013, Population at Risk http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/ index.php?title=File:At-risk-of-poverty_rate_and_threshold,_2011_YB14.png&filetime stamp=20131218121051; Eurostat, Statistics 2013, Population by Foreign Citizenship, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/ table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00157&plugin=1.

A TRANSVERSAL ANALYSIS ON TURKEY’S RE-QUEST FOR CENTRAL ASIA AND GEOPOLITICAL PLAYOFF ANDREEA-PAULA IBÃNESCU*

Abstract. The article aims to embrace a cross-disciplinary regard over the development of Central Asia after the disintegration of the USSR and a commencement of projects at the beginning of the 21st century with focus on Turkey. Being one of the reconsidered strategic regions in the post-Cold War epoch, Central Asia has witnessed domestic convulsions intermingled with a broad cultural re-evalution, prospects of economic development and security challenges. The energy deposits and corridors have further and mostly shaped the growing interest of not only the old and new great players in the region such as Russia, China and the US, but also middle powers which have attempted to exploit a share of influence within this space like Iran, Turkey, India or the Eastern Asian states. The paper, therefore, is a statement on Turkey’s overture on Central Asia after 1990, significantly revitalized after having redefined foreign policy objectives since AKP came to power, which extolled above all the geopolitical interests on various instrumental appanages. The paper makes use of primary and secondary sources – analyses, media releases and official data, while embodying snapshots of modern history and foreign policy analysis. The purpose is to substantiate the closely interrelated aspects of Turkish attemtps to reinfuse into the Central Asian space and reinforce the relations with the newly independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, contextually competing or cooperating with its historical rivals. Keywords: Turkey, Central Asia, soft power, foreign policy, impact, prospective developments.

Being once the possession of the Ottoman empire and bearing Turkish ethnic and cultural depths, Central Asia inspired a requiem for Turkey after the collapse of USSR in 19911. Turkey was the first to recognize the newly constituted five ———————— * PhD, Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Middle East Political and Economic Institute Bucharest, Romania; [email protected]; [email protected]. 1 Note – for further historical insights on Turkic hegemony in Central Asia and political clashes see JeanPaul Roux, Asia Centralã. Istorie si Civilizaþie [Central Asia. History and Civilization], Artemis Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 125-148, 241-274; Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (eds.), Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1995. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 21–30, Bucharest, 2015.

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republics and the first State to open embassies, as a natural and long-expected call for its original space. Turkey has since developed gradual ties with the Central Asian republics (CAR) following economic, cultural and security cooperation, being alongside with Iran and Russia in a close geographical, cultural and religious proximity and slow race. This aspect allowed the exercise of economic and political plays in a region whose importance has been revitalized. Within the newly generated vacuum of power, search for references and support in the nation-building process in the new five republics may have been at risk, as they could reorientate, despite pitfalls, to the traditional “bigger brother” Russia or bidder China. Turkey has been blocked till 1990 by the Soviet impervious bloc, the USA , India, Canada and some European states (Germany in particular). Thus, competition for occupying a strategic position in a region of high energy and market potential, as well as a strategic one (while the Middle East seemed to be further involved in ebullitions and insecurity), quickly regained significance for Turkey. On the overture of the seemingly independent horizon, opinions were arguibly projecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to follow either the secular Muslim model of Turkey, democratic and Western-oriented2, or Iran, a model of Islamic Republic, which has been a source, through the voice of its religious leaders, for an alleged export of the Islamic Revolution since 1979. According to Edmund Herzing, a scholar in Persian and Central Asian studies, ’the Central Asians weren’t wanting to adopt another country’s model and they weren’t wanting to negotiate or mediate their relations with the international community through Iran or Turkey. They wanted to shape their own identities and future and they wanted to make their own direct contact with the international community and that has been very much the pattern’3.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Resorts on Grounds of Soft Power Turkey aknowledged two main phases after the Cold War. The process of transition could be divided between 1990-2000 and post-2000 periods, thereof understanding a lukewarm and unremitting foreign approach towards Central Asia, and a consistently more dynamic attitude in the late 2000s, particularly since the arrival of FM Davutoğlu in 2009. His contribution highlighted Turkey’s awareness on the geopolitical and geo-economic significance of Central Asia, and for Turkey’s own instrumental role in the equation, as a geopolitical pivot, transit space, melting pot of cultures and civilizations, and emerging economy4. ——————— 2 Srdja Trifkovic, “Neo-Ottomanism in Action: Turkey as a Regional Power”, The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, February 7th 2012, accessed online on June 3rd 2012, at http://www.balkanstudies.org/ articles/neoottomanism-action-turkey-regional-power. 3 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Central Asia: Iran, Turkey Struggle To Influence Region” in Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, October 25, 2005, accessed online on October 18th 2012, at http://www.rferl.org/ content/article/ 1062385.html. 4 See N.G. Iliadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy” in Working Paper No 8/ 2010, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, April 2010, accessed online on August 19th 2011, at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C% CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99% CE%91%CE%A3-_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf.

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Basically, Turkey is following a dual-track pattern, being geographically and symbolically a gateway to the Caucasus and Central Asia, like Iran, while the regions themselves demand more interlinking and vice-versa, from East to the West. Recte, Turkey’s initiative commenced with impetus at the beginning of the 1990s, chiseling the rhetoric over ideologies like Pan-Turkism – Turgut Özal’s actions and speeches in 1994 declaimed “the Turkish century”5, a discursive platform about mutual national and cultural heritage, taking advantage of the cultural premises in the turcophone space of Central Asia, all except Tajikistan. It fostered cooperation at educational and cultural levels and it attempted to pose as a Kemalist political model, secular and democratic for the new republics, and to economically pervade the region6. Withal the religious factor was emphasized through what was seen as Turkey’s political tool, the Fethullah Gülen movement or the religious orders “tarikatlar”7. Still, the process was timidly pursued due to the lack of coherence in Ankara’s foreign policy, for it was engaged in other foreign priorities. This context made it easier for other states like China, Russia or Germany have access to the Central Asian market till the end of the 1990s. At the time, Turkey’s primary objectives were the EU accession, the problematic Northern Cyprus case, the contentions in the Balkans and the Gulf region. But resources and interest were lower, in comparison, for Central Asia. Starting with 1996, a series of corrective measures were meant to fold better on the pragmatic requests of Central Asian realities, with a special focus on the economic sector, chiefly8. Accordingly, Turkey’s focus on Central Asia envisioned political and economic reforms, a state-building process for the CAR, contriving premises for stability and offering contribution to infrastructure for carting the energy resources, heading to the West9. The High Level Strategic Cooperation Council mechanism was established with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the Cooperation Council with Tajikistan, aiming at offering support for the establishment of democratic rules and principles in the country. It also made diplomatic appraisal for Kazakhstan’s multi-party system creation through nation-wide elections on 15 January 201210. Another step forward to deepen linkages with Central Asia and ease business access from one state to another, was to unilaterally abolish the visa regime with Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and later in 2007, short-term visas were eluded ——————— 5 Sedat Laçiner, “Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism”, in USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol. 2, 2009, pp. 153-205, accessed online on March 7th 2013, at http://www. turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html. 6 Bayram Balci and Bertrand Buchwalter (coord.), La Turquie en Asie Centrale. La Conversion au Réalisme (1991-2000), Institut Français d’Etudes Anatoliennes Georges Dumezil, Istanbul, Janvier 2001, pp. 5-8, 26, 41. 7 Roman Muzalevsky, “Fethullah Gülen’s Movement in Central Asia: A Blessing or A Curse?”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, January 9th 2009, accessed online on September 24th 2012, at http://old.cacianalyst. org/?q=node/5167. 8 Esfandiari, op.cit. 9 Mustafa Kutlay and Salih Doğan, “Turkey and Central Asia: Modern Economic Linkages along the ‘Silk Road’” in Journal of Turkish Weekly, January 13th 2011, accessed online on January 12th 2013, at http://www. turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=3&id=2786. 10 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Turkey’s Relations with Central Asia, http://www.mfa.gov. tr/turkey_s-relations-with-central-asian-republics.en.mfa.

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for Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and also Mongolia. No surprise considering that political support was incremental when Abdullah Gül, the Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, stated that Turkey can thus become a second home for all Turks and Muslims11. Qubat Ibadoğlu Bayramov12 remarked that: ‘one of the important goals of Turkey is to become the flagman of the Turkic-speaking countries and to expand its hegemonic opportunities among them. It wants to expand cooperation in the fields of foreign trade, currency exchange, and exports [The recent move to end the visa regime] is the first step’13. The single critical aspect was Uzbekistan, occasionally pugnacious through his leader, President Islam Karimov, who criticized Turkish policy makers for the alleged support offered to the Uzbek opposition, as it received political Uzbek refugees inside its borders. It was the case of Muhammad Solih in 1993, the leader of Erk party, who received political asylum. Afterwards, the bombings in Tashkent in 1999 brought further fractures between the two countries. The lack of warm relations was felt by the Uzbek citizens, who paid $10 for visas until June 1, 2003. Although the sum increased along the years (up to $80 in 2007), it did not prevent trade flow and legal/illegal workers from creating contacts, especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya. Regarding the last one, Turkey has been a tourist destination not only for Europeans, but also for Central Asian citizens which are further linked to Turkey within entertainment resorts – around 40 000 Kazakhs and 2000 Uzbeks visited Antalya in 200614.

Between the Dynamism of Diplomacy and Economic Forays Ahmet Davotuğlu’s approach, ’zero problems with neighbors’ and the ideological shape of Neo-ottomanism15 meant a revulsion and fostered more dynamism within the Turkish foreign policy mainstream, which tried to patch the oversights in the important regions for Turkey, like Central Asia. By token, Davutoğlu’s first symbolic visits as a fresh Foreign Minister in May 2009 commenced with former possessions of the Ottoman Empire – the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, particularly when the global balance of power shifted quickly and tended to dislocate power poles to Asia – Pacific. Hereby, economy and trade were instrumental for promoting Turkey’s objectives both regionally and globally, and particularized the relation with the CAR after 2000s16. The ruling party AKP seized the opportunity of the flow of financial and industrial companies, which managed to transform Turkey’s total foreign trade ———————— 11 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Turkey lifts visa requirement for post-Soviet states”, in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31st 2007, accessed online on February 22nd 2013, at http://www.refworld. org/docid/46c1d36421.html. 12 Note – Qubat Ibadoğlu Bayramov is member of the Board of the Economic Research Center in Baku, http://erc.az/az/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=69&Itemid=94. 13 Saidazimova, op.cit. 14 Ibidem. 15 Note – for an extended perspective on Neo-Ottomanism see Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, in Insight Turkey, accessed online on March 2nd 2013, at http://pdfsb. com/readonline/ 59566c436577702b5633422b4448746d56413d3d-4894643. 16 Iliadis, op.cit.

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from $72 billion in 2001 to $333 billion in 2008, where the total pointed out the Asian countries (the Middle East included) prevailed. The balance of trade expanded from $18.7 billion to $131 billion, rising to more than 50% faster than the average. Economy concomitantly worked with political exuberance outside the EU borders, subsequently foreign trade was propelled in the disadvantage of the EU market, because the share in Turkish foreign trade declined from 51.38% to 42%, while Turkish foreign trade with Asia (if Middle East and North Africa “MENA” excluded) raised from 12% to 26.5%17. Moreover, in 2010, Turkey’s trade volume with these states reached $6.5 billion, the total investments of Turkish companies in the region exceeded $4.7 billion. Withal, the total value of projects successfully performed by Turkish contracting companies in the region were about $50 billion, on the basis of approximately 2000 Turkish companies acting in the region18. Iconic for economic emphasis in forging international visibility and achieving reliability, the account of settlement concerning the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) made progress through institutional investors. Though performance may be still lukewarm as regards international standards, Turkey managed for the first time, according to Doğan and Kutlay, to become visible in Central Asian/ Middle Eastern market and also the European one – in 2009, the direct investment stock represented $11.2 billion, out of which $3.1 billion was directed to Asia19. Turkey’s efforts to combine the dynamism of diplomacy and the economic development (both domestic and external) relied on public policy makers’ initiatives and the CEOs. EximBank actives are suggestive, for instance, when assessing the Turkish awareness of Central Asia’s market potential, between “poor” up to “engaging”. There were several loans offered by the bank to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan starting in 1990, reaching approximately $1 billion as foreign aid. This sum constitutes ¼ of Turkish total foreign aid along the two decades, and also assistance was provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)20. Significant and unremitting improvement in trade relations was eventually achieved, as Turkey managed to be a part of the top 6 trading partners of all five republics, rising from the ranks in fields like construction industry, hotel management, financial services, oil and gas, IT and telecommunication, or food production21. However, the political, strategic and economic competition is compelling in Central Asia; Chinese and Indian companies widely expanded as well.

Turkey’s Relation with the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and Regional Impact One of the CAR with which Turkey developed bilateralism in a multidimensional way is Kazakhstan, where the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious bonds ———————— 17 Kutlay, Doğan, op.cit. 18 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Turkey’s Relations with Central Asia. 19 Kutlay, Doğan, op.cit. 20 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Turkey’s Relations with Central Asia. 21 Kutlay, Doğan, op.cit.

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encouraged tighter relations. Turkey was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991 and a Strategic Partnership Treaty was signed in December 2009, during the visit of President Nazarbayev to Turkey22. Around 180 000 Meskhetian Turks and 40 000 Turkish citizens are living in Kazakhstan, and 3000 Kazakh citizens reside in Turkey, which brings further incentive to expand cooperation between the two, and for Kazakhstan to become one of the major partners of Turkey in Central Asia. Relevantly, the bilateral trade increased up to $3.28 billion in 2010, while the amount of total Turkish investment is around $2 billion. The education chapter is highly important and many corporations like Kazakh-Turkish Educational Foundation (KATEV) were involved in offering assistance; between 2010-2012, Turkey granted 175 higher education scholarships to Kazakhstan23. Concerning the geopolitical setting, the emergence of positive relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey may firstly loom a spill-over effect on the other members of the CAR in the future, and secondly, Russia’s play. Directly proportional to the nature of intensified Russian-Turkish relations, these may as well foster or hamper the Kazakh-Turkish ones, due to Russia’s large impact on the former24. Concerning Kyrgyzstan, relations with Turkey are even closer than the former’s with Iran, for instance, and the nature of diplomatic activity has been much based on personal contacts. Leader Atambaev manifested a visible inclination to propel impetus between the two states, as Turkey is seen as a strong economic regional power, independent in pursuing its foreign policy. He made numerous visits to Ankara, and during his visit in April 2011, several projects of geopolitical and economic cooperation were schemed. Among them, one envisions Kyrgyzstan to become a transportation hub that connects Istanbul with Shanghai, while another one proposes to create a Custom Union that includes Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Turkey, with Bishkek at the crossroads, as a reply to Moscow’s similar initiatives25. This jockeying is, in fact, motivated by more realist concerns around the unstable nature of Kyrgyzstan, the most striking one among the CAR in the late years. But similar to its neighbours, there are alternatives to guide foreign policy, out of which many straddle around Russia. The volatile power display allows more schemes and versatility in opting not to entrench integration with Russia, but chose for another “supervisor”. In this case, the sedulous interplay between Ankara and Bishkek reveals Turkey’s strategy to emphasize its geopolitical impact. ———————— 22 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan, http://www.mfa.gov. tr/relations-between-turkey-and-kazakhstan.en.mfa. 23 Hasan Kanbolat, “The Future of Kazakhstan for Turkey” in Today’s Zaman, November 28, 2011, accessed online on November 15th 2012, at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-264148-the-future-ofkazakhstan-for-turkey.html. 24 Mahir Zeynalov, “Turkey-Kazakhstan Relations Hit Peak”, in Today’s Zaman, October 25, 2009, accessed online on October 31st 2012, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-kazakhstan.en.mfa. 25 Dmitry Schlapentokh, “Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Deepen Ties”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 21, 2012, accessed online on January 17th 2013, at http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5736.

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Tajikistan’s bilateralism with Turkey does not surpass the level of rapprochement with Iran, but it witnessed an enhanced economic wave. The total trade volume raised from $86 million, the level in 2003, to $347 million in 2010. One encumbrance was the lack of macroeconomic development of Tajikistan. Lucrative meeting between presidents Abdullah Gül and Emomali Rahmon in 2009 carried forth facilitated possibilities to invest in Tajikistan, favoring both states26. The most concerning aspect for the two countries is related to regional security and stability. Tajikistan is regarded as litmus for entrenching stability in Afghanistan by Turkey, which provided major initiatives in precluding the instable factors in the area. Therefore, further development is likely to succeed as they share joint regional orientations and Turkey can improve its assistance in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan represents one Middle Asian State where Turkey exploited cultural, economic, ethnic and political enterprises. It assisted Turkmenistan in the process of nation-building from the beginning; Turkish companies continued investments when the Turkmen economy was in crisis and had payment delays for the Russian gas. Besides, the lucrative support of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), present in the entire CAR, paved the way to specific infrastructure investments. A positive aspect of Turkey’s diplomacy approached the linguistic realm. Turkey forayed into what was regarded as a lack of Turkmen national consciousness, translated through the quasi-use of Russian and lapidary manifestation of national identity27. The efforts of the Turkmen government to revive traditional patterns, dress code, literature and language was favored by the post-1990 arrival of many Turkish travelers and businessmen, and urban-used Russian was not helpful anymore, so Turkmen language was put back in use and Latin alphabet employed, an aspect observed by the historians to be a general phenomenon taking place in new-born Central Asia states. Turkey’s contribution meant the promotion of cultural diplomacy, by magnifying the ethnic and linguistic bonds with Turkmenistan and launching numerous Turkish language schools, which widespread the language and the interaction between the two states and populations28. These step-by-step cultural initiatives have not been far from geopolitical ambitions. Central Asia’s “pugnacious boy”, Uzbekistan, met hindrances in developing relations with Turkey, similarly as it did with its neighbors. Fears boosted around the Islamic wave, which according to some analysts, met the degree of paranoia29. Stances on the alleged Turkish propaganda in Uzbekistan, pressures ———————— 26 Gülay Mutlu, “Turkey-Tajikistan Relations: Limited to Bilateral Visits”, in The Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 9, 2011, accessed online on August 23rd 2012, at http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/ 3511/turkey-tajikistan-relations-limited-to-bilateral-visits.html. 27 Selcuk Colakoğlu, “The New Concept of Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy”, in The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 22, 2013, accessed online on March 28th 2013, at http://www.turkishweekly.net/ columnist/3732/. 28 Ibidem. 29 Hasan Kanbolat, “Turkey-Uzbekistan Relations on the 20th anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence”, in Today’s Zaman, September 23, 2011, accessed online on August 16th 2012, at http://www.todayszaman. com/columnists-257722-turkey-uzbekistan-relations-on-the-20th-anniversary-of-uzbekistansindependence.html.

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not to allow Uzbek political opposition to travel to Turkey, criticism on Turkey’s Western multilateralism, led for a long-term convulsive relation between the two. Economy mirrored this reality and bilateral trade remained suboptimal, $1143 billion in 2010, as it focused mostly on shared investments and Turkish construction, food, textile goods and services. Notwithstanding the slow increase of diplomatic and economic contacts in late years, relations are currently below their potential.

Prospective Developments on Geopolitical Pillars The pivotal place of Turkey aims at looming centrality rather than an intersection of continents and interests, and situates itself as a “central country”, more an Eurasian power within EU, rather than a marginal member of the EU. Europeanization was a source for domestic chiseling towards democracy and imposing performance standards in politics and economy since the 2000s. Turkey benefited from the context contriving a spill-over effect on the neighbors, such as supportive measures to Central Asian and Middle Eastern states – visa free regimes, financial support, education opportunities guaranteed by the Turkish State, trade agreements, “the Arab Schengen”, etc. In geopolitical language, the short and middle-term future of Turkey in Central Asia, one may believe, similarly depends on two exogenous factors. It has to do with the complete withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and the presence of Russia, which seems inspired by imperialist proclivities to reshape frontiers or former spheres of influence of the USSR. The trend was augmented mainly since Vladimir Putin’s presidential term. A prospective analysis on Turkey would encompass the US in the calculus, as well. It may not be reasonable to assume the latter totally gives up its strategic position in Central Asia as it has been achieved with difficulty, and where the US managed to break for the first time through the Afghan gate, under the shield of 9/11 events, which added a third player striving for influence in the New Great Game. Therefore, concerning the duet Russia – US, it may be expected to either clash or to agree. The US troops’ withdrawal from a volatile and perilous location like Afghanistan, would most probably stimulate Russia to redraw the conventional sphere of influence in Central Asia and to react either by cutting the US from the equation or by containing expansionist China. Due to China’s envisioned longterm ascent, the US would most probably prefer fealty to old but predictable enemies in the power games, namely Russia. Quite relevantly, a meticulous pavement of Russia – US relation resulted from a more recent agreement (March 2013) which brought the cancellation of the final stage of European missile shield30. ———————— 30 Steve Gutterman, “Russia Says US Must Do More to Address Missile Shield Concerns”, in Reuters, April 18th 2013, accessed online on April 23rd 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/us-russiausa-missiles-idUSBRE93H0OZ20130418.

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Conclusions and Beyond Turkey might be confronted with dilemmas over the best strategy to employ, as long as it aims to compete, in order to emphasize its impact in Central Asia and further exert influence over the energy corridors. Not astonishing at all, Turkey naturally seeks for enhancing the ethnic and cultural ties with the central Asia turcophone space, but also to economically infuse the region. The perspective of approaching the US lost the mesmerizing character, as there is a background of tensions between the two states. Besides, the US manages priorities in more convulsive parts of the world. Turkey’s main foreign policy objective at the start of the ‘90s was to secure an alignment for the Euro-Atlantic powers, but the metamorphosis of the international system has changed since then and Turkey was inspired to re-orientate to Russia and China, and to promote highlevel communication, security agreements and trade. A present core element could be the gradual rapprochement between Russia and Turkey and the multi-level cooperation, once they allow each other the limits of the playing roles (as they acted in the Balkans). It may prove fruitful for both once Russia understands the constructive role Turkey can play in Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan by helping prevent radicalism and extremism31. By the terms of this relation, reference to China is probably going to be adapted, as political calculation demands, from moderate to intensified one, such as quid pro quo. On balance, Turkey’s performance is still suboptimal in comparison with its aspirations, but it possesses the logistics served by ethnic and cultural bonds to be highly influential on the middle and long term, as the pathway to reviving the Old Silk Road route is a seemly correspondence to the world’s current realities, where power poles are bending to Asia and where middle powers generate multipolarity. BIBLIOGRAPHY Balci, Bayram and Buchwalter, Bertrand (coord.), La Turquie en Asie Centrale. La Conversion au Réalisme (1991-2000), Institut Français d’Etudes Anatoliennes Georges Dumezil, Istanbul, Janvier 2001; Bozkurt, Abdullah, “US-Russian Deal to Impact Turkey’s Role in Central Asia”, in Today’s Zaman, April 8th 2013, accessed online on April 16th 2013, at http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=312036; Colakoğlu, Selcuk, “The New Concept of Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy”, in The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 22, 2013, accessed online on March 28th 2013, at http://www. turkishweekly.net/columnist/3732/; Davutoğlu, Ahmet, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, in Insight Turkey, accessed online on March 2nd 2013, at http://pdfsb.com/readonline/ 59566c436577702b563 3422b4448746d 56413d3d- 4894643; ———————— 31 Abdullah Bozkurt, “US-Russian Deal to Impact Turkey’s Role in Central Asia”, in Today’s Zaman, April 8th 2013, accessed online on April 16th 2013, at http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnistDetail_ getNewsById. action?newsId=312036.

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Esfandiari, Golnaz, “Central Asia: Iran, Turkey Struggle To Influence Region”, in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 25, 2005, accessed online on October 18th 2012, at http://www. rferl.org/content/article/1062385.html; Gutterman, Steve, “Russia Says US Must Do More to Address Missile Shield Concerns”, in Reuters, April 18th 2013, accessed online on April 23rd 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/ article/ 2013/04/18/us-russia-usa-missiles-idUSBRE93H0OZ20130418; Iliadis, N.G., “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, in Working Paper No 8/ 2010, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, April 2010, accessed online on August 19th 2011, at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp content/uploads/ 2010/05/%CE%9A%CE% 95%CE% 99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91% CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91% CE% A3-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf; Kanbolat, Hasan, “The Future of Kazakhstan for Turkey”, in Today’s Zaman, November 28, 2011, accessed online on November 15th 2012, at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-264148-thefuture-of-kazakhstan-for-turkey.html; Kanbolat, Hasan, “Turkey-Uzbekistan Relations on the 20th anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence,” in Today’s Zaman, September 23, 2011, accessed online on August 16th 2012, at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-257722-turkey-uzbekistan-relations-on-the-20thanniversary-of-uzbekistans-independence.html; Kutlay, Mustafa and Doğan, Salih, “Turkey and Central Asia: Modern Economic Linkages along the ‘Silk Road’”, in Journal of Turkish Weekly, January 13th 2011, accessed online on January 12th 2013, at http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=3&id=2786; Laçiner, Sedat, “Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism”, in USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol. 2, 2009, accessed online on March 7th 2013, at http:// www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policyozalism.html; Mutlu, Gülay, “Turkey-Tajikistan Relations: Limited to Bilateral Visits”, in The Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 9, 2011, accessed online on August 23rd 2012, at http://www.turkishweekly. net/columnist/3511/turkey-tajikistan-relations-limited-to-bilateral-visits.html; Muzalevsky, Roman, “Fethullah Gülen’s Movement in Central Asia: A Blessing or a Curse?”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, January 9th 2009, accessed online on September 24th 2012, at http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5167; Roux, Jean-Paul, Asia Centralã. Istorie si Civilizaþie [Central Asia. History and Civilization], Artemis Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007; Rubinstein, Alvin Z. and Smolansky, Oles M. (eds.), Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1995; Saidazimova, Gulnoza, “Central Asia: Turkey lifts visa requirement for post-Soviet states”, in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31st 2007, accessed online on February 22nd 2013, at http://www.refworld.org/docid/46c1d36421.html; Schlapentokh, Dmitry, “Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Deepen Ties”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 21, 2012, accessed online on January 17th 2013, at http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5736; Trifkovic, Srdja, “Neo-Ottomanism in Action: Turkey as a Regional Power”, The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, February 7th 2012, accessed online on June 3rd 2012, at http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/neoottomanism-action-turkey-regional-power; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan, http://www.mfa. gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-kazakhstan.en.mfa; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Turkey’s Relations with Central Asia, http://www.mfa. gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-central-asian-republics.en.mfa; Zeynalov, Mahir, “Turkey-Kazakhstan Relations Hit Peak”, in Today’s Zaman, October 25, 2009, accessed online on October 31st 2012, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-andkazakhstan.en.mfa.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMPLEX AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR The Delimitation of the Security Complex of the European Union SANDA CINCÃ*

Abstract. Starting from the European security complex that was shaped in the context of globalization and transformations brought about by the end of the Cold War, the article proposes to identify the EU security complex and its evolution toward a security community. We are going to analyze the concept of security from the perspective of the Copenhagen School, and for the purpose of the case study of the EU security complex, we are going to use the framework offered by the theory of the regional security complexes. This European model is recognized today as the most complex model for the description of a new type of interaction among states and also it can explain the evolution of the security complex toward a security community. Keywords: security, Copenhagen School, the European Union, regional complex of security, security community.

Within the context of globalization and transformations brought about by the end of the Cold War (the collapse of communism, the reunification of Germany, the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the debut of regional conflicts in Europe) we are assisting now at a displacement of the analysis centre from the security in traditional (political-military) sense toward the security in modern, non-military sense, oriented toward the individual. As well at the general level of the UE as at the particular one of the member states, have appeared new security challenges, as well as the need for the securitization of new domains. The European Union represents a particular case among the international organizations due to the centripetal process s of evolution; from one treaty to another we can notice a continuous coagulation, tending to become a more unitary actor. Although it is a great global economic power, the EU plays a marginal ———————— * Scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations within the Romanian Academy and a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Bucharest; [email protected]. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 31–47, Bucharest, 2015.

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role in the security policy at this level. Even if it is not a security organization per se, the European Union acquired an aspect of a security complex attempting to create their political role and to develop its own security system within an extended regional framework. The objective of this study is to identify and delimit the security complex of the European Union, as well as the mechanisms that led to the formation of a security community within this complex, in the context of the evolution of the general European security complex, which was shaped beginning with the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century when the international security environment changed due to the apparition of new risks and threats to the security of the international system. In order to attain the proposed objective, we are going to organize our approach around the following questions: (1) how do we define the security concept, (2) which theories and explicative models describe best the security from UE’s perspective, (3) how does evolve the UE’s security complex. We are going to approach the security concept from the perspective of the security studies belonging to the Copenhagen School. In order to present and analyze the European security complex we are going to use the framework offered by the Theory of the Regional Security Complex (one of the most important directions of research from the theory of international relations for the last two decades) taken forward and developed also by Barry Buzan and his collaborators from the same School. This theory is destined to the understanding of the diverse regions of the globe (among which Europe) and it proposes an examination starting from the particular (regional) toward the general (global) for the understanding international security system. Our investigation is constituted thus of the unfolding of a case study where we apply the theory of the regional security complex to the security complex of the European Union, which will help the investigation, to the end of revealing the mechanism that led to the formation of a European security community. The Security Concept and its Post-Cold War Evolution Security is a central concept in the security studies and in international relations, a concept which, despite its extensive use, did not benefit from a widely accepted definition among the practitioners and the theoreticians alike. The definitions presented by different currents and schools of thought emerged within a specific historical context and they have emphasized several of the characteristics of security, but none seems to be complete. “When we are searching for an adequate conceptual bibliography on security”, noticed researcher Barry Buzan, we find that “there is no coherent school of thought”1. One of the definitions that is mostly used for this term belongs to A. Wolfers, who considered that security includes two dimensions, “a objective one, referring ——————— 1 Barry Buzan, Popoarele, statele ºi teama. O agendã pentru studii de securitate internaþionalã în epoca de dupã Rãzboiul Rece [Peoples, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies after Cold War Era], 2nd edition, Chiºinãu, Cartier Publishing House, 2000, p. 15.

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to the lack of threats to values, and another one, subjective, understood as the absence of the apprehension that they are to be attacked/endangered”2. Starting from this definition, a whole branch of international relation developed after WWII, known as security studies. During the years of the Cold War the main threats to security came from the political and military areas. Thus, security was defined in military terms, reflecting the main preoccupations of the two opposing blocks (East-West). From this perspective, the reference object of security was the state, this being the one who should have ensured the existence and which had to be protected, especially from the possible military threats. The dominant theoretical perspectives were realism and liberalism3. Once with the development of the institutional liberalism a wider approach of security began to be encouraged, starting from the type of the actors involved, and from the types of threats that they could face. During the 80s emerge the first tendencies of the redefinition of the security studies which had as a starting point, on the one hand, the international political economy that had to offer explanations for the turbulence generated by the globalization process and, on the other hand, the social sciences which were to offer plausible explanations for the new issues emerged on the agenda of security, such as identity, ethnicity, religion, poverty, terrorism, organized crime, the degradation of the environment, etc.4 The dismantlement of the Soviet Union created an acute theoretical problem and it has compromised the realist paradigm. The implosion of the USSR, generated by the serious deficiencies of the social and economic system, proved that security cannot be regarded solely from a military perspective anymore. Until then, security was seen by most of the practitioners and theoreticians as a derivate of the issue of power, perspective which cannot ensure societal, economic and environmental security, which led to be considered an “incompletely developed” concept, according to researcher Barry Buzan, who noticed this way the conceptual deficit of the domain5. The end of the Cold War brought along the modification of the perception of the individuals concerning the types of threats at their security. The problems related to the non-military dimensions replaced the ones with a military nature, without eliminating them though. Thus, we assist at the sociological development of security, at the nearing of security to society and its gradual departure away from the military structures6. At a theoretical level the redefinition and the reconceptualization of the idea of security imposed itself. ——————— 2 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 67, no. 4, 1952, p. 485. 3 See Martin Griffiths, Relaþii internaþionale. ªcoli, curente, gânditori [International Relations. Schools, Currents, Thinkers], Bucharest, Ziua Publishing House, 2003, pp. 17-183. 4 Ionel Nicu Sava, Studii de securitate [Security Studies], Bucharest, Center for Regional Studies, 2005, p. 29. 5 B. Buzan, op.cit. (...), p. 15. 6 Darie Cristea, Prognozã ºi prejudecatã. Dilemele metodologice ale relaþiilor internaþionale [Prognosys and Prejudice. The Methodological Dilemas of the International Relations], Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2012, p. 57.

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Among the new currents of thought emerged during the ’80s and the ’90s remarkable is the Copenhagen School, called also the post-Cold War School or the New School of Security whose main exponents – Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde – are the adepts of the enlargement of the sphere of definition for security. This school accepts main traditional realist hypotheses according to which security is an objective situation, but is inspired from the constructivist theories proposing new modalities of study for the interrelation of the domains of social life. They offer a constructivist operational method according to which security is a situation perceived and, also, they introduce sectors of analysis for security. The constructivist school affirms that the world is socially constructed, can be measured and analyzed with specific scientific means and thus it socially constructs the issue of security7. Ole Waever defines security as a speech act: “... the very affirmation constitutes the act ... pronouncing “security”, a representative of the state shifts the case from particular toward a specific area that, claiming a special right to use all the necessary means to stops this evolution”8. Resuming A. Woofers’ definition concerning the objective and the subjective dimension of security, the three authors insist on the fact that “securitization, as well as politicization, has to be understood as an essentially inter-subjective process”9. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde define security as the “movement that leads politics beyond the pre-established rules of the game and frame the issue either as a special type of politics or above politics”10. Significant is the modality in which the approach of security is discursively built, through an inter-subjective process. The contribution of B. Buzan and O. Waever to security studies is linked, especially, to the extension of the research agenda on security issues, where the state continues to be an important actor, but also to the emphasizing of and the inter-subjective character of security by the conceptualization of securitization and de-securitization. If the security threats are existential, then to “securitize” an element or a set of elements mean to move within a political space with a considerably higher probability for violent militarized interaction. Securitization represents the “discursive process s by which the inter-subjective understanding is built in a political community to treat a certain thing as an existential threat addressed to a valuable object of reference and to make possible the use of urgent and exceptional measures to confront that threat”. The process s may be directly discursive, addressing the definition of the situation, but most often it is indirect, when an orientation change toward other problems brings back the relative attention for the issue previously secured. On the other hand, de-securitization represents a “process by which a political community lowers the importance of ———————— 7 Olivia Toader, “Constructivismul în relaþiile internaþionale” [“Constructivism in International Relations”], in Andrei Miroiu, Radu S. Ungureanu (coord.), Manual de relaþii internaþionale [Handbook of International Relations], Jassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2006, pp. 155-163. 8 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, Securitatea: Un nou cadru de analizã [Security: A New Analysis Frame], Cluj Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011, p. 26. 9 Ibidem, p. 30. 10 Idem.

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a thing or stops treating a certain thing as an existential threat addressed to a valuable object of reference, and reduces or stops taking urgent and exceptional measures to confront the threat”11. Security is defined in relation to the perception of the threat addressed to the existence of an object of reference which is strongly valued, from the non-state actors, abstract principles and up to nature itself. The source of the threat can be identified in aggressive states, negative social tendencies or in cultural diversity. As a consequence, in the views of the Copenhagen School, the threats can manifest in a variety of political contexts or domains of the social life (economic, cultural, demographic, ecologic, etc.). The same specialists draw a “map” of the contemporary security issues, each issue being identified in relation to four variables: the spatial characteristic (local, regional, global), the sector localization (military, political, economic, cultural, and ecologic), the identity of the main actor (states, societal actors, and international organizations) and the nature of the object of reference (states, nations, principles, the environment). The most significant contribution to the transformation of the concept of security is brought by the neorealist researcher Barry Buzan who proposes the formulation of issues that envision: the widening of the field, to adequately answer to the question Security against what?; the repositioning of the landmarks, to establish more precisely Security for whom?; the introduction of the idea of securitization, to establish the manner in which is security instituted; the development of the methodological infrastructure, to surprise more exactly the levels, the sectors, the referential entities, the relevance thresholds, etc.12 B. Buzan proposes the widening of the semiotic sphere of the term security through the introduction of five main sectors, as many objects of reference and the multiplication of the levels of the analysis of security. The author has identified five main sectors of analysis for the national security, in relation to the nature of the threats: military and political (traditional sector), economic, societal and ecologic (non traditional sector). According to Buzan, the military security “concerns the double interaction of the offensive and defensive armed state capacities and the perception of the states, each of the other’s intentions,” and as threats the use of force toward the opponent, the blockade, the bombardments or the total war. The political security “refers to the organizational stability of the states, of the government systems and of the ideologies legitimating them”. As political threats we mention the threats directed toward the internal legitimacy of the state, or toward the external one, the ideological cleavages, and the political institutions with controversial legitimacy, pressures which the authorities cannot face anymore. The economic security “concerns the access to resources, finances and markets necessary to sustain an acceptable level of welfare and state power” (economic threats: economic-financial crises). The societal security “is preoccupied ———————— 11 B. Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 356 and p. 489. 12 I. N. Sava (2005), op. cit., p. 28.

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with the support capacity, within the limits of acceptable evolution conditions, of the traditional elements of language, culture, identity and cultural and religious customs”. The threats in this sector refer to what can affect the identity of certain community, in the sense of jeopardizing the existence of community as social group, as migration, horizontal (cultural) competition, vertical competition (exercising a pressure), depopulation. The environment security “refers to maintaining the local and planetary biosphere, as essential support of which depend all human actions”. The threats which can affect the security of the environment are: pollution, the natural or provoked catastrophes, etc.13 From the perspective of the Copenhagen School these sectors do not operate in insulation one from another, but each defines a central point within the issue of security and as a manner of ordering priorities. According to Buzan, “the security represents the capacity of the states and societies to maintain identity independence and the functional identity”14. Being a product of the political, military, economic, societal and cultural capacities that the states, societies and groups engage to the end of maintaining their identity and integrity, security presents as a function of conservation of societies, so it is a tendency of preservation of identity and integrity in a domestic and international environment characterized as anarchic. Another important element introduced by B. Buzan in security analysis, when approaching the international system, there is the division between weak states and strong states, in relation to the degree of socio-political cohesion, which signifies the traditional distinction among states in correlation to their military and economic capacity in relations with one another15. The character of the states determines the stable or unstable character of regional and international security. Strong states can absorb the shock of globalization, while the weak states prove to be unstable in front of this exam16.

Globalization and Regionalization The structure of the international system can be observed from three perspectives: the structure of the states that the realist school considers heterogeneous and anarchic and, after 1991, single-pole; the structure of the society of the states with tendencies of transformation in an international global society that the liberal school considers interdependent in general and integrated in particular (with different degrees of integration as it is in the case of the EU); the structure type network, in course of globalization, with centres and peripheries, which the sociological school considers ploughed by global and regional organizations, transnational societies etc.17 ———————— 13 B. Buzan (2000), op. cit., p. 31, see and pp. 124-141. 14 Ibidem, p. 18. 15 Ibidem, pp. 105-119. 16 See I. N. Sava (2005), op. cit., p. 134. 17 Ibidem, pp. 130-132.

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Globalization generates political fragmentation, which is a source of instability and insecurity. The process that attenuates the impact of globalization is called regionalization. Regionalization can be defined through the mediation of the term frontier18. The region gains identity in relation with a geopolitical border (a space of influence). By globalization, the states begin to have supplementary external responsibilities under the circumstances where a part of their domestic attributes are diminished. On the one hand, political fragmentation increases the number of states and entities that are going to be states; on the other hand, the globalization increases the interdependency among the states, that is, the number and intensity of the relations among them. The answer of the international system to these changes is visible by the increase of the number of international regimes and by the crystallization at the regional level of certain security complexes. To the new challenges, the international system reacts by the strengthening of the security regimes and by the regionalization of security19. Along with the decolonization, the level of regional security started to become autonomous and to impose itself in international relations. Then, disappearing the rivalry between the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR), which used to intervene obsessively in all the regions, the local powers had the possibility of imposing their own policies20. The fall of the two geopolitical blocks opened the way toward a gradual emergence of the multipolarity, and the regions gained relevance in the international security. Regional security constitutes, thus, a model of security of the international relations21 that interposes itself between the security of the system of states and the international security, determining the contour of a distinct domain of study. The process of a growing regional interdependence, especially at the societal level, was called sometimes regionalism or informal integration. As a rule though, in security studies, the term of regionalism describes either the apparition of a significant number of new regional organizations in a certain period, or the favoring of the regional agreements rather than of the multilateral ones to obtain a certain result at the international level. Thus, the security complex can be seen as a result of regionalism, but also as its correlative element. The immediate advantage of this concept is that it offers non-ideological legitimacy to the regional level of analysis, introducing it as an intermediary stratum between the national state and the international system22. ———————— 18 See Ilie Bãdescu, “Regiuni ºi frontiere” [“Regions and Frontiers”], in I. Bãdescu, D. Dungaciu, Sociologia ºi geopolitica frontierei [The Sociology and the Geopolitics of the Frontier], vol. I, part V, Bucharest, Floare Albastrã Publishing House, 1995, pp. 303-337. 19 I. N. Sava, op. cit., p. 134. 20 B. Buzan, Ole Waever (2003), Regions and Powers (...), p. 3. 21 Patrick M. Morgan, “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders”, in David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 20. 22 Luciana A. Ghica, “Securitatea regionalã. Contexte, agende, identitãþi”, in Luciana-Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean (coord.), Politica de securitate naþionalã. Concepte, instituþii, procese [The National Security Policy. Concepts, Institutions and Processes], Jassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2007, p. 109.

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The Theory of the Regional Complex of Security In post-Cold War era security became a complex concept23, a relational phenomenon that presupposes the understanding of the national security of a state in concordance with the understanding of the international model of security interdependence, inclusively of the regional one. As we have shown, Buzan’s researches did not limit to the investigation of the relations between states at the level of international system, and granted a special attention to the level of regional analysis. Buzan and Weaver shown that after the end of the Cold War the level of regional security became more autonomous and this autonomy of regional security constitutes a specific pattern of the current period. The theory of the regional security complex – TRSC offers a new interpretation of the security structure and distinguishes between the level of interaction of the global powers (that can transcend distance) and interaction at the level of the subsystem of the small powers of whose environment is the local region. The main idea of the regional security complex is that, from the most dangerous threats and the shortest distances, the interdependence security is modeled by a group of states that form a security complex24. These are preoccupied during history to notice mainly the capabilities and the intentions of their neighbors, the processes of securitization and the degree of interdependence of security. By TRSC the creation of a conceptual model was wanted that would include a new structure of the international security, where, along the great powers, the regions could become global actors. We are going to conduct as following a synthetic analysis of TRSC, starting from the definition of the security complex and the exposition of its main components. In essence a neorealist concept, introduced by Karl W. Deutsch, the regional security complex affirmed itself more and more at the end of the ’70s, even since the ’50s and the ’60s, under the form of community security in order to describe the framework of the relations among states from the North-Atlantic area. The model of the regional integration of Karl Deutsch sustained also the process of European integration. He accredited the idea of constructing regions politically. First of all it is about the EU as a regional entity built on the path of political intervention, and second, by NATO. Making the distinction between the amalgamation and integration he showed that “an amalgamate community has one supreme centre for decision making, but from it does not result that its opposite is simply anarchy”, while an “integrated community has multiple centre corresponding to the states forming it”25 (for instance, the EU). According to the author, community security represents “a group of states that became integrated in a community where there is a real assurance that the members of that community ———————— 23 See B. Buzan, “Is international security possible?”, in Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, London, Harper Collins Academic, 1991, pp. 31-55. 24 B. Buzan, O. Waever (2003), Regions and Powers (...), p. 4. 25 K. Deutsch et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 7, apud. M. Grifiths, op. cit., p. 288.

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will not fight one against another, but they will resolve their disputes in a different manner”. In other words, those states are not “integrated” enough to resemble “an amalgamate community security”, without the need to transfer sovereignty at supranational level. “The integration and amalgamation overlap, but not completely ... there can be amalgamation without integration (for instance the civil war), and integration without amalgamation (for instance the international peace)”. This way, rather than attempting to impose the amalgamation at international level as the preferred path toward peace, he suggested the creation of the “pluralist security community”26. The theory of complex security was approached by Barry Buzan for the first time in a paper published in 198327. A first definition provided by B. Buzan for the regional complex of security was the following: “a group of states whose security preoccupations link them together closely enough that their national securities cannot be considered realistically separately from one another”28. Afterwards, the issue of regional security was completed by the same author and approached by other researchers within the Copenhagen School. The most used definition of a regional complex of security is the 2003 one, given by B. Buzan and O. Weaver, who completed the first definition like this: “a set of units whose major securitization, de-securitization processes are interdependent to such an extent interdependent that the security issues of the component units cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolute separately from one another”29. This approach succeeds, despite the criticism brought, to be an important step forward and an argument for the analysis of security as a social sciences concept that is a state of flux. Although in the analysis of the security complexes researchers start from the assumption that the state is the object of reference of security, by the accentuation of the threats of a societal type one may consider that these categories of issues permit that next to the states are analyzed also other objects of reference of security, such as societies. Unlike the regional subsystem and the subordinate system, which are modalities to treat together on the basis of only one criterion certain states found in geographical proximity, the security complex brings to the fore the matter of a significant interdependence among the participants. The model proposed by the representatives of the Copenhagen School starts from the ascertainment of the interdependence of security and the perception of insecurity that is accentuated in correlation with the geographical proximity. In order to be able to identify the security complexes we should investigate also the manner in which a certain region is delimited. This was defined as “a coherent territory from the point of view of space, composed by two or more states”. Also we find that “The sub-region is a part of such a region and it may include several states (but less than the total number of the states in the region) ———————— 26 Idem. 27 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations, Wheatsheaf Books, London, 1983, pp. 106-115. 28 B. Buzan (2000), Popoarele, statele ºi teama (...), p. 196. 29 B. Buzan, Ole Waever (2003), Regions and Powers (...), p. 44.

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or it may have a transnational composition (an assembly of states, parts of certain states or both). The micro-regions refer to the sub unitary level within the borders of a state”30. According to B. Buzan, in terms of security, region means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security is formed by a group of states that were meant to be in geographical proximity ones against the others31. If in the case of the regions, their proximity and identification within a welldefined territory are important instruments in order to differentiate and separate the regions from other spaces, in what concerns the complexes, Barry Buzan underlines the existence of two main factors defining the structure of regional security: the local/regional power balance (the power relations) that show how many actors there are within the complex and the existence of the amity/enmity relations. As we can notice, in the analysis of the regional security complex B. Buzan and O. Weaver are using as well classical variables (geographical proximity, power relations, external elements, interdependence of security), as also one of constructivist inspiration, the social construction of the relations among states/ units, that is, the amity-enmity model32. To justify the need to direct the study of security issues toward the regional level, the two authors underline the importance of the precise definition of the types of power that we are encountering. To classify the power relations and identify their characteristics, the authors are using elements from classical realism. Most of the states are not organized anymore nowadays, unlike during the Cold War period, around two superpowers, because the international system begins to be formed out of a different type of actors, which can be considered rather great powers or regional powers (as are nowadays the EU and Russia in Europe). The local balance of power influences to a great extent the amity-enmity model at a regional level. By amity are understood the relations that range from simple friendship to the claims of protection and help. Enmity refers to the relations established on the basis of suspicion and fear. In what concerns the classification amity-enmity, we can encounter three great types of categories: the complex type conflict, characterized by enmity relations, with an increased possibility of conflict; the complexes where we find links with a low degree of enmity, specific for security regimes; and, thirdly, those based on amity, which are forming a community of security33. As we have shown, the identification of a security complex involves the analysis of the force of interdependence among different states. The interdependencies might be positive (when among the states there is cooperation and/or neutrality) or negative (when there is rivalry among the states). The interdependence concerns two aspects: on the one hand the existence of interstate relations seen through the rapport of amity-enmity, and on the other hand, the existence of common threats and interests of security. Within the same context, is developed as well the idea that these interdependencies are not exclusively military, diplomatic or ———————— 30 B. Buzan, O. Waever, Jaap de Wilde (2011), Securitatea. Un nou cadru (...), p. 36. 31 B. Buzan (2000), Popoarele, statele (...), p. 194. 32 B. Buzan, O. Weaver (2003), Regions and Powers (...), p. 52. 33 B. Buzan (2000), Popoarele, statele (...), pp. 196-199.

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political, as they can manifest also at societal level, at economic level or in matters of the security of environment. The identification of the regional complexes of security is accomplished through the analysis of the dynamics of security within these dimensions. The economic factor may influence two aspects which are important for the definition of a regional complex of security: the process of regional integration, and on the other hand it motivates the interest of the external actors on the regional complex. According to B. Buzan the factors that stay at the basis of the apparition and the evolution of the regional security complexes are: the local factors, the common interests and values, an elevated level of the threat/fear or an elevated level of trust and friendship, the socio-political and economic factors34. B. Buzan and O. Weaver approach descriptively the levels of analysis and the interactions among these35 within the theory of the regional security complex that can empirically explain the regional security. The four levels are: the domestic level in states and regions generating the vulnerabilities; the relations of one state with another state that generate the region itself; the interaction of the region with the neighboring regions; the role of the global powers in the region that determine the interaction between the structures of the global and regional security. These four levels, together, constitute a security constellation36. The essence of the theory of security complexes stays in that, as the political and military threats cross easier the shorter distances than the long ones, security is in general associated with proximity. Security complexes generate regionalization within the international system, as its characteristics. The regions which the security complexes draw have an objective character, in the sense that they have an ontological status in theory, as they are identified by the researcher on the basis of the already existing security relations. At the same time, security complexes are theoretical constructions that the analyst is using to describe and explain reality. The importance of the theory of the regional security complex is provided by its main assumptions that focus on several main elements such as: the regions represent the most appropriate level of analysis in security studies; the regions confer those studies a viable organization of the structure in empirical analyses; they offer analytical scenarios for the testing of the possible future developments within the international system37. In relation to the structure and the evolution of the regional security complexes, B. Buzan and O. Weaver identify different types of regional security complexes that determine the development of regional security and the reinterpretation of the concept of security, on which we are not going to insist now, but we stop at the centered security complex which can transform in different manners, from the accent placed on one power to an integrated structures through ———————— 33 B. Buzan (2000), Popoarele, statele (...), pp. 196-199. 34 Ibidem, pp. 199-208. 35 See B. Buzan, O. Weaver, chapter “Descriptive RSCT: a matrix for area studies”, in Regions and Powers (...), pp. 51-53. 36 B. Buzan, O. Weaver, J. De Wilde, Securitatea: un nou cadru (...), p. 201. 37 B. Buzan, O. Weaver (2003), Regions and Povers (...), p. 45.

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institutions. Such an example is the European Union, which represents a sophisticate security community based on norms, institutions and principles, and that intends to become an actor at global level38.

The Delimitation of the Security Complex of the European Union In what concerns the historic past of Europe, we ascertain the numerous attempts of several forms of region (centered, fragmented, covered) and, even more, it experimented processes of amalgamation and re-differentiation within many more security complexes. The release of the two World Wars showed Europe that it was going through a crisis of its own security complex, a crisis that continued also throughout the Cold War, when Europe was covered for approximately 50 years of the Soviet and American super-complexes. During the Cold War period, Europe knew times of insecurity during 1940-1959, security in the ‘60s and de-securitization during 1970-1980, and around the ’90s was noticed a re-securitization39. Initially, Europe saw the integration as a way to overcome the rivalry that provoked the two World Wars and also the economic havoc that followed these wars by an action of cooperation. The European integration was generated by three essential objectives: finding a solution to the German question, to the desire to make the wealthy members even more influential in the world as partners, more than they could be in separate states40, as well as to the insecurity hovering over Europe, entertained by the Soviet threat. The interdependence among the European states led to the formation of a compact European security complex meant to face the danger coming from the East, and the unification of Germany from 1990, offered a new drive to the European integration41. After the end of the Cold War, the image of the European security became distinct, in the sense that the traditional monopole of the state in security problems became attenuated or they even vanished, and the list of the challenges addressed to the European security complex enlarged, comprising all the sectors and almost all the levels. The problems of security of Europe in the new era of globalization start to be gradually better articulated, as well at regional level, as at the global level. At the European level is nowadays discussed the existence of two complexes of regional security, the security complex of the European Union which is dominant and the security complex centered on the Russian Federation. Our approach continues with the application of the model of the regional security complex previously synthesized, the present European security complex. Starting from the two main directions of the theory of the regional security complex ———————— 38 Ibidem, pp. 59-64. 39 B. Buzan, O. Weaver, (2003), Regions and Powers..., p. 356. 40 P. Calvocotessi, Politica mondialã dupã 1945 [World Politics after1945], 7nd edition, Bucharest, Publishing House Allfa, 2000, p. 221. 41 H. Kissinger, Are nevoie America de o politicã externã? Cãtre diplomaþia secolului XXI [Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward the Diplomacy of the 21st Century], Bucharest, Publishing House Incitatus, 2002, p. 34.

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(the type of powers involved and the relations of amity-enmity) we are going to attempt to delimit the security complex of the European Union and to emphasize the characteristics of this complex. The new European security complex (of the EU, this time) that took shape during the beginning of the ’90s, after the reunification of Germany has three defining characteristics: it is centered, it has the shape of concentric circles and it is a nucleus focalized on institutions42. As type of powers involved, we are going to notice that this security complex is a centered one, without a great power to its centre (although France, Germany and Great Britain have still the status of great European powers). Within the EU, the centrality is not offered by the domination of a single power pole, by through the formation of a group of states that delegate a part of their competences to the communitarian and international institutions. The Europeans started to accept more and more the idea that the structure of security is organized in a unique form that combines as well the interests of the member states as the centre policy. In matters of security the leading force belongs to all the states constituting the Union, even though sometimes it does not follow the same common foreign policy and security, (the analyst) sensing certain major differences in their approaches43. The centrality of the EU is given, thus, by the great legitimacy offered by the member states. The European Union is a centre-periphery structure, in the sense that Central and Eastern Europe was organized as a “concentric circle”44 around the Western nucleus. Provided that these countries are closed within a central order in the EU, the security issues in this part of the continent, it follows, partially, the same model as in Western Europe, but it determines supplementary complications, because the dependency on the West of Europe is as well an anchor of stability as a line of intrusion45. To operate as an institution of security, the EU must maintain its core intact besides the effects of the national political identities of the main European powers. This does not mean that the member states should forcefully accept a concept of the idea of Europe or that the European identity should be reduced to the national identity, but that in each European country, the terms nation, state and Europe should be carefully modeled, so that the European Union is to become a conjunction of national tradition and the European solidarity. Even more, EU may intervene directly at peripheries, there where the nonmilitary factors (socio-economic, ethnic, etc.) do not act powerfully enough to avoid conflicts46. The essential characteristic of the EU security complex is the institutional dimension (Parliament, Commission, Council, etc.) that confers legitimacy. Thus, the EU is a region integrated through institutions and not by one power that ———————— 42 O. Waever, “The Constellation of Securities”, in Aydinli Ersel, Rosenau James N. (eds.). Globalization, Security and Nation State: Paradigms in Transition, State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 161. 43 See Cãtãlin D. Rogojanu, Teoria complexului regional de securitate: complexul de securitate european [The Theory of the Regional security Complex: the European Complex of Security], Jassy, Lumen Publishing House, 2007, pp. 122-123 and 136-139. 44 O. Waever (2005), The Constellation..., op. cit., p. 161. 45 B. Buzan, O. Weaver (2003), Regions and Powers (...), p. 353. 46 Ibidem, pp. 161-162.

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gathers all the other states around it47. The institutional dimension is considered a modality of consolidation of the trust among states and of enhancement of the relations of amity within their mutual relations. Via its institutions the European Union receives the quality of global actor and from this status the privilege to ensure the coherence, before all, at institutional level. The European security complex succeeded to overcome the model of enmity and to transform the relations among its members by the construction of a form of economic and political organization, which is nowadays the European Union, with the merit to have ensured first of all the peace among the member states and, second, a type of economy through which a great number of citizens have had access to prosperity. The territorial disputes were a significant component of the conflicts developed in time, in Europe, but it proved that they could be overcame by the proposition of common objectives and methods identified to run its interests, which led to transparency and an increase of the mutual trust between states. The relations between the members states of the EU based on the project of integration are built as a meta-securitization48. The project of integration, in itself, generates security, which surprises a dimensional “societal security”49. The most efficient securitization is accomplished by enlargement, via the export of the communitarian values in the borderline regions, for this way the stability of the Union is ensured. The EU is nowadays the best multilaterally organized region of the world and it became the most institutionalized area of the globe, representing an important political factor, with a numerous population and it is the most important economic bloc of the world. By the integration of the national states in a supranational economic and political union, to which all the members take part equally, the European Union points the way toward other wider forms of post-national organization, beyond the narrow visions and the destructive passions of the nationalism era50. The manner of political organization of the EU is unique, because it neither replaces the state representation to the highest level, but it neither cancels the old order. In reality, it mixes a continuity of the sovereignty in a new organization. Even though the exact and final nature of the European construction is not established yet, however the proposed experiment led the European states toward peace, and the regional integration has drawn new limits.

Conclusions: From Security Complex to Security Community Starting from a global tendency of increased regionalization we can notice that the European model of integration was the first to offer a coherent answer ———————— 47 Ibidem, pp. 56-59. 48 Ibidem, pp. 352-353. 49 This is a sociological approach of security centred, not on the individual as actor and referent object, but on the human collectives. The organizing concept of the societal security is constituted by identity. Society’s identity is treated as “a thing” that can be menaced and “whose values and vulnerabilities are as objective as those of the state” (see B. Buzan, O. Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, 2011, Security. A New Framework...., pp. 171-180). 50 Z. Brzezinski, Marea tablã de ªah. Geopolitica lumilor secolului XXI [The Great Chess Board. The Geopolitics of the Worlds of 21st Century], Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 2000, p. 70.

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to the threats and challenges with which the region was confronted and which had the greatest impact in relation to different forms of regional cooperation. There are also other regions of the world (Southern and South-East Asia, for instance) which are in a quest for alternative models that overcome the state level, but which arrive at most at the inter-regional level. As shown, The European Union represents a regional complex of security, on the one hand due to the high degree of interdependence that is established among the national actors that enter in its composition, and on the other hand due to the existence of the institutions that had a determining role in easing the transformation of relations within the complex, to which we add cultural and socio-political elements of the European member states. One of the multiple functions of the EU is that to assure the security of the citizens of the member states in one or more of the domains of the social life. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, then European complex of security evolved within the context of the new threats and risks, but also, it evolved within the new concepts of security, toward a community security, and its legitimacy is being assigned by the member states. The UE can represent an example for the evolution of the security complexes toward a community security, provided that it fulfils the necessary conditions for the creation of a pluralist community security as presented by K. Deutsch and namely “the compatibility of the fundamental values derived from the common institutions and the common responsibility (a matter of identity, sympathy and mutual loyalty)”51. A security community is a concept based rather on values, than on interests, and the values are transformed in norms, in behaviour rules that structure the action of the individuals and institutions. Deutsch mentioned two types of security community that, subsequently, evolved in different directions: the European Community of Coal and Steel and NATO. The European Union, which developed from the Community of Coal and Steel, became a community security, in the sense that its institutions include certain values, transformed afterwards in norms and that, in turn, are shaping the preferences of the actors. The most relevant form of community and security contains an active and regional securitization, only that it is not the type of a state against another state to countervail, but is a collective securitization across the region. For this reason, the security community that represents the EU is a special and unusual form of a security complex52. Although it plays a marginal role in the security policy at regional level, acquiring the aspect of a regional complex of security, the European Union attempts to create itself a particular political and security role within a more extended regional framework. And we could also include in this scenario the future integration of the states from Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine) and in the Southern Caucasus (Georgia) that are part of the Russian ———————— 51 Karl Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 5. 52 See B. Buzan, O. Weaver (2003), Regions and Power...., pp. 437-439.

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security complex, or those from the Western Balkans that represent a sub-complex of regional security. In a globalized world, the regional differentiation of security represents a beneficial fact because, on the one hand, it creates the possibility of the transformation of the European Union in a regional actor and, on the other hand, through its own security complex, the Union can reach the status of global power. The perspective of the UE as organization with global economic and security value has already risen ample debates within its institutions and within the ranks of public opinion, which realization still needs common, coherent and perseverant efforts at multiple levels.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bãdescu Ilie, Dungaciu Dan (coord.), Sociologia ºi geopolitica frontierei [The Sociology and the Geopolitics of the Frontier], vol. I-II, Bucharest, Floare Albastrã Publishing House, 1995; Brzezinski Zbigniew, Marea tablã de ªah. Geopolitica lumilor secolului XXI [The Great Chess Board. The Geopolitics of the Worlds of 21st Century], Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 2000; Buzan Barry, “Is international security possible?”, in Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, London, Harper Collins Academic, 1991; Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations, Wheatsheaf Books, London, 1983; Buzan Barry, Popoarele, statele ºi teama. O agendã pentru studii de securitate internaþionalã în epoca de dupã Rãzboiul Rece [Peoples, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies after Cold War Era], 2nd edition, Chiºinãu, Cartier Publishing House, 2000; Buzan Barry, Wæver Ole, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Buzan Barry, Wæver Ole, De Wilde Jaap, Securitatea: Un nou cadru de analizã [Security: A New Analysis Frame], Cluj Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011; Calvocotessi Peter, Politica mondialã dupã 1945 [World Politics after 1945], 7nd edition, Bucharest, Publishing House Allfa, 2000; Cristea Darie, Prognozã ºi prejudecatã. Dilemele metodologice ale relaþiilor internaþionale [Prognosis and Prejudice. The Methodological Dilemas of the International Relations], Bucharest, IPSIR Publishing House, 2012; Deutsch Karl, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968; Dungaciu Dan, Cristea Darie (coord.), Doctrine, strategii, politici. De la discursul geopolitic la operaþionalizarea securitãþii internaþionale [Doctrines, strategies, policies. The geopolitical discourse on international security operational], Bucharest, IPSIR Publishing House, 2012; Ghica Alexandra-Luciana, Zulean Marian (coord.), Politica de securitate naþionalã. Concepte, instituþii, procese [The National security policy. Concepts, Institutions and processes], Jassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2007; Martin Griffiths, Relaþii internaþionale. ªcoli, curente, gânditori [International Relations. Schools, Currents, Thinkers], Bucharest, Ziua Publishing House, 2003; Kissinger Henry, Are nevoie America de o politicã externã? Cãtre diplomaþia secolului XXI [Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward the Diplomacy of the 21st Century], Bucharest, Publishing House Incitatus, 2002;

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McSweeney Bill, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Morgan Patrick M., “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders”, in David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; Rogojanu Cãtãlin-Dumitru, Teoria complexului regional de securitate: complexul de securitate european [The Theory of the Regional Security Complex: the European Complex of Security], Jassy, Lumen Publishing House, 2007; Sava Nicu Ionel, Studii de securitate [Security Studies], Bucharest, Center for Regional Studies, 2005; Miroiu Andrei, Ungureanu Sebastian Radu (coord.), Manual de relaþii internaþionale [Handbook of International Relations], Jassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2006; Wæver Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Lipschutz Ronnie D. (ed.), On Security, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998; Wæaver Ole, “The Constallation of Securities”, in Aydinli Ersel, Rosenau James N. (eds.). Globalization, Security and Nation State: Paradigms in Transition, State University of New York Press, 2005; Wolfers Arnold, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), 1952.

MACKINDER’S THEORY. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF TOO MUCH GEOGRAPHY IN THE FIELD OF GEOPOLITICS LUCIAN-ªTEFAN DUMITRESCU* MIRIAM CIHODARIU**

Abstract. There is no doubt that the most salient constituent of Mackinder’s perspective on the World Island is the geographical one. This article argues that what makes the question of Heartland so important for contemporary geopolitics is mainly the neglected part of Mackinder’s theory, namely the political ability of the Russian state to create a community of citizens and a regional, effective infrastructure. Only a highly modernized Heartland could be an unassailable competitor in the world politics. Therefore in highlighting the institutional dimension of Mackinder’s theory to the detriment of its geographical one, we contend that sociology has an important say in contemporary geopolitical analyses. The article also pinpoints the pernicious effects of a geography-dominated geopolitics, arguing that bringing mainly geography to the front of geopolitical analyses might transform Mackinder’s theory into a geopolitical metanarrative. Keywords: geopolitics, sociology, Mackinder, Heartland, metanarrative.

Mackinder’s Theory We don’t intend to write extensively on Mackinder’s theory on the World Island because everyone who is slightly conversant with the field of geopolitics may already know it by heart. And yet we believe that some insights on what resembles a geopolitical metanarrative might be useful for those readers that are less familiar with the field of geopolitics. There are many authors who have written disparagingly about geopolitics on different grounds, mostly ideological ———————— * Scientific Researcher III, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy; [email protected]. ** PhD, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work; [email protected]. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 48–58, Bucharest, 2015.

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ones. But those who didn’t savage geopolitics on ideological motives, mauled it on theoretical terms. Is Mackinder’s theory of any use at the beginning of the 21st century? Saul Bernard Cohen argues that Mackinder’s theory is still employed by United States for its macro strategy regarding Eurasia. Mackinder’s famous Heartland theory has three options, each one being used by the United States for its grand strategy at different moments in time. “To place Mackinder’s views in historical and contemporary perspectives, Cold War U.S. containment policy was based on his Heartland worlds of 1904 and 1919. Post-Cold War American balance-of-power goals are more in consonance with his 1943 global view”1. Following Cohen’s presentation, let’s have a closer look at Mackinder’s worlds. Mackinder’s 1904 famous article on the “Pivot Area” came at a time when railroads where considered superior to ship lines in terms of reach and delivery performance. Therefore, the impenetrable for sea powers “Pivot Area”, that stretched from Siberia’s forests in the north to its steppes in the south, and from Lena River in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west, was considered by Mackinder to be the key region for world domination. Surprisingly, Mackinder did not use the term Heartland in his 1904 article. This term, that has so much of the geopolitical theory revolving around it, was coined eleven years later by James Fairgrieve, another English geographer who claimed that China, instead of Russia, had the best geographical position to dominate Eurasia2. In an article published fifteen years later and titled Democratic Ideals and Realities, Mackinder redrew his initial map. Heartland’s area expanded to the west and included Eastern Europe from the Baltic through the Black Sea. The 1919 article was the first one where Mackinder used the term Heartland. But what really made this article famous was this most resonant dictum in the field of geopolitics: “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands World-Island: Who rules World-Island commands the world.” After WWII concluded, Mackinder’s worst geopolitical fears came true, for the Heartland came under the sway of USSR. Nevertheless, following the balance of power strategic culture specific to the British Empire, Mackinder came up with another map in 1943, a map which foreshadowed NATO. According to this new map, the vast swathes of land under USSR’s sway could be balanced by a combination of Western Europe, North Atlantic Ocean and the Eastern parts of the United States. The most important countries of the Midland Ocean region, a territory that was designed to balance a USSR dominated Heartland, were United States, Canada, Great Britain and France. The aftermath of both WWII and the Cold War disproved Mackinder’s theory. But the political consequences of the above-mentioned conflicts didn’t affect the English geographer’s perspective. One could argue that the most important ——————— 1 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics. The Geography of International Relations, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009, p. 19. 2 S. B. Cohen, p. 16.

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military alliances of the 20th century emerged in order to hinder the fulfillment of Mackinder’s prophecy regarding Eurasia. One important condition of Mackinder’s prescient perspective regarding the Heartland region is hardly noticed nowadays. A high capacity state was needed, according to Mackinder, in order to transform the giant land mass of Eurasia from a backward area into an unassailable international player. For, unless they are modernized, large swathes of land play just a second fiddle in the international power politics. We are arguing therefore that the political dimension of Mackinder’s theory on the Eurasia is as equally important as the geographical one. If one looks at Mackinder’s theory only from a geographical perspective, it risks making geography reign supreme in the field of geopolitics. USSR was very close to politically unifying the Heartland region. But a low capacity state, as the Russian state has always been so far, hasn’t been able to foster the development of a political community of citizens that would transcend religious, social, and regional cleavages. Apart from not being able to create a coherent and effective social and national infrastructure, the Russian low capacity state has also never forged a highly-modernized territorial infrastructure that could match the more developed infrastructures of the sea powers. Mackinder’s theory didn’t run out of steam in the post-Cold War period. On the contrary, it continued to make intellectual waves in the realm of international relations. Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most authoritative voices on issues regarding world politics, named Eurasia “the decisive geopolitical chessboard”3. For Brzezinski, “Eurasia is the world’s axial supercontinent”. Thus, any power that would control Eurasia would dominate Western Europe and East Asia, namely two of the world’s three most industrialized regions. Following in Mackinder’s intellectual steps, Brzezinski argued that United States needed to do whatever it takes in order to prevent the formation of a geopolitical block that might control Eurasia. A peaceful and quiet atmosphere is going to dominate over the world’s chessboard (quiet and peaceful mainly for the United States) as long as no political institution will control unilaterally the Heartland region. Brzezinski is one of the scholars who has raised the awareness of different American presidents with respect to South Caucasus and Caspian Sea resources which are quite tempting not only for Russian Federation or China, but also for Turkey and European Union. And still Brzezinski is not completely influenced by Mackinder. We argue that Brzezinski’s perspective on Eurasia draws especially from Nicholas Spykman, according to whom the Rimland area is the key of controlling the Heartland region. With a milder climate, endowed with a superior infrastructure, and more densely populated than the Heartland region, Rimland needs to be controlled in order to project an effective influence over the Heartland territory. Whereas Mackinder considered Eastern Europe as the key of controlling Eurasia, Spykman ——————— 3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marea tablã de ºah. Supremaþia americanã ºi imperativele sale strategice [The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives], Bucharest, Univers Enciclopledic Publishing House, 2000.

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highlighted the importance of the Rimland countries for getting the upper hand on the Heartland region. That is why Brzezinski claims that Russian Federation should not be allowed to control the peripheries of Eurasia. It is well-known Brzezinki’s exhortation for different American leaders to whom he recommended to dislodge Ukraine from Russia’s sway.

Geopolitics between Geography and Sociology At an early phase, geopolitics undoubtedly developed under the sign of geography. One can easily notice that social Darwinism and Friedrich Ratzel’s geographical perspective make up the intellectual structure of Rudolf Kjellen’s 1917 book Der Staatals Lebensform. States have always been involved in a callous fight over territories, the most powerful state being the one which had already dominated over large swathes of land. But although it drew heavily from Ratzel’s ideas, Kjellen introduced some novelties in the above mentioned book. Geopolitics was to examine not only the nexus between state and its territory, but mainly the political project of a certain state with an emphasis on the integrative capacity of the state. Thus, different states’ capacity to create coherent nations entered the field of geopolitics. Another important novelty that diverted geopolitics from its exclusive prior geographical course was the fact that Kjellen acknowledged the role of sociology, demography and economics in scrutinizing other dimensions of the state, namely the social, demographic, and economic ones. The Romanian geographer Ion Conea, in arguing that geopolitics was to produce political maps, broadened further the field of geopolitics. According to Conea, the political maps were supposed to highlight the geographical and demographic particularities of states, but simultaneously they aimed to offer information on the economic development potential of a certain state, on the population’s state of mind, and on the different cultural traditions of that state4. The focus of geopolitics was not primarily on cultural traditions, but on the different ethnic minorities that a nation was made of. This is how ethnographic studies were ushered in the geopolitical analysis. In addition to broadening the object of geopolitics, Conea made an interesting differentiation between geopolitics and political geography. Whilst at the center of political geography lies the state with its different geographic, economic, cultural and politic characteristics, geopolitics’ focus is rather on the international environment. Thus, geopolitics is mainly interested in the political interplay between states and the international order. We believe that Dimitrie Gusti is the Romanian scholar who has unintentionally dislodged geopolitics from the field of geography and transferred it to the realm of sociology. Gusti argued that the state was primarily a social unit which mirrored society. Considering that general ———————— 4 Diana Didã, ªcoala geopoliticã româneascã, Proiectul sociologic al geopoliticii interbelice [Romanian Geopolitical School. The Interwar Geopolitics Sociological Project], Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2012, p. 20.

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will is the most important constituent of Gusti’s sociological system, we argue that what Gusti intended to stress was that the state reflected the nation. Under such circumstances, geopolitics would have become the most complete way of studying the nation-state, a scientific status that Gusti, as the founder of Romanian sociology, did not want to concede to geopolitics. According to Gusti, the only complete social discipline was sociology which was supposed to study the natural and cultural frames of a society and its specific institutional expressions. The natural frames that sociology was to cover in Gusti’s view were the cosmic frame, which was tantamount to the geographical setting of a certain nationstate, and the biologic frame, which referred to the human communities within a territory. Geography was the social science summoned by Gusti to examine the cosmic frame, whilst demography was to address the biologic frame. In addition to that, sociology, as the most complete and appropriate way of studying the nascent Romanian state, was supposed to examine the cultural frames of every society, that is the historic frame and the psychological frame. The historic frame was to be scrutinized by social historians and the psychological frame by ethnologists. Gusti’s sociology was also designed to study the fundamental activities of a society, the economic and cultural ones, and also the regulatory activities of a society, namely the juridical ones. Following in Frederic Le Play’s footsteps, Gusti called his method of research monographic sociology. Through this particular type of sociology, Gusti intended to come up with a general sociological map of inter-war Romania. The task of geopolitical studies, at least according to Ion Conea, was to produce political maps that highlighted the geographical, demographic and cultural particularities of the state. One can easily notice that there were strong similarities between Conea’s geography and Gusti’s sociology. And yet there was an important difference, in the sense that Gusti stressed the social character of the nation-state instead of its mainly geographical allure. Therefore, Gusti was less prone on giving priority to geography in the study of society, as interwar geographers used to do. Gusti’s monographic method, that focused on the social traits of societies to the detriment of the geographic ones, started a little row between Gusti and George Vâlsan, a well-known Romanian geographer, who was offended for the lack of deference sociology manifested towards geography5. Vâlsan made two important remarks. The first one referred to the large scale use of monographic method in geographical studies, drawing attention on the fact that sociology is rather indebted to geography and not the other way around. The second remark was about the social range of monographic studies. Using monographic method to study small communities was rather ineffective, contended Vâlsan, who advised Gusti to carry out monographic studies only at a regional level. What’s interesting in the case of inter-war Romanian sociology is that its most important representatives managed, in a rather effective ———————— 5 Cãlin Cotoi, Primordialism cultural ºi geopoliticã româneascã [Cultural Primordialism and Romanian Geopolitics], Bucharest, Mica Valahie Publishing House, 2006.

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manner, to “sociologize” geopolitics. We argue that this is the only way to get over the absolute dominance of geography in the field of geopolitics with its specific pernicious effects that are to be addressed in the next section.

Consequences of too much Geography in the Realm of Geopolitics George Schöpflin is one of those authors who have criticized geopolitics without salvaging it. In other words, what Schöpflin questioned was not the ideological basis of geopolitics, but its fundamental methodological assumptions. Without trying to belittle Schöpflin’s examination of the very basis of geopolitics, we argue that the Hungarian scholar errs in not making a sufficient clear distinction between modern geopolitics and postmodern geopolitics. Whilst at the heart of modern geopolitics one finds the state and its relationships with geography, postmodern geopolitics lays emphasis on ethnic groups, identity problems, economic issues, and social conflicts engendered by either illegitimate political actors or by environmental degradation. To be more precise, postmodern geopolitics focuses also on the internal problems of nation states, starting with the premise that states and nations are not necessarily monolithic institutions, whereas modern geopolitics, in arguing that the smallest rift between states and nations would be inconceivable, is interested only in the nexus between state’s power and geography. Loaded with too much geography, modern geopolitical studieslack a salient sociological and political dimension. To sum it up, George Schöpflin’s critique of geopolitics is focused mainly on modern geopolitics and its fundamental methodological assumption according to which state power is decisively influenced by the size of its territory. Maybe the most important weakness of geopolitics, argues Schöpflin, is its deterministic character. As a consequence, the most important constituents of state power are its territory, population and resources. Given that power politics is at the heart of (modern) geopolitical analysis, a state with little resources at its disposal will play just a marginal role in a Hobbesian environment. It is already a common place in international relations that thanks to an astute diplomacy, small states have managed not only to survive in a violent international milieu but also to obtain important strategic gains. But geographers and military men who represented the intellectual backbone of modern geopolitics did not delve too much into the influence of “subjective” factors, such as diplomacy, on state power. This materialist approach, that lies at the heart of Schöpflin’s critique, made geopolitics blind to one important source of social power, namely ideology. Wedded mainly to geography, modern geopolitics paid only scant attention to the influence of ideas on state’s actions. It also turned a deaf ear to restraints on state power such as legitimacy, human capital and ethical constraints. Striving to examine the political interactions between states only in terms of

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territory, resources and population, modern geopolitics has produced a Manichean image of international relations, a realm dominated by great powers where small states have no say. Under such circumstances, it is pretty difficult to discern any theory of social change in geopolitical thinking. If the international politics is just a Hobbesian milieu where big states might resort to force at any time with no effective institutional restraints on such illegal actions, small states and their inhabitants will be always out of options. Of little use could be also the realist perspective counterpart, namely the liberal one, which pays no attention to power inequalities in the field of international relations, and stresses the equality between big and small states regarding the acceptance and observance of international norms. We argue that the followers of either a Hobbesian international context or a Kantian perpetual peace milieu are equally wrong in their basic assumptions of world politics because they cannot predict the Black Swans. “The significance of Black Swans, therefore, is that they cut across the linearity of predictable processes and introduce unforeseeable elements into, say, political power, often enough from ostensively non-political activities. And, equally important, no state – however powerful in the traditional terms of military, economic, and geographic power – can withstand non-state determined, emergent processes”6. What are the consequences of such a modern geopolitical perspective, that rests its political explanations only on geography? According to Schöpflin, the consequences are many, and they are dire. Firs, by ignoring “the double hermeneutic” process, these type of analyses may come up with flawed conclusions. Consequently, one will attribute to its counterpart reasons that the latter may not have. In its modern version, geopolitics has a very limited understanding of power. Secondly, considering state, territory and population the only sources of power, modern geopolitics could prove itself quite clumsy in coping with alternative sources of power, such as the state’s integrative capacity, human capital, technology, ethical constraints on the international interplay between states and international institutions. Thirdly, the very premises of modern geopolitics imprints the international context with a dominating Hobbesian perspective that will produce low levels of trust among interlocutors. Finally, for its methodological premise is rather unsophisticated, modern geopolitics cannot predict or examine Black Swans, namely unexpected change.

The Reign of Geography. Mackinder’s Metanarrative How can one explain the long lasting influence of Mackinder’s theory on geopolitics? Saul Bernard Cohen argues that Mackinder’s theory, in all of its three variants, has always been present in American strategic thinking with respect to Russia. To be more precise, Mackinder’s three types of Heartland have been employed by American strategic thinkers both in their Cold War and PostCold War undertakings related to conceiving an effective security strategy on ———————— 6 George Scöpflin, Politics, Illusions, Fallacies, Talin, TLU Press, 2012, p. 257.

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Eurasia. In order to verify Saul Bernard Cohen’s claim, one just needs to read George Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s security recommendations. There is no doubt that American authors’ influence on the field of IR and geopolitics is huge. But still, this intellectual dominance does not cogently explain Mackinder’s importance for contemporary geopolitics. We believe that Alexandros Petersen delivers the decisive motive in this sense: “The essential geography of the world remains today what was in antiquity. And for that reason Mackinder’s analysis and warning are as relevant now as ever”7. Alexandros Petersen’s assessment of Mackinder’s theory is correct. But exactly this specific type of reasoning consecrates the supreme reign of geography in the field of geopolitics. Of course, if geopolitical analyses don’t focus on the geographic determinants of political processes, they will be incomplete. But geopolitical analyses will also be incomplete if they rest only on geographical traits. The most salient constituent of Mackinder’s perspectives on the World Island is the geographical one. And yet we argue that what makes the question of Heartland so important for contemporary geopolitics is mainly the neglected part of Mackinder’s theory, namely the political ability of the Russian state to create a community of citizens and a regional, effective infrastructure. Only a highly modernized Heartland could be an unassailable competitor in the world politics. In other words, the political institution that might dominate the entire Heartland region should have attained a higher and more effective level of modernity than its most fierce competitors, that is, the sea powers, in order to become a superpower. USSR and the Russian Federation have both failed in forging a transcendental political community of citizens that could overcome religious, ethnic and economic rifts mainly because the processes of modernization have proved rather unsuccessful in the Heartland region. Additionally, the infrastructure forged by both USSR and the Russian Federation looks rather inchoate in comparison to the high-ways, railroads, airports, bridges, and harbors built by sea powers throughout the 20th century. There are many ways of explaining the differences between Western Europe’s complete modernity and Eastern Europe’s incomplete modernity. Perhaps the best way to explain it is to stress the difference between the high capacity states of Western Europe and the low capacity states from the Eastern parts of Europe. That is why we’vehighlighted the sociological dimension of Mackinder’s theory. Only a high capacity state could have transformed the Heartland region in an unassailable competitor in the realm of international relations. Formal citizenship, the state of law, and political accountability have never been among the institutional strengths of both USSR and the Russian Federation. We argue that if one understands Mackinder’s theory only from a geographical perspective, it might transform it into a metanarrative. Like every other modern prophecy, Jean Lyotard’s important announcement regarding the death of grand ———————— 7 Alexandros Petersen, The World Island. Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West, Denver, Praeger Security International, 2011, p. 150.

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narratives proved to be false. Postmodern culture, argues Fredric Jameson, cannot be grasped properly apart from seeing it as the supra-structure of an American military and economic domination that reached its climax once the Soviet Union dismantled. Post-Cold War American hegemony transformed rapidly into an unrestrained use of power politics that needed to be legimitated somehow. Robert Kagan claims that the Soviet Union’s military might represented the most important structural legitimation not only for huge defense spending in Washington, but simultaneously for a wide-spread acknowledgement of America’s involvement in power politics8. Once the Soviet Union collapsed,the United States’ allure of an international Leviathan looked rather dubious. Therefore a new Leviathan emerged and the United States just played the role of the “enforcer” of the newest source of order in international politics, namely the omniscient market. Therefore, neoliberalism with its emphasis on unrestrained market forces, shock therapy for former state dominated economies in the Eastern parts of Europe, and free international commerce has become the first grand-narrative of a new world order from which the Soviet Union has been abruptly excluded. The postmodern order produced other grand narratives, too. These are, according to George Schöpflin, the Grand Narrative of Nazi Germany, the war on terror, colonialism of former communist countries, European integration etc. Every Grand Narrative, contends Schöpflin, has tried to offer what human communities have always been desirous of, and that is order. Usually, a political institution has served this need by inventing a certain narrative with which it “sacralizes” the basis of order. Because it needs to hide one human community’s social discontinuities, solidarity rifts and institutional malfunctions under a sacred veneer, every story that aims at transforming itself into a Grand Narrative should fulfill at least three conditions, namely supra-temporality, supraspatiality, and universality. Additionally, because it is supposed to solve a social crisis usually caused by rapid social change, a Grand Narrative should come up with a myth of emancipation. Otherwise, without pointing out to a glorious future, and without delivering a suitable guide for action and interpretation, it will produce a lackluster social and political performance. Schöpflin argues that no matter how successful a Grand Narrative might be at a certain moment in time, its alleged unassailable character would be proved wrong by another wannabe Grand Narrative. Therefore, considering that every Grand Narrative strives to sacralize the order projected by a certain institution, once that institution is challenged to adapt to new economic and political realities, it is forced to come up with a new Grand Narrative. “The problem is that no narrative can encompass the entirety of human experience, not even a well-constructed cosmology can do that, hence there will always be counter-narratives and anomalies”9. ———————— 8 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, 2004, Vintage Books. 9 George Scöpflin, Politics, Illusions, Fallacies, Talin, TLU Press, 2012, p. 157.

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Schöpflin is right because every grand narrative is subjected to contestation, no matter how ubiquitous might seem at times. Since no human institution is going to last forever, so is the case of Grand Narratives. The monolithic character of Grand Narratives is massively dependent on the stability of the institutions they legitimize. When an institution legitimized through a Grand Narrative starts changing, the contingent character of the grand story is revealed. If geography reigned supreme, it would transform geopolitics in a quasinatural science. Arguing at the beginning of the 21st century that social sciences are context dependent, and, consequently, unable to produce long-term predictions is rather banal. The reason for this is the impossibility to reduce human activity to a set of rules10, considering that rules are forged by specific institutions and every institution’s activity is context dependent. Without a context-independent, general rule of human conduct, it is impossible to come up with a grand theory in social sciences. The same line of reasoning also applies to geopolitics. If state’s behavior in international relations is related only to a short-term interest, namely its survival, and this short-term interest is heavily dependent on the question of what state controls the Heartland region, Mackinder’s theory will become a grand theory, a law that might transform geopolitics in a natural science. Mackinder didn’t have such an intention, nor would it be possible. As we’ve pinpointed earlier, the most important layer of Mackinder’s theory is not the geographical one, but the political one. Only a high capacity state that could effectively modernize the Heartland region could become a superpower in international politics.

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY: Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Marea tablã de ºah. Supremaþia americanã ºi imperativele sale strategice strategice [The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives], Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 2000; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Triada geostrategicã. Convieþuirea cu China, Europa ºi Rusia [The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia], Bucharest, Historia Publishing House, 2006; Cohen, Saul Bernard, Geopolitics. The Geography of International Relations, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009; Cotoi, Cãlin, Primordialism cultural ºi geopoliticã româneascã [Cultural Primordialism and Romanian Geopolitics], Bucharest, Mica Valahie Publishing House, 2006; Didã, Diana, ªcoala geopoliticã româneascã, Proiectul sociologic al geopoliticii interbelice [Romanian Geopolitical School. The Interwar Geopolitics Sociological Project], Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2012; Flyvbjerg, Bent, Making Social Science Matter. Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; ———————— 10 Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter. Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, 2004, Vintage Books; Kearns, Gerry, Geopolitics and Empire. The Legacy of Halford Mackinder, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009; Klare, Michael, Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York, Henry Holt, 2001; Klare, Michael, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. The New Geopolitics of Energy, New York, Holt Paperbacks, 2008; Kuus, Merje, Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Petersen, Alexandros, The World Island. Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West, Denver, Praeger Security International, 2011; Schöpflin, George, The Dilemmas of Identity, Talin, TLU Press, 2010; Schöpflin, George, Politics, Illusions, Fallacies, Talin, TLU Press, 2012.

POLITICAL IMAGE, THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY

NOTES CONCERNING “ELIADE FILE” ION GOIAN*

Abstract. In order to understand the work of Mircea Eliade in its whole complexity, it should be situated within the context where it was thought and written. Whether the period beginning with the years after the war is somehow easier to follow in Eliade’s intellectual biography, the most discussed period and that gave way to numerous contradictory interpretations is, naturally, the ’30s. In this sense, the present study makes a small inventory of some obscure moments, because this obscurity gave birth, most of the times, either to misunderstanding or, where there was an ill will, to the misrepresentation of his words. To have been kept silent was for Eliade (especially during the’50s) a form of intellectual survival and maybe survival per se. Now, we have the right to judge things in a more nuanced manner, without denying the facts, but also without interpreting them tendentiously and approximately. But we can express reserves, of course, toward the method of the ‘file’ applied to Eliade, as well as to other important authors (such as Heidegger, Cioran and others), a modern form of a Manichaeism which has no place within the world of culture, the eternal empire of the nuances. Keywords. “Eliade file”, intellectual biography, obscurity, misrepresentation and clarifications. “And against all odds I stubbornly believe in the ‘initiation’ meaning of these pains and impotencies. I do not think necessarily at death. At my age this is nota problem anymore. The initiation toward something else: a ‘new life’, i.e. a total regeneration, revealing a different sort of creativity for me. I must exit the surrounding fence of minor preoccupations, where I have closed myself, unknowingly, for so many years”. Mircea Eliade, Journal1. ———————— * PhD, scientific researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, coordinator of the Political Sciences Department; [email protected]. 1 Mircea Eliade, Jurnal, vol. II, pp. 436-437. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 59–77, Bucharest, 2015.

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In order to understand the work of Mircea Eliade in its whole complexity, it should be situated within the context where it was thought and written. Whether the period beginning with the years after the war is somehow easier to follow in Eliade’s intellectual biography, the most discussed period and that gave way to numerous contradictory interpretations is, naturally, the ’30s. This is also the period when the personality of the Romanian scholar is fulfilled, but also the time of a confrontation with history, from which, apparently, Eliade did not always turned out victorious, illustrating through his person the old saying of the humanist Miron Costin who, living in an epoch of equal turmoil, memorably spoken of the poor man who is always under the times. Obviously, nobody can start on a reconstruction of the whole epoch and not even of the entire activity of Eliade during the ’30s, in a few pages. This is not and it cannot be the object of this chapter. Yet, there are a few legends that acquired a certain consistence over the years and that obscure a correct reception of the meanings of the Eliadian writings. As Ioan Petru Culianu also wrote, there is an “unknown Mircea Eliade”2. Even more, according to Ioan Petru Culianu, “Eliade is a myth builder through the incapacity of the others to decipher his story”3. We cannot discuss here in detail all the litigious aspects of a complex existence, which is in itself situated in an even more complex epoch, but we can make a small inventory of some obscure moments, because this obscurity gave birth, most of the times, either to misunderstanding or, where there was an ill will, to the misrepresentation of his words. Often, the Romanian author was the prisoner of a context, of some confrontations, rather of a political order, than of theoretical type, and some facts or some of his writings were used, not necessarily against himself as a person, but against a presupposed adverse team where he was registered without being asked. For instance, a fact suggested by Ioan Petru Culianu, a disciple who had the privilege of numerous direct talks with the Romanian Professor at Chicago and who wrote about these meetings: at some point, in the West, was registered what was called at the time “a recrudescence of the rightwing,” significant inclusively among the young people of university age. There began a process of identification of the exponents of this “theoretical rightwing,” who were subjected to a concentric fire. Was this, maybe, intended to control their influence on the youth? Were there other motivations? A cert result is that in a certain period of time was propagated the idea of a rightwing Eliade, and afterwards, Culianu writes, “rumors began to circulate, timid at first, about his supposed anti-Semite ism and pro-Nazism. Eliade’s method was to never answer the rumors, and so they quickly amplified under the quill of a Di Nola, a Furio Jesi and others, all the way to France”4. ——————— 2 Ioan Petru Culianu, Mircea Eliade necunoscutul, in vol. Ioan Petru Culianu, Mircea Eliade, Nemira Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, pp. 153-292. 3 Op. cit., p. 159. 4 Op. cit., p. 264.

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The image of a rightwing, anti-Semite and pro-Nazi5 convictions Eliade places under uncertainty the humanist Eliade. It is not easy to understand a philosopher who attempts to rethink humanism and to re-describe its importance within the context of our times, but at the same time nourishes resentments against a certain part of humanity under the pretext of the cultural differences and who expresses cryptically these resentments in philosophical and scientific writings. For this reason, among the complicated matters discussed around, in Culianu’s phrase, Eliade, the unknown, even if some cannot be addressed in these pages, at least that of his presupposed anti- Semitism and the question of a possible belonging to the Legionary movement of Eliade should be deciphered and clarified once and for all, at least in its essential aspects, returning to specific primary sources of the debate. The researcher who is attentive to the biography and bibliography of Mircea Eliade, Mircea Handoca, has offered recently a brief, but very useful, history of the attacks to which the Romanian scholar was subjected, in Foreword6, elaborated while gathering Eliade’s incriminated texts. Mircea Handoca reminds that Eliade was even since the ’20s considered superficial and a swindler and that his novels were considered indecent and forbidden by the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1934, and that afterwards the author of the novels was excluded from the system of education by the same authority. After more than a decade, in 1948, a part of Eliade’s books are listed among the forbidden publications. However, Eliade’s writing were note-edited in his natal country only until the end of the ’60s (with some titles from his literary prose) and toward the ’80s (his works of the history of religion). The attacks did not target only the writings, but also the person of Eliade. Even a hasty reading of Eliade’s Memoirs shows, however, the fact that the young author did not employ much diplomacy in his professional relations and that this brought him a great number of enemies, from P.P. Negulescu, his Professor, whom he jars on the occasion of his PhD thesis defense. To characters such as Oscar Lemnaru, who was to dedicate him an irreducible hate. Belu Silber, close to the Criterion group for a while, about whose doubtful morality were found more after the publication of Pãtrãºcanu file, accuses him, Eliade tells that, to be “a Security agent” (as we can see, nothing new under the sun within Romanian society!) and to the troubled blame that was addressed to him, he offered the excuse that such an accusation …is part of the methods of the Marxist journalism. From the same area emerge rather early infamy accusations: “Mr. Mircea Eliade is a fascist who ignores himself and a xenophobe with antiSemite prejudices. Even Mircea Eliade’s terminology is reminding of Hitler’s”7. ——————— 5 Such image is not, however, concordant with the notes from the Journal of the Romanian author. In a few places, Eliade laments about the historical destiny of the millions of “Jews killed or cremated in the Nazi concentration camps,” considering them “the avant-garde of humanity that waits to be incinerated through the will of ‘History’” (Mircea Eliade, Jurnal [Journal], vol. I, p. 412, note from November 27, 1961). This is certainly not the jubilating discourse of a Nazi. 6 Mircea Handoca, Cuvînt înainte [Foreword], in vol. Mircea Eliade, Textele “Legionare” ºi despre Românism, anthology by Mircea Handoca, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, pp. 7-35. 7 ªantier, January 1, 1935, p. 5 (apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., p. 10).

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In a letter to Cezar Petrescu, Eliade summarizes in a few words the police regime to which he is subjected in June 1938: “to be Nae Ionescu’s assistant, understandably, is right on subversive. To be a redactor of Cuvântul newspaper is even worse. Adding up these two faults, my family and I are unceasingly guarded by agents, for the last six weeks. There were five raids and searches, a descent to the owners, policemen on the street, and a sergeant at the gate. (…) For five days straight, since they came to ‘pick me up” – warrantless, of course – I am chased as a luxury game, from house to house, from station to station, from town to town’8. At the time, Eliade is under the cross fire of the two teams which became ever more exclusivist, and ever more intolerant within the Romanian society by the end of the ’30s. Mircea Eliade recalls in his Memoirs the reception in epoch of his book Yoga. Essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne: «For the nationalists, Yoga was of no interest because it was not concerned with ‘Romanian realities.’ For the leftwing journalists, Yoga had no value because it was written by me, Nae Ionescu’s assistant and collaborator of Cuvântul, thus ‘a rightwing man’”9. Now a method, a person and the works gain contour, framing that method which was to follow Eliade his entire life and which can be phrased as “Eliade file”. Starting with the second half of the ’30s, Eliade was to be the perpetual object of a “file”, which, periodically, became re-actualized, according to circumstances independent of his will and his knowledge. A Kafka-like instance opens a trial against the Romanian scholar, which, in a parallel with the trial from the writing of the author from Prague, cannot be won. As in The Trial signed by Kafka, the judging instance is never there where expected to be, but it is by accident found in the most unlikely places. The accusations are formulated with such ambiguity that any method of defense becomes inefficient in front of a public opinion that never finds the time to critically analyze the facts and the defendant is lost by the simple fact that he is accused, exactly as in the crepuscular Kafkian writing. On the other hand, any excess of defense becomes, as we shall see, incriminating in itself. The best method to form an opinion remains the attempt to present succinctly the concrete data. The corner stone of the architecture of Eliade “file” is the accusation of belonging to the Iron Guard. From this point follow a development of the accusatorial themes: as the Iron Guard was, according to the wider spread opinion, an anti-democratic, totalitarian, anti-Semite and even terrorist movement, using violence as a political method, the accusatorial logic implies that Eliade was an anti-democrat, a partisan of totalitarianism, an anti-Semite and, why not, a terrorist. In reality, things are, obviously, more complicated than this pseudo-syllogism implies. The relations between Eliade and the Iron Guard have a history that has to be investigated with impartiality before validating these accusations. A first aspect: Is the adhesion of Eliade to the Iron Guard an incontestable fact? There are proofs indicating some times to one direction, and other times to ———————— 8 Apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 9 Mircea Eliade, Memorii (1907-1960), p. 337.

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the other. The belief that Eliade was part, in the clearest manner, in the legionary movement is based on several elements: 1. The notoriety of his adhesion, to which refer, in the epoch or afterwards, a sum of friends (for instance, Mihail Sebastian), acquaintances10 or adversaries; 2. His public attitudes11, culminating with his arrest at July 14, 1938 and his imprisonment in the camp from Mircurea Ciuc by the authorities of the time and with his refusal to sign a declaration of desolidarization with legionarism; 3. The fact that he published in publications of legionary orientation; and 4. His testimonies included in his correspondence and, as suggested by Claudio Mutti12, certain allusions with a supposed autobiographical character, from the Eliadian belletristic13. Concerning the first point mentioned above, it may carry a certain weight, but it does not constitute an absolutely irrefutable proof for Eliade’s regimentation. In Romania, public rumor is an institution that always functions according to particular laws and that can not be invoked as truth by no one else but the interested parties. Sebastian, sensible observer, is often someone extremely subjective; he perceives Eliade’s political opinions which are different form his, first of all as ———————— 10 In this category could be placed the testimony of a former legionary, Zeanã, conform to which Eliade “was ‘regimented’, as part of the legionary branch (‘nest’) ‘Axa’, led by Mihail Polihroniade” (apud Claudio Mutti, Penele arhanghelului. Intelectualii români ºi Garda de Fier, Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 58). On the other hand, one can presuppose also that the legionaries attempted, as they had the interest, for reasons concerning the image, to claim the adhesion of Eliade even against historical reality. Another testimony was that of J. Evola (ibidem), sustaining that Eliade placed him in relation to Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, could have been true, but it is not, in itself, conclusive in what concerns the relations of the Romanian scholar with the legionary movement. However, there are authors contesting the role of Eliade in the relation CodreanuEvola (cf. Claudio Mutti, Evola and România, preface to J. Evola, Naþionalism ºi Ascezã. Reflecþii asupra fenomenului legionar, Fronde Publishing House, Alba Iulia, Paris, 1998, pp. 26-28. 11 According to a testimony of G. Bãlãnescu, quoted by Claudio Mutti, “Eliade was even a candidate on the electoral lists of the legionary party ‘Everything for the country’ and he expected that soon he were elected deputy” (Claudio Mutti, Mircea Eliade ºi Garda de Fier, Puncte cardinale, Publishing House, Sibiu, 1995, p. 31). 12 Claudio Mutti, Mircea Eliade ºi Garda de Fier, p. 15 passim. 13 Eliade takes sometimes a distance from such interpretations in autobiographic spirit of certain literary texts. For instance, in his Memorii, Eliade writes: “I have used many of my memories from the General Security and from Ciuc in The Forbidden Forest , and I am sorry; I may have left thus the impression that ºtefan Viziru (a character) was an alter ego of myself, which was not true” (Mircea Eliade, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului (1937-1960), Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991, p. 28). 14 “On Sunday, April 4 (1937) (…) I could not bear what came next. Not only because it seem stupid to me to hear him repeating Nae’s words – but also because his platitude of thought where I could see him sinking terrified me (…) But is friendship possible under such circumstances?” (Mihail Sebastian, Jurnal. 1935-1944, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p. 123). A more general observation: Sebastian’s Journal should be read maybe also with the eye of the psycho-analyst. This quite feminine sensitivity of Sebastian undertakes sometimes, in his relationship with Mircea Eliade, the accents of a rejected and betrayed love. Here is probably as well the source for (the psycho-analyst may say) certain exaggerate accusations or for the hysterical desire to believe all the negative things related by third parties, concerning Eliade (for example, the observation made by P. P. Comarnescu, included in the entry from September 20, 1939). Other victims of this manner of perceiving things, through particular lenses, in the Journal, accentuated by the events from January 1941, are Camil Petrescu (abundantly), Cioran (February 12, 1941), even Eugen Ionescu (February 10, 1941), but also, unexpectedly, E. Lovinescu (February 12, 1941) and even G. B. Shaw (May 6, 1941). There are, as well, in the same journal, cruel expressions and concerning certain women whom Sebastian loves and whom he seems to include in this ambivalent complex of “love and hate”, which the author of the Journal has developed within the terrible circumstances in which he found himself during the last years. Sometimes, the caustic spirit present in this writing led him to a sort of indifference to his own destiny, but also to a sort of despise for his congeners, caught within the same trap of the Jewish destiny in Romania of the ’40s.

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a betrayal of the friendship between them14. However, we have to say that Sebastian places Eliade’s adhesion to the legionary movement on his naivety15. A thing less emphasized by those who consider Sebastian’s Journal a piece of accusation in Eliade’s “file” is noticeable: Sebastian, so careful with any antiSemite nuance from the language of his friends does not mention, even once, anti-Semite expressions in the conversations between them, but only what other communicated him, more or less veridical (for instance, P. Comarnescu). The arrest of Eliade had its arbitrary and, if it attested the young writer as a follower of the legionary movement, it does not represent a proof for his regimentation. There is a good probability that Eliade was followed, as he accounts as well, more as an assistant, and as an intimate of Nae Ionescu16, who was also imprisoned in the camp from Miercurea. But, some may say, Eliade refused to sign a declaration of desolidarization from the movement. Nevertheless, he founded his refusal on the fact that he did not sign up in the legionary movement (“It is, probably, true”17, Z. Ornea comments). In his Memoires, the author explains this in a verisimilar mode. They have required from him a desolidarization that looked as an cowardly act and seemed rather a betrayal of his friends, and even, Eliade says, of his generation: “It seemed unconceivable to me to desolidarize from my generation during extreme persecution when people where followed and persecuted without any guilt”18. The fact that Eliade publishes in various periodical publications of philo-legionary orientation should be interpreted through the content of his articles. With few exceptions19, Eliade maintains his independence of thought in his writings from this epoch. ———————— 15 “Tuesday, 2 (March, 1937) (…) Not to forget, also, the explanation for his heartfelt adhesion to the Guard: ‘I have always believed in the primacy of the spiritual.’ He is neither a swindler, nor a demented person. He is only being naive. But there are such catastrophic naiveties!” (Mihail Sebastian, Jurnal. 1935-1944, p. 115). 16 Mircea Eliade, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului (1937-1960), p. 25. 17 Z. Ornea, Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptã româneascã, Fundaþia Culturalã Românã Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 209. 18 Mircea Eliade, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului (1937-1960), p. 28. 19 An exception, which is often reminded, is Eliade’s answer to an investigation of the official publication of the movement, Buna Vestire, answer entitled “Why I believe in the triumph of the legionary movement?” (Buna Vestire, no. 244, December 17, 1937, pp. 1-2). Mircea Eliade sustained afterwards that the answer in discussion does not belong to him, as it was composed in the redaction, and that he did not attempt a denial because it would have triggered a public scandal. Here are, indeed, a few phrases wit explicit Semite content. But the answer cited offers some points of view that obviously belong to Eliade, concerning the specific of the “legionary revolution”, as he imagined it, and which prove that the naivety mentioned by Sebastian in the Journal was not just an outthought word: “…While all contemporary revolutions are political, the legionary revolution is both spiritual and Christian. While all contemporary revolutions have as purpose the conquering of the political power by a social class or by a person, legionary revolution has as a supreme aim the salvation of the nation, the reconciliation of the Romanian people with God, as the Captain said. For that reason, the meaning of the Legionary Movement is different from everything that was done in history until now, and the legionary triumph will bring about not only the restoration of the virtues of our people, a worthy Romania, dignified and powerful – creating a new man, adequate to a new type of European life. The new man has never been born in a political movement – but always in a spiritual revolution, within a vast inner transformation. This way was born the new man of Christianity, of Renaissance, etc., in an accomplished primate of the spirit against the temporal, with the victory of the spirit against flesh. The new man is born through a truly lived freedom. I believe in the triumph of the Legionary Movement, because I believe in freedom, in the power of the soul against the biological and economic determinism” (Mircea Eliade, Textele “Legionare” and Despre românism, antology by Mircea Handoca, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, p. 65).

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Special weight carry some phrases from his correspondence from which one may derive, though, the regimentation of Mircea Eliade as legionary. In a letter from 15th October 1948 to his friend, Brutus Coste, Eliade tells him about the turmoil of the Romanian exile from Paris and, condemning the intrigues of the legionaries’ refugees in the capital of France, he writes: “As for me, I am forbearing. I know that nothing can remain pure eventually. In 1938 I have adhered to the Iron Guard for the memory of Moþa, only to see, in 1940, a Guard led by outlaws, loafers and semi-literates, compromising even the memory of the ideal of Moþa. This is ‘History’ – this is the reason why I am for metaphysics”20. An apparently irrefutable testimony, this ‘in 1938 I have adhered to the Iron Guard.’ But one may notice that this adhesion was not necessarily a formal one, registered in official documents, but contingently a sentimental one. However, the motivation of the supposed adhesion is avowedly sentimental: ‘for the memory of Moþa.’ On the other hand, it is possible merely that Eliade has somewhat underlined the data of reality, writing to a legionary member, his alleged adhesion being a formula of souled correspondence with it. Anyhow, the recent publication, in its integrality, of the Portuguese Journal of Mircea Eliade appears to clarify, at least formally speaking, the matter. Indeed, some passages from the notes made by Eliade between April 21, 1941 and (probably) September 5, 1945, which constitute the “Portuguese” section of the Journal, unpublished until recently, but partially, constituted as undisputed proof of the adhesion to legionary movement. July 1942, Eliade recalls a discussion in the journal, at Mircea Vulcãnescu’s home, between Constantin Noica and a group of former “criterioniºti”. Noica accuses the other that they have abandoned the movement that, after him, represented especially a moral position of condemnation of the bourgeois spirit in favor of a certain political objectivity; with the alibi of the formula “we are content to be technicians and to serve the state in whatever form it would require”. Noica asks, vehemently: “What have you done when Codreanu was killed? When have you voted the Constitution? The Plebiscite?”21 Eliade intervened in discussion with the confession that “although legionary (my emphasis I. G.), I have suspended any political internal judgment as long as the war with Russia is taking place”22. A few days sooner, with the occasion of a meeting with Mihai Antonescu, some of Eliade’s friends, in conformity with the same pages of his journal, hoped that the ad interim President of the Council of Ministers will attempt with the former ‘an understanding with the Legion’23. January 1945, he recalls, nostalgically, a certain youthful drive toward adventure. Within this context, Eliade writes the following lines: “ To my pathetic love for Nina, or the legionary adventure corresponded my passion for the absolute in metaphysics ———————— 20 “Mircea Eliade în corespondenþã cu Brutus Coste”, in Jurnalul literar, no. 5-10, March-April-May 2001, p. 14. 21 Mircea Eliade, Jurnalul portughez ºi alte scrieri, preface and editing by Sorin Alexandrescu, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, vol. I, p. 133. 22 Ibidem. 23 Mircea Eliade, op. cit., p. 131.

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and religion”24 and avows himself incapable to objectively rememorize the past. “The past freezes me”25, notes the author. It seems that these confessions are meant to end any discussion concerning the question of Eliade’s belonging to the legionary movement, recognized by him as expressis verbis in a text that doesn’t have, as the already mentioned letter to Brutus Coste, an immediate finality of communication. The Journal is, for Eliade, an occasion to clarify for himself several thoughts and, as such, he cannot be suspected of secondary intentions and of the desire to denaturize the facts. However, the mentioned aspects from the Portuguese Journal are summary enough to permit different interpretations, and it must be said, with all the directness of the expressions (“although legionary”, “my legionary adventure…”), they do not lack a certain ambiguity. First, legionarism seem to be, for the author of the journal, not as much a form of participation to the political action, as rather, a state of mind, a spiritual experience. This way, if the soulful adhesion is undisputable, the matter of the formal, effective adhesion to the Romanian radical right wing movement remains to be further discussed. Anyhow, we could interpret this way the repeated denial of his participation to legionarism, later on, to which we are going to refer hereon. Those who accused Eliade considered, obviously, a “regimentation” of the scholar in a movement understood as close to fascism (Eliade refers in the journal, in quotation marks, to the possibility to be perceived in the country, in 1945, as “fascist”26, as a brutal denaturizing of reality). Or, for any objective observer, Eliade’s personality (characterized by narcissism, with a clear cu o obsession for the development of his own ideas and for the literary expression of his own feelings) is, evidently, profoundly incompatible with any form of political regimentation. For this reason, Eliade was not to recognize himself, especially in the following decades, in the hypostasis of “adherent” to the Legion and not necessarily cowardice is what prevents him from seeing his past in these terms. And, while the accusation of legionarism proves to be evermore an instrument to deny him even the right to a scientific career, Eliade renounces, as his adversaries, to nuances and he rejects any relation between himself and the Legion, over passing sometimes the limits of truth27. ———————— 24 Op. cit., p. 293. 25 Ibidem. 26 Op. cit., p. 291. 27 Eliade’s letter of July 3rd, 1972 to Scholem, to which we are going to refer immediately, is an example of highly equivoque presentation of the relations of the Romanian scholar with the legionary movement. Without containing flagrante inconsistencies, the text is ambiguous enough to leave room for the idea that Eliade was altogether a foreign to the Legion, which is, however, not true. Evidently, Eliade’s excuse is that, at their turn, his accusers are, most often, indifferent to the truth, what is intended, in his case, could be qualified, simply, as a tentative of moral assassinate. For instance, in the article from Toladot which occasions the correspondence exchange Scholem Eliade, the Romanian scholar is no more and no less… than one of the leaders of the Iron Guard and among the main anti-Semite ideologues of the legionary movement. If one can extract a more general conclusion from this Eliade case, I believe it could be the following one: the 20th century invented not only the technologies of incarceration and mass assassinate, but also a technology of systematic, one may say, almost scientific deformation of the truth, against which the historical antecedents (“the black legend”, the propaganda of the 19th century, etc.) appear as belonging to paradisiacal times. Mircea Eliade is just one of the victims of an extremely refined system, where the quarters of truth, next to inferences,

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However, there are in his texts numerous proves that Eliade understood to maintain a certain distance from the legionary movement and these are, as a rule, overseen by those who bring periodically Eliade’s file in front of the public opinion. Eliade’s relation with the legionary movement is, mainly an echo of Nae Ionescu’s relations with the same movement28, or these relations knew complex evolutions29. Even more, when Nae Ionescu declared himself an adept of the hostile attitude toward the Jews of the legionary movement, Eliade refused to follow him, as it happened on the occasion of the famous preface to the book of Sebastian De douã mii de ani30. Even if we can register o period of appreciatively two or three years of closeness between Eliade and the legionary movement, it must be said that afterwards Eliade distanced himself from legionarism as what he thought to be a movement of spiritual renewal of Romania, transformed into a fight for political power, heavily manipulated from abroad, to extend the sphere of influence of Germany in Eastern Europe, and, of course, as the intellectuals of the legion were set aside by the militants of the movement, especially after the assassination of Zelea Codreanu and with the ascension of Horia Sima. As we have already shown, the motivation of the closeness of Eliade to the legionary movement is, according to all the available documents, not political, but a philosophical one. For Eliade, the legionary movement was rather a mystical sect31, a he declares himself, a movement called to (blindness of scholar obsessed with the religious evolution of mankind) to reinstall the primate of the spiritual within a civilization became excessively materialistic. And, non the least, he was fascinated with the heroic idealism of young people who were ready to lose their life for this noble cause, missing for now, as he was to discover later that their idealism could be manipulated without scruples in the fight for power in Romania32. ———————— rumors and the reiteration of information back and forth until its complete deformation, as in the aria “Calumny is a little breeze” of the Jesuit Don Basilio, which has destroyed thousands of lives within the poisonous atmosphere of the Cold War, which otherwise seems to return periodically. It is significant the fact that, after 1990, Eliade was, like Noica, accused in Romanian press of ...collaboration with Security. 28 Even if this affirmation can be corrected through opinions, for instance, as that of Sorin Alexandrescu: “Eliade’s closeness to legionarism had a different character than the adhesion of Nae Ionescu, although, even this one was never proven to be formal. Ionescu got to the side of the Iron Guard in the fall of 1933 for political reasons (…) The following four years, after the adjourning of the newspaper Cuvântul, Eliade did not follow his mentor, from a political point of view. He campaigned, especially in 1935 and 1936, simultaneously for the “spiritual revolution”, realized by the intellectuals, and for the overcoming of the political, rejecting both communism and Nazism” (Sorin Alexandrescu, “Fenomenul legionar: cuvântul ºi faptele – sau despre un caz colectiv de miopie politicã” (III), in 22, no. 37, 15-21 September 1998, p. 10). 29 In this respect, suggestions are found also in Mircea Vulcãnescu’s book, Nae Ionescu aºa cum l-am cunoscut, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992, pp. 100-101. Vulcãnescu affirms even that “…some (legionaries – my emphasis, I.G.) from those who kept in touch with Nae Ionescu formed, later on, the moderate wing of the movement and some of them even its Dissidence” (op. cit., p. 101). 30 Mircea Eliade, “Creºtinãtatea faþã de iudaism”, in Vremea, no. 349, 5 July 1934; Mircea Eliade, “Iudaism ºi anti-Semitism”, in Vremea, no. 347, 22 July 1934. 31 “…the legionary movement has structure and vocation of mystical sect, and not of political movement” (Mircea Eliade, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului (1937-1960), p. 30). 32 “All the more serious is the responsibility of these legionary heads who cancelled ‘the saturation with torture and blood sacrifice’ through the odious assassinates from November 30, 1940, when, next to many de mulþi alþii, au fost uciºi N. Iorga and V. Madgearu» (ibidem).

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On the other hand, this description of Eliade’s position toward the legionary movement should consider that the theoretical reservations of the scholar toward the ideology of the movement are present even in the moments when his enthusiasm and naivety determine him to express a rather personal adhesion than an intellectual one. Thing aggravate after the war. Eliade sets his domicile in Paris, in September 1945, in difficult material conditions, intending to enter within the ranks of the French university professors. In Romania, Mircea Eliade’s name is synonym with being a war criminal, given the biter resolve of some old adversaries, such as the above mentioned Oscar Lemnaru (probably, rather an instrument of other’s hate, whose names are not present for now). In Dreptatea, Oscar Lemnaru writes: “...Mircea Eliade, who not a long time ago asked for blood and death …In journalism, it should not enter any of those who have the hands stained by the ink of hate and infamy. Let not them penetrate the noble world of printing, let not them write, let not them think aloud, that is, in public, these teachers of crime, these professors of atrocities, these schoolmasters of impieties”33. After a month, the accusations of Oscar Lemnaru return, with the same virulence: “[Mircea Eliade] represented in Criterion hooliganism, orienting the word toward obscurantism both by writing and by patois”34. Apparently on an objective tone, Pavel Apostol denounces the “bourgeois idealism” of Eliade in Iluzia Evadãrii: “The exaltation of the past results in deturing the attention from the historical reality, from the reality of the fierce struggle of the working class against exploitation»35. In the publication Glasul patriei, for the Romanians from Diaspora, Eliade is accused of being responsible for the assassination of Iorga and, in a different issue, of a ‘dubious past, with criminal records at all the European police departments”36. Eliade is followed by the same methods also in the West. Due to the negative references of the Romanian ambassador in Paris, is rejected a scholarship approved by C.N.R.S. for the mathematician S. Stoilow.37 Vittorio Lanternari relates that the ambassador of Italy at Warsaw, Ambrogio Donini (the well-known historian of religions) “has received direct information from a Romanian diplomat (ambassador at Warsaw), as well as from French colleagues, about the anti-Semite and pro-Nazi past of Mircea Eliade”. The effect, comments Mircea Handoca, did not delay to appear, “Ambrogio Donini – who wrote the chapter Mircea Eliade in Enciclopedia Religiilor – calls him an anti-Semite and pro-Nazi writer”38. The Romanian scholar, despite these latent or manifest adversities, managed to publish numerous books and, starting with 1956, became professor of the History of Religions at the University of Chicago. In the country takes place, after 1964, a process of liberalization of the regime and, within this context, a ———————— 33 Oscar Lemnaru, «Perna cu ace», in Dreptatea, no. 8, September 3, 1944, p. 2 (apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., pp. 14-15). 34 Idem, October 11, 1944 (apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., p. 15). 35 Pavel Apostol, Iluzia Evadãrii [The Illusion of Escape], Scientific Publishing House [Editura ªtiinþificã], Bucharest, 1958 (apud ibidem). 36 Apud Mircea Handoca, Op. cit., pp. 15-16. 37 Mircea Eliade, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991, p. 92. 38 Mircea Handoca, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

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series of literary writings of Eliade are emerging and several articles regarding his work, especially the literary one, in spite of the opposition of a Gogu Rãdulescu, a Miron Constantinescu, a Leonte Rãutu or a ºtefan Voicu. In 1969, at Chicago appears the homage volume consecrated to Eliade by an important number of researchers of the field: Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade. This volume, which marks the definitive consecration of Eliade as one of the most important researchers of the history of religions, awakens the old animosities. In Toladot, a bulletin in Romanian language of the institute ‘Dr. J. Niemirower’ from Israel, in 1972, is published an unsigned commentary concerning Eliade, entitled ‘Mircea Eliade File’. The author of the article that later on was invoked as incontestable proof against Eliade, criticizing him among the authors who signed the homage volume for Gershom Scholem, the eminent scholar writing on the Jewish mystique, professor at the Jerusalem University, in the following terms: “The presence of the professor at our Hebrew university in the choir of those who bring eulogies to Mircea Eliade is embarrassing, to use a milder word. His colleague from Chicago was not worthy of a salute from Jerusalem. Mircea Eliade wa part of the ‘The Iron Guard’, an extremist anti-Semite organization, whose activity of assassinates is inscribed into our history with the blood of thousands and tens of thousands of victims from the Jews in Romania”39. Among the proofs gathered to support these afirmations, the author invokes the Journal of Mihail Sebastian, which was published in fragments at the time in the two volumes of Works editated by the Publishing House for Literature and which was published integrally by Humanitas Publishing House in 199740. Regarding the content of the article in Toladot, there is a letters exchange between Eliade and Scholem, published by Mircea Handoca in his Literary Journal in May 1998. Scholem urges Eliade to explain himself in what concerns the accusations in Toladot in the following terms: “These pages contain personal attacks against me and yourself, against me because I am ‘guilty’ to have honored you through my contributions to Festschrift; against yourself – because the author accuses you to have been a leading figure of the anti-Semite organization ‘The Iron Guard’ from Romania and to have been expressed anti-Semite ideas during the period of their activity and that you continued during the period of Hitler, including during the years of World War II. The author – Dr. Lavi (Theodor Lowenstein) is a Jewish historian from Romania; he works at the Institute Jad Vashem which is a memorial of the dead in Holocaust (…) I am hoping that you will understand that I am preoccupied by these problems and I would like from your part to react to these accusations, to express your attitude at the time and if necessary the reasons why you have changed your views. For the long while I have known you, I had no reason to believe that you have been an anti-Semite, much less a leader of the anti-Semite movement. I consider you a sincere and righteous man, whom I am looking up to with great respect, and for this reason it seems only normal to ask you to tell me the truth. If there is ———————— 39 «Dosarul Mircea Eliade», in Toladot, an I, 1972, pp. 21-27 (apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., p. 19). 40 Mihail Sebastian, Journal , Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997.

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something to be said on this matter, then let it be said so that the atmosphere of the general accusations is clarified”41. Eliade answered in a letter dated July 3rd, 1972 with the following explanations: “(…) 1. Among the common friends that we had, Sebastian and myself, there were some were legionary. 2. The newspaper Cuvântul [The Word], where Sebastian was a redactor, until its prohibition by King Charles, in 1934, became a pro-legionary organ and, at its reappearance, in September 1941, it was considered even the organ of the ‘Iron Guard’. At the time I was in London and I did not send any article. 3. Finally, and especially, we were, Sebastian and myself, the students and the faithful admirers of professor Nae Ionescu, director of the newspaper The Word (…) Nae Ionescu was adored and libeled with equal fervor and even today, after 32 years since his death, his name occasions a storm of hatred or exaltation. In a similar manner to mine and many other friends, and students, Sebastian did not distance himself from N.I. when it became the ideologue of the Iron Guard. This faithfulness has brought him many troubles, especially after he has published his novel De douã mii de ani [For two thousand years] with a preface by Nae Ionescu. (…) I was among the rare authors which, in two ample articles published in the journal Vremea [The Time], not only that I have defended Sebastian, but I also have criticized this preface, showing that the arguments brought by Nae Ionescu could not be justified theologically, as he thought. At my turn, I have been attacked in a fierce manner by the rightwing press”42. After a while, when the accusations seemed to decrease in intensity, “Mircea Eliade File” regains actuality in the ’80s. Then, Eliade’s writings, inclusively the scientific ones, are without any problems accepted within the country, some beginning to be translated in Romanian. Eliade died in 1986 and his death triggers a wave of enormous emotion. The integral republication of his works is demanded and, within this context, proof that in Romania was the source of the periodic agitation around the name of Eliade, resurfaces also the accusations in the “file”. Adriana Berger, the private secretary of Eliade (in 1984) and the author of a PhD thesis on his prose – The Time and Space in the Fictional Works of Mircea Eliade – publishes in the journal Minimum from Israel an article undertaking the accusations of fascism and anti-Semite orientation already known. Article retakes the theses of a communication given at the congress organized in America in memoriam for the Romanian scholar. A Scottish researcher, Bryan S. Rennie studied the documents invoked by Adriana Berger, arriving at the conclusion that her accusations are based on forgeries43. In August 1991, in the journal The New Republic is published an article of Norman Manea translated in journal 22 with the title “The Fortunate Guilt– Mircea Eliade, Fascism and the unfortunate fate of Romania”44. The author argues here ———————— 41 Apud Mircea Handoca, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 42 Ibidem. 43 Cf. Mircea Handoca, op. cit., p. 24. 44 Norman Manea, Culpa fericitã – Mircea Eliade, fascismul and soarta nefericitã a României, in 22, no. 6, 7 and 8, February – March 1992. The title of the article is an allusion to a note (29 August 1985) from Journal of Mircea Eliade: “…without that felix culpa I have been still in the country. At best, I would have died of consumption in a prison”.

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that “Eliade (…) does not hesitate to identity himself with that generation and even with its political destiny”, even though one can quote many writings where Eliade delimits himself, at least after the war, from the Iron Guard and the sinister assassinates made by its members45. In 1991, Leon Volovici publishes at Pergamon Press a book, translated in 1995 by Humanitas Publishing House, in a version revised by the author with the title Ideologia naþionalistã ºi “Problema Evreiascã” în România anilor’30 [The Nationalist Ideology and the Jewish Question in Romania in the ’30s]. Concerning Eliade, Volovici shows himself objectively enough in his appreciations, quoting several texts that nuance the anti-Semite accusations brought to the scholar: “differing from other intellectuals joining the Guard, Eliade places the accent on other values promoted by the movement such as the Christian spirit, spiritualism, messianic orientation, moral regeneration, the new man – offering the understanding that the anti-Semite characteristic of the Guard is not a central element. In none of his articles exalting the legionary spirit, Eliade does not refer to the obsessive ’question’ for the Legion. The only mention (unequivocal, though) of adhesion to its anti-Semite program appears in the mentioned declaration from the publication Buna Vestire [The Annunciation] (“Why Do I Believe in the Victory of the Legionary Movement”)…”46, confesses Leon Volovici. Relating to the declaration published by the legionary official publication The Annunciation, we must mention, though, that Eliade denied the authorship of the declaration. It seems that it was fabricated in the redaction for a festive issue, and Eliade, a friend of the director of the respective publication, avoided protesting, because he did not want to trigger a public scandal47. Evidently, Volovici maintains his idea that Eliade is an anti-Semite, even if he was merely an anti-Semite by conjuncture: “The position of Mircea Eliade in ‘the Jewish question’ was placed for a rather long time, under the sign of ambiguity, given the contradictory formulations, which seem motivated by the preoccupation to avoid the used patterns and the clichés, but also by the reluctance to adopt a clear attitude. The anti-Semite orientation, as much as it was (my underlining – I.G.), is gradually unveiled, with frequent receding and surprising leaps, without a theoretic approach at length, but one indicating the presence of a doctrine, ———————— 45 The intransigent position of Norman Manea provoked certain reserves among the colleagues in Romania. How relates Norman Manea in the essay entitled Lectura infidelã (22, no. 23, 9-15 June 1998, p. 9) in the editorial Ce înseamnã sã fii rasist, published in România literarã no. 19, 20 May 1998 is criticized by Nicolae Manolescu due to the “lack of nuances”, “the globalization of the accusations”, and “the displacement of the accent to an imaginary anti-Semite orientation”. Nicolae Manolescu recalls, in the mentioned article, also the attitude of Manea, which could be qualified as a “chauvinism of sufferance” toward the declarations of fraternization with the sufferance of some Jews: “In the spring of 1997, the director of Humanitas Publishing House, which issued the Journal of Sebastian, presented, at the Jewish Community in Bucharest, a movingly speech entitled “Sebastian, mon frère”. A declaration of sympathy toward the Jewish sufferance motivated by the speaker through what he suffered himself under the communist and afterwards”. “An analogy – comments Norman Manea – which left no room for a real condemnation of anti-Semite and of Holocaust or a honest analysis of the “fortunate guilt” of some intellectuals such as Eliade, Cioran, Nae Ionescu, Noica” (Ibidem). 46 Leon Volovici, Ideologia naþionalistã ºi “Problema Evreiascã” în România anilor ’30, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995. 47 Cf. Mac Linscott Ricketts, Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907-1945, Columbia University Press, East European Monographs, Boulder & Co., New York, 1988.

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which was never coherently exposed”48. In this passage, Volovici seems to believe that Eliade has an anti-Semite doctrine, but he avoids (why is that?) to transpose it into his articles; pretty unlikely, one may say, especially for a militant who is fully engaged in the legionary movement. A few pages farther, Leon Volovici corrects the idea of an Eliadian anti-Semite doctrine: “similarly to Robert Brasillach, in France, Mircea Eliade does not look for anti-Semite ‘metaphysics’. The fascist sort of mystic, at both authors, does not provoke also an anti-Judaic mystic, but it is merely accompanied by an anti-Semite orientation, de raison»49. We notice that the majority of these extremely critical commentaries addressed to Eliade refer, especially, and as we have seen, rather to the person of the scholar than to his work. However, much inventiveness is necessary, in order to discover in Eliade’s scientific writings (or in the literary writings, for that matter) proofs for his anti-Semite orientation or for his pro-Nazism. For this reason, the anti-Semite orientation and pro-Nazism are considered by these researchers rather associated with Eliade’s political orientations during the 30s (and the aim is to prove that, since they were not denied, they are present also later on) than with his philosophical orientations. With one more recent exception, which is the study consecrated to Eliade by Daniel Dubuisson in the volume Mythologies of the 20th Century (Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade). Dubuisson treats the entire work of Eliade, as historian of religions, in only one key, as an expression of the congenital anti-Semite and Nazi orientations of the Romanian scholar. The titles of the chapters consecrated to Eliade are significant: “3. 1. Fascism and mysticism; 3. 2. The primitive ontology of Mircea Eliade50; 3. 3. The eternal return of the anti-Semite perspective; 3.4. The neo-paganism of the homo religiosus; 3.5. Metaphysics and politics: Eliade and Heidegger”51. Dubuisson begins his study about Eliade declaring himself in disagreement with an idea expressed by Norman Manea (as we have seen, one of the most irreducible critics of the political orientations presupposed pro-fascist of the scholar), namely that one cannot establish a connection between the right wing political articles, on the one hand, and his erudite writings: “to establish a connection between these researches and his ‘fascist’ period, to cast a look of inquisitor over the ‘suspicious’ details present in his numerous erudite studies, would mean to provide the perfect example of a totalitarian method”52, writes Norman Manea. Daniel Dubuisson seems to assume the risk of a totalitarian method, if at stake is the destruction of that ‘very advantageous form of impunity and good will’53 of which Eliade benefits, on his view. “Under these circumstances and in ———————— 48 Leon Volovici, op. cit., p. 137. 49 Op. cit., p. 142. 50 In Society and Culture, no. 3 and 4, 1993 is a summary of the writing of Dubuisson who is mentioned in a footnote. The title is (a translation mistake or attempt to manipulate the original text?) “Ontologia antisemitã a lui Mircea Eliade” [The Anti-Semite Ontology of Mircea Eliade]. 51 Daniel Dubuisson, Mythologies du XXe siècle (Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade), Presses Universitaires de Lille, Lille, 1993. 52 Norman Manea, “Mircea Eliade et la garde de fer”, in Les temps modernes, no. 549, 1992, pp. 89-115, apud Daniel Dubuisson, op. cit., p. 221. 53 Ibidem.

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the interest of Eliade’s work, any study that attempts to understand it has, before anything else, to consider this question: are the ideas exposed in this work transposing the mystical, anti-Semite and anti-modernist ones defended by the extremist militant before the war, or are distinguished from them, rejecting without ambiguity their dishonoring conclusions?54” Armed with such a reading pattern, Dubuisson is browsing through the entire Eliadian work, arriving at not so fortunate conclusions for the Romanian scholar. Briefly, Eliade’s scientific work is categorized as ambiguous55, narcissistic56 and always oriented toward the dark, irrational, instinctive or prophetic57 aspect, since his work “adopts a mystic attitude or substitutes unceasingly his own convictions for the necessary conditions for a serious demonstration”58. Among the method deficiencies of Eliade’s writings, Dubuisson also lists: arbitrary and simplifying options, a total indifference to the historical and ethnographic (sic!) contexts, numerous abusive generalizations and contestable interpretations59. The very fact that Eliade practices a hermeneutic approach is, after Dubuisson, condemnable: “The choice of the word ‘hermeneutic’ to resume the activity of the historian of religions is in this sense revealing. If Eliade did not choose ‘exegesis’, ‘interpretation’, ‘analysis’, ‘commentary’ or any other word that sends to an approach which is at the same time intellectual and erudite, is because he did not want to found his approach on a defense and illustration of the reason and critical thought”60. This latter objection says a lot about the type of reading employed by Dubuisson and which strikingly reminds us of the commentaries of Pavel Apostol (with the difference that they are situated in the 50s). Following these critical exercises, Dubuisson caricaturizes Eliade’s lexis and understands to offer his readers the following exercise: “We leave to the reader, after we have offered the basic lexis, the pleasure to imagine for her the most amusing pastiches. But, the reader can be certain, they are easy to be composed, for any substantive can be associated to any epithet”61. Passing over to the presentation of the ‘primitive ontology of Mircea Eliade,’ Dubuisson starts with a warning to the reader that ‘from Eliade one should never expect a minute treatment of the sources or a detailed presentation of the notions”62 and that “the interest presented by the Eliadian thought does not come thus from the daring theories, from its intrinsic richness or from the doctrinal depth. It rather reside in its exemplary character, because we find here condensed all the defects and all the abuses characteristic for the mystic approaches claiming scientific value”63. ———————— 54 Op. cit., p. 222. 55 Op. cit., p. 223. 56 Op. cit., p. 224. 57 Ibidem. 58 Op. cit., p. 226. 59 Ibidem. 60 Op. cit., p. 231. 61 Op. cit., p. 234. 62 Op. cit., p. 237. 63 Op. cit., p. 238.

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“The Moldavian soul”64 (!?) of Eliade being impressed by this irrational aspect of the world, Eliade’s ontology is mixed with a sort of neo-paganism, according to Dubuisson, which refuses the ontological foundations of JudeoChristianity in favor of a cosmic sacredness of a primitive type, specific to an archaic homo religiosus, obsessed with the ‘ontic’65 element. ‘Amusing’ is, writes Dubuisson, “to ask ourselves if the Eliadian sacred corresponds rather to Parmenide’s being, with the absolute of Vedanta, with the One of the Neo-Platonists or, more prosaically, with the God (which one) from Timaeus, with Krishna or with the Christian God”66. If we draw the last consequences from the Eliadian position concerning the sacred, we may affirm, Dubuisson underlines that, as Eliade says, in Le sacré et le profane, “Christianity is not a religion”67. Eliade could be, Dubuisson reiterates, the exponent of a Platonian ontology, but ‘only summary and not quite Orthodox, but also deformed by all the superstitions that have laden neo-Platonism at the end of Antiquity and ulterior, Christianity, along its entire history”68. In what concerns the method, Dubuisson describes the phenomenology of religion as a “re-Platonization” of certain themes of Husserl’s phenomenology, the ontological realism being contrary to the spirit of Husserl. In the chapter “The Eternal Return of Anti-Semitism” Eliade’s ideas concerning the terror of history are amply discussed and qualified as a “metaphysical novel”69. The interpretation of the Eliadian views is seriously distorted by Dubuisson, in order to result that Eliade: 1. blames Judaic religion because “it invented history” (!?); 2. accuses the “Judaisation”70 of cosmic Christianity, etc. Eliade’s conclusion (invented in its entirety by Dubuisson, though) would be that “inventing history, the Jews and then, their followers, the Christians, not only they have introduced an ideology into the world, rather a heresy, which has led people to forgetting the only true valuable sacredness, that manifest in the wonders of Nature and Life, but through these the being of Being was impared71 (sic !). ———————— 64 Op. cit., p. 243. 65 Op. cit., p. 244. 66 Op. cit., p. 245. 67 This pseudo-quote from Eliade illustrates the manner in which Dubuisson operates with the texts which he criticizes. In Le Sacré et le Profane, Eliade enumerates three possibilities to approach theoretical the relation between the sacred and the profane: either by postulating a new type of religion, where the profane can become sacred itself , or admitting that “religiousness constitutes an ultimate structure (or fundamental – our note I.G.) of the conscience”, which means that the historical religions may disappear, but religiousness will never vanish, starting from the idea that Christian idea “is not a ‘religion’ and, as a consequence, Christianity thus not need this type of dichotomy of the real”; that, in fact, the Christian does not live in a Cosmos, but in history” (Mircea Eliade, Le Sacré et le Profane, Gallimard, coll. Idées, 1969, pp. 10-11). Dubuisson takes from this paragraph only what serves his thesis, the fact that the idea of religion at Eliade is of neo-pagan type (closed to the ideas of Nietzsche – seen by Dubuisson as an inspiring factor for the Nazi Weltanschauung). 68 Daniel Dubuisson, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 69 Op. cit., p. 270. 70 This is a play in words that we could qualify as ignoble. The incriminated text of Eliade sounds as following: “’The ‘Judaic’ character of the primitive Christianity is equivalent with its ‘historicization’, with the decision of the first theologies to link the history of the Jesus’ sermon and of the emerging Christian Church to the Holy History of the Israel people… The Fathers of the Church have followed the same route: they have ‘Christened’ – we should understand ‘historicized’ – the Asian and Mediterranean symbols, rites myths, relating them to a ‘holy history’” (Mircea Eliade, Aspects du Mythe, Editions Gallimard, 1963, p. 209). 71 Daniel Dubuisson, op. cit., pp. 272-273.

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This interpretation which seems to be entirely under the sign of what Ricoeur called “the epoch of suspicion”, culminates with the following conclusions: a. “the Jews and the Judaic Christianity bear the responsibility of the creation of the modern world as materialist, de-sacralized universe, subjected to science and technology (…); b. the same, that is, the Jews and their Christian successors, are thus responsively of the anguish, the alienation feeling felt by the modern man (…); c. the third conclusion established by Eliade from his meditation on history is based on an intolerable and inadmissible sophism. The Jews, he says, are the inventors of history and through it, of our modernity, rationale and unsacred, or shoah (the Holocaust) is a historical event, modern, rational, scientifically organized and lead; the same Jews are, undoubtedly co-responsible of their own exterminations from the Nazi camps”72. Such a reading among the lines is, in its own way, a masterpiece. If we could simile in front of these conceptual acrobatic approaches, we should remember the passages from the Provincial Letters of Pascal, where he ironically undertakes the art of probable opinions and the art of soundly directing the intention: «Reprenons donc ceux que vous m’avez dits, de peur de méprise; car l’équivoque serait ici dangereuse. Il ne faut tuer que bien à propos, et sur bonne opinion probable»73 [“Let us undertake here what you have told me because I’ll like to avoid the misunderstanding: because the equivoque will be here dangerous. We should not kill someone but for a just cause and based on a probably right opinion”]. This is not, of course, to conceal certain aspects of Mircea Eliade’s activity, in the above pages, for they would not be convenient for the image of the scholar. Obviously, as results from the arguments above, there was a closeness – that was maybe manifest in a former adhesion, but this is not important, unless for a Stalinist type of file – of Eliade to the legionary movement. But this closeness was not motivated politically or by a visceral anti-Semitism of the scholar (on the contrary, there are numerous proofs that this allegedly “antiSemitism” is an invention motivated by other interests). A role played also the naivety of Eliade, his search for a perspective of renewal for the Western civilization and especially for the Romanian civilization. Later on, when some attempted to fabricated a file for crime against humanity, Eliade avoided to fully explaining himself giving the impression that he conceal some aspects of his activity which did more harm than good. One thing should be emphasized, according to Monica Lovinescu: “here are no books of totalitarian tonality in Eliade’s works. Aside the case when insisting on the need for the sacred of any human society and to unveil ‘the camouflage adopted by the sacred in the unsacred world” would be the inherent signs of … fascism’”74. Why doesn’t Eliade recognize entirely his relation with Legionarism?, ———————— 72 Op. cit., pp. 274-275. 73 Blaise Pascal, Les Provinciales ou les lettres écrites par Louis de Montalte à un provincial de ses amis etaux RR. PPP. Jésuites, Editions Baudelaire, Paris, 1966, Septième lettre, p. 112. 74 Monica Lovinescu, “Câteva confuzii”, in 22, no. 10, 13-19 March, 1992, p. 13.

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we could ask. We can answer invoking a knowledgeable opinion in what concerns fabricating files, that of Monica Lovinescu: “In the West, confessing that you were a communist or even a Stalinist does not bring about any prejudice, on the contrary, the fact is quite well received; for exchange, the fact that one adhered to one form or another of fascism as transitory as it may be, represents an inerasable stain able to stop any intellectual career”75. Or, how Lucian Sfez wrote more recently: “The centre extreme condemns everything that it is not familiar to it, in the name of purification. It should better deal with the current forms of totalitarianism”76. To have been kept silent was for Eliade (especially during the’50s) a form of intellectual survival and maybe survival per se. Now, we have the right to judge things in a more nuanced manner, without denying the facts, but also without interpreting them tendentiously and approximately. But we can express reserves, of course, toward the method of the ‘file’ applied to Eliade, as well as to other important authors (such as Heidegger, Cioran77 and others), a modern form of a Manichaeism which has no place within the world of culture, the eternal empire of the nuances. BIBLIOGRAPHY Apostol, Pavel, Iluzia Evadãrii [The Illusion of Escape], Scientific Publishing House [Editura ªtiinþificã], Bucharest, 1958; Cioran, Emil, Cahiers 1957-1972, Editions Gallimard, 1997; Culianu, Ioan Petru, Mircea Eliade necunoscutul, in vol. Ioan Petru Culianu, Mircea Eliade, Nemira Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995; Cusin, Philippe, “A doua moarte a lui Cioran”, translation and adaptation by Iulian Anghel after Le Figaro Litteraire, 24 April 1997, in 22, no. 25, 24-30 June 1997; Dubuisson, Daniel, Mythologies du XXe siècle (Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade), Presses Universitaires de Lille, Lille, 1993; Eliade, Mircea, “Creºtinãtatea faþã de iudaism”, in Vremea, no. 349, 5 July 1934; Eliade, Mircea, “Iudaism ºi anti-Semitism”, in Vremea, no. 347, 22 July 1934; Eliade, Mircea, Aspects du Mythe, Editions Gallimard, 1963; Eliade, Mircea, Jurnal, vol. II, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993; ———————— 75 Ibidem. 76 Apud Philippe Cusin, “A doua moarte a lui Cioran”, translation and adaptation by Iulian Anghel after Le Figaro Litteraire, 24 April 1997, in 22, no. 25, 24-30 June 1997, p. 11. 77 Also in what concerns Cioran the method of “periodic disclosures”. A recent example is that of the polemics awaken in France by the publication of the biography of Patrice Bollon, Cioran l’hérétique. Signaling the issuance of this biography in Le Point at April 5, 1998, Jean-Paul Enthoven found the occasion to recall the “fascist past” of the author of The Trouble with Being Born in a note entitled “The second death of Cioran”. Immediately, in a different note, Bernard-Henri Lévy undertakes the suggestion, reminding the embarrassment of Cioran with the occasion of an interview where the interlocutor (that is, B.-H.L.) evoked the same cloudy past of the writer. To these, Edgar Morin answered in an article from Le Figaro littéraire that “one cannot imprison someone within nu his own past, hemming him in his youth when he has evolved” (apud Philippe Cusin, op. cit., in 22, no. 25, 24-30 June 1997, p. 10). Let us recall here a note from the “Book-notes” of Cioran: “I am thinking to my ‘mistakes’ of the past and I cannot regret them. It would mean to trample on my youth, which I would not do at any cost. My past exaltations emanated from my vitality, from my taste for scandal and challenging, from a will to be effective in spite of my nihilism at the time. – The best thing that we can do is to accept our past; or to forget about it, to consider it dead, dead as a doornail” (Cioran, Cahiers 1957-1972, Editions Gallimard, 1997, p. 208).

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Eliade, Mircea, Le Sacré et le Profane, Gallimard, coll. Idées, 1969; Eliade, Mircea, Memorii. Recoltele solstiþiului, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991; Eliade, Mircea, Textele “Legionare” and Despre românism, antology by Mircea Handoca, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2001; Lovinescu, Monica, “Câteva confuzii”, in 22, no. 10, 13-19 March, 1992; Manea, Norman, “Mircea Eliade et la garde de fer”, in Les temps modernes, no. 549, 1992, pp. 89-91; Manea, Norman, Culpa fericitã – Mircea Eliade, fascismul and soarta nefericitã a României, in 22, no. 6,7 and 8, February–March 1992; Pascal, Blaise, Les Provinciales ou les lettres écrites par Louis de Montalte à un provincial de ses amis etaux RR. PPP. Jésuites, Septième lettre, Editions Baudelaire, Paris, 1966; Ricketts, Mac Linscott, Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907-1945, Columbia University Press, East European Monographs, Boulder & Co., New York, 1988; Sebastian, Mihail, Journal, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997; Volovici, Leon, Ideologia naþionalistã ºi “Problema Evreiascã” în România anilor ’30, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.

LOCAL IDENTITY: A CONSTELLATION OF STIRRING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MULTIPLICITIES* HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN**

Abstract. Local identity can be seen nowadays as a diverse phenomenon, manifest as multiple realities. But even the identity of a specific place, seen in geographical and sociological terms is subjected to centrifugal dynamics specific for the complexity of the contemporary world. We notice that there are local identities seen sociologically (and ethnographically) that identify local characteristics structured by the practices of certain social groups specific for the region or group and individual practices that have a political bearing. The idea of this study proposes a perspective in which local identity is not a homogeneous entity, but a multitude (of differences and Derridarian differances), themselves caught within multiple processes of transformation, in time and space. If local identity is not just one, or is not easily definable anymore, then is it diffusing or vanishing? Keywords: local identity, personal identity, group identity, political and sociological identity.

Local identity is a diverse phenomenon which manifests itself through multiple realities. But even the identity of the place, one with a precise geographical situation subjected to centrifugal dynamics specific for the complexity of the contemporary world. We notice that there are local identities seen from the sociological perspective, which identifies certain local characteristics structured specifically for certain social groups and certain social practices associated with a certain region, and with a local identity with particular ethnographic nature, consisting in customs, crafts, artistic practices and artefacts and in linguistic artistic works, or particularities, considered descriptive for that particular area. The main idea of this study proposes a perspective that sees local identity as less than a homogeneous entity, but as a constellation of multiple differences ———————— * Version of the paper presented at the Conference entitled ”Patrimony and Local Identity”, Valea Verde, 4-7 September 2014. ** Scientific Researcher III, PhD, at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, and the Institute of Philosophy and Psychology “Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru” of the Romanian Academy and correspondent member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists; [email protected]. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 78–90, Bucharest, 2015.

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(and Derridarian differances) and transformative processes, themselves caught within multiple processes of transformation, in time and space. Whether local identity is not homogeneous and unitary and it is not easily definable, can we infer that it is diffusing or vanishing? Methodologically, we choose to approach local identity from the perspective of the subject, as whatever the subject decides to consider that it characterizes identity, either an element or a traditional process, or something else, something borrowed, or a result of her own creativity, when the self becomes her own work of art managed by herself and not the “mechanic” result of functional traditions, language games, customs, relations or the result of socialization and of the institutional practice, regional or national. On the one hand, local identity is a mosaic of narrations about pain, desire, fear, origin, future, heroes and heroism, women and men, society and solitude, victim and executioner, social inclusion or exclusion, etc. and about the individual perception on all these matters, as well as about the attachment to places, objects, customs, crafts, artistic and linguistic products considered descriptive for a particular area. On the other hand, these narrations are a true revealing process for the manner in which the universal myths of humanity are particularized within precise (yet different) temporal, historical, geographical, economic and political contexts. As well the mythology, as the collective memory and the nostalgia of communities play an important role within the structuring and the “colouring” of the particular narration of the local identities. Nevertheless, local identity, so powerful in traditional communities, dissipates during modernity and postmodernism toward personal identities through diverse mechanisms, which do not send local identity toward nihilism, relativism or annihilation, but treats it as a resource to treasure and capitalize upon, distilling it in creativity1, according to the conception (or lack of conception) of the world and self of the individual.

Local Identity in Traditional Perspective Local identity is in traditional perspective transmitted and cared for, or even established by the elders, or family, local historic, or context, social, economic, political position or by the communitarian authorities, and not by the individual upon will. In other words, in pre-modernity identity did not belong to the individual unless in the extent she felt it given was given for a pious preservation. When this is the case, local identity may be maintained for a longer while. Other times, the political regimes, the social and economic processes, or just time, may alter, or, at limit, may destroy local identity. This way, local identity is transformed or transfigured in its main characteristics, either slowly, or in a more drastic manner, following the directions drawn by the political, social, economic evolutions or by the personal one. In this respect we are going to ——————— 1 See also Viorella Manolache, “Dinamica modelului european asupra localismului creator în epoca „modernismului ofensiv” (Prima jumãtate a secolului XXI)”, in Revista de Filosofie, no. 1-2/2011, pp. 224-228.

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present several Romanian illustrations of this dynamics: the traditions of the socalled “momârlani” (“Dacian remains”, who still wear at the holidays the tight trousers and the shirt down to the knees and talk a in a specific manner characterized by certain particular terms) and the destiny of the Dacian fortress Bãniþa. Thus, the first example underlines the perpetuation of a Romanian identity forming tradition deep into modernity and post-modernity. We recall, within the poetic and philosophical vision of Lucian Blaga, “eternity was born in the village”. The village preserves certain appearances of places, certain objects, or customs, certain crafts or artistic and linguist products considered sacred for longer periods of time than the city. Some of these aspects are specific from village to village and some are common transcending the region. Nothing reaffirms more this long duration of tradition, than the custom of the Romanian population from the Jiu River Valley, called “momârlani,” a population resembling more the Dacians than the population from the rest of Romania, as a region unconquered (or incompletely conquered so that they were not really ruled or civilized) by the Romans, remaining closer to the Dacian traditions and culture. For example, these people from Bãniþa still preserve their tradition to bury their dead one in the garden behind the house2. Thus the families remain together after death, too, caught in a circle of eternity. One may notice that these houses are quite uncommon, someone else that they can never be sold, but in fact for these people to sell their houses is unconceivable. At home is where everyone is, a place of really imperceptible changes, and hence, at home is a place where the circularity of traditions and the long durations of customs, give people a sense of something very close to eternity. Another case provides an illustration of the disappearance of an identity custom. We refer to a custom from the same region that persisted until 1964 when it was eradicated by the communist regime. This was a ceremonial of the god Gebeleizis, perpetuated by the Dacians, as the ethnographer Petre Fãgaº relates3. He shows that the Church not being able to discourage this custom undertook it among the other religious manifestations taking place in the Easter day.“How was this custom: the wealthiest people from the locality, along with the not so wealthy ones, but driven to faith, and also with the help of the Church, after the end of the liturgy and the sharing of the Pascal (Easter bread is accompanied by wine), they brought in the Church long tables from people’s homes. They put on these tables bread, cheese, ham and wine. From these ate whoever wanted, but only after the end of the liturgy. No one had, though, the right to take anything away from there but they could eat as much as they wanted to. People could go out and return without restrictions (after the liturgy), because the Church was open from the dawn to dusk. At the occasion any pauper received also a glass with 150 grams of wine. And people said that there are ones who taste wine and bread only at Easter”4. ——————— 2 http://adevarul.ro/locale/hunedoara/raman-aproape-familie-moarte-1_50accc6b7c42d5a6638a1320/ index.html. 3 http://studiietnoistorice.wordpress.com/analize-si-cercetari/momarlanii-si-obiceiurile-lor-interviu-cupetre-fagas/. 4 Ibidem.

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Some of the elements of identity remain partially unchanged despite the hostile political regimes, especially because they are inactive or unused elements of local/traditional identity. Within the chain of Dacian fortresses erected to protect Sarmisegetusa Regia, the main Dacian fortress, there was also Bãniþa Fortress. Situated next to the Vâlcan Gate, and responsible for the prevention of the Southern Roman invasions, it barred the itineraries from the ªureanu Mountains which could lead behind the Dacian defence lines. Bãniþa Fortress is nowadays for us a hill, pointed and covered by vegetation from which here and there spring steps or dislevelment that can suggest, maybe, a fortress. During antiquity and the Middle Ages the fortress was still used, but then it slipped into the dark fogginess of history. Probably the Romans posted guards at the fortress’s feet in the attempt to insulate it. The wanderers say that the fortress is unsearched and it only escaped the communist vigilance because the 250-300 m of slope is difficult to climb (at least 25 de minutes)5. While the Churches were communist targets as active identity symbols of Christianity, at the time considered obsolete, this fortress, since it was not used, did not represent a big threat. Nevertheless, a part of the stones were used during the communist regime for the foundation of the railway. In this last case, but also in the other cases presented, we notice that identity is more of a composite of elements and historic-social and political processes, with a layered architecture, whose stratification potentates its dynamics and its adaptability. Local identity is modelled by events and political measures as much as by social and linguistic interaction. Mary Bucholtz from the University of California, Santa Barbara and Kira Hall from the University of Colorado propose in the study entitled “Identity and interaction: a socio-cultural linguistic approach” an analysis framework for identity, as a product of the linguistic interaction that follows a series of principles. In this respect, the authors show that identity is rather a product than a source of linguistic and semiotic practices and as following it is a socio-cultural product and not an intern psycho-social primary phenomenon. Another observation is that identities include diverse demographic categories at macro-social level, participative roles, specific situations and local and cultural positions, which are ethnographically triggered. Also, these authors show that the identities can be linguistically indexed in relation to style, structure and linguistic systems, etc. Also, the identities are built relationally through many aspects that sometimes overlap, concerning the relation between self and alterity, similarity and difference, authenticity and artifice/ artificiality or authority and lack of authority. Eventually, the identities can be partially intentional, partially a question of habit, when they are not entirely conscious. Partially the identities are the result of the negotiation interactions, partially being a construct of the perceptions and representations of the others, as well as a result of the action of the ampler ideological processes and structures6. ———————— 5 http://www.replicahd.ro/replica_db/index.php?pagerun=2&title=banita_cetatea_interzisa&more=1&c=1 6 Study available at http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/40469_13a.pdf.

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In this perspective we are remarking the ambiguities and the dislocations present inner local identities, which tend to be rather an instrument in the language games that give shape contemporary politics, to the individual reflection and aspirations, and in the more fortunate situation, they play an important role in the becoming of the individual as a personal resource. As the result of the diverse interactions and negotiations, of the locale narrative-historical distillates and of the more or less ideological (or indoctrinating) socialization, a pure local identity, part of a totally particular pure culture is unconceivable. Always, the culture and the local identity maintain and retain certain relations with universal concepts, values, characteristics and sentiments as they do with the particular and specific elements. As different, specific and special as doina is, touching the deep cords of the being when played on the flute of the Romanian shepherd it maintains powerful relations with all the sad and moving songs of humanity, voicing tentatively the ambiguous but powerful feelings of longing, love, fear, awe in front of life, death, love or nature, as in front of the great unknown or of the mystery. In this respect, this song is universal, be it popular or authored. Often, this type of song (which was translated by Bartók in the English language as long song7, which maybe should be called not according to its structure, but to its dominant feeling the longing song) traditionally does not have any words8, although it is a narration of feelings. Romanian ballads convey the same profound relation to the world and as powerful feelings through their words that sometimes are more important than the sound. And a similar profound trembling of being we find “far from home”, let us say, in that epical poem of Chesterton, “The Ballad of the White Horse”: For the great Gaels of Ireland/Are the men that God made mad,/For all their wars are merry,/And all their songs are sad 9. Does not convey this ballad the feeling of the individual facing the nature and destiny and the same profound feeling of being in the world, although it is a cult poem from different times? Time has shown that doina did not escape the language games that shape politics, fact especially apparent during the communist regime, which confiscated it precisely because it was an authentic and central element of local identity, first of all, and only then an element of the national identity. The communist politicized musical institutions were meant to elaborate music reflecting political ideas. Music was rather a modest background for the political symphonies, which were unfolding to the fore. “Olt River Doina” was such an assembly that did not fall far from the party line10. Most certainly, in farther area and depending on the softer zeal of the local leaders, as in Maramureº, for example, doina was sung according to the customs of the place and not in agreement with the party instructions11. ———————— 7 Elliott Antokoletz, “The Romanian ‘Long Song’ as Structural Convergent Point for the Chiasmal Harmonic Design in Bartók’s Fourth String Quartet”, Oxford Scholarship Online, DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/ 97801999361 82.003.0008. 8 http://www.webcitation.org/5qp3e9OPb. 9 See http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1719/1719-h/1719-h.htm. 10 Ibidem. 11 See also http://www.webcitation.org/5qp3e9OPb and P. Nixon, 1998.

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Some other times the local culture and identity survive the vicissitudes of history and politics. So did the Romanian village Viscri that seems to preserve the 12th century local identity to a great extent. Local voices, documentarians and the naturalists say that the secret of this preservation was the game capital, very important for hunting, a passion of the last communist leader, because otherwise, the leader would have erased all these “foreign” villages (with German or Saxon majorities, or sizable populations) and their local identity. In the communist regime’s master plan, severing roots, local identities, made the progress toward the golden age of the future smoother. Nowadays this village is famous given the fact that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales Sir Charles bought a residence nearby. In HRH point of view these corners of the Europe are unique and precious, examples of natural ecosystems and sustainability12. But this example is perfect to emphasize another aspect: what is the future for such a well preserved local identity? It is a not-simulated open air museum where people live, dress, talk and work almost like hundreds of years ago.

Local Identities Dependence on the Political Game: the Localism Localism is a favourable context for the local identities. “A global perspective on localism”13 shows the diverse tentative to reach the local grassroots engagements in order to use and manage them, the diverse philosophies of the local government, as well as the diverse jurisdictions that enhance the various particularities in localism. In other words, we can talk about localism as of a sum of philosophies that prioritize the local element, at the same time offering a great importance for the local governance, which is adequate to the particular details of a certain place. The global context and the phenomenon of globalization are the engines of localism nowadays. Although certain challenges of the localism of a region may be unique, there are nonetheless similarities, but there are especially common responsibilities and difficulties. It is about the local production and the local consumption of goods and also it refers to the local control of governance, as well as to the attachment to everything that is local – local history, local culture and local identity, all of them, inter-related14. Localism adopts critical positions toward the centralisation of the governmental power, considered in opposition with the personal freedom. Localism is oriented in the opposite direction to the tendency considered natural in The Federalist Papers, namely that of the increase of government to the detriment of citizen freedoms. This way, localism considers that no Bill of Rights is a sufficient as protection against the danger represented by the overwhelming increase of the government, being necessary to maintain governance at a reduced level at which ———————— 12 See Wild Carpathia, 2011, documentary produced for the Travel Channel by Charlie Ottley. Director: Alasdair Grant. 13 http://www.lgnz.co.nz/assets/Publications/A-global-perspective-on-localism.pdf. 14 http://www.dailypaul.com/272410/localism-a-philosophy-of-government.

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it can be accountable and transparent. The attachment to this type of philosophy of governance is as well included in the concept of localism. The decentralization of power is appreciated by the adepts of localism positively also from the economic standpoint, as they consider that by localism the market becomes stronger and that it maintains the prices of all the transactions at lower levels, maintaining thus also the people within the area, since otherwise, the price of the immigration in other culture is dear, as well financially, as at the level of interpersonal relations, of loyalty for people, culture and traditions of the familiarity of these traditions and customs, which all together build that comfort of home. Localism is based also on the premises, aspirations and purpose of freedom, as well as on the limits of just government. The fact that a government is reduced and local does not ensure as b y magic just governance. Political philosophy of a more recent date recommends a series of theoretical thinkers of various perspectives, such as Michael Sandel, Philip Pettit, William Gaston, Michael Walzer, Q. Skinner and Richard Dagger whose works analyze and propose a revived attachment for the values which are common to liberalism and republicanism, as are the constitutionalism, the rule of law, the individual rights, and entitlements, the civic engagement and civic participation, and the reassessment of the virtues of liberalism and classical republicanism, as solutions for the restitution of the legitimacy of the modern democratic state. They are themselves liberals, republicans or communitarians, thinkers oriented toward the interpretation of the place and role of the values which are fundamental for freedom and democracy, almost in a Tocquevillean spirit. And localism is beneficial for the civic participation to a greater extent than the national scene. At the local level, both local identity and tradition are in strict relation with the participation in the public affairs and with the legitimating of the public life, in general. Concentrating on the varieties of the public representation and understanding the representation in the democratic perspective of the popular entitlements, Philip Pettit15 understands localism within the national context, as a sum of benefices of the local pressure exercised within the process of democratic representation in the USA. “Within the system from Washington the members of Congress are prone to be influenced, for better or for worse, out of the preoccupation for the manner in which they will influence what is going on at home by their votes. This localism may bring occasionally real benefices to their district, as when the members can assure the obtaining of legislative favours. The members of the Parliament from Westminster have too little occasions to think in this manner, since their votes are controlled by the party; the local efforts will be restricted to offering local services of consultancy and performing occasionally roles of celebrity at the local events”16. ———————— 15 Philip Pettit, “Varieties of Public Representation”, in Representation and Popular Rule, ed. Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elizabeth Wood and A.S. Kirshner, C.U.P. in print, accessed at 25th August 2014 www.creum.umontreal.ca/.../Varieties_of_Publi.... See also https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/ 2010/Varieties%20of%20Public%20Representation.pdf. 16 See Philip Pettit, “Varieties of Public Representation”, in Representation and Popular Rule, ed. Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elizabeth Wood and A.S. Kirshner, C.U.P. in print, accessed at 25th August 2014 www.creum.umontreal.ca/.../Varieties_of_Publi... , p. 28.

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Yet, localism tends to be based on the homogeneity of the identities and of the local tradition or reflection on both modernity and post-modernity proving that the things are not quite like this. In his work After Virtue, A. MacIntyre17 conceptualizes the situation of rival traditions, given that even modernity brought along with progress diverse discontinuities in the local traditions and identities. The understanding of the rival traditions (which can be correlated with rival identities) can be realized only by an effort of imagination and opening in order to understand and interrogate the difficulties and the challenges of a different (if not rival) tradition, because eventually the purpose is to overcome these rivalries. The author investigates the importance of the historical transformation (and the importance of the vigilance of the “guardians” of the identities) of the traditional correctness. A. MacIntyre shows: “This transformation of the self and its relation to its roles, from the most traditional roles and to the more emotive contemporary forms, could not show of course if the forms of the moral discourse, the language of morality did not transform, simultaneously”18. The foundation of local welfare, guarantor of the (realistically, relative) preservation of the local identities, stay the democratic culture and traditions, as well as the good governance: the individual freedom, transparency, dialogue, tolerance and government’s accountability.

Personal Political Identity: Hybrid and Weak “The weakness” of local identity in contemporary times is represented by the pre-eminence of the universal in relation to the particular. The democraticrepublican “civil religion” plays an important role in this respect by the infiltration of the human rights, of the democratic rituals and of the modern idea of change and progress, at least as a vague aspiration or as a potentiality, more and more profoundly into the consciousness of the people. Also, an important role in what concerns the changes that “weaken” local identity has democratic pluralism sustained by postmodernism, along with multiculturalism, a more “flexible” reason and tolerance. As we have shown in a review of a recent book on identity19, the study signed by Ana Bazac “Identity and Globalization: An Epistemological Perspective” has a clarifying role introducing the idea that identity can be study instance by instance or in a specific environment that either frees or limits certain aspects of identity. Approaching the status of case and medium of identity, the author arrives to the interpretation of the logical meanings of identity that often prove to be limitative (similarly to the meaning of limit, which does not often limit, according to the phrase of Constantin Noica, but rather indicate what exactly should be overcome). This interpretation leads to another, undertaking an equivalence of ———————— 17 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 31 sqq.; http://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/4.+Macintyre.pdf. 18 Ibidem, p. 35. 19 See Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, book review, at Lorena Stuparu (coord.), Identitatea individualã în contextul globalizãrii. Studii ºi interviuri, Craiova, Aius Publishing House, 2013, see esp. pp. 49, 51, 67, 68, 82, 83, in Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations, no. 1, 2014, pp. 160-162.

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functionality in the analysis of the principle of identity related to a discussion of the principle of alterity. Within this perspective and preoccupied with the etymological moment, or with the capturing of that general mechanism conceiving identity for the human being, or the types of identities specific to individuals based on the dialectics of close-distant identities, this investigation centres on the subject, which is changing and at best evolving, in a dialogue with the perspective opened by Lorena Stuparu, building on the complexity of the concept of identity around and beyond the logical meanings, into the contextualization of the manner to allow identity to be “captured in words”: “Facing the rhetorical question ‘What happens next?” Ana Bazac answers by inter-relating the idea of mass with personal uniqueness, but clarifying from these aspects the meaning of a concept such as multitude, pretext for the affirmation that “identity cannot issue a comfortable discourse”, but it can arrogate the right to represent a subversive perspective. Within an “autochthon” perspective, the study signed by Adriana Neacºu reconfirms the entering in dialogue of the national models with the European ones, bringing to the fore the conception of [the Romanian thinker – our note] I. D. Gherea, who justified the term of pure self in relation with the substantial self, configuring concrete features found in relative stability. The two categories imply individual identities that entertain complex situations and reconfigure their own lasting interval as a criterion for individual identity”20. Investigating the tension between universalism and particulars, Ernesto Laclau analyzed also the tension between postmodernism and its associated multiculturalism and the Enlightenment (and the fundationalism associated to the empire of the Enlightenment values). Laclau has shown: “On the one hand, under the banner of multiculturalism, classical values of Enlightenment are under fire criticism and considered as just a little bit different as the cultural heritage of the Western imperialism. On the other hand, the entire debate concerning the end of modernity, the assault on fundationalism and its varied expressions, tended to establish an essential link between the obsolete notion of foundation of history and society and nowadays contents, which, since Enlightenment, have played the role of foundation”21. Pure local identity is unconceivable in the light of the current theories, but unconceivable is also a radically different identity. E. Laclau noticed also that it is necessary, even if only to affirm someone’s different identity, to consider at the same time the other’s identity, the way it is described, or interiorized and assimilated, even if only as a landmark, from which someone wants to differ. At the same time, there are sufficiently different identities to create the premises of marginalization. But even these identities are “polished” within groups in a similar manner as the exotic element, remaining the stain of colour of the group, marginalized all the same, but free to reposition, inscribing themselves in an already existing plurality of political initiatives, with the danger that the different ———————— 20 Ibidem. 21 Ernesto Laclau, “Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject”, d– i – f – f –e– r –e–n–c–e– s : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 7.1, 1995, p. 146.

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and combatant identity, to be diluted or entirely lost. The cultural authenticity capital transforms into political capital, to wear thin or to be spent for the most part within a process called hybridization22. “Hybridization is not a marginal phenomenon but the very terrain where contemporary political identities are built”23. Discussing the phrase “strategic essentialism” Laclau noticed that it has the advantage to emphasize an important antinomy. On the one hand, this phrase explains the fact that essentialism sends to the idea of a strong political identity, without which neither the political calculus nor the political action could be conceived. But, Laclau continues, it is just a strategy and in fact an indication for the contingency of the political action. Political identity nowadays is fragmented and limited in its combative intensity as limited is the action of the historical agents, notices Laclau. Even when political action is based upon a strong affirmation of the particularity, with a conviction that no agent could be capable by herself, it still emphasizes a community of some sort and the particulars involved discursively (we would say) in that political action are still convincing by the appeal to universal principles. As a consequence, Laclau investigates the critique of fundationalism and selects two main characteristics of identity: 1. The antagonism and the exclusions are constitutive to any identity; 2. The system (as well as in the case of the Lacanian object petit a) against which these antagonisms and exclusions are appreciated and in consequence, against which the identity is judged is whatever system is required by the very logic of the context, but which, surprisingly, is still impossible. This necessary system is present by its absence. And so is identity, because is never fully formed, or entirely fixed, or entirely stable. This does not mean that identity is entirely unstable and entirely unfixed. This perspective supports the idea that identity is best seen as work-in-progress. Hereby the fragmentary character of identity which influences the nature of society, although it never fulfils its entirety and universality. In other words, we can infer that local identity is never completely particular, because it is undermined by the universality which is included in its particulars, paradoxically, even by the absence of that universality. In the book entitled Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies24 and edited by Stuart Hall and David Held, the former25 distinguishes three very different conceptions on identity: (a) the identity of the Enlightenment subject; b) the identity of the sociological subject; and, c) the identity of the postmodern subject. Presenting the identity of the Enlightenment subject Stuart Hall emphasizes the fundament of this identity, which is a specific conception about the human ———————— 22 Ibidem, p. 149. 23 Ibidem, p. 150. 24 See Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, Wiley-Blackwell, 1996; http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Hall-Identity-Modernity 1.pdf. 25 Ibidem, p. 597.

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nature, as fully centred and unified individuality, gifted with rational capacity, cu consciousness, capable of action, with a “centre” consisting of a specific core emerged at the birth of the subject, and which has evolved with the subject, remaining though, essentially, the same – continue or “identical” with himself, we can say – along the entire existence of the individual. That essential centre of the self, explains Stuart Hall, was the identity of the person. The identity of the Enlightenment subject, in Stuart Hall’s perspective, which is the generally accepted contemporary perspective, too, was an identity with a pronounced “individualist” and masculinist character, the subjects being described during Enlightenment as men. The notion of identity of the sociological subject reflects at S. Hall the complexity of the modern world, found in full development, a world where knowledge built an awareness of the fact that the inner core of the subject was not autonomous and self-sufficient, being formed in relation to the “significant others” who have mediated in diverse modalities the relation of the subject with the world (with the values, meanings and symbols that are at the basis of culture) and as a consequence the manner in which it was inherited. Hall mentions that these ideas are indebted to the works of the symbolic interactionists such as Mead, C.H. Cooley, who have elaborated the “interactive” conception about the identity and the self. This is also the perspective that became classic in sociology, shows Hall: identity is formed by the “interaction” of the self with society. According to Hall, the sociological conception maintains in some of its interpretations the idea of the essence of being (considering that there is a “real self”, but it is modified, and formed within the discursive interaction with the world and the multiple identities that it offers. We can notice along with Stuart Hall the fact that the identity of the subject, in the sociological view, is a bridge between the self and the society, between what is personal and what is public. On the one hand, we are projecting ourselves in all the cultural identities we encounter, which we also internalize in proportions and manners that vary, and, on the other hand, we both make new meanings and values part of us, making at the same time as well us, a part of them and a part of the total social structure. There takes place also a process of relative adjustment of the individual identity to the social structure. The feelings and the objective positions occupied in society become more and more suitable to the social structure, a fact that strengthens the “welding” of the subject in the social structure26. In this interpretation of S. Hall the stability or even the establishment of the subject within the world that he or she “dwells”, the unity with the world and the predictability of the world are changed tackling the identity of the postmodern subject. The subject considered previously unitary and with a fixed identity, becomes characterized precisely by a fragmentary identity, compose and composite, multiple and hosting contradictions among antagonist aspects of the same identity. Postmodern institutional, cultural and structural change affects all the social identities in the sense of their fragmentation. Within the process of its identification the projected ———————— 26 Ibidem.

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self is as well variable, un-final and problematic. The postmodern subject has no permanent monolith identity, becoming a “moveable feast”, as Hall says, in the sense of a continuous transformation within the continuous exposal and strain of the cultural systems surrounding the subject. In this theoretical perspective that we accept, the identity of the subject is neither, as we say, pre-defined, nor defined because it is a conglomerate of disjunctive identities found around the coherent self, Hall shows, but we may say, in a Lacanian perspective, around a coherent absent self. At different moments and in diverse situations the subject manifests varied identities that are neither expressions of a coherent self nor of unity around a coherent self as said above, but contradictory expressions, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are fluid, as Z. Bauman would say, and inconstant. In Hall’s view, we feel that we own a unified identity from cradle to grave, only due to the re-comforting “narration about the self” that we are telling ourselves as we go, thoughtlessly readjusting it along the way27. Thus, the fully unified, complete, sure and coherent identity is just a fantasy, and we can emphasize that it is quite the necessary fantasy to legitimate and fuel that “narration about the self”. In fact, says Hall, to the extent that the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, we are confronted with an impressive multiplicity of the possible identities, each, at its time, being the identity with which we have temporarily identified28. Certainly, Hall warns, the three conceptions concerning the identity of the subject are, to a certain extent, simplifications. The philosophical, sociological and even historical arguments can complicate and render more precise the three perspectives. Nevertheless, as landmarks, these surprise the character of change consisting in the manner in which “we” relate to the self and to post-modernity. Globalization is also a factor of perpetual but rapid or frequent change, with a specific character, specifically influencing identities. According to Giddens29, globalization is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”, changing the world profoundly30. The frozen, traditional relations, and the venerable ideas are swept away and the new ones become old in an incredibly fast manner, almost up to a point where what is solid melts into the air, as S. Hall showed. He also quotes A. Giddens: “In traditional societies, the past is honoured and symbols are valued because they contain and perpetuate the experience of generations. Tradition is a means of handling time and space, which inserts any particular activity or experience within the continuity of past, present and future, these in turn being structured by recurrent social practices”31. Modernity, in accordance with these sources, not only that is an experience of the extensive and dynamic life, but it is also an extremely reflexive ———————— 27 Ibidem, p. 598. 28 Ibidem. 29 A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CT., 1990, p. 64. 30 Ibidem. 31 A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 1990, p. 21, apud S. Hall, op. cit.

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form of life where “social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information atout those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character”32. Local identity is no longer that a temporal monolith from the bucolic reveries. Globalization, the tendency of disappearance of the rural space, or, at least its redefinition produces a more and more eclectic, dislocated, multiplex identity (as C. O. Schrag would say), in the places where we withdraw in the search for the traditional mark, for values and authenticity. The traditional element insinuates within fashion and artistic products whose aura of authenticity is paler. What we can see is a composite result, an exotic global identity gradually taking over local traditional identities. Globalization appears to promote either a parallel or a replacement identity. Local identity, as much as it still lasts, is affected by globalization, but it remains a personal resource within the socio-political language games, which prone the individual to look inside and at its own individuality, as to at a work of art, found in progress. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baker, L. R., Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Garrett, B., Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, London, Routledge, 1998; Hall, Stuart, Held, David, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson (ed.), Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies, Wiley-Blackwell, 1996; Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990; Hirsch, E., The Concept of Identity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982; Hume, D., Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1978; Lacan, Jacques, The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book XI, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, New York, Norton, 1998. Laclau, Ernesto, “Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject”, d– i – f – f –e– r –e–n–c–e– s : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 7.1, 1995; Lewis, D., ‘Survival and Identity’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley, California, and reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983; Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxfor, Clarendon Press, 1975; MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, 3rd ed., Notre Dame, In, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007; Martin, R. and J. Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003; Pettit, Philip, “Varieties of Public Representation”, in Representation and Popular Rule, ed. Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elizabeth Wood and A.S. Kirshner, C.U.P. Under print, available at www.creum.umontreal.ca/.../Varieties_of_Publi...accessed at 25th August 2014; ªerban, Henrieta Aniºoara, book review [Lorena Stuparu (coord.), Identitatea individualã în contextul globalizãrii. Studii ºi interviuri, Craiova, Aius Publishing House, 2013] in Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations, no. 1, 2014, pp. 160-162; ªerban, Henrieta Aniºoara, Ideologiile reformatoare, Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2010; Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, introduction by Bertrand Russell, transl. by C. K. Ogden, 2007; Zimmerman, D., “Criteria of Identity and the ‘Identity Mystics’,” Erkenntnis 48, 1998, pp. 281-301. ———————— 32 Ibidem.

DRACULA AND THE TOPOS OF MIRROR CIVILIZATIONS MARIA-ANA TUPAN*

Abstract. Despite his associations with Oscar Wilde, Theosophists and the Society of the Golden Dawn, who were generally constructing an idealized image of Tibet, as in Edwin Arnold’s The Light of Asia, or digging into archaic Celtic roots, Bram Stoker is taking a critical view of antiquated models and values in his Dracula. Instead of the frozen masks of national identities inherited from the Holy Roman Empire, Bram Stoker unfolds a record of migrations, political conspiracies and mirror images of nomadic, rootless ethnic groups, relativizing the West/East polarity in matters of ancestry and cultural specificity. Vampire expert Abraham Van Helsing may be seen as a fictional portrait of experimenting German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, who was Frederick Myers’acknowledged inspirational source in the elaboration of his Theosophy. In parallel to an implicit commendation of “bourgeois life in its aspiration to rationality, philanthropy and scientific spirit” (Ballerstaller 2011, 246), Stoker uses the political construction of the vampire as the embodiment of ancient Asian despotism in Wilhelm Wundt’s Ethics in support of the contemporary cultural movement (Kulturkampf) in Germany and France, whose aestheticism was underwritten by a political agenda of democratic reform. The past is actually ousted from the modern world and symbolized as revenant – a popular image disseminated by contemporary libraries of occultism. Keywords: The Vampire Myth, Cultural Wars, Reverse Colonization, Pragmatism.

Rewriting the Vampire As well as Oscar Wilde, who has Dorian Gray confess his aspiration to the status of aesthete-cum-scientist, Bram Stoker too engaged in earnest with the latest research in psychology carried out in the experimental laboratories of Germany, France or America. The School of Charcot, emulated by Dr Seward, was based on experiments conducted in public, recorded case histories, scientific hypotheses and the practice of hypnotism. Abysmal psychology necessitated ———————— * Habilitated Professor of Bucharest University; [email protected]. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 91–99, Bucharest, 2015.

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some new kind of knowledge, provided, in Dracula, by Abraham Van Helsing, a scholar of encyclopedic knowledge, a hypnotist and pragmatist, and also a connoisseur of ancient lore and folk superstitions. The rationale behind experimentalist Dr. Seward’s invitation to his former professor in Amsterdam to come over and aid him in the vampire case springs from Wilhelm Wundt’s distinction between objects of nature, which can be directly observed, and social phenomena which can only be studied when they have acquired a certain stability by being reified as myths, beliefs, and customs. It is social psychology, which necessitates historical and comparative studies, that allows us to understand the soul of nations manifest in history. According to Wundt, even in more complicated individual cases, such as the one Seward is confronted with, social psychology is needed to complete experimental research: It follows, then, that psychological analysis of the most general mental products, such as language, mythological ideas, and laws of custom, is to be regarded as an aid to the understanding of all the more complicated psychical processes. In its methods, accordingly, this form of psychology stands in close relation to other sciences: as experimental psychology, to the natural sciences; as social psychology, to the special mental sciences (Wundt 1907, § 2: 4). In England, Wundt appears to have been the Virgilian guide of the new psychology taught by Frederick Myers as co-founder of both the Theosophical Society and the Society for Psychical Research (1883), as we can infer from key passages in Myers’s Phantoms of the Living, published jointly with Edmund Gurney and Frank Podmore in 1886 . It was Myers who advertised Wundt’s ideas in the Introduction to the book, in order to press home a theory of the reversed “relation of the corporeal to the psychical life”, which probably was the sources of Wilde’s reversal of life’s priority over art in “The Decay of Lying”: “It is not the psychical life,” he [Wundt] says, “which is a product of the physical organization; rather it is the physical organism which, in all those purposive adjustments which distinguish it from inorganic compounds, is itself a psychical creation” (Gurney 1918, XXXVIII). Research in the state-funded laboratories of physiological psychology, such as the one in Leipzig, which has in the meantime become as important a landmark in psychology as Jena in philosophy, might have owed its rapid spread to other countries, especially France and England, to the prestige conferred by its being backed up by a political agenda pursued by none other than Chancellor Bismarck, one of the most powerful men in Europe. He and Wundt were leading the Kulturkampf which defended the peaceful development of civilized manners and the increase of knowledge in modern, liberal societies, against the heritage of absolutism and clericalism supported by the still standing pillars of the Holy Roman Empire. It was in De l’Esprit De Conquete et L’Usurpation (1813) that Benjamin Constant had first spoken about ancient Asian despotism versus modern liberalism, a polarity which Wundt elaborated on in his Ethics, published in 1886, while also enlarging the frame of political philosophy to include a narrative of psychological anthropology.

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Who Are You, Count Dracula? In movies and in exegetic work, Bram Stoker’s Dracula is identified with Vlad the Impaler, Prince of Wallachia (1431–1476), so called because of the ferocity with which he treated Turkish prisoners. Jonathan Harker, however, in his journey to his distinguished client, never sets foot in the southern part of present-day Romania, The Impaler’s Wallachia, which was an independent principality back then, in the 15th century, nor does he reach the Castle of Bran, which is popularly known as “Dracula’s Castle”. Besides, Dracula is a Count, not a ruling prince. Harker, one of the centres of consciousness, or focalizers in Stoker’s novel is jotting down in his diary an experience of the frontier, a rite of passage from one type of civilization to another: [ …. ] leaving the West and entering the East; the most western of splendid bridges over the Danube, which is here of noble width and depth, took us among the traditions of Turkish rule (Stoker 1897, 2). Dracula’s castle is “on the borders of three states, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Bukovina” (Ibid), on the Bogo Pass, which the castle’s owner is jealously guarding, insinuating, for instance, before the driver of the coach, that he had tried to take his English guest further on into Bukovina. The count resembles one of those Marcher Lords or margraves who were making a fortune guarding borders. Bogo Pass is based upon the Eastern border of the former Holy Roman Empire. The notion of ‘frontier’ is so much emphasized that it is worth a more attentive look. Austria was viewed as a mark: Marchia Orientalis, the “eastern borderland”, or the eastern outpost of the Holy Roman Empire, separating it from the lands inhabited by Székelys, Magyars and Slavs. In the popular imagination, the former had probably attracted to themselves the warrior-like reputation of the marcher lords through whom Otto had managed to expand his empire eastwards (Schutz 2010, 61). The Székelys derive their name from a Hungarian expression meaning “frontier guards” and were regarded as the finest warriors of medieval Transylvania. The Székely territories came under the leadership of the Count of Székelys (Latin: Comes Siculorum), initially a royal appointee from the non-Székely Hungarian nobility who was defacto a margrave; from the fifteenth century onward, the Voivodes of Transylvania held the office themselves (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Székelys). Dracula’s name was known in the Middle Ages to have derived from that of a monarchical chivalric order, Ordo Dragonis, of which The Impaler’s father, Vlad II, had been a member. The Order, whose emblem was a crossed serpent, was founded in 1408 by Sigismund, King of Hungary (1387-1437) and later Holy Roman Emperor (1433-1437). In the book, Dracula is mostly feared on the eve of Saint George, the patron saint of the Order of the Garter, which had probably served Sigismund as a model. The sword of the Order is carved with the mythical pattern of The Tree of Life, as represented in Magyar mythology. The list opens with Stephanus despoth,

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dominus Rasciae, and Stefan Lazarević, Serbian Prince and Despot, including also Vlad II Dracul, Prince of Wallachia. The nickname (surname) “Despot” is suggestive of that ancient heritage of oppressive ’Herrschaft’ (lordhip) which could still be felt in Austria in Stoker’s time. By contrast, Harker is coming from a civilization which seems to have discarded strict hierarchies and hegemonies. The picture of the peaceful and loving bourgeois family is pitted against the autocratic society of the East, where commoners speak beneath their breath, look aside to avoid disquieting questions or critical remarks about “Herren”. The hegemonic structure is everywhere present. Harker vanishes behind his collective representation as a statutary class: the “English Herr”. He puts up at the Hotel Royale in BudaPest and at the Crown Hotel in Bistriz. That whole portion of land was a Crown Hotel in a metaphoric sense as well, because a lot of ethnic groups – Szekelys, Magyars, Germans, Czechs, Slovaks … – were mingling the threads of their lives here. This cosmopolitan society had been created by Empress Catherine as part of an imperial design: she had invited ethnic groups of various provenance to come over, at the state’s expense, and settle the area between the western border and River Volga. Dracula says his kin descended from the Huns, whose migrations had presumably included the North of Europe (Iceland, Scandinavia). His “racial autobiography” is actually one steeped in Magyar mythology. It appears that his kin had sprung from one of Nimrod’s sons, Hunor, being distinct from the Magyars claiming descent from Magor. This legend, which established a link between Huns and Magyars, similar to Geoffrey of Monmouth’s dynastic succession of Aeneas, Brut and Aurelius Ambrosius, was concocted by Simon Késai in Gesta Ungarorum (1282-85), and used by Hungarians as a legitimating translatio imperii or foundational narrative. As a member of the newly emerged professional classes, has Harker documented his prospective journey in the British Museum, as the novelist himself had done, and it is worth noting that he does not include Dracula among the “Wallachs, who are the descendants of the Dacians”, or, later, among the Romanians on the return ship (“Catherine the Great”), who claim desperately that the box in which Dracula is lying be cast overboard. He is very precise about his destination: “east, and Szekelys in the East and North. I am going among the latter [the Szekelys], who claim to be descended from Attila and the Huns” (Stoker 1897, 4). Historians, generally, claim the opposite, namely that the Szekelys were Hungarians too, of the first migration, dispatched to the east to guard the frontier, who got alienated from their kinsmen because of their isolation in the mountains. Be it as it may, Stoker constructed his character according to the superstitious spirit of the place, that is, in mythological garb. As he is trying to get information concerning his client, Harker sees people crossing themselves anxiously, looking embarrassed or frightened. They call the Count “Ordog” and the top of the mountain “Isten szek!’ – ‘God’s seat!”. In Magyar mythology, Isten, God, creates the world with the help of Satan, or Ordog. Dracula also speaks about a race begotten by the Devil on his mother

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in the desert. The Magyar creation myth does indeed mention the generational role of Satan as well as of Mother God, the other major divinity, the God of War, being the very ditty that controls Dracula all the time, spurring his warrior-like instincts. God’s seat is the upper part of the Tree of Life, which is also present in Norse mythology: the Yggdresil, the gigantic tree of Norse cosmology, or the Celtic Tree of Life in The Book of Kells. Such analogies between the eastward and the westward voyages of Dracula are actually more numerous. Whitby was the site of the religious competition between the rites of the Church of Rome and those of the local Celtic monks. The 664 Synod allowed the former to suppress the latter. Bukovina lies at the other end of the Holy Roman Empire bordering the rising Russian power. The ship taking Dracula to England is significantly named after Demeter, the great earth goddess, related through her daughter to the underworld. The gate of entry is Whitby, whose abbey is fabled to be hiding the body of a maid immured in its walls, as is a certain Petrof Skinsky, similarly reported to have been buried in the cemetery walls of the St. Peter church in the East (Galatz). The ship named after Empress Catherine the Great with her expansionist, imperial plans, brings back home the New Evil (De Ville) of reverse colonization. The martyred founder of the Western Christian church (St. Peter) dies symbolically in the body of another martyr in the East. It is as if Yeats’ two temporal gyres matching order and disorder were here being spatialized, emptying into each other.

Vampires and … Mitteleuropa Politics With Wilhelm Wundt, the vampire emerged from the mists of mythology being packed and offered up as an object lesson for anthropology and political philosophy. Dracula takes Harker back to the very roots of his mythical past. His place looks as if nothing had happened since illo tempore, when Hunor and Magor, the flounders of the Hun race were hunting the white stag. Dracula, who welcomes him with disparaging words (“you dwellers in the city cannot enter into the feelings of the hunter”), appears like the ghost to Wittenberg-schooled Haratio in Hamlet (I/1): “A mote it is to trouble the mind’s eye”. The portrait of Stoker’s vampire follows Wundt’s Ethics à la lettre, as we can conclude from a parallel reading of Wundt and Stoker: Death, for instance, is the beginning of a voyage (Meerfahrt) to the Isle of the souls in the west, following the journey of the sun. Its rise and setting are also the only moments when Mina is free from the undead soul’s grip. The undead are visible to the eye but they lack bodily substance, and therefore cast no mirror images. In both texts, we encounter the primitive mind’s sense of the community through blood ties, revived in the rites of certain modern brotherhoods, combined with the compulsive need for revenge – Blutrache/ blood revenge – even when

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the descendants were in no way involved in their forefathers’ wars. The system of fights and retribution (Wundt 1892) originates in the belief in the judgment of the dead by Rhadamanthos. Dracula is a telling example of what Wundt calls “Selbstregulation egoistischer Triebe” (the self-regulation of the selfish tribe) [Wundt 1892, 210-11]. Identity in the land hosting Harker boils down to being positioned within the master-servant class system. Hegemony, demanded by Wundt’s egotistic despot of Asian extract, is three times mentioned in the phrase used by the driver of the antiquated caleche (Dracula in disguise) in reference to the owner of the castle on the border: “mein Herr, and my master the Count”. In the class society based on hierarchy and hegemony, all the subjects are absorbed into the body of the boyar or master. The others only possess a mandated or participatory identity: In his speaking of things and people, and especially of battles, he spoke as if he had been present at them all. This he afterwards explained by saying that to a Boyar the pride of his house and name is his own pride, that their glory is his glory, that their fate is his fate. Whenever he spoke of his house he always said ‘we’, and spoke almost in the plural, like a king speaking. I wish I could put down all he said exactly as he said it, for to me it was most fascinating. It seemed to have in it a whole history of the country (Stoker 1897, 52). An attentive reader will notice, however, that Dracula is not speaking of biological but moral kinship. He does claim kinship, counter to historical truth, with the “Ugrig tribe which had borne down from Iceland the fighting spirit of Thor and Woden”, probably because that was just one of “other races” which shared with the Szekelys the disposition to fight like lions “for lordship”. And yet the Hun and the Woden descent were related through what Benjamin Constant had relatively recently qualified as the “ancient spirit of conquest and usurpation” (De l’Esprit De Conquete et L’Usurpation, 1813). To the republic/ monarchy polarity, cutting across centuries, Constant opposed an evolutionary model grounded in the ancient/modern spirit dyad. Whereas “our freedom must consist of peaceful enjoyment and private independence”, “the system [...] of ancient liberty demands that the citizens should be entirely subjected in order for the nation to be sovereign, and that the individual should be enslaved for the people to be free” (Constant 1819, 10-11). In Harker’s world, “there are no slaves but almost everybody must earn a living through work” (Ibid.), Mina, for instance, is learning shorthand to be able to assist her husband’s work, whereas Dracula, in the speech which he deems fit to gratify his guest and prospective victim with, unfolds the whole array of the ancient spirit’s warlike spirit, which had probably inspired Wundt’s own distinction between the Eudemonismus of creative modern man and the destructive energy of murderous atavism. Harker is the typical citizen of a commercial society “qui apprécie tout par l’utilité”, open to a life of travels and exchanges of goods, and indifferent to the “sterile glory of the military spirit” (Constant 1813, 11). On the contrary, Dracula belongs to a “military race whose victory is associated with glorious renown

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going far beyond their existence on earth” (Constant 1819, 13). While Harker is collecting recipes in search of civilization’s domestic delights, the Szekelys have lived “from battle to battle”, enjoying only the constant pleasure of vanquishing the enemy” (Constant 1819, 19). Unlike the modern company in the novel, saving their society from the intruder in order to be able to enjoy in the future their leisurely and free lives, Dracula is one of Constant’s undead, living both outside time and outside the European civilization, playing on the “loterie de plaisir et de mort” (Constant 1813, 20). Dracula’s person is the locus of a paradoxical mix of brutality and refinement of manners, of extreme violence and greed (Ibid.), the vampire coveting the improvements of the West he hates and despises. The Szekelys and the Northern warrior bands were superior races, because they were master souls. Dracula feels closer to the Berserkers of the Norse mythology, fighting like mad dogs, or rather wolves, than to his mythical Scythian ancestry: old witches, who, expelled from Scythia had mated with the devils in the desert” (Stoker 1897, 53), or to the races with which the Szekelys have been associated by historians: “the Magyar, the Lombard, the Avar, the Bulgar, or the Turk” (Ibid). Instead, he acknowledges no other connection with the Magyars except for a contractual, military one: And when the Hungarian flood swept eastward, the Székelys were claimed as kindred by the victorious Magyars, and to us for centuries was trusted the guarding of the frontier of Turkeyland (Stoker 1897, 54). The next event he mentions seems to be the admission of Vlad II into the Ordo Draconis. He alone had been chosen out of the four nations that had poured into that territory – Magyars, Germans, Transylvanians and Székelys – to receive the ceremonial sword steeped into the dragon’s blood: Who more gladly than we throughout the Four Nations received the ‘bloody sword,’ or at its warlike call flocked quicker to the standard of the King? (Ibid.) The following passage alludes to an episode of The Impaler’s wars against the Ottoman rule and to his betrayal by his brother, Prince Radu the Beautiful: Who was it but one of my own race who as Voivode crossed the Danube and beat the Turk on his own ground? This was a Dracula indeed! Woe was it that his own unworthy brother, when he had fallen, sold his people to the Turk and brought the shame of slavery on them! (Ibid.) Dracula is not a raced body (biological identity), but the very effigy of the warlike spirit (“their heart’s blood, their brains, and their swords”) haunting the people of the present, unheroic age, and feeling nostalgic about the “warlike days” which are no more. Wundt mentions two matrices which may serve for a classification of moral types: Christian, preaching forgiveness, and the Vedanta philosophy, urging retaliation. The Count belongs to the latter. The value of a personality is relative to society’s corporate body, Wundt says, while the Count is leaving scorched ground under the master’s feet: They said that he thought only of himself. Bah! What good are peasants without a leader? Where ends the war without a brain and heart to conduct it? (Stoker 1897, 56).

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Unlike Dracula, Wilhelmina is ready to sacrifice her life for the common good. It is not just her family that concerns her, but the safety of the whole of mankind, or, as Wundt puts it, personal dedication to the good of all (Wundt 1892, 235). “Egoismus”, the pursuit of personal happiness, is set over and against “Eudämonismus”, a contribution to the progress of the civil society, in the form of Friendship, Hospitality and care for the sick. The Asian Despot, Wundt says, will ask a servat to taste his food for fear it might be poisoned. The other may very well die. On the contrary, the holy circle that saves the champions of the Good in the end unites the generous host (Arthur), the caring physician (Seward), and the true friend Van Helsing, running to their rescue. The engineering of social life was rallying both scientists and humanists under the banner of the Battle for Culture against militarism and nationalism. Europeans were divided over dangerous versions of nationalism: Pan-Germans, Russian Pan-Slav agents, Italian irredentists or German politicians planning to take back the German territories into which Russia had extended following the imperialist designs of Catherine the Great (J. Frank 1975, 380). Bismarck was trying, which he suceeded for a while, to divert public attention from the revisionist politics of the ambitious (the forces of Ultramontanism, especially their feudalist and Slav allies” (Hayes 1994, 275), unfolding his plans for a common customs frontier and common market economic integration. By promoting a practical morality of allegiance to the state rather than to antequated notions of hegemony and vasselage, and by prioritising the cosmopolitan exchange of cultural goods over notions of racial identity, Wilhelm Wundt and Bram Stoker contributed in their fictional/non-fictional ways to a program of universal rather than individual progress. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Stoker, Bram, Dracula. Planet PDF, http://www.planetpdf.com/planetpdf/pdfs/free_ebooks/ Dracula_T.pdf.

Secondary Sources Ballerstaller, Norbert, Verführung – Kapitalismus – homme fatal: Eine psychoanalytisch orientierte Studie zerstörerischer Männlichkeit in der englischen Erzählliteratur und Gesellschaft zwischen 1800 und 1900. Dissertation, Braunschweig: Technische Universität Carolo-Wilhelmina, 2010; Constant, Benjamin, De l‘Esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation: dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne. Third Edition Revised and Enlarged, Paris: Le Normand, 1813-4; Constant, Benjamin, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns (1819), The Online Library of Liberty. A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc., http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2251/ Constant_Liberty1521_EBk_v6.0.pdf; Dessoir, Max, Das Doppel-Ich. Leipzig: E. Günther, 1896, http://archive.org/ details/dasdoppelich 00dessgoog>;

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Frank, J., The German Migration to the East, North Dakota Historical Society of Germans from. Russia, 1975, http://library.ndsu.edu/grhc/history_culture/history/files/Jerry%20Frank%20-% 20The% 20German% 20Migration%20to%20the%20East.pdf; Greenwood, John D., “Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, and Experimental Social Psychology”, History of Psychology, Volume 6 (1), February 2003, pp. 70-88, American Psychological Association, 2003; Gurney, Edmund, Frederic W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore. 1918/1886, Phantasms of the Living, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., Ltd. New York: E. P. Duttom and Co., 1918, http:/ www. archive.org/stream/PhantasmsOfTheLiving-1918/5173877-Phantasms-o-the-Living Abridged_djvu.txt in December 2009; Hayes, Bascom Barry, Bismarck and Mitteleuropa. Cranbury, New Jersey, US; London, England, UK; Mississauga, Ontario, Canada: Associated University Presses, 1994; Schutz, Herbert, The Medieval Empire in Central Europe. Dynastic Continuity in the PostCarolingian Frankish Realm, 900-1300, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010; Wundt, Wilhelm, Ethik. Eine Untersuchung der Thatsachen und Gesetze der Sittlichen Lebens, Zweite Auflage, Stuttgart. F. Enke, 1892; Wundt, Wilhelm, Outlines of Psychology. Trans. Charles Hubbard Judd. St. Claires Shores, MI: Scholarly Press, 1907, http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~psycho/wundt/opera/wundt/OLiPsych/ OLiPsy02.htm.

THE MUDEJAR CITY ELEMENTS OF ISLAMIC-CHRISTIAN SYNTHESIS WITHIN URBAN PLANNING ANA MARIA NEGOIÞÃ*

Abstract. This essay analyses the main elements of the Mudejar City from different points of view: historical, stylistic, religious and mainly urban. We include some examples of how the main Islamic urban structure experienced modifications during the Reconquista period with a focus on those solutions that are characteristics of the Mudejar style. We observe the main phases of the process (the transformation among the urban tissue and the main buildings) that occurred from the point where the Islamic city underwent change during the new Christian period. Keywords: Mudejar, Islamic city, khittah, mosque, cathedral, Christian city, urbanism, mozarabe, urban planning, urban syntheses, Reconquista.

In a brief analysis of urbanization of the Iberian Peninsula, we can identify cities in the southern area which may be defined as adhering to a particular Islamic character of urban structure, while in northern cities Christian features prevail. There are a number of urban centers that are found in the central and southern part which passed through different stages: Romanization, Visigoth and later Islamic period. Among the so called Christian cities, we can mention Leon, which maintained an evidently Roman character of planimetry. The Late Medieval period experienced an unprecedented growth of suburbs that revolved around the Central nuclei, often formed around the triad of religious building, aulic residences (the royal court) and commercial space1. There is a series of cities which developed beginning from this nucleus, respecting in the initial phase a pattern typical for the Islamic urban ideology, this structure evolved during the Reconquista period, experienced a series of transformations which in the end generated a new urban typology specific to this area. The history of urbanism mentions specific types of Islamic cities such as: ———————— * Art Historian. PhD in art history at CESI – University of Bucharest; [email protected]. 1 Fabie, Via jespor Espagna, Madrid, 1879, in Simposio Internacional Sobre La Ciudad Islamica, op. cit., pp. 433-434. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 100–106, Bucharest, 2015.

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cities of the Ottoman Empire, North African cities and Saharan cities. According to this enumeration a new type of city needed to be introduced a city specific to the Iberian space, the Mudejar City. Representative of this type is a series of cities in the region of Aragon area such as Teruel. During the Reconquista a series of travelers reminisced about the Moorish population which continued to practice their rites and customs even in the spaces occupied by Christians.There are many examples of these cities in which even after the restoration in force of Christianity important groups of populations preserved their day by day life following the norms and rituals specific to Islamic society, we mentioned Teruel but we can add Palencia to this case study. The travelers indicate the fact that the Christian community willingly accepted the integration of these kinds of groups. This type of tolerance often manifested in the city’s inhabitants but was less practiced by the political and religious authorities, but this pattern was implemented and became norm in the mentality of the Iberian Peninsula during the Islamic period. Paolo Cueneo2 specifies that the particularity of this type of medieval town is a main characteristic of an urban phenomenon that could be called urban Mudejarism, a phenomenon that has occurred at different intensities causing transformations of the urban tissue in all the Islamic cities after they had been conquered, but this phenomenon was concentrated in the urban centers as well as Avila or Burgos later in Malaga or Valencia. In many of these cities the structuring of the cities in khittah was preserved until the late period of the middle age and this took place even in the Renaissance period.

Different type of Mudejar Cities The Transformations of the Urban Tissue during the Process ———————— 2 Paolo Cueneo, Storia dell’urbanistica. Il mondo islamico, Bari, La Terza, 1986, pp. 216-220.

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Terms such as: las mozarabías, las morerías las juderías, represented names of such neighborhoods (khittah) areas which have been delimitated in the urban space in which the rules of daily life reflected the specific needs to that community. The main transformation produced inside the city during the restoration of the Christian ideology affected the planimetry of the house. The locative structures included large familiar groups which lived in the same building, the division of the inner space followed gender hierarchy and the ways these genders interacted with the public space. The core characteristics of the Islamic private space were totally contradicted by the Christian way of living. In this sense the house suffered an entire process of morphological changes in their attempt to open towards the public space, to find in-situ solutions to be in direct contact with the street, with the community, the locative spaces are fragmented and the multi-family system is dissolved, this transformation fundamentally modified the urban tissue emphasizing the sense of randomness and the irregularity of the urban structure. Beginning with the Reconquista we notice that the Arab population migrated to the southern part of the peninsula; those who remained in the middle area which had been reconquered by Christians by Christians were called Mudejars. The Mudejar City experienced a series of movements which were the reverse of the Islamisation period; more specifically the transformations concentrated on the religious edifices such as the mosques that were either destroyed or adapted to the Christian rituals. The classic example in this case is the great mosque of Cordoba which was converted into a Cathedral as well as the mosque Bab-alMardun of Toledo which functioned as a Christian Cathedral. The Mudejar City experienced a process of restructuring and redivision of the public spaces, the entity of the entity of khittah was replaced with another entity patterned on the ideological nature of Christian parishes. At the end of the 12th century in cities already conquered an important campaign of building rural oratories, specifically Christian oratorios placed in the suburbs of ancient Islamic cities. Pedro Lavado3 considers from the urbanistic point of view the Mudejar City does not experience any fundamental change, all the transformations have been generated by the necessity to adapt the urban tissue to new norms and new socioreligious conditions. The city silhouette preserved a defensive characteristic and the surrounding walls which had often been restored by muslim groups such as in Palencia and Teruel, this was a demand that the catholic kings expressed towards the Muslim population. The Mudejar term applied to urban systems was borrowed from the repertoire of decorative stylistics where it defined a new style classifying a series of elements of the synthesis: mixing the typical Christian iconography with decorative elements or patterns of organizing the space typically Islamic, insertions of techniques and materials specific to Islamic decoration in the morphology of Christian style. For example in the case of Compostela it can be noticed that the hospitals which ———————— 3 Simposio Internacional Sobre La Ciudad Islamica, Potencias y comunicaciones, Zaragoza, Institution Fernando El Catolico, 1991, pp. 444-446.

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had been added to the Madrasas of the Islamic cities were fully preserved, having the same function as before: assistance and caring of the pilgrims. Many hospitals are mentioned along the pilgrimage routes mainly in the 15th and 16th centuries, these buildings settled a new architectural style characterised by the Mudejar stylistics: Hospital de rei y de la conception from Burgos, Palmero sin Fromista and the Santiago in Benevente. Cities such as Toledo and Madridtook the institution of the hospital as they had been organized in the Islamic period (public buildings raised and supported by the tax system specific to the Islamic administration or by Mecena solutions). As the phenomenon of forming a new political, military, religious and economical Christian aristocracy became more aware the modification experienced by the urban structures became more evident4. Cities such as Toledo, Zaragoza, Almeria, Malaga, Valencia and Cordoba suffered planimetric modifications imposed by the will of this new Christian social hierarchy. Perhaps the most significant change occurring in these cities is synthesized at the level of commercial premises; from the 12th century, markets typically lose their Islamic characteristics. The structuring of the goods within specialized areas, typical for Islamic markets, is dissolved. The preferences to place these markets in the central area of the city, near the religious buildings or in so called public spaces are still preserved.

Urban planning of Malaga and Valencia in the Mudejar period

During the Christian period they had a mixed function. It can be noticed that the phenomenon of migration of the population towards the south took place ———————— 4 La Ciudad En Al-Andalus z El Maghreb in Actas del II Congreso Internacional La Ciudad En Al-Andalus Y El Maghreb, Universita de Cadiz, 1999, pp. 328-341. 5 Moeno, Ana Navarro, Centros urbanos en Al-Andaluz, Madrid, Art Gerust Publicaciones, 2010. 6 Palazon Navarro Julio & Castillo Pedro Jimenes, Las Ciudades de Al-Andalus. Nuevas pespectivas, Zaragosa, Institudo de EstudiosIslamicos y del Oriente Proximo, 2007.

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simultaneously to another phenomenon which occurred inside the city, more precisely the Muslim and the Jewish population moved into individual suburbs: so called Moreria and Juderias. They formed individual districts preserving inside these communities the ethnic characteristics and the rituals according to their religious needs5. These districts were closed by gates during the evening. As a consequence of this phenomenon inside the cities free areas (uninhabited areas) were formed, houses and entire residential areas had no owners and were occupied by the Christian population which had arrived in the cities after the reconquering. In this regard the planimetrical change began inside the core of the city. A small locative nucleus were the first to be affected extending to the public space and the main administrative building. The specific Islamic tendency that the industrial and artisanal spaces be placed at the periphery of the city was dissolved, the religious rituals of the new community would radically transform the inner and the exterior space of the building but mainly the interstitial space between the religious building and the urban planimetry6. For example in Toledo a whole series of mosques became in the Christian period either sanctuaries or monasteries. Beginning in 1300 it can be noticed in Cordoba, Toledo, Segovia, the initiation of a campaign to build synagogues, a fact that proves the infiltration of the Jewish community in the official structures of the new power. In the Islamic period the centre of the city was formed by the pair, mosque – official residences. In the Christian period the central area was redefined by the silhouette of the cathedral and the buildings of the local authorities: the city hall. The individual districts which still preserved ethnic characteristics specific to the Islamic period were divided according to new urban systems, as we mentioned the main nucleus of these districts were represented by the parishes. In conclusion we can establish a series of main characteristics able to define a Mudejar type city: 1. There are no markets (in the sense of Islamic suk) nor any forums, nor palestrae with antique roots as we expected after to resurrect after the Christian conquest. Step by step inside the city a new public space appeared which we can call piazza/plaza, a space which includes the significance of the above mentioned Roman spaces, a space which received an important attention from the urbanists and artists during the renaissance. 2. The city gates with military and defensive function among the towers represents the most important medieval characteristic of the city. 3. The Watchtower had in this new typology a double function, defensive and religious. It was often integrated in the city walls but also in the main public buildings of the city. 4. An element which is inseparable in relation to the tower is represented by the clock, the presence of the clock tower definitely changed the urban physiognomy and the rapport between the public space and the community. Initially this was inside the church tower afterwards becoming an annex of the city hall. an example is Tore Nueva from Zaragoza built on the initiative of the municipal authority. Step by step the clock tower regained its own individuality gaining

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authority and the typical architectural morphology. In the late period we notice the integration of the clock tower in the mosques in the Tunisian areas. 5. The existence of 2 ritual (religious) buildings which competed for the public space inside the city: Mosque and cathedral7. 6. The market which in this period had a mixed typology tried to adapt the typical Islamic organisation to economic and social demands of the new city hierarchy. 7. The appearance of new public edifices demanded by the new structure of social life: the city hall, public fountains (for decorative purposes), hospitals transformed in the already mentioned way. The mosques occupied in the urban space an isolated space in the meanwhile the cathedral had the tendency to incorporate various utility buildings as well as locative spaces. 8. A dialectic conflict can be noticed at the level of civil life inside the power groups: the nobility and aristocratic one and the rest of the social segments, this intersocial rapport inside the Mudejar City involve a series of changes in the urban morphology. One of the main characteristics of the urban functions which concentrated on the commercial spaces would shape the spaces into a structure that follows an order ruled by Christian habits but also Islamic ones taking into account the fact that the majority of the commercial agents were from these two communities. 9. Elements such as water shaped the general form of the city (placement and orientation towards the water source) but also created internal urban points which concentrated among these elements (with decorative or practical functions)8. 10. The Mudejar City is characterized by a series of morpho-structural synthesis which had an impact on the urban tissue including spaces with different characteristics: Islamic, Christian, Judaist but also public buildings which had to respond to the socio-religious needs of both communities (Islamic and Christian communities).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Al-Andaluz, Pais de ciudades, Actas del congreso celebrado en Oropea (Toledo, del 12 al 14 de margo de 2005), Diputacion Provincial de Toledo, Graficas Monterreina, 2007; Al-Hathoul, Saleh, The Arab-Muslim City: Tradition, Continuity and Change in the Physical Environment, Riyadh, Dar Al Sahan, 1996; Alvarez, Raul Ruiz, El urbanismo de la Granada Nazari, Madrid, Art Gerust Publicaciones, 2010; Carra, Lorenzo (ed.), Ciudad y territorio en el Andalus, Granada, Athos-Pergamos, 2000; Carrascosa, Felicidad Perez, Ciudad y urbanismo en Al-Andaluz, Madrid, Art Gerust Publicaciones, 2110; Chalmeta, Pedro, El senordelzoco, in Espagna: Edades Media y Moderna, Contribucion al Estudio de la Historia del Mercado, I-X, 761, Madrid, Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1973; Hernandez, Medianero Jose Maria, Historia de las formas urbanas medievales, Sevilla, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 2004; Jeal, Francois (ed.), Regards a l’Andalus (8eme et 15eme siecle), Madrid, Casa de Velasquez, Editions Rut d’Ulm, 2006; La Ciudad En Al-Andalus z El Maghreb in Actas del II Congreso Internacional La Ciudad En AlAndalus Y El Maghreb, Universita de Cadiz, 1999;

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Marcais, W., Simposio International Sobre La Ciudad Islamica, Ponencias y Comunicaciones, Zaragoza, Institucion Fernando el Catolico, 1991; Marin, Manuela, Ciencia, Ensenianza y Cultura En La Ciudad Islamica in Simposio Internacional Sobre La Ciudad Islamica, Zaragoza, Institution Fernando El Catolico, 1991; Moreno, Ana Navarro, Centrosurbanos en Al-Andaluz, Madrid, ArtGerustPublicaciones, 2010; Munos, Lopez F., Sobre la evolucion de unamanzana de casas andalusies, en Memorias de Arqueologia, VIII (1999), pp. 415-436; Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Ibn Jaladun nos revela el secreto, El Espectador, 1934, Obras completast, II: 661-690; Palazon, Navarro Julio & Castillo Pedro Jimenes, Las Ciudades de Al-Andalus. Nuevas pespectivas, Zaragosa, Institudo de Estudios Islamicos y del Oriente Proximo, 2007; Navarro, Palazon J. Un Ejemplo de Vivienda Urbana Andalusi: La Casa nr. 6 de Syassa, Archéologie Islamique, II, 1991; Perez, Juan Abellan, Del Urbanismo Cristiano Musulman, en Simposio Internacional Sobre La Ciudad Islamica, Zaragosa, Institucion Fernando El Catolico, 1991; Shinaq, Mazen Suleiman, La Ciudad Musulmana y la Influencia del Urbanismo Occidental en su Conformacion, Madrid, Instituto Huande Herrera, 2001; Simposio Internacional Sobre La ciudad islamica. Potencias y comunicaciones, Zaragoza, Institution Fernando El Catolico, 1991.

IN FOCUS

WILLIAM J. CONNELL – ON THE PRINCE

* WILLIAM J. CONNELL, Professor of History, Chairman of the Joseph M. and Geraldine C. La Motta Chair in Italian Studies at Seton Hall University. Directs the Charles and Joan Alberto Italian Studies Institute. He received his B.A. summa cum laude from Yale University, and his PhD. in Italian History from the University of California at Berkeley. He has been a Fulbright Scholar to Italy, a Giannini Italian-American Scholar, a Fellow at the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studiesin Florence, and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is Secretary of the Journal of the History of Ideas, and a member of the editorial advisory board of Renaissance Quarterly, member of the American Historical Association, the American Catholic Historical Association, the American Italian Historical Association, the American Association for Italian Studies, and the Medieval Academy of America. From 2002 to 2005 he served as a commissioner on the New Jersey Italian American Heritage Commission and as Co-Chair of the New Jersey Institute for Italian and Italian American Heritage Studies. He has published numerous books and articles on late medieval and early modern Italian history, including a new translation of Machiavelli’s Prince. Authored book: Machiavelli ºi Renºterea italian. Studii (2014), Giannozzo Manetti: Historia Pistoriensis (2011), Come ho imparato l’italiano (2007), La Citta dei Crucci: fazioni e cliente in uno stato repubblicano del ’400 (2000). In collaboration with Giles Constable: Sacrilege and Redemption in Renaissance Florence: The Case of Antonio Rinaldeschi (2008, in Romanian translation 2011). Edited books: Anti-Italianism: Essays on a Prejudice (with Fred L. Gardaphé, 2010), Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power (with Andrea Zorzi, 2003), Society and Individual in Renaissance Florence (2002), Renaissance Essays II (1993). * Gabriela Tãnãsescu: Dear Professor Connell, you are the author of a new English translation of the most provocative work of early modern political thought – Machiavelli’s Il Principe – and also of a new perspective on the significance of this famous work. How did you synthesize the originality of your interpretation and which are the main interpretative directions in Machiavelli’s work that you, however, consider related? Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 107–112, Bucharest, 2015.

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William J. Connell: It is an interesting fact that although Machiavelli’s Prince is one of the most-read books in all of the world’s literature, there has been relatively little research by historians on the composition and meaning of Machiavelli’s masterpiece. To be sure, there has been much philological research by literary scholars, beginning mostly in the 1980s, but historians had tended to treat The Prince as a means to illustrate other phenomena, rather than focus their attention on the text itself. I wanted to prepare an edition of The Prince that was done by an historian for other historians. It would be a book that measured Machiavelli in terms of the political and social context of Florence and Europe in the Renaissance. Since I have devoted decades of archival research to studying the society and politics of Renaissance Florence, I thought I could offer an account of the text and it meanings that was more accurate than those of the political theorists and literary connoisseurs who have prepared all of the other, many editions of The Prince that one finds in English. The fact that my edition1 has by now sold about 30,000 copies, and that it is assigned in a standard way in many university classes, tells me that it has been quite successful. As for my own interpretative direction, I think that Machiavelli wished to write a book that was shocking in an ironic way. He knew that many other people had written books on politics and on the nature of the good prince. He decided to write something that was quite different, that argued that rather than structure the ideal regime about a good prince, one should build from the bottom up. By taking into account the worst in human nature, knowing that princes themselves are often wicked – that they, as he says, “need to know how to be not good” – he nevertheless hoped to show how one could construct a regime and a civil life that were as secure as possible against external and internal threats to its survival. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: In the light of the lucidity that is expressly attributed to you in the interpretation of Machiavellian work, how do you appreciate the current influence of the work which, at 500 years after its appearance, is still in the center of a nuanced debate? William J. Connell: Thank you, it is nice to be told that one’s interpretation is “lucid”! The question of the current influence of Machiavelli is an interesting one. In the English-speaking world, Machiavelli’s name has surpassed even that of Shakespeare in common parlance. The Prince is read not only in classrooms, but in the business world, in the military, and in prisons. To tell the truth, this is probably NOT a good thing. I don’t know that Machiavelli himself would have liked this. He seems for the last decade of his life to have been trying to suppress The Prince – to put a genie back in its bottle, as it were. Too often The Prince is used to excuse improper actions or crimes. There are deep moral lessons that can be learned from reading The Prince. It is a great text for instruction in how complicated and unclear human action and its motivations can be. But too often The Prince is cited as an authority with the simple message, “Ends justify means.” ——————— 1 The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli with Related Documents. Translated, Edited and with an Introduction by William J. Connell, New York, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005.

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Such a message exists in The Prince, but it is presented by Machiavelli in an ironic and difficult way, not in the easy way that the popular media, politicians and business consultants imagine. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: You are dedicated to a type of interpretation which contextualizes Machiavelli’s work and presents its multiple levels of meaning. How do you feel the impact of such an interpretation in the specialized scientific communities of the United States? William J. Connell: In the English-speaking world there emerged what might be called a “scholarship of context” in the late 1960s that especially involved political theory, literary criticism, and the history of philosophy. It was a scholarship that at the time sought to create a very useful middle ground. Contextualists acknowledged and the relevance of social and economic factors, however they opposed rigid Marxists by acknowledging the importance of language, ideas, politics and religion. Contextualists also disagreed with those idealists who preferred to study great books either as single texts or as belonging to a suprahistorical discussion in which Plato, Augustine and Nietzsche were reading and writing for one another, but not for their times and not for the rest of humanity. So the contextualists have performed a great service. Where problems have arisen, it has been in the inappropriate privileging of certain contexts over others. Language, for instance, over political events. It is rare that the scholars who allege “context” in their work of interpretation really have the contextual experience of a past age that can be gained only by years of immersion in old texts and archives. Instead we often find a modern theory privileging one kind of context battling another modern theory privileging another kind. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: How far do you believe that the analytical interpretations may be associated with the approaches established in the history of ideas? William J. Connell: To address this would involve a long essay concerning many modern writers and critics. But let me mention an older, quite interesting methodology to which I find myself often returning. It was developed in the middle of the 20th century by A. O. Lovejoy (the founder of the Journal of the History of Ideas, of which I am Secretary) that sought to chart how individual ideas have changed and evolved over time. This was not dissimilar to the great Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe project of Otto Brunner. One quick example, relevant in fact to Machiavelli, might be to take the concept and word “virtue.” With its root vir, the word signified manliness. But over time, in Western civilization, virtue came to signify a quality that is precious (but all too easily spoiled) in a woman. Today, the word has been rendered neuter. So “virtual reality” has the “force” or “feel” of reality, but it is not real. After Lovejoy there were many contextualists who thought that this sort of focus on a single word or term was excessive, and that larger shifts in language and society needed to be studied. I can only agree with them. And yet.... again and again I find that the study of a single term like “virtue” is extraordinarily suggestive. For the historian these are like the sea buoys that tell us the height of tides and alert us to underwater reefs.

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Gabriela Tãnãsescu: Your personal papers and those that you have edited reflect, moreover, a specialized concern for a political, societal and ideational contextualization of an era and a form of state organization: the Renaissance Florence. Basically such a contextualization recovers aspects of the public sphere and the political and interpersonal relationships, moral values, the collective imaginary, but also those of the individualistic paradigm of the political and artistic thought, the social sphere of its applicability and, in general, the realm of social acceptability and unacceptability of all forms of innovative thinking. How do you synthesize the importance of this type of contextualization for the history of political ideas, in particular, and how relevant consider you this type of contextualization for the contemporary political ideas? William J. Connell: One of the chief problems of contextualization, as I argued in an essay on Machiavelli’s concept of the state as something that needs to grow – to grow or else to die – is that the process of studying and learning the context can become so overwhelming that the historian loses sight of what is original in a given writer or text. In the case of Machiavelli, the discovery by certain modern scholars that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries other Florentines were using a vocabulary similar to the Florentine Secretary’s, combined with their desire to explain (but, really, “to excuse”) the harsh lessons of The Prince, has led them ignore what is most provocative in his writings. He has been portrayed as one link in a long chain of republican theorists, rather than as an eruptive voice that really changed the way the world thought about government. I suppose that is why, not content to ride the waves, I have always tried to keep my eyes on those sea-buoys. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: Previous years have you worked with Romanian researchers of Machiavelli’s work. Where can be located their concerns among the international concerns of profile? William J. Connell: This (in April 2014) is now the third time I have visited Romania. By now I have a good number of scholarly friendships in this country, and I am also a corresponding editor on the boards of two Romanian journals including this one. I also remember that in 1998 the Journal of the History of Ideas sponsored a conference in Bucharest on “Culture and the Politics of Identity in Modern Romania.” Although I did not attend that conference I remember the long discussions that went into planning it. The connection with Romania is something of which I am quite proud, and I hope it will continue, especially now that two books of mine have been published here2. With older Romanian scholars I have had long, interesting discussions of the Cold War and of the Ceauºescu period. And I have met many younger Romanian scholars in Italy and in France ——————— 2 William J. Connell, Giles Constable, Sacrilegiu ºi rãscumpãrare în Florenþa renascentistã. Cazul lui Antonio Rinaldeschi, translation by Teodora Cãrãuºu, preface by Gheorghe Lencan Stoica, Jassy, Institutul European, 2011. William J. Connell, Machiavelli ºi Renaºterea italianã. Studii, translation by Gabriela Tãnãsescu, Lorena Stuparu and Ioana Drãgulin, edition by Gabriela Tãnãsescu, preface by Gheorghe Lencan Stoica, Jassy, Institutul European, 2014.

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who are making great contributions. There is energy in Romania, and an eagerness to interact on an international scale, that is quite impressive. I find that some of the most impressive scholarly work being done by Romanians involves – not surprisingly – questions of ethnic identity and of the relations between single countries and larger international organizations (EU, NATO, United Nations). Significant traditions of textual and archival scholarship and of narrative history that had been recognized around the world – as exemplified in that truly great scholar, Nicolae Iorga – were largely interrupted in the decades after World War II. I have often wished to know more about the role played by Andrei Oþetea. Oþetea was a historian who, before World War II, had done significant work on Renaissance Florence, and especially on Machiavelli’s friend, Francesco Guicciardini. After the war he seems to have become something like the “face” of the historical profession in Romania. It is perhaps not entirely relevant, but, although “Connell” is an Irish name, an elderly aunt who lives in Chicago recently explained to me that in the nineteenth century one of my great grandfathers was an ethnic German who was born in this part of the world – in southern Bessarabia, in a town called Sãrata that was then in Russia. In 1900 he emigrated to the United States and then Canada, but his brothers remained and they became citizens of Romania after World War I. Their families emigrated to Germany in 1945 when that territory became part of the Soviet Union. Sãrata is now in Ukraine, although these days one wonders if it may become part of what Vladimir Putin has taken to calling “Novorussiya”... In any event, I hope someday to visit this town that was once a part of Greater Romania. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: What expectations have you from the international symposium held in Romania these days? William J. Connell: The international symposium on Machiavelli that is being held in Bucharest and Sinaia3 offers an excellent opportunity for scholars from two continents and (perhaps) 10 countries to discuss their research on a long list of important topics related to Machiavelli. I am, for instance, curious to hear what Professor Baldini of Turin will say about the interpretation of Machiavelli that was made by Mussolini and at the time (1924) was actually endorsed and republished by none other than Jiddu Krishnamurti, who was then being promoted by the Theosophist movement as its “World Teacher.” How strange! This is of special interest to me because my own edition of The Prince publishes in an appendix my translation of Mussolini’s very interesting essay on Machiavelli. Machiavelli remains of genuine interest worldwide, and there are still significant interpretations that can be developed and significant discoveries that can be made concerning his texts and their reception in subsequent centuries. In recent decades I have seen many Spanish-speaking scholars, in Spain and in Latin ———————— 3 The International Conference “The Exercise of Power 500 Years after The Prince was Written”, Bucharest-Sinaia, April 10-11, 2014, organized by Lumina The University of South-East Europe in collaboration with The University of Bucharest, under the patronage of the Italian Embassy in Romania.

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America, use their publications on Machiavelli as a way of engaging the larger world of international scholarship. One would like to see the same thing happen for Romanian scholars, and indeed it is already happening. If there were to be one single initiative that would make a big difference in this area, let me recommend the translation of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy into the Romanian language. This is a text that has a long and distinguished history that teaches the reader as much about Roman history as it does about government and politics, and that shows Machiavelli to have been a far deeper thinker than the writer of a somewhat nasty handbook for tyrants that one finds in centuries of mistaken caricature. Gabriela Tãnãsescu: Accept my cordial thanks for the kindness to answer to my questions.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE INCONCEIVABLE FAILURE OF FREE-MARKET LIBERALISM GIORGIO BARUCHELLO*

Abstract. The present article addresses a recent essay by liberal thinker Martin Rhonheimer as representative of an aporetic assumption that has been characterising mainstream economic thinking as well as influencing worldwide policy-making for a very long time. Specifically, it criticises the common place liberal hypothesis concerning the markets’ unique capacity to generate prosperity and explain that such a hypothesis obfuscates from the start the ability of those who operate under it to: read historical experience in ways that may render more complex or contradict the original assumption; avoid engaging in pseudo-scientific ad hoc explanations, or de facto exculpations, so as not to revise the original assumption; envision different, hybrid, pragmatic, contingent or case-specific solutions to economic problems; and conceive of major alternatives, whether based on past experiences or novel ones. Keywords: Capitalism, economics, liberalism; Rhonheimer; science; socialism.

Introduction1 The international economic crisis following the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers unleashed a flood of fiat money by selectively prodigal central banks that have seen fit to keep over-indebted private banks afloat, protect the value of financial assets from inflation, and plunge the world into a prolonged slump (cf. Hudson, 2012). Also, it unleashed an outburst of academic literature on the crisis itself, its causes, its effects and its possible solutions. With this literature, a ————————

* Professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Akureyri, Iceland; [email protected].

1 This article is based on a previous conference paper of mine, itself developed upon a review essay of the book in which Rhonheimer’s essay appeared (“Free Markets and the Culture of Common Good”, EMFM, 7(4)/2012, 276-91), presented at the March 2013 NSU Symposium in Akureyri, and eventually published the same year in the conference proceedings as “The hopeful liberal. Reflections on free markets, science and ethics”, Nordicum-Mediterraneum 8(2), available at: http://nome.unak.is/nm-marzo-2012/vol-8-no-2-2013/ 58-conference-paper/395-the-hopeful-liberal-reflections-on-free-markets-science-and-ethicsDuly revised and modified under the title “The Unscientific Ground of Free-Market Liberalism”, another version of this conference paper might be published in a future anthology of NSU contributions that is currently being considered by the NSU’s governing board. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 113–131, Bucharest, 2015.

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modicum of doubt has timidly re-entered the mainstream of public discourse on topics such as globalisation, capitalism and the free market, to the point that even major national and international newspapers have reported renowned liberals’ and conservatives’ statements that, until few years ago, would have been associated with leftist or nationalist ‘radicals’, anachronistic religious leaders, and generally ignored by mainstream media: • “The doctrine of the dictatorship of the market is dead” (Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of the French Republic, 2008); • “We need… humaneness… rules… and abandoning the idea of… massive profits” (MIT Nobel-laureate economist Paul Samuelson, 2008); • “The dictatorship of the [credit] spread… nullifies… universal suffrage… [because] those who hold economic power… have every decisional power“ (former MP and head of Italy’s securities and exchange commission [CONSOB] Giuseppe Vegas, 2012); • “There emerge... in civil Europe the first signs of a new type of fascism: financial fascism, white fascism” (Italy’s MP and former Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti, 2012: 14)2.

Aims and Methodology Such statements, though notable, remain uncommon. International economic crises and their dramatic outcomes notwithstanding, certainlong-lived, deeply rooted beliefs are truly hard to die. Thus we hear leading politicians and revered economic advisors calling for a return to growth and asserting that structural reforms are imperative, so that market confidence may be re-established and increased competitiveness achieved, without ever pondering upon the fact that these aims are precisely those that guided the global economy before the crisis (e.g. Monti, 2012). Could it ever be that endless growth, market confidence and increased competitiveness are under-defined or even misguided aims for the world’s economies?3 If even economic meltdowns cannot undermine the belief in these aims as self-evident and justified, what else can do it? In the present text I wish to address one of these resilient beliefs4. Specifically, in the traditional philosophical way initiated by Socrates, I shall assesssome conceptual knotsarising froma specific hypothesis, that is, the common place liberal notion that the so-called “free market” possesses a unique capacity to generate prosperity5. This hypothesis is highly generic, diversely instantiated and potentially ——————— 2 All translations from Italian into English are mine, unless otherwise stated. 3 Castoriadis (1997) speaks of economic pseudo-rationality, since notions such as growth, competitiveness and market confidence (i) beg the question of their ultimate aim and, under current socio-economic conditions, (ii) are aims in themselves, i.e. growth for growth’s sake. 4 Briefly, I do tackle in this text the notion of the overall aim of any economy (cf. note 13). 5 In today’s US, this notion is shared by both “liberals” and “conservatives”. However, my use of “liberal” refers to the broader economic tradition initiated by the French physiocrats and the Scottish enlightenment thinkers David Hume and Adam Smith, as well as to the broader political one associated with Continental thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Cesare Beccaria and Benjamin Constant, and pivotal British ones such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill.

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vague6. Nevertheless, it is worth tackling, for it pervades the whole spectrum of the liberal conceptions of the economy, not only at the level of political rhetoric, but also at the academic level, as exemplified by the microeconomic textbook category of “market imperfections”, according to which explaining is needed when the outcomes of market transactions are not optimal (e.g. Sloman, 2006). Similar considerations apply to macro economic stochastic models describing disequilibria as the result of external shocks on an otherwise peaceful ocean of market equilibrium (cf. Schlefer, 2012) This hypothesis applies also to Adam Smith’s canonical “invisible hand”, i.e. the doctrine of unintended consequences whereby the individual’s pursuit of self-interest results regularly, though not always, in collective well being (1776: IV.ii.9)7. There exists extensive literature for each of these conceptions, which I could address in a book, but not in ashorter text like the present one. Rather, I shall select one symbolic liberal formulation of the hypothesis at issue and deal with those conceptual knots that I deem most representative – hence most likely to be of interest to a scholarly audience.8

Rhonheimer’s Formulation The formulation hereby selected appears in a recent book chapter written by the Swiss liberal thinker Martin Rhonheimer (2012)9, who claims that the “free market” is “a necessary condition” of human prosperity (9; emphasis in the original). In his eloquent account of Eucken’s ordoliberalism and the related critique of laissez-faire liberalism, Rhonheimer offers in support of his claim: (A) One elucidation; and (B) One generic token of empirical proof. (A) The elucidation is that no central planner would be able to coordinate all economic activities as efficiently as the “free market”, in which individual agents pursue their own particular self-interest and, by so doing, unintentionally produce prosperity, in accordance with Smith’s principle of the “invisible hand” (Rhonheimer, 2012: 9-10). Though not all conditions for prosperity may arise this way, none would arise without it. The “free market” is a necessary condition for prosperity, albeit not a sufficient one, which is instead what more trenchant laissez-faire liberals believe. States must also be involved, according to ordoliberalism and many other streaks of liberalism, in order to secure fair market transactions, enforce beneficial rules, correct market distortions, or redress socially and morally harmful market outcomes. Exemplarily, Friedrich Hayek (1944) argued that “there is no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the ability to work” should be guaranteed by public institutions, “[n]or ——————— 6 Being highly generic, ergo potentially vague, explains part of the hypothesis’ success: since it can apply to many different circumstances, it can be called upon under all and any of them. 7 The hypothesis at issue is present in recent liberal expressions of faith in free-market economics and institutions, e.g. Rajan & Zingales (2003), who echo traditional ordoliberalism. 8 My references are parsimonious too, i.e. mostly limited to cited sources or exemplary cases. 9 I published a critical essay of this volume in the fourth 2012 issue of Economics, Management and Financial Markets, in which I address some of the knots hereby discussed.

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is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate provision” (124-5). However, as Rhonheimer (2012) rejoinders, to think that “central planning and state regulation… through several government-run agencies” could ever achieve any prosperity without the “free market” is a foolish notion to be discarded at once (5). (B) The generic token of empirical proof is that “history teaches” all this: “a capitalist economy based on a free market, entrepreneurial activity, and free trade without tariff barriers is more realistic and in the long run beneficial for everybody” (Rhonheimer, 2012: 24). In this respect, the unrealised failure of Roosevelt’s New Deal and a passing reference to Soviet Union are the two cases of “socialism” that the author utilises to give strength to his point (4-7)10. So obviously flawed and so doomed is the case for socialism that Rhonheimer does not deem it necessary to dwell much on it. Perhaps, it is conventional wisdom, since he writes as though the audience that he addresses with his chapter were most likely to share in the same belief without hesitation11.

The Critique 1. Indemonstrable Necessity Rhonheimer’s elucidation, though commonly heard, is not much of an empirical proof. At best, it is an enthymeme, i.e. a rhetorical proof (cf. Richards, 2008). To make it stick more convincingly, it would require itself many empirical proofs for adequate scientific substantiation. Yet here emerges a severe and unflinchingly by-passed methodological issue. How can anyone prove as binding and comprehensive a thesis as the one presented in Rhonheimer’s essay and, in general, upheld by the liberal community?12 The necessary character of any economic system cannot be determined in a scientific way, for we have only one planet, one humankind and one very short historical span at our disposal for any empirical verification and/or falsification of the beneficence of the “free market” or, for that matter, of “socialism”. For any claim of such a necessary character to be ascertained, we should investigate a set of entirely alternative and separate systems over a certain period of time, probably a very long one, so as to determine that only the ones operating upon the “free market” produce prosperity, at least under certain definitions of it. ———————— 10 The choice of the failed failure of Roosevelt’s New Deal strikes as odd, since it is admitted that it was not a failure, due to the gigantic multiplier effect induced by the war effort of 1939-1945. The choice of Soviet Union strikes as myopic, since it ignores the vast literature by Trotskyites, libertarian socialists (e.g. Castoriadis, 2000), market – and other socialists (e.g. Lawler, Ollman, Ticktin and Schweickart in Ollman, 1997) criticising “real socialism” as State capitalism, i.e. a system differing from the Western one in one crucial element alone: State bureaucrats, not shareholders and/or managers, led an economy fostering class antagonism. 11 Rhetoric teaches to start from premises that are immediately acceptable to the audience, even if they may not be demonstrated to be true (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). 12 I do not address here the evidence running contrary to his claim, e.g. the demographic decline of freemarket post-communist Russia under Boris Eltsin and its partial recovery via a far less liberal economic system under Vladimir Putin (cf. Todorova & Gille, 2010).

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Unfortunately, to this day, such a test has been impossible to perform. Moreover, focussing onto the “market” versus “socialist” dichotomy can be misleading, since it shifts the gaze away from what is undeniably necessary for the meaningful survival of our species, i.e. the continued satisfaction of genuine human needs across generational time (cf. McMurtry, 1999, 2013; Noonan, 2006). That is the prime end, whatever additional feature we may wish to add to the notion of prosperity, such as “freedom” or “political rights” (cf. Berlin, 1969: 124). Economies are the means to attain in primis this prime end13. As the past is concerned, we know that some civilisations have made it this far. In this connection, we might think of prehistoric, ancient and medieval Earth, let us say before the age of European exploration, as a plausible set of sufficiently separate and alternative economic systems to conduct a comparative study. Yet, apart from the fact that hardly any of the known ones would count as a free-market system, we know far too little, if anything, about most of them to make any valid scientific comparison, whatever notion of prosperity we may wish to employ (cf. Boldizzoni, 2011). If we look at what history has produced until now, we may be in a better position to determine which system has been the most ruthless, hence the one that has imposed itself over the others via, say, conquest, extortion, enslavement or mass slaughter (cf. Castoriadis, 1997). However, that would be a banal and, I suspect, degrading notion of superiority, not to consider the thin or absent link that such a superiority may have to genuine human needs or prosperity. Furthermore, Rhonheimer (2012) seems oblivious of the contingent origins and historical development of global market structures themselves, which emerged through a prolonged process involving political, legal, military, monetary and industrial planning by public authorities (cf. Polanyi, 1944). Not to mention the socio-cultural and anthropological changes required for actual human beings to think of themselves and lead their lives as entrepreneurs, employees, speculators, self-interested individuals, etc. rather than heathen priests, slaves, legionaries, or loyal members of a certain clan or gens (cf. Castoriadis, 1998; Weiner, 2013). As the present is concerned, there may be alternative but no separate systems, given that even the most isolated indigenous communities in the world are being affected by the environmental changes produced by the advanced economies of the planet (e.g. Itkadmin, 2007). As the future is concerned, unless we deny the ability of humankind to change creatively its collective organisation, which has varied enormously throughout the known history of our species, we cannot even begin to fathom what awaits our descendants: a Star-Trek-like society without money, need and greed; or a Mad-Max-like post-atomic age of competitive barbarism? Yet this is the province of science-fiction, not of science. ———————— 13 On this point, the UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has long espoused an aim-driven approach: the specific economic system of each member nation is not important, as long as human rights are protected, respected and fulfilled (cf. Baruchello & Johnstone, 2011). I regard the CESCR’s approach as a paradigm of intellectual openness.

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2. Lack of Prosperity If we follow Rhonheimer’s (2012) representative formulation and understand prosperity as “consumption, that is, the satisfaction of the needs of all the persons living in a determinate territory” (19; emphasis in the original), we quite simply lack information about most human communities in most parts of the world throughout most of human history. Presently, the past is closed to us; and so is the future, for we cannot predict with exactitude what will happen on our planet tomorrow, not to mention in two years or two centuries14. As the history of today’s world is concerned i.e. the so-called “global market”, which is usually claimed to be an imperfect instantiation of the “free market” (Rhonheimer himself does so at times), we know for sure the following: it fails to satisfy the needs of all the persons living on the planet, as the UN’s annual statistics on death by malnourishment and starvation regularly report (e.g. FAO, 2013). While failing these persons’ needs, the current imperfect instantiation of the “free market” also caters to artificially instilled wants of others, including the desire for carcinogenic cigarettes and life-shortening junk food (e.g. O´Flaherty et al., 2012). In other words, the global market fails not only to secure planetwide need-satisfaction, which is what Rhonheimer appears to be taking as “consumption”, but also to distinguish between, say, the need for bread of starving paupers and the desire for golden toilets of oil tycoons, so as to prioritise the former above the latter. No distinction between genuine human needs and sheer subjective wants is built firmly within current economics (cf. Quiggin, 1993; Noonan, 2006). Quite the opposite, what sets in motion the “free market“ in both theory and practice is money-backed demand, i.e. subjective preferences or wants of market agents endowed with pecuniary means, not the vital necessities of humans and societies, not to mention other living beings, whose possession of pecuniary means may be nil15. In point of fact, under present conditions, wealth can be accumulated by some to unprecedented heights, while at the same time access to basic sanitation or healthcare is denied to others (cf. OECD, 2012; FAO, 2013). Money-backed demand, not need, is what determines consumption in today’s world, pace Rhonheimer’s noteworthy equation (cf. McMurtry, 1999). Revealingly, mainstream economists and, above all, the actual economy of many countries treat both food and luxury items as priced, marketable goods (e.g. Parkin, Powell & Matthews, 2008)16. No axiological compass is present for basic distinctions between that which is of real value and that which is not, or that which is good and that which is bad. Economic ordinalism may not depict a night in which all cows are black, but neither any economic “good”, nor all ———————— 14 The worldwide depletion of natural and social life support systems does not bode well for future consumption, though no exact prediction can be made (cf. UNESCO, 2002-13). 15 It should be noted that many a subjective preference and want are the result of artificial conditioning by the most sophisticated marketing techniques (cf. Galbraith, 2004). 16 There exist countries that publicly provide or subsidise vital staples and services outside market transactions, countering “privatisations” and “market liberalisations” that, by definition, indicate the deprivation of some individuals (i.e. what is private is not public) and the axiological homogenisation of such staples and services (i.e. they turn into priced market items, exactly like non-vital luxury and carcinogenic ‘goods’; cf. McMurtry, 1999 & 2013).

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economic “goods” are good. Some are bad. For example, financial speculation over the price of staples such as rice and wheat may be deemed economic “rational“ and itself a form of “wealth creation“, but it does increase malnutrition and illnesses, which are clear tokens of badness17. In other terms, the invisible hand seems to possess an invisible brain, which is why ordoliberals à la Rhonheimer, unlike libertarians and laissez-faire liberals, has long recognised the importance of at least some State intervention18. 3. Imperfect Imperfections In connection with the importance of State intervention, Rhonheimer (2012) introduces a number of additional qualifications that cause the “free market” to come across as more inefficient than initially stated. Albeit he claims it to be a necessary one, the “free market” is not a sufficient condition for prosperity or consumption. It is said that it “frequently” leads to prosperity, i.e. not always (Rhonheimer, 2012: 10). It is incapable of providing many “public goods” (14)19. It is prone to “failures” (13). If the State does not intervene, it generates “cartels” (15). Indeed it possesses “a tendency to destroy itself” (15), given also that it causes major social “problems” such as “inequality” (25)20. These qualifications are unlikely to sound surprising to most professed liberals, for, in varying degrees, the near-totality of them have long acknowledged that imperfections, even lethal ones, do affect the market system (e.g. Smith, 1776; Veblen, 1924; Pareto, 1935). They sound even less surprising to professed socialists, who have persistently remarked upon market economies’self-destructive tendencies, ranging from Marx’s (1894) allegedly inexorable doom by falling rate of profit, to the promotion of anthropological traits such as short-term greed and infantile hedonism that run counter to those personal virtues of “honesty, integrity, responsibility, care for one’s work, respect for others” that market economies have inherited from previous societies, built themselves upon, and are yet “incapable of reproducing” to a comparable extent (Castoriadis, 1990: 242)21. ———————— 17 19th century social Darwinists, sadists and Pyrrhonian sceptics may not agree on malnourishment and illness being clearly bad, though I know of no member of these groups who has sought either for herself. 18 State intervention is per se no guarantee of fairness, equality or prosperity, since it may, inter alia, favour select clients, bail out private businesses at the expense of the population at large, or lead to war. Rather, State intervention flags out the need for guiding, integrating and/or constraining non-economic rationalities (e.g. religious, moral, aesthetic, medical). 19 The inability to provide many public goods strikes as a major limitation vis-à-vis socially owned, managed, protected and/or provided “civil commons” i.e. social constructs enabling universal access to vital and life-enabling goods – and a fortiori Rhonheimer’s (2012) own “consumption“ – such as: “universal health plans, the world wide web, common sewers… sidewalks and footpaths... water fountains… the air we breathe, effective pollution controls... old age pensions, universal education, Sweden’s common forests... the rule of law, child and women shelters, parks, public broadcasting, clean water... the UN Declaration of Human Rights, occupational health and safety standards, village and city squares, the Brazilian rainforests, inoculation programmes… the Ozone Protocol… death rituals, animal rights agencies, community fish-habitats, food and drug legislation, garbage collection, the ancient village commons before enclosures” (McMurtry, 1999: 206-7). 20 States can actually increase inequality by means of fiscal and monetary policy, financial (de)regulation and ad hoc legal norms favouring the wealthy over the poor (cf. OECD, 2012). 21 Paganelli (2013) refers to field experiments showing how the interpersonal commercial activities praised by Adam Smith can foster morality, but fails to notice how dominant impersonal consumer and corporate activities do the opposite, thereby destroying moral propensities cultivated in prior stages of civilisation (cf. Castoriadis, 1990, Terjesen, 2011).

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However, it is perplexing to notice that qualifications of the actual market economies such as the ones listed by Rhonheimer (2012) are generally not seen for what they are, i.e. features of the market system, which consists of living individuals engaging in mutual exchanges under certain types of norms (cf. Barden & Murphy, 2010). On the contrary, in a strange twist of logic, they are seen as exceptions to the implicit rule, which assumes markets to be perfect, even if they are not perfect – and have proven repeatedly not to be so. Indeed, few years before his death, John Kenneth Galbraith (2004) argued the very talk of “free market” or “market system” to be nothing but a “fraud” (in the title) aimed at hiding the historical fact of capitalism, that is to say, a much more fitting descriptor of real market economies, in which there have always been: (i) At least one powerful group planning the economy to its own advantage (e.g. merchants, industrialists, absentee owners, corporate managers, financial managers); as well as (ii) Conspicuous market manipulation (including creating demand by operant conditioning techniques); and (iii) Conditions of monopoly and oligopoly covering key-areas of the economic arena (e.g. credit), if not most of it22. Textbooks often refer to methodological convenience when explaining why economists assume abstract, unreal, perfect market conditions (cf. Häring & Douglas, 2012). Though understandable, such a prioritisation of methodological convenience over empirical evidence is a grave departure from standard scientific methodology, as Veblen had already acknowledged one century ago (cf. Reinart & Viano, 2012; Reisman, 2012)23. Galileo may have invited the scientific inquirer to reason ex hypothesi, but he never maintained that contrary evidence should be systematically side-stepped in order not to change the starting hypothesis (cf. Schlefer, 2012)24. In the natural sciences, hypotheses are meant to be tested and ———————— 22 After about fifty years of activity as one of the world’s best-known economists, Galbraith (2004) reached a conclusion that, until now, has been thoroughly ignored by most of his colleagues, for accepting it to any significant extent would demand a Copernican revolution within his discipline. According to him, contemporary economics and business studies teach a number of fraudulent notions that make economists popular among the rich and powerful, and are so commonly repeated and commended that most economists accept them uncritically, thus making these lies “innocent” (in the title). The lies are: that there exists a market system, rather than capitalism; that consumers are the price-determining sovereign, rather than corporate pawns being moulded through and through by the most sophisticated marketing techniques; that annual GDP marks progress, despite past greatness in poorer societies and present environmental devastation in richer ones; that “work” applies equally to the poor, for whom unemployment means destitution and blame, and the rich, for whom it means leisure and distinction; that States alone have bureaucracies, not private corporations; that individual entrepreneurs are the standard economic agent, rather than large corporate entities, and that the two are equivalent anyway; that shareholders have decisional power, rather than the managerial class; that the public sector is separate from and interferes with the private one, whilst corporate interests have hijacked public bodies at all levels; that business-friendly deregulation is good for growth, rather than the root of private abuse over the public at large; that finance experts monitor and forecast likely economic trends, which are unknown and unknowable by definition; that market discipline is the rule, whilst those who bear the brunt of economic failures are innocent employees and their families, not the wealthier actual decision-makers; that monetary policy matters, whilst central banks are largely ceremonial. 23 McCloskey (2002) criticises economists’ existence theorems for assuming the unproven. 24 On the liberal economic scene, the so-called Cambridge school of Keynesian economics did nothing of the sort, but it was marginalised by the neoliberal school, especially in America, to the point of producing what Krugman (2010) calls the “Dark Ages” of his discipline, i.e. ignorance of economic history and major alternative or older doctrines (cf. Castoriadis, 1997).

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revised in light of empirical evidence, as done, for example, by system theorists Vitali, Glattfeder and Battiston (2011) with regard to “the network of global corporate control” (in the title) that characterises today’s global economy25. Facts, as unpleasant as they may be, should be the backbone of scientific inquiry26. Only the formal sciences, i.e. logic and mathematics, content themselves with coherent theoretical constructs (cf. Hintikka et al., 1981)27. 4. Vaguerand Vaguer Referents The absence of exact instantiations of the growingly unempirical “free market” is only the beginning. If we allow for some State intervention, as Rhonheimer (2012) does, what should count then as truly “free market” and “socialist” economies? Where should we draw the line of demarcation? These two terms are almost omnipresent in both recent political history and scholarship, yet their actual separation is far from obvious. Indeed, from a conservative perspective, liberals and socialists can be hardly distinguishable from each other, as the political critiques by Pope Pius X (1907) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1872) exemplify28. Furthermore, before the 20th century, most societies in human history had not been market societies. They may have contained some markets, such as slave trade in the ancient Mediterranean, but most of their members did not participate in them (cf. Boldizzoni, 2011). As far as we can ascertain, subsistence, redistribution and reciprocity were their main features (cf. Polanyi, 1944). These features were reflected also in these societies’ cultures, which kept the analogues of today’s economic rationality as secondary instruments to other primary social goals, such as community status, personal honour, or the salvation of the believer’s immortal soul (cf. Chesterton, 1935; Castoriadis, 1997). It should be observed that great achievements were possible in these older societies, whether in the arts, philosophy, mathematics, law or religious life. Such human accomplishments seem to have little to do with “free markets” or the size of a country’s GDP, and perhaps may be unrelated to whatever prosperity the liberal hypothesis at issue implies. Still, it is not aimless to ponder upon the fact that even the great scientific discoveries that led to the technologies whereby ———————— 25 Häring & Douglas (2012) criticise standard economics for being methodologically blind to the power structures and power relations shaping economic events in a decisive way (cf. also Galbraith, 2004) and for following the ordinalist unwillingness to distinguish between preferences and needs for the sake of methodological convenience (cf. also McMurtry, 1999). 26 Boldizzoni (2011) discusses the illustrative case of cliometrics, i.e. free-market economic history, which avoids much of the toil of traditional historical research in lieu of a theory-driven reconstruction of the past for which market structures are anachronistically presupposed and imposed upon it, e.g. “implicit markets”, “shadow costs” and “invisible transactions” (50). If not avoiding altogether by expunging it from university curricula, free-market economists try to re-write the history of actual economies as flawless exemplifications of their assumptions, which any serious economic historian, however, would dismiss as either naïve or dishonest, given the ample record of, inter alia, protectionism, State intervention and cartels in the development of modern economies (e.g. Cattini, 2010). 27 McMurtry (1999) explains modern economics’ reliance on mathematical theorems and models as a technique of avoidance that keeps facts farther away from the discipline. 28 Socialist Castoriadis (2000) and liberal Galbraith (1977) too cannot clearly separate actual free-market and socialist economies: the former describes both as kindred forms of bureaucratic organisation; the latter as analogous responses to the same economic problems.

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20th century human populations boomed worldwide, in both self-proclaimed “capitalist” and “socialist” economies, were made in countries with smaller GDPs than today and, often, limited market systems (cf. Galbraith, 2004). Moreover, modern societies, in which commercial and financial markets have become much more extensive and influential, have often retained – sometimes up to the present day – significant elements of subsistence, redistribution and reciprocity (e.g. small-scale farms in Scotland, Poland and India; national and international poverty alleviation programmes; ‘old pals’ networks and ‘revolving doors’ inside corporate bureaucracies)29, as well as many development-spurring elements of public ownership and planning (e.g. independent Venice’s publicly owned merchant and military fleets; George C. Marshall’s post-WWII ERP; Germany’s, Brazil’s, North Dakota’s and communist China’s public banks)30. Additionally, Rhonheimer (2012) himself claims that genuine free markets existed worldwide only for a brief period of time, i.e. “between 1850 and 1870”, and that self-proclaimed “free market” post-WWII USA have resembled postWWI Germany in maintaining the State-centred structures inherited from their war economies, which still allow the State, for one, to bail out bankrupt private firms (21). In short, given Rhonheimer’s own standards, the issue of identifying genuinely “free market” and “socialist” economies is not an easy one. Not even post-war USA may count as a decent token of the former type of economy, at least according to Rhonheimer, who compares them to the historical champion of cartel-friendly organised capitalism, i.e. Wilhelmine Germany (cf. Veblen, 1915; McGowan, 2010)31. Any firm, trenchant scientific evaluation of the historical experience of concrete societies seems therefore less and less likely, at least if we take Rhonheimer’s (2012) considerations seriously, for we lack clear referents for the key-terms of “market” and “socialist” economies32. 5. Non-existence The distance from concrete societies increases further whenever it is asserted, as Rhonheimer (2012) does, that the “free market” is an ideal (15), i.e. something that does not truly exist in reality (I shall not dwell on the contradiction entailed by his claim about free markets having existed worldwide only for a brief period of time in the 19th century). In other words, it is a purely theoretical construct, an empirical impossibility: the human being is actually incapable of operating according to it. Perfect markets, in whatever Hyperuranion they may be located, are therefore not to be blamed for crises, unemployment or any other misfortune that may befall upon us. People are. The former are not around. The latter are. ———————— 29 Quiggin (1988) offers a concise review of recent systems of common property; Weiner (2013) reveals the persistence of non-liberal clan-based societies in today’s world. 30 My choice of examples signals how reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange can be good as well as bad. No fixed axiological standard is inherent to each or any of them; rather, it is imposed onto them from the outside (e.g. legislation, politics, religion, moral education). 31 Rhonheimer is not alone in his assessment of the USA. For one, 1980s free-market advocates of the Ludwig von Mises Institute were critical of Ronald Reagan, whom Sheldon Richman (1988) defines “the most protectionist president since Herbert Hoover.” 32 Gorbachev (1995) testifies to the varieties of “socialism” experimented with in the USSR.

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Rhonheimer (2012) seems not to notice the trouble some implications of such an approach, for not only does it mean that there is no clear empirical evidence that free markets are the one, necessary way to prosperity, but also that there cannot be any, for they have never been truly present, since they are not suited to “the human condition” (15). Moreover, he does not seem to notice that his approach is analogous to that of many 20th century Marxist zealots who, when confronted with the failures of Eastern Europe’s “real socialism“, argued that their theory was correct, since its practice alone had failed, given various and varying human flaws. In short, no amount of contrary evidence could disprove their stance. 6. Unfalsifiability The Marxist zealots’ case leads us to the most fundamental and most intractable conceptual knot of the liberal position with regard to the markets’ unique ability to generate prosperity. If (i) the genuine “free market” cannot be established, for it is a theoretical construct inconsistent with “the human condition”, and if (ii) the actual historical experience of what is commonly referred to as the “free market”, i.e. the history of mostly Western developed countries over the past three centuries, is one of considerably imperfect applications involving significant elements of State intervention (e.g. post-bellic Germany and USA), why is the market system necessarily responsible for wealth and, to some extent, wellbeing, whereas, say, significant State intervention and ownership are not? Why not the two of them together, on a par (cf. Rajan & Zingales, 2003)? Or why not either of them, or other factors (e.g. literacy, patriotism, military strength, sciencetechnology), depending on the specific circumstances of each particular case, duly investigated by means of close historical, economic, legal, medical, sociological, anthropological, environmental and axiological analyses? Principled comparisons are possible, but they must rest on solid empirical ground (cf. Boldizzoni, 2011). Moreover, reality may well be messy, diverse and complex. Why should there be one necessary source of prosperity for all cases?33 By his own account and qualifications, Rhonheimer (2012) has no answer to these questions. Quite simply, he states his thesis and uses it to read history so as to be allowed to state it. In other words, Rhonheimer is assuming a priori that the “free market” produces necessarily wealth and, to some extent, well being. By means of that assumption he then proceeds to reading human history as its verification – State-led development, recurrent crises, vast environmental degradation and social tragedies notwithstanding. This is not just a case of rash oversimplification, which it certainly is too, such that it would be necessary to pause and specify which forms of market transactions are beneficial in which ways to which groups of people under which circumstances. It is also a profound methodological flaw. It does not apply solely to Rhonheimer’s essay, but also to much political liberalism and mainstream ———————— 33 The peculiarity of different types of successful economic development shows in studies such as Hodne (1975 & 1983), Lintner & Mazey (1991), Hudson (1993) and Ofer (1987).

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economic thinking in general. In effect, it does begin with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and reaches its highest peak in laissez-faire economics, which argues that the “free market” is the necessary and sufficient condition for human prosperity. In all of its forms, it is an example of scientific unfalsifiability, or pseudo-science, for such an assumption, whereby “free markets” are bound to generate prosperity, admits of no counter evidence34: First of all, insofar as it is assumed that unhindered markets bring about prosperity, if we do not have prosperity now, then we must simply wait and abstain from causing undue hindrance. As Christians and Marxists have long known, eschatology calls for patience; hence the recurrent phrases commonly attached to so-called “market reforms”: “transition”, “in the long run”, “long-term benefits”, “children and grandchildren”, etc. (e.g. Monti, 2013). Secondly, if waiting is not a credible option, then we can always blame someone else, such as the government (e.g. “corruption”,“red tape”, “interference”, “distortion”), the trade unions (qua common example of “rent-seeking special interest group”) or some dishonest private actors (e.g.“crony capitalism”, “State capture by private interests”), for being unfaithful to the spirit of “free markets” and causing hindrance. Markets fail not; people do – although one can legitimately wonder what markets may be if not people transacting with one another within a certain normative setting (cf. Barden & Murphy, 2010). Thirdly, insofar as Smith’s followers and ordoliberals à la Rhonheimer argue as well for the desirability of some State intervention (e.g. Smith’s progressive taxation, Presbyterian-style education of the youth, public regulation of banks and mentally destructive working conditions; Eucken’s redressing of socially detrimental market outcomes), they corner public authorities in a hopeless argumentative position. Given the starting point, growth and prosperity can always be seen as the result of the markets’ enduring degree of freedom – i.e. not of the State’s intervention – while crisis and misery can always be blamed onto the State – i.e. not onto the markets being actually unable to generate growth or genuine prosperity.35 (d) Operating under such an assumption, markets can never be wrong, whatever major environmental or social ills may have arisen. If things go well, it is because markets have been allowed to work out their “magic” (hence “rational agents” have responded to “incentives”, “entrepreneurship” has been “rewarded”, etc.): a textbook case. If things do not go well, then the guilty party is always someone or something else, including protectionism36, unpredictable “financial ———————— 34 The principle of falsification has been crucial in the history of science since at least the 17th century and was famously crystallised in the philosophy of science of Karl Popper (1963). 35 Even the recent financial collapse has been blamed on insufficient State regulation and supervision, despite deregulation and freedom from State interference being the policies that free-market advocates had been promoting, successfully, for decades (cf. Hudson, 2012). 36 Taking effects for causes, Hayek (1944: 132-3) blames the mass unemployment of the 1930s-1940s on “the striving for security” by “restrictionism”, i.e. the worldwide response to the Great Depression, as though the Golden Age of free capital trade (1860s-1914), the crash of the Roaring Twenties, and the mass liquidations that followed it had no import whatsoever.

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tsunamis”37 andexcessive cocaine intake38. In short, the unintended consequences are such that, if they are positive, their intended premise is the free market; if negative, something else39. (e) A fortiori, if the markets do not deliver the promised bounty, it is because there have not been enough, or they have not been “free” enough; hence the cure can only be more of the same40. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what happens in Rhonheimer’s 2012 essay: “markets”, he says, are “normally and as a matter of principle the solution” (12; emphasis in the original)41. Similarly, leading statesmen, politicians and economic advisors seek more of the same, even after promoting market-oriented policies for decades (e.g. the EU’s competition policies; cf. McGowan, 2010). If these policies have not been glaringly successful – they cannot but conclude, given the starting assumption – it is because there is still too limited amarket systemin place (e.g. former EU competition commissioner Mario Monti; cf. Monti, 2012)42. 7. Nefarious Consequences Rhonheimer’s (2012) essay is fallacious because of the self-contradictory morass resulting from (i) insisting upon the markets’ necessary beneficence, whilst also (ii) piling up observations and qualifications that point precisely to the opposite conclusion and (iii) to the empirical non-testability of (i). Representative of analogous liberal assessments, his essay is built upon an unfalsifiable hypothesis that has made him – and many liberals – unable to: (a) Read historical experience in ways that could (a1) acknowledge a much higher levelof complexity (e.g. the role of trade unions’ demands in forcing capitalism to become civilised and allowing for a higher share of the existing wealth to reach the population at large and improve overall living conditions43; the analogous role of socialist, religious and/or conservative agendas in civilising capitalism44; the prevailing mixed45 as well as oligo and monopolistic character ———————— 37 Yet Marxism teaches since the 19th century that unfettered capitalism leads inevitably to crises, as also argued by the French regulation school of Aglietta (1976; & Rébérioux, 2004). 38 As peculiar as it may sound, British neuropsychopharmacologist David Nutt claimed cocaine consumption by bankers to be the cause of the 2008 financial crisis (Williams, 2013). 39 Current mainstream economics proceeds as though market agents become immediately something else as soon as their behaviour is not conducive to the expected results. Yet those agents, amongst whom there may be cocaine-addicted bankers, are actually the market actors whose behaviour the empirical scientist should observe, describe and predict. 40 An unassailable comprehensive rational explanation allowing for no serious doubt and no possible change of conduct is a standard token of lunacy (cf. Chesterton, 1908: 10ff). 41 A corollary of the unfalsifiable hypothesis at issue is the notion of self-correcting markets. 42 Quiggin (2010) dubs “zombie” those economic beliefs that, despite contrary evidence, creep back relentlessly. The unfalsifiability of the liberal hypothesis discussed in the present text explains why this “undeadness” occurs, such that even after the recent disastrous deregulation experiment in the financial sector, free-market adherents may still believe that “the more… interfering with the market system, the greater the insecurity” (Hayek, 1944: 134). 43 Keynes (1936) claims workers’ demands for better salaries to spur economic activity. If correct, Western “labour reforms” causing the precarisation and pauperisation of large sways of workers since the 1970s would harm actual economic growth (cf. Hobsbawm, 2011). 44 Gibson (2002) offers an account of the conservative roots of environmentalism. 45 Hayek (1944: 130) is paradigmatic in his anti-historical claim that planning and free market systems are “irreconciliable”, as well as in assuming the actual existence of such ideal types.

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of modern capitalism46), or (a2) contradict the original assumption (e.g. ecological collapse47 and waste accumulation48; recurrent economic crises49; enduring unemployment50; the failure of most businesses and products launched every year51; successful national development and/or post-war reconstruction by public planning of industrial production or strategic subsidies52); (b) Avoid engaging in pseudo-scientific (b1) ad hoc explanations (e.g. the State’s pro-market legislation, deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation are to blame, for they were erroneous, corrupt or insufficient; State institutions are to blame for financial crashes, because of some minor change in the laws that unleashed an otherwise impossible flood of private greed; Mexican, Korean, Russian, Icelandic...X culture is not ready or adequate for a well-functioning “free market” economy)53, or (b2) sweeping de facto exculpations, so as not to revise the original assumption (e.g. people fail markets, not vice versa; capitalists fail, not capitalism; human nature itself is not suited to the actual application of the “free market” and therefore leads to its historical failure)54; (c) Envision different, hybrid, pragmatic, contingent or case-specific solutions to socio-economic problems (e.g. context-based mixed economies; voluntary communes, cooperatives and social enterprises; State ownership of strategic assets qua cost-abating additional factor of production; Georgist taxation of economic rent from natural resources; cooperation with oligopolies; ritual debt cancellation; sustainable retreat by carbon rationing; market socialism) that are typically pushed forth by other actors (e.g. trade unions, religious groups, philanthropists, green parties) for reasons that have little or nothing to do with “free markets” (e.g. better salaries, social cohesion, national prestige, fear of revolt, humaneness, conservationism; cf. Castoriadis, 1997)55; ———————— 46 Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz (2011) photograph candidly this given, which Veblen, Chamberlin and Robinson had already observed and discussed extensively in their lifetime. How i.a. Hayek (1944) may ignore it or assume its equivalence to the free market is baffling. 47 Awareness of looming environmental disaster is as old as the Club of Rome’s denunciation of the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). Considerable progress has been achieved in “green” economics (e.g. Jackson, 2009; Dietz & O’Neill, 2012; Weston & Bollier, 2013). However, all this intellectual production has not dented neoclassical orthodoxy and, above all, standard textbooks, upon which is formed the knowledge of economics of most business people, politicians, as well as economic and political advisors, i.e. crucial decision-makers (cf. Häring & Douglas, 2012), who still claim “growth” to be the supreme end. 48 See Stuart (2009) on the vastly wasteful character of today’s market economies. 49 Free-market advocate Greenspan (2010) brushes away crises as “notably rare exceptions”. 50 British historian Hobsbawm (2011) notes how mainstream economics has abandoned the Keynesian principle of full employment for the Friedmanite ‘natural’ rate of unemployment. 51 National statistics bureaus register the failure and voluntary closure of most businesses launched annually after only few years of activity, e.g. US Census Bureau (nda). 52 See Florio (2004) on State-led reconstruction in post-war Britain and an extensive welfare comparison with the economic and social outcomes of Thatcherite privatisations. 53 Business and financial presses print these explanations and exculpations most commonly, but they are not absent from academic discourse either, e.g. Linz (2000). 54 The notion of a well-functioning free market abstracted from actual market agents is captured in the title of Rajan & Zingales (2003), Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists. 55 In the 20th and 21st century, liberal economists sponsoring a more hybrid and contingency-based conception of economic activity (e.g. Keynes, Galbraith, Tobin, Krugman) have often been derided as “socialists” and other disqualifying predicates aimed at preventing wide social acceptance and true intellectual exchange (e.g. Luskin, 2011).

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(d) Conceive of alternative systems, whether based on past experiences or untested and novel ones – freedom entailing creativity and change that cannot be predicted in advance. Despite its recurrent talk of liberty and freedom, and its systemic avoidance of insufferable facts notwithstanding, the liberal mind-set castrates imagination ab initio by assuming the received conditions to be somehow rational and only perfectible, but not something that could or should be overcome altogether (cf. Castoriadis, 1998)56.

Concluding Remarks If my argument is sound, then contemporary politics, influential policies and entire academic programmes are built upon an unscientific assumption. I do not object to having unscientific assumptions. Indeed, some of the most important dimensions of human existence are built upon unscientific assumptions, such as intimate love and religious life. I do object to doing so, though, and not admitting it. Were liberals, and mainstream economists in particular, to state that, given some partially successful partial instantiations of the market system, they hope or have faith that the markets, left largely unhindered, may provide us (or some of us) with future prosperity, then they would be intellectually honest. They could follow in the steps of Richard Rorty (1998), who advocates political liberalism qua hopeful civil religion of democracy. They would be consistent with Friedrich Hayek’s (1992) characterisation of the market order as “transcendent” and comparable to the religious one in assuming that its own unfathomable will, “not mine” i.e. humankind’s, “be done” (72). They would bear witness to Keynes’ (1936) claim that non-rational passions determine market trends and his warning that his own future-driven theory might be merely “a visionary hope” (24.v). They would be reminiscent of the Providential character of Adam Smith’s (1776: IV.ii.9) “invisible hand” (cf. Oslington, 2011). But how many liberals and main stream economists do it? Textbooks in economics say nothing of the sort. On the contrary, they: Assume the free markets’ existence, which is itself empirically doubtful and at best historically limited (cf. Rhonheimer, 2012); Assume away any shortcoming by presupposing methodologically the free markets’ perfection; and Ascribe to the free markets the necessary generation of prosperity, what ever contrary evidence there has been in human experience, such as: State-led development (e.g. communist China); prosperous cartel-intensive economies (e.g. Bismarck’s Germany); the collapse of the first age of market globalisation (1871-1914) and the ensuing Great War and Great Depression; the booming populations of 20th century officially “socialist” nations (e.g. USSR); or the world wide depletion of natural and human systems upon which “the life and health of the billions [are] supported” (Hayek, 1992: 75)57. ———————— 56 Smith (1776) prefigures and exemplifies the unimaginative character of liberal ‘realism’ by dismissing ‘utopian’ ideas such as the worldwide abolition of slavery, universal literacy, democratic constitutions, the UK wide abolition of commercial barriers, or preventing poor workers and their families from being wiped out by famines and disease in times of crisis. 57 UNESCO (2002-13) offers a comprehensive record of the depletion of these civil commons.

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Such a reticence about economic reality and the unfalsifiable assumption at issue are not only unscientific; they are also unprofessional. In truth, they are tantamount to a lie. And lying is, under normal circumstances, unethical. Still, I doubt that there is any self-interested intention to lie or avoid the truth systematically in the writings and statements of committed free-market liberals and mainstream economists (an accusation made, inter alia, by Galbraith, 2004, Ha-Joon, 2012, and Häring & Douglas, 2012). Too many and too frequent are their public utterances about the free market’s unique ability to generate prosperity. Mendaciousness, double standards and Jesuitical hypocrisy on such a scale would require an incredible amount of inter-subjective coordination and group discipline. Albeit logically possible, it seems practically improbable. Rather, the uncritical acceptance of the hypothesis at issue is much more similar to an embedded structure of superstition, or a religious dogma, rooted deeply in the consciousness of the adherents to liberalism, to the point of becoming a Burkean “prejudice” (i.e. habitual belief without reflexive judgment; 1791: 144-5), a tacit criterion for professional selection and self-censorship (cf. Häring & Douglas, 2012) or, to use Veblen’s (1914) famous phrase, a “trained incapacity” (347) to think outside the box. It is analogous to the largely unquestioned and openly unquestionable belief in God’s existence to be found in Europe’smedieval mind-set, amongst both simple laymen and sophisticated scholars58. Probably, the very suggestion that free markets may not be a necessary source of prosperity must sound preposterous, if not ungodly, to their ears: a prank at best; a blasphemy at worst. Yet, the exploration of the superstitious (or religious) character of free-market liberalism would require at least as much space as the present text and I cannot pursue it here. This stone, for the moment, is better left unturned59. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aglietta, M., A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience, London, Verso, 1976; Aglietta, M. & Rébérioux, A., Dérives du capitalisme financier, Paris, Albin Michel, 2004; Barden, G. & Murphy, T., Law and Justice in Community, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; Baruchello, G. & Johnstone, R.L., “Rights and Value. Construing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Civil Commons”, Studies in Social Justice, 5(1): 91-125, 2011; Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969; Boldizzoni, F., The Poverty of Clio: Resurrecting Economic History, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011; Burke, E., Reflections on the French Revolution, 2001/1791, available at: http://bartelby.org/24/3/; Castoriadis, C., The Imaginary Institution of Society, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998; Castoriadis, C., La societé bureaucratique, Paris: Christian Bourgois, 2000; ———————— 58 Contemporary economics is strikingly analogous to medieval theology: in its institutional success; in its display of technical skill; in its appeal to young minds; in its discussion of unreal perfect abstractions that justify de iure (like a theodicy), and do not challenge de facto, the status quo and those who benefit most from it (cf. Häring & Douglas, 2012). 59 Stiglitz (2003) and McMurtry (2004) have already turned this stone to a large extent.

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A RELIGIOUS TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC DYSFUNCTIONS: RELIGIOUS ECONOMICS VIORELLA MANOLACHE*

Abstract. The aim of this article is to provide a concise account of religion’s means of responding to the crises of the contemporary world by expanding the religious project beyond philosophical-cultural aspects to include alternatives of an economic and social nature. The concept of religious economics is understood in the sense of a theological justification of economic utility, the means used by the Church to offer solutions (including in terms of economics) to contemporary crises. Without providing a historical record of the subject, this study will focus on the theoretical warnings issued by Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI in the international Catholic journal Communio, as well as the more recent project of Cardinal Peter Turkson and the ideas arising out of the circular Caritas in Veritate: A Catholic Framework for Economic Life. In this context, the position and role of the Church in the “setting of new rules” as part of “shaping a new vision for the future” are also considered, demonstrating that the effects of the theological-economic formula are being fully felt, at the end of 2012 and start of 2013, as an alternative means of addressing the immediate problems of the contemporary world against a backdrop of “amicable secularisation”, of a virtuous fusion of religion and economics. Keywords: Bindungskraft, Secularisation, Philosophical Theology, Religious Economics.

Introduction: The need for More/New Bindungskraft in Religion Given the visible elasticity of the contemporary religious project, the present study, intentionally avoiding a thorough examination of the latter’s theologicalphilosophical work (which has already been successfully conducted in Romanian academia), aims to suggest and verify the hypothesis according to which, if the ———————— * Scientific Researcher III, PhD., Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania; [email protected]; [email protected] Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 132–141, Bucharest, 2015.

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secularised state still makes use of cultural sources as a means of fuelling consciousness/solidarity, then the religious project will expand beyond the philosophical-cultural effect to include alternatives of an economic and social nature. The study does not intend to analyse the social-economic principles of the Roman-Catholic Church or the possibilities for their practical application in a concrete social/historical context, but reaffirms the energies given by the elasticity of the religious project that of readjustment, contacting and even fusion with the contemporary transformations of the world, society and nature. In fact, in the globalising space of the challenges facing religion, the aforementioned development contradicts what Niklas Luhmann1 understood through the generic term of “religious pathology” as a withdrawal/ immobilisation of religion within a certain niche of society. There it reproduces itself, oblivious to what is going on around it – a form of dynamism that is easy to locate within the impasses of the European project (i.e. its crises), which calls for a shift of emphasis away from solutions originating in philosophical-political space to economic-social reflexes not unrelated from what the then Cardinal Ratzinger identified in the religious citizen – secular citizen relationship. These reflexes were approximated, in the sphere of political philosophy, by the answers provided by Jürgen Habermas and Cardinal Ratzinger2 to the question posed in 1967 by Ernst Böckenförde3 – Does the state (based on individual liberty) live by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself? – either in terms of the democratic state’s need of “cultural resources” (Habermas) or the identification of an efficient ethical reality as a means of unlocking interculturality and in response to post-secularised society (Ratzinger). In fact, in establishing Bindungskräfte (binding forces/points), Böckenförde anticipated a Kantian solution as a means whereby the secularised state can charge itself from the religious fuse board, a formula for the reactivation of religious binding forces. Habermas did not shy away from warning of the need for philosophy to take the phenomenon of interiority seriously, with its effect of cognitive provocation, through a connection to religion as a means of expressing sensibilities that are “sufficiently differentiated so as to be able to perceive miscarried lives, social pathologies, the failures of individual life projects and the deformation of misarranged existential relationships”4. The limits of Habermas’ complementary learning process refer precisely to the overly serious way in which secularised reason and religion acknowledge each other amid the assault on moral awareness from multiple directions, not only religious5, in the context of the limited translatability of religion as part of ——————— 1 Niklas Luhmann,“Ich denke primär historisch”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 9: 937, 1991, pp. 937. 2Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, Dialectica secularizãrii. Despre raþiune ºi credinþã [Dialektik der Säkularisierung - Über Vernunft und Religion], Apostrof Publishing House, Cluj, 2005. 3 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1991. 4 Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, Dialectica secularizãrii. Despre raþiune ºi credinþã [Dialektik der Säkularisierung - Über Vernunft und Religion], Apostrof Publishing House, Cluj, 2005, p. 93. 5 Detlef Horster, Jürgen Habermas und der Papst. Glauben und Vernunft, Gerechtigkeit und Nächstenliebe im säkularen Staat, Transcript, Bielefeld, 2006.

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“anamnetic reason”6. According to Habermas, the well established position of religion in the globalising dynamic relates to the interconnections between universalism and intellectualism through a reconsideration of the validity of philosophy as critical-transformative appropriation, as a means of adopting religious content and its integration into the argumentative discourse. In terms of reconnecting binding points, Andrei Marga7 warns that “the discourse of the faithful about religion is not the only legitimate discourse about religion”. This gives rise to the hypothesis that, while the interdependence existing between religion and economics, with all its revisions and updating, remains a point of interest for contemporary research, also in the guise of the establishment of The Association for the Study of Religion, Economics and Culture (ASREC) and The Center for the Economic Study of Religion (CESR), then the intention of this study is to announce/denounce the signs of transition from the philosophicaltheological solution to the combined theological-economic model found both in the theoretical warnings of J. Ratzinger in the International Catholic Journal Communio and in the more recent project of Cardinal Peter Turkson and the ideas arising out of the circular Caritas in Veritate: A Catholic Framework for Economic Life.

Discussion: the Updating of Religious-Economic Philosophy In discussing the Church and the economy, the chapter which brings together the articles of J. Ratzinger published in the Communio magazine (Pope Benedict XVI, 2010) reveals the signs of denaturalisation, experienced in philosophical terms, arising from the undermining of the link between economy, ethics and religion, thus confirming from a historical perspective the evidence according to which the fundamental political error of the saeculum consists in the attempt to equate the centralised economic system with the moral system, in contrast with the mechanistic responses of the market economy. This criticism refers to a far more radical and fundamental determinism of the centralised systems, as opposed to that found in liberalism, and implies the renunciation of ethics as an independent means of the economy. This also explains the sentiment of tracing religion back to economics, as a particularising reflection, an obstacle to the progress strived for by the natural laws of history. The need to move beyond this failed perspective, to which the Church is no longer able to contribute correctively, is also felt in religion’s incapacity to respond to and rectify the remnants still visible within the concepts of the global economy. Terminologically speaking, based on Novak’s typology8, this theologicaleconomic vision relies on the nodal points of a tripartite system: the private economy (as a preoccupation of theology/theologies for the evaluation of the institutions, ——————— 6 Johann Eckerstorfer, ”Dialektik der Säkularisierung”, in Jenseits der Säkularisierung. Religionsphilosophische Studien, Herta Nagel - Docekal, Fredrich Wolfram, Parerga, Berlin, 2008. 7Andrei Marga, Absolutul astãzi. Teologia ºi filosofia lui Joseph Ratzinger [Absolute Today. Joseph Ratzinger’s Theologhy and Philosophy], Eikon Publishing House, Cluj, 2010. 8 Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, Madison Books, Lanham, 1991.

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practices and ethical problems pertaining to certain economic spaces); the theology of economic systems (with a focus on an evaluative understanding of economic systems and a theological interpretation of economic theory/practice); and general economic theology (a trans-systemic/historical endeavour of theological interpretation of economic phenomena/processes). In attempting to reconcile these three levels within the realm of the traditional economy, and given all the evidence that the Church and the economy can no longer avoid one another, Ratzinger proposes an elimination of the discursive distance assumed by the Church vis-à-vis economic problems. This debate was clarified in philosophical terms with all the theoretical implications from the moral sphere translated through the action of spiritual powers: because the rules of the market only function when a moral consensus exists that sustains them. In fact, the tension at play between the purely liberal model of the economy and considerations of an ethical nature deepens the inequality existing in particular in large swathes of the Third World through exploitation, institutionalisation and injustice. In this case, the centralised economy still represents a moral alternative. In the spirit of Max Weber, it is not the economy that produces religion, but a fundamental religious orientation that decides which economic model we should follow. Ratzinger’s statement refers precisely to the idea that the liberal capitalist model can no longer be regarded as a solution. One possible alternative comprises Christian self-criticism in respect of political and economic ethics9. In a critique of the available models, the dialogue between Pope Benedict XVI and Catholic Bishops from the United States, transcribed in a document entitled A Catholic Framework for Economic Life, marks a visible shift of philosophical emphasis towards a combined economic and religious model. While the Catholic Bishops from the United States highlight the urgent need to adhere to an ethical framework for economic life, as principles for reflection, criteria for judgement and directions for action – and thereby reiterating Pope John Paul II’s call for the Catholic tradition to be based on a “society of work, enterprise and participation” that “is not directed against the market, but demands that the market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society and the state so as to ensure the basic needs of the whole society are satisfied” (in Centesimus Annus) – Pope Benedict XVI reconsiders the mechanism of the economic sphere in the sense of its not being ethically neutral, inhuman or opposed to society, and as such should be treated in an ethical manner (A Catholic Framework, 36)10. For the economy needs ethics in order to function correctly (A Catholic Framework, 45) a principle translated through the imperative to counteract the amoral nature of the economy, excessive disparities, the effect of marginalisation, a lack of social cohesion and internal forms of mutual solidarity, of legitimate rights. “Economic activity needs to be directed towards the pursuit of the common ———————— 9 Joseph Ratzinger, “Church and Economy. Responsability for the future of the World Economy”, Communio, 13:199-204, 1986. 10 A Catholic Framework for Economic Life, Caritas in Veritate, available at: http://www. usccb.org/ upload/caritas_in_veritate-study-guide-3.pdf (viewed 8 April, 2014).

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good, for which the political community in particular must also take responsibility” by instilling the consumer with a specific social responsibility. This explains the impossibility of not regarding the crises of the contemporary world in terms of opportunities, understood as the need, on a religious level, to “replan/set new rules”, in fact “to shape a new vision for the future”. J. Ratzinger11 cautioned that the essence of morality is based around the concepts of freedom and norm, autonomy and heteronomy, self-determination and external determination by authority, notwithstanding the tension arising from the clash of Christian morality and that of authority; this gives rise to the danger of transforming ideological ethics into a nihilistic formula and the downgrading of conscience to a euphemistic form of participation in knowledge. In response to the twin questions – What contribution can the Church make to the creation of a balance between exterior progress and morality? and What can it do not only to remain active, but also to reveal the moral (re)sources of humanity? – Ratzinger reaffirms the imperative to reconsider the structural relationship between the competence to take decision and competent knowledge, with the emphasis on establishing and applying practical, immediately applicable rules. The definitive transition from a philosophical level to economic responses is visible in the corrective remarks made by Cardinal Peter Turkson in his address of 2011 entitled “Protecting Human Life and Dignity: Promoting a Just Economy”. The Cardinal draws attention to the fact that the religious terminology utilised by the Church in defining the concepts of peace and justice requires clarification and that terms such as “social justice” and “gift” are not understood in their initially intended sense, for “the vocabulary which is just taken for granted and used freely may have had some nuances which sometimes are missed because of the way the terms are used in the political context”12. In the light of Pope Benedict’s plan for “integral human development” based on principles of charity and truth, the concept of social justice was erroneously coupled with “socialism”/“communism”, with the result that it was mistakenly understood in terms of a promotion of socialism or the big government solutions to social problems. In Turkson’s opinion, social justice implies the obligations and responsibilities that come with ensuring fairness and equal opportunities in communities/societies, as opposed to the ideology of socialism, in which private property/interests are placed entirely at the service of government policies. The Cardinal says that what Pope Benedict proposed in Caritas in Veritate was an achieving of the common good without sacrificing personal interests, understanding of the term “gift” in a manner closer to the philosophical-theological idea of charity, in terms of gift, acceptance, and communion. In the same philosophical vein, the key to a real human-economic vision consists of involving ethics in all decision making. ———————— 11 Joseph Ratzinger, Despre conºtiinþã [On Conscience], Galaxia Gutenberg Publishing House, Târgu Lãpuº, 2008. 12 Cardinal Turkson, Interview, council’s offices in Rome, available at: http://catholiceye. blogspot.ro/ 2011/01/social-teaching-american-audiences.html (viewed 26 February, 2014).

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Case Study: A Religious Treatment of Economic Dysfunctions Against a backdrop of accusations about interfering in matters outside the remit of the Church, the application of the principles of the social Catholic doctrine in the context of the economic crisis does not appear to be distancing itself historically from the combined philosophical-economic and religious model, which results in a confirmation of the main points of the inaugural document of modern social Catholic doctrine that translate into the promotion of social equality, trade union rights, a rejection of socialism (communism), laissez-faire capitalism and the right to private property – the prescriptions through which the state ensures the “common good”. The adoption the official position vis-à-vis the social issue, through a reactivation of the essential role of the economic situation for the wellbeing of the individual, demonstrates that religious perspective does not appear to be far removed from an effective involvement in the diagnosis and resolution of economic dysfunctions (see on this matter the contribution of the Vatican at the UN international conference on financing for development (2008) held in Qatar and the publication by the Catholic delegation of a document on the subject of financial abuse). While, according to Pope Benedict, the Church cannot and should not take up the political battle, and also cannot and should not seek to replace the state, it must nonetheless play its part through rational argument, given that fact that a just society must be the achievement of politics, not of the Church13. This also results in the need to manage globalisation through recourse to an authority with a subsidiary and polyarchic structure, either in order not to infringe on freedom or in order to be efficient in practice14. In documenting the causes of the economic and financial crises, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (2011) diagnoses either the inherent errors in policy, resulting in a weakening of the political, economic and financial institutions, or the ethical breakdowns based an implosion of materialism and utilitarianism – all of which we can describe in philosophical terms as a particular technical error. Economically speaking, the different dynamics of the quantitative limits that determine the cost-price relationship have been unable to prevent an inflationary spiral with negative results of a liberal bent in terms of the threat of bankruptcy. The consequences for the real economy and the grave difficulties it faces in certain sectors have generated a negative wave on production markets and in international trade, with serious repercussions for employees and other toxic effects against a backdrop of growing inequalities. After the second Vatican Council, in his Populorum Progressio. Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on the Development of Peoples, Pope Paul VI prophetically denounced the dangers of economic development in liberalist terms with a destabilising ———————— 13 Pope Benedict XVI (2006), Deus Caritas Est, available at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html (viewed 1 July, 2014). 14 Mohler, Albert, “A Christian View of the Economic Crisis – is the economy really driven by greed?”, Christianity Today, available at: http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/september/ (viewed 13 January, 2014).

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effect on peace, adding that full and global development is only another name for peace. This foresight is confirmed by the Annual Report of the International Monetary Fund (2007), which recognised the deficit accrued on account of the inadequate management of globalisation and the entrenchment of inequalities. As transpires from the Church’s position, economic liberalism (as a form of economic apriorism, with all its exaggeration of certain aspects of the market devoid of laws of functioning and real economic development, and with imperfect regulations and controls and the individual interests of the countries that enjoy an economic and financial advantage), together with utilitarian thinking or that of technocratic ideology (in the words of Pope Benedict), contains the ideological seeds of the crisis. The shifting of focus towards a philosophical-economic model is seen in the proposal to create an ethical global authority to regulate financial markets based on the global economy’s need of ethical solidarity. In view of this the Vatican called for a uniting of the different views of economic change, calling for new solutions through which to destabilise the preexisting balances of power. The economic and financial crisis becomes, in a religious sense, a pretext to re-examine the principles and their moral and cultural foundations as a basis of social coexistence, by offering an alternative to the “idolatry of the market” and “neo-liberal” thinking as a means of providing exclusively technical solutions. This also leads on to an alternative combined economic and religious formula in the guise of a “supra-national authority” with “universal jurisdiction” to guide economic policies and decision, with the United States as its initial reference and later having an independent status, in fact as a “minimum shared body of rules to manage the global financial market” and “forms of monetary management”. Such imperatives call for the creation of a central world bank, similar to the national central banks, to regulate the flow and system of monetary exchange through gradual solutions and a balanced partial transfer of each nation’s powers to a world authority and regional authorities in the context of the dynamism of human society and the economy and the progress of technology, already eroded in a globalised world. This also implies the need to inject a dose of ethics and to replace rampant profiteering and reduce inequality through recourse to another authority, in order to restore “the primacy of the spiritual and of ethics”, as well as “the primacy of politics – which is responsible for the common good – over the economy and finance” in terms of the idea that “virtuous” banks help out the “real economy”.

Results: A Virtuous Contamination – Religious Economics Viewing the separation between state and Church, in the tradition of the Westphalian principles, as a practical and theoretical act of rationality, a means of discernment or a clarifying method, Gabriel Chindea15 concludes that this separation serves to preserve that which belongs to each sphere, thus clarifying ———————— 15 Gabriel Chindea, “Separarea dintre bisericã ºi stat sau aporiile complicitãþii” [Separation Church- State or the Complacency Aporia], in Idea Artã +Societate, 2005.

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them. In this light we cannot but mention the bourgeois divisions that engender a demarcation between ethical imperatives and economic imperatives, between idealism and realism, between class interest and universal interest, etc. themes that are reviewed in relation to possible accelerated interactions/contaminations between the political, social and economic spheres. In fact, neither the state nor the Church is immune to potential overlappings/ contaminations, translated either in terms of the transcendence of the religious beyond its established limit or through the separation of the state from religious indifference, something found at European level through the inclusion of Christian affiliation in the constitution. According to Max Weber16, the “spirit” of capitalism has to do with the rational approach to economic activity and formally free labour, understood as the industrial organisation of labour, the separation of private finance from that of the enterprise, as well as the understanding of profit as an end in itself, all of which leads to an understanding of economic success as bordering on the commendable/virtuous, in the sense of the predominantly protestant nature of the possession of capital and entrepreneurship. Beyond denouncing the unidirectional way religious ideas are able to influence economic behaviour, contemporary commentary does not refrain from highlighting the bi-directional manner in which economic realities contaminate religious life, leading to a discovery of the new ways of adjusting economic models in order to respond to problems pertaining to the system of beliefs, norms and values, in fact the continuous way in which religion affects economic behaviours and attitudes. In the opinion of L. Iannaccone17, from the perspective of the theory/ techniques of micro-economics, religious behaviour leads to economic consequences, thus establishing a religious economics with a direct impact on religious organisations deemed functional in respect of the laws of the market economy and with a view to boosting the efficiency with which said organisations utilise resources. This confirms the idea proposed by R. M. McCleary and R. J. Barro18 that, viewed as a dependent variable, religion/religiosity affects individual characteristics, the work ethic and honesty, as well as influencing economic performance. Viewing the secular empirical data, significant economic development tends to be inversely proportionate to religiosity or, in other words, the better off an individual the lower his level of religiosity. Efforts to revitalise religion are considered by Habermas as an achievement of secularisation, translated in terms of “Kantian republicanism” as “non-religious post-metaphysical justification of the normative foundations of the constitutional democracy”. The evidence shows that progress should not be understood as a ———————— 16 M. Weber, Etica protestantã ºi spiritul capitalismului [The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism], second edition, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007. 17 L. Iannaccone, “Introduction to the Economics of Religion”, in Journal of Economic Literature 3: 1465-1495, 1998. 18 R.M. McCleary, R.J. Barro, “Religion and Economy”, in The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 249-72, 2006.

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multi-dimensional constellation of the “good life”, but rather as the “personal exercise of virtue” with a view to establishing a common civic project. Civic virtue confirms the fact that its value lies in the rational support for political systems as a variation of the constitutive role of civic virtue in the creation of “good policies”. Given these philosophical demarcations, the moral world, instilled with constructive significance, becomes the reason why the project of an inclusive social world (made up of clearly defined interpersonal relationships between the free and equal members of a “self-determined association”, the equivalent of Kant’s Kingdom of Ends) is able to serve as a substitute for the ontological reference to an objective world. Any possible and temporary recovery, given such global(ising) (dis)order, confirms the fact Europe is in crisis and legitimises the mild disagreement between Christianity and enlightened rationalism, which has distanced itself from its Christian roots in order to be able proclaim and present itself as an aspect of European identity.

Conclusions While J. Habermas discusses the grounding of moral stages in terms of a logic of development, examining the ontogenesis of a decentred understanding of the world structurally rooted in action oriented towards understanding through recourse to the socio-cognitive transformation of the conventional stage into a moral notion19, the option of a religious economics confirms the relegation of the philosophical-theological discourse to the second tier and the acceptance of religious-economics alternatives as an immediate means of reacting to the inherent tensions of the contemporary world. This explains the conclusion of this study that the stepping down of Pope Benedict represents for religion the swapping of one set of problems for another, recalling what Marcel Gauchet20 calls the oscillation of legitimacy from the supply of meaning towards the demand for meaning, with the religious adapting to the profane, as a way of responding to the urban and globalising nature of its practice. In the same vein as Gianni Vattimo21, we cannot avoid the fact that the return of religion/issues of faith cannot be separated from worldy history (i.e. from its transformations) and cannot merely be reduced to the transition of stages (i.e. merely the connecting points) of life viewed as constantly equal to itself. This explains the attempt by religion to break free from the provisionality of its positioning and the acceptance of secularisation as de-sacralisation, the inclusion of subjectivity in a system of more complex social and power relations, translated in terms of a system of mediation, notwithstanding the revision of Max Weber’s hypothesis of modern capitalism as being the result of a protestant ethic, a reaction in the sense of a Stimmung (a spiritual atmosphere), providing interpretations of reality. ———————— 19 Jürgen Habermas, Conºtiinþã moralã ºi acþiune comunicativã [Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action], Substanþial All Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000. 20 Marcel Gauchet, Ieºirea din religie [Getting Out of Religion], Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006. 21 Gianni Vattimo, A crede cã mai credem. E cu putinþã sã fim creºtini în afara Bisericii? [Credere di credere], Pontica Publishing House, Constanþa, 2005.

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While the fusion of Church and economics as a secularising model cannot claim to be a novel idea, the present study highlights the novelty of the religious contribution to economics in terms of technical solutions, even where these practical constructs have been met with reservation as a simplistic response to the troubled current reality. J. Ratzinger (in Communio) and later as Pope Benedict (in Caritas in Veritate: A Catholic Framework forEconomic Life) warns in philosophical-theological vein of the fluctuations/impasses experienced in the economic field, while his withdrawal from the post, and the circulation of the name of Cardinal Turkson as a possible replacement, confirms, if not the tracing of religion back to economics, then at least the possibility for religion to reoccupy a niche with a direct economic impact. Safe from accusations that religion has retreated into/is stranded within a philosophical vocabulary (despite the rephrasings and clarifications provided by Cardinal Turkson), the fusion between Chrurch and economics appears to represent the most visible form of response, in the sense of correcting the faults discernible within the concepts of the global economy. In the context of the encounter between Habermas and Ratzinger that took place at the start of 2004 in the form of a dialogue on the themes of law vs. ecclesial, religion vs. philosophy, the foundations of the rule of law vs. the relationship with alterity (as a substitute for a point of reference), we realise, now more than ever, that the effects of the theological-economic formula can represent an alternative model with which to approach the immediate difficulties of the contemporary world in the guise of an “amicable secularisation”. SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Recht, Staat, Freiheit, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1991; Gauchet, Marcel, Ieºirea din religie [Getting Out of Religion], Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006; Habermas, Jürgen, Conºtiinþã moralã ºi acþiune comunicativã [Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action], Substanþial All, Bucharest, 2000; Habermas, Jürgen, Ratzinger, Joseph, Dialectica secularizãrii. Despre raþiune ºi credinþã [Dialektik der Säkularisierung – Über Vernunft und Religion], Apostrof, Cluj, 2005; Horster, Detlef, Jürgen Habermas und der Papst. Glauben und Vernunft, Gerechtigkeit und Nächstenliebe im säkularen Staat, Transcript, Bielefeld, 2006; Iannaccone, L., “Introduction to the Economics of Religion”, in Journal of Economic Literature, 3: 1465-1495, 1998; Marga, Andrei, Absolutul astãzi. Teologia ºi filosofia lui Joseph Ratzinger [Absolute Today. Joseph Ratzinger’s Theologhy and Philosophy], Eikon, Cluj, 2010; Novak, Michael, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, Madison Books, Lanham, 1991; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Towards Reforming the International Financial and Monetary Systems in the Context of Global Public Authority, Vatican City, 2011; Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger in Communio, vol. I, The Unity of the Church, Eerdemans Publishing House, Michigan, 2010; Ratzinger, Joseph, “Church and Economy. Responsability for the future of the World Economy”, in Communio, 13: 199-204, 1986; Ratzinger, Joseph, Despre conºtiinþã [On Conscience], Galaxia Gutenberg, Târgu Lãpuº, 2008; Vattimo, Gianni, A crede cã mai credem. E cu putinþã sã fim creºtini în afara Bisericii? [Credere di credere], Pontica, Constanþa, 2005; Weber, M., Etica protestantã ºi spiritul capitalismului [The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism], second edition, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2007.

KUHN, LAKATOS AND THE PARADIGM CHANGE IN BRITISH POLITICAL ECONOMY IN 1979 IAN BROWNE*

Abstract. The concept of a paradigm change has been used by economists and historians of economics to explain the transition after 1979 from a Keynesian model of political economy to a neo-classical model. The present study examines the use of Thomas Kuhn’s model of paradigm change to explain this change as being a rational response to the apparent anomalies that arose in the Keynesian paradigm between 1973-9. It shows that the way Kuhn’s ideas have been used relies upon what Lakatos calls ‘dogmatic falsificationism’, a falsificationist methodology which neglects the holistic implications of the Duhem-Quine thesis. As a result of neglecting Lakatosian forms of falsificationism that incorporate the Duhem-Quine thesis, the Kuhnian model of paradigm change cannot explain the change from a Keynesian model of political economy to a neo-classical model as a rational response to apparent anomalies within the Keynesian model. It then provides an alternative account of the events of 1973-9 which suggest that in fact no paradigm failure occurred and that the events of that period were perfectly explicable from within the Keynesian paradigm. The study suggests that the Kuhnian accounts of paradigm change are driven by the tendency within economic history to write ‘Whig’ history, which mistakes political success for truth. Therefore the Kuhnian structure imposed upon the events of 1973-9 is an ex post facto rationalisation of a politically driven process that was far from rational. The use of the Kuhnian idea of a paradigm change provides the basis for a narrative that mimics the structure of scientific and philosophical explanation, but is actually neither scientific nor philosophical. The paradigm change that occurred after 1979 is best seen as the result of the narrative of Keynesian paradigm failure winning ‘the battle of narratives’, which paved the way for the neo-classical paradigm to acquire hegemonic status. Keywords: paradigm change, Kuhn, Lakatos, neo-classical, Keynes, political economy. ———————— * Studied at Churchill College, University of Cambridge and at St. Andrews University, Scotland. Current research interests include Aristotelian ethics, political philosophy and anti-realist semantics; ianbrowne1311 @gmail.com Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 142–154, Bucharest, 2015.

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Keynesianism The post war period up to 1973 in Britain is usually referred to as the Keynesian period, ‘the golden age’, or as the period of the post-war consensus, when both major parties appeared to share the same ideas regarding economic management. The period between 1973-79 is seen as as a transitional period, and post 1979 is seen as the Thatcherite or neo-classical period. Keynesianism is a term whose meaning is subject to considerable variation, encompassing an approach to government, a political philosophy and an economic theory1. It is now accepted that the consensus was not quite as consensual as we previously thought, and however we interpret the term ‘Keynesian’, we are now aware that the period to 1973 was not quite so Keynesian as we might have believed, nor did Keynesianism die in 1974 or even in 1979. However, despite these reservations, I will describe the period up to 1973 as being Keynesian and use 1979 to mark the major shift in approaches to managing the British economy, and in the understanding of the parameters within which the state and its institutions should operate.

The Keynesian and the Neo-classical Models The four aims of economic policy are maintaining employment, keeping prices stable (low inflation), ensuring that imports don’t exceed exports (that balance of payments is not negative), and ensuring the economy grows steadily. The fundamental difference between the two models is that according to the Keynesian model, these goals can best be achieved by the government intervening in the market. The neo-classical model, the current prevailing model, argues that unregulated markets possess the greatest allocative efficiency, and that government involvement in the economy merely impedes the efficiency of the market. Keynesians see one of the potential problems facing society as being market failure, the failure of the market to ensure full employment, inflation free growth, and avoid a balance of payments deficit. The particular concern of the Keynesian post war settlement was to ensure full employment. Classical theory in economics took the view that although unemployment occurs, it is a disequilibrium phenomenon, and that in the long run the market will always return to equilibrium and hence there could never be prolonged involuntary unemployment. Keynes argued that the market could settle into an equilibrium at high levels of unemployment, so the economy needed to be stimulated to ensure full employment. The typical assumption is that during the golden age politicians used Keynesian counter cyclical demand management to ensure full employment – deliberately creating demand when the economy was slowing down in order to get it moving and deliberately reducing demand when the economy was moving to fast in order to ——————— 1 Backhouse, Roger E., ‘The Keynesian Revolution’ in Backhouse, Roger E., and Bateman, Bradley. W. (editors), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

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prevent inflation2. A further, political, aspect of government intervention was to alter the market determined distribution of goods in pursuit of the public interest, by introducing such things as free education and free healthcare for all. Neo-classical theory sees the major potential problem facing society as being not market failure, but government failure – the distortions introduced into the market by government activity which prevent the market allocating resources efficiently.

The Crisis of 1974-1979 In practice it proved very difficult to pursue simultaneously all the four policy goals – full employment, low inflation, growth and a non negative balance of payments. There seems to be an inverse relation between employment and inflation3, and the pursuit of high rates of growth ran the risk of encouraging imports, as supply side deficiencies in investment and in the quality of British labour meant that British firms could not meet all the demand, which would have a negative effect upon the balance of payments. Economic policy in the Keynesian period therefore consisted in trying to achieve a balance between the four objectives and in switching priorities between the four as circumstances dictated. “For a quarter of a century or so after the end of the Second World War the British people enjoyed full employment, no major recessions, and the fastest rate of economic growth ever experienced on a sustained basis, as well as the most egalitarian distribution”4. It is important to remember this when reading about the supposed failure of this period, as the Thatcherite version of this time has, in Middleton’s words, “corrupted our historical reading of the years since 1945.” It is this period, 1945-73, which is supposed to have produced the seeds which came to fruition between 1974-9 and it is this latter period which is supposed to have served as a sort of crucial empirical test which showed the falsity of the Keynesian model. In falsificationist mode, Thatcher identified the Keynesian period as the source of all Britain’s problems, “No theory of government was ever given a fairer test or a more prolonged experiment in a democratic country than democratic socialism received in Britain. Yet it was a miserable failure in every respect”5. ——————— 2 Middleton argues that maintaining the pound as an international currency and having a positive balance of payments took precedence over full employment. Middleton, Roger, The British Economy Since 1945, Macmillan, Houndmills, 2000. 3 This is the basis of the Phillips Curve. 4 Middleton, p. 25. 5 Thatcher, M., The Path to Power. Thatcher’s ideological reading of history meant that she used the term “socialism” to describe the welfare state and the mixed economy which emerged after 1945. When Thatcher came to power in 1979 the percentage of national output produced by state owned enterprises was 11.1%. This was around the EU average, slightly higher than West Germany where the percentage was 10.7%, but lower than Austria where the percentage was 14.5%. To describe this sort of mixed economy as “socialism” is perverse, if not downright dishonest, as it means that not only did West Germany and Austria qualify as “socialist” countries, but so did every other country on the western side of the Berlin wall.

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The Events of 1973-1979 According to the theory of the paradigm failure of the Keynesian model, the attempts to balance the four goals of policy had simply led to the inherent problems of balancing inflation and employment becoming more and more pronounced. Unemployment and inflation were locked together in a vicious cycle with the cost of reducing unemployment being paid in higher and higher levels of inflation and the cost of reducing inflation being paid for by higher and higher levels of unemployment. The problems were alleged to be inherent to the Keynesian paradigm and since its beginnings, “...it was taking larger injections of demand to reduce unemployment at each stage of the economic cycle; at each stage the relationships between levels of unemployment and inflation were deteriorating. Reflation by increased government spending not only caused inflation to accelerate but eventually left unemployment higher at the next downturn in the cycle”6. On this analysis, the events of 1974-79 represented the culmination of these inherent failings and the point where this inflation/unemployment cycle became unmanageable and both the economy and the country teetered on the brink of chaos. In 1972, the Conservative government initiated a “dash for growth”, the most significant peacetime reflation of demand the British economy has ever experienced. The consequence was high growth and a rapid fall in unemployment. The downside was a pronounced deterioration in the current account balance of payments and a 9% rate of inflation. The preferred measure for reducing inflation was to use the power of the government to limit price rises and restrict wage rises via a prices and incomes policy. But in 1973 the price of oil quadrupled, the OPEC I shock which, since Britain was an oil importing country, had the effect of importing a further degree of inflation to an economy which was already experiencing high inflation. The principal anomaly which was supposed to prove the falsity of the Keynesian model was the co-occurrence of inflation and unemployment after 19737. Rather than being inversely related as the model suggested, both inflation and unemployment increased, with inflation rising from 16% in 1974 to 24.2% in 1975 whilst unemployment rose from 2.6% in 1974 to 4.2 % in 1975. Added to this were problems with the other pair of goals, increasing growth while avoiding a negative balance of payments. As growth increased, the balance of payments started deteriorating, and reached a deficit of 4% of GDP in 1974-5. A run on the currency massively increased the cost of imports, generating yet further inflationary pressures. The Bank of England’s attempts to defend sterling on international exchanges led to Britain approaching the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976 for a loan, which it received subject to various ———————— 6 Kavanagh Dennis, The Reordering of British Politics, Politics after Thatcher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 53. 7 This is not the same objection as the one in Kavanagh, although both criticisms share the idea that the inflation/employment linkage was the central problem for Keynesianism.

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conditions, these being that the borrowing required for government capital spending be reduced and that targets for the money supply be introduced. As Oliver and Pemberton put it, the crisis of Keynesianism was more than just the failure of the unemployment/inflation trade off: “Although inflation peaked by 1975, the continuing high level of unemployment, the growth of the public sector borrowing requirement, the fall of sterling on the foreign exchanges in 1976 and the high rate of inflation combined to unravel the Keynesian paradigm from 1976 onward. It is clear that 1976 was one of the defining moments in the move toward neoliberalism. As Peter Middleton commented, “in the minds of markets, and probably also in terms of public perceptions within the UK, the IMF agreement marked a decisive point”. By the end of that year, the Labour government’s adjusted but still broadly ‘Keynesian plus’ macroeconomic strategy had clearly failed”8. Distinguishing three orders of policy change, Hall argues that the government moved from first order adaptations to the Keynesian paradigm, changes in the the settings of the instruments of British policy, such as changing the rate of interest, through to second order adaptations to the paradigm, where although the goals behind British macroeconomic policy remained largely the same, the techniques and policy instruments used to attain them were altered, such as agreeing to the monetary targets set by the IMF. A variety of first and second order changes were employed but policy remained Keynesian up to the election of 1979. However, states Hall, as the 1970s wore on, these first and second order changes were ineffectual, and displayed the inability of the Keynesian paradigm to solve the problems it faced. According to Hall “The government reacted with a series of policy experiments that were basically ad hoc attempts to recover control of the economy by adjusting traditional Keynesian practices. However, the effect of these adaptations was to stretch the intellectual coherence of the paradigm that was supposed to be guiding policy to the point of breaking”9. Like Hall, Oliver and Pemberton conclude that after 1974 “no amount of experimentation with new instruments and settings could hold the paradigm together and during the next five years Keynesianism gradually disintegrated”. What happened, according to these two accounts is that in 1979, when the Labour government was replaced by Thatcher, third order change occurred – the old paradigm was displaced by a new one, the neo-classical one.

Falsification, Kuhn, and Lakatos Hall, Oliver and Pemberton10 offer a Kuhnian account of paradigm change, and explaining paradigm change in terms of falsificationism. They believe a ———————— 8 Michael J. Oliver and Hugh Pemberton, ‘Learning and Change in 20th Century British Economic Policy’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2004, pp. 415–441. The quotation they cite is from Middleton, P., ‘Economic Policy Formulation in the Treasury in the Post-War Period’, National Institute Economic Review, 127, 1989, pp. 46-51. 9 Hall, Peter A., ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993, pp. 275-296. 10 Oliver and Pemberton make their debt to Hall absolutely clear and their intention is to offer an improved version of the account found in Hall.

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theory must be answerable to the world. If a theory claims to tell you something about the way the world is, there must be something, anomalies, which counts as getting the facts wrong. When anomalies occur they generate theoretical revisions that can be either ‘normal science’ or paradigm change. Normal science, what Hall calls first and second order changes, resolves anomalies using the resources of the existing paradigm, and leaves the core elements of the theory intact, and the paradigm is able to successfully adapt to new situations. In contrast, according to Hall, “Third order change is... marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a ‘paradigm shift’... Like scientific paradigms, a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm. As these accumulate, ad hoc attempts are generally made to stretch the terms of the paradigm to cover them, but this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Efforts to deal with such anomalies may also entail experiments to adjust existing lines of policy, but if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, these experiments will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the existing paradigm”11. For Hall, you can tell which anomalies are resolvable by first and second order changes, and which anomalies are not. Unfortunately, the world is not so simple. As Quine pointed out, ‘any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system‘12 (the DuhemQuine thesis). Theories are falsifiable as wholes. We know something is wrong, but we don’t know which part is wrong, because the whole includes everything – not just the core of the theory, but it also incorporates subsidiary theories, ceteris paribus clauses, and decisions about what to count as basic statements whose truth is taken as incontestable13. The Duhem-Quine thesis means that, if you want to use the language of ‘falsificationism’, to say that a paradigm has failed, it is essential to be able to tell which adjustments to a theory are legitimate responses to or legitimate extensions of the core theory, and which are simply ad hoc attempts to save a failing paradigm. The problem with the accounts offered by Oliver and Pemberton and by Hall is that they ignore the holistic nature of theories, that anomalies show that something is wrong, but they cannot show exactly where the flaw lies, whether the flaw lies in the core of the theory or somewhere else. Looking at Oliver and Pemberton’s and at Hall’s accounts of the events of 1974-9, one would think that what we saw in that period was an example of ———————— 11 Hall, pp. 279-80. 12 Quine, W. V. 0., 1953, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in Quine, Willard V. O., From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953. 13 Lakatos, Imre, ‘Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes’, in Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan, (editors), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.

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rational theory change driven by the the steady accumulation of anomalies which ‘proved’ the falsity of the Keynesian model, that an inevitable process was in operation, so that although various attempts were made to amend and adapt the Keynesian paradigm, each attempt to solve an existing anomaly merely generated further anomalies, which in turn required further adjustments in the structure of the Keynesian paradigm, which produced further anomalies, and so the strategy of trying to save Keynesianism simply exacerbated the inherent problems that the paradigm faced until it collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions14. This is a nice story, but unfortunately for Oliver and Pemberton and Hall, it is wrong. Obviously the economy had all sorts of problems, but the key issue, which is the point of the Duhem-Quine thesis, is not whether there were problems, but how to interpret those problems. We need an account of whether the first and second order policy changes between 1973-9 were merely ad hoc adjustments which showed that the core of Keynesianism was flawed, or whether they were legitimate responses which showed that appropriate extensions and adaptations of the Keynesian model could account for and provide suitable policy responses to the events of 1973-9.

An Alternative Account of the Years 1973-1979 If the Duhem-Quine thesis is correct then it should be possible to offer an account of the years 1973-9 which shows, not that the policy responses were desperate inadequate ad hoc attempts to save a failing Keynesian paradigm, but that they were appropriate responses intelligible in Keynesian terms, and that core theoretical elements of Keynesianism were not ‘falsified’. I propose to offer such an account, not just as a worked example that serves as a theoretical exercise in philosophical holism, but as a serious attempt to argue that the events of 1973-9 did not show the failure of Keynesianism. I will argue that the responses were not ad hoc and that consequently the Keynesian paradigm was not abandoned on rational grounds. From 1973-9 the government tried in unpropitious circumstances to establish a balance between the four goals for the economy. The main failure, according to Oliver and Pemberton and Hall, was the inability to maintain full employment and low rates of inflation. But according to a Keynesian account, inflation and unemployment were being driven by different forces. The 400% increase in the price of oil delivered by OPEC I led to cost push inflation, where prices were driven up by substantial increases in costs of energy. The level of unemployment was determined by the level of demand. “According to the Keynesian model, ———————— 14 Hall, pp. 284-5, “When monetarism replaced Keynesianism... the wholesale shift in policy paradigm,... display(ed) many of the features a Kuhnian model would lead us to expect. The process was initiated early in the 1970s by a series of economic developments, of which the most important was rising rates of inflation, soon to be joined by stagnating levels of growth and employment... they were particularly threatening to the Keynesian paradigm because it could neither fully anticipate nor explain them. In other words, they were “anomalies“ in the Kuhnian sense, which called into question the adequacy of Keynesian analyses of the economy”.

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this was precisely what happened – demand was constrained while rising costs fed an inflationary spiral”15. There was therefore nothing in the co-occurrence of inflation and unemployment that was incompatible with the Keynesian paradigm. Between 1974-9 there was a change in priorities, and inflation rather than unemployment came to be seen as the main focus of government policy. But this represented not so much a failure of the model, as an indication of the effective use of the model to achieve changed political priorities. And though, for the reasons just given, unemployment and inflation had risen simultaneously between 1973-4, after 1975, when in order to reduce inflation the government adopted a Keynesian mixture of demand management (deflation) and incomes policies, first order changes in the instruments of policy, inflation fell and unemployment rose, which is what Keynesianism would lead us to expect. Oliver and Pemberton suggested that the government’s appeal in 1976 to the IMF for funds marked the decisive point which showed that Keynesianism had clearly failed. Britain, it seemed, was no longer in control of its own economy and policy was being dictated from outside. However, appealing to the IMF for funds to cover a shortfall in the balance of payments was not such an exceptional event. Britain had been a regular borrower from the IMF, and borrowing had taken place in 1956, 1961, 1962, 1967, 1969 and 1974-5. By the end of 1977 improvements in the balance of trade meant Britain did not need to draw the full loan from the IMF. Tomlinson and Clift16 argue that despite the mythology to the contrary, the IMF visit and subsequent loan was not the cause of the reversal of British economic policy seen in the mid 1970s. The policy had already shifted fundamentally towards deflation rather than maintaining employment before IMF officials set foot in Britain. “The problem of 1976, to reiterate, was not that the IMF was forcing a new and uncongenial policy direction on the Labour government. By the time of the IMF visit, policy was clearly giving priority to reducing inflation, which was on a downward path, and public sector finances were rapidly improving following the fiscal packages of 1975 and 1976, and the imposition of cash limits on public spending”17. The government undertook a series of actions based on its understanding of Keynesianism to reduce inflation, eliminate the balance of payments deficit, return to positive growth and accepted that the cost of this would be a degree of unemployment, which it tried to keep within tolerable limits. Inflation fell significantly from its 1975 peak of 24% to 8.3% in 1978 rising to 13.4% in 1979. By 1979 unemployment had fallen to 5.1% from a peak of 5.7% in 1977, by 1977 the balance of payments deficit had changed to a surplus where it remained ———————— 15 Michael Kitson, ‘Failure followed by success or success followed by failure? A re-examination of British economic growth since 1949’, in Floud, Roderick, and Johnson, Paul (editors), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume 3. Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 16 Clift, Ben, and Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Negotiating Credibility: Britain and the International Monetary Fund, 1956–1976‘, Contemporary European History, 17, 4, 2008, pp. 545-566. 17 Clift and Tomlinson, pp. 565-6.

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until the mid eighties, and after being negative in 1974 and 1975, growth became positive and stood at a respectable 2.8% in 1979. The results were what the government aimed for. This reading of the empirical evidence does not support Oliver and Pemberton and Hall’s claims of paradigm failure. In short, the key indicators suggest that by changing priorities in response to circumstances, and adapting old and adopting new policy instruments, Hall’s first and second order changes, Keynesian policies returned the economy to a degree of stability, under which a sort of Kuhnian ‘normal’ economics could take place. This account provides “a possible alternative narrative... which sees the events of the 1970s, not as the ‘culmination’ of long run problems but as largely the consequence of short term forces... highly contingent and particular factors causing a short run crisis within a longer run picture of ‘mildly disappointing’ performance in the golden age”18. One of the problems with suggesting that the events of 1973-9 indicated that the Keynesian paradigm had failed is that what counts as ‘ad hoc’ is never defined by Oliver and Pemberton, or by Hall. And here lies the heart of the difficulty, the reliance on Kuhn and an ill defined sort of falsification as their methodological tools to demonstrate paradigm failure. Only if we know what counts as ad hoc change can we choose which narrative is correct, their narrative of paradigm failure or the alternative narrative of paradigm success. The kind of falsificationism Oliver and Pemberton, and Hall use permits the assessment of a paradigm for failure independently of the existence of there being another paradigm against which to measure it. However Lakatos has argued that paradigms cannot be assessed in isolation, but only against each other, and that if there are reasons to give up a paradigm, it’s because we have a more promising one to replace it with. If Lakatos is right then the kind of noncomparative falsificationist approach that Oliver and Pemberton, and Hall have simply cannot show what it claims to show19. The possibility of an alternative and, it should be stressed, extremely plausible narrative means that none of the evidence adduced by Oliver and Pemberton and Hall supports a narrative of paradigm ‘failure’, as nothing they adduce in the way of the shifting priorities and the adapting of old and adopting of new policy instruments, their ‘first and second order changes’, suggests that these changes were merely ad hoc, and out of line with the core theoretical tenets of Keynesianism.

Whig Narratives There was a crisis in the seventies when the prevailing paradigm was Keynesian, and there was a paradigm change after 1979, when Thatcher won the ———————— 18 Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long Twentieth Century’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol 20, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 227-251. 19 Clearly, on a Lakatosian approach, to show that Keynesianism failed, one would need to show that the neo-classical one which replaced it was better. What counts as ‘failed’ and ‘better’ is the subject of Lakatos’s famous 1970 article.

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1979 election. But that doesn’t mean that the reason for the change from one paradigm to another was the result of a rational process driven by a falsificationist logic20. If, appearances to the contrary, Oliver and Pemberton and Hall are not actually offering an account of rational paradigm change then what sort of account are they offering? The answer is that they are offering Whig history, written from the perspective of the present, in the knowledge that the neo-classical paradigm was the “winning” paradigm. Economics purports to be a science, and science is particularly prone to Whig narratives, stories with winners and losers, based on the assumption that our current theories, the winners, represent the accumulated knowledge of the past, and telling a story of science getting closer and closer to the truth over time. It would be a strange science whose history was the story of how it had moved further and further away from the truth. Mark Blaug has written extensively on the dangers of reconstructionist Whig history in economics, and on the need for economic history to be more empirically oriented, using not Kuhnian, but Popperian and Lakatosian techniques to test theories against the evidence provided by the real world21. Using evidence to test a theory cannot mean writing histories which “uncritically accept a few ideas from the philosophy of science in the light of which they fit some episode of economics into a ‘reconstruction’”22. It mustn’t mean making the evidence fit the theory. It has to mean testing the theory against the evidence (and deciding which statements count as evidence). And if the theory of rational paradigm change brought about by the falsity of the Keynesian paradigm doesn’t fit the evidence we need to look elsewhere to account for the reasons that paradigm change occurred.

Non-rational Paradigm Change The best explanation of what happened in 1979 is that there was a nonrational paradigm change. The 1979 election was won by Thatcher, and after that the idea of using demand management to reduce unemployment disappeared from politics, and the overriding macroeconomic goal became the reduction of inflation. A narrative of Keynesian failure followed by neo-classical success emerged, which dismissed the entire Keynesian period as a period of cumulative failure, its internal contradictions culminating in the crisis of 1973-9. Any narrative of crisis needs a resolution, and Thatcher’s first administration came to ———————— 20 On the nature of the reasons for this irrational paradigm change see Hay, Colin, ‘Chronicles of a Death Foretold: the Winter of Discontent and Construction of the Crisis of British Keynesianism’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (3), pp. 446-470, 2010. 21 Blaug, Mark, ‘No History of Ideas, Please, We’re Economists’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter, 2001, pp. 145-164. 22 Backhouse, Roger E., pp. 31-2, in Backhouse, Roger E. ‘How should we approach the History of Economic Thought, Fact, Fiction or Moral Tale?’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 14, Spring, 1992, pp. 18-35.

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be narrated as the cure for the Keynesian disease, replacing the failed paradigm with a better one. It is this political narrative and not the actual events of 1973-9 that delegitimised Keynesianism. As Tomlinson writes, “For many superficial analysts as well as political opponents the whole period of the Labour Government [1974-9] remains one spoken of in absurdly exaggerated terms of breakdown and disaster”23. These exaggerated narratives bear very little resemblance to the actual events they narrate, and, as Hay says, “their ‘success’ as narratives relies not on their ability to accurately reflect the complex webs of causation that interact to produce disparate effects, but on their ability to provide a simplified account sufficiently flexible to ‘narrate’ a great variety of morbid symptoms whilst unambiguously attributing causality and responsibility”24. Economics is the study of how scarce resources should be allocated25. Keynesianism and neo-classicism take different views not just of demand management and the relative priorities of employment and inflation, but also very different views of the role of government in deciding who should get what and how it should be paid for, of levels of spending on, for example, education and health, and deciding, for example, what the rates of taxation should be for different income groups. The debate over the role of government in determining the allocation of resources and the distribution of income and wealth had been a central feature of British political life for the whole period of the post war consensus, and the allocative and redistributive activities of government “had replaced the barricades as the fault line of a class society”26. Between 1945-79, the economy was seen to be a political question. The Thatcherite narrative delegitimised the post war consensus, a form of political economy which produced not only the fastest sustained rate of economic growth ever experienced, but also its most egalitarian distribution27. According to Thatcher these years were “a miserable failure in every respect.” To be electorally successful political narratives don’t have to be true or rational. They don’t even have to be coherent. They simply have to be convincing. And so by narrating the short term difficulties of 1973-9 as the terminal stage of Keynesian economics, Thatcher was able to undermine the social goals which underpinned post war projects, the elimination of poverty, unequal educational opportunity, unemployment, poor housing, and lack of access to health care, the five giant evils of “squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease” identified in The Beveridge Report of 1942. ———————— 23 Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Economic policy’, in Seldon, Anthony and Hickson, Kevin (editors), New Labour, Old Labour The Blair, Wilson and Callaghan Governments, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 66. 24 Hay, Colin, ‘Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol 1, Issue 3, October, 1999, pp. 317–344. 25 Middleton p. 11. He consciously echoes Robbins famous definition, “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.“ 26 Middleton, p. 75. 27 Middleton, p. 25.

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The effect of the success of the Thatcherite narrative has been to reduce the perception of what governments can achieve in the sphere of the economy, to radically change the parameters of the argument about who gets what and who pays for it. In the 35 years of neo-classicism income inequality, unemployment, poverty and inequality of educational opportunity have increased dramatically, and full employment has ceased to be a political goal of any of the political parties. There has been a de-politicisation of the issue of the allocation of resources and the distribution of income and wealth, transforming the issue of how scarce resources should be allocated, of who gets what, into a technical question for neo-classical economists and the ‘market’ to answer, rather than the sort of political questions society asked itself in The Beveridge Report. According to the neo-classical paradigm the refusal to ask these questions represents intellectual progress. Political economy has now become just “the economy” in a way that was unimaginable in the 1970s. As Hay said, “Keynesianism’s death in Britain was not economic given, but politically orchestrated”28.

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY Backhouse, Roger E., ‘How should we approach the History of Economic Thought, Fact, Fiction or Moral Tale?’, in Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 14, Spring 1992, pp. 18-35; Backhouse, Roger E., ‘The Keynesian Revolution’, in Backhouse, Roger E., and Bateman, Bradley. W. (editors), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006; Blaug, Mark, ‘Why I am not a Constructivist: Confessions of an Unrepentant Popperian’, in Backhouse, Roger E., New Directions in Economic Methodology, Routledge, London, 1994; Blaug, Mark, ‘No History of Ideas, Please, We’re Economists’, In The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter, 2001, pp. 145-164; Clift, Ben, and Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Negotiating Credibility: Britain and the International Monetary Fund, 1956-1976’, in Contemporary European History, 17, 4, 2008, pp. 545-566; Hay, Colin, ‘Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change’, in The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol. 1, Issue 3, October 1999, pp. 317-344; Hay, Colin, ‘Chronicles of a Death Foretold: the Winter of Discontent and Construction of the Crisis of British Keynesianism’, in Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (3), pp. 446-470, 2010; Hall, Peter A., ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’, in Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1993, pp. 275-296; Kavanagh Dennis, The Reordering of British Politics, Politics after Thatcher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997; Kitson, Michael, ‘Recession and Economic Revival in Britain: The Role of Policy in the 1930s and 1980s’, in Journal of Contemporary European History, Volume 8, Issue 1, March 1999, pp. 1-27; Kitson, Michael, ‘Failure followed by success or success followed by failure? A re-examination of British economic growth since 1949’, in Floud, Roderick, and Johnson, Paul (editors), The ———————— 28 Hay, 2010.

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Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume 3. Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004; Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962; Lakatos, Imre, ‘Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes’, in Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan (editors), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970; Middleton, Roger, The British Economy Since 1945, Macmillan, Houndmills, 2000; Oliver, Michael, J., and Pemberton, Hugh, ‘Learning and Change in 20th Century British Economic Policy’, in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2004, pp. 415-441; Quine, Willard V. O., ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in Quine, Willard V. O., From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953; Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Economic policy’, in Seldon, Anthony and Hickson, Kevin (editors), New Labour, Old Labour The Blair, Wilson and Callaghan Governments, Routledge, London, 2004; Tomlinson, Jim ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long Twentieth Century’, in Twentieth Century British History, Vol 20, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 227-251.

SCIENTIFIC LIFE

A CONFERENCE ON “THE NEW HUMAN OF EUROPE”

On May 23-24, in Chiºinãu, in the Conference Room of the Palace of Republic, took place the International Scientific Conference “The New Human of Europe: models, prototypes, ideals”, organized by the Chair of Universal Literature and the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures of the Moldova State University, in partnership with the Moldovan representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Romanian Cultural Institute. In the festive opening session of the conference (moderated by Mrs. Tatiana Ciocoi, PhD, Chief of the Chair of Universal Literature, MSU) a word of greeting was sent by Mr. Matthias Meyer, ambassador of Germany in Republic of Moldova, and Mr. Marius Lazurcã, ambassador of Romania in Republic of Moldova. In the second day of conference participants were joined by Mr. Valeriu Matei, academician, director of the “Mihai Eminescu” Romanian Cultural Institute from Chiºinãu. Words of greeting were uttered by all the guests of honor. There followed the Session I with an exceptional lecture “The Recent Human” by Mr. HoriaRoman Patapievici, philosopher, writer, scientist from Romania. In his speech he opted for a European civilization returned to Christian values and affirmed that cultural, economic and political development is due to Christianity. (Right to) property, law and morality are those three pylons that resist in any times. However the human of today, the “recent” one, disposes freedom and democratic values as never in the past, he became conformist and indifferent to the intellectual, spiritual and educational values. Redefining relations with values would be the most important lesson that the “recent” human would have to learn. The mental device of the European civilization was born in 325 in Nicaea, and since then there were formed many automatisms of perception, behavioral circuits, associations, different ones from other civilizations. The Romanian philosopher talked also about the transcendence relation of the modern human with the reality, about the redignity of Europe, about coming of nihilism, destruction of values that are not more creditable, about historical fracture produced by the people, about the human eroded from inside etc. The end of the lecture gave the opportunity to return and to redefine: “We all are recent. But we can’t be satisfied with this”. In the plenary of the Session II communications were held by: Mrs. Ana Selejan, university professor, PhD, “Lucian Blaga” University from Sibiu, referring to the “Destiny of the new human as a compulsory literary character”; Mr. Gheorghe Manolache, university professor, PhD, “Lucian Blaga” University from Sibiu, who spoke about the “Avatars of the new human in Romanian prose of the ’80s”; Mr. Lucian Chiºu, professor, Romanian Academy (Bucharest), pointing the temptations, challenges and ripostes of literature in the informational society of knowledge and talking about the new kind of intelligence, artificial one, that becomes more significant in the economy of knowledge. In my communication I referred to the new human of the online space called homo digitus / homo digitalis, that adds to other features of post-modernity the feature of the virtual human, who presses the keys (charged by an easily decipherable symbolism) ctrl + alt + delete, i.e. the human controls, alternates / chooses and forgets / (be)comes again. Communications from the Session III were noteworthy by Mr. Vasile Spiridon, professor at “Vasile Alecsandri” University from Bacãu (“The new human after Adio, Europa! by D. Sârbu”); Mr. Sergiu Pavlicenco, university professor, PhD, vice president of the General and Comparative Literature Association from Moldova, MSU, who outlined an unusual image of the retired human in contemporary literature; Mrs. Viorella Manolache, PhD, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy (Bucharest), who gave arguments for “the third citizen”. Mrs. Maria Sleahtiþchi, PhD, Chief of the Department for Research and Innovation, MSU, Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 155–171, Bucharest, 2015.

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referred to the characters, mentalities and behaviors in the novel of the 80s and noted, citing Eminescu, that all is old and all is new. The second day of the conference, Sessions IV and V, was marked by the Balkan human (Anatol Moraru, PhD, “A. Russo” University from Bãlþi, “Representations of the Balkan human in Romanian literature”); by the “post” syndrome (Ion Plãmãdealã, PhD, Institute of Philology, Academy of Sciences of Moldova, “Literature and phantasm of meaning: reflections on the “post” syndrome); by the concept of crisis (Mircea V. Ciobanu, editor-in-chief, “ªtiinþa” Publishing House, “Identity crisis in Prague Cemetery by Umberto Eco”); by the biblical message (Ioana Scherf, PhD, Humboldt University from Berlin, in a meditation “How new is the new human”); by the public reading and show (Alexandru Laszlo, PhD, “G. Bariþiu” National College of Cluj-Napoca, “Lectura Dantis seen as a literary show”). Mrs. Emilia Taraburca, PhD, MSU, dissociated the image of the human of Enlightenment from that of the contemporary human; Alex Cosmescu, PhD, Institute of Philology of the ASM, spoke in terms of otherness and “self escape” from the perspective of Em. Levinas; Mrs. Natalia Sporîº, PhD, MSU, received a perfect and prompt translation of her communication from Russian in Romanian by the session moderator Ivan Pilchin, relating about amnesia as a syndrome of the contemporary culture, but Ivan Pilchin, lecturer, MSU, revealed to the audience the “new spirit” in literature from the perspective of Guillaume Apollinaire, illustrating his communication with a calligrammes-poem “The small car” in the dynamic electronic form. Session VI was focused on such phenomena as “massiveness” in the modern society, citing Revolt of the masses by J. Ortega y Gasset (Raisa Ganea, PhD, MSU); mercantilism of the modern human being is seen by the Bessarabian novelists of the nowadays generation (Iulian Ciocan, PhD, journalist, Radio Free Europe); Homo sacer (“the slaughtered human and simultaneously the human excluded from the sacred rite of society”) (Maria Pilchin, lecturer, MSU). Dumitru Crudu, writer, director of the “ªtefan cel Mare” Library from Chiºinãu, brought up the image of the “new Moldovans”, the post-Soviet ones, an eloquent case being that of Vasile Ernu. Ioana Petcu, PhD, “George Enescu” University of Arts from Iaºi, has developed to the audience the image of the new human from the Eastern European film of the ’70s and 80s of the ’20th century. In the summary meeting the guests of the conference have reviewed the perspectives of the approaching to such a challenging topic with its endless openings. Mrs. Elena Prus, university professor, PhD, director of the Institute of Philology and Intercultural Researches (Moldova Free International University), spoke about the hypermodern individual and the world where everything becomes hyper. The conference was closed with an impressive speech by the event’s moderator Mrs. Tatiana Ciocoi, “Under the sign of pietas: The Red Human’s Death by Svetlana Alexievitch” – a pleading for freedom and equality in the modern world, a communication about the neurosis, crisis and great questions of the humanity, about the ungrateful second-hand times, about the technical destiny of the mankind in Heidegger’s view, about the author’s death and the death of the text, about the kitchen dissent, about books that became a cultural surrogate, about differences and diversity. All communications that were presented live will be published in a volume of conference materials. The event was held in a collegial atmosphere, overflowing with ideas and proposals. Thanks of the organizers were expressed to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, to the Romanian Cultural Institute and to all who accepted the invitation to answer the question of the conference title. Definition of what is European (homo europeus), Karl Schmidt as the first mayor of Chiºinãu, an old new human or a new old human, hyper-citizen, homo oeconomicus, discovering the Other and through the Other, homo digitalis, digital / technical Humanities, literature as a space that creates identity and includes multiple identities, labyrinth human, cultural marketing, strategies of the vulgarization of high texts, intertextuality as a gift... – all the subjects have had a point of convergence: “the human of Europe is doomed to progress”. ELENA UNGUREANU, PhD, Institute of Philology of the ASM Information Society Development Institute Translation from Romanian to English by IVAN PILCHIN, Lecturer, Chair of Universal Literature, Moldova State University

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BOOKFEST, INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR, 31 May 2014 INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS LAUNCHED THE BOOKS: REPERE TEORETICE ÎN BIOPOLITICÃ Author VIORELLA MANOLACHE and SISTEMUL POLITIC DIN ROMÂNIA. ACTORI, INSTITUÞII, PROVOCÃRI Coordinated by ARISTIDE CIOARBÃ and CONSTANTIN NICA REPERE TEORETICE ÎN BIOPOLITICÃ [Theoretical Landmarks in Biopolitics] ALLOCUTIONS ”One of a kind”, reads one of the critical references to Dr. Viorella Manolache’s latest, out of the ten books published along as many years. Theoretical Landmarks in Biopolitics, brought out by the Institute of Political Sciences Publishing last year, which is our host at this book fair, is illustrative of a decade’s studies in such a complex subject as last century’s East Europe, filtered through the conceptual frames of postmodern critical theories. “One of a kind”, we would like to add, because, unlike common young researchers, Dr. Manolache does not limit herself to applying some particular theory to the empirical object under consideration, opting instead for a Husserlian phenomenological variation. The doctrine of social hygene (eugenics) is examined primarily in light of Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopolitics”, but also of Adornian and Foucaultian social criticism, of Hayden White’s deconstruction, of doctrinaire liberalism (an English version of Benthamite utilitarianism), of identity studies, and of the movement of ideas. Disciplinary lore and conceptual rigor are thus enriched by a pluralistic methodology which is extremely beneficial in the posttotalitarian, East-European context. The present tableau vivant, with the author having us on either side, i.e., Prof. Ion Goian, a philosopher, and me, a specialist in literary studies, which is integrated nowadays within the broader disciplinary field of the humanities in all major universities, is telling in regard to Dr. Manolache’s pluralistic methodology as hermeneutic exercise and discourse of values. Setting out from the nominal communality between Michel Foucault’s biopolitics and the homonymous concept employed by a group of Transylvanian eugenists in the Buletin Eugenic ºi Biopolitic (Eugenic and Biopolitic Newsletter) of the inter-war period, Dr Manolache goes on to define the terms she is working with, pleading in favor of Dominick LaCapra’s historiography or Foucault’s critique of reified ideologies rather than the kind of deconstruction of history underwriting Hayden White’s “tropes of discourse”. Although I had previously published criticism on modernist literature, I had not heard of the Romanian writings on social medicine dating back to the same time before being offered one by an absent-minded librarian who had mistook the reading desk. I was emerging out of postcolonial studies, with my head full of postmodernist vocabularies teeming with notions of pluralism, dedoxification, alterity, the priority of the other over the self etc., and I was shocked to read now at random about the necessity to eliminate physically and mentally disabled persons in order to ensure the health of the social body. The author’s sick mind was ransacking history for similar practices, landing in ... ancient Sparta’s custom of smashing handicapped babies against the rocks. The author, I. Fãcãoaru, if I’m not mistaken, had cast his ideas in the form of a social hygiene textbook. No wonder the memory of the race had failed to keep alive a theory looming within the confines of biologized social facts. Searching such counter-ethical anomaly is, however, worthwhile, particularly with peoples who have sometimes been denied an institutional soul (C. RãdulescuMotru). That is, they are supposed to lack the capacity to rise from the ground to a biped’s position, not only physically but also mentally. An evolved human society is not something built within the empire of nature but in contradiction to it (see Niklas Luhmann’s concept of “Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft”).

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The logic of equivalence, the biologizing of the social is likely to trigger human misery, sometimes through a sort of boomerang effect. I remember the sad beginning of our so-called “new world” which proved the new power’s incapacity at the time to go back to lawfulness, meaning the rational search for the truth in a court of law. I watched the “abridged” version of the Ceauºescu trial, which had been rendered possible by ... Nicolae Ceauºescu’s decree of the martial law, followed by a brutal execution. In another TV scene, the dictator’s daughter, a fragile figure, pressing a puppy against her breast, was seen surrounded by armored tanks and soldiers armed to their teeth, one of whom dropped a casual remark to his companions: “Let her have her cigarettes; she won’t be living for much longer, anyhow”. The paranoid mind, inherited from the previous regime, was looking at Zoe Ceauºescu without seeing her; her skin split under her parents’ masks. I, who had been a victim of her mother’s personnel politics, could have said then: “Here is God’s hand: our lives and careers have been smothered by decrees from Cabinet No 2, and look now at her children going down into sickness and death for the ... bad file of having made a wrong choice of parents ...”. There were fourteen criteria for dispossessing people of their rights, none of them being their own responsibility. I was not in a mythical mood, though. I felt contempt for the madcap who stabbed the dictator’s son, whose hand he had probably kissed not long before. I passed then the most difficult test of my ethical being. I was able to thanks to my education at the school of a civilization whose narratives have always counterpointed nature and culture, while the folklore of my own represents the forest as “man’s brother”. The heart of the former has always been a scene of socialization and of nomic practices: the king and the comitatus, domus and curia, the code of laws dating back to 600 A.D., the king’s bank of jurors (12th century), Magna Carta (1215), the Model Parliament of 1295 ... If God punishes by hurting innocents, well then civilized man can do a better job. I’m saying that even if an MP speaking in parliament at a time when such speeches delighted us, previously to the present shortened version of black and white elects or electronic vote, made the following comment on the dictators’ end: “Ceauºescu had lived all his life in contempt of the law, so that, when he finally called out for it, nobody heard him...” Est modus in rebus ... The oldest parley over the nature/culture controversy in English literature is probably a scene in Fugens and Lucres, a play written by Henry Medwall, a chaplain of Cardinal Morton’s, the latter being also Thomas More’s patron. Whom shall Roman Lucres choose for a husband: an aristocrat of the blood, or a patriot ennobled by his own virtue and talent? The rights of caste, class, and rank were still being relentlessly defended by ... servants who could even throw down the glove and fight a duel over the issue... Gathered together in London, a party of humanists including Erasmus, Morus, Juan Luis Vives, and John Colet, diverted the political thought of the age from a militaristic logic to the Horatian ideal of the good life. Aristobios, the good life, was becoming a code rooted in humanistic thought. By the end of the 16th century a system of relief for the poor, managed by knights, had been created. Romantic Wordsworth, the political ally of a conservative lord, glorifies the power of the humble people’s heart to love for love’s sake (”The Idiot Boy”). Lord Byron defended the machine breakers in Parliament, and wrote a moving passage in Childe Harold about a Dacian taken to Rome and slaughtered in the arena of the Colosseum. Is there some Romanian text on this subject? Virginia Woolf, a famous scholar’s daughter, indicts official eugenic politics in Mrs Dalloway. Wherefrom all this aristocratic superbia in a land which had but recently got the dignity of a state ruled by an ancient dynasty, a land in which the Romanians had till then suffered from an inferior social status? Dr. Manolache contextualizes the phenomenon, so as to allow Romanian eugenics to appear as a belated and tamed manifestation of the Galton-founded discipline. The same phenomenon emerging in the late 19th century was pressed down in western countries by parliamentary legislation (the Birkett Report) or politically committed art works (Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World). The cult of the lesser values, such as the biological, natural signified, betrays lack of education, the victimization of the innocents is a sign of primitivism, while retaliation against the blameless for the guilty ones is a symptom of clinical paranoia. The politization or militarization of civil life, of the Medizinischepolizei kind, can be explained through the absence of those disciplinary traditions and schools of thought which are only formed around ancient universities. Political changes in Romania are still abrupt, just military rounds of salute. People are on the lookout for changing Orders of the Day .... Minds unaccustomed to critical exercise work through

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totalitarian stereotypes and narratives. Contrariwise, an individual possessed of institutional lore will find more of the Human Rights Charter in the act of an officer who placed the baby of a dissenter against the communist regime in an orphanage without mentioning her ancestry than a presumably democratic minister of justice who refused to rehabilitate the victims of communist repression, including the baby’s father. Reductionist political thinking can be amended, according to the author, with the help of two schools of philosophy: the social criticism of the Frankfurt School meant to awaken people to an understanding of the way they are being manipulated by the power system or by the press, and the ethical awakening to an awareness of “the irreducible face of the other” (E. Levinas). While defining the concept of biopolitics in Foucault’s spirit, as technique of disciplining and repressing the individual body so as to serve the interests of the power system, the author makes room for the only legitimate form of biopolitics which is, according to the late Foucault of Studies in the History of Sexuality, the shaping of one’s own self, the aesthetic self of the autonomous individual so as to render it apt for a genuinely valuable model of the good life. ANA MARIA TUPAN

* * * For me, coming from the Anglo-American analytic tradition in philosophy, reading Dr. Viorella Manolache’s work has opened up new ways of thinking about politics and philosophy. She is a synthetic thinker, with an ability to draw together a multiplicity of strands, bringing together ideas from different sources and discovering connections between them in ways which cast a new light on areas of scholarship. This is one of the great strengths of her writing, and is possible only because of the depth of scholarship that Viorella Manolache has, and the ease with which she is able reach back into the history of philosophy, and to draw upon it. But more than that, she constantly demonstrates how contemporary concerns and ways of analysing society are related to concerns that have a long history within political philosophy, and she utilises contemporary scholarship to throw fresh light on long standing political and philosophical concerns, concerns that reach back into the history of philosophy, and to reconfigure them in ways which reflect this depth of knowledge. Another of Viorella Manolache’s strengths is to demonstrate how concepts are always contested, and how the process of responding to that contestation means they are always changing, that understanding is never final, and that there can never be a last word on the subject. For someone immersed in the analytical tradition, where one hopes to achieve some sort of settled understanding, one of the real benefits of reading Viorella Manolache’s work lies in recognising that understanding is never final. And concomitant with that has been learning how to appreciate the way in which her writing offers the reader the opportunity to occupy a multiplicity of perspectives, and to see an issue from every angle. Her book, Repere Teoretice în Biopoliticã, has proved a rich source of ideas and approaches for my particular concerns, which are related to neo-liberalism, and in particular the way in which she uses Foucault’s concept of biopolitics to illuminate the idea of the natural in politics. Viorella Manolache is particularly good at showing how natural life comes to fall within the scope of state power and how the idea of the natural has been incorporated into neo-liberal conceptions, not just of what ‘naturally’ man is, but also of what sort of people there should be, one of the abiding questions in biopolitics. And using terminology resonant with biological import that is very familiar in British political discourse, that of ‘the body politic’, Viorella Manolache raises important questions about what neo-liberalism takes to be the nature of the body politic, how it conceives the body politic as healthy or unhealthy, identifies certain ‘cells’ as foreign or diseased, and determines how they are to be ‘cured’ or ‘expelled’, to make the body politic whole and healthy again. So for my part I’m very grateful to Viorella Manolache for opening up new ways of thinking. I’d also like to add that not only is it the basis of a fruitful intellectual relationship, but it is the basis of a warm personal relationship, and for both these reasons I’d like to thank her for her writing and her friendship. IAN BROWNE

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SISTEMUL POLITIC DIN ROMÂNIA. ACTORI, INSTITUÞII, PROVOCÃRI [Romania’s Political System. Actors, Institutions, Challenges] FINALLY, A TREATY ON THE ROMANIA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM The launch of the book Romania’s Political System. Actors, Institutions, Challenges took place under the auspices of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, in Institute’s Publishing stand, on Saturday, May 31, 2014, at 16.30, in the presence of the special guests Professor Adrian-Paul Iliescu, PhD and Professor Alexandru Radu, PhD, the director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations (ISPRI) and ISPRI Publishing House, Professor Dan Dungaciu, PhD, a coordinator of the book, Senior Researcher Constantin Nica, PhD, the authors of the book, other specialists, academics, journalists and the public interested in new editorial issues. Dan Dungaciu, the director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations (ISPRI), opened the event by considering that the volume Romania’s Political System. Actors, Institutions, Challenges ranges among the fundamental works of the Institute, illustrating a kind of work which really constitutes the raison d’être of the institutes of academic research, that of initiate and develop research programs on topics of major scientific interest and social impact, capitalizing them in research academic exchanges, partial studies, reviews and, finally, in books, representative both for the scientific field and for the authors. The volume, concluded Professor Dan Dungaciu, constitutes an academic success, both in terms of content and in terms of the graphic form. The prestigious Professor Adrian-Paul Iliescu, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, confessed that he has the honor and the joy to present a “work-event” that will withstand the test of time and will gradually impose itself on the free market of ideas as a “big book”. Professor Adrian-Paul Iliescu considered that the work Romania’s Political System is a genuine Treaty whereas it impresses connoisseurs, given the way it was designed, the methodology it used – a successful fasten of the systematic approach with the structural-functionalist one –, and the way in which the arguments and conclusions were drawn. He praised the work stressing that deserve to be congratulated both those who had the initiative of this important project, who have materialized it and, equally, those who have decided to keep in the Institute’s research programs of the project from which the volume has been materialized. Professor Adrian-Paul Iliescu also has drawn attention on the need of the presence of such books and authors in the public space and on the book market, currently monopolized by celebrity-publishers and celebrity-personages that mostly prove superficiality and imposture. He said, among other laudatory assessments that this important project it should have known before the book appeared, in order to be better known, and he expected that the book be recommended as study literature. Alexandru Radu, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science of the Christian University “Dimitrie Cantemir” from Bucharest, PhD, revealed the interesting conception of the thematic structure of the book, retaining the authors meritorious decision to open the analysis with studies on the actors of political realm and the culture and behavior of the social body constituted in a political body. In this context, he said that the authors have shifted the focus of the observation from the institutions – the traditional perspective that “pushes” the demarche toward a legal vision – to the modern and indispensable agents of representative and pluralistic parliamentary democracy, parties unions, NGOs and other components of civil society. Professor Alexandru Radu wanted to clarify that each chapter is inciting, considering that the proposed views deserve attention, especially from the perspective of a critical debate involving specialists sustaining other positions on an issue or another, the contradictory debates and arguments of each part being those which stimulate the progress in the field of knowledge. Gabriela Tãnãsescu, scientific researcher III, PhD at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, co-author of the book and the moderator of the book launch, said that the main initiator and coordinator of the project who made possible this work is Mr. Aristide Cioabã, until recently senior scientific researcher PhD at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, head of contemporary

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political theories and institutions, which, unfortunately, because of some objective reasons, could not attend the event. He sent to those who attended the event his confidence that the work Romania’s Political System is a systematic framework necessary in order to understand and analyze the Romanian political phenomenon and that it will constitute a fruitful debate framework and a landmark for future researches. Dr. Constantin Nica, Senior Researcher I at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, the other scientific coordinator of the project, revealed that the book deserves to be read, that it will enter in the public intellectual domain of our country, because it provides an thorough and unified analysis of the problem and proposes innovative points of view and arguments, opening thus new avenues of research in the field. He spoke about how the idea of preparation of this volume was born, about the establishment of the research team – Aristide Cioabã, Constantin Nica, Lorena Stuparu, Gabriela Tãnãsescu, Gheorghe Ciascai, Ruxandra Iordache, Bogdan-Mihai Popescu –, about how the team worked and established itself as a true professional scientific community. Gabriela Tãnãsescu considered that the work is a critical approach of the Romanian political system carried out according to the current standards of the Western political science, as language, conceptual framework, methodology and theoretical and empirical analysis. In her appreciation, the work clearly answers to the question: where are we as a political society on a scale of democratic consolidation, especially in the last decade, as well as an answer to the questions: how does the constitutional-extraconstitutional, formal-informal dialectics work in Romania in the current political system, and what kinds of interactions are necessary and desirable in order to avoid the intraexecutive conflicts, failures, political stalemate and political spectacle of poor quality. She thanked the guests and the audience for attending the event and expressed the hope that both the topics which were dealt with “calm” in the book and those which were treated “incisively” will constitute the subject of certain useful and renewing future debates. LORENA STUPARU

THE DEBATE UKRAINE – A PROSPECTIVE ABORDATION INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ROMANIAN ACADEMY and CONFLICT PREVENTION AND EARLY WARNING CENTRE 25 JUNE 2014 After the military intervention in Crimea and the annexation of that region of Ukraine to Russia, the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 18 opened the door to a new reality in the post-soviet space and the Wider Black Sea Region: border at stake, will to rebuilt the former Soviet Union, fight for the land of all Russians, to be united with Russia, aggressiveness of politics, military, economic, political pressure, informational war. In that environment, with no guarantees that the first step or steps – together with the 2008 intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia – are the last ones. On the other hand the reaction of Ukraine was quite weak, no shot gun on ceding Crimea, as the Western Countries, US and EU alike, proposed economic targeted sanctions as a reaction to this abominable gesture. In that particular context, all countries in the region felt under pressure and attack by the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin, with his new plan to gain by force a part or all of the former Soviet Union in a Russian State. Ukraine, the countries in the Wider Black Sea Region as well as the whole world would like to see where it is this going. That’s why the debate proposed to look into the possible multiple futures of the issue. Based on the methodology of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre created by prof. dr. Iulian Chifu based on the PLATO – Plausible Futures methodology, it tried to find the alternative scenarios and developments within 3/5 years.

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COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL “FOUCAULT POST MORTEM” Laboratory Cultures et Sociétés en Europe, University from Strasbourg, le Centre «Corps, Conflits et Créativité» (Dynamiques Européennes), Centre Michel Foucault Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences de l’Homme Alsace (MISHA), Strasbourg, 25-26 JUNE 2014 Scientific Researcher III, PhD, Viorella Manolache (ISPRI) has participated with the study: Foucaultian Reflexes: The Russian Doll Effect. The study proposes a demolition of the impediments which seem to plague a reading of the Foucaultian score within post-1989 Romanian space; the first one perceives itself as the result of a secondary complex signalling the belated contact between Romanians and the Foucaultian discourse, with act-taking objectified only in the late 90’s; the second aims to prove a detachment of Foucaultian creation from any postmodernist extensions or plunging into postmodernism. The first answer would involve a recourse to the 5/1967 volume of the Secolul 20 magazine, dedicated to “an introduction into structuralism”, publishing (with no synchronizing qualms) Sartre’s generational polemic coupled with the “new wave” ideas of Foucault – Lévi Strauss – Lacan, while attempting to bring to light all the effects of “thought before thought.” Perspectives offered by different comments hurry to report/place/label(ing) Foucault within/in the position of modernity/Illuminist critic, or of adept/seeker of an alternative modernity [through the attack launched against the concept of modern rationality – oppressive, reductionist and coercive – or against the idea of progress, in the sense of unmasking impartiality and universality] – of counter-modern exponent boasting a critical resistance attitude which is characteristic of postmodernism, as an intellectual brand which is difficult to define, marked by scripted dandyism, suspected of philosophical abuse and/or seen as an artisan of a politics of writing [we consider that, in the context of discontinuous knowledge, the myth of Foucault the postmodern is a false one, synthesizing theses and antitheses which are nothing more than simple stylistic expressions in a context acknowledging of the fact that Foucault was never postmodern]. We hold the conviction that Foucault is a poststructuralist (with infrastructural accents) despite all the recycling/borrowings he operated in/within postmodernity. Such a statement is backed by the limit/evidence which shows that Foucault is neither for nor against exposing the suppressed discourse of/in modernity, in the sense of a separation from the truth with the aim of connecting to a disciplinary device with nodal points within the abnormal and normalizing alterity. From this point of view a whole feminist, neo-historical and/or post-colonial range of concepts appears, contaminating the Foucaultian endeavour and making it vulnerable to postmodern labelling.

ACADEMIC MEETING BETWEEN THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (ISPRI) and Shanghai Institute for International Relations (SIIS), ISPRI, BUCHAREST, 1 JULY 2014 The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations was the host of a delegation of Chinese professors and researchers, led by Yang Jiemian, professor, researcher and vice-president of Shanghai Institute for International Relations (SIIS). The Romanian part was led by Professor and Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Dan Dungaciu, Ambassadors Ioan Donca and Sergiu Celac, Laurenþiu Pachiu, member of Energy Policy Group and other ISPRI researchers.

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The discussions have pivoted around the crisis from Ukraine and of the risk of the international political medium to enter accelerated cold political relations between the power centres. The Chinese part has accentuated the idea that another Cold War is not in Beijing interest, whose target is to transform the specific international competition into cooperation, and the transformation of the null game into a game with positive result seems to be the preponderant use of the economic and cultural factors against the military ones. At least, this seems to be the formula adopted by China in order to reformate the actual international medium. Mr. Yang Jiemian has underlined that China wishes another international system, less bellicose and more efficient. We must notice Mr. Yang Jiemian affirmation according to which, referring to the Ukraine crisis, the ex-soviet republics from the Central and Eastern Europe intend to enter the European club. A wish which can be affected by a rapid extension – military and economic – of the United States in the Central Europe and in the East. During the meeting, the researchers have established common collaboration actions between the two institutes.

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE COMMISION OF PROSPECTIVE STUDIES OF THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY (CSPAR) 7 JULY, 2014 Monday, July 7, 2014, at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy (IPSIR) took place the Prospective Studies Committee meeting of the Romanian Academy (CSPAR) at the initiative of the academician Mircea Maliþa, inscribed in a tradition of decades of prospective studies in Romania. In front of a packed audience there were presented objectives, projects, membership of this committee – consisting in over 31 members – academicians, diplomats, researchers and university professors. The opening speech of university professor, PhD, Director ISPRI Dan Dungaciu placed this meeting in the context of concerns related to the shape of the future in Romania and stated that the event follows the first committee meeting, which took place in 2011. The series of communications hosted by the event began with the presentation of Academician Mircea Maliþa, based on the argument for the necessity to study scientifically the future (the possible, and the probable one) with and with the care for a construction which should be as accurate as possible of the present. Employing the metaphor of “the arrow that returns from the future into the present” academician Maliþa explained how prospective studies are essential to the manner in which a country – with the specific example of Romania, in a world of increasingly complex and fluid – builds strategies and policies in at least two of the areas of great significance for the future – on the short term, medium term and especially the long term: in education and diplomacy. Prof. George ªtefan, correspondent member of the Romanian Academy, spoke of the special and very ambiguous relationship of the current world with the future, placing it into the so-called paradox of prospective, of the acceleration of technological developments and of the manner in which these tools are used in prospective studies, and of the difficulty to include / understand / predict in their evolution the ample emergent effects. Prof. George ªtefan proposed the launching of a master for training future specialists in the use of high technology foresight studies, also in context and ISPRI, a proposal welcomed by Professor Dan Dungaciu. Academician Lucian Liviu Albu, director of the Economic Forecasting Institute of the Romanian Academy, related the prospective studies to the studies in economic prospective, highlighting the limits of the standard forecasting methods in the study of emergent phenomena

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such as the economic crises. He highlighted the role of the economic crisis triggered in 2008 to revive a research and forecasting and challenged established theories and methods. Also, academician Albu has proposed the establishment, also within ISPRI of an Advanced Center for Prospective Studies as a nucleus already formed for expertise in this area. Mr. Emil Hurezeanu, undertaking the metaphor of the arrow from the future to the present and the past, developed the ambivalent relationship on all three temporal axes. The direction of the flow of time, from past to future, could be reversed by a proper “recycling” and the interpretation of those arrows of future, with direct application via lessons that Romania – the same small state, with medium resources – could extract from past experiences concerning its relations with the great powers. Mr. Cosmin Dugan, Secretary of CSPAR, made reference to several administrative issues related to establishing a timetable for regular meetings of CSPAR, and a thematic panel regarding the prospective thematic issues to be addressed in the studies of CSPAR. Among the proposals advanced were concerning the affiliation of the Commission to similar international bodies, as well as the attention to access European funds in order to support prospective projects. These few lines of discussion and the reactions that were generated from the audience are a supplementary argument for the significance of this event and for the many dimensions of development for CSPAR. Under this commission was appointed on behalf of ISPRI, as a member, scientific researcher university professor PhD Darie Cristea. RUXANDRA IORDACHE

ISUD INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR UNIVERSAL DIALOGUE 10TH WORLD CONGRESS “THE HUMAN BEING: ITS NATURE AND ITS FUNCTIONS” Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania 7 July 2014 From the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy have participated: Lorena-Valeria Stuparu, Scientific Researcher III PhD,: “The Religious Dimension of Aesthetic Experience” and Gabriela Tãnãsescu, Scientific Researcher III PhD: “Individualism and Responsability in the Rationalist Ethics. The Actuality of Spinoza’s Ethics”.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE BOOK Cold War Diplomacy, author Academician MIRCEA MALIÞA, CENTRAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, BUCHAREST, 8 July 2014 The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, has launched the book Cold War Diplomacy, author Academician Mircea Maliþa, at the Central University Library, Bucharest, in partnership with Club Romania and Digi 24. In this launching/evoking event, participated as speakers, next to the Academician Mircea Maliþa, Mugur Isãrescu, the Governor of the National Bank, Remus Pricopie, the Minister of the National Education, Emil Hurezeanu, Digi24 TV programmes producer, Member in the Directing Council of the Black Sea Foundation (FUMN), University Professor, PhD, Dan Dungaciu, the Director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy.

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The Academician Mircea Maliþa was part of several major events of the Cold War and he has gained the respect of the leaders of the United States, Western Europe and the countries exiting the colonial period, at the international level. His memoires are the testimony of an eyewitness of the public events and the discussions taking place behind the closed doors, during the most volatile moments of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Romanian media, diplomatic and intelligence games avoiding a similar fate. “The final idea of this book is that, in fact,what we believe and know about the Cold War is not true (…). The missile crisis is not representative for the Cold war. The missile crises, actually, begun quite tumultuously, and at some point normalized, one way or another and, quickly, the collaboration was continued. Why? The explanation is that not the conflict was at the basis of the Cold War. The limit was never crossed (…). Each time the parties paid attention to certain limits which were never crossed, and these limits were never put in writing, but they have functioned each time. (…) During the Cold War, each actor had the consciousness of the fact that the limits were not to be crossed”, commented the director of ISPRI, university professor, PhD, Dan Dungaciu, with reference to the information presented in the volume. A supplementary argument, to which academician Mircea Maliþa referred in the book, relates to the role of the secret services from Washington and Moscow. “The secret services were important during the Cold War, suggested the academician, not because the former spied on the latter, but because these were ultimately the mechanisms maintaining these proto-agreements. If the leaders were wrong, there were ‘valve-institutions’, which met, discussed and stated limits: ‘this far!’ This is the reason why there were never conflicts,” declared also Dan Dungaciu. At the same time, the latter underlined the fact that even if an atomic conflict emerged during that period, “the two great powers (the USA and the USSR, redactor’s note) found a solution not to initiate the war” (...). “This concerns the so-called theory of the first strike. If ever arrives a leader whom the actors cannot control through the instituted mechanisms (those proto-agreements to which were parts the secret services inclusively) and wants to begin war with the other part, and within those proto-agreements each part, Washington and Moscow, should ensure that its first strike would not hit their own territories. So, if you the Soviet people, hit us, do not hit the USA, but another state, from Europe, as well as us are not to hit you, but another allied state of yours, from your block, following that after these hits we sit in negotiations and make peace after things came down”, explained the director ISPRI, underlining that this cynical understanding showed once more that, in fact, the Cold War was rather a question “regulated to a greater extent” than suggested by the present day conflict theories. Even more, Dan Dungaciu stated that “it is obvious that the theory of the first strike is not written on any document” and unveiled that “the theory was presented by Mircea Maliþa himself and it was a determining argument for the President of Finland to reopen the renegotiations for the Helsinki Final Act (1975), because the Europeans were not very interested by their security, stating anyway that ‘nothing will happen to us’”. Presenting his volume, academician Mircea Maliþa spoke about the main rules that were found at the basis of what he calls a tacit agreement between the great superpowers during that period – the USA and the USSR. “First – we do not have a real war, no one relates to the nuclear weapon. Two – the military confrontations are avoided (there will not be any conventional wars). Three – none of us gets involved into the affairs of the other space. Then, the permitted things: the doctrinaire consultations continue, the freedom of the press, each superpower having the permission to establish relationships in the Third World under the circumstance that these do not affect the interests of the other superpower. These were the guiding rules during the Cold War. Question: Was this document written anywhere? No! Was it known? Probably it was suspected. It can be checked point by point that it was respected? Yes! Then it means that it was a tacit agreement. A diplomat is allowed to write about the tacit agreement deduced from the visible, verifiable experience. A historian is not allowed to do that, a historian is the prisoner of the written, authenticated (etc.) documents. (…) These were the rules, but they were never written. They are verifiable though, and we can consider them real,” argued the former ambassador of Romania in the USA.

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”The name of Cold War is not quite suitable for a period that is invisibly led, in a peaceful way. We should call it ‘The period of a tacit agreement that lasted forty-some-odd years’”, added the Romanian diplomat, referring to the historical period 1947-1989. For a change, sustains academician Maliþa, the true ‘Cold War’ took place during the period 1945-1950, “a period neglected by history, which hosted a terrible European war, although it was nothing written about it”, referring to the wars waged in the European space by the USA, “with all the visible and the invisible means,” for the “defeat of the communist parties and in order to set in power the other parties.” The Romania diplomat says that “special reserve armies were created in various places in Europe by the Americans” to this end, and the true Cold War ended when the communist party in Italy was replaced through vote by a Christian Democrat party. ”At that point the Cold War ended. America declared ‘We won! The power of the political left has gone into thin air (…) These are disclosures of a researcher who is also a diplomat, neither a political, nor a theoretical and nor a historical type, but who is building his arguments on things that were neither said nor written, on things that were never expressed and constitute the foundation of contemporary history”, also asserted academician Mircea Maliþa.

SUMMER SCHOOL ON THE TOPIC “HISTORY AND CINEMA IN BESSARABIA” WITHIN THE HISTORIC FILM FESTIVAL AT RAªNOV, 1-10 August 2014 20 young people from Moldova Republic and Ukraine took part, during 1-10 August 2014, in the Summer School with the topic ‘History and Cinema in Bessarabia’ organized by the Romanian Cultural Institute, as partner, in the Historical Film Festival at Râºnov. Found at its first edition, the summer school organized by the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR) through the Direction Romanians Abroad and the Romanian Language addressed especially the students and the Master’s students within the space of the historical Bessarabia passionate for history and cinema. The participants had the opportunity to discuss with personalities of the Romanian cultural world and access to all the events of the Historical Film Festival in Râºnov Fortress. During ten days, the student selected were to participate in debates, conferences, film projections, workshops, thematic trips, benefitting from the presence of reputable specialists (historians, political scientists, sociologists, cineastes, visual artists, etc). The students were invited to expose their ideas concerning the history and culture specific for their native space. Octavian Bâlea, photo artist resident in Helsinki, presented his album, “Transnistria, the prison of the Romanian language”, under press at the ICR Publishing House. Within the fortress took place as well the vernissage of an exhibition with approximately 50 photos realized by the artist in Tiraspol. The section included as well two workshops for the participants in the Summer School. The first, organized by Virgil Mãrgineanu, president of the Documentary Festival CRONOGRAF in Chiºinãu, presented the state of contemporary Bessarabia cinematography. The second workshop, sustained by Octavian Bâlea, was centered on his experience in Transnistria, which the artist visited repeatedly. In the opening of the ICR Summer School, the academician Ioan-Aurel Pop delivered the conference “Romanian Spirituality between the Latin West and the Byzantine East”. Among speakers there were also the historians Adrian Cioroianu, Petre Otu, Mihai Croitor, Horia ªerbãnescu, Georgeta Filitti, Cosmin Budeancã and Liviu Tofan, the ambassador of Slovakia, Jan Gabor, professor Jan Rydel (European Network Remembrance and Solidarity, Poland), Radu Filipescu, anticommunist Dissident, the sociologists Vasile Dâncu and Dan Dungaciu, the artists Ion Caramitru and Ioan Gyuri Pascu, the publicists Sever Voinescu, Bogdan Hrib, the cineaste Laurenþiu Damian, the essayist Theodor Paleologu, the ambassadors Sergiu Celac and Sorin Ducaru, Alexandru Grumaz,

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diplomat and general in reserve, the economist Ionuþ Dumitru, Bogdan Olteanu, vice-governor BNR, the political scientist Iulian Fota, presidential counselor. The students participated also in the other events of the Historical Film Festival, organized outside the ICR Summer School. The complete programme of the festival included over 40 documentary and fiction films, concerts and special events, and also debated related to the themes of the festival – ‘The Great War’, ‘Year 1989’ and ‘Los Angeles 1984’.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PATRIMONY AND LOCAL IDENTITY, VALEA VERDE, 5-7 SEPTEMBER 2014 The National Conference on Patrimony and Local Identity, organised by Valentin Trifescu, Vali Ilyes and François Bréda, and sponsored by Ioan Sicoe and Petru Ursan was held at Valea Verde from 5-7 September 2014. The conference attracted a wide range of academics and researchers from a variety of disciplines, each of whom was able to use their expertise in their particular areas of research to inform the debates. This led to a remarkable degree of cross disciplinary exchange, as academics and researchers from the fields of art history, literature, philosophy, politics, architecture, theater and history, engaged in an exchange of ideas, and it was this which played a key role in the success of the conference. The richness and variety of the papers offered, and the stimulus to intellectual discussion they provided, contributed to the success of the conference, and the discussions, both formal and informal, went on long into the night. Valentin Trifescu’s paper on ‘The spirit of place and literary artistic creation in inter-war Transylvania’ – a richly associative work, deciphered hidden ideatic codes and illuminated new angles of study and thought in the fields of art history and regionalism, analyzing the present day validity of concepts such as minorities, nationalism, comparative history, regionalism, art history - as applied to the political geography of interwar Transylvania. Viorella Manolache’s ‘The effect of editing the local – a technical(ised) demonstration’, provided a characteristically dense study, filled with interesting ideas and utilizing both a critical vocabulary and a complex theoretical framework deriving from post modernist philosophy. It sparked a debate which contributed to the fertile exchange of ideas between all the participants. Ian Browne’s paper on heritage and nostalgia, working very much within the analytic tradition, was a philosophical exploration of the construction of heritage taken as national myth, through processes of the emotional identification with collective memory, and it examined the way in which discoursive structures and rhetorical tropes facilitate the transformation of local and particular historical events into the general and the national, constructing the mythic elements of heritage. Some of the themes of this paper resurfaced in Casian Popa’s paper ‘Fluctuations in Romanian identity heritage assumptions of early history’, which looked at changing conceptions of the mythic origins of the Romanian people. He undertook an exercise in demythologizing, drawing attention to the way conceptions of difference and similarity were integral to the various self conceptions offered within scholastic textbooks as ways of creating a Romanian identity and concluded by offering a map of the distribution of DNA in Europe and Romania which provided a stark contrast to some of the mythic conceptions of national and biological identity he had examined. The ideas of difference and similarity surfaced again, as a key feature of ªtefania Custurã’s paper on ‘Identity and otherness in medieval Braºov’. She utilised an array of archive material to examine the way in which the ideas of inclusion and exclusion served to regulate medieval life in Braºov, by conferring upon the citizens an identity, as insiders or outsiders, which quite literally marked out the range of possibilities and opportunities that were available to them. Her researches in the archives also served to shed light on the mysteriously fascinating figure of Dr Honigberger who linked Braºov to the fabulous Orient, Tibet and Shamballa through a network of associative discoveries and esoteric secrets positioning him in close proximity to Csoma de Koros and his well-known travel books.

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Gina Puicã also dealt with the themes of travel, exile and return in her paper on ‘The other Romanian exiles, an insufficiently appreciated heritage’. Her focus was on the the complexity and ambiguity of the relationships between the literary figures who left Romania for France – such as emblematic dissidents Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, as well as less-well known intellectuals and writers – and the communist regime. George Custurã’s contributions deserve special mention. Not only did he present a talk on Medieval farce in the seventeenth century, but he showed a short film of a performance of ‘The Justice of Michael Weiss’, which brought to life in exemplary and entertaining fashion the themes he had identified in his paper. Vali Ilyes contribution on ‘The wooden churches of Bozed, Mureº’ brought the discussion of heritage up to date by focusing on contemporary issues and examining some of the political questions that arise concerning the preservation of heritage The paper given by François Bréda, ‘The geography of heaven in the thought of St. John of the Golden Mouth’ provided a complete change of focus, by bringing a spiritual dimension to the conference, using the thoughts of St. John Chrysostom to examine the relationship between substance and spirit, and the nature of the relationship between eternal heritage and transcosmic local identity in the afterlife. After this excursion into metaphysical geography, the conference concluded with two papers on geography of a more down to earth kind – the physical and geographical aspects of localism and heritage, focusing on architecture, and on urbanism and ruralism – ‘Eclectic versus eclectic, Bucharest between heritage without identity and identity without heritage’, read by Monica Mureºanu and ‘The local dimension of globalization, rural patrimony between exodus and gentrification’ by Florin Mureºanu. Monica Mureºanu’s paper illustrated in graphic fashion the changes which have taken place in Bucharest, without any clear regard for a conception of Bucharest’s rich architectural heritage, which, as she pointed out, has resulted in an eclecticism which has had a dismal and depressing effect upon the urban environment and has resulted in an irreplaceable loss to Bucharest’s heritage. Florin Mureºanu’s paper focused more acutely upon recent, and not always happy, hybridizations between traditional rural architecture and its imported counterparts,which create a non-authentic landscape translating prosperity into flamboyancy; continuity and change within the architectural patrimony of Romanian villages were also discussed. Overall, the most fascinating and most fruitful aspect of the conference proved to be the way in which each of the contributors approached the theme of localism and heritage. Each contributor had an aspect of the subject that they wanted to explore, but the diversity of contibutions and the range of disciplines present ensured that no two approaches were the same. However, one of the most positive aspects was the willingness of the participants to find links between the different disciplines. Both the venue of the conference and the active engagement of all the participants stimulated lively discussions that continued in a relaxed and informal way, long after the formal sessions had closed, and special mention should be made of Ioan Sicoe and George Custurã for their ability to produce, spontaneously, an appropriate cultural moment which blended perfectly with the themes of local identity and heritage. We must also note the pleasant welcome extended to all the participants by the mayor and vice-mayor of Sohodol, whose expertise and generosity made all the participants feel comfortably at ease and ensured a friendly, relaxed atmosphere, filled with true Romanian hospitality and genuine human warmth. But most praise is due to Valentin Trifescu for the success of the conference, and in large measure this success must be attributed to his efforts to ensure that the atmosphere was so conducive to discussion and engagement with the ideas that were presented. That such a multidisciplinary conference, with each contributor engaging with the themes of localism and heritage in very different ways, engendered such a collective sense of intellectual engagement and a willingness to cross disciplines, is largely down to his efforts. AM BROWNE

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THE BUCHAREST DEBATE ON EUROPE, 19TH-20TH OF SEPTEMBER 2014, “1914-2014 WHAT IF EUROPE FAILS?” Hundred years ago Europe failed and within a few weeks found itself in a World War nobody could have foreseen in this extent. Is it possible something like this could happen again today? Given the current tension in Eastern Europe writers and scholars from 10 European countries discuss on September 19 and 20 in Bucharest on key issues concerning the project Europe. The Program has approached: Dealing with one another in Europe and its neighborhood: diplomacy, sanctions, war (with interventions of Dan Dungaciu – Sociologist, Romania, Emil Hurezeanu – Political Journalist, Romania, Ivan Krastev – Political Scientist, Bulgaria, Michael Stolleis – Historian, Germany. Moderation: Mihai-Rãzvan Ungureanu – Historian, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister and former Director of the Foreign Information Agency, Romania); Close and remote European “neighbors”: Russia and the United States (György Dalos – Writer, Hungary; Sonja Margolina – Publicist, Russia; Oksana Sabuschko – Writer, Ukraine; Richard Swartz – Publicist, Sweden. Moderation: Heinrich Detering – Literature Scientist and Writer, Germany); Ethnicity in Europe. The Renaissance of ethnic nation states? (Andrei Cornea – Publicist and Philosopher, Romania; Slavenka Drakulić – Writer and Journalist, Croatia; Silvia Marton – Sociologist, Romania; Ilma Rakusa – Writer and Translator, Switzerland. Moderation: Raluca Alexandrescu – Political Scientist, Romania); The margins of Europe: a hazard zone, a grey zone, or a trading zone? (Edhem Eldem – Historian, Turkey; Yaroslav Hrytsak – Historian, Ukraine; Jörn Leonhard – Historian, Germany; Karl Schlögel – Historian, Germany. Moderation: Andrei Pleºu – Philosopher, former Minister of Culture and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania).

DEBATE UKRAINE: THE SECOND FROZEN CONFLICT AT ROMANIA’S BORDERS 24 SEPTEMBER 2014 Black Sea University Foundation and Adevãrul newspaper have organized the debate entitled “Ukraine: the Second Frozen Conflict at Romania’s Borders”, 24 September 2014, at the House of the Scientists, in Bucharest. The debate had as a starting point the results of an opinion poll conducted by Inscop Research ordered by Adevãrul newspaper within the project entitled “The Truth about Romania”. The event was moderated by university professor Dan Dungaciu, PhD, Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, President of the Black Sea University Foundation and Ion M. Ioniþã, Senior Editor of Adevãrul newspaper and transmitted live on www.privesc.eu. Speakers: Ambassador Liviu Bota, President of the Director Council, Black Sea University Foundation (FUMN), Ambassador Sergiu Celac, member in the Director Council, Black Sea University Foundation (FUMN), Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – TBC, Emil Hurezeanu, member in the Director Council, Black Sea University Foundation (FUMN), George Scarlat, Black Sea University Foundation (FUMN), Darie Cristea, Scientific Director of the Black Sea University Foundation (FUMN), university professor at Bucharest University, and the representative of the Embassy of Ukraine in Romania – TBC.

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SCIENTIFIC MANIFESTATION ROMANIAN ANTROPOLOGHY DAYS 21th Edition IMAGE ADVENTURE. IMAGE, IMAGINATION, IMAGINARY 25-29 SEPTEMBER 2014, SIBIU At the international scientific event (organized by the “Lucian Blaga” University from Sibiu, Faculty of Socio-Human Sciences, Sibiu County Council, Astra Library, Astra National Museum Complex, County Center for Preservation and Promotion of Traditional Culture “Cindrelul – Junii” Sibiu and gathering more than 80 de professors and researchers from Romania and from USA, France, Taiwan and Turkey), with interdisciplinary accents and approaching anthropology, history, letters and arts, have participated with scientific communications, ISPRI researchers: CARMEN BURCEA, The Hispano-American Continent Image in Gabriel García Márquez Representation; VIORELLA MANOLACHE, The Third Order Instructions of the Image: Representation – Proximity–Identity; HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, Democracy as Freak Show Adventure; ENACHE TUªA, Constanþa at 1914 in an Epoch Film and The Propaganda Romanian Movie and its effects in Dobrogea 1950-1980

THE DEBATE – UKRAINE A NEW PANDORA´S BOX Casa Titulescu, 14 October 2014 The European Foundation Titulescu – Centre of Strategic Studies has organized on 14 October, Casa Titulescu, the debate – Ukraine a New Pandora’s Box, having as special guests: Mr. Adrian Severin, vice-president of the Foundation of the Social-Democrat “Ovidiu ºincai” Institute, Dan Dungaciu, Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy and Armand Goºu, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. The debate was moderated by the FET President, Adrian Nãstase.

THE 7TH EDITION OF THE CONFERENCE RELIGIOUS TEXT AND DISCOURSE, 7-8 NOVEMBER 2014, SIBIU The conference “Religious Text and Discourse”, organized by the Centre of Intercultural and Philological Researches, “Lucian Blaga” University, Cultural Association “Religious Text and Discourse” and “Andrei ªaguna” Faculty of Theology, has continued the spirit of the language theology. Placed among the literary resuscitate theological perspective, in its formula certified in the interwar period in Sibiu through Dumitru Stãniloae’s Philokalia and amplified by Nichifor Crainic, the present conference closes the circle appealing to Wittgenstein perspective on religious discourse. The conference has gathered a valuable and voluminous presence – more than 60 participants, professors, researchers, PhDs, theologians and philologers. Scientific Researcher III, PhD., ISPRI, Viorella Manolache has moderated atelier 2 and has presented the scientific communication: Radical Orthodoxy Politics.

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INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR, GAUDEAMUS, ROMEXPO, Bucharest 20-22 November 2014 Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest has launched the following books: Teorii ale legitimitãþii puterii [Theories of Legitimating Power], authors: Constantin Nica, Gabriela Tãnãsescu, Lorena Stuparu, Adela Deliu, with the participation of Professors CARMEN DIACONESCU, ALEXANDRU FLORIAN and DUMITRU BORÞUN; Spaþiul public european. Idei, instituþii, politici [European Public Space. Ideas, Institutions, Policies], authors: Alexandru ªtefãnescu, Viorella Manolache, Gabriela Tãnãsescu, Lorena Stuparu, Cristian Popa, Aniºoara ªerban, with the participation of Professors LILIANA POPESCU and DANIELA BLEBEA NICOLAE; Protecþia infrastructurilor critice în cadrul relaþiilor internaþionale [The Protection of the Critic Infrastructures in International Relations ], authors: Victor Matei and Dana Dumitru; Uniunea Europeanã dupã 25 de ani [European Union after 25 Years], coord. Dan Dungaciu; Filosofie politicã republicanã [Political Republican Philosophy], authors: Aniºoara ªerban, Cristian Popa, Ion Goian, Viorella Manolache, Enache Tuºa, Sari Florescu, with the participation of Professors VASILE MORAR, DUMITRU BORÞUN and IAN BROWNE; Între geopoliticã ºi utopie [Between Geopolitics and Utopia], author: Ion Goian, with the participation of Professors VASILE MORAR, DUMITRU BORÞUN and MIHAI MILCA; Romanian-Moroccan Forms of Manifestation in the European Space, coord. Viorella Manolache, with the participation of the journalist, essayist, diplomat and correspondent for Romania at “Observatoire d’études Géopolitiques“, Paris, CLEOPATRA LORINÞIU and scientific researcher LUCIAN JORA.

* * * Istoria prin ochii diplomatului [History through the Diplomat’s Eye], Mircea Maliþa, Dan Dungaciu, Rao Publishing House, with presentations of: Ambassador IOAN DONCA, Prof. ELENA MALIÞA and DAN DUNGACIU; Thomas Kuhn despre revoluþie ºi paradigmã în dezvoltarea ºtiinþei [Thomas Kuhn on Revolution and Paradigm in Developing Science], coord. Angela Botez, Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, Oana Vasilescu, Marius Augustin Drãghici, Gabriel Nagâþ, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, with presentations of: Researcher ANGELA BOTEZ, IAN BROWNE, HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN and VIORELLA MANOLACHE.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE After 25 Years. Histories and Memories of Communism, 20-21 November 2014,

National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA), Bucharest At the international conference organized by the Memoria Cultural Foundation and the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile and focused on Historiography of Communism, Everyday life, Memory and history of the repression, Memory trends and Postmemory generation, scientific assistant ISPRI, NICOLAE ÞÎBRIGAN, has participated with the presentation: “The Soviet Regime Repressive on the Population from Bessarabia and North Bukovina (1940-1941)”.

BOOK REVIEWS

Aristide Cioabã, Constantin Nica (coord.) Sistemul politic din România: actori, instituþii ºi provocãri, Bucharest, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations Publishing House, 2014, 817 p. The volume Sistemul politic din România: actori, instituþii ºi provocãri [The Political System in Romania: Actors, Institutions, Challenges] integrates current and pertinent analyses concerning the structure and the functioning of the Romanian political system, following the fundamental aspects of its organization, along with the relevant mechanisms of its functioning. Methodological, the volume approaches an explicative model based on the systemic and structural-functionalist evaluations applied to the social system, to the national community and to the state from Romania, following three main directions: political actors, decisional institutions of the powers of the state and the endogen and exogenous provocations which emerge in the system functionality. Product of the recent researches of a group authors from the Political Systems, Theories and Institutions from the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, preoccupied by the political system from Romania, by the institutions and political class, in a relation with the democratic consolidation process and implication in the decisions and function of the European Union, the book proposes an analysis of the major political and interdependent subsystems. The Introduction, “Power and Liberty in Different Configurations of the Romanian Political System”, signed by the one of the volume’s coordinators, Aristide Cioabã defines the terms and the specific theoretical zone of the research. The Researcher explains the preoccupation of the volume for the “problematic of the formal and informal organization of the Romanian political system and (...) its functional mechanisms in the configuration process and its changes, mainly after the communist fall, through the transition to a democratic pluralist regime. The investigation circumscribes this idea to the specific framework and methods of the comparative perspective in the contemporary political science” (p. 11). The relation power-liberty in the context of democratic consolidation in Romania is analyzed not only from the terminological and democratliberal historical-conceptual perspective, but also by using an investigation of the institutional and constitutional arrangements from Romania, observing that “we have in the Romania Constitution the fundamental elements able to circumscribe and to activate the maintained mechanisms of exercising the delegate to the government by the people powers, in reasonable limits of a democratic regime” (p. 67). The volume consists of three parts. Part I, entitled “Actors, Participation and Political Behaviors” is structured on two levels: “A. Parties and Civil Society” and “B. Participation and Political Culture”. In the first part, Constantin Nica analysis the political parties, considered inseparable actors by the democratic political systems, the mono-party East-European communist failure and the pluralist alternative opening, the genesis, evolutions and political parties systems characteristics. Discussing the role and the function of the political parties, Constantin Nica approaches the promotion of the social and national social corpus interests, the programs and the doctrines, the electoral function which confirms to be “indispensable to any political pluralist and democrat system” (p. 196), along with the government function and that of influencing political power. The analyst shows that: “The stake of the exercise of power, combined with that of its influence is evident in terms of social normality, and it becomes stronger in times of historical rupture, as that from 22 December 1989 until the eve of 2000s”. The present chapter investigates all the aspects regarding the functional aspects of the political parties in Romania, considered as entities in development, able to react democratically through dialogue, representatively and socio-political interaction, demonstrating democratic competences. “The phenomenon of ideological-doctrinal compatibility between all parties across the spectrum, was imposed from the first years after 1990 and has become an outcome of the operation of representative democracy, of expression and of promoting the interests of all economic, professional, social and ethnic structures“ (p. 254). In the chapter entitled “Civil Society and the Groups of Interests – Anatomy and Action in the Public Space”, Constantin Nica, relating the phrase “civil society” to an expression of the political pluralism in Romania, seen as a sum of different political parties forces: legal and voluntary associations of citizens constituted on the similitude of convictions and interests, but outside politics and politicization, following the fulfillment of public objectives considered important for the state. The groups of interests and the pressure groups are defined distinctively, the former, through the transparent political dialogue, and the latter, discretely, through actions of influence. The complexity of the political system is given by the manner in which the groups of interests render more permeable as well the frameworks of political parties, as those of the organizations of the civil society per se. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 172–180, Bucharest, 2015.

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Opening the second segment of the first part, “B. Participation and Political Culture”, Bogdan M. Popescu analyzes “The Elections and the Electoral System. The Parliamentary Elections in 2012 and the Perspectives of the Electoral Reform” starting from a short presentation of the evolutions of the electoral system after 1989, emphasizing in its analysis the profound relations between the electoral system and the democratic regime. Then is discussed the role of management of the elections in correlation with the electoral system of the country, “the relevant themes associated with the electoral management and its implications”. As following the investigation refers to the perspective of an electoral reform, “a theme launched after the first parliamentary elections in 2008 and reiterated after the elections of December 2012” (p. 280). Lorena Stuparu investigates “The Political Culture. Historical Antecedents and Current Traits” synthesizing the idea of a mix political culture in Romania, multi-strata, in conformity with the diverse levels of awareness of the “values of the city (the law, justice, authority, virtue, norms, respect, dignity, freedom, rights, and tolerance): a political ‘culture’ of the inadequacy mix with unexpected moments of ‘punctuality’” (p. 321). In the study “Political Attitude and Civic Participation” Lorena Stuparu shows that the concrete expression of interiorizing the political culture values is the civic participation, an ideal which can be achieved. Observing the civic oscillating attitudes, between the indifferent one and the combative one, the author proposes as a test of the active and participative citizen, the lack of understanding and the obedience in front of the obedient understanding of the citizen in front of the abuses of power. The second part, entitled “The Institutional Subsystems of the State Powers” is composed of several studies signed by Aristide Cioabã and it debuts with the topic “The Parliament within the Structural Aggregate of the Current Political System”. Thus the Parliament is investigated as an important part of the central nucleus that exercises power, next to the government, the public bureaucracies and the instances of the judicial power. “The new institutional framework of the democratic political system (after December 1989 – our emphasis) was configured naturally starting from and organizing itself against the national representative institution – the Parliament – as it was consecrated in the doctrines of the separation of powers in the modern state of liberaldemocratic inspiration” (p. 349). Studying this institution from the historical political perspective, from that of political philosophy and from the functionalist-comparative perspective characteristic for the political sciences, the author investigates also the role of the President of Romania within the structural democratic system showing that the constitutional attributions are either exceeded or under-fulfilled and identifying the deviation of the real authorities from the legal ones of the real presidential authority especially in the case of President Traian Bãsescu. The Executive is analyzed as expression of a government responsible with the elaboration and materialization of the public policies, than it highlights the importance of the elaboration and realization of the public policy, then the importance of judicial authority for the state functioning is emphasized, along with the legal role of guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitutional Court in relation to the conjectural one, of political actor, which the Constitutional Court performed during the recent years in Romania. The second part ends with a portrait of the public administration as a sum of institutional structures with theoretical role of functional capacities of the state, arriving at the following conclusion: “Within the system of the Romanian public administration the bureaucratic dysfunctions and the rigidity of the relations with the citizens or with other organizations are “capitalized”, in a specific manner”, as opportunities for corruption (p. 558). “The Political Class and the Requirements of the Democratic Government” is the general theme of the third part. The first study is signed by Aristide Cioabã and it treats the “Theoretical General Framework and the Structural Profile of the Post-Communist Political Class”, starting from an interesting discussion concerning the interdependence between the political class and the type or the characteristics political regimes. The ample analysis conducted proves the failure of the political class in Romania, partially due to the liberal and democratic proven deficit and in part due to the failure to implement in practice the mechanisms of “horizontal responsibility”. This was triggered by the blockage of the functioning of the system of checks and balances, by the tragedy of the overlapping of the individual interests over the public ones often cancelling the latter, which “favors and aggravates the phenomena of corruption and inefficiency of the rule of law” (p. 609). The next study entitled “The Electorate and the Selection of the Political Class”, signed as well by Aristide Cioabã emphasizes the diverse deficiencies in relation to the desiderate of directing the selection process after moral and rational criteria, sub ordered to the idea of assurance / guarantee of the responsibility of the representatives of the destinies and interests of the collectivity (p. 631). The forth part, entitled “The Political System and the New Challenges” opens with the theme “The SemiPresidentialism and Its Functional Equilibriums. Options for the Revision of the Romanian Constitution”, and is analyzed by Gabriela Tãnãsescu. The analytical perspective followed emphasizes the especially important role performed by the relation of the presidents to the other state powers confronting the personalities of the characters in key positions in state, and of their political styles with the structure of the parliamentary majorities. The author shows that “in the evolution of the semi-presidentialism in Romania a determining role was played by the dialectics circumscribed precisely to the rapport of the presidents and of the political leaders of the parliamentary majorities and of their political behavior to the constitutional design drawn in 1991” (p.

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693-4) highlighting in different perspectives an obsolete character of “the preeminence deprived of political responsibility of certain leaders enlightened by a Divine gift, of the historical personality situated outside the democratic control” (p. 698). The next subject, “The Democratic Consolidation: Uncertainties and Regressive Temptations”, signed by Aristide Cioabã, broadly evaluates the sideslips of the democratic consolidation and the modalities to measure scientifically this democratic consolidation, marking also the slippages generated by the unbalance of the state powers, the most flagrant case being the defiance of the Parliament. Gheorghe Ciascai in his study “The Political System between National Sovereignty and European Integration” runs a radiography of the opportunities and challenges generated by the accession to the European Union, analyzing then the political nature of the European Union and the competences of the Union, considered as a political entity sui generis with sinuous evolutions toward a political-juridical identity organized around the treaties and of the European “integrative” common interest. These particularities govern the relation between the European Union and the member states. The Guardians of the Union and of the treaties as the author calls the European Commission and the Court of Justice have prerogatives of control over the member states, among which, the most powerful is considered the infringement procedure. Romania’s role is associated to the paradoxical European political postmodernity: Romania is a full member but can not capitalize on his membership in the Union through successful participation in European decision-making process. Ruxandra Iordache signs the study “The Participation in Decision-Making of the Romanian Authorities in the European Union – the Case of Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020” confirming the conclusions of the previous study in regard to this particular situation. “In what concerns the Romanian participation to the negotiations concerning MFF, in the stage that corresponds to the political agreement, several conclusions are more important. The relation of Romania to the European mechanism is still “work in progress” from the perspective of the theoretical approaches that place the accent on the process of learning ‘as you go’ of the processes and manners of action in the EU decision institution. There is a natural need for a period of assimilation of a true ‘culture’ of mutual trust and respect that took place in the older member states (...)” (p. 805). The final considerations of the book (signed by Aristide Cioabã) underline the importance of the democratic consolidation, and the importance of the consolidation of the rule of law, of the in-depth learning of the rules of the political game observing the democratic rules, of the responsibility of the political class, of the ameliorated formalism and bureaucracy for a functional and rational bureaucracy, eliminating the clienteles’ cultivation, of the corruption and arbitrary accomplishing the stability and functionality of our democratic system, and, through these aspects we can assess the importance of this fundamental research for the specialists, for students and for the democratic culture in Romania.

Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban Lutgard Lams, Geert Crauwels and Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban Totalitarian and Authoritarian Discourses. A Global and Timeless Phenomenon?, Oxford, Ed. Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2014, 349 p. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Discourses. A Global and Timeless Phenomenon? edited by Lutgard Lams, Geert Crauwels and Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban is an interdisciplinary accomplishment arguing the thesis of the universality of totalitarian discourses (and of discourse of totalitarian type, as it is considered here the authoritarian discourse. The introduction explains the theoretical views and the methodology of the volume, interestingly structured in three parts: “Creation – Identity and Memories,” Mass Communication and Official Discourse”, and “Power Structures – Politics and Truth”. The theoretical argument “Totalitarian Discourse: The New Snow White/Society in the Discursive Wooden Mirror” signed by Henrieta ªerban finds a detailed illustration in the case studies approaching the situation of totalitarian or authoritarian discourse or of aspects that characterize them in diverse countries and at different moments, making the volume more convincing. There are several powerful defining angles undertaken by the author, among which we have selected the following: “Totalitarian discourse is a symptom of fear and guilt, widely spread into society, illustrating both the aim of political power of indoctrination, mobilization and the thorough transformation of the human being, and the failure of governance, ‘the incapacity to govern the country through ’normal’ authority and executive measures’1. Due to this inability of normal governance, the civilian individuals become an army of ‘homocuses,’ indoctrinated toy soldiers, enrolled in the mechanism of the totalitarian society” (p. 23). ———————— 1 S. Zizek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion, London, Verso, 2011 (2001), p. 119.

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Rãzvan V. Pantelimon approaches the myth of Che Gurvara in the Cuban political discourse, Geert Crauwels analyzes literary autobiographic discourse ca totalitarian discourse, Arvi Sepp discusses Nazi poetry, Soonhee Fraysse-Kim investigates the North Korean totalitarian discourse, Jorge V. Tigno and Jean Encinas Franco approach the dictatorial discourse in Philipine, Lutgard Lams evaluates the symbolical construction of the contemporary Chinese discourse, the mystifying discourse about the Soviet soldier in the Yugoslavian press is analyzed by Ivana Dobrivojevic, and the pathos of the Soviet press is evaluated by Ruta Marcinkeviciene. The volume includes an analysis of the myth of military indispensability in the Burmese political culture conducted by Ko Ko Thett, an investigation of the totalitarian discourse and of the rule of anti – in Ceauºescu’s Romania in the vision of Viorella Manolache, as well as the approach of the characteristic aspects of the totalitarian discourse in Tunisia of Ben Ali in the analysis of Abdenbi Sarroukh. All these serious and varied case studies confirm under specific aspects parts of the theoretical argument elaborated by Henrieta ªerban, in diverse spaces and varied periods of time, stretched up to contemporary times, overcoming thus the consecrated classification, more limiting from a conceptual point of view: fascist, Nazi, communist and postcommunist discourses. Another conceptual opening of the paper is the avoidance of the chronological structuring or simply on combined historical-geographical criteria of the volume. Instead, the totalitarian discourse is interpreted in the three above mentioned parts from the three dimensional perspectives, relevant for the analysis and emphasized in the theoretical argument: the discursive power to create identities and memories, by the chapters signed by Pantelimon, Crauwels, Sepp and Soonhee Fraysse-Kim; the totalitarian discursive power of influence via the official media (analyzed in the works of Jorge V. Tigno and Jean Encinas Franco, Lutgard Lams, Ivana Dobrivojevic, and Ruta Marcinkeviciene); and, the reifying power of the totalitarian discourse through the reification of the power structures and of the relation between politics and truth (see the chapters signed by Ko Ko Thett, Viorella Manolache, and Abdenbi Sarroukh). The totalitarian temptation (or the authoritarian temptation seen as a form of the first, but with a more limited transformative power than in totalitarianism and with an imposing presence but almighty, as in totalitarianism) is real, although some may not embrace this part of the analysis. The presence of discourses that identify enemies or “melt” the individual subjectivity and alterity, or they become vehicles for the transformation of the national leaders in myths, or demonize the dissonant voices, all in an ideological language, ambiguous, heavy and artificial that tends to replace the natural language (langue de bois) are clues for the explanation of the successful survival of the totalitarian discourse. In 1976 La tentation totalitaire was published by JeanFrançois Revel, who investigated the appetence of the individual for totalitarianism and the appetence of the western left for the “dreams” of the powerful socialism, if not even for something more radical. In 2009, also in the French space and under the same title the work is republished, completed though by the idea of an essay of the totalitarianisms of transcendence, the thesis of totalitarian violence is emphasized by Jacques Pons who argues that violence is sustained by a religious drive. This volume, edited by Lutgard Lams, Geert Crauwels and Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban has not only the merit to emphasize the religious dimension of the totalitarian discursive manipulation, of the supreme leader or the paradox millenarism of the totalitarian society, but also apparent in discourse, but also the audacity to sustain the idea of universality and of the relative independence of certain geographical spaces or of fixed temporal landmarks. This idea does not involve the indiscriminating treatment of all subjects, the lack of difference from case to case, but it underlines the striking similarities beyond the differences generated by culture, history or the natural language. Among these similarities, interesting is the argument of particularism brought always to the fore by the representatives of the totalitarian regimes and seen as a protection against any criticism that can be then rejected due to the lack of sophistication and access to the subtleties of language, culture or history. The universality of the totalitarian discourses of the discourses of totalitarian type is identifiable also in the disguising attempts of the populist or xenophobe discourses, or even in the double standards still present in the third millennium. Thus, if we accept this perspective, the study of totalitarian discourse is real and relevant, and it is sustained to the fore of contemporary research as a foundation for the comparative research of the characteristics and transformations of the European political discourse nowadays, and beyond, in the world, widening the sphere of investigation past propaganda and manipulation and selecting and analyzing the manipulation of the individual, of the institutions and eventually of the entire society through discursive manipulations and from here to notice the dramatic changes induced into the social fabric and the individual nature. In fact, this volume contributes both to linguistic pragmatics, now applied to totalitarian discourse and to the political philosophy of the totalitarian discourse, closely inter-related. We understand how are legitimated all these discourses through some variation of discourse about the “bright future”, as a paradox, already present, through a total emancipation of whatever past, insufficiently “bright” from an ideological standpoint, and thus “backward”, and through an emancipation from the so-called inadequate values and symbols which are too closely related to the past. This sort of artificial discursive realm that results, generates an “artificial” society, formed out of “artificial” members of society that, certainly, can be situated anywhere, anytime.

Ruxandra Iordache

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Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, Cristian-Ion Popa (coord.) Filosofie politicã republicanã. Ipostaze moderne ºi contemporane, Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2014, 314 p. This volume entitled Republican Political Philosophy. Modern and Contemporary Landmarks is a collective work that capitalizes the results of the research program “The Idea of Republic in Modern and Contemporary Political Philosophy” led by the researchers directed by Scientific Researcher I, Ion Goian, PhD at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations (2011-2013). The volume consists of the three parts: Historical Landmarks, Contemporary Approaches of Republicanism and Documentary. The theoretical background of this republicanism is capitalized in the contemporary studies that can be considered a republican revival of the ancient political ideas of the Greek city and the Roman republic, developed by the thinkers of Italian Renaissance, of the thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries, and by the “founding fathers” of the USA. “Historical Landmarks” debuts with the study “Machiavelli and the Classical Republicanism: Contemporary Interpretations”, by Ion Goian who interprets that Machiavelli’s represent the origin of modern republicanism. Also, English republican thinkers (James Harrington, John Milton or Algernon Sidney) are crucial to the studies of civic republicanism, centered on Machiavelli and the liberalism of John Locke contributing the basic ideas of the American republic. “American Republicanism – Political History and Philosophy” by Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban further analyzes the English liberal democratic and republican theoretical sources welded into the American Constitution and democracy, emphasizing republican history, events and mechanisms in their fascinating inter-relation. The next study, “Republican Ideas in Contemporary Political Philosophy” of Viorella Manolache approaches various dimensions of modern and contemporary republican theory, within a complex and in-depth analysis, not avoiding the analyses of republican practices, mainly in Europe and in Romania. Enache Tuºa entitles his substantial contribution “Projects and Visions of the Republican Form of Government in Romanian Society” and approaches the particular republican itinerary of ideas and institutions in Romania. Conducted since the beginning of the 19th century and until today, the investigation points to a specific quest of accustoming to the European republican path, which at times valued the pre-modern elements and at times went around them, seen as obstacle elements, which did not favour the implementation of modern elements such as: the Roman law, the civil relations, the citizens’ rights, etc. a glorious republican moment was marked by the reforms carried along by the scholars and legislators around Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Part II, “Contemporary Approaches of Republicanism”, starts by “Neorepublican Public Philosophy” by Cristian-Ion Popa, a study dedicated to the interpretation of the public policies built around social causes answering to the entitlements of certain groups and their relation to liberalism or/and democratism and socialdemocracy. “The Compatibility of the Republican Theory of Pettit with Rawlsian Liberalism” by Sari Florescu approaches the theories of freedom as non-domination and justice as fairness from the two philosophers analyzed. The author investigates the extent of the compatibilities of these two, and the extent of their complementarities. The research also approaches the characteristics of a space of “contestatory democracy” (Philip Pettit) open by republican incentives, and becoming a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (John Rawls) of central importance for liberal democracy, too. “American Republicanism: Several Conceptual Landmarks” by Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban investigates the American philosophic republicanism in its characteristic elements. Is nowadays republicanism the heritor of the pluralist and patriotic American republicanism of the Fore Fathers? The study identifies the fundamental republican political values still valuable and discussed by present-day American thinkers. The third part, “Documentary”, is composed of two interesting studies of Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, in translation. Philip Pettit discusses the ideal of freedom as non-domination and its importance within the philosophical debates. Quentin Skinner also interprets the republican perspective on freedom, as to be free is not to be dominated and to live in a free state is to be un-dominated neither by inner institutions or individual nor by external forces, or corporations, etc. “Republicanism: One More Inquiry into the Coherence of a Concept”, is an interview with William Stearns, American theoretician specialized in political culture, who approaches republicanism from a philosophical, discursive and symbolical perspective, with interest for civic participation and communitarian cohesion, republican values, virtuous civism, and most importantly, freedom. The “Succinct Glossary of Main Personalities, Concepts and Events of Republicanism”, by Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, is actually quite sizable, a useful instrument, identifying the main elements for the study of republicanism. It synthesizes them with a clear view over the ensemble of the topic, revealing the complexity of the republican issues. This substantial work succeeds to cover a very important topic of contemporary political philosophy with relevance for the Romanian political philosophical debates and for the democratic practice, alike.

Alexandra Vasile

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Angela Botez, Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, Oana Vasilescu, Marius Augustin Drãghici and Gabriel Nagâþ (coord.) Thomas Kuhn on Revolution and Paradigm in the Development of Science, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2014, 510 p. Structurally conceived and edited with a respect for the (im)posed – (dis)posed norms of rigorously scientific anticipatory vision, with the intention of anticipating and resolving any demands an expert reader might raise in a post-lecture mode and on a Kuhnian note – “now I know what happened, this makes sense (…); what was for me just a list of facts has now become a recognizable pattern”, the volume Thomas Kuhn on Revolution and Paradigm in the Development of Science traces and recommends an analytical trail with milestones already suggested by a dual approach towards both traditions and event landmarks – the 50 year anniversary of the publication of the book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the 90th anniversary of Thomas Kuhn’s birth (1922). Not at all aleatory, the present volume is un-syncopated and a further volume in the same Philosophy of Science series (published by the Romanian Academy Publishing House) – a series started in 1978 with Angela Botez as its initiator, catalytic spirit and scientific endeavour coordinator – in the sense of a traditio’s philosophical canon: simultaneously reclaiming and relevant. Any activity dedicated to the subject’s approach – which can seem to be, when first reading the texts included in the book, a consolidate(ing)-exegetic endeavour (six volumes have been edited so far) of a nucleus of local and international specialists, an editorial aim for scientists and philosophers, researchers and teachers was intensified and amplified through establishing particularizing contacts (see the dialogue between Angela Botez and Thomas Kuhn, and his reply on the 9th May 1995) and/or by intentional, analytical delimitations of a reflex of the notorious author (i.e. erosion) already apparent within the Romanian space with an intention of re-launching it in an actualized form [for instance, at the moment when we are transmitting the present signal, one can mention the convincing study Kuhn, Lakatos and the Paradigm Change in British Political Economy in 1979 by British researcher Ian Browne, included in the present issue of Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations]. In fact, the published volume offers a fundamental comparative analysis of both Kuhn’s ideas and the landmarks of Romanian philosophical thinking, and/or offers a pertinent reappraisal of the aforementioned philosophical systems, with an accent upon reaffirming specific Kuhnian markings: a reconfiguration of the analytical spectrum of investigation regarding an examination of scientific activity and an interpretation of its results, through promoting new standards in scientific historiography by accepting any initiative of reconceptualizing scientific changes and imposing a pattern of historical-sociological approaches, as applied to the contemporary philosophy of science. The commentary About Scientific Certainty in Kuhn’s Works, by Marius Augustin Drãghici, confirms the separation of studies included in the present volume (just) from any polishing or routine re-reading of Kuhn’s texts, while stating that said text [texts] do not explicitly target the originality of the author’s work but rather “throw a light to help us in understanding Kuhnian concepts and reconciling differently perceived and momentarily received periods, circumscribed by the Structure’s moment and post-interval as a means of examining the dynamics of scientific knowledge.” One also decodes the analytical – directive method of designing an “around” as a modality of non-limited inclusion inside the already – mentioned best-seller, or rather as a possibility of appraising any aspects targeting Kuhnian concepts of before and after the sparkling of the event marked by the work’s publication/reception. The particularizing character of our recently published book is a distancing from any obvious risky automatism, through investing any coordinators with a (strict) sense of identifying advantages and specificities, at any price, in the sense in which the directorial/ guiding collective for the present volume discerningly applies rules of information trial and assembly, or classifying and structuring ideas and content in accordance with certain criteria and relationships, through an equation of coordination endeavors with a symbology of cardinal landmarks which serves to confirm/ administer realistic analytical directions. If the objectives noted are (a)pproved from the “control tower“ of research by Angela Botez and (a)ccredited by academic Gheorghe Vlãduþescu or university professors Ioan I. Roºca, Gabriel Nagâþ (in his Scientific Revolution as a Kuhnian Concept. A Comment about the Return Journey from the Structure) abundantly uses the method of reader guidance (animated by a curiosity of careful examination and marked by the impact of the first volume Kuhn published, The Copernican revolution) in the direction of a primordial return. An intention of examining the entire Kuhnian corpus of works is thus established using Kuhnian selfevaluatory mechanisms, and acccented by permanent slidings between “a kind of unknown hermeneutics” and “the silent abandonment of conceptual continuism in favor of a revolutionary epistemolgical and social fracture”, banking upon a review of essential pre-Kuhnian elements and of graduality – an important result of extraordinary research (and favoring normal research much less).

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By avoiding the pertinently- panoramic character of analytical coordinates already demonstrated in Angela Botez’s Introduction to the volume [with a (selective) echo: in directing lines traced by philosophy of science specialists – H.W. Newton-Smith, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Ilie Pârvu, Mircea Flonta, Angela Botez, Gabriel Nagâþ, Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, Dragoº Bâgu or Marius Augustin Drãghici; in translations belonging to the historist – relativistical school – Roger Trigg, Larry Laudan, Friedrich Stadler, Steve Fuller, H.-J. Dahms, M. Schorner, Christian Dambock, Christoph Limbeck-Lillienau, David Rabouin; and / or in Kuhnian Philosophical Confluences publicized in translation by Jacobs Struan, Alexandru Boboc, Jan Barbour, Xavier de Donato Rodriguez, Sergiu Bãran, Narcis Zãrnescu or Valentin Teodorescu etc.], one cannot help but underline the method and the analytical instruments used, which recommend a new lecture grid for Kuhn’s works, already interpreted by an appeal to the rule of two. The authors’ new option is not unfounded, taking into account the fact that it certifies any notes within the book’s restorative opening pages already stated and commented in the text Relationships between History and the Philosophy of Science by confessingly establishing the duality of Kuhnian involvement in reconfiguring an intersectingly – philosophical historical profile, uniting both communication and rapprochement in the inter – and not intra – disciplinary sense and contrary to Kuhn’s warning which states that both the history and the philosophy of science must continue to exist separately, as two different disciplines. If in a Lyotardian aception the rapporteur was a philosopher, in the Kuhnian score the status of a historian – chronicler acknowledges his double vocation – open towards research in both the history and the philosophy of science – overtaking any description and relying on structure which offfers an almost-sociological approach to history and philosophy, seen as sources which produce knowledge, and in which, non-equally, criticism can be substituted for research as a formulation ready to generate a new, totally different field of study. Hence the double option already expressed in the Kuhnian statement that history represents a potential grant for rationally rebuilding the sciences, banking on an “autonomy of historical understanding”; and philosophy reclaims a covering law model, by offering an articulated version of history’s image. The way/criteria of archiving the two registries ensures precision and professional competence guarantees for any information processed by the volume’s coordinators, already interested in systematized Kuhnian concepts, interpretations of Kuhn’s works and exhaustive treatment of conflated historical philosophies of science; Angela Botez, “A Historicist-Mutational Vision of the Development of Science: Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Agassi”; “Confluences of Historist Philosophy of Science (Th. Kuhn, M. Polanyi, C. O. Schrag) and Blaga’s Philosophy”; Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban,“The Concept of the Paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s Work”; Marius Augustin Drãghici, “About Scientific Certitudes in Thomas Kuhn”; Xavier de Donato Rodriguez, “Goodman, Kuhn, Panofsky and Gombrich about Science and Art” (translated by Oana Vasilescu); Jan Barbour, “The Role of Paradigm in Religion” (translated by Oana Vasilescu) and Gabriel Nagâþ, “The Kuhnian Concept of Scientific Revolution. A Comment about the Return Journey from the Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. The volume brings to atention Mircea Flonta’s appreciated study “How will the Structure of Scientific Revolutions be understoood by a reader of Wittgenstein?” and Alexandru Boboc’s “Science and Knowledge in Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms” – but also notes, in a balancing note, any opinions, comments or reactions of Kuhnian works’ predecessors, disciples and critics (Robin Collingwood, Michael Polanyi, Ian Hacking, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Larry Laudan, Michael Devitt or Ernan McMullin), who both actualize and value the paradigm of American philosophy (via Devitt, McMullin, Hoyingen-Huene, R. Rorty), and the Kuhnian school (Toulmin, Lakatos, Feyerabend), while focusing upon the philosophy of science in both its constructivist and deconstructivist instances. Angela Botez notes in her Introduction that the volume “once again illustrates the diversity of Kuhn’s philosophical work” and underlines “the conscious, voluntary limitations which occur when accenting some of Kuhn’s innovative sources, as well as a confrontation between his approach and the general perspective dominating the field of Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science almost without any opposition, could equaly stimulate both an interest and a receptivity of any reader towards them”. With an accent upon the correctly – proportioned non-limitative approach, the directions offered a place within the same dual registry note both an option for a reading in terms of singularity which would reassess Kuhn’s visionary originality/ uniqueness [with equal reference to any importance awarded to the Kuhnian mutationist dynamics and to incomensurability (included in a tension-dominated relationship with the idea of scientific progress, seen as the matrix’s ordering capacity, when associated to a paradigm, to solve any puzzles/problems) but also of subjectivity (perceived as a theory choice with maximal role in stimulating any values which can engender dissonances, or as a mode of interfering in science’s normal way of functioning) or sociality (as regards any community involved in formulating conclusions on the basis of observation, and of choosing solutions for controversial theories), and the preference for a desingularizing process, definitory of any approach unable to exclude Kuhnian predecessors such as – Bradley, Collingwood, Polanyi, or surprising convergences between Kuhn and Blaga (see in this sense Angela Botez’s and R.T. Allen’s studies). From the perspective of interdependence between Quine, McMullin and Feyerabend, as well as any encyclopedi(zing) exigencies, (see in this sense “Th. Kuhn” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Humanistic

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Sciences, Bucharest, All Publishing House, 2004, p. 562), Kuhn’s vision of the history of science acknowledges first-rank informational networks by correlating them with “normal science”’s (de/in-signs) and finding them able to sustain unexpected paradigm mutations, which serve to embody a revolutionary formulation of paradigm change (“a solid structure of conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological acquisitions”) to another structure (a sum of “anomalies”), in order to understand and explain nature “completely, objectively and truly”. The effects of such an actively-dialogal approach (see Thomas Kuhn, “Relationships between the History and Philosophy of Science”) have an effect upon the shell of significant variables inside the internal structure of real science, from whose core “the scientific community – a primary unit producing science –, the paradigmdiscipline matrix, including the main cognitive operations of the scentific group, normal science – the applications of paradigm to real institutional domains of scientific research, the scientific revolution – as a result of normal science’s crisis , or the incommensurability of successive paradigms” are all included [Angela Botez, The Historist – Mutationist Vision of the Development of Science (Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Agassi, Sneed, Stegmüller)]. In Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban’s opinion (as presented in her work The Concept of the Paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s Works) any scientific endeavor establishes its own contor(ting) roadmaps while searching for landmark(s), and identifies the definition of the paradigm concept (whether accepted or renewing in its essence) both as an instrument/image, and an exemplary status, thus ensuring a real opportunity of revealing “any competition between fragments of scientific communication” with the avowed purpose of scientific element discovery, and not of “self-justification”. Equal to the “rule of two”, the volume Thomas Kuhn – on Revolution and Paradigm in the Development of Science constitutes a decidedly active argument in tracing new directions with an interest in the paradigmatic lecture grid, and/or formulating a cumulative measure which does not diminish the mechanism of solving the Kuhnian puzzle through assimilation- selection- solution.

Viorella Manolache

Viorella Manolache (coord.) Romanian – Moroccan Forms of Manifestation in the European Space, Bucharest, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations Publishing House, 2014, 259 p. This volume on Romanian – Moroccan Forms of Manifestation in the European Space, coordinated by Viorella Manolache, has the merit of rethinking, reorienting and debating the connections, the partnerships and the Romanian-Moroccan relations – a historical, political, diplomatic, economic, commercial, cultural wellknown reality, with a consolidated tradition, but insufficiently studied with scientific and academic approaches within academic groves. This is why the current volume is a necessity and an imperative that targets to shed light on various issues pertaining to Moroccan-Romanian connections on the one hand, and to Moroccan-Romanian connections with Europe, on the other hand. The volume is a highly thought work that recommends itself through the balance between the texts in French and English, through the thematic concerns raised and studied, and through the problematic brought to the fore. Beyond the intellectual and diplomatic value outlined in the Allocutions Chapter, the volume consolidates its importance through the insightful contributions of scholars and researchers who hammer on interesting topics. The importance of this volume also lies in both its structure and its textual corpus. Viorella Manolache assumes that the rewriting of space brings to the fore certain clarifications maintained on the coordination of current European interests, reaffirming the architecture of what could be accepted as a plane table for the state of the places (p. 38). Such conceptualization is important in the ways through which, the Romanian-Moroccan va-et-vient inside cultural space retrace the double universal and global trajectories and itineraries anticipating unlimited connections on the cultural level. Ian Browne argues, following Burke’s use of the concept of tradition, that such a concept can be re-used to give substance to the idea of membership within a social, moral and political community, in its effects on the nation, and that the idea of membership is seen as precondition to some sort of embedded identity. The researcher suggests that affective relationships, such as cherishing, held towards one’s tradition are bound up with the idea of a country having a narrative, as opposed to having a history, whereby the narrative turns into a structure imposed upon the past in order to make meanings of the past in terms of a nation’s conception of the present in its goals and achievements (41). If Ana Maria Negoiþã considers the correlations between the trading spaces and the dynamic ones – see, the Qaysariyia model in her case –, Abdelmjid Kettioui, however, discusses the cultural ramifications and

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repercussions in approaching The Specter and Allure of “Turning Moor”: The White Captive and the un/Happy Tiding in Thomas Pellow’s Account of Captivity and Adventures in Barbary (1740), assuming that “Turning Turk” not only meant that some English subjects were converting to Islam, but more broadly and significantly that the English society was adopting new procedures and identities that were based on a Mediterranean experience (64). Eliza Rãducã reconfirms the historical and cultural facts, dealing with the particular reflexes on which the French culture maintained a strong impact, both on the Moroccan and the Romanian cultures. Within the same register, François Bréda suggests an inedited perspective, using a personal filter when discussing Shawkat Seif Eddine. Unclosed to a single perspective and to a rigid, punctual perspective, the volume is open to few incidental studies, those which approach the Moroccan Diplomatic Encounters with Early Modern Europe: Spain in Moroccan Embassy Discourse (Layachi El Habbouch), Religion, Revolution and the Public Sphere (Abdelaziz El Amrani), “Terrorism” and the Politicisation of Religion (Monaim El Azzouzi), Arabisation Policy in Education in Morocco (Marouane Zakhir) or Eastern European Non-Power in the Interwar Period: Definitions and Ways of Actions (Cristina Arvatu Vohn). These contributions, albeit framed within general conceptualizations, strengthen the particular themes of the volume while valorizing and maximizing the immediate impact of the overall topic. The Place of Romania and Morocco in Europe’s Geopolitical Space (Zeljko Mirkov) is highlighted in this contribution, and reminds us that recent (modern) history holds many answers through a comparative overview of many modern nations in their predicaments. Adina Burchiu with her Stages in the Romanian-Moroccan Relations Dossier, a pertinent study, or the openings, solutions and the proposals of Lucian Jora in his EU Public Diplomacy Towards the South Mediterranean Countries – Instances of Intercultural Cooperation at Work to Support Economic and Political Interests fall within the same vision and enhance the multidisciplinary approach of this volume. The study about Humanism in Particularism: A Brief Feminist Incursion into a Muslim Story (Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban) closes the chapter and opens the final one which dynamically inventories the cultural and artistic experiences relevant to the Romanian-Moroccan interrelations (see for example, Carmen Burcea, Gheorghe Manolache, Valentin Trifesco, Claudia Moscovici or Mohammed Al-Sadoun). Every study and the volume itself as a coherent unity deliver strong and necessary intellectual and scientific arguments, pertinent to Europe as a meeting point of Romanian and Moroccan relations throughout various junctures in history.

Lhoussain Simour

Assistant Professor, PhD Cultural Studies, Hassan II University, Casablanca

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

STUDIA POLITICA. ROMANIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, NO. 1, 2014 The first issue from 2014 of the journal entitled Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, published by the Faculty of Political Science, Bucharest University, is opening the series of articles with the study entitled “A Critical Assessment of the Concept of Europeanization in the Light of the State of the Union” signed by Ramona Coman and Amandine Crespy. The authors argue that, although there were realized important empirical research on the concept of “Europeanization” of the states under the impact of the integration in the EU, its relevance as a specific concept is limited to a couple of aspects. The first, referring to the conceptual debates from the literature of specialty, leading to the conclusion that, the “Europeanization” describes a general phenomenon of transformation and modernization (un explanandum rather than explanans). The second envisions the methodological aspects that have determined many intellectuals to overestimate the impact of the integration of the states in the EU. In conclusion, the authors leave opened the path for the critical observations concerning the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis of debts of the Southern European states, the European macroeconomic policies (pp. 27-28). “Does Education Make Voters More Leftist of More Rightist? A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis” interrogation to which try to answer Florin N. Fesnic and Oana I. Armeanu in their study. Although education is one of the most important determinants of the political preferences and of the voting behaviour, the direction of this impact is not universal. In a post-communist country as Romania, education is negatively correlated with the support for “leftist” policies. As in a democratic country post-industrial, as France, the development of education is translated into a more ample support for a moderate left (for example, a post-materialist, socialist ecologist left). The authors explain this difference as the conjugated result of several recent historical experiences and of the current level of economic and social development of the two European countries (pp. 34-35). Within the same line registers the study entitled “Unicameralism vs. Bicameralism Revised. The Case of Romania,” signed by Ionut Apahideanu. Within the context of public debates concerning the project of the governmental majority of Constitution revision, the author re-brings into discussion the controversies concerning “unicameralism” vs. “bicameralism”; at the same time, it explores the Constitution’s relevance and applicability to the Romanian bicameral current legislation. The research begins with an empirical approach, centred on the European area, based on theses shared by specialists in what concerns certain correlations between the structure of the Parliament and that of the state, having as purpose the contextualization of Romania, as well in descriptive terms, as in explicative terms. The associated debate is structured along nine criteria of comparative analysis usable, ideally, as legislative indicators of performance. The final part is based on the analysis of the legislation of the Parliament of Romania, concerning the bicameral structure reflecting the strengths and weaknesses (p. 53). An interesting subject is approached by Dãnuþ Florin Sandovici in the article “Republicile non-arabe din Orientul Mijlociu. Orientãri geopolitice ºi de securitate în perioada post-Rãzboiului Rece” [“The Non-Arab Republics from the Middle East. Geopolitical and Security Directions during Post-Cold War Era”]. Within the geopolitical system of the Middle East, the non-Arab countries (Israel, Turkey and Iran) are a special category of regional actors that play an important role in the dynamics of the area. The recent history, starting in 1991, was marked by the disputes of these states with their Arab neighbours. The apparition of the “Arab Spring” (in 2011) has led to an increased role for Turkey and Iran in the geopolitical equation in the region and within this context it was influenced by the increase or development of Islamist “nuclei”. The Israel was forced to adapt his strategy of security to the possible evolutions in the political orientations of the Arab states. In conclusion, the author emphasizes: “Regardless of the academic and sometimes political orientations of researchers preoccupied by this region... we appreciate the fact that the inter-Arab relations or of the Arab states with the other actors of the international community cannot be dissociated from their relations with Israel, Turkey and Iran. Even more, a complete investigation of the evolutions of the area imposes the consideration of the role of the USA and USSR, within this system, although these respective states are not a part of the region of the Middle East, from a geographical point of view” (p. 110). The article that closes this issue of the journal, entitled “Liberté, ordre et gouvernement, entre Anciens et Moderns. Du modèle politique roumain (1821-1830)” is signed by Raluca Alexandrescu. The author examines the manner in which Romanian political thought from the beginning of the 19th century was connected to the intellectual circuit of Western European modernity. Romanian political thought, the study shows, was often tentative in adopting the ideas of the liberal majority, triggered by the French Revolution, and also in synchronizing with the rhythm of political changes. Thus, concepts such as constitutional regime, rule of law, freedom and order were combined with other concepts as sovereignty, political legitimacy, within a doubtable philosophical context, drawing a thin demarcation line between “Antique” and “modern”.

Monica Marinescu (Translation from Romanian by Henrieta ªerban) Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XII, 1, pp. 181–182, Bucharest, 2015.

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NORDICUM-MEDITERRANEUM

Nordicum-Mediterraneum is an international, multi-and interdisciplinary forum for the presentation, discussion and exchange of ideas and resources dealing with Mediterranean and Nordic issues. In particular, though by no means exclusively, Nordicum-Mediterraneum wishes to be a venue for the exploration of the ties between Iceland and Italy: historical, cultural, economic, political, scientific, religious and artistic. Above all else, Nordicum-Mediterraneum wishes to foster the awareness and the understanding concerning the common origins, intertwined traditions and shared problematics of the Eurasian communities of the North – hence Nordicum – and of the South – hence Mediterraneum. It is the firm belief of the journal’s editors that culture is a public good and, as such, it must be available to the public as easily and as economically as possible. Publishing NordicumMediterraneum exclusively in the electronic format is meant to serve this twofold goal, not to mention its reduced environmental impact. The journal was established in 2005 and the first issue released in the Spring of the following year. Designed for exclusive online access and consultation, Nordicum-Mediterraneum has pioneered web-based open-access scholarship in Iceland and is listed on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) of Lund University Libraries.

THE AUTHORS

THE AUTHORS CIPRIAN NICOLAE RADAVOI, doctor of Law, Lecturer in Law at the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing. The author’s research is focused on corporate social responsibility and environmental justice, with publications in journals and books in China and United Kingdom. His approach is always multidisciplinary, as a reflection of his multiple professional backgrounds (human rights lawyer, diplomat, journalist). ANDREEA-PAULA IBÃNESCU holds a PhD in International Relations at ‘Babeº-Bolyai’ University of Cluj-Napoca (2013), her thesis being a ‘Comparative Study on the Geopolitical Statute of Iran and Turkey in the post-Cold War Era. Focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia’. She is currently a researcher at the Middle East Political and Economic Institute of Bucharest and her late articles are centered around energy corridors and geo-strategic perspectives engaging Iran and Turkey, but also interdisciplinary approaches to the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, with emphasis on foreign affairs, geopolitical axes, explorative game theory and scenarios. SANDA CINCÃ is a scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations within the Romanian Academy and a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Bucharest. Her research priorities include security studies, the Common Foreign Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, as well as Romania’s political history. She is co-author of several articles and studies published in books, among which the most recent are Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World (2014), Institutions, International Organisations and Romania (two volumes, 2013), The EU after the Lisbon Treaty (2012), International Relations Reflected in Romania’s Parliament Debates (two volumes, 2011, 2012). LUCIAN-ªTEFAN DUMITRESCU has been working for the Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy for six years. Scientific researcher at Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations. He has been involved in fundamental research programmes regarding the social problems that a still backward rural area needs to grapple with. He has a PhD in Sociology from Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest; PhD candidate in political philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest; associate lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest, where he teaches classes on history of sociology, political sociology, societal security, international relations etc. He is also involved with The Department-UNESCO Chair in Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Exchanges at the University of Bucharest, where he delivers classes on Sociology of European Culture and Globalization and European Cultural Identity. Areas of interest: history of sociology, social history, political sociology, sociology of culture, security studies. MIRIAM CIHODARIU is an all-but-dissertation PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Bucharest and a PhD candidate in Anthropology at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. She has experience as a teaching assistant and as a junior researcher in various groups conducting medium and small-scale researches and field trips, as well as doing field research on her own, employing various qualitative methods (interviews with various degrees of limitations, focus groups, observation and participative observation, photo elicitation, mental maps and narrative mental maps etc). Her areas of interest are urban anthropology and the anthropology of policy, postmodern scholar thought, the systems of meaning in everyday life, postmodern mythology, Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., X, 2, p. 183–184, Bucharest, 2013.

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the lore and narratives of virtual worlds and the internet community, medieval festivals and reenactment activities through a ethnographic and narrative research lens, geopolitics and international relations and last, but not least, death and the policies and cultural meanings dealing with it. ION GOIAN, PhD, scientific researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, coordinator of the Political Sciences Department, Associate Professor at the “Ovidius” University, Constanþa. Author of the books (selective): Between Geopolitics and Utopia (2013), From Polis to the Ontology of the Politics (2001), Leo Strauss: The Art of Writing, Lecture Itineraries (2005), Machiavelli The Enigmatic One (2008), Machiavelli an Annotated Biography (2009), Polis and Political Philosophy (2009), Between Geopolitics and Utopia (2013) and the coordinator of the Encyclopedia of the Fundamental Works of the Political Philosophy, vol. 1-3. HENRIETA ªERBAN, PhD degree from the Romanian Academy; scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, and the Institute of Philosophy and Psychology “Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru” of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania; correspondent member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists. She has lectured at the Catholic University of Brussels and at Loughborough University. Authored books: “The Political Language in Democracy”, 2006; “The Paradigms of Difference in the Philosophy of Communication. Modernism and Postmodernism”, 2007; “Mapping Marginality” (with Viorella Manolache), 2010; “Reforming Ideologies”, 2010 and editor (with Lut Lams and Geert Crauwels) of the volume “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Discourses. A Global and Timeless Phenomenon? ”, Peter Lang Publishers, 2013. MARIA-ANA TUPAN, PhD degree, Habilitated Professor of Bucharest University. She was affiliated with Penn State University as Senior Fulbright Grantee in 1994-5. Member of the Romanian Writers’ Union and of several academic societies (EFACIS, Die Gesellschaft fur Fantastikforschung, Flann O’Brien Society). Author of 17 books, and of a considerable number of book chapters and articles in the fields of literary history and theory, comparative literature, genre theory, discourse analysis, and cultural studies. The list of her publishers include Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, Universitätsverlag Winter (Heidelberg), Bucharest University Press. ANA MARIA NEGOIÞÃ, PhD in Art History at CESI – University of Bucharest, specialized in Islamic architecture during Middle Age. She has a degree in art history at “The National University of Art“ of Bucharest, also a Master degree in the same field. Her studies include scholarship in Islamic art PhD program at the Department of Oriental Studies, University “La Sapienza” – Rome. GIORGIO BARUCHELLO, Professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Akureyri, Iceland. He read philosophy in Genoa and Reykjavík, Iceland, and obtained a PhD in philosophy from the University of Guelph, Canada. His publications encompass several different areas, including socio-political philosophy, theory of value and philosophy of science. Since 2005 he edits Nordicum-Mediterraneum (http://nome.unak.is), Iceland’s scholarly journal in Nordic and Mediterranean studies. VIORELLA MANOLACHE, scientific researcher III, PhD, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania. Author of numerous articles, studies, coordinator of 3 collective international volumes and of 10 authored books – the latest ones being: “Repere teoretice în biopoliticã” – “Theoretical Approaches in Biopolitics”– ISPRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013 and “Signs and Designs of the Virtual(izing) E@ST”, LAP, Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2013. Member of several scientific Societies and Associations and of several national and international journals and reviews (peer-reviewer and board member). IAN BROWNE, studied at Churchill College, University of Cambridge and at St Andrews University, Scotland. Current research interests include Aristotelian ethics, political philosophy and anti-realist semantics.