Running head

An Integrative Model of Moral Reasoning and Moral Intuition: Implications for Moral Education Changwoo Jeong* (Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea)

Hyemin Han (Stanford University, Stanford, USA)

Abstract This article discusses integrative moral psychology, including moral intuition and moral deliberation, to explain the mechanisms of actual moral behaviors. To this end, we briefly review current models in the field

of

moral

psychology

dealing

with

moral

intuition

and

moral

reasoning, after which we present an integrative model based on these earlier ones. Our model focuses on a moral intuitive process, a process of reflection on initial emotional responses, moral reasoning, and moral introspection. We critically examine and discuss recent research from the rapidly growing fields of neuroscience and the natural sciences to strengthen

and

support

this

model.

In

closing,

we

explore

the

educational implications of our model and possible educational methods to promote moral development.

Key words: moral intuition, moral reasoning, moral introspection, neuroscience, moral psychology, moral education

* Corresponding author ([email protected])

82

THE SNU JOURNAL OF EDUCATION RESEARCH

Ⅰ. Introduction Among those who study moral philosophy and psychology, the

relationship

between

moral

reasoning,

moral

intuition

and

moral judgment has become one of the most controversial issues. Haidt’s

influential

judgment,

“The

piece

on

Emotional

emotion

Dog

and

and

its

reason

Rational

in

Tail:

moral

A

Social

Intuitionist Approach to Moral judgment” (2001) has profoundly affected

the

field

of

moral

psychology,

introducing

with

the

concept of “moral intuition.” Before Haidt, Kohlberg’s theory of moral

development

functioning main

process

Bebeau,

&

However, the

have in

moral

Volker,

after

of

importance

a

neo-Kohlbergian proposed

judgment

1986;

Haidt’s

importance

philosophers and and

and

consistently

Rest

study

in

al.,

moral

reasoning

1984;

began

to

moral

the Rest,

2006).

consider

Many

debated the

and

moral is

Thoma,

judgment.

moral psychologists have of

1981,

1999;

scholars

moral

to

reasoning

(Kohlberg, et

many

intuition

approach

that

moral priority

intuition,

and

relationship between the two (Haidt & Bjorklung, 2008a, 2008b; Jacobson, 2008; Narvaez, 2008). More recently, with the aim of integrating those two types

—

of psychological processes

—

several

researchers

mechanism

between

However,

few

moral reasoning and moral intuition

have moral

studies

tried

to

intuition,

have

dealt

examine

the

interactive

reasoning

and

judgment.

with

actual

decision-making

processes in the real world. For instance, in one of these studies, Musschenga

(2009)

understanding

the

provides

us

relationship

with

between

a

new

moral

approach intuition

to and

moral reasoning in the context of a review of previous theories, but

does

not

decision-making

nonetheless occurs

via

the

explain

how

mechanisms

actual

of

moral

moral intuition

and reasoning. In

this

article

we

examine

the

field

of

integrative

moral

psychology, including moral intuition and moral deliberation, to explain the mechanisms of actual moral behaviors. To this end, we first briefly review recent research related to moral intuition and moral reasoning. We then suggest an integrative model of

83

An Integrative Model of Moral Reasoning and Moral Intuition

moral

decision-making

before

examining our

that

considers

more

concrete

processes,

model’s educational implications. In what

follows, we pose the following question: How can we pursue the moral

development

of

children

and

adolescents

in

accordance

with our model? In our answer, we discuss this question from a “practical,

descriptive”

perspective,

“normative” one, by looking to human

moral

functioning.

rather

than

several scientific

In

closing,

from

a

discoveries on

we

describe

the

implications of our results for potential educational methods.

Ⅱ. The Kohlbergian Model Historically, has

always

the

importance

featured

of

reason

prominently.

In

in

the

moral

functioning

eighteenth

century,

Immanuel Kant argued that reason is related to the basis of the determination of the will and is essential for principled morality (Kant, 1999). Philosophically speaking, Kant’s concept of practical and moral reasoning is related closely to individual or collective practical

reasoning

(Richardson,

2007).

that

the

reasoning

the

concept

arguments

about More

what

recently

process

of

justice

have

greatly

is

an

one

morally

John

Rawls

important

(Wenar, influenced

2008; the

ought

has

factor

Rawls,

to

also for

argued

inducing

2003).

Kohlbergian

do

These

view

of

moral psychology, which asserts the importance of reasoning and principles in moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1973; Lapsley, 1996). Basically, the Kohlbergians insist that a moral judgment and its final result

—

that is, a moral action

—

is based on deliberation

and reasoning. Moreover, moral judgments occur by deliberating and

considering

stages

of

various

moral

Kohlbergian

moral

development

approach

to

principles (Kohlberg

our

moral

that &

derive

Candee,

judgment

is

from 1984). rooted

the The in

time-consuming processes: reasoning and deliberation. More modifying adding

recently, this

various

earlier other

neo-Kohlbergians model

in

factors.

response In

have to

succeeded

various

particular,

Rest

in

objections, and

his

colleagues have put forth a four-component model that consists

84


of

moral

sensitivity,

moral

reasoning,

moral

motivation

and

moral character. It is important to note that this model includes not

only

moral reasoning but

also

the

affective

parts

of

moral

functioning (Rest, 1994; Rest et al., 1999; Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This newer model of moral functioning sought to better explain the

actual

mechanism

of

moral

action

than

previous

models,

which focused solely on reasoning. Although this more recent model of moral functioning takes in

account

moral Thoma,

affective

factors,

judgment

rooted

2006).

the

judgment

Of

plays

a

in

it

nonetheless

moral

four

reasoning

components

central

remains

role

in

of

(Rest their

focused et

al.,

model,

decision-making

on

1999; moral

when

an

individual encounters a moral dilemma. The three other factors relate moral

to

the

perception

values,

Questions

and

that

of

in

the

the

are

situation,

persistence

more

the of

directly

commitment moral

related

to

behavior. to

actual

decision-making, such as “What should I do?” or “Between these possible solutions, which one should I choose?”, are dominated by moral reasoning rather than by other factors. Also, Rest and his colleagues primarily employ the Defining Issues Test, which was

invented

to

assess

the

reasoning

process,

for

their

psychological studies (Rest, 1994; Rest, Bebeau, & Volker, 1986). Undoubtedly, even the neo-Kohlbergians have focused extensively on the reasoning process in their empirical studies. These

Kohlbergian

dominated

research

psychology

for

with

the

models

and

roughly

development

moral

thinking

two of

of

in

decades.

scientific

approaches

to

human

Kohlbergian

and

neo-Kohlbergian

the

field

However,

and

morality,

functioning

cognitive

arguments

models

of

of

most

have moral

recently,

psychological against

moral

the

judgment

have been proposed. In the next section we briefly review these objections, which emphasize the role of moral intuition.

Ⅲ. Arguments for Moral Intuition: Haidt et al. Our understanding of human morality is based partially on

85


an

empiricist

version

“sentimentalism”)

of

moral

developed

intuitionism by

(sometimes

called

eighteenth-century

British

philosophers. They insisted that human morality came from the non-rational sentiment.

part Also,

of

man

they

—

from,

argued

for

that

the

instance, moral

his

moral

decision-making

process is basically unconscious and that it occurs immediately, without a long period of consideration. David Hume (1711-1776), Anthony Ashley Cooper, the earl of Shaftesbury (1621-1683) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) were the major exponents of this philosophical view (Hume, 1990; Cooper, 1990; Hutcheson, 1990; Broadie,

2009).

Their

arguments

conflict

with

the

Kantian

approach toward human morality, which instead emphasizes the importance of reason in moral judgment. Contemporary

moral

Sinnott-Armstrong re-examine moral

(2008a,

moral

intuition

intuitionists

Sinnott-Armstrong

like

psychologists, 2008b),

as

it

was

Hume,

defines

have

such

recently

conceived

Shaftesbury

moral

among

and

intuition

as

begun

as

to

earlier

Hutcheson. strong

and

immediate moral beliefs (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a). Scholars who focus on moral intuition argue that it is immediately, quickly, or spontaneously

initiated

and

that

it

directly

causes

moral

judgment (Shweder & Haidt, 1993). They have also argued that this type of social cognitive process is automatic, pre-conscious, implicit and prior to our reasoning or deliberation (Bargh, 1994; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Perhaps

the

psychologists

most

focusing

prominent

on

the

of

this

later

moral-intuitionist

group

view

is

of

Haidt.

According to him, moral intuition is defined as a psychological process akin to aesthetic judgment: one sees or hears about an event 2001). social

and This

one

instantly

occurs

intuitionist

feels

without

approach

approval

any to

or

awareness.

moral

disapproval Haidt

judgment

that

(Haidt,

proposes

a

emphasizes

the role of an intuitive process in human moral functioning. In his view, actual moral judgment occurs through moral intuition, and

moral

previously

reasoning made

usually

intuitive

produces

judgments.

reasons

Accordingly,

to he

justify

describes

the minor role of moral reasoning provocatively as the “rational

86


tail of the emotional dog” (Haidt, 2001). According to his model, moral judgment occurs through moral intuition in an immediate, unconscious manner, and moral reasoning is merely a supportive process. As we mentioned earlier, however, this model has been to the subject of various counter-arguments. In the next section, we discuss to the ways in which we might integrate these two approaches

into

psychological

a

model

that

processes

in

accounts

for

both

explaining

types

actual

of

moral

decision-making. In turn, we explore the educational implications of this integrated approach.

Ⅳ.

The Integrative Model of Moral Reasoning, Intuition and Feedback To

integrate

moral

reasoning

and

intuition

into

a

model

explaining the process of moral decision-making, we begin with moral cannot

intuition. be

The

denied

existence

when

a

and

person

process finds

of

him-

moral or

intuition

herself

in

an

urgent situation that threatens another’s life or welfare. This type of

situation

instance,

we

often

appears

can

consider

in

the

the

popular

heroic

act

press of

Lee

or

media.

Su-hyun

For at

a

Tokyo subway station.

“In

January

2001,

a

South

Korean

student

named

Lee

Su-hyun was waiting for the subway in Tokyo when a Japanese man

fell

on

the tracks.

Lee and another

Japanese man

jumped

onto the rails in an attempt to get him out of the way before an oncoming train reached the station. Sadly, they were unsuccessful and all three men were killed.” (Soh, 2008)

Lee and the other man drew upon an intuitive process that emerged in response to the urgency of seeing another human in a life-threatening situation. Although this decision resulted in the death

of

all

three

men,

it

highlights

the

difference

between

intuition and reasoning. If they had relied solely on deliberative moral

decision-making,

they

would

not

have

been

able

to

87


respond

immediately.

Instead,

they

would

have

undergone

a

process requiring greater deliberation and thus time. However, as the situation in the subway shows, time was of the essence and intuition forced them to make a quick decision. In

fact,

neuroscientific

studies

on

human

brain

processes

show the ways in which these intuitive processes are performed. A recent fMRI study done by Young et al. (2007) demonstrated that people can make faster decisions when they are faced with an “intentional harm condition.” These reaction times were much faster

than

under

an

those

experiments kinds

of

experienced

“attempted on

reaction-time

moral

immediately

harm

dilemmas

activated.

following

fashion:

if

consistent

information

“neutral The

differences moral

can

interpret

We

face

a

indicates

situations”

effects

show

our

people that

during

condition.”

us

intuitive

that

these

under

what

processes

such

situation

results with

victims

or

of

in

clear

are

are the and

threatened

by dangerous, harmful conditions, they can then make a moral decision faster using intuitive processes. With this in mind, we argue

that

the

intuitive

process

initiates

the

moral

decision-making process, especially in urgent situations involving another’s welfare. These moral intuition processes resemble those described by Haidt (2001). However, such an intuitive process cannot solely be applied to moral decision-making in all situations. Sunstein (2008) argues that

the

existence

of

plural

and

conflicting

accounts

of

the

foundations of morality makes this type of intuitive, immediate process

insufficient

Narvaez

(2008),

in

for

assessing

objecting

to

complex

Haidt

and

situations.

his

intuitive

Also, model,

argues that actual, daily moral decision-making usually includes a consideration of the moral principles of a person and that it can

be

connected

to

“practical

wisdom”

rather

than

to

simple

intuitive processes. This type of counter-argument highlights for us the fact that, in many situations, especially complex situations involving intuition

conflicting to

make

a

values, decision,

we

cannot

because

solely

doing

so

rely can

on

moral

potentially

lead to errors. Additionally,

Musschenga

(2009)

has

argued

that

moral

88


intuition lacks reliability and that we have no determinate way in which to trust our intuitive moral judgments. As a result, he insists that deliberate reasoning should work in conjunction with the

intuitive

process

to

make

up

for

the

weaknesses

of

moral

intuition. His argument is convincing, offering an integrated view of decision-making, unlike earlier studies, which focused on only one side of moral decision-making. Musschenga the

ways

reasoning. practical moral

thus

in

which

In

what

moral

offers to

a

useful

integrate

follows,

we

decision-making

reasoning,

a

slower

theoretical

moral apply

this

processes.

process,

framework

intuition

model

We

might

with to

also

actual,

ask

cooperate

on

moral

how

with

the

intuitive process in our model. In order to show the necessity of this

model,

we

begin

by

examining

earlier

models

that

have

solely emphasized moral intuition while neglecting the value of moral

reasoning.

intuitive concrete

We

process,

do

even

behavioral

not if

behave moral

decision.

solely as

intuition

Although

the

has

scholars

result

of

an

influenced argue

a

correctly

that intuition “orders” us, they ignore the possibility that there is

still

a

chance

demonstrated

to

deny

through

electroencephalographic neuropsychologists

intuitive

reference

commands.

to

several

experiments,

who

are

interested

This

can

conducted in

be

neuroscientific

the

by

possibility

of

human free will in the decision-making process. One

such an

experiment, conducted

by Libet

(1999),

seems

to confirm the existence of free will and its ability to intervene in unconscious decision-making. In Libet’s experiment, we make an

unconscious

decision

550ms

(milliseconds)

before

an

actual

behavior occurs. However, 300ms after the unconscious decision, we

can

employ

behaviors.

People

100-150ms

by

consciousness are

capable

employing

as of

a

mean

of

stopping

consciousness

preventing

their

and

free

decisions will.

our for

During

these 100-150ms, Libet argues that we can change our mind not to follow, or to “veto,” the unconscious decision. Haggard and Libet

(2001)

conclude

that

while

free

will

does

not

appear

to

initiate a voluntary process, it could still act as a control agent. Ramachandran

(1998)

has

also

commented

on

this experimental

89


result

that

“our

conscious

minds

may

not

have

free

will

but

rather ‘free won’t’.” From these studies we can conclude that a person can make conscious

decisions.

Thus,

while

earlier

scholars

have

offered

nuanced arguments about decision-making, they tend to agree on a

number

decisions

of

key

with

points,

our

from

“we

consciousness”

can

to

deny

“we

our

can

unconscious

make

conscious

decisions voluntarily.” All of those scholars have argued that our conscious

process

previously Gazzaniga

exists

made (2006)

and

that

unconscious

cautions,

the

process

decisions

however,

that

can

affect

(Dennett,

these

ideas

2003).

are

based

on a form of neuroscientific determinism, which views the brain as automatic. therefore

Such ideas cannot

keep

interactions,

in

moral

mind

explain

other

factors,

and

free-will

values,

everything. such

as

We

should

social

(Champagne

&

choice, Curley,

2005; Schilbach et al., 2006; Haggard, 2008). As

a

result,

we

can

conclude

that

actual

human

behavior

does not rely exclusively upon intuitive processes and that both conscious

and

unconscious

processes

are

involved

in

moral

decision-making. A very short period of time between the end of the

intuitive

impossible

process

to

stop

and

the

the

behavioral

connection

result

through

the

makes

it

process

of

deliberate reasoning. Therefore, we need to explore an alternative route

to

stop

affective

the

reactions

reasoning

connection. occur

processes.

prior

Recent

According to

studies

and on

to

Zajonc

much the

faster

human

(1980),

hot,

than

cold,

brain

point

out that the direct thalamic pathway, where emotional processes occur, is much faster than the cortical pathway. But the thalamic pathway as

the

cannot cortical

process pathway

the

same

(LeDoux,

type

of

1995;

complex 1996).

information

Moreover,

the

emotional process in the human brain seems to block intuitive, immediate responses toward problematic situations. Because such processes

are

faster

than

reasoning

processes,

they

offer

a

possible explanation of those couple of hundreds of milliseconds of “free will.” Working from Libet’s study (1999), Haggard and Libet (2001) have argued that, in the “chasm” between the completion of an

90


intuitive process and the occurrence of a resultant behavior, we can

pause

and

prevent

beginning.

This

mechanism

operates

can

easily

hesitation (2003)

and

an

the

a

doubt that

chasm.

range

that

of

our

guilt,

what

common

feelings,

like

behavior.

self-conscious

and

behavior

just

Through

of

check

several

embarrassment

inappropriate

question

in the

catalogue

suggests

shame,

raises

can

of

sense,

we

questioning,

In

fact,

emotions,

be

from

kind

related

Haidt

such to

as

moral

functioning, offering checks to people’s dispositions. In addition, one ought to consider common sense and its mechanism from a more philosophical and psychological perspective. Greene

and

his

colleagues

have

provided

neuroscientific

evidence proving that some emotional responses alert us to the “inappropriateness” situations,

thus

2001).

these

If

of

previous,

delaying types

of

hundreds-of-milliseconds there At

are

that

several

the

we

emotions

can

occurrence

instant

with

of

a

–

occur

then

an

“veto”

activate our cortical pathway

responses

decision-making

moment,”

problems

moment,

prevent

final

at

we

result.

moral reasoning

et

see

that

judgment.

response We

–

al.,

“conscious to

made

immediate

behavioral

particular

the

start

intuitively

the

in

(Greene

and

can

then

for reflection

and evaluation, in order to find another response. By

what

standard,

then,

can

we

evaluate

these

emotional

responses? To answer this question, we can turn to Aristotle. He argues

that

“righteous

indignation,”

as

a

point

of

equilibrium

between envy and spite, is the pain or distress we feel at the misfortunes

of

others

(Aristotle,

2007;

Striker,

1996).

If

we

face

emergent situations that may severely threaten another’s life welfare,

we

make

an

intuitive

judgment

to

undertake

or

some

action to solve the problem. Then, if our emotional response at the moment is coherent with our intuitive judgment, in this case righteous

indignation,

we

can

or

are

compelled

to

act

on

our

judgment to affect the emergent situation. In other words, in this case,

we

may

feel

a sense

of

duty or

obligation

to

act.

If

we

failed to act immediately on this judgment, then we would not be able to save others in a similar situation, in which time is of the

essence.

On

the

other

hand,

for

a

case

in

which

our

91


emotional response leads us to hesitate, instead of leading to a sense

of

obligation

(Westermarck,

2009),

we

may

veto

our

previously made judgment and begin a reasoning process. At

this

point

we

encounter

another

mechanism,

moral

reasoning. As mentioned earlier, this mechanism is slower than the

intuitive

or

emotional

pathway.

It

occurs

in

the

most

evolved, slower parts of the human brain, such as the prefrontal cortex,

and

farther

away

from

the

most

primitive

parts

that

operate more quickly, such as the limbic system (Damasio, 1998; Waltz

et

al.,

intuitionist

1999;

model,

Sherwood, Haidt

2010).

(2001)

Basically,

proposes

in

that

the

our

social

reasoning

merely supports the results of moral intuition. However, Pizzaro and Bloom (2003) have argued that deliberation or reasoning can modify

or

override

the

result

of

the

intuitive

process.

Also,

Greene et al. (2004) have shown that if we confront difficult and complex

moral

dorsolateral cognitive

dilemmas,

prefrontal

processes,

the

anterior

cortex,

are

more

cingulate

which

are

active

than

cortex

involved when

in

we

and

the

abstract

deal

with

easy problems. In addition, some proponents of such an integrative model have

argued

for

the

importance

of

moral

reasoning

in

moral

judgment. Guthrie and his colleagues (2009) have suggested that an

important

know

when

when

we

can,

should

deliberation. arguing

component we

that

or

good

override

Musschenga good

of

must,

(2009)

judgment

judgment

rely

on

them comes requires

is

the

intuitive

through to

a

ability

processes reasoning

similar

educated

to and and

conclusion,

intuition

and

insight, both of which allow us to override and modify intuitive processes by deliberation. Such studies suggest the importance of reasoning: when we face complex problems that seemingly cannot be properly solved solely through an intuitive process, our reasoning process takes over and potentially overrides the intuitive process. Although the reasoning

process

is

much

slower

than

the

unconscious,

immediate intuitive process, it can nonetheless help us to solve complex problems by forcing us to consider various aspects of a given problem. In fact, psychological and neuroscientific studies

92


have

shown

intuition, modify

as

the

intuitive reasoning judgment

that

this

Haidt

has

judgment

result

the

can

does

suggested.

provided

produces

process when

process

a

not

Instead,

by

moral

negative

even

problem

it

hand

follow

has

intuition,

emotional

directly at

simply

ability

when

response.

participate is

the

moral

highly

in

the The

moral

abstract

sophisticated.

Figure 1. The integrative model of moral reasoning and moral intuition

or

93


Our

model

(see

Figure

1)

can

be

summarized

as

follows.

First, if we encounter a difficult situation, our intuitive process is immediately

activated.

In

most

situations,

this

intuitive

process

will be initiated. However, as Greene et al. (2004) have shown, in

situations

that

are

highly

abstract

and

impersonal,

our

reasoning process can be activated immediately. If the situation is imminent, a great deal of harm to others’ lives or welfare can be anticipated, and if few or no emotional obstacles impede the actor, then intuitive judgment will directly result in the agent’s behavior. the

However,

intuitive

milliseconds

if

an

—

process

—

agent

feels

within

“negative

that

gap

emotions”

of

after

hundreds

of

and if the situation is not so imminently harmful,

then the intuitive process will not result in a given behavior. In such

circumstances,

evaluate

or

adjust

a the

moral

reasoning

results

of

the

process

is

intuitive

activated

process.

If

to the

dilemma is more abstract and impersonal, the reasoning process can be activated instead of the intuitive process. The reasoning process in turn might confirm or override the conclusion drawn by moral intuition. To clarify, let’s consider a few possible examples. Let’s start with a situation in which the immediate moral intuitive process directly

causes

actual

above-mentioned

case,

moral

Lee

behavior.

Su-hyun’s

heroic

Consider

behavior

in

the Tokyo

subway. He recognised the urgency of the situation, and failed to

feel

any

morally

negative

emotions

that

would

have

dissuaded his intuitive decision. As a result, he instantly jumped onto the subway tracks. Sometimes, though, an actor will modify his or her initial intuitive decision as a result of the reasoning process.

Think

of

a

simplified

case

of

the

Heinz

dilemma

(Kohlberg, 1981). Would a man, whose wife is near death, steal an unreasonably expensive medicine to save her life? Impulsively and

immediately,

medicine.

That

is

this the

man result

might of

his

feel

an

urge

intuitive

to

moral

steal

the

judgment.

After a while, however, he feels guilty about and moral disgust at his initial, anti-moral decision. Eventually he chooses to follow his

own

moral

standard

and

modifies

his

initial

decision

after

the moral reasoning process, deciding not to steal the medicine.

94


Such

a

hypothetical

decision,

which

example

causes

shows

negative

that

emotions,

an

initial

can

be

intuitive

modified

by

the reasoning process. Finally, sometimes people initially activate their

reasoning

instance,

when

standards

in

processes a

her

rather

teacher

than

intuitive

attempts

classroom

in

to

advance

processes.

establish

of

the

For

behavioral

beginning

of

a

semester, she will consider abstract, general moral norms such as “Do not lie” or “Serve the public good,” which may be derived from

Kantian

or

utilitarian

theories.

In

such

a

process,

hardly

would such a teacher start with the moral intuition. She follows instead the processes of deliberation and reasoning. In the next section, we explore the implications of this model for education. We consider how to promote the proper moral development of people in accordance with our model.

Ⅴ. Educational Implications of Our Model With

this

model,

we

can

sketch

several

educational

implications that might help improve overall morality, including individuals’ moral intuition, moral emotion, and moral reasoning. First,

we

need

development

to

of

an

consider intuitive

how

we

process

in

might

moral

facilitate

the

functioning.

The

development of moral intuition ought to make an individual act morally

in

needed

to

urgent

interventions

are

intuition skills, and

situations,

protect

morally

the one

lives

when or

such

an

way

to

allowing them, when

problematic

immediate

welfare

situation,

of

response

others.

enhance

students’

they encounter

to

offer

both

is

Educational

a

moral

a pressing proper

and

immediate response. Various proper (2001) tacit

studies

methods suggests

or

learning Dreyfus expertise

that

implicit from and

in

that

education might

we

can

experience.

suggests

acquire

knowledge,

Dreyfus’ that

In

(1991) the

have

facilitate

by

attempted intuitive

intuitions,

learning

terms

of

of

formulate

which

processes intuition

developmental

acquisition

to

skills.

model

intuitive

Hogarth embody and

by

education, of

ethical

ethical skills

95


may imitate the acquisition of practical skills, such as driving a car

or

playing

educational

chess.

methods

Dreyfus that

and

might

Dreyfus

enhance

also

suggest

intuitive

skills.

Nonetheless, they were unable to successfully provide systemized educational models that enhance the domain of moral intuition. As

a

result,

we

sophisticated educational

might

benefit

educational

from

studies,

methodology,

in

a

which

searching

consideration are for

directly models

of

more

related to

to

improve

moral intuition. An

expertise

promising

development suggest

of

“four

Narvaez

approach

educational

et.

moral

levels

al.,

of

2004;

to

moral

character

for

effectively

model

intuition.

Narvaez

ethical

skill

Narvaez

&

appears

and

instruction” Lapsley,

to

be

facilitating her

colleagues

(Narvaez,

2005).

a

the

Their

2006; levels

involve immersion in examples and opportunities, an attention to facts

and

skills,

practice

procedures,

and

an

integration

of

knowledge and procedure. Based on this model, they suggest an ‘expert-in-training

pedagogy.’

This

theory

includes

a

well-structured environment, the simultaneous learning of theory and skills, and focused practice. Its goal is to encourage students to

have

higher

levels

of

expertise

in

order

to

encourage

the

formation and application of moral intuitions. In addition, we ought to consider educational intervention in order to improve emotional functioning in morality. As we have suggested

in

our

model,

emotional

functioning

plays

a

critical

role in controlling intuitive reactions. For an educational method to

improve

such

emotional skills,

we

can

turn to

work

in

the

field of Social and Emotional Learning (SEL). The field of SEL has

emerged

biology, and

from

emotions

happiness

these and

(Cohen,

new

understandings

intelligence 1999;

and

Shriver,

their

of

the

relation

Schwab-Stone,

nature to

&

of

success DeFalco,

1999). Moreover, many SEL applications have undergone various trials

in

provide

actual us

methodology

educational

with with

an

situations.

effective

which

to

As

and

develop

a

result,

systemized students’

SEL

might

educational

social-emotional

skills. We need such skills to understand and to reflect upon our emotional

states.

Moreover,

these

skills

also

enhance

our

96


emotional Again,

skills,

as

necessary intuitive

allowing

suggested for

us

to

process.

us

cope

above,

skilled

determine

SEL

might

with

our

emotional

whether

just

be

emotional

a

or

reflection

not

reliable

states.

to

way

follow to

is an

enhance

such necessary skills. Simply put, SEL is a process that helps youths to develop fundamental

skills

for

an

effective

life,

teaching

them

how

to

handle themselves, their relationships, and their work effectively and

ethically.

developing

It

includes

care

relationships,

and

recognizing

concern

making

for

and

managing

others,

responsible

emotions,

establishing

decisions,

and

positive handling

challenging situations constructively and ethically (CASEL, 2010a). According

to

the

proponents

competencies

are

Therefore,

ought

teach

we

and

necessary

scaffold

to

SEL,

for

create

social

of

desirable

the

and

social

sort

of

emotional

and

emotional

moral

outcomes.

atmosphere

that

competences

can

(CASEL,

2010b; Elias et al., 2008). Given that we want to focus on emotions that are directly related to “morals,” of the various educational methodologies in SEL we can direct our attention to self-awareness, self-regulation and

self-reflection skills. These include pausing and considering

our feelings, i.e., cueing self-monitoring (Elias et al., 1997). These educational interventions, according to our model, can thus force us

to

consider

our

emotional

responses

(e.g.,

shame,

embarrassment, and guilt), when we encounter immediate moral intuitions. Finally, we should consider how to develop moral reasoning skills.

Numerous

educational

methodologies

have

attempted

to

improve moral reasoning skills, following the Kohlberg and the neo-Kohlbergians. This article suggests that traditional educational methodologies, tested and established by moral educators, might be

useful

Such

in

improving

educational

discussions, strategies

the

general

methodologies

just

(Kohlberg

one’s

community &

Hersh,

moral include

approach,

1977;

reasoning

as

Higgins,

ability.

moral-dilemma well 1995;

as

other

Snarey

&

Smuelson, 2008; Hildebrandt & Zan, 2008). In

addition

to

traditional

educational

approaches

to

moral

97


reasoning, we also consider “moral introspection.” Most simply, in

psychology,

the

word

“introspection”

refers

to

a

process

through which each of us can “look within” ourselves to observe and

then

report

on

the

contents

of

our

thoughts.

With

introspection, we can examine our own mental images, describe them,

and

discover

what

information

they

contain

(Gleitman,

Reisberg, & Gross, 2007). Traditionally, the

meaning

moral

of

psychologists

moral

reasoning

have and

mainly

moral

understood

judgment

as

processes with which to make actual behavioral decisions (Rest et al., 1999; Kohlberg, 1973). In our model, however, the ability to

reason

especially

enables in

an

moral

introspection,

educational

context.

and

Locke

becomes (2005,

important,

2009)

argued

that, without our introspection, we cannot properly perceive and identify

the

underlying

meanings

of

immediate

emotional

responses. In such a process, our reasoning ability enables us to monitor

our

responses,

inner

allowing

states,

especially

us

properly

to

our

initial

modify

emotional

the

emotional

functions of our minds. As a result, we ought to acknowledge the role of reasoning processes on introspection, and their ways in which such processes enable appropriate coordination among intuition, emotional responses, and reasoning. Therefore,

if

we

explore

the

educational

implications

of

moral reasoning from the standpoint of moral introspection, then in our model moral reasoning would mean that a person tries to reflect

on

the

deliberative

content

reasoning,

of

his

even

or

her

when

intuitive

such

process

reasoning

through

might

offer

little or no correct or valuable information about how one ought to

behave.

reasoning,

Furthermore, allowing

appropriateness

of

we the

moral

should

teach

individual

intuition

in

the to

skills

of

consider

accordance

with

moral the moral

principles. In this way, when we are developing students’ moral reasoning, we should focus not only on improving their ability to

make

good

moral

decisions,

but

also

on

their

introspective

ability to evaluate and monitor the results of immediate intuitive and emotional processes. As a result of reflection and introspection, a person has the

98


ability to judge whether or not the result of a given intuition is morally which

acceptable. acts

as

a

This

type

is

of

based

on

emotional

“cognitive

motivation

dissonance,”

to

self-correct

behaviors and attitudes (Festinger, 1985; Dienstbier et al., 1975). If

a

person

that

undertakes

person’s

dissonance, previous

notion

which

result.

identity,”

as

will

a

manifestation

of

we

that

could

be

we

cognitive

right, the

have

integrated link

the

that

does it

a

(Blasi,

result

dissonance.

motivations

our

to

self”

cognitive

or

a

the

“moral moral

self

and

will

motivation

and

the

1995,

2004).

this

modify

with

correct

our

introspective

Finally, to

induce

moral

moral

an

coincide

suggest,

1984,

of

may

“moral

into

between

not

motivation

psychologists

emotion

generate

is

provide

moral

closer

produce

behavior

what

Because

then

conclude

of

will

understanding have

a

Accordingly,

process

internal

the

could

dissonance

moral

decisions

resulting from immediate, intuitive, and emotional processes. In

fact,

there

are

several

examples

that

prove

that

this

deliberative, introspective process can affect the intuitive process. For instance, Selman (1971) has shown that, by role-taking, we can induce a modification to a child’s intuitive processes, so that he or she

produces a

reflection. synthesis

Also, in

reciprocal form

Haidt

moral

(2007),

in

psychology,

through deliberation and

reference

has

to

shown

the

that

idea

the

of

a

reflective

process may occur after intuitive judgment, modifying its result. Finally, it is our sense that all of these educational interventions should

be

moral

development

carefully

conducted in

in

an

students,

attempt

including

to

induce

moral

overall

intuition,

reasoning or deliberation, and actual behavior.

Ⅵ. Conclusion In this paper, might

develop

links

moral

appropriate

an

we

have

reasoning

model

considered the

integrative

to

to

explain

model moral actual

of

ways in

moral

intuition. moral

which

one

functioning

that

To

behavior,

create we

an

briefly

reviewed several scientific studies, including research in the area

99


of neurobiology, to examine the psychological basis of our moral functioning. According to our

actual pattern

of

decision-making

and behavior, we also considered what types of factors should work

depending

process.

In

methodologies functioning

on

closing, that

ability

each

phase

we

might

that

in

the

discussed

moral

the

enhance

allows

us

to

decision-

possible one’s

engage

making

educational

overall in

actual

moral moral

actions. However, there is no way for this paper to explain in full all of the relevant phenomena and to provide a complete set of educational implications. Further studies should be conducted to unearth a more sophisticated and accurate theoretical framework to explain the concept of moral functioning presented here, and to

develop

effective

enhance

the

intuition

to

overall moral

methods moral

for

moral

abilities

of

introspection.

Because

education

our

cannot be fully explained by any lone factor reasoning educational

–

an

methods

integrative based

on

—

students

—

theoretical such

a

moral

that

from

will moral

functioning

that of intuition or framework

framework

should

and be

established. In our view, such questions are a promising area of research for the near future.

Received in 30th September , 2012 Reviewed in 20th November, 2012 Revised version received in 23rd December, 2012

100


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