HRRI Working Paper 10-02 Industrial Relations Center University of Minnesota
Share and Share Alike? Intelligence, Socialization, Personality, and Gender-Pairing as Determinants of Giving by Avner Ben-Ner* Fanmin Kong** Louis Putterman***
July 2002
Abstract We conduct dictator game experiments in which women and men are allowed to split $10 with a completely unknown person or a person of known gender. Subjects also complete personal background surveys, personality tests, and a cognitive test. We find that (a) gender information significantly affects giving only in the case of women, who give systematically less to women than to men and persons of unknown gender; (b) largely on account of this difference, women give less than men on average, although the difference is not statistically significant; (c) giving is significantly explained, especially for women, by background, psychological measures, and the cognition score; (d) the main findings are corroborated in separate trials of the experiment at a public and a private university in two different U.S. regions.
* Professor and Director, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455,
[email protected] ** Associate Professor of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University,
[email protected] *** Professor of Economics, Brown University,
[email protected]
Share and Share Alike? Intelligence, Socialization, Personality, and Gender-Pairing as Determinants of Giving* I. Introduction Why do people share some of the money that they are permitted, but not required, to divide with another individual in the much-studied dictator game experiment? There are numerous possible answers, including altruism, adherence to a norm of fairness, a desire to impress the experimenter, confusion, and the belief that the choice may lead to consequences not yet revealed by the experimenter. Beginning with Forsythe et al. (1994) and Hoffman et al. (1994), a number of experimenters have been careful to craft procedures that assure subjects of anonymity, in order that the desire to impress the experimenter can be eliminated from this list. A few potential determinants of the degree of altruism or of concern with fairness—especially gender—have been isolated for study. The effect upon the dictator/sender of information about the identity of the recipient has also begun to be studied (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). The present paper, which analyzes the results of experiments conducted at the University of Minnesota and Brown University, has two objectives. The first of these is to contribute to the growing stream of research about whether men and women differ in their behaviors in simple bargaining environments, in particular with respect to altruism or fairness norms. Beyond the effect of the dictator’s gender, we also analyze how, if at all, the decisions of men and women are affected by knowledge of the gender of the person with whom they are paired. Our second purpose is to study determinants of sharing or altruism in addition to gender. First, we ask whether personality factors help to explain giving in the dictator game. Second, we look at the effects of background or socialization, to see how environment might shape the propensity towards altruism or fairness. Third, we look at the impact of an intelligence measure, controlling for other factors, to test the proposition that sharing is a result of confusion or, alternatively, that altruism and cognitive weakness go hand in hand. To our knowledge, we are the first to check for an effect of cognitive abilities and personality traits in a dictator game. Our results resemble other experiments that find no significant difference between giving by men and women under conditions in which the recipient is anonymous and no information about his or her characteristics is made available. We find that only in one of the four possible gender pairings, giving by a woman to another woman, is the amount shared significantly different from that under the other gender pairings and under the *
We would like to thank John Dickhaut for his help in designing the experiment, and Dan Magan and Shuyi Oei for their help in carrying out the experiment.
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condition of no information about the recipient’s gender. In our experiments, women give significantly less to other women, and this causes average giving by women to be lower. This resembles the finding in Eckel and Grossman’s (2001) and Skolnick’s (2001) gender-paired ultimatum game experiments, in which women dividers offered significantly less to female than to male receivers. Together, these results suggest a lesser sense of entitlement or expectation or a more nurturing stance of women toward men, which might help to explain certain outcomes both in labor markets and in intrahousehold gender relations. With respect to our intelligence, psychological, and socialization variables, our findings are equally interesting. We find that subjects with lower cognitive scores, or at least female subjects with such scores, tend to give more than other subjects. We find that the personality factors are statistically strong predictors of giving: more ‘agreeable,’ more ‘open,’ and less ‘neurotic’ subjects, especially women, give more than other subjects. And we find that at least one background variable, religious school attendance, is a positive significant predictor of giving. Because results of similar experiments often vary from one study to another, the question of replication is an important one. A special feature of this paper is that we analyze both in pooled and in unpooled fashions the data from a trial of our experiment at a large midwestern state university, the University of Minnesota, and that from a trial conducted a year later at a smaller private New England university, Brown. The main qualitative results hold at both universities: female subjects give significantly less to other women at both campuses, and the signs, if not the significance levels, of the main explanatory variables are in agreement for both sub-samples. In both cases, the explanatory variables also have greater explanatory power for female than for male subjects. And in both cases, lower female-to-female sending causes the average amount shared by a female dictator to be less than the average shared by a male. There are also some limitations of our study that should be noted at the outset. First, the Brown sample was too small to replicate all Minnesota treatment conditions, so the claim of uniformity across samples must be a qualified one. Second, undergraduates at selective U.S. universities may not be representative of broader populations. Third, given the moderate sample sizes, some of the results could be idiosyncratic to the particular subjects and to their moods on the days of the experiments. Care should be exercised before generalizing from our findings. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we introduce the theme of gender, gender-pairing differences, and the other issues addressed by our analysis: intelligence, personality, and socialization. Section III provides a description of our experiments. Section IV analyzes subjects’ behaviors. Section V concludes the paper. II. Altruism, Fairness and Gender
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Although economic theory often adopts the simplifying assumption that people care only about their own income or consumption, economics has also explored two motives for sharing an endowment that depart from that assumption. Altruism within the family features prominently in theories of savings and education expenditures, and more general forms of altruism have been studied by a number of theorists.1 Unlike altruism, which focuses on the consequences of an act for another person, the concern with fairness is more procedural or rule-oriented. Andreoni (1989, 1990) distinguishes between the increase in one’s utility that may come from seeing that another person is better off (altruism) and the utility gain (or avoidance of loss) that comes from adhering to a norm that one values (which he calls “warm glow”).2 The preference for seeing another’s welfare improve and that for being fair toward another individual may have numerous sources. Many economists share with biologists the view that altruism toward kin, especially offspring, has a biological basis (Becker, 1976, Bergstrom, 1996). Whether altruism toward non-kin could also have been selected for by evolution is more problematic. Following Trivers (1971), some biologists and social scientists believe that there may be a predisposition to cooperate with others like oneself or with whom one might interact repeatedly (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).3 This predisposition could include receptivity to the social inculcation of fairness norms. Although the conditions for reciprocity in a strict sense are lacking in the one-shot dictator game, subjects may apply rules of fairness to such environments for many reasons, including (a) the rarity of one-shot interactions in ordinary life (Aumann, 1990), (b) the fact that rules are disseminated in general form because of bounded rationality, (c) disbelief in or uncertainty about the announcement of anonymity, causing reputational concerns to retain their relevance, or (d) the emergence of pro-social norms through cultural evolution (Henrich, forthcoming). We focus on five possible determinants of sharing in dictator games. The first is gender. Men and women may differ in their propensities to share a windfall for a variety of reasons. Differences in family roles may lead to the valuing of nurturing and conciliating qualities in women and of competitive qualities in men (Eagly and Crowley, 1986, Eckel and Grossman, forthcoming). While such differences tend to be inculcated through socialization, some differences in behavioral propensity could be biologically based. The second factor is gender pairing. Persons of either gender may vary their behaviors depending upon the gender of the person with whom they are interacting. For example, women may feel greater solidarity with other women than with men, or, on the contrary, women may view other women as competitors. The former could be considered an instance of in-group/out-group behavior, as studied in many psychological experiments (Tajfel, 1981). The latter would conform to the predictions of evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1998). 1
On altruism and the family see Becker (1993). On altruism more generally see, for example, Collard (1978) and Stark (1995). 2 This parallel’s Ben-Ner and Putterman’s (1998) distinction between “other-regarding preferences” and “process-regarding preferences.” 3 For other references, see Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) and Bowles et al. (forthcoming).
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The third factor we look at is personality type. Psychologists note that people differ in various attributes of personality, probably due to a combination of genetic and environmental differences. One leading psychological scoring system is the NEO fivefactor inventory, which generates measures of personality dimensions called “neuroticism,” “extraversion,” “openness to experience,” “agreeableness,” and “conscientiousness.”4 How the propensities towards selfishness versus altruism, generosity, or rule-based behavior play out in a particular individual may be significantly linked to such personality variables, as shown recently by Boone et al. (1999), Koole et al. (2001), and LePine and Van Dyne (2001). We include in our formal analysis three of the five factors, which show significant correlations with sending behavior: “neuroticism,” “openness,” and “agreeableness.”5 The fourth factor we look at is socialization. If the propensity to be generous or to adhere to norms of fairness is partly acquired through experience, then its strength can be expected to differ depending upon an individual’s socialization and the influences to which he or she is exposed. In our experiment sessions, we administered a survey that yielded data on a large number of background variables. In our analysis, we use data on two of these variables: (1) parental sociability, measured by the reported frequency of visits by others to the home, and (2) religious training. We also include a third variable that probably contains both experiential and personal temperament components: how many close friends a subject had in high school. The fifth and last factor is cognitive ability. Decision-making errors and misunderstanding of instructions are often suggested as explanations of experimental outcomes seemingly at odds with neoclassical predictions. Since the neoclassical prediction in the dictator game, assuming strictly self-interested agents, is sending zero, while only positive amounts or zero can be sent, errors cannot center on the predicted value but are of necessity positive. Thus to the extent that errors play an important role in explaining sending and that errors are less likely to be made by subjects with stronger cognitive abilities, there should be a significant negative relationship between amounts sent and a reliable measure of cognitive ability. Another possibility is that intelligence is systematically related to generosity for reasons other than proclivity to error: for instance, perhaps Machiavellians are right that “only fools are kind when there is nothing in it for them.”6 Although our experimental design does not permit us to distinguish between these two possibilities, they make it interesting to look for correlations between cognitive
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The NEO Five-Factor Inventory is one of the most commonly used methods of assessing personality type. The test measures sixty traits from which five factor scores are calculated. For a discussion of the NEO and other personality tests, see Briggs (1992). 5 Persons whom the test labels as “agreeable” are also variously described by psychologists as sympathetic, appreciative, soft-hearted, generous and helpful; those labeled as “open” are also said to have wide interests or to be intelligent, insightful, or sophisticated and clever; and those identified as “neurotic” (inverse: ‘emotionally stable’) are also called tense, nervous, worrying, fearful and self-pitying. See, for example, Loehlin (1992) and Rowe (1997). 6 Of course, others might contend it is the better part of wisdom to share one’s good fortune.
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ability and sharing in a dictator game. Accordingly, we administered a test of cognitive ability, the Wonderlic.7 Finally, the Minnesota experiment, although not the one at Brown, allows us to study the effect of another type of information about the person with whom the endowment can be shared: their place of origin. “In-group”/“out-group” effects may arise if subjects perceive those from the same place as themselves as “in group” members, those from elsewhere as members of an “out group.” Although we give the matter less attention because of the smaller sample and the lack of second-site replication, we do report briefly the relevant findings at the end of Section IV. III. The experiment The experiment was conducted by a team of researchers from the University of Minnesota, first at that university, and subsequently at Brown University one year later. It involved 224 first semester undergraduate students at Minnesota, of whom 112 were assigned the role of dictator, and 84 first semester undergraduates at Brown, of whom 42 were assigned that role. The Minnesota subjects responded to an e-mail invitation to the university’s entire freshman class (which numbered about 5,000), while the Brown subjects responded by e-mail to a flyer distributed to all freshmen (about 1,600). The email invitations were issued individually (the identities of other recipients were not shown on the invitation), and both these and the flyers at Brown asked for participation in an economics/psychology experiment that would last up to two hours, that would require no physical effort, that would assure subjects’ anonymity, and that would earn them a $15 participation fee and possibly additional earnings.8 Subjects who subsequently learned of their roles as dictators or recipients entered different rooms in separate buildings and were assured explicitly of their anonymity. Once they entered their assigned room, there was no way to connect an individual to an e-mail address or to a name. At both campuses, all rooms in which dictators sat contained similar numbers of male and female subjects seated without regard to gender, so there were no general cues about the salience of gender in the experiment. In addition to the $15 fee for participation, each participant in the sender rooms was given $10 in 1 dollar bills that he or she was asked to keep or divide with an anonymous recipient. The experiments were fashioned in a manner that closely follows the doubleblind design of Hoffman et al. (1994) and Eckel and Grossman (1996) so as to assure 7
The Wonderlic Personnel Test is a timed, 50-item cognitive ability measure commonly used in the preemployment selection context. Wonderlic scores are highly consistent with other well-recognized measures such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the General Aptitude Test Battery, and the Stanford Achievement Test. See, e.g., Hawkins et al. (1990) and McKelvie (1989). The Wonderlic is also used as a cognitive ability measure in LePine and Van Dyne, cited above. 8 The range of earnings in similar experiments was not communicated to the participants so as not to provide any unintended normative yardstick to senders. The relatively high participation fee, which could have some bearing upon the amounts sent, was deemed necessary due to the time required by participants to complete the survey and other forms described below.
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anonymity both among subjects and between subjects and experimenters.9 However, the instructions follow more closely the “divide an endowment” language used by Forsythe et al. (1994) rather than the “set a price” language used by Hoffman et al. (1994) (see Bolton et al. 1998 for a discussion of a possible difference in framing effects). All subjects also completed the short version of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory, the Wonderlic test, and the questionnaire regarding their personal experiences and characteristics. The Appendix contains the instructions given to dictators (but not the tests and questionnaire, which are available upon request).10 In a departure from more basic dictator games, the written instructions given to roughly 70% of dictators included information about their potential recipient. At Minnesota, 23 subjects were given no information about the person with whom they were dividing their $10, 20 subjects were told that this person was a female, 26 were told that this person was a male, and 43 subjects, whose decisions are excluded from the analysis until section IV.D, were given information about their recipient’s place of origin. At Brown, 21 9
In particular, after the random selection of two room assistants—we used this term rather than ‘monitors’ to enhance the sense of anonymity—from among the subjects, each remaining subject was randomly handed an envelope marked on the upper-right corner with an identification number used to associate his/her subsequent sending choice with his/her survey and test results. General instructions were taped to the envelope (see Appendix). Inside were smaller envelopes of different colors containing the NEO, Wonderlic, and survey questionnaire, as well as a money envelope marked with the same ID number as the external envelope. Each money envelope contained 10 slips of paper and 10 one dollar bills, mixed together—the slips being included so that sending decisions would take the same amount of time to implement, and the resulting envelopes would be of the same thickness, regardless of the amount sent. The decision on how much money and how many slips of paper to retain and to send was made at “privacy stations” fashioned so as to hide the subject from the knee up (thus providing complete privacy for transferring money or paper slips from envelopes to one’s own pockets). The small envelope containing the slips of paper and/or money was deposited by the subjects in a box. When all subjects completed their decisions, a room assistant brought the box with small envelopes to counters who waited outside each room. In the presence of the room assistant, the counters registered the number of dollars included in the money envelope and the ID number of the sender. Room assistants and counters transported the money envelopes to the appointed receiving room and gave them to the room assistant for distribution there. After making their sending decisions, dictators completed the NEO, Wonderlic, and survey, placed these in large envelopes, deposited the envelopes in a large box, and proceeded to the door where the in-room experimenter handed out their participation fee. 10 The basic set-up and accompanying questionnaires were the same as those of pilot experiments run by Ben-Ner, John Dickhaut, Puranjaya Singh, and Dan Magan with 83 subjects at Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota, in March and April, 1997 (see Singh, 1997). The instructions for the Hamline experiments were tested extensively with University of Minnesota undergraduates (in Industrial Relations Center classes) to ensure that they were properly understood, particularly with regard to the fact that dictators have no obligation to send money to the person with whom they are paired. These tests indicated that there was overwhelming comprehension of the instructions. In the University of Minnesota sessions, there was a second stage, not announced in advance to the original dictators, in which recipients of the first stage game were assigned the dictator role and senders that of receiver. The second stage experiment, meant to study reciprocity, is analyzed in Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong and Magan (2001). Due to the sequencing of stages and original dictators’ ignorance of what would come later, the second stage experiment does not impinge on the sending behaviors that are analyzed in this paper. The close similarity of the Minnesota results (for the first dictator game there) to those at Brown (where only the first stage dictator game was conducted but using identical procedures) is supportive of this claim. We do not include the data from the Hamline experiment in this paper’s analysis because of small differences in the conduct of that pilot experiment, including the fact that the Wonderlic test was not administered there.
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subjects were given no information about the person with whom they were dividing their $10 and 21 subjects were told that this person was a female. Limitations on the number and genders of subjects who showed up for the experiment at Brown meant that both the sending-to-male condition and conditions with information about the place of origin of the recipient could not be included there. Our focus is on the sending-to-person (no information), sending-to-female, and sending-to-male conditions. Because subjects were told nothing about whether information was being given to other subjects, or if so, what kind of information, the absence of certain conditions at one of the two schools cannot have affected the understanding or framing of the task facing a subject in a condition that existed at both of them. IV. Experimental Results and Analysis A. Description Table 1 displays definitions of the variables included in our analysis. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables in the pooled sample of male and female, Minnesota and Brown, dictators. Figure 1 shows the distributions of amounts sent for the sample as a whole, and for the sub-samples generated by campus and by gender breakdowns, respectively. Table 3 shows a breakdown of sending by male and female dictators at Minnesota and Brown. Average behaviors by gender are remarkably similar at the two schools. We see that on average, male dictators sent more than female dictators at both universities. However, this difference in average sending is not statistically significant in either the pooled or unpooled samples.11 Both a Mann-Whitney test and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show no significant differences between overall sending at Minnesota and at Brown, no significant difference between sending by women at Minnesota and by women at Brown, and no significant difference between sending by men at Minnesota and by men at Brown.12 While women shared less of their endowments than did men, on average, the differences between male and female sending are not significant in the sending-to-person and sending-to-male conditions. The lower level of female sending seems to be mainly attributable to the fact that at both schools, women sent smaller amounts in the send-tofemale condition. Table 4 displays the results by gender pairings for each school individually and for the pooled sample. Mann-Whitney tests show that the only significant differences in amounts sent are that women sent less to women than to men and to persons (both differences are significant at the 5% level for Brown and Minnesota samples combined and at the 10% level for Minnesota subjects only) and that women
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At the 90% confidence level, there is no significant difference in average sending between male and female dictators in either campus or for the pooled data. It is also true for the distribution of average sending, based on the Mann-Whitney test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 12 The Skewness/Kurtosis joint test for normality reveals that the distribution of amount sent by Brown female dictators is not normal (Prob. > χ2 = 0.0001). Normality of the distribution of sending by other dictators either at Brown or at Minnesota cannot be rejected.
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sent less to women than did men (significant at the 10% level for Brown and Minnesota combined but not significant in either school individually). One cause for concern about our results is that the average amounts sent in both the Brown and Minnesota dictator games are about twice those exhibited in the previouslycited double-blind dictator game experiments of Forsythe et al. (1994) and Hoffman et al. (1994), although similar to those in earlier single-blind dictator games in which the identity of the sender is shielded from the recipient but not from the experimenter. The only available explanation is that our subjects were paid participation fees of $15 (an amount decided upon in view of the considerably longer time spent at our experiments completing the survey and tests after making the sending decisions), whereas show-up fees were only $3 for the experiments of Forsythe et al. (1994) and Hoffman et al. (1994) and $5 for the experiment in Eckel and Grossman (1996). B. Regression analysis A more careful analysis of the effects of gender and of gender pairing requires controlling for other factors that may affect the sending decision. We study the effects of cognitive ability, personality, and socialization jointly with those of gender and gender pairing using multivariate regressions. Table 5 presents OLS and ordered logit estimates for the combined Minnesota and Brown samples, with both genders combined, and for male and female dictators separately.13 Only dictators in the no information (sending-to-person), sending-to-female, and sending-to-male conditions have been included, and the data have been coded to distinguish between, e.g., females and males sending to females.14 Chow tests reject at the 10% level the null hypothesis that male and female behaviors conform to the same parameters; the tests accept at the 10% level the null hypotheses that female (male) behaviors at Brown and those at Minnesota are described by the same parameters.15 An interesting feature is that the multivariate model predicts sending relatively well for females and poorly for males, as can be seen from a comparison of the F and χ2 statistics. 13
There are several estimation methods that can be employed in this situation; the restricted range and discreteness of the dependent variable calls for a method such as ordered logit, the grouping of the data as shown in Figure 1 suggests the possibility of using Tobit estimation, and the possible two-step decision process of subjects – to give or not to give, and then how much to give – may be dealt with using a Heckman sample bias correction method. Here we present OLS and ordered logit estimates, which are qualitatively similar. 14 Sending by male dictators in the no information (sending-to-person) condition is the excluded genderpairing condition. A gender dummy can be included in the columns labeled “All” only if another of the pairing dummies is excluded. Note that there was nothing in the experiment’s instructions, nor in the room assignments or seating arrangements, to suggest to senders that gender pairing would be a focus of analysis. 15 For OLS, the test statistic for pooling men of both schools with women of both schools is F = 1.922, which exceeds the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis at 10%, F*0.10, 8, 95 = 1.736, but falls short of the critical value at 5%, F*0.05, 8, 95 = 2.037. A Chow test of whether Brown and Minnesota observations can be pooled, disregarding gender differences, fails to reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level, with (F = 0.796 < F* 0.1,8,95 = 1.736. The test statistic for pooling males of the two schools is F = 0.514 < F*0.1,8,25 = 1.929. The test statistic for pooling females of the two schools is F = 0.510< F*0.1,8,54 = 1.787. A Chow-type test, calculated for the ordered logit regressions, gives similar results.
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Among female subjects, religious training shows a significant positive impact on amount sent, those with lower cognitive scores sent significantly more, and sending to another female is significantly less, consistent with Table 4. The three personality factors are all statistically significant predictors of sending in the ordered logit estimate, according to which more “agreeable” and “open” female dictators shared more with their unknown recipients, more “neurotic” female dictators shared less. The visits variable, reflecting parental sociability, has a significant negative coefficient for females. The estimates for males show fewer significant coefficients, and the entire model predicts male behavior less well. In the ordered logit estimate, two of the NEO factors are significant for males, with the sign on “neurotic” being opposite that exhibited for females. Reporting having had less than five close friends is associated with sending more, significant at the 10% level. Cognitive ability does not seem to affect sending by males, nor is there any effect of gender pairing on male sending. C. Robustness How robust are these results? In particular, could they be driven by outliers? And are the effects of individual variables for a given gender the same at the two campuses? We used the Hadi method to test for outliers.16 These tests do not identify any outlier in either the male or female sub-samples or the pooled sample included in Table 5. The equations were also estimated separately for the full Minnesota and full Brown sub-samples, and for male and female dictators separately at each school.17 For the pooled-gender OLS estimates, no coefficient that is statistically significant at one school or in the combined sample exhibits a different sign at the other school, with one exception.18 For the estimates using female senders only, the signs of all coefficients concur across schools. For the male-only estimates by school, there is no disagreement on sign for any coefficient that achieves significance. Most importantly, females send significantly less to females at both schools. This is a reassuring degree of concurrence for relatively small samples. There are other ways of parsing the sending conditions for analysis. Instead of five dummy variables for gender pairings, we could use two dummy variables for sending conditions (sending-to-male and sending-to-female, with sending-to-person as omitted category). We could use a coarser categorization of gender pairings: sending-to16
The Hadi method is a multivariate, multiple outlier technique. Classical outlier detection methods (e.g., Mahalanobis distance and Wilks’ test) are powerful when the data contain only one outlier, but the power of these methods decreases drastically when more than one outlying observation is present. The loss of power is usually due to what are known as masking and swamping problems (false negative and false positive decisions), but in addition, these methods often fail simply because they are affected by the very observations they are supposed to identify. The method developed by Hadi (1992, 1994) attempts to surmount these problems and produce an answer, albeit second best, in finite time. 17 The 43 Minnesota dictators in send-to-place conditions continue to be excluded until section IV.D. 18 The exception is the coefficient on the male-to-female dummy variable, which is positive and significant at the 5% level at Brown, while it is negative and insignificant at Minnesota. The pooled-gender ordered logit estimates similarly fail to show sign conflicts on significant coefficients, except that visits, which is significantly negative at Brown, is positive although not remotely significant (p = .92) at Minnesota.
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opposite-sex and sending-to-same-sex (also with sending-to-person as omitted category). Or we could use a still-coarser categorization into “no information condition” (sendingto-person) and “gender information condition” (sending-to-male plus sending-to-female). Estimates using each of these approaches were made, but the results add little to those shown in Table 5, and are thus omitted to conserve space. D. A Note on the Place Information Results As mentioned above, the Minnesota experiment also included conditions with information about the place of origin of the recipient. 18 dictators were told that their recipient was from Minnesota, 25 were told that their recipient was not from Minnesota.19 Average sending among these 43 subjects was $2.72, or 47 cents below that for the 111 subjects included in the analysis above. Like those among the latter subjects, the 26 females in the send-to-place conditions sent less on average than the 17 males ($1.65 vs. $4.35, respectively), with the difference in sending being statistically significant for this sub-sample. The place information conditions were included in the Minnesota experiment to study possible in-group/out-group effects based on place of origin. Because we also collected information about the place of origin of our Minnesota dictators, it is possible to study the effects of six pairings—Minnesotan-to-Minnesotan, Minnesotan-to-non-Minnesotan, Minnesotan-to-person (with neither gender nor place information), etc.—paralleling the male-to-male, male-to-female and other pairings studied in the regressions of Table 5. A regression of this sort leaving out the 67 Minnesota and Brown subjects in the two sendto-gender conditions fails to support the hypothesis that subjects treat those from the “same place” as favored members of an “in group.” Of the five place-pairing dummies, only the coefficient on the non-Minnesotan to non-Minnesotan variable is statistically significant, and it is negative.20 Interestingly, although not explained by any theory we are aware of, it appears to be females, in particular, who respond by sending less when provided with certain information about the place of origin of the recipient, while such information does not seem to influence male sending.21 But in view of the small sample 19
Whether or not a dictator and his or her recipient are said to be from Minnesota depends upon where they report having attended high school. 20 Adding the 44 subjects (23 at Minnesota and 21 at Brown) in the send-to-person condition to the 43 in the send-to-Minnesotan and send-to-non-Minnesotan conditions gives a sample size of 87 for this regression. The other included variables are the first seven shown in Table 5, with female-to-female and other gender-pairing variables being dropped, and with non-Minnesotan sending to person being the omitted place-pairing category. Similar results are obtained for OLS and ordered logit estimates. Note that “non-Minnesotan” is a heterogeneous category, which could include both people from neighboring midWestern states and people from India or Hong Kong. 21 First, when the OLS and ordered logit regressions described in the previous note are estimated separately for the 34 male senders and for the 53 female senders whose data were pooled there, we find no significant place effects among the males, but a significant coefficient on non-Minnesotan sending to non-Minnesotans among the females. Second, we estimated a set of regressions including the same variable set as those in Table 5 but adding the 43 subjects in the send-to-Minnesotan and send-to-non-Minnesotan conditions to generate a combined sample of 154 subjects, and adding to the twelve variables and the constant of Table 5 two new pairing dummies: male sending to person from known place (i.e., to Minnesotan or nonMinnesotan) and female sending to person from known place. While the other results remain similar, the
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size and the lack of well-formulated theories to explain this finding, we do not pursue it further. V. Conclusions Our dictator game experiments suggest that the personalities, cognitive abilities, and personal backgrounds of individuals affect how much they send to an anonymous recipient in a one-shot dictator game. Information about the recipient likewise affects the amount sent. Interestingly, all of these factors have a more pronounced effect for women than for men. In separate experiments at two universities, female subjects on average shared less of their endowments than did males, mainly because women paired with other women sent less than those paired with men or with persons about whom no information was provided. Women with lower cognitive scores and those with religious education sent more, and the three included personality factors were also significant predictors of sending. The model is far more successful at explaining female than male sending. These findings are based on relatively small samples, so conclusions should be drawn tentatively and with great care. The results are consistent with the belief that personal background and personality affect behavior in economic and social interactions.22 Women with higher factor scores for “agreeableness” and “openness” and lower scores for “neuroticism” tend to give more than other women. Men’s scores for the same factors have much less effect on their own sending decisions. The impact of the religious education variable is in line with the notion that institutions affect economic outcomes by shaping individual preferences.23 The result for the cognition measure gives partial support to suggestions that the deviation from neoclassical predictions is due to errors, but its small absolute value and its significance for females only imply that this is only a small part of the explanation for positive sending. The fact that female dictators shared less of their endowments than did males at both campuses is at odds with any simple notion that women are the “fair sex.” However, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) review the literature and note that the findings of different studies are mixed. Their own study concludes that “which is the fair sex” depends on the price of conferring benefits on the recipient. Our findings for the treatment that is comparable to most previous studies of the issue, the sending-to-person condition, are consistent with those past studies that found no difference between male and female sending (see Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001, for references).
coefficients on the female sending to person of known place dummy are statistically significant in both OLS and ordered logit estimates, and in both pooled and female-only regressions, whereas the coefficients on male sending to person of known place are never significant. 22 In this sense, our findings resemble those of Boone et al. (1999), who show that personality measures are significant predictors of behaviors in a set of prisoners’ dilemma games. 23 Note, by the way, that self-selection into the degree of religious education received is essentially ruled out, since the decision is one taken by the subjects’ parents during their childhoods. See again Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998), and for a specific application to religion, Guttman et al., 1992.
12
Why do female subjects in our study send less when they are told that their recipient is also a female? Certainly, this behavior is at odds with the idea of “own gender solidarity” or of an “in group” effect based on gender. One possibility is that female subjects seek favorable relationships with males and see fellow females as competitors. It isn’t clear why males in our experiment don’t show a similar bias in favor of the opposite sex.24 Another possibility is that the females in our subject pool feel that women are weaker or are entitled to less than men. Women may tend to be more risk averse and to see themselves as weaker, which might make them more reluctant to share except with a potentially stronger individual whose ire they may wish to avoid provoking, or who might be a potential source of protection. The possibility that women themselves feel that women are entitled to or will accept less than men is consistent with the findings in Eckel and Grossman’s (2001) and Skolnick’s (2001) gender-paired ultimatum game experiments, in which women dividers offered significantly less to female than to male receivers. If women unconsciously feel that women are entitled to or will accept less than men, this may have important economic effects, perhaps accounting, for instance, for some inequalities in the labor market and in the division of work burdens in the household.25 A nurturing inclination of women toward men, also consistent with the results in our experiment, may help to explain why women take on more unpaid “caring labor” in families and in volunteer positions (Folbre and Weisskopf, 1998). Of course, there is no reason to assume that such attitudes, if they exist, are universal and biologically driven. In fact, even though our findings were replicated at two American college campuses, a recent study that similarly looks at differences in dictator game sending by gender pairings, carried out in Sweden, obtains an opposite result, namely that both genders give more to women than to men (Dufwenberg and Muren, 2001). To what degree the difference between the two studies is due to differences in design,26 to what degree to differences in the cultures of the two societies, is something that can only be established by further research.
24
Such a bias is in fact shown by males in the Brown sample, but not in the larger Minnesota sample, and hence not in the combined sample estimates shown in Table 5. 25 An experiment by Major et al. (1984) found that women paid themselves less and worked longer hours for the same amount of pay than did men. 26 The Dufwenberg-Muren study includes only students enrolled in introductory economics courses, who are more likely to know one another. There is no sending-to-person treatment, and gender identification of the recipient is established by use of first names. Only a small randomly selected subset of participants are actually paid after choices are made, and half of these are in a condition wherein they were informed in advance that they will be paid publicly in front of their class.
13
References Andreoni, James, 1989, “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy 97: 1447-58. Andreoni, James, 1990, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, Economic Journal 100(401) (June): 464-477. Andreoni, James and Lisa Vesterlund, 2001, “Which is the Fair Sex?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1) (February): 293-312. Aumann, Robert, 1990, “Irrationality in Game Theory,” pp. 214-27 in Partha Dasgupta et al., eds., Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn. Cambridge: MIT Press. Axelrod, Robert, and William Hamilton, 1981, “The evolution of cooperation,” Science 211: 1390-96. Becker, Gary, 1976, “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology,” Journal of Economic Literature 14(3): 817-26. Becker, Gary, 1993, A Treatise on the Family (Enlarged Edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ben-Ner, Avner and Louis Putterman, 1998, “Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis,” pp. 3-69 in Ben-Ner and Putterman, eds., Economics, Values and Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ben-Ner, Avner and Putterman, Louis, 2000, “On Some Implications of Evolutionary Psychology for the Study of Preferences and Institutions,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43:91-99. Ben-Ner, Avner and Louis Putterman, with Fanmin Kong and Dan Magan, 2001, “Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game,” unpublished paper, Brown University and University of Minnesota. Bergstrom, Theodore, 1996, “Economics in a Family Way,” Journal of Economic Literature 34: 1903-34. Bolton, Gary, Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick, 1998, “Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness versus Acts of Kindness,” International Journal of Game Theory 27: 269-99. Boone, Christopher, Bert De Brabander, and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 1999, “The Impact of Personality on Behavior in Five Prisoner’s Dilemma Games,” Journal of Economic Psychology 20: 343-77.
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Bowles, Samuel, Robert Boyd, Ernst Fehr and Herbert Gintis, eds., forthcoming, Strong Reciprocity: Modeling the Roots of Cooperative Exchange. Princeton: Princeton University Press [tentative]. Briggs, Stephen R., 1992, “Assessing the Five-Factor Model of Personality Description,” Journal of Personality 60: 253-93. Buss, David, 1998, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Collard, David, 1978, Altruism and Economy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economics. NY: Oxford University Press. Dufwenberg, Martin and Astri Muren, 2001, “Discrimination by Gender and Political Correctness,” unpublished paper, University of Stockholm. Eagly, A.H. and M. Crowley, 1986, “Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature,” Psychological Bulletin 100: 283-308. Eckel, Catherine and Philip Grossman, 1996, “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 16: 181-91. Eckel, Catherine and Philip Grossman, forthcoming, “Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental Evidence,” in C. Plott and V. Smith, eds., Handbook of Results in Experimental Economics. Eckel, Catherine and Philip Grossman, 2001, “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games,” Economic Inquiry 39(2): 171-88. Folbre, Nancy and Thomas Weisskopf, 1998, “Did Father know best? Families, markets and the supply of caring labor,” in Ben-Ner and Putterman, eds., Economics, Values and Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin and Martin Sefton, 1994, “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior 6: 347-69. Guttman, Joel, Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Spiegel, 1992, “Rent Seeking and Social Investment in Taste Change,” Economics and Politics 4: 31-42. Hadi, A. S., 1992, “Identifying Multiple Outliers in Multivariate Data,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 54: 761-771. Hadi, A. S., 1994, “A Modification of a Method for the Detection of Outliers in Multivariate Samples,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 56: 393-396.
15
Hawkins, K., S. Faraone, J. Pepple and L. Seidman, 1990, “WAIS-R Validation of the Wonderlic Personnel Test as a Brief Intelligence Measure in a Psychiatric Sample,” Psychological Assessment 2: 198-201. Henrich, Joseph, forthcoming, “Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith, 1994, “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 7: 346-80. Koole, Sander, Wander Jager, Agnes van den Berg, Charles Vlek and Willem Hofstee, 2001, “On the Social Nature of Personality: Effects of Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Feedback About Collective Resource Use on Cooperation in a Resource Dilemma,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27 (3): 289-301. LePine, Jeffrey and Linn Van Dyne, 2001, “Voice and Cooperative Behavior as Contrasting Forms of Contextual Performance: Evidence of Differential Relationships with Big Five Personality Characteristics and Cognitive Ability,” Journal of Applied Psychology 86 (2): 326-36. Loehlin, J.C., 1992, Genes and Environment in Personality Development. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Major, Brenda, Dean McFarlin and Diana Gagnon, 1984, “Overworked and underpaid: On the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47: 1399-1412. McKelvie, S., 1989, “The Wonderlic Personnel Test: Reliability and Validity in an Academic Setting,” Psychological Reports 65: 161-162. Rowe, David C., 1997, “Genetics, Temperament, and Personality,” pp. 367-386 in Robert Hogan, John Johnson, and Stephen Briggs, Handbook of Personality Psychology. San Diego: Academic Press. Singh, Puranjaya, 1997, “Human Behavior in Dictator Games,” Ph.D. Thesis, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota. Skolnick, Sara, 2001, “Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game,” Economic Inquiry 39(2): 189-200. Stark, Oded, 1995, Altruism and Beyond: An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges within Families and Groups. NY: Cambridge University Press. Tajfel, Henri, 1981, Human groups and social categories, Cambridge University Press.
16
Trivers, Robert L., 1971, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35-57.
17
18
Table 1
Variable Definitions
Variable
Definition
Dependent variable Send
Dollar amount sent ($0, $1, $2,…,$10)
Independent variables FewFriends
Friendship dummy, 1 if the dictator had 4 or fewer close friends while in high school, 0 otherwise
Visits
Sociability dummy, 1 if the dictator had family members or friends visit a few times a week or more often while growing up, 0 otherwise
Reltrain
Religious training dummy, 1 if the dictator attend Sunday school or other religious training once a week or more often while growing up, 0 otherwise
Agreeable
Raw score the dictator earned on NEO Agreeableness scale
Neurotic
Raw score the dictator earned on NEO Neuroticism scale
Open
Raw score the dictator earned on NEO Openness scale
Cognition
Raw score the dictator earned on Wunderlic Personnel Test on problemsolving ability
Female to female
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a female dictator was informed that her paired recipient is also a female; 0 otherwise
Female to male
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a female dictator was informed that her paired recipient is a male; 0 otherwise
Female to person
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a female dictator was NOT informed any gender or origin information of her paired recipient; 0 otherwise
Male to male
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a male dictator was informed that his paired recipient is also a male; 0 otherwise
Male to female
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a male dictator was informed that his paired recipient is a female; 0 otherwise
Male to person
Gender pairing dummy, 1 if a male dictator was NOT informed of any gender or origin information of his paired recipient; 0 otherwise
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Table 2 Variable
Descriptive Statistics Observations
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
2.410
0
10
Send
111
3.189
FewFriends
111
0.414
0
1
Visits
111
0.495
0
1
Reltrain
111
0.613
0
1
Agreeable
111
32.514
5.807
18
45
Neurotic
111
22.946
8.576
6
48
Open
111
32.288
6.231
10
43
Cognition
111
29.180
5.537
11
41
Female to female
111
.243
0
1
Female to male
111
.144
0
1
Female to person
111
.243
0
1
Male to male
111
.090
0
1
Male to female
111
.126
0
1
Male to person
111
.153
0
1
20
Figure 1
Distribution of Amounts Sent by Dictators, with School and Gender Breakdown
Brown
Minnesota
.4 .3 .2 .1 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
0
Female
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
Male
.4 .3
Fraction of All Dictators
.2 .1 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
Total .4 .3 .2 .1 0 0
Amounts Sent by School and Gender
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Table 3
Amounts Sent, by School and Gender Gender
Total
Female
Male
Brown
2.667 (2.140) 24
3.833 (2.640) 18
3.167 (2.408) 42
Minnesota
3.152 (2.366) 46
3.304 (2.601) 23
3.203 (2.429) 69
Total
2.986 (2.287) 70
3.537 (2.599) 41
3.189 (2.410) 111
Note: The first line entry in each cell, in bold, is the mean; the second, in parentheses, is the standard deviation; and the third is the number of observations.
22
Table 4
Amounts Sent, by Gender Pairing Brown
Minnesota
Combined
2.09 (2.02) 11
2.25 (2.59) 16
2.185 (2.338) 27
N/A
3.81 (2.26) 16
-
3.15 (2.19) 13
3.43 (2.03) 14
3.296 (2.072) 27
N/A
3.50 (2.99) 10
-
Male to female
4.00 (2.98) 10
3.00 (2.94) 4
3.714 (2.894) 14
Male to person
3.63 (2.33) 8
3.22 (2.28) 9
3.412 (2.238) 17
Total
3.17 (2.41) 42
3.20 (2.43) 69
3.189 (2.410) 111
Female to female
Female to male
Female to person
Male to male
Note: The first entry in each box, in bold, is the mean; the second, in parentheses, is the standard deviation; the third is the number of observations.
23
Table 5
Determinants of Sending: gender and no information conditions OLS
Variable
Ordered Logit
All
Males
Females
All
Males
Females
FewFriends
.415 (.477)
1.161 (.950)
.129 (.517)
.353 (.383)
1.200* (.677)
.179 (.505)
Visits
-.372 (.477)
1.063 (1.023)
-.875* (.505)
-.311 (.381)
1.027 (.704)
-.985** (.497)
Reltrain
.872* (.473)
-.188 (.968)
1.209** (.558)
.700* (.380)
-.143 (.625)
1.249** (.539)
Agreeable
.083* (.047)
.084 (.082)
.100* (.055)
.071* (.038)
.094* (.057)
.093* (.051)
Neurotic
-.025 (.029)
.092 (.062)
-.068** (.031)
-.015 (.023)
.069* (.040)
-.057* (.031)
Open
.070* (.038)
.048 (.076)
.063 (.042)
.060** (.030)
.009 (.048)
.082** (.040)
Cognition
-.083* (.048)
-.013 (.099)
-.090* (.052)
-.066* (.037)
.001 (.062)
-.097** (.048)
Female to female
-1.358* (.754)
-.964* (.565)
-1.373** (.608)
-1.137** (.554)
Female to male
.422 (.854)
.911 (.653)
-.035 (.648)
.678 (.614)
Female to person
-.308 (.738)
Male to male
.958 (1.017)
.583 (1.334)
.423 (.839)
.128 (.854)
Male to female
.709 (.858)
-.116 (1.073)
.507 (.723)
-.085 (.702)
Constant
.883 (2.274)
-3.118 (4.404)
1.532 (2.613)
111
41
70
111
41
70
.064
.810
.001
.036
.614
.000
R / pseudo R
.178
.142
.361
.051
.048
.112
Adjusted R2
.077
-.107
.266
N Prob. >F/ χ2 2
2
-.393 (.572)
Note: Standard errors of parameter estimates are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are marked with * for p ≤ 0.10, and ** for p ≤ 0.05. For ordered logit, the estimates for ancillary parameters are not reported here.
24
Appendix GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. Please note that: 1) You will be paid $15 in cash when you leave today. You will have the opportunity to make more money in cash during the experiment. 2) The experiment requires no physical exertion on your part. 3) You will be asked to fill out three questionnaires. 4) Anything you do in the experiment and write on questionnaires is completely anonymous, and absolutely nothing can be associated with your name. 5) Please follow the oral and written instructions carefully. The large envelope that you received upon entering the room contains several colored envelopes. You should remove the inner envelopes only when and as instructed. You will deposit the large envelope in a box as you exit this room at the end of the session, and will then receive the $15 for your participation. 6) As part of the experiment, two room assistants will be chosen by way of a random drawing conducted by the experimenter. Every participant in the room has an equal chance of being selected as one of the room assistants. The room assistants will help with the administration of the experiment. 7) The experiment and questionnaires will be completed in less than two hours. 8) Please keep the same seat until the end of the session. Thanks again for your participation!
25
1
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT [for the ‘sending-to-male’ condition] The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. No questions will be answered during this experiment. If you have any questions, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the experiment has begun, please do not talk at all. In this experiment you have been paired with a person. This person is in a different room from yours, room B. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the experiment. Your only information about this person is that he is also a participant in the experiment and that he is a male. The room in which you are seated is referred to in these instructions as room A. You will notice that there are other persons in the room who are also participating in this experiment. You have not been paired with any of these persons. Two persons in room A - room assistant 1 and room assistant 2 have been chosen to be the facilitators for today’s experiment. The room assistants will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. In addition, room assistant 1 and room assistant 2 will verify that the instructions have been followed as they appear here. In this experiment, persons in room A, yourself included, will have the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all, or none of $10 to the person they have been paired with in room B. The person in room B then keeps the money sent to them. The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how this experiment is run. The experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the room assistants, will know your personal decision. Since your decision is private we ask that you not to tell anyone your decision either during, or after, the experiment. The experiment is conducted as follows: Large envelopes were given to you upon entering the room today. Each of these large envelopes contains 4 envelopes. One of the
26
envelopes is small and labeled ‘money.’ This envelope contains ten (10) one dollar bills and ten (10) blank slips of paper. You should now take out the envelope marked ‘money.’ Each person assigned to room A will be called, one at a time, by room assistant 1. The person who was called will then go to one of the privacy stations and open the envelope privately inside the privacy station. Each person in room A must: 1) First open the sealed envelope marked ‘money.’ You must decide how many
dollar bills (if any) and how many blank slips of paper to leave in the small envelope which will be sent to the person you have been paired with. The number of dollar bills plus the number of slips of paper must add up to 10. You then keep the remaining dollar bills and slips of paper. The money you keep is yours to take from the experiment along with the $15 your receive for participating. Examples: (a) leave $2 and 8 slips in the small envelope, keep $8 and 2 slips; (b) leave $9 and 1 slip in the small envelope, keep $1 and 9 slips. These are examples only, the actual decision is up to each person. Once you have made your decision regarding the money, you will seal the envelope inside the privacy station, and then place it in the box at the front of the room marked ‘return envelopes’. 2) You will then go back to your seat in the room and await further instructions
from the experimenter. After all the small envelopes have been put in the return box, room assistant 2 will transport the box to a recorder, who is in the hallway. With room assistant 2 observing, the recorder will then, one at a time, 1) open the envelope, 2) record on a blank sheet of paper the number on the envelope and the amount
of money in the envelope, and 3) put the money back in the envelope and reseal it, and put the envelope back in
the return box.
27
At this point, room assistant 2 will take the return box to room B where the money will be distributed. The person you have been paired with is in room B. Each person in room B has also been asked to fill out the questionnaires and given $15 to participate. The money will be given to the appropriate person in room B. At this stage, you will wait for an experimenter to come into the room and give you instructions as to what will happen next.* For the moment, please note that your decision regarding the $10 in the small envelope is the only decision that you will be asked to make in this experiment. SUMMARY: 1) You have been paired with a person from another room. That person is a male. 2) You need to decide how much of $10 you will send to this person. 3) Once you have made your decision regarding how much money to send, you should put the envelope in the box marked ‘return envelopes’, return to your seat and await further instructions. 4) No participant in the experiment, including the person with whom you have been paired in Room B, the room assistants, and the experimenters, will know the decision made by you as an identifiable individual. You will not be told and will have no way of knowing the identity of the person in Room B with whom you have been paired.
*
Note to reader: these instructions concerned the completion of the NEO, and Wonderlic, and survey.
28
