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Abstract: Why run for reelection when the logic and incentives of the political system leaves no doubt that running for other offices is a better option? This paper ...
Should I stay or should I go? Explaining Political Ambition by Electoral Success*

“Should I stay or should I go now? If I go there will be trouble” The Clash

Carlos Pereira Michigan State University – MSU and School of Economics of Sao Paulo - FGV (Corresponding author) Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Michigan State University 303 South Kedzie Hall East Lansing - MI 48824 Phone: (517) 353-1686 E-mail: [email protected] webpage: http://polisci.msu.edu/people/pereira.htm Lucio Renno Universidade de Brasilia, CEPPAC Assistant Professor Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro, Multiuso II Asa Norte Brasilia – DF 70000-070 Brazil Phone: 55 (61) 3327-0786 E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: Why run for reelection when the logic and incentives of the political system leaves no doubt that running for other offices is a better option? This paper focuses on the factors that influence both career choice as well as electoral success of those who run for reelection and those who attempt other offices using Brazil as a case-study. It is argued that Legislators run for reelection because it is the safest bet. The probability of winning is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office.

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A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the “Political Science Regional Workshop at the Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame University, May 19, 2005. We are very grateful to the comments offered by participants of the workshop, especially from Scott Mainwaring and Michael Coppedge. We thank also Scott Desposato, David Samuels, Nathan Monroe, and Gregory Robinson for very good comments and suggestions.

1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1482804

I. Introduction This paper has two objectives: 1) investigate the determinants of political career choice and 2) analyze the factors that influence the electoral success in those choices. Differently from previous studies that focus either on Federal Deputies’ reelection bids (Ames 1995, Samuels 2000, 2001, Pereira and Renno 2002) or on their career paths (Samuels 2003, Leoni, Pereira and Renno, 2004), we argue that both phenomena cannot be analyzed separately. They are inexorably linked because career choice depends on expectations of electoral success, especially in countries where Congress incentives to return to office are skim at best. This is the case of most Latin American countries, where the legislative branch plays a secondary role in the governing process vis-à-vis the Executive’s dominance. Hence, predicting the determinants of electoral success is fundamental to define career choice strategies among ambitious politicians. One must look outside the doors of Congress, to the electoral setting, to understand why incumbents choose to run for reelection. By focusing on the electoral incentives for career choice, we confront conventional wisdom that a professional and institutionalized legislature is the essence of explaining why incumbents seek reelection. Consider, for instance, the situation of an incumbent in a lower house legislative body embedded in a setting with the following characteristics: the legislative branch does not control the budgetary process; congressional committees play a limited role on policy making; decision-making inside Congress is centralized in the hands of few party leaders, and gate keeping power is exercised by the speaker of the House. In addition, the executive branch controls the power of the purse and several other resources, such as jobs in the bureaucracy. The executive branch is extremely proactive in the formulation of laws and public policy and Congress plays a reactive role. In fact, the executive branch is the main policy-maker in the land. Furthermore, the country is also a federal system, with enticing executive branch offices at the state and municipal levels.

2 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1482804

Finally, incumbents have amateur staff and few professional resources that enable them to claim credit for policy-making and to actively participate in policy formulation. Without informational and human resources, legislators cannot assemble a team capable of making significant policy contributions and effectively oversee executive bureaucratic behavior. In sum, consider a context in which most incumbents have very few if not null opportunities to affect the functioning of the legislative branch. One has to agree that this is not the ideal setting for encouraging static ambition, i.e. running for reelection.1 Why would any congressperson bother running for reelection in such unappealing setting? This paper focuses on the factors that influence both career choice as well as electoral success of those who run for reelection and those who attempt other offices (Senate, Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and State Deputy) having Brazil as the case-study. The environment incumbent Federal Deputies face in Brazil is not much different from the one described above, nor is that of most other Latin American countries.2 In fact, the Brazilian Congress is way ahead of its Latin American peers when it comes to organization, infrastructure and funding. Thus, an unprofessional and poorly institutionalized legislature is not a ‘privilege’ of the Brazilian political system. Precisely, it is a dominant feature in new democracies. However, contrary to the Brazilian case, Latin American countries behave according to the literature’s prediction: poorly institutionalized legislatures and low rates of reelection.3 Brazil, on the other hand, has an institutional setting in which Congresspersons are elected in a highly competitive election with large district magnitude, they have to face a very fragmented party system, and they have low capability of influencing policy making. However, a majority of incumbents run for reelection. For instance, in the 1998 elections 75% of the incumbents ran for reelection and in 2002 71% did so.4 Explaining why this counterintuitive event occurs may help elucidate some aspects of the theoretical link between career ambition and legislative organization.

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If legislators neither have institutional nor professional motivations for reelection, why is static ambition prevalent in Brazil? We claim that Brazilian Federal Deputies predominantly run for reelection because it is the safest bet. The probability of winning is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office. Therefore, running for reelection is safer than running for higher office and provides better returns in terms of the perks of office than running for even safer lower offices. In spite of very weak institutional and professional incentives for the legislative job in Brazil, the great majority of Brazilian legislators run for reelection. This fact in itself is evidence that career choices cannot be explained only based on the design of the legislative branch. In effect, there is some sort of independence between legislative institutionalization and career patterns. In addition, politicians’ decision to run (or not run) for an office is not just a function of their ambition but also a consequence of their evaluations of how likely they are to win for that particular office.

II – Why is reelection attempts in Brazil so prevalent? Where legislative seats are valuable career goods, reelection attempts should be high and Congress will be designed in a way that facilitates reelection (Mayhew 1974). On the other hand, if most representatives run for offices outside of Congress, then the legislature will not foster long-lasting legislative careers where politicians can gain necessary experience and knowledge to become professionals and reelection rates should be low. If the predominant career goal is to seek offices outside the legislature, then the organizational structure of Congress will reflect this goal and will not stimulate reelection bids (Squire 1988). Institutional factors suggest that the latter characterization should be a more accurate description of the lower house in Brazil, yet this does not seem to be the case. In other words, the organizational structure of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies does not facilitate

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legislators to seek for reelection. In fact, the unprofessional environment invites legislators to look for higher offices; but even so the reelection attempts have been quite elevated. The box 1 below illustrates the argument above contrasting theoretical expectations and the empirical reality in Brazil. The question then is: what is the solution to the puzzle? [Box 1 about here] One possible answer is that Brazilian legislators are not strategic thinkers; they are clueless about cost/benefit calculi. The poor souls are irrational. Though tempting, such hypothesis seems highly implausible. After all, incumbents are minimally competent and strategic to have won office at least once, an impressive achievement given the competitiveness of legislative elections in Brazil. Most also held other elected positions before entering the Chamber of Deputies. They deserve, at least, the benefit of the doubt. We therefore assume that incumbents are capable of rational strategic thinking. Assuming that Federal Deputies are strategic thinkers, another possible answer to the Brazilian conundrum is that Brazilian incumbents like any other in the world, do not run for higher office because they are risk-averse. As the costs are too high then the wish for high offices is offset. Incumbents therefore run for the office with the best combination of low electoral risk and high payoff in terms of perks of office. If no risks were attached, all politicians would run for offices with higher resources, policy influence, and prestige (Rohde 1979). “The decision to run results primarily from a matching of individual ambition and the context of the opportunities available to the potential candidate” (Kazee 1994). Consistent with this literature, we therefore also assume that if no risks were present that all politicians would pursue higher office. In Brazil, this clearly means running for executive level offices at the federal, state and larger municipalities, those with greater political resources, powers, and budgets, and the Senate, where politicians would have higher tenure, power, prestige, and greater advantages.

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All choices, however, come with a price: different levels of risk to bear. Our claim, following the literature on career choice (Rohde 1979; Squire 1988; Swift 1987; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Brady et al 1999; Hibbings 1999; Santos 1999; Patzelt 1999; Kernell 2003; Samuels 2003; Leoni et al 2004; Carson 2005), is that the expected probability of victory is a central determinant of political ambition. We argue that Deputies in Brazil run for reelection, despite the contrary institutional and professional incentives, because it is the safest bet. The probability of winning victory is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office. This seems to be the solution to our puzzle. Career choices are therefore linked to forecasts of electoral success. In order to understand why a deputy chooses to run for a specific office, it is mandatory to evaluate incumbents’ likelihood of victory in the elections for each different office. Even though previous studies in Latin America acknowledge the importance of the probability of victory in career calculi, this factor has not been sufficiently emphasized (Samuels 2003; Leoni et al 2004). Our theoretical model stresses exactly the decisiveness of victory probabilities in accounting for career choice. Empirically, we argue that the best form of understanding career choice is to compare the expected probabilities of victory for different offices. Modeling electoral success therefore becomes an integral part of the study of career calculi. In order to understand why candidates choose a certain office, it is necessary to know which factors increase incumbents’ predictability of the outcome of elections for different offices. To estimate the predictability of the outcome, we further argue that it is necessary to model electoral success, estimate predicted probabilities for each candidate, and compare such probabilities by different offices.

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With this purpose in mind, we interweave two strands of literature that do not intersect as often as they should: the research on career choice and the research on reelection success (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Jacobsen 1983; Cain et al 1987; Stein and Bikers 1994; Ames 1995; Bikers and Stein 1996; Katz and Sala 1996; Samuels 2001, 2002; Pereira and Renno 2003; Carson and Roberts 2005). We apply our theoretical model to explain the puzzling case of Brazil, where, in spite of contrary institutional and professional incentives, the vast majority of incumbents run for reelection. In the conclusion, our analysis will offer some insights about the theoretical relation between career choices in the organization of legislatures, in light of the Brazilian experience.

III. Elements of Career Calculi All discussions about incumbents’ career choice are based on a simple model that can be summarized by the following equation: U (O) = P (O) B (O) – C The expected utility U(O) of running for a specific office is a function of the probability of winning office P(O) weighted by the benefits of the office B(0), discounting the costs (C) of running.5 Our claim is that of these factors, the hardest to predict is the probability of victory. The probability of winning office therefore becomes a key factor in career choice. The benefits of office refer to the perquisites attached to every office. In Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries where the executive branch concentrates several institutional powers, executive level offices offer the highest benefits. Senatorial offices also have high perks, in the form of higher staff funding, higher pay, and especially longer terms. The senate also is part of the public policy decision-making loop, having a decisive say in law making. All of these offices provide higher pay-offs than running for reelection in the

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lower house.6 Therefore, the benefits associated with these posts will always be a stimulus to run for higher offices.7 The costs of running are also more predictable than the probability of victory. Races for governor and senator are, on average, more expensive than races for Federal Deputy. Our own data indicates that campaign expenditures for higher offices are about five times greater than running for reelection. Therefore, the cost of campaign for progressive ambition is unquestionably higher than of static ambition. Holding all else constant, when it comes to campaign costs, incumbents would be more inclined to attempt reelection. This is an established fact, easy to predict.8 Campaign expenditures, in fact, are a central explanatory factor of the probability of victory. So, not just it is easy to expect that running for higher offices will be more expensive, including it in the equation along side the probability of victory, as is proposed in the traditional equation of career choice, is redundant and may lead to an exaggeration of the impact of campaign expenditures on career choice. Campaign finance affects career choice by influencing the probability of victory. In fact, campaign finance only indirectly affects career choice. On the other hand, the probability of victory is not as easy to forecast as the benefits and costs of running. It could be argued that the probability of victory of running for higher offices should be smaller than when seeking lower office. A simple reason for this is that senatorial, mayoral and gubernatorial elections are ruled by plurality and majority systems. The number of offices available is lower when running for higher office. In races for Federal and State Deputy, ruled by open-list proportional representation and at-large districts with high magnitude, the number of slots available is much higher. The relationship between number of seats available and probability of electoral success, however, is far from perfect. Even if the correlation is strong, the difference in the

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probabilities of victory for the different offices is not predefined and is subject to the interference of several variables. Probabilities of victory need to be modeled and should vary according to individual candidates’ previous electoral and legislative performance as well as by state. The comparison between the probabilities of victory for the different offices can vary more widely from election to election and from district to district than any of the other components in the classic career calculi equation. When making a choice of career, incumbents know that the benefits and costs of higher office are greater than running for reelection. Both of these factors are essentially fixed. However, the probability of victory is much harder to estimate and more variable. Therefore, the estimation of the probability of victory for each distinct office is fundamental to making a viable career choice. Because the probability of victory is itself a function of several distinct variables, it requires modeling. That is the main reason why the study of electoral success can contribute to analyses of career choice. After all, studies of electoral success focus exactly on identifying the factors that influence the probability of victory for a specific office. In summary, our argument is that incumbents’ career calculus is highly influenced by a comparison of the success probability of running for different offices. Incumbents will predominantly choose to run for offices with a higher probability of electoral success; in the case of Brazil, run for reelection. Expectations about the costs and benefits of all choices of career are practically fixed. Estimating the probability of victory, in the other hand, is more erratic. In other words, incumbents would run for offices in which the outcome of the election is more predictable. Incumbents tend to avoid risk, and seek predictability. Probability of victory thus explains the puzzle.

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Therefore, our main hypothesis is the following: incumbents run for reelection because the probability of winning reelection is higher in comparison to running for any other offices.

IV. A Model of Electoral Success and its Hypothesis A model of electoral success will permit us to test the main hypothesis of this study: the probability of victory for those who attempt reelection is much higher than the probability of victory for incumbents who seek offices outside the chamber. Incumbents who run for reelection, therefore, have better conditions of predicting their electoral luck based on their past electoral achievements; performance in office; performance within their political parties; the amount of money they need to win; and their strategic relationship with the executive. The same may not true for incumbent legislators who run for other offices. To test these assumptions our model has four classes of variables: 1) electoral features; 2) aspects related to the incumbent’s power within political parties; 3) the legislator’s relationship with executive branch; and 4) legislator’s performance within the Chamber of Deputies.

Electoral dimension: A first set of variables is related to the electoral dimension. We include four variables strictly related to the electoral performance of individual incumbents: lag vote, electoral concentration, number of candidates, and campaign finance. LAG VOTE indicates the total amount of votes the incumbent received in the previous election. This is a measure of the incumbent’s electoral security. We hypothesize that this variable should have a positive impact on electoral success since it is expected that the larger the amount of votes obtained in the previous election the safer the incumbent would be in the next election.

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ELECTORAL CONCENTRATION is more directly related to the pattern of spatial distribution of an incumbent’s vote. Ames (1995) has argued that there are two aspects to the distribution of an incumbent’s vote throughout the state that have to be taken into account; concentration and dispersion.9 Concentration is measured by the percentage of the total votes a candidate receives on the single municipality where that candidate received most of his/her votes. We predict that electoral concentration should have a negative impact on electoral success because incumbents with a high electoral concentration tend to be more vulnerable from potential competitors than incumbents with a low electoral concentration. On the other hand, we hypothesize that incumbents who disperse their votes through several municipalities (that is, those who have lower levels of concentration in one single municipality) should be more likely to win. We also included in the model a measure of electoral competition at the district level, indicating the number of candidates in the district (MEAN CANDIDATE PER DISTRICT). The hypothesis is, the more competitive the district, the harder it should be to get elected. As said before, another factor that affects electoral success is campaign expenditures. The probability of victory is a function of the costs of running. The received wisdom argues that campaign spending is the central determinant of electoral success in Brazil. We test this hypothesis in the 2002 elections using each candidate’s declared campaign expenditures (CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE). Because we include campaign expenditure in the model of the probability of victory, we believe that including it in the equation of career choice alongside the probability of victory is redundant and leads to the overestimation of the impact of the costs of running. Other costs, of a more personal nature could be included in the equation of career decision. Such costs are not readily measurable. In the case of open-list proportional representation system, with centralized budgetary power in the executive branch, there are several other hypotheses that explain electoral success in addition to the

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amount of money spent in the campaign (Ames 1995; Samuels 2000, 2002; Pereira and Renno 2003).

Performance of incumbents within their political parties A second set of variables is related to the performance of incumbents within parties. First, we have a count of the number of PARTY SWITCHES that a candidate did during the term. Following the literature on political parties, which claims that party is one of the main sources of candidate identification, party switches should have a negative impact on electoral success. A second variable is a measure of PARTY POSITION, or the incumbent’s position inside the hierarchy of the party. This variable is a dummy with the value of 1 indicating whether the incumbent is a party leader and 0 otherwise. Party leaders are more visible actors within and outside the chamber. We expect thus that being a party leader should payoff in elections. Finally, GOVERNING PARTY is a dummy variable with the value of 1 indicating if the incumbent is a member of center/right-wing party in Brazil, the coalition that supported President Fernando Cardoso’s administration and 0 otherwise. By belonging to the governing coalition, Center/right-wing party members used to have more access to pork barrel policies and patronage (Pereira and Mueller; 2004). Members of the governing coalition probably benefited in the 1998 election. In 2002, with the election of Lula, center/left-wing parties gained more seats in the Chamber, so the possible advantage Center/right-wing parties had diminished and probably this advantage has been transferred to the parties of the current governing coalition. Combining both periods, the contrary effects in the two elections should cancel out. In addition, political parties are seen as electorally weak in Brazil, so we do not expect that the partisan variables will have a dramatic impact on vote choice (Meneguello

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1994; Mainwaring 1999; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Kinzo 2004). Nevertheless, it is necessary to control for them.

Relationship between legislators and executive branch A third set of variables refer to the relationship between the incumbent and the executive branch. RUN FOR MAYOR is a dummy that indicates if the incumbent ran for mayor in the midterm election (1996 and 2000). Even when loosing the midterm election, running for mayor may foster incumbents’ electoral success because it enhances the visibility of the incumbent during the term and may affect name recognition in the subsequent election. Running for mayor should also be more strongly decisive for those who are running for higher office, simply because those who run for mayor demonstrate a predisposition to leave the Chamber and therefore are also more likely to run for and win offices outside the chamber. INDEX is a measure of voting favorably to the position of the executive branch in roll call votes. Given that the Federal Executive branch controls several institutional powers, including the power of the purse, being in the good graces of the president should have a strong impact on electoral success. Previous studies (Pereira and Renno, 2003) have suggested an indirect relationship between supporting the presidential agenda and electoral success. The literature on political psychology has also shown that voters do not store and use detailed factual information in their decision-making (Lodge et al. 1989; Lodge et al. 1995; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Keeping track of a representative’s votes on roll calls within the Chamber is clearly too costly for voters. However, by favoring presidential preferences, an incumbent gains access to resources controlled by the president (distribution of Federal monies) which might impact election outcomes.

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Incumbent’s performance inside the Chamber of Deputies The next set of variables refers to the role of incumbents inside the Chamber of Deputies. These variables indicate if the performance of the incumbent inside the Chamber fosters electoral success. We include in the equation indicators of having participated in a hierarchical or leader positions inside STANDING and SPECIAL COMMITTEES and the DIRECTING TABLE (which holds gate keeping power in the Chamber). We also have a measure of SENIORITY, indicated by the number of terms the incumbent has prior to the current one; number of projects in which the incumbent was a RAPPORTEUR within committees; and the number of legislative PROJECTS (projetos de lei) initiated by the incumbent that were approved on the floor. We expect these variables to have only a limited impact on incumbents’ electoral luck since the monitoring costs for voters are very high. Still, they should be included in the model because active participation in Congress increases incumbents’ access to resources, proximity with other important political actors in the executive branch, campaign financers, activists and lobbyists (Hall 1996). We also test for the impact of individual budgetary amendments. In Brazil, incumbents have the right to present 20 individual budgetary amendments up to R$3.5 million benefiting any locality or group they see fit. Most distribute amendments throughout their home states. However, presenting the amendment does not assure appropriation. Because of the contingent nature of the Brazilian budget, which just authorizes expenditures but not obliges the executive to comply with Congressional decision, the final word for the appropriation of amendments is given by the executive branch. We operationalized two variables indicating incumbents’ strategies for distributing amendments. First, we calculated the mean percentage of the total value of amendments presented by the Federal Deputy that were appropriated by the executive branch for the fouryear term (MEAN BUDGET). Second, we calculated the percentage of the value of

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amendments presented by an incumbent and appropriated by the executive branch favoring the municipality in which the Federal Deputy received most of his/her votes (MEAN PORK). In this way, we capture the different strategies incumbent may employ to take advantage of right to propose budgetary amendments. Our expectation is that having a higher percentage of the statewide amendments executed will have a positive impact on electoral success. On the other hand, concentration of amendments, similar to the impact of concentration of votes in a single locality, may not be so rewarding.

V. Data and Results Sample Issues: Why should we include ‘Suplentes’? To test these hypotheses, we rely on a unique dataset of incumbent’s electoral and legislative performances in the 1998 and 2002 Brazilian legislative elections. Our data include all of the variables mentioned above and is composed of all Federal Deputies, main office holders (titulares) and substitutes (suplentes), that held office in the 50th and 51st Legislatures. We believe it is important to include all politicians who held office in the Chamber because if we included only titulares, we would arbitrarily exclude from the population suplentes who held office for long periods of time. Just to recall, Federal Deputies in Brazil are allowed to take leaves of absence, without loosing their seats, to hold nonelectoral positions during their tenure. About 30% of main office holders take leaves of absence for positions in the federal and state level bureaucracies. This means that suplentes step in to substitute as titulares quite often. Our sample, therefore, is of all incumbents who held office during these two Legislatures.10 In our analysis, we add two controls for the possible fact that main office holders have a greater likelihood of winning office. First, we include a dummy variable identifying main office holders. In 1998, our sample includes 488 titulares and 120 suplentes. In 2002, there

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are 496 main office holders and 124 substitutes.11 Second, we created a variable for the percentage of days the incumbent held office during the legislature. In 1998, 78% of main office holders held office for all of the term and in 2002, 73% did so. Our data shows that main office holders who leave office to occupy positions on the bureaucracy (as Ministers or State Secretaries), stay away from the Chamber for only short periods of time. In fact, 90% of all incumbents in 1998 stayed in office for 90% or more of the duration of their terms. In 2002, 86% of incumbents stayed in office for 90% or more of the time. In other words, when considering the amount of time incumbents stay away from office, the leaves of absence appear to be only temporary. Almost all incumbents stay in office most of the time. When offered a position in the bureaucracy, an incumbent promptly accepts because she has nothing to loose. A position in the bureaucracy increases access to resources and name visibility. The position in the bureaucracy can be seen as a strategy to foster political survival; it is not a goal in itself. Holding a position in the bureaucracy is not a career objective per se. In fact, such an option cannot be seen as a career option simply because it is beyond the power of an incumbent to run for a bureaucratic office; it is not an elected office, which one can choose to run for. A politician does not choose to become a minister or state secretary; she is chosen to do so by the president or governor, not by the people. Hence, it is an option that lies outside incumbents’ career choice set and considering it a career goal or choice is a misconception of the true options that incumbents have in Brazil. In addition, among the incumbents who stay in the Chamber for over 90% of the time, 84% in 1998 and 80% in 2002, ran for reelection. Therefore, those who stay in the Chamber most of their term are the ones most likely to attempt reelection. It is noticeable that for the overwhelming majority of incumbents, staying in the Chamber is more than a fallback strategy; it is a true career option. Those who leave stay out temporarily and promptly return.

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The Choice of Political Career Incumbent Federal Deputies are allowed to take a leave of absence to run for mayor in the midterm election. If they win, they can renounce their term in the Chamber and take their position at the municipal office. If they lose, the Chamber welcomes them back with open arms. Hence, there is no risk of staying out of office if an incumbent decides to run for mayor. The worst thing that can happen is for the incumbent to be forced to return to Brasília (which, in some people’s opinion, can be seen as a punishment). In fact, most who run for mayor do return to Brasilia. In 1998 a very high percentage of incumbents, 19% (116 incumbents) ran for mayor. Of these, 35% (41) won, therefore exiting the Chamber halfway into their terms. In 2002, only 11% of all incumbents (69) ran for mayor and 25% of those who ran won (17), leaving the Chamber. There was an abrupt decrease in the pattern present in the 50th legislature and in the 49th. Hence, there is no clear trend that incumbents prefer to run for mayor, even though the system apparently stimulates such a choice. The constitutional reform of 1997 that allows mayors (and other executive posts) to run for one consecutive reelection might also be responsible for the decline in the number of mayoral candidates from 1996 to 2000. The low levels of electoral success may be the key to understand why only a minority of incumbents runs for mayor. We should also keep in mind that losing a mayoral race bears some costs. It is true that an incumbent who losses a midterm election for Mayor can automatically return to the Chamber. However, there are, for instance, reputation costs involved in loosing an election, especially in important municipalities with highly contested elections and equivalent media coverage. It is not uncommon to see powerful legislators return powerlessly to the Chamber after a smashing defeat in the midterm election. Thus, even with these potential reputation costs, running for mayor, even if one is to lose, should

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have a positive effect on an incumbent’s electoral success in the Chamber. The costs associated with loss, however, are very difficult to measure. The findings above indicate that a majority of incumbents do not run for mayor or exit the Chamber for offices for state and federal level bureaucracies for extended periods of time. They might prefer to do so, but their actual behavior gives no support for making such a claim. The absolute majority of incumbents stay in office for most of their terms. Our data indicate that only a small minority of incumbents displays ambivalent career patterns. Only a few alternate between the legislative and the executive branch. As preferences and behavior may not be the aligned, inferring that incumbent legislators prefer to run for reelection from their actual behavior of running more often for reelection could not be totally accurate. In order to have evidence that legislators’ preferences are consistent with their behavior of career choice, we conducted a survey with Federal Deputies in the current Legislature (52rd). We emailed three questions to all 513 incumbent legislators: 1) What is the best option for an incumbent legislator to run in the next election? 2) What is the easiest position to be elected in Brazil? And, what is the option of political career that provides more power and capacity of political influence? Each question offered nine possible alternatives in which legislators were invited to rank their preferences. Answers obtained for about 6% of legislators (26) suggest that running for reelection is the preferable option for incumbent legislators.12 Table 1 shows that the mean of running for reelection is greater and statistically different than any other option of career when legislators have to make career choices. The test of means also reveals that running for reelection is the career choice that more easily leads to electoral success when compared to other positions. In fact, according to this legislators’ survey, it is more difficult to be elected as a senator, mayor, governor, vice-governor, and even for the local council than to get reelected as a federal deputy. Finally, the survey shows that legislators do not see the national

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legislative career as either influential or powerful, when contrasted to the presidency, senate, or governorship. [Table 1 about here] What incumbents do prefer is to stay in power, to stay in office. They do so, preferably, by running for offices with small electoral risk and a high level of benefits. Our claim is that incumbents predominantly run for reelection, even in face of incentives contrary to static ambition, because it offers the best combination of benefits and costs. Most importantly, incumbents choose to run for reelection because this choice of career has the highest victory rate of all career choices. Table 2 shows the rate of victory for each different office in the 1998 and 2002 elections and the percentage of incumbents who attempted each office in parenthesis.13 This is the simplest form of showing that incumbents who run for reelection have a much higher success rate than those who run for any other office, including mayor. Running for mayor provides a totally distinct set of incentives in comparison to running for any other office. An incumbent only loses personal prestige and money when running for mayor. They can readily return to the Chamber if their mayoral attempt fails. Still, most do not run for mayor because the likelihood of victory is low. In addition, for those who ran for mayor and failed in the midterm elections, running for Federal Deputy in the subsequent general elections is the primary choice. Of those who ran for mayor in 1996, 56% ran for Federal Deputy in 1998, 8% ran for State Deputy, 2% ran for senator, 2% ran for governor and vice-governor, and 32% retired from politics. Of those who ran for mayor in 2000, 65% ran for Federal Deputy in 2002, 4% ran for State Deputy, 1% ran for senator, 3% ran for vice-governor, no one ran for governor, and 26% retired. So, even for those who ran for mayor, returning to the Chamber of Deputies was the principal choice, when one would assume that running for an office outside the chamber would be the

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most likely option. The reason for this is because running for Federal Deputy is the best option among all the different ones; modest risk and medium to high payoffs. [Table 2 about here] It is clear that running for Federal Deputy, i.e. running for reelection, is the safest option. About two-thirds of those who attempt reelection are successful in their bid. The second safest bet is to run for state deputy, what we refer to as a form of regressive ambition. The logic of using this oxymoron is that incumbents who run for state deputy, a position with lower resources and prestige, are still ambitious politicians. They still want to survive in politics, even if in a lower office. It is interesting to note that running for state deputy should have a higher probability of victory, given that there are always more offices available in such races. Empirically, however, this is not the case, which indicates that the relationship between number of offices and probability of victory is not linear. This further enforces our point that the probability of victory is the least predictable of all components of career calculi. The other three options - running for vice-governor, for governor, and for senator are considered forms of progressive ambition. All have much lower rates of success. When these options are aggregated, the combined rate of success is 26% in 1998 and 27% in 2002. Therefore, it is clear that those who run for reelection start out with a higher average probability of winning.

Reelection: a formula for electoral success? Looking only at the percentage of victory is identical to analyzing a naïve model, one where the personal characteristics of each individual incumbent is ignored. Obviously, some incumbents are more likely to win office than others. This leads us to the second form of evaluating the likelihood of victory; by modeling electoral success. Our next step is to

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compare the mean predicted probabilities estimated after modeling the electoral success of incumbents running for different offices. We estimate the predicted probability taking into consideration various factors that may influence electoral success. We then analyze the predicted probabilities estimated for electoral success in races for the different offices using the model of electoral success laid out above.14 Table 3 below reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. The dependent variables below are dummies, therefore we use probit estimation. The first explanatory variable, in column 2, indicates those who got reelected. The second focuses on those who obtained success with higher office (senate and governor) and the third focuses on the electoral success of those who won for offices outside the Chamber (higher offices and state deputy).15 Standard errors are estimated using the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator and are adjusted for clustering at the individual level, since some incumbents who ran for office appear twice in the sample because we pooled the 50th and 51st legislatures. We also included a dummy variable to distinguish between the two different election years. In 2002 the birthright candidate rule (candidato nato) was extinguished, so differences between the two years can be partially attributed to this institutional variation. All the continuous independent variables (lag vote, electoral concentration, seniority, party switches, campaign expenditures, mean budget, mean pork, index, projects, and percentage days) were centered at the state mean and the mean for each office. In this way, we increase the comparability between incumbents given that they compete directly with other challengers for to the same office at the state level.16 [Table 3 about here]

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It is not our goal here to discuss the impact of every single variable. Our goal is to use the above model to estimate the improvement in the overall predicted probability of victory. Through the model we estimate the predicted probability of winning reelection for each incumbent and are then in the position to compare these probabilities across offices. However, it is interesting to point out some results that have a direct bearing on the current debate about reelection in Brazil: mainly, the use of individual budgetary amendments for electoral purposes. There are three basic views about the impact of budgetary amendments in electoral success. The first view is that the use of budgetary amendments directly and positively affects electoral success (Ames 1995; Pereira and Renno 2003; Pereira and Mueller 2004). The second is that the appropriation of budgetary amendments does not affect electoral success at all (Figueiredo and Limongi 2004). The third is that budgetary amendments indirectly affect electoral success by first increasing campaign donors interest in funding candidates. Campaign expenditures, not budgetary amendments, would then have a direct effect on electoral success (Samuels 2002). We find that the appropriation of individual budgetary amendments throughout the state (MEAN BUDGET) has a direct and positive effect in electoral success for all offices, confirming Ames’, Pereira and Renno’s, and Pereira and Mueller’s previous studies. Therefore, the evidence clearly negates the validity of Figueiredo and Limongi’s claim that individual amendments do not affect electoral success.17 It also puts into question Samuels’ claim that amendments only have an indirect impact. In addition, campaign expenditures do not statistically affect electoral success, further contradicting Samuels’ explanation of the electoral connection in Brazil (2002). Our findings indicate that the impact of incumbents’ average execution of amendments impacts their electoral success even when controlling for campaign expenditures.18

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Finally, it is also necessary to highlight that budgetary amendments are only effective when distributed throughout the entire state. When they are centralized in the deputy’s main electoral stronghold (MEAN PORK), it has no effect in electoral success. Therefore, the strategy employed in distributing budgetary amendments, concentrating or dispersing, has a decisive impact on candidates’ electoral performance. Given that this is the first time that a systematic analysis of electoral success for different offices has been made in Latin America, it is worthwhile comparing how the impact of the variables in electoral success varies by office. First, it is clear that the same variables do not affect electoral success for the different offices. Only three of them, allocation of budgetary amendments (MEAN BUDGET), lagged vote, and mean electoral competition at the district level impact the outcomes of all career choices. Those who run for any office benefit from executing budgetary amendments and are hurt by electoral competition at the district level. There are several differences between the determinants of electoral success for the different offices. Those who seek offices outside the chamber are better off by taking long leaves of absence. Incumbents who have career goals outside the chamber fare better by staying most of their terms outside Congress, closer to state and local politics. There is a negative statistically significant impact of percentage of days in office on winning offices outside the Chamber. Other differences are related to measures of incumbents’ relationship with the executive branch: running for mayor and supporting the president. Running for mayor in the midterm elections has a very strong positive effect in influencing the outcome of elections for offices outside the chamber. Those who run for mayor probably tend to increase their name visibility during their tenure, since they are more often in the public’s eye because of shorter intermissions between campaigns. Also, supporting the president in roll call voting has a

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positive impact in influencing the electoral success of those who run for offices outside the chamber, especially when running for state deputy is considered (column 4 on table 3). This indicates that being an ally of the president pays off when seeking offices outside the chamber.19

The Predicted Probability of Victory: The Reason to Run for Reelection Our main goal, however, is to evaluate how the model affects the predicted probability of victory. The results on table 4 indicate that the predicted probability of victory is still much higher for running for reelection. Furthermore, the standard errors (in parenthesis) show that there is less variation in the predicted probability for those who run for Federal Deputy. [Table 4 about here] In conclusion, it is clear that running for reelection has the highest mean predicted probability and the smallest standard error. Running for offices outside the chamber, either exclusively higher offices, or combined with lower offices, has a smaller probability of victory and a higher standard error. In other words, the uncertainty of victory is higher when running for offices outside the Chamber of Deputies. Running for reelection has a more predictable outcome.

IV. Conclusion: implications for legislative politics and professionalization While some pundits criticize high reelection rates as evidence of a “political mafia,” the maintenance of a core of specialized and experienced legislators is widely seen as essential to an effective and efficient legislature. Where legislators have experience and specialization, they can effectively oversee bureaucracy, provide a counter-weight to the powerful executive branch (in presidential systems), and generally produce higher quality

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policy and legislation. Many systems, however, lack experienced legislatures; turnover is frequent, and a legislative term is merely a brief stop on the path to other political opportunities. In some systems (Costa Rica and Mexico, for example) immediate reelection is prohibited by Constitutional or other legal restrictions. But in most Latin American countries, reelection rates are a function of legislators’ career ambition. Where legislative seats are valuable career goods, reelection rates should be high. Consequently, if the legislature does not foster long-lasting careers where politicians can gain necessary experience and knowledge to become professionals, reelection rates should be low and the chances of the legislative branch becoming a central actor in policy formulation are bleak. Despite the fact that Deputies have improved their direct and indirect salaries20 and also can hire and pay reasonable salaries to professional staff, the Brazilian Congress seemingly does not provide enough professional nor institutional incentives for incumbents to seek reelection. In reality, it is quite the opposite. The decision-making process in the Chamber is centralized on the hands of few legislators; the executive interferes constantly in legislative business by issuing decrees (Medidas Provisorias) and unilaterally calling urgency time procedures on specific bills; individual legislator can be substituted at any time from Standing and Special committees which decreases incentives for specialization and experience; legislators are not allowed to initiate legislation on specific issue areas such as budgetary and administrative policies; etc. Immersed in such an unwelcoming institutional environment, it is puzzling that the great majority of legislators keep running for reelection. This paper argued the reason that incumbents tend to run for reelection is that the career decision Federal Deputies make is mostly determined by the predictability of electoral success. In other words, Federal Deputies’ choices of career are guided not only by the incentives of the position pursued,

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such as a higher stipend or a bigger staff, but also by the electoral viability of that choice. The higher utility of being elected to these offices is weighed against the risks and costs one must incur. Still, the choice of career is driven by the probability of success of each option available. That is why, when confronted with the classical dilemma enunciated in the epigraph, a majority of incumbents decide to stay. If they decide to go, they are destined to electoral trouble. Brazil’s case also provides evidence that challenges theoretical arguments suggesting a direct relationship between the organization of Congress and career choice, as pointed out by Mayhew’s now classic idea of electoral connection. Although we believe that reelection oriented legislators have more incentives to increase the internal complexity of the legislative body, professionalization is not directly driven by legislators’ career goals and ambition in Brazil. We provide supporting evidence for Swift’s idea that legislative organization and career goals are only ephemerally related to each other (1988). She bases her claim on the finding that legislators’ career goals and electoral success were high in the early American House of Representatives during the domination of Speaker’s era (1789 to 1914). In those days, decision making in the House was more centralized and committee chairs subordinated to the Speaker. Swift argues that political party strength and realignment is a more likely explanation for the internal organization of the American House than legislators’ career ambition. The organizational structure of the current Brazilian Chamber of Deputies resembles that of the early American House of Representatives. However, in Brazil, we claim that the way the Chamber is organized is much more a consequence of a preponderance of the executive branch on policymaking than to career ambitions. Otherwise, one would expect a Congress with more budgetary powers and professional incentives. Rather, the Constitution

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of 1988 and the Rules of the Chamber (Regimento Interno) clearly give the Executive branch more legislative and budgetary power than Congress. The previous democratic design (19461964), marked by an institutionally weak president and a Congress with decentralized decision-making process, was prone to deadlock and stalemate (Santos 1986; Santos and Renno 2004). The founders of the new political order that emerged after 1988 chose to delegate a bulk of powers to the Executive in order to reach governability and exorcise the spectrum of political instability, without changing electoral rules that facilitate legislators’ electoral survival. In other words, legislators chose to construct governability by altering executive-legislative relations instead of changing voter-representative relations via open-list proportional representation. That is, deputies traded influence in the policy-making process for maintaining the electoral system, which favored their reelection goal, intact. Thus, deputies extract benefits from the electoral system since the majority of them get reelected. Deputies play according to the rules of the game and they are quite proficient in doing it.

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References: Abrucio, Fernando. Os Barões da Federação. São Paulo: Hucitec Press, 1998. Ames, Barry. “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation” American Journal of Political Science 39 (2):406-433, 1995. __________. “Electoral Rules, Constituencies Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress.” The Journal of Politics 57 (2): 324-343, 1995a. __________. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001. Amorim Neto, Octavio; Gary Cox; and Mathew McCubbins, “Agenda Power in Brazil’s Camara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998” World Politics, 55 (4): 550-578, 2003. Bickers, Kenneth and Stein, Roberts “The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel” American Journal of Political Science, 40 (4): 1300-1326, 1996. Carson, Jamie, “Strategy, Selection and Candidate Competition in House and Senate Elections” The Journal of Politics, 67 (1): 01-28, 2005. Carson, Jamie and Roberts, Jason, “Strategic Politicians and U.S. House Elections, 18741914” The Journal of Politics, 67 (2): 474-496, 2005. Crisp, Brian F., and Ingall, Rachael E. “Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia” American Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 733-48, 2002. Figueiredo, Argelina and Limongi, Fernando, Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional. São Paulo: FGV Press, 1999. Fenno, Richard. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978.

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Hall, Richard and Van Houweling, Robert “Avarice and Ambition: Representatives’ Decisions to Run for or Retire from the U.S. House”. American Political Science Review, 89 (1): 121-136, 1994. Hall, Richard. Participation in Congress New Haven: Yale University Press 1996. Hibbing, John R. “Legislative Careers: Why and how we should Study them.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (2): 149-171. 1999. Kernell, Samuel. “To Stay, To Quit, or to Move Up: Explaining the Growth of Careerism in the House of Representatives, 1878-1940.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia-PA. August 28-31, 2003. Jacobsen, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Election Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983. Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Zeng, Langche. “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decision, 1947-1986.” The American Political Science Review, 87 (4): 928-941, 1993. Kinzo, Maria D’Alva. “Partidos, Eleições e Democracia no Brasil pós-1985” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19: 23-40 2004. Leoni, Eduardo, Carlos Pereira; and Lucio Renno. “Political Survival Strategies: Political Career Decisions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.” Journal of Latin American Studies, 36 (1): 109-130, 2004. Lodge, Milton; McGraw, Kathleen; and Stroh, Patrick. “An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation” American Political Science Review 83: 399-419, 1989. Lodge, M., Steenbergen, M. and Brau, S. “The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation” American Political Science Review, 89: 30926, 1995.

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Lupia, Arthur. “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections” American Political Science Review 88 (1): 63-76, 1994. Lupia, Arthur and McCubbins, Mathew. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Mainwaring, Scott P. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Mayhew, David, Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press 1974. Meneguello, Rachel, “Partidos e Tendências de Compartamento: O Cenário Político em 1994.” In Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil, São Paulo: Brasiliense Press, 1994. Patzelt, Werner. “Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (2): 239-279. 1999. Pereira, Carlos and Renno, Lucio, “Successful Reelection Strategies in Brazil: The Electoral Impact of Distinct Institutional Incentives.” Electoral Studies, 22 (3): 425-448, 2003. Pereira, Carlos, Timothy Power, and Lucio Renno. “Under What Conditions do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case” The Journal of Politics, 67 (1): 178-200, 2005. Pereira, Carlos and Muller, Bernardo. “Partidos Fracos na Arena Eleitoral e Partidos Fortes na Arena Legislativa: A Conexão Eleitoral no Brasil” Dados, 46(4): 735-771, 2004. Rohde, David. 1979. “Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the Members of the United States House of Representatives” American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1): 1-26.

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Samuels, David. “Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil” Legislative Studies Quarterly XXV (3):481-497, 2000. ____________. “Incumbents and Challengers on a Level Playing Field: Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance in Brazil.” The Journal of Politics, 63 (2): 569-584, 2001. ____________. “Pork-Barreling is Not Credit-Claiming or Advertising: Campaign Finance and the Sources of the Personal Vote in Brazil.” The Journal of Politics, 64 (3): 345863, 2002. ____________. Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Santos, Fabiano. “Recruitment and Retention of Legislators in Brazil” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (2): 209-237. 1999. Santos, Fabiano and Renno, Lucio. “The Selection of Committee Leadership in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies” The Journal of Legislative Studies, 10 (1): 50-70, 2004. Santos, Wanderley G. Sessenta e Quatro: Anatomia da Crise. São Paulo: Vértice Press, 1986. Stein, Robert and Bickers, Kenneth. “Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel” The Journal of Politics, 56 (2): 377-399, 1994. Squire, Peverill. “Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures” The Journal of Politics, 50 (3): 726-744, 1988. Swift, Elaine. “The Electoral Connection Meets the Past: Lessons from Congressional History, 1789-1899” Political Science Quarterly, 102 (4): 625-645, 1987.

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Box 1: The Puzzling Brazilian Political Incentives for High Reelection Attempt Literature’s Prediction Institutional Feature

Electoral Outcome

High Professional and Institutional Legislative Environment Low Professional and Institutional Legislative Environment

High Reelection Attempt

Low Reelection Attempt

Brazilian Congress Low Professional and Institutional Legislative Environment

High Reelection Attempt

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Table 1: Difference between Running for Reelection and other Elected Positions (Test of Means) President

Reelection

Senate

State Deputy

Mayor

Vice Mayor

Question 1: Mean Standard Deviation Z test

What is the best option for an incumbent legislator to run in the next election? a 4.3810 7.9130 6.5000 3.7619 6.1364 2.7273 2.9236

1.4744

Governor

ViceGovernor

Local Council

7.2273

4.7143

1.5238

1.7928

1.4458

2.3764

1.4859

1.1925

1.4193

0.9808

2.9822 ***

9.8479 ***

3.1123 ***

12.1366 ***

1.7716 *

7.6573 ***

17.6758 ***

Question 2: Mean Standard Deviation Z test

What is the easiest position to be elected in Brazil? b 8.7143 3.3478 6.5455 3.3333

4.5909

2.6190

6.2727

4.3810

4.4762

Question 3: Mean Standard Deviation Z test

What is the option of political career that provides more power and capacity of political influence? c 9.0000 5.4348 7.0870 3.9545 4.8182 1.9091 7.6522 3.9545

5.2846 ***

0.7171

1.7480

-13.9150 ***

0.0000

0.8958

1.7655

1.7416

1.8168

1.5322

2.0744

1.8296

3.0922

-6.3054 ***

0.0288

-2.4155 **

1.5360

-5.2823 ***

-2.0002 *

-1.5562

0.6683

0.8439

1.7358

0.6102

0.8317

1.5000

1.5577

0.8018

-19.4986 -7.2423 5.8926 1.5465 15.9365 -8.8871 4.0357 *** *** *** *** *** *** N = 26. Level of Statistical Confidence: 2.72 = 1% ***, 2.04 = 5% ** and 1.67 = 10% *. a The highest preference is represented by the number 9 and the lowest by the number 1. b The most difficult position is represented by the number 9 and the easiest position by the number1. c The most powerful of political career is represented by the number 9 and the least powerful position by the number 1.

16.0346 ***

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Table 2: Federal Deputies’ Career Choice and Electoral Success: 1998 and 2002. 1998 Election

2002 Election

Office Run (%)

Success (%)

Run (%)

Success (%)

Federal Deputy

75

65

71

68

State Deputy

04

55

04

43

Mayor (in midterm election)

19

35

11

25

Vice-Governor

02

38

01

13

Senate

03

19

05

34

Governor

01

14

02

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Table 3: Probit estimates (probabilities of change) for winning Reelection, winning Higher Office and winning Offices outside the Chamber* Run for Run for Run for Offices Higher Variables outside Reelection Office Chamber Control for Main Office Holder Main Office Holder 0.11* Percentage Days -0.05 -0.42** -0.69*** Electoral Variables Campaign Expenditure 0.000 0.000 -0.000 Lag Vote 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** Electoral Concentration -0.33*** 0.08 0.66** Mean Candidate per District -0.02** -0.05** -0.06** Performance in Political Party Party Switches -0.05** 0.04 0.12** Party Position 0.03 0.008 0.05 Governing Party 0.05 -0.11 -0.15 Relation with Executive Branch Index -0.02 0.43** 0.75** Run for Mayor 0.03 0.73** 0.85*** Performance in Congress Senior -0.01 -0.07** -0.09** Directing Table 0.03** 0.005 0.02 Standing Committee 0.006 0.02 0.05* Special Committee -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** Rapporteur Mean Budget 0.16* 0.52*** 0.67** Mean Pork 0.03 0.03 -0.18 Projects 0.06 -0.11 -0.23 Controls Businessperson -0.12*** -0.05 0.004 Election Year – 2002 -0.04 0.09 0.19 N 829 71 84 Pseudo R-Squared 12% 51% 47% *Statistical significance denoted by *; where * equals p-value < 0.1, ** equals p-value