Somali and Ethiopian Diasporic Engagement for ...

Somali and Ethiopian Diasporic Engagement for Peace in the Horn of Africa Author(s): Markus Virgil Hoehne, Dereje Feyissa, Mahdi Abdile Source: African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 71-99 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.1.1.71 . Accessed: 06/04/2011 16:25 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iupress. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Somali and Ethiopian Diasporic Engagement for Peace in the Horn of Africa Markus Virgil Hoehne, Dereje Feyissa, and Mahdi Abdile1 Abstract: This article examines the complexities and multi-

ple layers of diasporic engagement in homeland peacebuilding in Somalia and Ethiopia. The study challenges the negative perception of diasporas as conflict drivers and unscrupulous long-distance nationalists. It identifies three major contributions of diasporic engagement to peacebuilding in the conflictridden Horn of Africa. First, remittances from the diaspora enhance family economic survival, community stabilization, and economic activities in the absence of effective state institutions. Second, diasporic engagement enhances the space for greater contestation of ideas and broadens the range of political options for the homelanders. Finally, direct and indirect diasporic peace initiatives in the homelands, especially at the local level, have the potential to induce moderate social and economic development and hope for a brighter postwar future. This gives people a stake in their polity and contributes to peace.

Keywords: diaspora, conflict, peacebuilding, Somalia,

Ethiopia

African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, issue 1, volume 1 pgs. 71–99 Spring, 2011. ©Indiana University Press All Rights of reproduction in any form reserved

African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review

volu m e 1 is su e 1

I. Introduction Due to conflict, violence, and lack of development, many people have fled Ethiopia and Somalia since the second half of the twentieth century in search of peace and a better life. Despite their physical absence from their homelands, many Somalis and Ethiopians abroad have remained engaged in the political, economic, and social life of their native countries and communities. This article examines a very special aspect of diasporic engagement, namely: the engagement in peacebuilding in the country of origin. In the context of this study, peacebuilding is defined as the nonviolent activities of various actors, including individuals and groups, aimed at sustainable transformation of the structures and patterns that foster conflict. This definition goes back to Johan Galtung’s understanding of peace, conflict, and nonviolent conflict-transformation. Galtung (1996: 31–33) distinguished negative peace from positive peace: negative peace is simply the absence of violence, while positive peace enables individuals, groups, and “systems” (including nature) to coexist and develop peacefully. Conflict is perceived as arising from the incompatibility of goals among individuals or within groups (Galtung 1996: 70–71). Galtung (1996: 2–7) also made a distinction between direct and indirect violence. The latter is also called structural violence. Direct violence can be traced back to a “sender” who intended the violent consequences of his/her actions. In contrast, structural violence is rooted in the social, economic, or cultural conditions prevailing within or between societies. Nonviolent conflict transformation entails the struggle to overcome the actions and structures breeding conflict by peaceful means. This requires the identification of the causes of conflict, the search for constructive alternatives for all parties involved, and the creation of new social, economic, and political conditions (Galtung 1996: 114–26). For Galtung (1996: 90), who invoked Ghandi, conflict “‘solution”’ is at best a temporary goal. In his view, conflict transformation is a continuous process that may even bring new contradictions and conflicts. Drawing upon Galtung’s emphasis on structural factors and patterns, this study takes into account the social and economic inequalities, the religious, ethnic, and clan antagonisms, the culture of violence (following decades of guerrilla struggle and civil war), and the discrimination and political oppression that typify Somalia and Ethiopia. Diasporas constitute a particular form of group identity. However, Sökefeld (2006: 280) noted that “the development of diaspora 72

Di a sp or ic E ng ag e m e n t for pe ac e

Hoehne, Feyissa, and Abdile

identity is not simply a natural and inevitable result of migration but a historical contingency that frequently develops out of mobilization in response to specific critical events.” Moreover, diasporas are heterogeneous groups whose members are “stratified by class, caste, education, occupation, religious affiliation, cultural interests, urban or rural background” (Werbner 1999: 24). Clearly, the Somali and Ethiopian diasporas are not unified communities. They have significant ideological, religious, ethnic, clan, gender, and generational differences. This article addresses two main questions. First, what are the chances of Somali and Ethiopian diasporic actors contributing to peacebuilding in their respective homelands? Second, what is the nature of their peacebuilding contributions? These are important questions that have not been sufficiently studied. As Lyons (2004: 6) pointed out, “research on conflict-generated diasporas and their roles in homeland conflict is new and more case studies need to be conducted.” This article is a contribution to the emerging research on the nexus between peace and conflict in diasporic engagement. The study identifies two broad forms of diasporic contributions to peacebuilding: direct and indirect contributions. Direct contributions refer to personal or financial interventions in homeland conflict with the aim of preventing the escalation of or settling a conflict. These kinds of activities have been critical particularly in Somaliland and Somalia, where the state is either very weak or barely exists. Direct contributions to peacbuilding tend to be minimal in countries where the government is relatively strong and eager to preserve its sovereignty in domestic matters, as in Ethiopia. The most typical and significant form of diasporic contribution to peacebuilding is indirect engagement. This comprises contributing to family economic survival, providing forums for discussing and developing political alternatives and reforms, and supporting infrastructure development such as schools and hospitals. Through these contributions, diasporic actors have helped transform some of the structural conflict factors and patterns prevailing in Somalia and Ethiopia. This is essentially long-term peacebuilding. This study focuses largely on the indirect contributions of diasporic actors to peacebuilding. The study is based on field research in Ethiopia, Somaliland, and some parts of northeast and central Somalia. The research was conducted by three principal researchers between November 2008 and mid-2009. Each researcher conducted his individual research, but during the process the researchers were in contact and met 73



occasionally to discuss results. The data were collected through open and semistructured interviews, focus-group discussions, and participant observations.

II. The Horn of Conflict The Horn of Africa is a highly volatile and conflict-ridden region (Markakis 2003; Cliffe, Love and Tronvoll 2009; Shinn 2010). In the second half of the 20th century it was characterized by a host of civil wars and interstate violent conflicts. In the 1960s, for example, the so called “Greater Somalia” policy of the postcolonial Somali governments in Mogadishu led to major conflicts with Kenya and Ethiopia (Matthies 1977). The Somali civil war began in the 1980s as opposition against the dictatorial government of Mohamed Siyad Barre mounted (1969–1991). The two key armed opponents of the government were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). Both were hosted by Ethiopia. While the SSDF fell apart in 1985, the SNM continued the struggle. The SNM had its support base among the members of the Isaaq clanfamily in northwestern Somalia. More guerrilla groups emerged in the late 1980s. Mohamed Siyad Barre was finally overthrown in January 1991. The lack of agreement among the various Somali guerrilla groups led to new violence and the complete collapse of the Somali state. In 1991, the northwestern region unilaterally seceded from the rest of Somalia and became the Republic of Somaliland. In the northeast, Puntland was founded as an autonomous region in 1998. Southern Somalia, which is still in war, is plagued by external military interventions, proxy-wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and militant Islamists and criminals taking advantage of the statelessness for their parochial objectives (Prunier 1995; Menkhaus 2007; Human Rights Watch 2008; Marchal 2009; Hoehne 2009a; Adam 2010). In contrast, Somaliland and Puntland in the north have become relatively peaceful. Over the past two decades, there has been social, political, and economic reconstruction in the north. These developments are mostly the result of the effective and innovative interventions of local traditional authorities, community leaders, and diasporic actors (War-torn Societies Project 2001, 2005; Kleist 2008; Horst 2008; Terlinden and Ibrahim 2008; Ibrahim 2010; Hoehne 2010a). In Ethiopia, ethno-national guerrilla groups struggled against the government in Addis Ababa since the 1960s. Some of them wanted to 74



establish their own independent state, whereas others sought to renegotiate their marginality within the Ethiopian polity. The most prominent guerrilla groups were the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). For years the TPLF and the EPLF cooperated closely against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF formed an alliance with other ethno-liberation groups and established the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in the late 1980s. The EPRDF seized power in Ethiopia, while the EPLF captured Eritrea. The EPRDF restructured the Ethiopian state into an ethnic federation. The good relations between EPRDF and EPLF made it easier for Eritrea to officially gain its independence in 1993 with the backing of the new government in Addis Ababa. Eritrea experienced a short period of reconstruction and recovery. However, the conflicting projects of state-building, failure to devise a mutually acceptable economic arrangement, and a border dispute with Ethiopia led to a devastating war between 1998 and 2000 (Negash and Tronvoll 2000). After the peace agreement of 2000, the conflict continued in the form of a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in collapsed Somalia. Since the mid-1990s, Ethiopia has increasingly become a singleparty state dominated by the EPRDF, within which the TPLF continues to be the dominant political force. The TPLF leadership claims to represent the Tigrean ethnic group from northern Ethiopia (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Clapham 2009). In 2005, the EPRDF allowed free multiparty elections. However, according to independent election observers, the EPRDF rigged the results after it became clear that the opposition parties had won a large share of the votes. Violence erupted in June 2005, and until November of that year many people were killed and huge numbers of people were jailed (ICG 2009). The Ethiopian government is still being challenged by ethno-nationalist organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (Asafa 2005; Hagmann 2005; Samatar 2004). Also, the uneasy relationship among the various religious groups in Ethiopia and their volatile relation with the government has resulted in violent religious conflicts (Hussein 2006). According to the 2007 census, the three largest religious groups among the approximately 80 million Ethiopians are Orthodox Christians (43.5%), Muslims (34%), and Protestants (18.6%). Many Muslims have contested this result and claim that their number is actually higher. Several researchers have noted the steadily increasing role of religious and 75



interfaith conflicts in defining the terms of political debate in Ethiopia, which was hitherto dominated by ethnicity (Hussein 2006; Bahru 2008). The main parties to the conflict are members of the historically dominant Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Muslims. The Muslims are currently calling for a redefinition of Ethiopian national identity to recognize the Islamic heritage of the country. Members of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora play an important role in this process.

III. Diasporas for Peace Until recently, the contribution of diaspora actors to the escalation or perpetuation of conflict has dominated the literature (Anderson 1992: 12–13.; Kaldor 2001: 7–9; Demmers 2002, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 575).2 Leroy and Mohan (2003: 612) have noted the emergence of a more balanced view of diaspora contributions that takes into account both the negative and positive consequences of diasporic engagement. This engagement takes place primarily through two forms of remittances, namely: economic (i.e., financial) and social. Economic and social remittances are critical to understanding the political, economic, social, and cultural engagement of diasporic actors in their homelands. Economic remittances contribute to household survival. In some countries, remittance accounts for a considerable part of national revenue. In the case of Somaliland, remittances are by far the biggest source of national revenue. Menkhaus (2009a: 189) observed that “[e]conomically, the US$500 million to US$1 billion that the Somali diaspora remits annually to relatives in Somalia dwarfs all other sources of revenue in Somalia and essentially floats an otherwise dysfunctional economy.” A good part of this money actually flows to Somaliland. Lubkeman (2008) argues that despite their seemingly limited focus on the family, individual financial remittances can contribute to overall political stability, economic development, and structural changes in a country. In countries characterized by long civil wars and high unemployment, individual remittances can keep people away from crime and violence (Lubkeman 2008). Another area of diaspora investment at the family level is education. Relatives in the diaspora often finance the education of their younger relatives back home. Diaspora associations sometimes support infrastructure projects, such as the building of schools, roads, or hospitals. Private investments from the diaspora in the local economy are also important drivers of economic growth in the countries of origin (Ibrahim 2010). 76



Despite its positive contributions, monetary support from abroad has its downsides. Economic remittances can be used to finance wars (Maimbo 2006). Armed movements such as the SNM in northern Somalia, the EPLF in Eritrea, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka were all financed through the diaspora (Shain 2003; Reno 2003; Orjuela 2008; Radtke 2009). Another negative effect of economic remittances is diaspora dependency. Able-bodied individuals may rely entirely on remittances, instead of engaging in productive economic activities. Similarly, governments may neglect their responsibilities to provide basic services, such as education, with the hope that diaspora communities will fill the blanks (Menkhaus 2009a: 193). Social remittances refer to the ideas, values, norms, and information that diasporic actors, who gained particular experiences, knowledge, and skills from abroad bring to their homelands (Levitt 1998). One notable example of social remittances is the political engagement of diasporic actors.3 Social remittances tend to have beneficial effects on peacebuilding and political stability when sincere and skilled personalities invest their social and cultural capitals gained while living abroad. The effort of the April 2007 delegation of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora is a case in point. Its activities, which are outlined in detail below, were inspired by the values of cultural and religious pluralism that they experienced while living in Europe and North America. It is also possible, however, that diaspora actors pursue their individual interests at the cost of the people at home. In the worst cases, politicians who returned to their homeland could simply go back to their countries of residence when their political ambitions “at home” fail to materialize. They often leave behind a political mess with which the locals have to deal (Ibrahim 2010). A typical example is the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in southern Somalia, which is staffed by Somalis from abroad. The indications are that some of the people are not seriously committed to staying in war-torn Somalia and working for the betterment of the fragmented society (Sheikh and Healy 2009). Despite the recent debates about diasporic and transnational communities as social formations across and beyond the borders of nation states (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Appadurai 1996), the role of states remains vital in many regards (Wayland 2004 in Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009). States can actively engage or co-opt diasporic and transnational actors in their own self-serving policies (Glick Schiller 2005). Furthermore, they can take punitive measures against threats emanating from 77



transnational and diasporic civil society activism. The January 2010 Civil Society Law in Ethiopia, for instance, prohibits foreign NGOs, including those founded by the diaspora or with diapora support, from engaging in core issues such as human rights, conflict settlement and reconciliation, citizenship and community development, and justice and law enforcement services. These restrictions on NGO activities also diminish the scope of possible partners for local and diasporic Ethiopian actors who engage in human rights, conflict settlement, and other “sensitive” issues. This law “may be a reaction to the monetary support received by the opposition during the 2005 elections from the (mostly US-based) diaspora, and the fear among top EPRDF echelons of a foreign supported ‘velvet revolution’ removing them from power in 2010” (Cliffe et al. 2009: 154). In Somalia and Somaliland, where government structures are nonexistent or extremely weak, diaspora actors face different, but equally difficult conditions (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009). In particular, they have to take into account the existing insecurity and violence, which sometimes make their engagement impossible. Moreover, they have to carry the burden of caring for their relatives and loved ones “at home” since no state institutions would provide basic services such as healthcare or education. Western politics and legal restrictions to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks on the United States also have strong impacts particularly on the activities of Muslim diasporic communities. In November 2001, for instance, the United States declared Al Barakaat, the then biggest Somali Hawala company doing money transfers to the Horn of Africa, an organization supporting terrorism. It was suspected that some of the money transferred by Al Barakaat would benefit Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida.4 The accounts of the company were frozen and remittances worth millions of US dollars were held, which had severe effects on Somali families. Since then, Al Barakaat, which closed down its operations, has been replaced by other Somali Hawala companies (Schlee 2004; Lindley 2009). Economic and social remittances from the diaspora can contribute to both conflict escalation and peacebuilding. This is in part because diasporas are diverse communities and do not necessarily form a common platform to influence their homeland. The differences within a particular diaspora partly mirror the fragmented social and political landscape of the homeland and partly emanate from different sets of diasporic experiences in the host country. Women, for instance, may experience being abroad differently than men; and youngsters differently than 78



the older generations. Divisions within the diaspora can have negative (conflict-driving) and positive (peacebuilding) impacts on diasporic engagement. This study fittingly explores the complexities of diasporic engagement in peacebuilding in Somalia and Ethiopia. The specific case studies discussed below include individual and collective engagements most notably in local development, conflict mediation, and the struggle for basic social and political rights.

IV. Diasporic Engagement in Somalia Somalis constitute a sizable global diaspora comprising about one million people (Sheikh and Healy 2009).5 There are large Somali communities in the United States, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Australia, and other countries. The out-migration of Somalis is largely the result of four factors: first, educational and labor policies during the colonial era; second, attraction of better economic opportunities in the Middle East and in the West; third, political repression under Siyad Barre’s rule; and fourth, ongoing civil war and violence caused by external intervention (Ahmed 2000; Gundel 2002; Pérouse de Montclos 2003; Menkhaus 2009a; Sheikh and Healy 2009; Hoehne 2010a). Members of the Somali diaspora support their families through financial remittances and contribute to the general development of their home areas through infrastructure-building and businesses (Kent et al. 2004; Cassanelli 2007; Horst 2008; Ibrahim 2010). However, there are some in the Somali diaspora who support insurgents or clan militias. Some Somali guerrilla organizations, such as the SNM, have historically been financed by the diaspora (Reno 2003; Bakonyi 2009). More recently, the United Islamic Courts (UIC), Al Shabaab, and Hisbul Islam are examples of groups supported by the diaspora (Menkhaus 2009b).6 The Somali diaspora also provides significant assistance to various political authorities back home. The TFG in southern Somalia, the governments of Somaliland and Puntland, and local “traditional” authorities in the countryside have all benefited from diasporic support (Horst 2008; Kleist 2008; Sheikh and Healy 2009). Arguably, peace and stability in Somaliland has been maintained by the joint efforts of diasporic and local actors. In the absence of international recognition for this de facto state, the diaspora constitutes the vital lifeline that guarantees the political and economic survival of this polity (Hoehne 79



2010a). However, members of the Somali diaspora seem to be mired by the complexities of the local setting, which often includes local conflicts driven by personal and clan rivalries. This has reflected negatively on their engagements. The following brief case-studies highlight the difficulties of diasporic peacebuilding.7 The first case concerns an individual diaspora actor from the United Kingdom and his extended family. Genealogically, he belongs to the Dhulbahante clan, which is part of the Harti clan-confederation. In 2008, the man had returned to a small town called Galgal in the Sool region of eastern Somaliland. Sool is one of the most underdeveloped regions of Somaliland. It is predominantly inhabited by Dhulbahante, but some Isaaq clans resided in the western part of the region. The presence of effective government structures there is very limited, compared with the other parts of the country.8 The diasporic actor considered Galgal his hometown. He started building a house and a well next to it, which his local clan-relatives perceived as small “development” project. However, ownership of Galgal and its surroundings has been contested by the Habar Jeclo, a clan belonging to the Isaaq clan-family, and the local members of the Dhulbahante clan for over five decades. The bone of contention has been the ownership of water reservoirs. In 1952, the British colonial administration passed a decree banning the construction of any buildings or wells in Galgal. Tradition dictates that the first clan to dig a well or construct a house in a location has the right to claim ownership of the area. Therefore, it was only natural that members of the Habar Jeclo clan saw the project as a Dhulbahante attempt to reinforce their historical claim to the town. They launched an attack to prevent the construction from proceeding. Anticipating hostile reactions to the house-project, the Dhulbahante had already created a small militia to secure the site. The militia defended the construction site and ensured the successful completion of the project. Having failed to prevent the construction militarily, a local Habar Jeclo man began to dig a well not far from where the Dhulbahante returnee had been building his house and well. This project, if successful, would have automatically strengthened the Habar Jeclo’s position that the town belongs to both clans, and not only to Dhulbahante (as the latter mostly see it). The Habar Jeclo man, however, was unable to complete the well due to lack of funding. He reportedly left for Europe in 2009 to raise money for the well. In this case, it is clear that the Dhulbahante man from the diaspora knowingly enflamed the situation on the ground. The locals and those in the diaspora originating 80



from Galgal were fully aware of the conflict-potential of the “development” project. Some peace initiatives were started with the help of the diaspora. As of mid-2010, the conflict was still not settled, but negotiations had begun (Abdile 2010). Unfortunately, this case shows how clannish diasporic engagements contribute to conflict, even when they have reasonable development objectives. The second case involves five Somali individuals from the United Kingdom and Finland who worked for the Peace Initiative Program (PIP) in Somaliland, Puntland and parts of central Somalia. The PIP initiative was developed by Somali religious and traditional leaders and some activists in Somalia and abroad, who thought they could reduce or even eliminate interclan hostilities in their homeland by bringing together their skills and resources. The program was supported by Finn Church Aid (FCA), a religious NGO, and the Finnish Foreign Ministry. The primary objective of the initiative was to settle and prevent interclan conflicts by employing traditional and Islamic conflict settlement strategies. This would involve identifying capable, credible, and respected religious and traditional leaders from the warring clans to work as peace facilitators on the ground. The mediators received financial support to cover fuel, food, accommodation, and other expenses. Traditionally, interclan conflicts would be negotiated by elders. The inclusion of religious leaders, whose influence had grown since the collapse of the state, was an innovative idea. Many Somalis seek refuge in religion against the background of past experiences of violence and misguided politics in Somalia. PIP was engaged in thirteen cases of conflict, including the Galgal conflict mentioned above. Four of the conflicts have been peacefully settled. An earlier example of direct diaspora involvement in peacebuilding in Somaliland that had been very successful concerns the Peace Committee for Somaliland. This committee consisted of a group of Somaliland citizens living abroad who intervened in a conflict among various Isaaq clans in central Somaliland in 1994 and 1995 that endangered the existence of the country. The committee organized a series of intraand interclan peace conferences and thereby contributed to the settling of the conflict (Eubank 2010: 16). The PIP case and the work of the Peace Committee for Somaliland show that the Somali diaspora has the potential to foster peacebuilding. The PIP initiative demonstrates that diasporic actors, including the younger and western educated ones, are aware of the important role local traditional and religious authorities play in the Somali context. It also 81



shows a significant level of transnational cooperation in which local and diasporic actors worked together at the grassroots level. A third case study relates to diasporic involvement in the educational sector (particularly in higher education) in Somaliland. In 1991, much of the infrastructure, including almost all schools, in northwestern Somalia was destroyed by civil war. Also, the social fabric of the society was damaged: families were torn apart and the youth socialized into violence. For many young males, looting and robbing became a way of life. After the declaration of independence of Somaliland on May 18, 1991, local and diasporic actors set out to rebuild the basic infrastructure, especially schools. The effort to rebuild schools, which began at the primary and intermediary levels, expanded into the university level when Somaliland became more stable from 1997 onward. The first university of Somaliland, Amuud University, was opened near the town of Boorama in Awdal region in 1998. The project was developed primarily with the resources of the local and the diaspora community of the Awdal region, where mostly members of the Gadabuursi clan reside. Other diasporic actors from all over north-western Somaliland contributed to the project as well. Amuud was the very first Somali university outside of Mogadishu, the old capital of Somalia. The intention of the university founders has been “to find an outlet for the many children in the region who had no real prospect of productive employment other than joining the roaming militias” (Samatar 2001: 648). The actors involved were very conscious about not making Amuud a clan-owned institution but a university for all Somalis (Samatar 2001). The University of Hargeysa followed in 2000. This institution was also initiated by the diaspora. Local and diasporic actors joined hands to ensure its completion. Two steering committees, one in London and one in Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland, were set up in 1997. Fawzia Yusuf Haji Adam, one of the key actors and later the first chancellor of the University of Hargeysa, travelled back and forth for several years between the UK and Somaliland to improve the collaboration between the locals and the diaspora community. Fawzia and Saad Ali Shire, a Somali businessman, who was also involved in the project, used their extensive personal networks in Somaliland and abroad to acquire land and a building from the government in Hargeysa and secure donations for the university.9 The pioneers wanted to provide the first generation of postwar secondary students in Somaliland with follow-up opportunities at the tertiary level and inspire them to study. This was also a way of getting the young males away from the streets 82



and the militias. Moreover, Fawzia and Saad saw the potential contribution of better educated local youths to the national economy (MacGregor et al. 2008). These kinds of dual concerns about security and economic opportunity were common among the diasporic actors investing in education (Lindley 2008). The founding of the universities in Amuud and Hargeysa carried significance beyond the educational sector in Somaliland. These investments, like the building of the Ambassador Hotel near Hargeysa Airport, showed that the civil war was over and that the time had come to orient toward the future (Ibrahim 2010). Arguably, both university projects had a positive psychological effect in showing local and diasporic actors what they could accomplish together. Hundreds of new schools and a dozen universities have been established in Somaliland since 2000.10 The vast majority of them are pioneered by the diaspora community. Some of them consciously wish to introduce new values among the Somali students. The founders of the International Horn University (IHU), a private university that was established in Hargeysa in 2006 by Somalis who had spent many years in Finland and Pakistan in the 1990s and early 2000s, stressed that in the past, the educational system had contributed to the escalation of violence through teaching “clan hatred” and corruption. As Ali Omar Boosir, one of the founders and current heads of the IHU, noted: “If the generation that grows up now is taught and understands something, then it can happen that they break with the past and say: ‘We are a new people, we are a new generation and we wish to have our own future.’”11 The founders agreed that they would like to produce students who are “complete,” know their culture and religion, but also know Western science and the world beyond Somaliland and Somalia. However, the university has been known for its conservative Islamic ethos. Some locals, particularly against the background of Al Shabaab’s gains in southern Somalia and the desires of this group to expand to the north, were suspicious of IHU and other similar institutions, which they accused of pursuing a hidden “fundamentalist” agenda (Hoehne 2010b). Despite the successes, there are considerable challenges faced by social entrepreneurs from the diaspora. In Somaliland, diasporic actors have to deal with the fluid security situation, clan divisions, and the local suspicion of returnees. The security problems include both personal safety and property damage issues. In particular, working in the peacebuilding, advocacy, and human rights sectors carries considerable risks as compared to the health sector. These problems are even worse in Puntland and southern Somalia. As one engaged diasporic actor noted: 83



When you are implementing human rights, advocacy, or peacebuilding programs, people tend to question your motives. It’s even more complex when you are mediating inter-clan conflicts [. . .]. The root causes of the conflict you are trying to mediate are many [. . .] in addition to inter-clan rivalries there are political dimensions. If you want to be successful in your mediation, you have to behave neutral to all parties involved. You ought to explain yourself constantly if you work in the peace sector, and people tend to be more suspicious of such projects than, for instance, about food production programs.12

Diaspora returnees are also “stigmatized” in their homeland. Salma Ali, a twenty-two-year-old woman from UK noted that members of the Somali diaspora are easily distinguishable in the homeland communities. She told Wales Online about her experience in Somaliland: People immediately see you’re different. They think we walk too fast [. . .] no matter how much we try to dress traditionally, they can tell we’re from abroad. You can’t blend in, so you get teased but not in a nasty way [. . .] we get called the ‘in-betweens.’ (WalesOnline 2009)

In sum, the Somali setting is characterized mostly by clan divisions, tensions between different Islamic orientations (e.g., in the south, between supporters of Al Shabaab and other extremists, and those who favor “moderate” Islam), and the lack of effective state institutions. These factors shape and partly challenge diasporic engagement. Nonetheless, diasporic actors have one decisive advantage over all other humanitarian actors in Somalia and Somaliland, including foreign NGOs, governments, and international organizations: They are flexible and can react quickly and without much bureaucratic hurdles to changes in the local setting. As such, they remain extremely important given the unpredictable situation in Somalia.

V. Diasporic Engagement in Ethiopia Over one million Ethiopians live in North America, Europe, and the Middle East (Lyons 2007). To differentiate among the myriad of Ethiopian diasporic actors, the study groups members of the Ethiopian diasporas into four categories based on the nature of their political

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engagement with homeland affairs. These are: first, “centrists” who vigorously contest the legitimacy of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism designed and implemented by the EPRDF; second, “ethno nationalists” who bitterly resent what they consider EPRDF’s “backsliding” from democratic ethno-federalism into ethnocracy; third, pro-government diaspora supporters who act as a transnational political constituency; fourth, religious diasporas whose members contest the EPRDF’s topdown prioritization of ethnic identity and the continued inequalities in the country’s religious landscape. The study focuses on the fourth category, most notably the Muslim diaspora, which has emerged as a critical player in Ethiopian identity politics and peacebuilding. This group of diasporic actors is highly relevant in the contemporary setting due to the growing tensions between Muslims and Christians and among the various Muslim groups (Dereje 2010). Muslims are calling for a redefinition of Ethiopian national identity so as to recognize the Islamic heritage of the country. In particular, they want Ethiopia to be recognized as the land of the “First Hijra,” which is an important phase in the development of Islam.13 Although the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has lost its political leverage vis-à-vis the Ethiopian state since the 1974 revolution, the narrative of the Ethiopian nation has largely been based on the history and symbols of the Orthodox Church. This has led to the representation of Ethiopia as an “island of Christianity” surrounded by a “sea of Muslim principalities.”14 This image had defined Ethiopia’s foreign relations with its Muslim neighbors for centuries (Hussein 1992, 2006). Over the past few years, the EPRDF has made significant concessions to include the Islamic heritage of the country as part of its history. However, it will take a lot more to balance Ethiopian identity and history. For decades, the one-sided Christian narrative of Ethiopian history and nationality had a strong bearing on the Ethiopian Muslims’ sense of alienation. This narrative is very strongly resented by the Muslims in the homeland and in the diaspora. This problem is compounded by the negative reaction of the Christian population towards the Muslim rights movement. The Christian establishment has not positively responded to the Muslims’ struggle for recognition, which began during the EPRDF government reforms in the late 1990s. In particular, members of the Orthodox Church have questioned the legitimacy of the demands of Ethiopian Muslims and linked them to purported global Islamic fundamentalism. This perception was exacerbated when the government in Addis Ababa joined the United 85



States’ war on terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and cracked down on its own and America’s enemies in the Horn of Africa.15 It is largely against this background that Ethiopian Muslims began to actively engage in transnational identity politics. The Network of Ethiopian Muslims in Europe and the United States-based Badr are on the forefront of the Ethiopian Muslim rights movement. They have maintained a very strong cyber presence through the use of websites, blogs and internet radios. In addition, they hold annual conferences to assess social and political issues pertinent to Ethiopian Muslims. They also send delegations to Ethiopia to dialogue with the political and religious leadership of the country. One very important delegation was sent in April 2007. It consisted of nine members: four from the United States, three from Europe, one from Canada, and one from Saudi Arabia. The composition of the delegation reflects the efforts of the organizers to have a global representation of the Ethiopian Muslims. The nine delegation members had high social standing, represented different ethnic constituencies, and adhered to different teachings within Sunni Islam (from ‘traditional’ Sufism to contemporary reform movements). Before the delegation headed to Ethiopia, it undertook a thorough investigation and conducted a baseline survey in order to establish the prominent Muslim issues in contemporary Ethiopia. On the basis of its findings and the extensive feedback it received from the homeland Muslims upon the announcement of the planned visit, the delegation produced a sixteen page document entitled Questions Raised by the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora to the Prime Minster Meles Zenawi. The document addressed a wide range of issues. The most notable issues include: 1) greater recognition of the Islamic heritage of the country (i.e., Ethiopia as the land of the First Hijra), 2) the quest for more physical space for worship (i.e., land for the construction of mosques proportional to the demographic size of the Muslim community in all parts of the country), 3) the right to establish an autonomous and legitimate national Islamic organization in place of the rigid state control over Muslim representative bodies, 4) the right to manifest religious symbols in public institutions, 5) ensuring civil liberties, 6) lifting the ban on Islamic NGOs, 7) ensuring an impartial census, 8) establishing a more balanced media that does not represent Muslims as a “national security threat,” and 9) creating a Ministry of Religious Affairs to promote interfaith dialogue and address religious conflicts. The nature of this document sharply contrasts the depiction of diaspora actors as unscrupulous long-distance nationalists who are detached from homeland realities 86



(Anderson 1992: 12–13). Moreover, the symmetric collaboration between the diaspora and the homeland in setting the Muslim rights agenda also challenges the conventional wisdom that diasporic actors would seek to dominate their homeland compatriots. The articulation of the aspirations of the Ethiopian Muslims by the diaspora delegation differed from the activities of the local Muslim rights movement in so far as the former was more focused, consistent, and completely peaceful. The written demands of the diaspora actors partly united the Ethiopian Muslims, who have been disunited. Drawing on the new sets of democratic experiences the Ethiopian Muslims have gained in their host countries, the diasporic actors eschewed the language of violence and framed their claims in the “rights language.” During its one-month stay in Ethiopia, the delegation held discussions with high-ranking government officials, including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and a cross-section of the Muslim community. The delegation also reached out to the leaderships of other religious groups to foster peaceful religious co-existence. This was an important initiative because the politically dominant Christian population has not yet come to terms with the Muslim rights movement. Muslim demands partly contributed to the recent rise of religious conflict in Ethiopia. In fact, many members of the Orthodox Church still believe that the Ethiopian nation belongs to the Orthodox Christians and feel threatened by the awakening of other religious groups. Mindful of the Orthodox Church’s historical claims, the delegation set out to explain what the Muslim rights issues were. This was done in the spirit of belonging to a common nation and shared citizenship. Within the Muslim community, the delegation managed to avoid sectarian violence by providing a neutral forum for the feuding ulema to peacefully resolve or live with their theological differences, such as the Sufi-Salafi divide.16 The objectives and achievements of the April 2007 delegation demonstrate the peacebuilding dimension of the Ethiopian Muslim identity politics. In sum, there are five notable aspects of this effort that have great peacebuilding potential. First, the delegation set a social reform agenda for the Muslim rights movement. By avoiding the “victimhood-trap,” into which most politically active minorities fall, the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora demonstrated that it wants to go beyond past injustices. Rather, it is engaged in reforming contemporary Ethiopian society for a better future. This is important not only for the Muslim community at home, which is divided and lacks a unified and legitimate leadership, but the Ethiopian polity at large. The audience 87



and the relevant actors in Ethiopia, not least the Christian population, were at times in want of explanations about the objectives of the Muslim rights movement. In the absence of adequate explanations, Orthodox Christians in particular tended to naively equate Muslim demands with Islamic fundamentalism. The aim of the Muslim diaspora delegation was to open discussions about the rightful place of Ethiopian Muslims in the nation. Second, the Muslim diaspora organizations and the delegation they sent to Ethiopia in 2007 framed their demands in the globally recognized rights language. They cited the country’s constitution and international conventions. Additionally, they drew on the new set of democratic experiences, which many of them had made in their host countries such as the United States and Sweden. The ascendancy of the rights-language over the language of violence espoused by some fringe radical elements is an important discursive asset in peacebuilding. The alternative to a legalistic approach to protest would be to appeal to globally established Islamic radicals. Most probably, radicals would readily respond to the Ethiopian Muslims’ call for “solidarity,” given the country’s proximity to the Middle East. This would allow global jihadists to hijack the Ethiopian Muslims’ struggle and exploit it for their own ends. Third, the diaspora became directly involved in conflict resolution within and between religious groups in Ethiopia. The delegation moderated the polemic theological debate that threatened to incite sectarian violence among the Ethiopian Muslims through the creation of an ulema unity forum where compromises were made and civility prevailed in accommodating theological differences. The delegation also sought to reach out to the Christian establishment to foster interfaith dialogue at a time when religious conflicts were on the rise in Ethiopia. Fourth, the diaspora’s call for the reconstruction of a national identity that appropriately includes Muslims can be a structural contribution to political stability and social integration. The identity politics of the Ethiopian Muslims unleashed a new sense of national belonging among the country’s historic minority. By focusing on potentially integrative narratives, such as the First Hijra, the Ethiopian Muslims in the diaspora have become active players in the grassroots and inclusive reconstruction of the Ethiopian nation. This nascent reform agenda, however, is not wholly embraced by members of the dominant Orthodox Church who still claim historical ownership of the Ethiopian nation. Finally, the demands for freedom of association and organizational autonomy by the delegation enhanced the ongoing struggle for 88



democracy in Ethiopia by exposing the extent of state control in Ethiopia (Clapham 1986; Clapham 2009; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009). Various political parties, civil society organizations, and the donor community have noted the narrowing of the political space especially during the May 2005 elections. The 2010 Civil Society Law, for instance, has hampered grassroots participation in public debates. Moreover, government interference in the leadership of religious communities glaringly contravenes the religious rights enshrined in the Constitution.

VI. Conclusion: Peacebuilding Results of Diasporic Engagement The cases discussed in this article amply reveal how important diasporic actors have become in their respective countries of origin in the Horn of Africa. They are shaping social, economic, and political processes at home. They also show the double-faced nature of diasporic engagement with homeland affairs. While some individual and collective diasporic actions feed into local conflicts, others significantly contribute to peacebuilding. Conflict is a very problematic, relative, and politically loaded term. Conventionally, it is defined in contrast to peace and assumes a negative attribute. In contrast, the term peace is positively signified and is often equated with the stability of the status quo. In this study, we used a nuanced meaning of peacebuilding. We did not necessarily view political struggles to restructure a polity into a more inclusive entity in negative terms, even if they temporarily led to (more) conflict. Of course, disporas are not homogenous actors. Like other sets of actors, diasporas are differentiated along various axes. Political ideologies, religious orientations, and clan and ethnic identity accentuate the divisions among people in the diaspora who originate from Somalia and Ethiopia. However, diasporic actors may also have developed a kind of “diasporic consciousness” (Vertovec 1997: 281–88). This consciousness is based on experiences of hardship during the migration process and the paradoxical experiences of marginalization and integration in the new country of residence. This consciousness can sensitize diasporic actors to problems of human rights, minority rights, tolerance and development. These gains can lead to peacebuilding engagement in conflict settings back “home.” In all the cases examined in this study, with the exception of the Galgal case, this kind of diasporic consciousness arguably played a role and informed the peacebuilding activities of the diasporic actors. 89



This study contradicts the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 575), which suggest that a sizable diaspora increases the risk of ongoing or renewed violent conflict in the country of origin. In contrast, we argue that without the continuous flow of economic and social remittances, Somalia and Ethiopia would have experienced more violence and political instability. The study identifies three fields of activity in which diasporic engagement directly or indirectly contributed to peacebuilding in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa. The first is the economic field in which financial remittances and private economic investments play the most important role for family survival and community stabilization. In the Ethiopian and the Somali settings, as in many other African countries, financial remittances play an important role in sustaining families and contributing to the local economy. Irrespective of any modest economic gains over the past years, the living conditions of ordinary people have not really improved in the Horn. Generally, the quality of life may have worsened in Ethiopia and Somalia since the 1980s. Many families would find it nearly impossible to survive without money sent by relatives from abroad. Having one or more relatives in the diaspora has become an economic asset. Financial remittances not only benefit family units, but can also, if invested in private businesses, contribute to the development of the local economy. This could also have positive effects on political stability. Mohamed Ibrahim (2010) pointed out that people are less ready to engage in fighting when they have a stake in the local economy. In the case of Ethiopia, the diaspora has financed experimental home-grown development projects. In Somaliland, which is not an internationally recognized state, remittances are the main source of foreign exchange. The Somaliland diaspora constitutes the vital lifeline that guarantees the political and economic survival of this aspiring state. Collective financial remittances also contribute to peacebuilding by facilitating development projects. In Somalia and Somaliland, this is visible, for instance, in the education sector. Diaspora actors have provided young Somalis new educational opportunities that may also have a larger economic effect by providing the local market with indigenous experts in various fields, such as IT and business-management. This can be an important foundation for longterm political stability. Additionally, in southern Somalia, the diaspora sometimes provides basic humanitarian aid in areas where no other actors reach. The second field of activity for diasporic engagement in peacebuilding is in the social and political domains, which highlights the importance 90



of social remittances. Despite the modest liberal openings in many African countries during early 1990s, there has been a narrowing of the political space in the countries of the Horn. Clan political sentiments in Somalia and Somaliland, and nationalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia have crowded out the political space, where genuine political ideas are to be contested. Under such circumstances, the diasporic political space has become the most important forum for the contestation of ideas that would allow more informed political choices for the public. In Ethiopia, this has helped break the government’s closure of the democratic space and stopped the drift towards authoritarianism. In the Somali context, inspired diaspora-initiatives sometimes challenge the established clanthinking.17 In this sense, the diaspora could help to promote political liberalization. The public debates in the diaspora, though at times very polemic, provide alternative social spaces to question the conventional wisdom and straitjacket ideas prevailing in the countries of origin, which are inimical to the quest for better alternatives. Diaspora-driven discussions can set new agendas in the search for solutions to the daunting security and developmental challenges. Furthermore, the new values of professional training, self-reliance, and tolerance for ethnic and religious diversity inculcated in some diaspora-driven schools and universities have the potential to break the narrow ‘clan-thinking’ which has long plagued Somalia and Somaliland. The third field of diaspora contribution is direct peacebuilding, most notably through interventions in conflict situations. The 2007 Ethiopian Muslim delegation, for example, contributed to peacebuilding in various ways. It meticulously articulated and set the agenda for the Muslim rights issues that improved the situation. Similarly, the interclan engagement of the PIP in Somaliland and parts of Somalia also reveals the direct peacebuilding capacity of the diaspora. The PIP closely works with local religious and clan elders with the aim of reducing interclan conflicts. Like the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora delegation, the PIP challenged the conventional assumption that diaspora groups harbor hegemonic aspirations in their homelands.

Notes

1.Field research for this paper was conducted as part of the larger Diaspeace-Project (www.diaspeace.org). Finances for the field research of Markus Virgil Hoehne and Dereje Feyissa were provided by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale,

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Germany. We are grateful to Florian Mühlfried, Tabea Scharrer, Abu B. Bah, and the two anonymous reviewers of ACPR for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Contacts: Markus Virgil Hoehne: [email protected]; Dereje Feyissa: dereje_dfd@yahoo .com; Mahdi Abdile: [email protected]. 2. For an in-depth literature review on this topic, see Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009. 3. Political engagement of diasporic actors fits the definition of “longdistance nationalism” according to Glick Schiller 2004. In contrast to the narrow understanding of this concept that focuses only on the involvement of diasporic actors in conflict and violence at home (e.g., Anderson 1992), Glick Schiller understands any kind of diasporic political activism (also peaceful and reform-oriented policies) relating to the country of origin as long-distance nationalism. 4. These accusations have not yet been proved (Lindley 2009: 529). 5. This number refers only to the “far diaspora” beyond the Horn of Africa. The “near diaspora” in the neighboring countries around the former Somali Republic is not included here. Several million Somalis live in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. However, many of them do not consider themselves alien to these states. Somalis have in fact been living in the territories that later became Djibouti, modern Ethiopia, and Kenya since before the colonial period. Nevertheless, there are also many Somali civil war refugees who came to these neighboring countries after 1990. There is a need for research on the near Somali diaspora, on how it is constituted and in how far Somalis in the neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa engage as diaspora in collapsed Somalia. 6. This shows how imprecise it is to speak about the Somali diaspora. Certainly, the actors who supported the SNM in the 1980s and continue to aid Somaliland up until today (2011) are completely different from those supporting Al Shabaab in the late 2000s. 7. Most Somali cases are concentrated in Somaliland. The projects of one organization involved in diasporic activities, however, are located also in Puntland and central Somalia. 8. Sool is located in the contested borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland (Hoehne 2009b). 9. Both Fawzia and Saad had studied in the USA. They later settled in London, where they started their investment in education back home in Somaliland. 10. For similar developments in the south, see Abdullahi 2007. 11. Interview: Ali Omar Boosir, Hargeysa, December 18, 2008. 12. Interview: diasporic actor Hargeysa, July 3, 2009.

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13. The history of Islam in Ethiopia dates back to 615 AD when the companions of the Prophet Mohamed (the Sahaba) came to Axum, fleeing religious persecution by the ruling elite in Mecca, a historic event that Ethiopian Muslims refer to as the First Hijra (Trimingham 1952: 44; Erlich 2010: 2–3). According to Islamic traditions, this is the reason the early jihad was not applied to Ethiopia at a time when all countries in the Red Sea subregion succumbed to the new Islamic political and military power. 14. By the ninth century AD, there had already been various Islamic principalities in the Horn of Africa that vied for regional political power with the Christian kingdom (Trimingham 1952). 15. The above-mentioned extremely violent military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia (2006–2008) was an outcome of this regional engagement in the “war on terrorism.” 16. Salafi/Salafism refers to “contemporary Muslims who generally eschew the interpretive methods and norms of the medieval Islamic schools and take as a guide for proper behaviour only the word of God, the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the example set by the pious forbears” (Euben and Zaman 2009: 3). Sufism is the general label for a more mystical and “folkloristic” Islam. The divide between Sufis and Salafis is currently visible among many Sunni Muslim communities in the world. It certainly also informs political developments up to the level of violent conflict in Somalia. 17. The Somali diaspora is certainly not free from “clanism” (Bjork 2007). Still, voices “against clan” and conscious efforts to transcend narrow notions of belonging are growing in the diaspora.

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