Table of Contents: Eine Frage nach der Technik - Braintrust Base

Table of Contents: Eine Frage nach der Technik

Introduction Problem Hermeneutical Remarks Consideration of Style Summary (Danish) Acknowledgement

1 2 2 2 3 3

1. The Question Concerning Technology 1.1. A Context for Reading Heidegger: Ontotheology 1.2. The Essence of Technology: Ge-stell a. The Concept of Essence b. Technology’s Essence 1.3. The Danger 1.4. Das Rettende 1.5. Essence in Context: Technology and Ontotheology

4 6 6 8 10 11 13

2. Literature and Interpretation: Das Rettende 2.1. A Conventional Reading: Reflection 2.2. Ian D. Thomson: Reontologized Teaching and Research 2.3. Hubert Dreyfus: Marginal Practices

15 16 17

3. Discussion: Three Threads 3.1. Gathering Threads 3.2. Tying a Knot

19 20

Conclusion

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Bibliography

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Michael Hockenhull Advisor: Søren Gosvig Olesen

Bachelor Thesis 27-05-2011

Department of Philosophy University of Copenhagen

Introduction: Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a seminal German philosopher. His thinking, whether in Sein und Zeit or in his later articles, is based on this simple question: What is the meaning of being? As was the case in Heidegger’s time little attention is paid to this question today. Since Heidegger’s death in 1976 the world has become more technological and technology is a central question of the current day. Heidegger foresaw this and witnessed it to some degree. His thinking eventually came to rest upon, and to question, technology. In reading “Die Frage nach der Technik,”1 Heidegger’s lauded essay on the topic of technology, I became frustrated by his rather vacuous way of ending the essay. The concept of das Rettende, that which saves, was left open and ill-defined. Not only was it ill-defined, but it seemed to leave the fate of the world in a state of untouchable ephemerality. Were there any actions that could further or delay das Rettende? Heidegger alluded that there were, but an allusion was all he gave. With these questions on my mind, I delved into the secondary literature concerning “Die Frage nach der Technik” and I myself considered das Rettende, technology and its essence further. This thesis is the result of my reading of and work with these topics. Heidegger claims that, with regards to the danger of technology, “Menschliches Tun kann nie unmittelbar dieser Gefahr begegnen.” 2 I began this paper with the belief that action must be a fundamental part of any response to this danger. Through reading Heidegger however, I have come to the conclusion that the response, das Rettende, is ambiguous in a very fundamental sense. I will through this thesis show how this can be concluded. In order to do so I will explore Heidegger’s position with regards to technology, based on an ontotheological reading of his thought. I will consider the concepts of ontotheology, essence, Ge-stell, the danger and das Rettende. I will show that reading technology based on ontotheology is a both viable and important strategy for understanding “Die Frage nach der Technik” and das Rettende. I will then present a selection of the literature regarding Heidegger’s thoughts on technology and das Rettende. The literature was selected with an eye towards interpretations that were concrete and furthered das Rettende in an action-oriented manner. As will be shown in the discussion, this approach has inherent problems.

1

Martin Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,“ in Vorträge und Aufsätze, Klett-Cotta, Elfte Auflage, 2009. Henceforth abbreviated as FT. 2 FT, 38. QCT, 33.

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Finally, I will discuss 1) das Rettende and ontotheology, 2) the ambiguity of das Rettende and 3) what the secondary literature provides of input for understanding das Rettende. Following this I will be able to give an answer to the problem of the thesis, which I will pose below. Problem What is the possibility and merit of understanding Martin Heidegger’s essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” in relation to his notion of ontotheology and is it possible to gain a more concrete and actionoriented understanding of das Rettende on the basis of 1) such a relation and 2) other interpretations of das Rettende? Hermeneutical Remarks I have read “Die Frage nach der Technik” in its original German version, but I have relied on the commonly used translation, by William Lovitt,3 in doing so. For this reason all quotes from “Die Frage nach der Technik” will be given in German. I have decided after much internal debate, to list the main concepts in German. This includes das Rettende, Dasein and Ge-stell, specifically. I could have left other terms in their original language as well, but ultimately the distinction comes down to readability. A text bristling with foreign words makes for difficult reading. I leave the terms in German where I find their German sound and character essential, but attempt to do so sparingly. Whenever the German is translated, I rely on Lovitt’s translation unless otherwise specified. I leave the original Greek as it appears in “Die Frage nach der Technik.” Considerations of Style The thesis is written according to the style recommendations of The Chicago Manual of Style. For this reason the following features will be observed: Theoretical terms will be written in italics upon their first appearance, and subsequently written in normal font. First appearance here means the first appearance in the main part of the text. In titles, the introduction, the problem and the summary sections of the thesis, the concepts will be rendered in normal font. Books titles will be in italics throughout the text. Articles and essays, however, will be referenced in normal font but will be in quotation marks.

3

Martin Heidegger, ”The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, Harper & Row, 1977. Henceforth abbreviated as QCT.

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Quotations and references will follow the footnote system. Upon first reference sources will be given with full title, authors name, publisher, etc. Subsequent references will be abbreviated. Quotations will generally be set aside from the main text, indentured and marked up with quotation marks and italics. Where the quoted text is already in italics, it is left in normal font. A full bibliography is supplied at the end of the thesis. It is divided into primary sources and secondary sources. Summary (Danish) I følgende bachelor-opgave undersøger jeg Martin Heideggers essay ”Die Frage nach der Technik.” Jeg forsøger at læse det centrale begreb i teksten, teknikkens essens, ved hjælp af Heidegger’s eget ontoteologibegreb som ramme. Med denne læsning samt et udvalg fra sekundærlitteraturen undersøger jeg begrebet das Rettende. Jeg ønsker dermed at nå frem til en læsning, der forstår das Rettende mere konkret og hvordan denne kan fremmes igennem handling. Opgaven er delt op i tre dele. Den første del er både redegørende og fortolkende og beskæftiger sig med ”Die Frage nach der Technik” og ontoteologibegrebet. Den anden del indeholder en fortolkning af et af Heideggers eget forslag til at fremme das Rettende samt udlægninger af to forskellige stykker sekundærlæsninger af samme problematik. Den tredje del er en diskussion af das Rettende langs tre tråde. Diskussionen påpeger at das Rettende er et tvetydigt begreb på et fundamentalt plan. Herefter fremlægger jeg det synspunkt at tvetydigheden der karakteriserer das Rettende åbner op for muligheden af flere fortolkninger af begrebet, men også en ramme for disse fortolkninger, idet de skal tage hensyn til at Das Rettende handler om at afløse metafysikken, men samtidig er tvunget til at gøre det fra et metafysisk udgangspunkt. Til sidst konkluderes det at svaret på opgavens problem er tvetydigt både ja og nej. Det er bestemt muligt at læse ”Die Frage nach der Technik” i forbindelse med ontoteologibegrebet. Ontoteologibregrebet fastlægger teksten i forhold til Heideggers kritik af metafysikkens historie. Das Rettende viser sig svær at konkretisere og fremme, og det konkluderes at selve trangen til at fremme kan kritiseres for at tage udgangspunkt i metafysiske måder at tænke på. Acknowledgement I wish to thank Professor Seung Chong Lee, Department of Philosophy, Yonsei University, Seoul, S. Korea, for generous support and advice given under the preparation and completion of this report, which was carried out during my stay as exchange student at Yonsei University in the period September 2010- June 2011. Naturally, I also wish to thank Lektor Søren Gosvig Olesen, Institute of Philosophy, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, Copenhagen University, Copenhagen, Denmark for his support and critique, in the function of advisor for this paper.

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1: The Question Concerning Technology “Die Frage nach der Technik” was published in 1954, and was identical in all but name to a lecture given in 1949 titled “Ge-stell” or, in English, “The Framework.”4 It has been massively influential in the development of contemporary Philosophy of Technology. In the following I wish to give an account of the essence of technology as put forth in “Die Frage nach der Technik,” through the lens of ontotheology. This concept is used by Heidegger to denote the structure of metaphysics. I will proceed by first exploring ontotheology. I will then give an interpretation of essence, the essence of technology, the danger of technology and das Rettende, that which saves from technology. All of these concepts are form “Das Frage nach der Technik.” Finally I will connect the concept of ontotheology to the essence of technology. 1.1. A Context for reading Heidegger: Ontotheology The key to having Heidegger as a guide is to listen intently to what he says and thereby thinks. However, it is also important to understand the context he is thinking in. I propose to read “Die Frage nach der Technik” in the context of ontotheology. The following will give a short but precise summary of what is meant by this term. 5 The term ontotheology itself is a neologism composed of combining the words ontology and theology. This passage will illustrate what Heidegger means by ontotheology: “If we recollect the history of Western-European thinking […] the question of the being of entities, is double in form. On the one hand, it asks: What is an entity in general as an entity? In the history of philosophy, reflections which fall within the domain of this question acquire the title ontology. The question ‘What is an entity?’ [or ‘What is that which is?’] simultaneously asks: Which entity is the highest [or supreme, höchste] entity, and in what sense is it? […] We call the domain of this question theology. This duality in the question of the being of entities can be united under the title ontotheology.” 6 The passage describes ontology and theology as two different kinds of questions concerning the same topic, namely being. Ontology is the question of what it means to be an entity. Theology concerns the ultimate meaning and kind of such an entity. These two ‘questions’ combine under the heading ontotheology. Ontotheology means the two-fold question about being, or, the structure of the question about being.

4

Albert Borgmann, “Technology,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005. 428. 5 I have been inspired to this and guided by Ian D. Thomson’s explication of ontotheology: Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: The Politics of Education, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Henceforth abbreviated as HoO. 6 HoOy, 13. Pathmarks, 340. Gesamtsaufgabe 9, 449.

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By the phrase “history of Western-European thinking,” Heidegger means the history of western philosophy or metaphysics. 7 So in addendum to the characterization of ontotheology just given I will add that ontotheology is a historical concept. This gives us: Ontotheology means the historical two-fold question about being. The history in question is that of philosophy from Plato8 up until Nietzsche9. In other words, metaphysics has from Plato until Nietzsche had the same structure. Plato’s theory or doctrine of ideas, for example, is an answer to the ontotheological question. Plato defines ideas as the ontological and theological ultimate components of reality. Successive answers to the two-fold question develop over the course of history, as seen in Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and others. Finally, the development culminates in Nietzsche. I will expand upon this in a later section. For now let me say that Heidegger considers Nietzsche’s staunch anti-metaphysical position to contain an unthought version of ontotheology. It is important to note that the sense of history that Heidegger invokes above is not a chronological reckoning of events or history understood as a scientific discipline. German has two words for history, Historie and Geschichte. Heidegger understands the first of these notions to mean history as a science, and the second to mean how history happens – history as certain events to be critically engaged with. Heidegger uses the second term, Geschichte,10 in “Die Frage nach der Technik,” and I believe ontotheology should be understood through this meaning of history. As history in the sense of Geschichte, ontotheology is historical in that it is a tradition to be engaged with by the thinker. Heidegger’s other name for this tradition and its history is Seinsgeschchite or history of being.11 History of being has, for Heidegger, a definite beginning at the outset of the West, with the Greeks. It is comprised of Ereignis, important events, like that of Nietzsche thinking his unthought, and has sent the West towards a certain destiny. This destiny is for Heidegger either a new beginning, the overcoming of metaphysics or the danger of technology. All of these concepts occupy Heidegger’s later thought and I mention them here in order to show in what sense ontotheology is historical. What is important for my project is that Heidegger accords privilege to the history of being. Developments in this history are part of the grand trajectory from the Greeks to destiny, either a new beginning or the danger. Having shown that ontotheology means the historical structure of metaphysics, spanning from Plato to Nietzsche, concerning the two-fold question of being, I will now consider Heidegger’s essay, “Die Frage nach der Technik.” 7

Heidegger elsewhere distinguishes between thinking and philosophy, but here they are meant to be the same. HoO, 32. 9 HoO, 20-21. 10 FT, 28. QCT, 24. 11 Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999. 95-97. 8

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1.2. The Essence of Technology: Ge-stell I have now established a contextual background for reading Heidegger: Ontotheology, the structure of metaphysics. In the following I will turn to Heidegger’s essay “Die Frage Nach der Technik.” I shall do so by first examining a central theme to the essay, the concept of essence and then, secondly, go on to explore what Heidegger takes the essence of technology to be. a. The Concept of Essence: Essence is a recurring term in the essay. It is specifically discussed in twice, first in the beginning of the essay and later towards the end. The first characterization states: “Die Technik ist nicht das gleiche wie das Wesen der Technik. Wenn wir das Wesen des Baumes suchen, müßen wir gewahr werden, daß jenes, was jeden Baum durchwaltet, nicht selber ein Baum ist, der sich zwischen den übrigen Bäumen antreffen läßt. So ist denn auch das Wesen der Technik ganz und gar nichts Technisches.“12 Here Heidegger defines essence negatively, by saying what it is not. This means as stated that an essence is not to be confused with what it is an essence of. However, this leaves many possibilities for what essence can be in the positive sense. Which leads us to his second treatment. Towards the end of the essay, Heidegger has defined what the essence of technology is, but he has not defined in which way it is an essence. Therefore Heidegger asks again what essence might mean and the following accounts for this second characterization. He turns to the ‘common’ philosophical conception of essence: genus or quidditas. Once again, however, he answers the question as to whether this is the kind of essence needed in the negative: “[…] aber dieses ist niemals das Wesen der Technik im Sinne einer Gattung.” 13 From here he shifts gears however. Heidegger has at this point already established what the essence is: Ge-stell. What he claims now is that Ge-stell itself forces us to think essence in a different manner. Since it does not conform to the idea of essence as a genus or quidditas, it must be essence in another way: “Beachten wir dies, dann trifft uns etwas Erstaunliches: die Technik ist es, die von uns verlangt, das, was man gewöhnlich unter ‹Wesen› versteht, in einem anderen Sinne zu denken.14“

12

FT, 9. QCT, 4. FT, 33. QCT, 29. 14 FT, 34. QCT, 30. 13

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What other way can and should we think essence? Heidegger turns to look at the term essence, Wesen in German. He connects it to the verb währen, meaning lasting or enduring. Contrary to the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (and hence western metaphysics) Heidegger does not understand this enduring to be permanent. Instead, inspired by the words of Goethe15, Heidegger takes enduring to be something related to the German gewähren – to grant. So he concludes: “Nur das Gewährte währt. Das anfänglich aus der Frühe Währende ist das Gewährende.”16 I understand Heidegger as saying that essence, in the case of technology, is not a genus but rather a continual presence or presencing of a trend. Essence is verbal for Heidegger. As he says: “Vom Zeitwort ‹wesen› stammt erst das Hauptwort ab.”17 Whether or not this is true from an etymological perspective is in some sense irrelevant. Heidegger is here appealing to the same notion that appears elsewhere in his works. That the nature of a thing or object derives from its use, or what is does. Is stems from does. And so the essence of technology is naturally not anything technological, i.e. a piece of technology, but rather how technology essences or behaves. As said, Heidegger connects Wesen to währen, and währen again to gewähren. Wesen is related to how essence essences. Währen then, points out that this active essencing is something that endures or lasts. This means that for something to constitute an essence it must last for some time. But how to determine whether something is lasting or enduring? It can be concluded that it is not what lasts permanently, since Heidegger, in order to distinguish his notion of essence from that of Plato and Aristotle specifically says that it is not. What sense of lasting or enduring can Heidegger be implying? The final concept Heidegger evokes is gewähren, which is translated as to grant. This answers the question I just posed: that which lasts or endures, is that which is granted.18 It is a difficult notion to make sense of. I will later attempt to understand this granted nature of essence based on ontotheology. Shortly put, I understand that an essence is granted when it is a part of the history of being. In short, essence means for Heidegger not the permanent enduring of some aspect or the common genus of the technological. It means that which is granted and endures in an active or verbal way.

15

FT, 35. QCT, 31. FT, 35. QCT, 31. 17 FT, 34. QCT, 30. 18 In the German text both gewähren, das Gewährte and das Gewährende appear. When it pertains to an essence, I assume that the term is to be written as das Gewährte. 16

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b. Technology’s Essence: Having considered what essence is I will now turn to the particular of technology’s essence. As I will show, Heidegger understands this as Ge-stell. The clarification of this essence runs along two threads: The first is looking into the superficial characterization of technology, the instrumental definition and following where that thread leads to ancient technology and the Greek understanding of revealing. The second builds upon the first, and is a look into modern technology. First of all, Heidegger rejects the common conceptions of technology. These conceptions are the instrumental and anthropological definitions. The instrumental definition states that technology is simply a means to an end. The anthropological definition states that technology is a human activity. Heidegger will admit that they are correct but also that “das bloß Richtige noch nicht das Wahre [ist].” 19 However, he also states that, “Das Richtige stellt an dem, was vorliegt, jedesmal irgend etwas Zutreffendes fest.” 20 For this reason, Heidegger takes the instrumental definition (the anthropological definition is subsumed under the instrumental) 21 as his point of departure to investigating the essence of technology. Instrumentality is related to causality, 22 and causality is an ancient Greek doctrine stemming from Aristotle. 23 Therefore, Heidegger embarks upon a voyage into the roots of ancient Greek language and philosophical terminology. 24 Heidegger shows that causality for the Greeks was something radically different from what we know as causality today. He shows that causality was not the effecting of causes, but instead the interplay of various factors in bringing-forth. 25 Nature, (ancient) technology26 and the arts were all understood as such a bringing-forth. This is to be understood not as simply causing something to be, as after the instrumental manner of A causing B, but instead realizing that which is already there, as bringing forth the chalice that is already latent in the silver. Finally Heidegger reaches the conclusion that this bringing-forth is a revealing. 27 In this last term Heidegger understands something that has an intimate connection with truth. Here truth is not understood propositionally but is instead more similar to the truth found in Sein und Zeit. It is truth as aletheia, or aletheia (un-disclosedness). 28 So from instrumentality and causality, Heidegger is able to reach the notion, that for the Greeks, technology was a revealing: Revealing is not to be understood as en epistemological 19

FT, 11. QCT, 6 FT, 11. QCT, 6. 21 FT, 10. QCT, 5. 22 FT, 10-11. QCT, 5. 23 FT, 11, 13. QCT, 6, 8. 24 FT, 11-16. QCT, 6-12. 25 FT, 15. QCT, 10. 26 As opposed to modern technology which I will look at shortly. 27 FT, 15. QCT, 11. 28 FT, 15. QCT, 11. Aletheia is the Greek word for truth. 20

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concept. It is not a theoretical concept of how we perceive, but instead an ontological way of understanding what technology is. Having established what causation and thereby technology originally meant to the Greeks, Heidegger turns his enquiry to modern technology. For modern technology is something different from the original or ancient technology. We saw that this ancient technology or ΤέΧνη was a revealing. According to Heidegger, so is modern technology: “Was ist die moderne Technik? Auch sie ist ein Entbergen.”29 It turns out that it is a revealing of a different sort, however. “Das Entbergen, das die moderne Technik durchherrscht, hat den Charakter des Stellens im Sinne der Herausforderung.” 30 The revealing is different from the past where it let what was inherent in a thing come to presence. Now revealing challenges nature and man, extracting and exploiting instead of letting come to pass peacefully. Heidegger’s examples are of nature seen as a resource to be optimized instead of land to be stewarded or a river to be passed. Land is now cultivated for maximum gain, the Rhine challenged to provide energy via a dam. All of this energetic challenging and setting-upon that characterizes modern technology (indeed, modern society) is directionless according to Heidegger. The land is challenged with ever increasing efficiency and the reason behind the challenging and setting-upon is not that there are more mouths to feed. Instead Heidegger coins the term standing-reserve which denotes the stockpiling character with which modern technology works. All resources are pulled out, set in order not to meet a specific goal – but instead simply for the purpose of stockpiling it. This is not a reason, but points beyond there being any particular reason for the setting-upon. Human beings are also a part of this challenging, setting upon, standing-reserve: we participate both in being resources to be ordered around and as those who order around the resources. 31 Finally Heidegger’s thought culminates in the designation of the essence of technology. As we have seen, technology is a revealing of a sort. But it is a revealing of a specific type:

29

FT, 18. QCT, 14. FT, 20. QCT, 16. 31 FT, 21, 23. QCT, 16, 18. 30

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“Wir nennen jetzt jenen herausfordernden Anspruch, der den Menschen dahin versammelt, das Sichentbergende als Bestand zu bestellen – das Ge-stell.” 32 And: “Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt, d. h. herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des Bestellens als Bestand zu entbergen. Ge-stell heißt die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der modernen Technik waltet und selber nichts Technisches ist.”33 This is the essence of technology: A type of revealing that challenges, sets upon into standing-reserve and forms a network of intertwining interlocking sources of this revealing. This whole complex Heidegger calls Ge-stell. As an essence, this is the granted enduring that technology continually does. So in all technological feats and industries we see the unfolding of the essence of technology in the way that it continually stockpiles and transforms everything into standing-reserve, resources. That, then, is the essence of technology. 1.3. The Danger I have now looked at how Heidegger conceptualizes technology as Ge-stell. In the following I will look at what Heidegger believes this entails: the danger of Ge-stell. Having defined the essence of technology as Ge-stell, what consequences does this concept bring? Heidegger believes that Ge-stell implies the greatest danger, die äußerste Gefahr. 34 What is this danger? Heidegger says explicitly that the danger is not that which most modern people associate with technology. It is neither rogue states with nuclear weapons, rampant genetic change nor global warming. Instead, for Heidegger, the danger is that Ge-stell, as revealing, will block out the possibility of any other kind of revealing. And that in doing so, it will make us, those who reveal in one way or another, forget that there ever was another way of revealing. In this sense, the danger of Ge-stell is two-fold. Further exposition of the two-fold danger is warranted. Earlier I stated that there were two kinds of revealing – one, bringing-forth and the other, Ge-stell. The danger is simply, according to Heidegger, that we will come to reveal only through Ge-stell, in effect forgetting the other way of revealing. And then this first forgetting will itself be forgotten. We will then be left with an understanding of the world as something only to be revealed as Ge-stell, and no other manifestation of beings will be allowed. This is the two-fold danger.

32

FT, 23. QCT, 19. FT, 24. QCT, 20. 34 FT, 33. QCT, 29. 33

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Heidegger does not however, think that we are totally fated to this two-fold danger. Instead he introduces a saving power, in German, das Rettende. 1.4. Das Rettende Das Rettende is according to Heidegger, something that grows alongside the danger. It is that which might be able to save us from the danger. But as it grows along with the danger, it is not something diametrically opposed to the danger, something different from it. Instead, the two are related. Heidegger comes to this conclusion by paying heed to the words of the German poet Hölderlin, who says: “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst Das Rettende auch.” 35 The use of the poet’s words is not just a literary allude or a poetical way of expressing a thought. For Heidegger poetry and thinking are intimately connected, and especially Hölderlin played a dominant role in Heidegger’s later thinking. According to Heidegger, the words of Hölderlin express a deep insight, and by citing poetry Heidegger attempts to think what the poet expresses. If we then accept Heidegger’s reliance on Hölderlin, what is das Rettende then? Heidegger clarifies it as follows: “Das Gewährende, das so oder so in die Entbergung schickt, ist als solches das Rettende. Denn dieses läßt den Menschen in die höchste Würde seines Wesens schauen und einkehren.” 36 The English translation of the first sentence reads: “The granting that sends in one or another way into revealing is as such the saving power.37” The second sentence completes the first by stipulating that das Rettende allows man see and take residence in, his essence in the highest sense.38 Heidegger has at this point already explored a highly idiosyncratic sense of what the word “retten” – to save, might mean. For him it means exactly to “fetch something home into its essence.39” What this essence is, follows: “Sie beruht darin, die Unverborgenheit und mit ihr je zuvor die Verborgenheit alles Wesens auf dieser Erde zu hüten.“ 40 Heidegger’s point seems to be that we as humans must realize our essence as being participants in letting dis-closedness and closedness happen or presence. These terms are related to Heidegger’s notion of 35

FT, 32. QCT, 28. FT, 36. 37 QCT, 32. 38 Recalling that essence is verbal and means ’granted enduring.’ 39 QCT, 28. 40 FT, 36. 36

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truth, aletheia, mentioned earlier. Das Rettende is thus a term that denotes the change from the current state of affairs where Ge-stell is the only type of revealing. The change should be to a state where mankind or Dasein, 41 realizes its own essence as the shepherds of un-disclosedness. What other kind of revealing would replace Ge-stell? Heidegger does not tell us with any certainty, but he gives the following clue: “Doch menschliche Besinnung kann bedenken, daß alles Rettende höheren, aber zugleich verwandten Wesens sein muß wie das Gefährdete.” 42 The idea evoked is that any saving power must be related to what it is to save (or save from), but that it must be of a higher essence. It has been established earlier that the kind of essence here referenced is Heidegger’s verbal essence of granted enduring and of course, that what the saving power must save from is the danger caused by the essence of technology. Therefore, according to the cited paragraph, the saving power must be of the same essence as the essence of technology, Ge-stell. And Ge-stell is a kind of revealing. So I can conclude that the saving power appears to be a revealing of some kind. Beyond being an essence that is ‘kindred’ to Ge-stell, the essence must also be of “a higher kind,” the English translation of “höheren.” This is a problematic notion, for how am I to distinguish between higher and lower kinds of essence? The next passage may point at one way of understanding “higher kind:” “Vermöchte es dann vielleicht ein anfänglicher gewährtes Entbergen, das Rettende zum ersten Scheinen zu bringen (…)”43 A hint is given as to what “higher kind” might mean: “anfänglicher gewährtes” or, “more primally granted.” By higher, Heidegger seems to mean primal – which is no doubt to be understood in that word’s original meaning: simply first, original or early. So Heidegger indicates a type of revealing that came before the present type, Ge-stell. “Einstmals heiß ΤέΧνη auch das Hervorbringen des Wahren in das Schöne. ΤέΧνη heiß auch dies ποιησις der schonen Künste.” 44 This is Heidegger’s own candidate for that which can bring about das Rettende, having both a ‘kindred’ yet ‘higher’ essence. It is art as ποιησις. This is not art as we know it today, instituted at museums or produced through art schools:

41

Heideggers term for man in general, from Sein und Zeit. I assume the reader is familiar with the term and, according to common practice, will not attempt to translate it. 42 FT, 38. QCT, 33-34. 43 FT, 38. QCT, 34. 44 FT, 38. QCT, 34.

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“Die Künste entstammten nicht dem Artistischen. Die Kunstwerke wurden nicht ästhetisch genoßen. Die Kunst war nicht Sektor eines Kulturschaffens.” 45 Instead, Heidegger tells us, art as ποιησις was simply a revealing practice that permeated life. There was no distinction between art and technology because both were united in bringing-forth what was true, and therefore both went under the name of ΤέΧνη. Finally though, Heidegger does not predict that art will necessarily save us. It is too soon to tell “Ob der Kunst diese höchste Möglichkeit ihres Wesens (…) gewährt ist, […].”46 It is important to note from the previous discussion that art has taken on a highly ambiguous character. It seems as if Heidegger is both promoting art as das Rettende itself and as that which might further it. This is not contradictory, however, as art is a revealing it can very well be das Rettende, if we take this to mean a change in revealing. Art can also be something that furthers das Rettende as when Heidegger speaks of it as a realm in which reflection upon technology can take place.47 I will later discuss how I believe this reflects a fundamental ambiguity in the term das Rettende. The question of how to bring about das Rettende will be given further treatment in the second section of the thesis. First however, I will connect the essence of technology with ontotheology. 1.5. Essence in Context: Technology and Ontotheology I have shown that Heidegger’s understanding of technology is that the essence of technology is Gestell. Ge-stell is a grave danger for both Dasein and being because it risks monopolizing revealing into a single and exclusive way of revealing. But what relation is there between the context given earlier, ontotheology, and Ge-stell? I will examine this in the following. Ontotheology was shown to be the historical structure of Western metaphysics. According to Heidegger the last great thinker to contribute to ontotheology was Nietzsche. While Nietzsche was critical of exactly metaphysics Heidegger maintains that Nietzsche was in fact a metaphysical thinker. For Heidegger, a great thinker such as Nietzsche always has an unthought to whatever he thought. Thomson explains: “(…) unearthing the ‘unthought’ ontotheological unity of […] Nietzsche’s doctrines of will-topower and eternal recurrence enact the final fulfillment and collapse of metaphysics understood as (…) an ontotheological foundation.” 48

45

FT, 38. QCT, 34. FT, 39. QCT, 35. 47 FT, 39. QCT, 35. 48 OoH, 21. Thomson writes the word ‘unity’ in cursive italics, which is reversed here. 46

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Nietzsche’s formulation of ontotheology has the dimensions of eternal recurrence and will-to-power, as ontology and theology respectively.49 Nietzsche’s ontotheology is one in which beings are understood as resources and inherently meaningless particles that can be manipulated in their continuous striving for selfovercoming. In this sense the parallels to Ge-stell are clear. The ontotheology of Nietzsche is similar to the characteristics of Ge-stell as a revealing that challenges forth into standing-reserve. I believe that Ge-stell is the revealing associated with ontotheology, i.e. the historical structure of metaphysics. By saying that the two terms are associated, I more precisely mean that Ge-stell reveals metaphysically. Beings are revealed by Ge-stell in a manner that I find more or less identical with the structure of ontotheology. The danger of technology is that this metaphysical revealing of ontotheological truth will come to be the only revealing. The saving power is that the revealing of Ge-stell will make us aware that it is, in fact, a revealing and that it may therefore change. The relationship between ontotheology and Ge-stell clarifies, to me, why Heidegger names the latter a granted enduring. If ontotheology is historical as it was explained earlier then it is a part of the history of being and so too, then, is Ge-stell. The historical characteristic of Ge-stell is what makes it granted. Heidegger says: “Das anfänglich aus der Frühe Währende ist das Gewährende.” 50 What grants, according to the English translation of this sentence, is what endures primally out of the earliest beginning.51 This earliest beginning is the beginning of the history of being. Heidegger can call Gestell granted because it is part of the history of being. I have now situated Ge-stell in the context of ontotheology. Read in this context, Ge-stell turns out to be a metaphysical way of revealing beings. This ties Ge-stell in with the history of being and explains how it can be called a granted enduring. This concludes the first section of the thesis which has dealt with reading and examining “Die Frage nach der Technik” and doing so from an understanding of ontotheology. The next section will focus upon interpretations of and bringing about das Rettende.

49

OoH, 44, 55-56, 69. FT, 35. QCT, 31. 51 FT, 35. QCT, 31. 50

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2: Literature and Interpretation: Das Rettende I will now look further at das Rettende. I will pursue this by looking at Heidegger’s own concepts of reflection, as it appears in “Die Frage nach der Technik,” and at two secondary sources. The secondary material was chosen based on the desire to provide concrete perspectives on das Rettende that were also conducive to practical action. I will address the following: 2.1. A Conventional Interpretation: Reflection 2.2. Iain D. Thomson: Reontologized Teaching and Research. 2.3. Hubert Dreyfus: Marginal practices 2.1. A Conventional Interpretation: Reflection Earlier I concluded that art was promoted by Heidegger in an ambiguous way to be both das Rettende and that which might bring about das Rettende. I will return to this ambiguity in the next section of the paper. Here, I wish to return to a passage quoted earlier and look at a second notion that Heidegger believes might bring about das Rettende. “Doch menschliche Besinnung kann bedenken, daß alles Rettende höheren, aber zugleich verwandten Wesens sein muß wie das Gefährdete.“ 52 I will turn my attention to the idea of menschliche Besinnung, in English translated as human reflection. I understand this term to be related to many other terms that Heidegger advances in this section of the text. He writes, for example, that the reader must “das Wesen der Technik bedenken“ 53 and “die äußerste Gefahr im Blick behalten.“54 These sentences imply to me that in order to further das Rettende what is needed is not action, but thinking, pondering and reflecting. I will summarize these expressions under the term reflection. For Heidegger then, another way to further das Rettende is reflection. No action can be taken that will instantaneously bring about das Rettende. Heidegger is here consistent with his own notion of essence. If true essence is granted, then mankind cannot decide or take action to make it come into its own. Desire to bring about change immediately may itself be an expression of Ge-stell, the desire to order around and challenge forth the wanted outcome. As das Rettende is the different from this kind of revealing, action seems to be flawed from its outset.

52

FT, 38. QCT, 33-34. FT, 40. QCT, 35. 54 FT, 37. QCT, 33. 53

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How then, does reflection help? Reflection makes those who reflect ready to participate in what is being granted. Reflection opens up the possibility of understanding what is granted and coming into a connection with it. Reflection allows one to see the nature of Ge-stell and hence, to understand that it too is a revealing. Reflection is what is needed for Dasein to understand its own essence, the role it has to play in revealing.55 Thus I interpret Heidegger as saying that das Rettende can also be brought about or aided by reflection. This reflection is crucial for Dasein’s understanding of its own and technology’s essence. 2.2. Ian D. Thomson: Reontologized Teaching and Research Earlier in the paper I relied on Ian D. Thomson in order to give an account of ontotheology. In addition to reading Heidegger through the ontotheology, Thomson’s work also make a constructive attempt to read das Rettende in concert with education and research. I will now provide a short summary of this position. Thomson’s book centers on the Heidegger’s notion of ontotheology56 and, amongst other issues, on education and research. 57 Thomson shows that education and research, in short the university, was an issue of enduring interest for Heidegger. 58 This interest passed through several phases, most obviously as Rector of Freiburg University, until it concluded with a view to reontologize education. This cryptic word implies to make education ontological again, and has two attendant parts, as Thomson explains: “[…] Heidegger’s reontologization of education – namely his perfectionism (his reessentialization of excellence) and his vision of philosophical thinking as revolutionary science […]”59 Thomson believes that Heidegger wanted to reontologize education and research through these two approaches. Shortly put the first, perfectionism, means to understand education not as a vocational skillupgrade, but as an education for perfecting what it means to be a human being (Dasein). The second means to include philosophy or thinking as a revolutionary practice that scientists should engage in, in order to understand the metaphysical presumptions they base their work on. Reontologization of education is connected to Ge-stell and das Rettende. It is connected because the present state of higher education is the result of the influence of Ge-stell. Reontologization, which is to combat this state of affairs in higher education, may therefore be understood as an antidote to Ge-stell. In other words, it is a candidate for furthering das Rettende. This is straight-forward: If we need to think of the 55

FT, 36. QCT, 32. HoO, part 1. 57 HoO, part 4. 58 HoO, 150-155. 59 HoO, 171. 56

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danger then the institutions of education seem to be the first places where the existence of this threat must be taught and understood. Another way in which reontologization is related to Ge-stell and das Rettende is via the notion that: “Existence is determined by science, but science itself remains rooted in metaphysics, whether it realizes it or not.” 60 Upon this understanding, science is a mediator between our metaphysical understanding of reality and our lived reality. Science formulates what we know and does so based on ontotheology. Therefore, by reontologizing higher education it becomes possible to work with the ontotheology at the place of its formulation into science. Scientists and students (scientists-to-be) can understand and work with the metaphysical implications and presuppositions of their work. In this way das Rettende is furthered and Gestell countered. Upon this understanding education is the mediator or place where the formulation of the dominant ontotheology occurs. Higher education thus seems like a place at which das Rettende would have more efficacy than if applied in another place. I have (very) briefly shown that for Thomson, the way to bring about the das Rettende is a reontologization of education and research. 2.3. Hubert Dreyfus: Marginal Practices Attempting to explain what das Rettende means, Hubert Dreyfus gives the following possible understanding: “To begin with, Heidegger holds that we must learn to appreciate marginal practices – what Heidegger calls the saving power of insignificant things – practices such as friendship, backpacking in the wilderness, and drinking the local wine with friends. All these practices remain marginal precisely because they resist efficiency.” 61 Here Dreyfus, I believe, seizes upon Heidegger’s comment in “Die Frage nach der Technik” that: “Hier und jetzt und im Geringen so, daß wir das Rettende in seinem Wachstum hegen.”62

60

HoO, 154. Hubert Dreyfus, “Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. nd Guignon, Cambridge University Press, 2 Edition, 2006. Page 365-366. Henceforth abbreviated as NATP. 62 FT, 37. QCT, 33. 61

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Leaving aside Dreyfus’ somewhat upper-middle class notions of ‘drinking the local wine’ and backpacking, it is possible to understand the gist of his interpretation. He emphasizes that we as people must take care not let technological mandates run everything in our lives. This will seem commonsensical to some, but in an age of increasing self-optimization (or self-improvement as it is often called) the idea is important. There is a whole industry of psychologists, coaches, personal trainers, life-style advisors and more which makes money telling people how to order their lives. Dreyfus’ term marginal practices is informative here, and it signifies those practices of everyday life that are not easily optimized but are increasingly in danger of becoming so. One way of encouraging das Rettende is then to tend to these marginal practices. But, as Dreyfus adds: “But just protecting non-technical practices, even if we could succeed, would still not give us what we need […]”63 The marginal practices are at best a temporary delay of Ge-stell. But what these practices, upon my interpretation of both Dreyfus and Heidegger, might provide, is the space or clearing necessary to consider the other aspects of das Rettende. As Heidegger says in the line immediately following the one quoted before: “Dies schließt ein, daß wir jederzeit die äußerste Gefahr im Blick behalten.”64 In short, Dreyfus advocates marginal practices as an interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of “Hier und jetzt und im Geringen so, (…)“65 as a way to foster das Rettende. These practices alone, however, will not bring about das Rettende.

63

NATP, p. 366. FT, 37. QCT, 33. 65 FT, 37, QCT 33. 64

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3: Discussion: Three Threads 3.1. Gathering Threads I will now gather some elements of this paper into a discussion concerning das Rettende. The discussion has three threads. 1) The relationship between das Rettende and ontotheology. 2) The ambiguous character of das Rettende. 3) The ideas provided by secondary sources, for furthering das Rettende. (1) Ontotheology and Ge-stell were shown to be related through their metaphysical character, the similarity of Nietzsche’s formulation of ontotheology and Ge-stell’s characteristics and Ge-stell’s part in the historical structure of ontotheology. How then, can this relationship help us understand das Rettende? When I looked into das Rettende it became clear that it was meant as a change in revealing and relatedly, allowed Dasein to come into its highest essence. Das Rettende is then what saves Dasein and being from the dangers of Ge-stell. If we understand Ge-stell to be metaphysical and related to ontotheology, then the postulate is that das Rettende simultaneously saves us from metaphysics in toto. (2) This is why art appeared ambiguous as das Rettende. Heidegger seems to hold that art is both that which is das Rettende and that which might bring about das Rettende. This is because art, for Heidegger, is a sphere free of Ge-stell where the danger can be considered.66 At the same time Heidegger recalls the time when art, for the Greeks, indeed was another mode of revealing. A pre-ontotheological time in which art and technology were one and the same. Does this wholly account for the ambiguous character of das Rettende? Heidegger makes no clear distinction between das Rettende and what it is that might bring it about. While Heidegger never was one for clear distinction, it makes sense: The danger is that metaphysics in the form of the revealing, Ge-stell, threatens to swallow up all revealing. Being saved would be to have a change in revealing, yet how to bring about that change in revealing from within the hold of Ge-stell? There seems to be no other way than to promote a different revealing. Das Rettende is ambiguously both that which saves and that which furthers that which saves. The ambiguity is fruitful for thinking perhaps, but an obstacle for action. This leads me to the third thread. (3) The interpretation of reflection and the secondary literature accounts was an attempt to see das Rettende concretely and in an action-oriented manner. They sum up to three approaches: education and research, marginal practices and reflection. My accounts of them are to the point yet they provide different perspectives and answers to the question: Can das Rettende be furthered by action? In answering this

66

FT, 39. QCT, 35.

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question, even posing it, I necessarily enter into ambiguity again. The following points illustrate what I mean: a. Insofar as investigating the texts and interpretations of Heidegger prompts one to consider the danger, then it is, on Heidegger’s view, fruitful for das Rettende. b. However, the desire to make effective, bring about, further das Rettende seems itself to be an expression of Ge-stell and thus runs counter to das Rettende. c. Some of the interpretations presented might indeed further das Rettende. If education and research could come to acknowledge Ge-stell it might promote thinking of das Rettende. If we reflect on technology’s dangers we might actually aid das Rettende. Here the ambiguity is whether prompting to action can further das Rettende. A and c suggests it can, b suggests it cannot. The theme is: the issue of das Rettende is metaphysical and therefore not something that can be addressed by actions alone. But actions seem nevertheless to be a part of the solution; take action for art, for education or in reflecting. My three threads hereby turn into each other, forming a single knot: ambiguity. 3.2. Tying a Knot I answer my research problem in both the affirmative and the negative. It is no doubt possible to read ontotheology in connection with ‘Die Frage nach der Technik.’ In fact, it is in some manner essential. So the first part of my question can be answered in the affirmative. As to the second part: To use this connection and other readings of Heidegger to understand das Rettende more concretely. This is a more difficult issue. In short, it seems that the answer to the second part of my question is, quoting Heidegger, “zweideutig.”67 I propose that it is the kind of Zweigdeutigkeit that Heidegger lauds as pointing towards truth. The conclusion of this thesis suggests the following concrete suggestions for further investigations: -

The term das Rettende and the whole of “Die Frage nach der Technik” can with benefit by read in the context of ontotheology.

-

The term das Rettende is in a fundamental sense ambiguous. This implies that it is open to interpretation and that further interpretation is warranted.

-

The ambiguity of das Rettende should serve as a constraint of such interpretations. This constraint is that interpretations must balance the need for action and actively furthering das Rettende with reflection. These first traits risk metaphysical contagion, and so must be considered.

67

FT, 37. QCT, 33.

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Conclusion: In this thesis I have explored Heidegger’s essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” through the concept ontotheology and interpretations of das Rettende. I have situated central elements of “Die Frage nach der Technik” in an ontotheological context. I have presented an interpretation of das Rettende in terms of reflection. And I have presented two interpretations of das Rettende that attempt to understand it concretely and in a manner conducive to action. I have discussed das Rettende in three threads: ontotheology, ambiguity and the concrete interpretations given of this concept. I found that the threads had the shared trait of ambiguity, a trait that I argue is fundamental to the overall concept of das Rettende. On the basis of this, I here make three suggestions for further readings of “Das Frage nach der Technik” and particularly, das Rettende. Overall I answer the problem posed in the thesis both positively and negatively: Ontotheology is a good context for reading the essay, but das Rettende both can and cannot be read in a concrete and action-oriented manner for fundamental reasons. This one question concerning das Rettende concludes by pointing towards further questioning.

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Bibliography Primary Sources: Heidegger, Martin, “Die Frage nach der Technik,“ in Vorträge und Aufsätze, Klett-Cotta, Elfte Auflage, 2009. Heidegger, Martin, ”The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. Lovitt, William, Harper & Row, 1977. Secondary Sources: Borgmann, Albert, “Technology,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005. Derrida, Jacques, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Quesiton, trans. Bennington; Geoffrey, Bowlby, Rachel, The University Press of Chicago, 1987.

Feenberg, Andrew, Heidegger and Marcuse – The Catastrophe and Redemption of History, Routledge, 2005. Heidegger, Marin, Væren og Tid, trans. Skovgaard, Christian Rud, Forlaget KLIM, 2007. Hubert Dreyfus, “Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 2006. Inwood, Michael, A Heidegger Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999. Riis, Søren, “The Question Concerning Thinking,” in New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, eds. Olsen, Jan Kyrre Berg; Selinger, Evan; Riis, Søren, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Rojcewicz, Richard, The Gods and Technology – A Reading of Heidegger, State University of New York, 2006. Pattison, George, The Later Heidegger, Routledge, 2000. Thomson, Ian D., Heidegger on Ontotheology: The Politics of Education, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wentzer, Thomas Schwarz; Sørensen, Peter Aaboe, eds., Heidegger i Relief - Perspektiver på Væren og Tid, Forlaget KLIM, 2008.

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