TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on the Author

XVII

General Editor’s Preface to Volumes 11 and 12 of the Treatise

XIX

Preface to Volume 11

XXI

Acknowledgements

XXV

Part I - Prologue

1

Chapter 1 - Analytic Jurisprudence Established

3

1.1. Austinian Orthodoxy 1.1.1. Holland’s Opus 1.1.2. Austinian Orthodoxy Challenged 1.1.2.1. Commands and Complications 1.1.2.2. Limits of the Sovereignty Doctrine 1.2. Dicey: The Sovereignty of Parliament and the Supremacy of Law 1.3. Salmond: Positivism Recast 1.3.1. Jurisprundentia Universalis—The Science of Civil Law 1.3.2. The Nature of Civil Law 1.3.3. Ultimate Legal Principles and Judicial Recognition 1.3.4. Salmond and Analytic Jurisprudence 1.4. Matters of Method 1.4.1. Analytic Jurisprudence: General vs. Particular 1.4.2. The Province of Analytic Jurisprudence 1.4.3. Dissenting Voices 1.4.3.1. Miller: Jurisprudence in the Scottish Tradition 1.4.3.2. Moderate Dissent at Mid-Century 1.4.3.3. Oakeshott: Philosophical Jurisprudence Reconceived 1.4.4. Glanville Williams: Convergence of Philosophy and Jurisprudence

5 5 6 7 9

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785428

13 18 18 19 21 24 25 26 29 32 33 35 36 39

VIII

Treatise, 11 - 20th century: the common law world

Chapter 2 - Justice Holmes: A New Path for American Jurisprudence

43

2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5.

45 45 46 48 49 51 57 57 59 62 64 64 66 70 70 73

Holmes:The Man and the Mind 2.1.1. Jurist, Judge, Justice 2.1.2. Orientation Common Law, Science, and Positivism 2.2.1. “Formalism” and Langdell’s Science of Law 2.2.2. Pollock’s Predictions Holmes’s Static Conception of Law 2.3.1. Common-Law Orientation 2.3.2. Enforcement Positivism 2.3.3. Law, Morality, and the Bad Man Holmes’s Dynamic Conception of Law 2.4.1. The Life of the Law 2.4.2. The Dynamic Interaction of Form and Substance Law, Theory, and Adjudication 2.5.1. Holmes’s General Jurisprudence 2.5.2. Theory, Skepticism, and Adjudication

Part II - The Holmesian Legacy

79

Chapter 3 - Realism and Reaction

81

3.1. Roots of Realism 3.1.1. Movement or Mood, Metaphysics or Method? 3.1.2. Fabricators of the Tools of the Realist Trade 3.1.2.1. Gray: Law vs. Sources and the Importance of Finality 3.1.2.2. Pound: Two Forms of Jurisprudential Empiricism 3.1.2.3. Dewey: The Logic of Inquiry 3.1.3. Hohfeld: Analytic Jurisprudence in Realism’s Province 3.1.3.1. Jural Correlatives and Opposites 3.1.3.2. A General Framework for Analysis of Law 3.1.3.3. Reception of Hohfeld’s Analytic Jurisprudence 3.2. Realism: Skepticisms and Remedies 3.2.1. Rules: Paper and Proper 3.2.2. Rules and Reasoning in Judicial Decision Making 3.2.2.1. Conflicting Rules 3.2.2.2. Finding the Ratio Decidendi and the Problem of Generalization 0 3.2.2.3. The Problem of Determination: Authority and the Judgment Gap

81 82 84


84 89 95 98 99 103 104 106 107 110 110 111 113

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3.2.2.4. Argument from the Conclusion and Judicial Window Dressing 3.2.2.5. The Problem of Relevance: Fact-Skepticism 3.3. If Not Rules, What? 3.3.1. Failures of Formalism 3.3.2. Realist Science of Law 3.3.2.1. Impartial Idiosyncrasy 3.3.2.2. Jurisprudence as Social Science 3.3.2.3. Law Jobs: Llewellyn’s Conception of Legal Science 3.3.3. Recovery of Craft and Principle 3.3.3.1. Pound, Cardozo, and Reasoned Elaboration 3.3.3.2. Llewellyn: The Discipline of Craft 3.3.3.3. Levi: The Forum of Principle 3.4. Conclusion

IX

118 121 122 123 124 126 127 131 132 133 135 137 138

Chapter 4 - Implicit Law and Principles of Legality

141

4.1. Charting a New Path 4.1.1. Legal Realism vs. Legal Reality 4.1.2. Sovereignty and the Foundations of Legal Order 4.2. Human Interaction and the Law 4.2.1. Eunomics: The Science of Good Social Order 4.2.2. Interactional Foundations of Law 4.2.2.1. Interaction and Informal Social Rules 4.2.2.2. Interactional Dimensions of Contract, Case Law, and Statute 4.2.2.3. Vertical Interaction and Congruence 4.3. The Internal Morality of Law 4.3.1. Immanent Reason 4.3.2. Law’s Internal Morality 4.3.3. Legality and Substantive Justice 4.4. Spontaneous Order and the Foundations of Law 4.4.1. Spontaneous Order and Social Rules 4.4.1.1. The Idea of Spontaneous Order 4.4.1.2. Social Rules: Implicit and Abstract 4.4.2. The Informational Conditions of Thetic Law 4.4.3. Modern Law as a Mixed Order 4.5. Nomos, Liberty, and the Rule of Law 4.5.1. The Rule of Law in The Constitution of Liberty 4.5.2. Nomos, The Law of Liberty 4.5.3. The Value of Liberty

141 142 143 146 147 147 148


149 151 153 154 155 161 162 164 164 166 168 170 172 172 174 175

X


4.6. Common-Law Adjudication and Hayek’s Arguments for Law-as-Nomos 4.7. Conclusion

176 180

Chapter 5 - Economic Jurisprudence

181

5.1. Roots, Ambitions, and Projects 5.1.1. Realism and Neo-Classical Economic Theory 5.1.2. Theoretical Ambitions of Law and Economics 5.1.2.1. Basic Theoretical Assumptions 5.1.2.2. Projects and Theses: Analytic, Explanatory, and Normative 5.1.2.3. Law and Economics and General Jurisprudence 5.2. Analytical Tools 5.2.1. Concepts of Efficiency 5.2.1.1. Utility and the Pareto Criteria 5.2.1.2. Kaldor-Hicks and Wealth Maximization 5.2.2. Virtual Markets, Transaction Costs, and Legal Rules 5.3. Positive Economics: Case Law, Torts, and Deep Explanation 5.3.1. Efficiency Explains the Law 5.3.2. The Case-Law Thesis Illustrated: An Economic Theory of Tort Law 5.3.3. Evidence and Explanation 5.3.3.1. The Empirical Case for the Case-Law Thesis 5.3.3.2. Functional-Causal Explanation 5.3.3.3. Interpretive Explanation 5.3.3.4. Economics as the Logic of law 5.4. Efficiency as a Political Norm 5.4.1. Is Social Wealth a Value? 5.4.2. Proxy Principle and Ex Ante Consent 5.5. Pragmatism and Politics

181 181 183 184

Chapter 6 - Critical Jurisprudence and the Rule of Law

213

6.1. Progressive Politics and Critical Theories 6.2. Law as Ideology and the Ideology of Law 6.2.1. Law as Ideology 6.2.2. Ideology Analysis in Critical Jurisprudence 6.2.2.1. Law as Patriarchy 6.2.2.2. Law as Politics 6.3. The Indeterminacy Critique 6.3.1. Structure of the Argument

213 215 215 217 217 220 224 225

185 189 190 190 190 191 192 194 194 195 197 197 198 200 201 202 202 204 206

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XI

6.3.2. Dimensions of Indeterminacy 6.3.3. Sources of Law’s Indeterminacy 6.3.3.1. Impoverished Opulence 6.3.3.2. Theory-dependence 6.3.3.3. Patchworks, Political Forces, and Fundamental Contradictions 6.3.4. Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law 6.4. Oppression, Objectivity, and Law 6.4.1. Oppression 6.4.2. Law’s Complicity in Gender Oppression 6.4.2.1. Man is the Measure 6.4.2.2. Impoverished Legal Reason 6.4.2.3. Objectivity as Objectification 6.5. Attack on the Citadel

226 228 228 229

Part III - Hart And His Legacy

259

Chapter 7 - Hart’s Critical Positivism

261

7.1. Hart and Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century 7.1.1. Hart’s Project 7.1.2. Philosophical Resources 7.1.2.1. Bentham, “Greats,” and the Two Austins 7.1.2.2. Philosophical Techniques: Alternatives to Definition and Description 7.1.3. Hart’s Theory of Law in Outline 7.2. Hart’s Critical Frame 7.2.1. The Strategy of The Concept of Law 7.2.2. Against Reduction 7.2.2.1. Kinds of Laws and their Functions 7.2.2.2. Normativity and Empirical Reductionism 7.2.3. Transcendental Inflation of Normativity 7.3. Social Rules 7.3.1. Hart’s Hermeneutics 7.3.2. The Internal Point of View 7.3.2.1. Accept and Use as Guides 7.3.2.2. Interior vs. Insider 7.3.2.3. Social Rules and Conventions 7.3.3. Obligation: Social and Legal 7.3.4. Challenges to Hart’s Account of Normativity 7.4. Social Rules and Legal Systems 7.4.1. The Luxury of Legal Validity 7.4.2. The Sobering Truth about Law

261 261 264 264

231 235 240 242 244 245 248 251 257

265 267 271 271 273 274 279 283 285 286 291 292 294 297 299 301 304 305 307

XII


7.5. The Rule of Recognition 7.5.1. The Idea of a Rule of Recognition 7.5.2. Unity, Persistence, the Systematic Character of Law 7.5.3. Ultimacy and the Normative Foundations of Law 7.5.4. The Rule of Recognition and the Social Foundations of Law 7.6. Adjudication 7.7. Lead us not into Temptation: Resisting the Pull of Natural Law 7.7.1. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals 7.7.2. Natural Law as a Theory of Legal Validity 7.7.3. The Minimal Demands of Natural Necessity 7.7.4. Justice in the Administration of Law and the Rule of Law 7.7.5. Positivism and Jurisprudential Method

Chapter 8 - Positivism Extended: Institutions, Sources, Authority, and Law 8.1. Hart’s Legacy 8.2. Institutionalism 8.2.1. The Idea of an Institutionalized Normative Order 8.2.2. Law as an Institutionalized Normative Order 8.3. Basic Themes in Raz’s Theory of Law 8.3.1. Hartian Pedigree 8.3.2. Methodology of Legal Theory 8.3.3. Law’s Claim to Legitimate Authority 8.3.4. The Sources Thesis 8.4. The Case for the Sources Thesis 8.4.1. Authority Requires Sources 8.4.2. The Service Conception of Authority 8.4.2.1. Authority and Exclusionary Reasons 8.4.2.2. The Justification of Authority 8.4.2.3. Authority and Coordination 8.5. Law’s Claim to Authority: Challenges 8.5.1. Questioning Authority 8.5.2. Law’s Authority and Raz’s Claims for It 8.5.2.1. Non Sequiturs 8.5.2.2. Just What Does Law Claim? 8.6. Legal Reasoning 8.6.1. Applying the Law, Determining the Law, and Moral Reasoning

309 310 314 317 319 321 325 325 326 329 334 336

341 341 342 343 346 348 349 350 353 355 356 357 360 360 364 367 369 370 372 372 375 377 378

table of contents

8.6.1.1. Directed Powers 8.6.1.2. Two Aspects of Legal Reasoning 8.6.2. The Impossibility of a Theory of Legal Reasoning 8.7. Formalism Again: The Rule of Rules 8.7.1. A Neo-Formalist Model of Practical Reasoning 8.7.1.1. Neo-Formalist Analytic 8.7.1.2. The Normative Case for Neo-Formalist Practical Reasoning 8.7.1.3. The Asymmetry of Authority 8.7.2. Neo-Formalist Jurisprudence: Rules and Law

Chapter 9 - Positivism Challenged: Interpretation, Integrity, and Law 9.1. Challengers 9.2. Principles and Controversy 9.2.1. The Province of Principles 9.2.1.1. Principles in Practice 9.2.1.2. Positivism’s Divided House 9.2.2. The Claims of Controversy 9.2.3. Positivist Conventions Feel the Sting of Controversy 9.3. Interpretive Jurisprudence 9.3.1. Against Archimedes 9.3.2. The Practice of Interpretation 9.3.2.1. The Interpretive Attitude 9.3.2.2. The Domain of Constructive Interpretation 9.3.2.3. The Dynamics of Constructive Interpretation: Data, Fit, and Appeal 9.3.3. Can There be a Best Theory? 9.4. Law as Integrity 9.4.1. An Interpretive Plateau 9.4.2. Conventionalism: A Challenger in Interpretive Clothing 9.4.3. Law’s Integrity 9.4.3.1. Political Responsibility, Justice, and Integrity 9.4.3.2. Law as Integrity 9.4.3.3. The Problem of the Wicked Legal System 9.4.4. Questioning Integrity 9.4.4.1. On the Possibility of Principles 9.4.4.2. Whose Integrity?

XIII

379 380 385 388 389 390 393 395 396

401 401 404 404 405 407 411 415 421 421 425 425 426 430 434 438 438 440 443 444 446 448 451 451 453

XIV


Chapter 10 - The Incorporation Debate

457

10.1. Explaining the Difference Moral Principles Make 10.1.1. Elmer, The Duke, and Dr. Bonham 10.1.2. It’s a Mistake 10.1.3. A Case for Incorporation 10.1.4. Employed but not Incorporated: Exclusive Legal Positivism 10.1.5. Incorporation by Common Practice of Argument: Inclusive Legal Positivism 10.1.6. Natural-Law Perspectives on Incorporation 10.2. The Dialectic in the Positivist Camp 10.2.1. The Fiction of the Midas Touch 10.2.2. The Compatibility of Conventionalism and Incorporation 10.2.3. Implications of the Practical Dimension of Law 10.2.3.1. The Challenge of the Argument from Authority 10.2.3.2. Practical Guidance, Authoritative Directives, and Directed Powers

457 457 458 459

Chapter 11 - Conventions and the Foundations of Law

483

11.1. Conventions, Conventionalisms, and Law 11.1.1. Law and Conventions 11.1.2. Normativity and Law’s Conventional Foundations 11.2. Humean Conventions 11.2.1. Conventions and Social Cooperation 11.2.1.1. Hume on the Conventions of Justice 11.2.1.2. Lewis Conventions 11.2.2. Humean Conventions and the Law 11.2.2.1. The Rule of Recognition as a Humean Convention 11.2.2.2. Humean Conventions and the Normativity of Law: Two Approaches 11.2.3. Humean Conventions Challenged 11.3. Conventions as Joint Commitments 11.3.1. Joint Commitments and Shared Cooperative Activities 11.3.1.1. Existence Conditions of Social Conventions 11.3.1.2. Conventions, Dispositions, and Reasons 11.3.2. Duties and Joint Commitments 11.3.2.1. Conventions as Collective Fiat 11.3.2.2. Shared Cooperative Activity, Obligation, and Disagreement

483 483 485 486 486 486 488 493

461 463 467 470 471 474 478 478 481

494 497 500 504 505 505 506 507 508 511

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11.3.3. Commitments, Reasons, and Obligations: Some Questions 11.3.3.1. Dispositions, Commitments and Reasons 11.3.3.2. Do Joint Commitments Yield (the Right Kind of) Obligations? 11.3.3.3. On the Possibility of Fundamental Disagreement within Shared Cooperative Activities 11.4. Constitutive Conventions 11.4.1. The Concept of Convention Analyzed 11.4.2. Kinds of Conventions 11.4.2.1. Constitutive Conventions 11.4.2.2. Deep vs. Surface Conventions 11.4.3. Constitutive Conventions and the Foundations of Law 11.4.4. Constitution, Cooperation, and Convention 11.4.4.1. Is Law Like Chess? 11.4.4.2. Convergence 11.5. Legal Conventionalism Challenged 11.5.1. Conformism, Arbitrariness, and Moral Seriousness 11.5.2. Law as a Discursive Practice 11.5.3. Getting it Together vs. Getting it Right 11.5.4. The Limits of Formal Conventionalism

XV

514 514 515 517 519 519 523 523 526 526 528 529 531 533 534 536 538 542

Chapter 12 - Analytic Jurisprudence Challenged

547

12.1. Natural-Law Theory’s Ambitions 12.2. A Natural-Law Theory of Practical Reasonableness 12.2.1. Basic Human Goods 12.2.2. Principles of Practical Reasonableness and Morality 12.3. Natural-Law Jurisprudence: Law, Authority, and the Common Good 12.3.1. A Natural-Law Challenge to Methodological Positivism 12.3.2. Practical Reasonableness in Community: Common Good and Poiesis 12.3.3. Positive Law and Legal Reasoning: Dimensions of Natural-Law Positivism 12.4. Retrieving Normative Jurisprudence 12.4.1. The Poverty of Methodological Positivism 12.4.2. Law’s Habitat: The Circumstances of Politics 12.5. Authoritative Rules, Systematic Integrity, and Argument: Waldron’s Normative Jurisprudence 12.5.1. The Normative Case for a Positivist Conception of Law

549 551 551 552 554 555 556 558 562 563 564 565 565

XVI


12.5.2. Publicity, Systematicity, and the Argumentative Nature of Law 12.5.3. The Artificial Reason of Law: Judicial Reasoning as an Institution-Shaped Hybrid

568 571

Chapter 13 - Concluding Note

577

577 578

13.1. Vera Philosophia 13.2. On the Threshold of a Philosophical Jurisprudence

Bibliography

585

Index of Subjects

607

Index of Names

0