tax mimicking among local governments: some

TAX MIMICKING AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: SOME EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH MUNICIPALITIES Autores: Francisco J. Delgado(1) Matías Mayor-Fernández(2) P. T. N.o 17/09

(1) Department of Economics – University of Oviedo; [email protected]. (2) Department of Applied Economics – University of Oviedo; [email protected]. Acknowledgements. We are indebted to Santiago Lago-Peñas and seminar participants at the Complutense University of Madrid for comments and suggestions, but the responsibility for errors remains with us. Francisco J. Delgado gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. N.B.: Las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo son de la exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores, pudiendo no coincidir con las del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Desde el año 1998, la colección de Papeles de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales está disponible en versión electrónica, en la dirección: >http://www.minhac.es/ief/principal.htm.

Edita: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales N.I.P.O.: 602-09-006-9 I.S.S.N.: 1578-0252 Depósito Legal: M-23772-2001

INDEX 1. INTRODUCTION 2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 3. DATA, EXPLORATORY SPATIAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS REFERENCES SÍNTESIS. Principales implicaciones de política económica

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ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to study the strategic interactions in the Spanish local tax system with spatial econometrics procedures. We analyse the property tax, the motor vehicle tax and the building activities tax, that represent jointly the 80 per cent of the tax revenue at the local level of government in Spain. We consider three weight specifications to define competitors: contiguity, distance and the proposal of Fingleton. After carrying out a spatial exploratory analysis, the results of the estimation of spatial lag and spatial error models confirm the horizontal externalities or positive spatial-autocorrelation in the property tax and the building activities tax, with an order of magnitude between 0.3 and 0.5, but not in the motor vehicle tax. This tax mimicking is in line with the results achieved in the empirical literature on local tax competition. Keywords: tax mimicking, spatial econometrics, local governments. JEL Codes: H71, H73.

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Instituto de Estudios Fiscales

1. INTRODUCTION The study of the local tax competition is the objective of a broad empirical literature in the last years. The strategic interactions or externalities can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal externality refers to when the fiscal choice made by a local government affects the fiscal decision of the neighbouring jurisdictions. And vertical externality arises from the interaction between several levels of government: municipal and regional or state, regional or state and national or federal. This means that the fiscal choice of a local government depends on the choice of the state or regional government level. We analyze the horizontal externalities in the setting of the local tax system. Tax mimicking can be tested if we find significant correlation between the tax rates of a municipality and those current in the nearest jurisdictions. In advance, the explanations for the interaction could be based on mobility –the Tiebout (1956) model or tax competition–, the political yardstick competition –where voters use information from other jurisdictions to judge the performance of their own incumbents– or the expenditure spillovers –derived from the existence of correlation in expenditure levels across jurisdictions–. Note that the mobility and the yardstick competition allow the taxpayers to escape tax increases, in the first case by migration and in the second case by voting to change the politicians. If the differences on the tax rates are not too large to promote migration movements, and the spillover effects are some limited too, the yardstick competition could be the most plausible cause of the tax mimicking, as it is showed in some papers quoted below. A selection of the previous papers on this topic is briefly reviewed in Table 1. Firstly, several works have concluded evidence of such horizontal interactions at the local level, mainly for the income tax and property tax. But the estimation of the tax mimicking effect is different by taxes and countries (from 0.05 to 0.745). Besides, other papers studied the horizontal and vertical interactions jointly. The vertical interactions are confirmed in approximately the half of the studies. A growing literature is devoted to test the yardstick competition as the possible origin of the tax mimicking since the initial work of Besley and Case (1995). Among the studies revised, only Edmark and Agren (2008) rejected this hypothesis, in this case for the income tax in Sweden1. In this paper, we test the hypothesis of strategic interactions in the tax reaction functions from a sample of Spanish municipalities located in the northern region of Asturias. The proximity between the 78 local governments 1

Bordignon et al. (2004) provide a good overview of yardstick competition. Additionally, Hill (2008) studied the effects of agglomeration in the determination of tax rates by the jurisdictions. From data for county governments in Tennessee for sales tax and property tax, he found that counties with more establishments were able to maintain higher tax rates.

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means that can be a good test for the strategic decisions. And we do not study vertical externalities because local taxes are not shared with other higher levels of government in Spain. We estimate two models of spatial interaction: spatial lag model and spatial error model. The existence of a spatial process induces the failure of the ordinary least squares method. The multidirectionality of the spatial dependence causes changes into the properties of the least square estimators. If a spatial lag model is considered, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent irrespective of the properties of the error term, whereas the OLS estimator in a spatial error model has the same properties as a time series model: unbiased but inefficient. Anselin (1988) asserted that the maximum likelihood method is the best option to estimate spatial process. However, there are other econometric approaches to solve the problems described above, mainly the instrumental variables method (IV) as it is briefly discussed in the next section. In this article the main local taxes in Spain are analysed: property tax, motor vehicle tax and tax on building activities. In 2004, these taxes represented the 14.93%, 4.77% and 4.64% of total revenue for the Spanish municipalities. With regard to the tax revenue, these shares were 49.25%, 15.72% and 15.30% respectively. Local business tax is not studied for several reasons. First and main, the 2002 reform of the local public finance system in Spain practically abolished the tax: only 10 per cent of previous taxpayers continued after the reform, concretely the corporations with net revenue above one million euros. In that year, this tax represented only the 3.07% of total revenue for the local level. Second, there is a broad national normative and municipalities only can alter one tax rate, the so-called coefficient of situation. It depends on the category of the street –the local level can establish between two and nine street categories– with a minimum rate not below 0.4 and a maximum not above 3.8. In the local property tax, the municipality can establish the tax rate within an interval, between 0.4% and 1.1%2, over the property value. However, this nominal rate must be complemented with the year of reassessment of that value, a fact that remarkably increases notably the liability. There exists a mechanism to avoid it, which is a reduction of the tax base to adequate to the new values in a ten-year period, and the option of decreasing the nominal rates. For this reason, we also compute an effective tax rate that combines both variables. As the nominal rate is more visible for the citizens and the politicians, we take both rates for the study. In the motor vehicle tax, the municipality applies a coefficient between 1 and 2 over the amounts approved by the central government. As these rates can differ among vehicle types, we choose the average rate over the automobiles. For these, five categories are distinguished and reference liabilities are from 2

Indeed, the municipality has some increases if it is a capital or has urban public transport.

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12.62 to 112 euros, so after the application of the local coefficient, the maximum taxes vary from 12.62 to 224 euros. Finally, the local authority establishes a rate from 0 to 4 per cent in the tax on building activities, and this tax is not compulsory at the local level of government. Nevertheless, as the resource needs grow with the demanding of the citizens, an increasing number of local governments have introduced this tax. In 2004, in the sample of 78 municipalities, only 10 had not adopted the tax, whereas 9 had established the top rate of 4 per cent. With regard to the scanty literature on this topic for Spain, in Solé-Ollé (2003), from a sample of municipalities in the province of Barcelona and by using instrumental variables approach, the estimations of the interaction effects were 0.39 –property tax– and 0.33 –motor vehicle tax, he found no significant effect for the business tax and did not study the building activities tax. Bosch and SoléOllé (2007) study the yardstick competition from a sample of Spanish municipalities, and only in the local property tax, again by using an instrumental variables approach. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy. Section 3 contains the data, the spatial exploratory analysis and the results from the estimations of the tax reaction functions by spatial econometrics models. Finally, Section 4 concludes. Table 1 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE ON LOCAL TAX COMPETITION Study

Country/taxes

Results

A) Tax mimicking: horizontal interactions Ladd (1992) Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) Brett and Pinkse (2000) Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) Buettner (2001) Solé-Ollé (2003)

Allers and Elhorst (2005) Kangasharju et al. (2006)

United States/Property tax, sales tax Belgium/Income tax and property tax Canada (Brittish Columbia) /Business property tax United States (Boston)/Property tax

Yes property, 0.5-0.8. No sales Yes, between 0.5 and 0.7 Yes, but with different results Yes, but with different results

Germany/Business tax Yes, but only 0.05 Spain (Barcelona)/Several Yes property tax (0.389), taxes vehicle tax (0.333). No business tax Netherlands/Property tax Yes, 0.35 Finland/Income tax Yes, 0.303 (Follow)

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(Continuation) Study

Country/taxes

Edmark and Agren (2008) Sweden/Income tax B) Tax mimicking: horizontal & vertical interactions Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) Switzerland/Income tax Hayashi and Boadway (2001) Canada/Business tax Revelli (2001) United Kingdom/Property tax Cavlovic and Jackson Canada/Income tax and (2003) business tax Brulhart and Jametti (2006) Switzerland/Tax index Leprince et al. (2007) France/Business tax C) Yardstick competition Besley and Case (1995) United States (States)/Several taxes Bordignon et al. (2003) Italy/Property tax

Results

Yes, 0.745 Yes, horizontal and vertical Yes, horizontal and vertical Yes horizontal, no vertical Yes in income tax No in business tax Yes, horizontal and vertical Yes horizontal, no vertical

Yes. Vote-seeking and taxsetting are tied together Yes. Positive spatial autocorrelation in tax rates when mayors run for reelection. No interaction when mayors face a term limit or large majorities Solé-Ollé (2003) Spain (Barcelona) Several Yes. Tax rates are higher with taxes bigger electoral margins, with left-wing governments and in non-election years Allers and Elhorst (2005) Netherlands/Property Yes. Voters penalize tax incumbents for anticipated tax rate differentials, but not for unanticipated Yes. Incumbents are punished Vermeir and Heyndels Belgium for higher rates, more (2006) (Flanders)/Income tax intensely with lower rates in and property tax neighbouring jurisdictions Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007) Spain/Property tax Yes. Evidence of “comparative voting behaviour” (a tax increase bigger than the others municipalities has an important vote loss) Edmark and Agren (2008) Sweden/Income tax No. Similar interaction between weak and strong majority, and in election years

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2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY First, we estimate the tax reaction function by OLS as benchmark or initial approach, and then the two main spatial models. As stated above, OLS estimations are not valid under the presence of spatial autocorrelation, so an exploratory spatial analysis is carried out to study both global and local autocorrelation patterns. In spatial econometrics, there are two basic specifications in order to summarize the spatial autocorrelation: the spatial lag model and the spatial error model. The spatial lag model3 is based on the inclusion into the model of the spatially lagged dependent variable. The tax setting equation for each tax, in the spatial lag model specification, is as follows: T = ρ WT + α X + ε

(1)

where T is the tax rates matrix, X is the matrix of explanatory variables, W is the weight matrix, ρ the spatial coefficient and ε the disturbance vector, with i.i.d. error terms (zero mean and constant variance). The presence on the righthand side of the equation of the spatial lag term produces a non zero correlation with the error term. Each value of spatially lagged variable is not only correlated with the error term associated with this location, but with all of them. There are two interpretations of the spatial autoregressive coefficient. In the first case, this parameter measures the spatial spillover when the actors under consideration match the spatial unit of observation and the spillover is the result of a theoretical model. The second interpretation is related to the spatial autocorrelation due to a mismatch between the economic phenomenon and the spatial area in which is allocated. In the tax setting analysis the suitable interpretation is the first option, as it is showed in Case et al. (1993). The spatial error model consists on the specification of a spatial process for the disturbance term. The immediate consequence of this is the existence of nonspherical error covariance matrix. The most common approach is the inclusion of a spatial autoregressive process: T = α X + δ, δ = λ W δ + ε

(2)

where λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient for the error lag. This type of model is adequate to include the spatial autocorrelation due to measurement errors or to variables that are not crucial in the model (nuisance dependence)4. 3

Anselin (1988) named this model as mixed regressive, spatial autoregressive model. There are other specifications for the spatial error process; see Cliff and Ord (1981) and Kelejian and Robinson (1993). 4

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In the tax competition framework, the spatial error model is consistent with a situation where determinants of the tax rate omitted from the model are spatially autocorrelated and with a situation where unobserved shocks follow a spatial pattern (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). And the spatial lag model is theoretically consistent with the situation where the tax rates interact with the tax rates in nearby jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2003). Nevertheless, a priori, none of these models is best to model the tax reaction function and empirical results will be determinant to select the most appropriate one5. In spatial econometrics literature the most common specification strategy is of type “specific to general” or bottom-up. In this paper we considered the specification search strategy based on robust test to local misspecification (Anselin et al., 1996) unfolded by Florax et al. (2003). In the first place, the LM test is applied in order to detect the existence of spatial dependence due to an omitted spatial lag or due to a spatial autoregressive error process. If both tests are significant, the model is selected according to the results of the robust LM test. If there is local misspecification, robust LM test has more power in pointing out the correct alternative test and, as a consequence, can be applied to choice the model specification. With regard to W matrix, different criteria are applied to design the spatial weights and nowadays there is not a unique criterion or consensus about the system to obtain them. As Anselin (2002) stated, “the specification of the weight matrix is a matter of some arbitrariness and it is often cited as a major weakness of the lattice approach”. Recently, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2009) analyzed the different ways to build a spatial weight matrix with two main options: in the first one, the spatial weight matrix is considered a theoretical conceptualization of the structure of spatial dependence (binary, distance matrix). These matrixes are not strictly related to the real data. In the second case, the spatial weight matrix is based on some “empirical” evidence about the variables. We consider different options with the aim to analyze the sensibility of the results. In first place, we apply the binary matrix based on a contiguity criterion among the municipalities (W 1) , so w ij = 1 if jurisdictions i and j share a border and 0 otherwise. Other frequent option consists of the distance based matrix (W 2 ) where w ij = dij−2 , being dij the distance between two jurisdictions i and j . This matrix summarizes the idea that the spatial dependence is reduced with the increase of distance among municipalities. These matrices could be considered as exogenous because they are obtained by means of criteria non related to the dependent variable. There are other ways to define spatial weight matrix based on data related with the problem. These weights could be considered as a pseudo endogenous 5

See Revelli (2005) for a discussion on the empirical specification of strategic interaction models at local level.

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matrix. In this paper, we built as a third option (W 3 ) the Fingleton (2001) matrix where w ij = Y j2 d ij2 , where Y j is the per capita disposable income of territory j . The weight matrix is usually standardized such that the elements of a row sum to one. This standardization makes easier the interpretation of the spatial lag variable as an average of neighbouring values. Furthermore, it allows the comparison among the spatial parameters associated to different models. The first contribution related to the maximum likelihood estimation (ML) of the spatial lag and error model was published by Ord (1975). After estimating the models without spatial interaction by OLS, the spatial lag model is estimated by a two-stage procedure and the spatial error model by an iterative two-stage procedure (Anselin, 1988). In the spatial lag model, the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable is considered as a form of endogeneity. The common estimation method applied when a problem of endogeneity appears is the instrumental variable estimation (Anselin, 1988). The key aspect consists of the selection of the proper instrumental variables6. Furthermore, the method is quite poor with small samples as in this paper. One advantage of this method consists of its operational simplicity since it is implemented in most of the commercial econometric software and probably this is the reason for its widespread application. More recently, Das et al. (2003) demonstrated that the IV estimators are less accurate than the ML. The X matrix, following certain agreement in the literature on local tax interaction from the tax competition theory, is formed by the following variables7: • Structural characteristics: population and area. • Socio-demographic characteristics: percentage of population under 15 years, percentage of population over 65 years and rate of unemployment. • Fiscal magnitudes: per capita disposable income and per capita grants received8. With regard to the signs expected in the estimations, for the structural characteristics, a negative sign in the population can be interpreted as the existence of increasing returns in the public goods provision, while a positive 6

Kelejian and Robinson (1993) demonstrated that the instruments WX, WX2, etc. in a spatial lag model allow to obtain a consistent estimation of the coefficient. 7 It would be interesting to include the income inequality at the municipality, but data are not available. 8 Grants represented the 35.13% of the total revenue for the Spanish municipalities in 2004. Theoretically, stronger revenue equalization system will imply less incentive to tax competition. As in other decentralized countries, there is vertical fiscal imbalance consequently with the greater decentralization of expenditures than taxes.

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sign in the area reflects that this provision is costlier in a bigger area. The three considered socio-demographic characteristics are expected to be positive correlated with the tax rates: young and elderly people need more resources than the rest of the population, and a bigger rate of unemployment also carries more public resources. Finally, it is expected that the per capita disposable income has a positive sign if public goods are normal, while the sign of the grants is of special interest in the study of the so-called flypaper effect or “money stick where they hit”. Theoretically, the standard median voter model predicts that block grants from higher levels of government crowd out local spending and some of the grants are distributed as lower taxes in accordance with the income elasticities of that voter. But in the empirical studies crowding-in or flypaper effect is frequently achieved, so the lump-sum grants have a positive and large effect (bigger than an income increase) on the local spending and no effect or positive on the local taxes; see the reviews by Hines and Thaler (1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1998). Recently Dahlberg et al. (2008) found evidence of crowding-in for Sweden. Although we are interested in the tax mimicking and we do not study the local spending, if the coefficient of the per capita grants received is positive we find some partial evidence of the flypaper effect or crowding-in, with the limitations of this approach.

3. DATA, EXPLORATORY SPATIAL ANALYSIS AND 3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Table 2 contains the summary statistics of the variables, referenced to year 2004. One key characteristic in the study of the local public sector is the population. The 78 municipalities analysed range from 278 to 270,880 inhabitants with the following distribution: 16 below 1,000 citizens, 32 between 1,000 and 5,000, 23 between 5,000 and 20,000, 4 between 20,000 and 50,000 and finally 3 above 50,000 inhabitants, so the 70 per cent of the municipalities are between 1,000 and 20,000. The property tax rates are the nominal rate and the effective rate as the relation between the tax liability and the tax base. In the motor vehicle tax, the rate is the average coefficient, between 1 and 2, over the liabilities of reference to the automobile. And in the building activities tax, we analyse the tax rate, between 0 and 4. Figure 1 shows the kernel density estimates for the tax rates. The explanatory variables are the population (thousands), the area, the percentage of young people as below 15 years, the percentage of elderly people as above 65 years, the unemployment rate, the per capita disposable income (thousand of euros) and the per capita grants received (thousand of euros) calculated from the public budgets. — 14 —


Table 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Variable

Mean

Stand dev. Minimum Maximum

Property tax – nominal rate (%) Property tax – effective rate (%) Motor vehicle tax rate (coefficient) Building activities tax rate (%) Population (thousands) Area (km2) % young population % elderly population Unemployment rate Per capita disposable income (thousand) Per capita grants (thousand)

0.65 0.55 1.24 2.43 13.79 135.94 8.45 28.70 11.83 12.20 0.51

0.19 0.17 0.18 1.12 39.17 130.83 2.04 6.31 4.64 0.94 0.44

0.40 0.28 1.00 0.00 0.21 5.29 3.87 16.771 4.67 9.90 0.15

1.10 1.04 1.70 4.00 270.88 823.57 14.36 42.72 31.55 14.01 2.57

Source: Ministry of Economics and Finance of Spain (tax rates and grants), National Statistics Institute of Spain – INE (population and area), SADEI (unemployment rate and per capita disposable income). 2

Before estimating the equations, it is useful to carry out an exploratory spatial data analysis. Moran statistics on tax rates are reported in Table 3. The spatial dependence is positive and significant in the four cases if the binary matrix based on contiguity criteria is used to calculate the Moran (I) global test by means of this expression: n

n I= S0

n

∑ ∑ w ij z iz j i =1 j =1 n

∑ z i2

(3)

;i ≠ j

i =1

zi = ti − t , S 0 =

n

n

∑ ∑ w ij

i =1 j =1 . where So the relatively high (low) tax rate municipalities tend to be located nearby other high (low) tax rate territories more often than would be expected due to random chance.

Table 3 MORAN STATISTICS ON TAX RATES (CONTIGUITY MATRIX)

Moran (p-value)

Property tax Nominal rates

Property tax Effective rates

Motor vehicle tax

Building activities tax

0.0835* (0.096)

0.2724*** (0.001)

0.2017*** (0.004)

0.3340*** (0.001)

Note: ***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

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Anselin (1995) asserted that the assumption of stationary or structural stability over space may be unrealistic and the strategy applied in the exploratory analysis usually forget this idea and only use global statistics to obtain statistic evidence of the existence of spatial dependence. The LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association) statistics allow identifying local spatial clusters and the existence of spatial outliers9. This is the expression of the local Moran statistic (Ii ) : Ii = z i

Ji

∑ w ij z j

(4)

j =1

where Ji are the neighbouring municipalities of the jurisdiction i . This statistic shows a positive value when there is a spatial clustering of high values or a spatial clustering of low values. On the contrary, if LISA shows a negative value in a specific municipality, this is considered as a spatial outlier which can be highlow or low-high. Figure 1

0

0

.5

.5

1

Density 1

Density 1.5

1.5

2

2

2.5

KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATES OF TAX RATES 1(a). Property tax rates – effective 1(a). Property tax rates – nominal

.2

.4

.6 .8 Property tax - nominal rates

1

1.2

.4

1

1.2

1(d). Building activities tax rates

0

0

.5

.2

Density

Density 1

.4

1.5

2

.6

1(c). Motor vehicle tax rates

.6 .8 Property tax - effective rates

1

1.2

1.4 Motor vehicle tax

1.6

1.8

9

0

1

2 Building activities tax

3

4

Getis and Ord (1992) proposed also two statistics to study the existence of a local spatial autocorrelation pattern.

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We include in Figure 2 the spatial clustering maps related to the four cases analyzed in the paper. There is spatial clustering of low values in the municipalities in the West of Asturias for the four tax rates analyzed. Moreover, it is possible to identify clearly a spatial cluster of high values in the north-east of Asturias when the motor vehicle and building activities tax rates are considered. Figure 2 SPATIAL CLUSTER FOR TAX RATES 2(a). Property tax rates – nominal

2(c). Motor vehicle tax rates

2(b). Property tax rates - effective

2(d). Building activities tax rates

The estimations of the tax reaction functions are reported in Tables 5 to 8, with the results of the specifications test in Table 4. We realized the Moran test on the OLS residuals of each variable and analyzed the sensitivity of the results to the different specifications of the spatial weight matrix. With the aim to select the most adequate model between lag and error model, we followed the strategy selection unfolded by Florax et al. (2003) as stated above. The results of the Moran test are significant in order to reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation on the OLS residual in the model of property tax with effective rates and building activities tax rates. In the first case, the results of LM and LM robust tests show the spatial lag model as the most adequate option when the contiguity matrix and distance matrix are considered, whereas the spatial error model is the best option with the Fingleton matrix. In — 17 —

the second case, the spatial lag model is the best specification. However, spatial and error model are estimated in order to confirm this choice. When the analysis is focused on the OLS residuals of the model for property tax with nominal rates as dependent variable, the specification tests are not significant so we do not reject the null hypothesis with the exception of the Fingleton matrix. Similar results are obtained in the model of motor vehicle tax rates with the exception of Moran test with the contiguity matrix and Moran and LM lag with the Fingleton matrix. The sensibility of the specification tests due to different specifications of the spatial weight matrix is low. For each model, the specification tests reach the same results with different spatial weight. Our main objective in the estimations is the spatial coefficient as it quantifies the strategic interaction, but the signs of other variables, specially population, income and grants, are also of interest. The results for the property tax using nominal rates are summarized in Table 5. The dummy variable is 1 if the municipality has revised the building values and 0 otherwise. The strategic interaction is positive but not significant. Among the control variables, the coefficient of the area is significant and positive, as it is expected and detailed previously. There is no significant effect of the grants on tax rates, although the estimated coefficient is negative and hence supports the flypaper effect, and the dummy variable is clearly significant and negative, as was discussed above. When the effective rates are analysed (Table 6), there is evidence of tax mimicking. The spatial parameter is positive and significant, being 0.337 in the spatial lag model with the binary matrix, that is, a one higher tax rate in neighbouring municipalities causes a 0.337 higher tax rate in the jurisdiction, ceteris paribus. The spatial coefficient is bigger (0.557) with the distance matrix. In the analysis of the signs of the variables, again the per capita grants received are not significant with a small negative coefficient, in line with the flypaper effect hypothesis and contrary with the median voter model predictions. Now, the dummy variable is not significant as we expected because the effective rates include the effect of the new values. This opposite result when nominal and effective rates are studied can be somewhat contradictory in light of the more visibility of the nominal tax rates that are published in laws and official statistics. In the motor vehicle tax, the interaction is positive but generally not significant, with one exception, the spatial error with the Fingleton matrix, as is reported in Table 7. With regard to the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables, it is significant and with the expected sign for the population, positive reflecting decreasing returns, the area, positive, and the per capita income, positive too. The per capita grants received, also significant, present sign negative, so there is not evidence of the flypaper effect on the tax side here. — 18 —


Finally, in the building activities tax (Table 8), we find evidence of tax mimicking with a spatial parameter of 0.325 with the binary matrix, and about 0.5 with the other weight specifications. In this case, again the per capita grants received are frequently significant with negative estimations, and hence with a negative effect of the grants on the local tax rates. To sum up, these results about the spatial interaction are in line with those achieved by other studies where the parameter was in the 0.2-0.6 interval, as pointed out Allers and Elhorst (2005) in a review of the existing literature. More specifically, we achieve similar results than to Solé-Ollé (2003) for a Spanish sample of municipalities in the province of Barcelona in the property tax with effective rates (0.39), but not in the motor vehicle tax as he found tax mimicking (0.33). With regard to the effects of the grants on the local tax rates, we have found little evidence of the flypaper effect or crowding-in, our results are in agreement with the theoretical predictions from the standard median voter model or crowding-out. Table 4 SPECIFICATION TESTS 3(a). Property tax - nominal rates BINARY

FINGLETON

DISTANCE

Moran errors

1.241 (0.214)

2.124** (0.034)

1.901* (0.057)

LM-Lag

0.424 (0.514)

0.129 (0.718)

1.761 (0.184)

LM-Error

0.453 (0.501)

1.350 (0.245)

1.309 (0.253)

Robust LM-Lag

0.001 (0.971)

6.571** (0.010)

0.577 (0.447)

Robust LM-Error

0.031 (0.861)

7.791*** (0.005)

0.125 (0.724)

3(b). Property tax – effective rates BINARY

FINGLETON

DISTANCE

Moran errors

3.273*** (0.001)

3.272*** (0.001)

3.735*** (0.000)

LM-Lag

8.143*** (0.004)

2.326 (0.127)

11.567*** (0.000) (Follow)

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(Continuation)

3(b). Property tax – effective rates BINARY

FINGLETON

DISTANCE

LM-Error

6.564** (0.010)

3.892** (0.048)

7.843*** (0.005)

Robust LM-Lag

1.985 (0.158)

5.852** (0.015)

6.054** (0.013)

Robust LM-Error

0.406 (0.524)

7.412*** (0.006)

2.330 (0.127)

3(c). Motor vehicle tax rates BINARY

FINGLETON

DISTANCE

Moran errors

1.866* (0.062)

2.638*** (0.008)

1.516 (0.129)

LM-Lag

0.659 (0.416)

3.621* (0.057)

0.749 (0.387)

LM-Error

1.661 (0.197)

2.320 (0.127)

0.710 (0.399)

Robust LM-Lag

0.251 (0.616)

1.305 (0.253)

0.080 (0.774)

Robust LM-Error

1.251 (0.263)

0.004 (0.952)

0.041 (0.839)

3(d). Building activities tax rates BINARY

FINGLETON

DISTANCE

Moran errors

3.774*** (0.000)

5.077*** (0.00)

4.626*** (0.000)

LM-Lag

10.923*** (0.000)

19.544*** (0.000)

14.931*** (0.000)

LM-Error

9.412*** (0.002)

10.522** (0.001)

13.414*** (0.000)

Robust LM-Lag

1.549 (0.213)

10.762*** (0.001)

1.719 (0.189)

Robust LM-Error

0.037 (0.846)

1.739 (0.187)

0.203 (0.652)

Note: ***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. p-value between parenthesis

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Table 5 ESTIMATION RESULTS: LOCAL PROPERTY TAX MODELS - NOMINAL RATES OLS

Constant Population–total Area Population - % young Population - % old Unemployment rate Per capita income Per capita grants Dummy R square Spatial ρ Spatial λ

0.6573 (1.20) -0.0002 (-0.48) 0.0003** (2.11) -0.0179 (-1.09) -0.0018 (-0.27) 0.0026 (0.62) 0.1304 (0.45) -0.0614 (-1.26) -0.1387*** (-3.03) 0.334

BINARY Spatial lag Spatial error

0.6396 (1.24) -0.0002 (-0.51) 0.0003** (2.20) -0.0176 (-1.15) -0.0020 (-0.34) 0.0023 (0.58) 0.0107 (0.40) -0.0598 (-1.31) -0.1361*** (-3.16) 0.222 0.0960 (0.62)

0.7123 (1.37) -0.0003 (-0.54) 0.0003** (2.34) -0.0172 (-1.11) -0.0022 (-0.37) 0.0019 (0.47) 0.0094 (0.34) -0.0559 (-1.22) 0.1384*** (-3.19) 0.230

FINGLETON Spatial lag Spatial error

0.6099 (1.15) -0.0002 (-0.51) 0.0003** (2.26) -0.0176 (-1.14) -0.0018 (-0.29) 0.0025 (0.62) 0.0129 (0.47) -0.0605 (-1.31) -0.1375*** (-3.20) 0.216 0.0900 (0.42)

0.1200 (0.77) Log likelihood 39.09 66.33 66.38 66.20 Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

0.7244 (1.41) -0.0005 (-1.10) 0.0003** (2.55) -0.0150 (-0.99) -0.0020 (-0.33) 0.0016 (0.39) 0.0060 (0.22) -0.0514 (-1.15) -0.1362*** (-3.23) 0.249

0.2740* (1.79) 66.89

DISTANCE Spatial lag Spatial error

0.5457 (1.07) -0.0002 (-0.48) 0.0003** (2.29) -0.0176 (-1.16) -0.0020 (-0.34) 0.0021 (0.54) 0.0096 (0.36) -0.0578 (-1.28) -0.1301*** (-3.05) 0.227 0.2934 (1.46)

66.98

0.7058 (1.34) -0.003 (-0.59) 0.0003** (2.48) -0.150 (-0.96) -0.0018 (-0.30) 0.0017 (0.42) 0.0071 (0.24) -0.0504 (-1.10) -0.134*** (-3.04) 0.248

0.3300 (1.62) 66.95

Table 6 ESTIMATION RESULTS: LOCAL PROPERTY TAX MODELS - EFFECTIVE RATES OLS

Constant Population–total Area Population - % young Population - % old Unemployment rate Per capita income Per capita grants Dummy R square Spatial ρ

0.5701 (0.88) -0.0005 (-0.86) 0.0003 (-1.54) -0.0314 (-1.62) -0.0033 (-0.42) 0.0072 (1.42) 0.0345 (1.01) -0.0567 (-0.98) -0.0883 (-1.63) 0.168




0.6255 (1.08) -0.0006 (-1.05) 0.0003* (1.81) -0.0334* (-1.93) -0.0057 (-0.83) 0.0051 (1.13) 0.0196 (0.63) -0.0536 (-1.04) -0.0682 (-1.41) 0.170 0.3370** (2.47)

0.4047 (0.66) -0.0005 (-0.95) 0.0003* (1.75) -0.0311* (-1.74) -0.0033 (-0.46) 0.0059 (1.26) 0.0337 (1.06) -0.0530 (-0.99) -0.0801 (-1.60) 0.148 0.2960 (1.55)

0.4589 (0.81) -0.0005 (-0.97) 0.0003* (1.90) -0.0293* (-1.73) -0.0046 (-0.68) 0.0046 (1.05) 0.0166 (0.55) -0.0468 (-0.93) -0.0652 (-1.38) 0.203 0.5570*** (3.52)

0.9342 (1.52) -0.0006 (-1.20) 0.0003** (2.07) -0.0351** (-1.97) -0.0067 (-0.97) 0.0046 (0.97) 0.0151 (0.44) -0.0461 (-0.88) -0.0637 (-1.28) 0.256

0.3610** (2.70) Log likelihood 25.68 55.87 55.71 53.71 Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Spatial λ

0.7429 (1.24) -0.0010** (-2.09) 0.0003** (2.21) -0.0270 (-1.55) -0.0040 (-0.58) 0.0043 (0.94) 0.0184 (0.56) -0.0404 (-0.78) -0.0812* (-1.68) 0.246

0.4590*** (3.69) 54.94

57.20

0.8594 (1.40) -0.0006 (-1.17) 0.0003** (2.14) -0.0310* (-1.73) -0.0051 (-0.75) 0.0037 (0.80) 0.0152 (0.43) -0.0394 (-0.76) -0.0508 (-1.00) 0.286

0.5970*** (3.95) 56.76

Table 7 ESTIMATION RESULTS: MOTOR VEHICLE TAX RATES MODELS OLS

Constant Population–total Area Population - % young Population - % old Unemployment rate Per capita income Per capita grants R square Spatial ρ

0.8444* (1.71) 0.0008* (1.73) 0.0003** (2.54) -0.0094 (-0.62) -0.0059 (-1.03) -0.0001 (-0.04) 0.0519* (1.94) -0.0881* (-1.97) 0.419




0.7520 (1.59) 0.0008* (1.83) 0.0003*** (2.85) -0.0094 (-0.66) -0.0061 (-1.13) -0.0003 (-0.07) 0.0481* (1.81) -0.0778* (-1.83) 0.413 0.1090 (0.80)

0.6272 (1.33) 0.0009** (1.99) 0.0003*** (2.90) -0.0086 (-0.61) -0.0071 (-1.33) -0.0006 (-0.16) 0.0407 (1.52) -0.0738* (-1.76) 0.425 0.2690 (1.61)

0.6658 (1.37) 0.0008* (1.82) 0.0003*** (2.85) -0.0084 (-0.55) -0.0059 (-1.08) -0.0003 (-0.09) 0.0466* (1.73) -0.0776* (-1.82) 0.419 0.1850 (0.96)

0.7235 (1.50) 0.0007* (1.73) 0.0004*** (3.16) -0.0108 (-0.75) -0.0062 (-1.15) -0.0009 (-0.23) 0.0621** (2.33) -0.0655 (-1.55) 0.440

0.2340 (1.60) Log likelihood 44.73 72.07 72.68 73.19 Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Spatial λ

0.8344* (1.78) 0.0006 (1.61) 0.0004*** (3.01) -0.0119 (-0.85) -0.0067 (-1.24) -0.0011 (-0.30) 0.0568** (2.20) -0.0841** (-2.04) 0.446

0.3149** (2.14) 72.86

72.16

0.7279 (1.50) 0.0007* (1.72) 0.0004*** (2.83) -0.0100 (-0.69) -0.0057 (-1.03) -0.0007 (-0.19) 0.0461** (2.27) -0.0742* (-1.74) 0.432

0.2810 (1.33) 72.27

Table 8 ESTIMATION RESULTS: BUILDING ACTIVITIES TAX RATES MODELS OLS

Constant Population–total Area Population - % young Population - % old Unemployment rate Per capita income Per capita grants R square Spatial ρ Spatial λ

-0.0710 (-0.02) 0.0040 (1.24) 0.0012 (1.32) -0.0819 (-0.78) -0.0262 (0.65) 0.0084 (0.31) 0.3231* (1.75) -0.6013* (-1.94) 0.291


0.6780 (0.22) 0.0036 (1.24) 0.0014* (1.81) -0.0716 (-0.77) -0.0353 (-1.00) 0.0062 (0.26) 0.2021 (1.18) -0.4670* (-1.68) 0.300 0.3250** (2.51)

0.9392 (0.29) 0.0028 (1.02) 0.0015* (1.69) -0.0790 (-0.82) -0.0418 (-1.16) 0.0061 (0.24) 0.2684 (1.46) -0.4862* (-1.72) 0.372


1.0113 (0.34) 0.0043 (1.56) 0.0015* (1.92) -0.0511 (-0.57) -0.0417 (-1.22) -0.0013 (-0.05) 0.1148 (0.70) -0.3733 (-1.40) 0.336 0.5030*** (3.55)

0.3509*** (2.60) Log likelihood -106.20 -75.36 -75.76 -73.30 Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

1.4261 (0.46) 0.0014 (0.58) 0.0016** (1.98) -0.0610 (-0.67) -0.0402 (-1.15) -0.0050 (-0.21) 0.2114 (1.21) -0.4328 (-1.62) 0.403

0.5300*** (4.77) -74.71


0.5586 (0.18) 0.0036 (1.28) 0.0014* (1.82) -0.0570 (-0.62) -0.0329 (-0.94) -0.0005 (-0.02) 0.1728 (1.02) -0.4462 (-1.62) 0.317 0.4880*** (3.01)

-74.40

1.2063 (0.37) 0.0029 (1.08) 0.0014* (1.68) -0.0764 (-0.79) -0.0410 (-1.15) -0.0043 (-0.17) 0.2583 (1.37) -0.4834* (-1.73) 0.403

0.5749*** (3.68) -74.17


4. CONCLUDING REMARKS The election of the local tax rates is complex and depends on several factors. Theoretically, these variables include structural characteristics –population and area-, socio demographic characteristics –young population, elderly population and rate of unemployment- and fiscal magnitudes –per capita disposable income and per capita grants received. However, the decisions made by neighbouring municipalities can also be determinant and hence we must estimate the tax reaction functions by introducing the average of the tax rates of neighbouring jurisdictions with spatial econometrics procedures. From a sample of Spanish municipalities, particularly the 78 jurisdictions of the region of Asturias, we have studied the horizontal externalities in the three main local taxes in Spain: property tax –both nominal and effective tax rates are analysed, motor vehicle tax and building activities tax, which represent about 80.3% of the local tax revenue jointly. We estimate both spatial lag model and spatial error model, with three specifications of the spatial weight matrix: binary, distance and the proposal of Fingleton. The results show evidence of tax mimicking in the property tax when we study the effective rates with a spatial parameter of 0.337, but not in the nominal rates with a spatial parameter positive but not significant, in spite of the visibility of the later to take public decisions. The building activities tax also shows strategic interaction with a spatial parameter of 0.325 with the binary matrix, and near 0.5 with the other weight matrixes. However, we do not find tax mimicking in the motor vehicle tax, with a spatial parameter positive but not significant. The results are congruent with the empirical literature of tax mimicking; as Allers and Elhorst (2005) pointed out, the parameters are in general in the interval between 0.2 and 0.6. Additionally, the study of the flypaper effect based on the sign of the coefficient of the grants received reveals little evidence of such effect –null or positive- of the grants on the local tax rates; our results are more in line with the theoretical predictions from the median voter model than with the empirical literature on the “money stick where they hit” hypothesis (for a review see Hines and Thaler, 1995). Further research includes the search of explanations for that tax mimicking, with the yardstick competition as the most tested cause in the literature of strategic interactions among local jurisdictions. A complementary study will be the analysis of the local public expenditure interactions.

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REFERENCES ALLERS, M. and ELHORST, J. (2005): “Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local governments in the Netherlands”, International Tax and Public Finance, n.º 12(4), pp. 493-513. ANSELIN, L. (1988): Spatial econometrics: methods and models, Kluwer Academic Publishers. – (1995): “Local indicators of spatial association (LISA)”, Geographical Analysis, n.º 27(2), pp. 93-115. – (2002): “Under the hood: Issues in the specification and interpretation of spatial regression models”, Agricultural Economics, n.º 27, pp. 247-267. ANSELIN, L.; BERA, A.; FLORAX, R. and YOON, M. (1996): “Simple diagnostic test for spatial dependence”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 26, pp. 77-104. BAILEY, S.J. and CONNOLLY, S. (1998): “The flypaper effect: identifying areas for further research”, Public Choice, n.º 95, pp. 335-361. BESLEY, T. and CASE, A. (1995): “Incumbent behaviour: vote seeking, tax setting and yardstick competition”, American Economic Review, n.º 85(1), pp. 25-45. BORDIGNON, M.; CERNIGLIA, F. and REVELLI, F. (2003): “In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipal property tax setting”, Journal of Urban Economics, n.º 54(2), pp. 199-217. – (2004): “Yardstick competition in intergovernmental relationships: theory and empirical predictions”, Economics Letters, n.º 83(3), pp. 325-333. BOSCH, N. and SOLÉ-OLLÉ, A. (2007): “Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities”, International Tax and Public Finance, n.º 14(1), pp. 71-92. BRETT, C. and PINKSE, J. (2000): “The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia”, Canadian Journal of Economics, n.º 33(3), pp. 695-714. BRUECKNER, J. (2003): “Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies”, International Regional Science Review, n.º 26(2), pp. 175-188. BRUECKNER, J. and SAAVEDRA, L. (2001): “Do local governments engage in strategic property-tax competition”, National Tax Journal, n.º 54(3), pp. 231-253. BRULHART, M. and JAMETTI, M. (2006): “Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: an empirical test”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 90(10-11), pp. 2027-2062. BUETTNER, T. (2001): “Local capital income taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 31(2-3), pp. 215-245. — 27 —

CASE, A.C.; HINES, J.R. and ROSEN, H.S. (1993): “Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 52, pp. 285-307. CAVLOVIC, A. and JACKSON, H. (2003): “Bother thy neighbour? Intergovernmental tax interactions in the Canadian Federation”, Working Paper 2003-09, Department of Finance of Canada. CLIFF, A.D. and ORD, J.K. (1981): Spatial processes: models and applications, Pion Limited. DAHLBERG, M.; MÖRKA, E.; RATTSØ, J. and AGREN, H. (2008): “Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 92(12), pp. 2320-2335. DAS, D.; KELEJIAN, H.H. and PRUCHA, I.R. (2003): “Finite sample properties of estimators of spatial autoregressive models with autoregressive disturbances,” Papers in Regional Science, n.º 82, pp. 1-26. EDMARK, K. and AGREN, H. (2008): “Identifying strategic interactions in Swedish local income tax policies”, Journal of Urban Economics, n.º 63(3), pp. 849-857. FELD, L.P. and KIRCHGÄSSNER, G. (2001): “Income tax competition at the state and local level in Switzerland”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 31(2-3), pp. 181-213. FERNÁNDEZ-VÁZQUEZ, E.; MAYOR-FERNÁNDEZ, M. and RODRÍGUEZ-VÁLEZ, J. (2009): “Estimating Spatial Autoregressive Models by GME-GCE Techniques”, International Regional Science Review, n.º 32, pp. 148-172. FINGLETON, B. (2001): “Equilibrium and economic growth: spatial econometric models and simulations”, Journal of Regional Science, n.º 41, pp. 117-147. FLORAX, R.J.G.M.; FOLMER, H. and REY, S.J. (2003): “Specification searches in spatial econometrics: the relevance of Hendry’s methodology”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 33, pp. 557-579. GETIS, A. and ORD, K. (1992): “The analysis of spatial association by the use of distance statistics”, Geographical Analysis, n.º 24, pp. 189-206. HAYASHI, M. and BOADWAY, R. (2001): “An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada”, Canadian Journal of Economics, n.º 34(2), pp. 481-503. HEYNDELS B. and VUCHELEN, J. (1998): “Tax mimicking among Belgian municipalities”, National Tax Journal, n.º 51(1), pp. 89-101. HILL, B. (2008): “Agglomerations and strategic tax competition”, Public Finance Review, n.º 36(6), pp. 651-677. HINES, J.R. and THALER, R.H. (1995): “Anomalies: the flypaper effect”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, n.º 9(4), pp. 217-226. KANGASHARJU, A.; MOISSIO, A.; REULIER, E. and ROCABOY, Y. (2006): “Tax competition among municipalities in Finland”, Urban Public Economics Review, n.º 5, pp. 13-24. — 28 —

KELEJIAN, H.H. and ROBINSON, P.D. (1993): “A suggested method of estimation for spatial interdependent models with autocorrelated errors, and an application to a county expenditure model”, Papers in Regional Science, n.º 72, pp. 297-312. LADD, H. (1992): “Mimicking of local tax burdens among neighboring counties”, Public Finance Quarterly, n.º 20(4), pp. 450-467. LEPRINCE, M.; MADIÈS, T. and PATY, S. (2007): “Business tax interactions among local governments: an empirical analysis of the French case”, Journal of Regional Science, n.º 47(3), pp. 603-621. REVELLI, F. (2001): “Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking”, Applied Economics, n.º 33(9), pp. 1101-1107. – (2005): “On spatial public finance empirics”, International Tax and Public Finance, n.º 12(4), pp. 475-492. SOLÉ-OLLÉ, A. (2003): “Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology”, European Journal of Political Economy, n.º 19(4), pp. 685-713. TIEBOUT, C.M. (1956): “A pure theory of local expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, n.º 64, pp. 416–424. VERMEIR, J. and HEYNDELS, B. (2006): “Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections”, Applied Economics, n.º 38(19), pp. 2285-2298.

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SÍNTESIS PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA La determinación de los tipos impositivos en el nivel local de gobierno es un tema de gran trascendencia para comprender el funcionamiento de los sistemas fiscales municipales. Teóricamente, la elección de los tipos impositivos locales depende de variables estructurales, socio-demográficas y fiscales: población, área, población joven y mayor, tasa de desempleo, renta per capita y transferencias recibidas per capita. Sin embargo, resulta conveniente contrastar la hipótesis de tax mimicking, es decir, si la determinación de tipos de gravamen de un municipio está condicionada, además, por los tipos elegidos en las jurisdicciones próximas. En este trabajo hemos abordado el estudio de las interacciones estratégicas horizontales en los principales impuestos locales en España por recaudación: impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles (IBI), impuesto sobre vehículos de tracción mecánica (IVTM) e impuesto sobre construcciones, instalaciones y obras (ICIO), que conjuntamente suponen el 80% de los ingresos impositivos a nivel local. El ejercicio empírico se ha realizado con datos de los municipios asturianos mediante modelos de econometría espacial, spatial lag y error lag, con diferentes matrices de proximidad: contigüidad, distancia y la propuesta de Fingleton que combina renta per capita y distancia. Los resultados obtenidos muestran evidencia de tax mimicking en el IBI cuando analizamos tipos efectivos, con un parámetro de interacción de 0,337, es decir, ésta es la cuantía media del aumento de tipos de un municipio si los municipios vecinos incrementan sus tipos en un punto. Sin embargo, no hallamos imitación fiscal significativa con los tipos nominales, a pesar de ser más visibles para contribuyentes y políticos. Además, no detectamos interacciones estratégicas en el IVTM, ya que el parámetro espacial si bien es positivo, no resulta significativo. Y también se confirma la externalidad horizontal en el caso del ICIO, con un parámetro de interacción de 0,325. Otro efecto analizado en las estimaciones es el de las transferencias recibidas sobre los impuestos locales. Según el teorema del votante mediano, mayores subvenciones incondicionadas a los ayuntamientos se reflejan en una disminución de tipos dando lugar a un efecto crowding-out. Sin embargo, el efecto flypaper postula el resultado contrario, crowding-in. Nuestros resultados están generalmente en consonancia con el teorema del votante mediano.

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NORMAS DE PUBLICACIÓN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES Esta colección de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehículo de expresión a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economía Pública. Las normas para la presentación y selección de originales son las siguientes: 1. Todos los originales que se presenten estarán sometidos a evaluación y podrán ser directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a revisión, o rechazados. 2. Los trabajos deberán enviarse por duplicado a la Subdirección de Estudios Tributarios. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378. 28035 Madrid. 3. La extensión máxima de texto escrito, incluidos apéndices y referencias bibliográfícas será de 7000 palabras. 4. Los originales deberán presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio. En la primera página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, el nombre del autor(es) y la institución a la que pertenece, así como su dirección postal y electrónica. Además, en la primera página aparecerá también un abstract de no más de 125 palabras, los códigos JEL y las palabras clave. 5. Los epígrafes irán numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeración arábiga. Las notas al texto irán numeradas correlativamente y aparecerán al pie de la correspondiente página. Las fórmulas matemáticas se numerarán secuencialmente ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas. La bibliografía aparecerá al final del trabajo, bajo la inscripción “Referencias” por orden alfabético de autores y, en cada una, ajustándose al siguiente orden: autor(es), año de publicación (distinguiendo a, b, c si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y año), título del artículo o libro, título de la revista en cursiva, número de la revista y páginas. 6. En caso de que aparezcan tablas y gráficos, éstos podrán incorporarse directamente al texto o, alternativamente, presentarse todos juntos y debidamente numerados al final del trabajo, antes de la bibliografía. 7. En cualquier caso, se deberá adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word. Siempre que el documento presente tablas y/o gráficos, éstos deberán aparecer en ficheros independientes. Asimismo, en caso de que los gráficos procedan de tablas creadas en excel, estas deberán incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas.

Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregará también un resumen de un máximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de política económica que se deriven de la investigación realizada.

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PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas. The rules governing submission and selection of papers are the following: 1. The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for publication, accepted with subjections for revision or rejected. 2. The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdirección General de Estudios Tributarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Institute for Fiscal Studies), Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria, nº 378, Madrid 28035. 3. The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no more than 7000 words. 4. The originals should be double spaced. The first page of the manuscript should contain the following information: (1) the title; (2) the name and the institutional affiliation of the author(s); (3) an abstract of no more than 125 words; (4) JEL codes and keywords; (5) the postal and e-mail address of the corresponding author. 5. Sections will be numbered in sequence with arabic numerals. Footnotes will be numbered correlatively and will appear at the foot of the corresponding page. Mathematical formulae will be numbered on the right margin of the page in sequence. Bibliographical references will appear at the end of the paper under the heading “References” in alphabetical order of authors. Each reference will have to include in this order the following terms of references: author(s), publishing date (with an a, b or c in case there are several references to the same author(s) and year), title of the article or book, name of the journal in italics, number of the issue and pages. 6. If tables and graphs are necessary, they may be included directly in the text or alternatively presented altogether and duly numbered at the end of the paper, before the bibliography. 7. In any case, a floppy disk will be enclosed in Word format. Whenever the document provides tables and/or graphs, they must be contained in separate files. Furthermore, if graphs are drawn from tables within the Excell package, these must be included in the floppy disk and duly identified.

Together with the original copy of the working paper a brief two-page summary highlighting the main policy implications derived from the research is also requested.

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ÚLTIMOS PAPELES DE TRABAJO EDITADOS POR EL

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES

2004 01/04 Una propuesta para la regulación de precios en el sector del agua: el caso español. Autores: M.a Ángeles García Valiñas y Manuel Antonio Muñiz Pérez. 02/04 Eficiencia en educación secundaria e inputs no controlables: sensibilidad de los resultados ante modelos alternativos. Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja Chaparro y Javier Salinas Jiménez. 03/04 Los efectos de la política fiscal sobre el ahorro privado: evidencia para la OCDE. Autores: Montserrat Ferre Carracedo, Agustín García García y Julián Ramajo Hernández. 04/04 ¿Qué ha sucedido con la estabilidad del empleo en España? Un análisis desagregado con datos de la EPA: 1987-2003. Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 05/04 La seguridad del empleo en España: evidencia con datos de la EPA (1987-2003). Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 06/04 La ley de Wagner: un análisis sintético. Autor: Manuel Jaén García. 07/04 La vivienda y la reforma fiscal de 1998: un ejercicio de simulación. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 08/04 Modelo dual de IRPF y equidad: un nuevo enfoque teórico y su aplicación al caso español. Autor: Fidel Picos Sánchez. 09/04 Public expenditure dynamics in Spain: a simplified model of its determinants. Autores: Manuel Jaén García y Luis Palma Martos. 10/04 Simulación sobre los hogares españoles de la reforma del IRPF de 2003. Efectos sobre la oferta laboral, recaudación, distribución y bienestar. Autores: Juan Manuel Castañer Carrasco, Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 11/04 Financiación de las Haciendas regionales españolas y experiencia comparada. Autor: David Cantarero Prieto. 12/04 Multidimensional indices of housing deprivation with application to Spain. Autores: Luis Ayala y Carolina Navarro. 13/04 Multiple ocurrence of welfare recipiency: determinants and policy implications. Autores: Luis Ayala y Magdalena Rodríguez. 14/04 Imposición efectiva sobre las rentas laborales en la reforma del impuesto sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 15/04 Factores determinantes de la distribución personal de la renta: un estudio empírico a partir del PHOGUE. Autores: Marta Pascual y José María Sarabia. 16/04 Política familiar, imposición efectiva e incentivos al trabajo en la reforma de la imposición sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 17/04 Efectos del déficit público: evidencia empírica mediante un modelo de panel dinámico para los países de la Unión Europea. Autor: César Pérez López.

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18/04 Inequality, poverty and mobility: Choosing income or consumption as welfare indicators. Autores: Carlos Gradín, Olga Cantó y Coral del Río. 19/04 Tendencias internacionales en la financiación del gasto sanitario. Autora: Rosa María Urbanos Garrido. 20/04 El ejercicio de la capacidad normativa de las CCAA en los tributos cedidos: una primera evaluación a través de los tipos impositivos efectivos en el IRPF. Autores: José María Durán y Alejandro Esteller. 21/04 Explaining. budgetary indiscipline: evidence from spanish municipalities. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 22/04 Local governmets' asymmetric reactions to grants: looking for the reasons. Autor: Santiago Lago-Peñas. 23/04 Un pacto de estabilidad para el control del endeudamiento autonómico. Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera 24/04 Una medida de la calidad del producto de la atención primaria aplicable a los análisis DEA de eficiencia. Autora: Mariola Pinillos García. 25/04 Distribución de la renta, crecimiento y política fiscal. Autor: Miguel Ángel Galindo Martín. 26/04 Políticas de inspección óptimas y cumplimiento fiscal. Autores: Inés Macho Stadler y David Pérez Castrillo. 27/04 ¿Por qué ahorra la gente en planes de pensiones individuales? Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López-Laborda. 28/04 La reforma del Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas: una valoración con microdatos de la ciudad de Zaragoza. Autores: Julio López-Laborda, M.ª Carmen Trueba Cortés y Anabel Zárate Marco. 29/04 Is an inequality-neutral flat tax reform really neutral? Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 30/04 El equilibrio presupuestario: las restricciones sobre el déficit. Autora: Belén Fernández Castro. 2005 01/05 Efectividad de la política de cooperación en innovación: evidencia empírica española. Autores: Joost Heijs, Liliana Herrera, Mikel Buesa, Javier Sáiz Briones y Patricia Valadez. 02/05 A probabilistic nonparametric estimator. Autores: Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 03/05 Efectos redistributivos del sistema de pensiones de la seguridad social y factores determinantes de la elección de la edad de jubilación. Un análisis por comunidades autónomas. Autores: Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Yolanda Ubago Martínez. 14/05 La relación entre los niveles de precios y los niveles de renta y productividad en los países de la zona euro: implicaciones de la convergencia real sobre los diferenciales de inflación. Autora: Ana R. Martínez Cañete. 05/05 La Reforma de la Regulación en el contexto autonómico. Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez.

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06/05 Desigualdad y bienestar en la distribución intraterritorial de la renta, 1973-2000. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado Málaga y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro. 07/05 Precios inmobiliarios, renta y tipos de interés en España. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 08/05 Un análisis con microdatos de la normativa de control del endeudamiento local. Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez, Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermín Cabasés Hita. 09/05 Macroeconomics effects of an indirect taxation reform under imperfect competition. Autor: Ramón J. Torregrosa. 10/05 Análisis de incidencia del gasto público en educación superior: nuevas aproximaciones. Autora: María Gil Izquierdo. 11/05 Feminización de la pobreza: un análisis dinámico. Autora: María Martínez Izquierdo. 12/05 Efectos del impuesto sobre las ventas minoristas de determinados hidrocarburos en la economía extremeña: un análisis mediante modelos de equilibrio general aplicado. Autores: Francisco Javier de Miguel Vélez, Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores y Jesús Pérez Mayo. 13/05 La tarifa lineal de Pareto en el contexto de la reforma del IRPF. Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Encarnación Macarena Parrado Gallardo y María Dolores Sarrión Gavilán. 14/05 Modelling tax decentralisation and regional growth. Autores: Ramiro Gil-Serrate y Julio López-Laborda. 15/05 Interactions inequality-polarization: characterization results. Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 16/05 Políticas de competencia impositiva y crecimiento: el caso irlandés. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Carlos Garcimartín y Luis Rivas. 17/05 Optimal provision of public inputs in a second-best scenario. Autores: Diego Martínez López y A. Jesús Sánchez Fuentes. 18/05 Nuevas estimaciones del pleno empleo de las regiones españolas. Autores: Javier Capó Parrilla y Francisco Gómez García. 19/05 US deficit sustainability revisited: a multiple structural change approach. Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio. Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 20/05 Aproximación a los pesos de calidad de vida de los “Años de Vida Ajustados por Calidad” mediante el estado de salud autopercibido. Autores: Anna García-Altés, Jaime Pinilla y Salvador Peiró. 21/05 Redistribución y progresividad en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: una aplicación al caso de Aragón. Autor: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta. 22/05 Estimación de los rendimientos y la depreciación del capital humano para las regiones del sur de España. Autora: Inés P. Murillo. 23/05 El doble dividendo de la imposición ambiental. Una puesta al día. Autor: Miguel Enrique Rodríguez Méndez. 24/05 Testing for long-run purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era: evidence from old and new tests. Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández y Montserrat Ferré Cariacedo.

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25/05 Análisis de los factores determinantes de las desigualdades internacionales en las emisiones de CO2 per cápita aplicando el enfoque distributivo: una metodología de descomposición por factores de Kaya. Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 26/05 Planificación fiscal con el impuesto dual sobre la renta. Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 27/05 El coste recaudatorio de las reducciones por aportaciones a planes de pensiones y las deducciones por inversión en vivienda en el IRPF 2002. Autores: Carmen Marcos García, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Teresa Pérez Barrasa y César Pérez López. 28/05 La muestra de declarantes IEF-AEAT 2002 y la simulación de reformas fiscales: descripción y aplicación práctica. Autores: Alfredo Moreno, Fidel Picos, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, María Antiqueira y Lucía Torrejón. 2006 01/06 Capital gains taxation and progressivity. Autor: Julio López Laborda. 02/06 Pigou’s dividend versus Ramsey’s dividend in the double dividend literature. Autores: Eduardo L. Giménez y Miguel Rodríguez. 03/06 Assessing tax reforms. Critical comments and proposal: the level and distance effects. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez y Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell. 04/06 Incidencia y tipos efectivos del impuesto sobre el patrimonio e impuesto sobre sucesiones y donaciones. Autora: Laura de Pablos Escobar. 05/06 Descentralización fiscal y crecimiento económico en las regiones españolas. Autores: Patricio Pérez González y David Cantarero Prieto. 16/06 Efectos de la corrupción sobre la productividad: un estudio empírico para los países de la OCDE. Autores: Javier Salinas Jiménez y M.ª del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 07/06 Simulación de las implicaciones del equilibrio presupuestario sobre la política de inversión de las comunidades autónomas. Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez y Anabel Zárate Marco. 18/06 The composition of public spending and the nationalization of party sistems in western Europe. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago.Peñas. 09/06 Factores explicativos de la actividad reguladora de las Comunidades Autónomas (1989-2001). Autores: Julio López Laborda y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 10/06 Disciplina credititicia de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera. 11/06 Are the tax mix and the fiscal pressure converging in the European Union?. Autor: Francisco J. Delgado Rivero. 12/06 Redistribución, inequidad vertical y horizontal en el impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas (1982-1998). Autora: Irene Perrote.

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13/06 Análisis económico del rendimiento en la prueba de conocimientos y destrezas imprescindibles de la Comunidad de Madrid. Autores: David Trillo del Pozo, Marta Pérez Garrido y José Marcos Crespo. 14/06 Análisis de los procesos privatizadores de empresas públicas en el ámbito internacional. Motivaciones: moda política versus necesidad económica. Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 15/06 Privatización y liberalización del sector telefónico español. Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 16/06 Un análisis taxonómico de las políticas para PYME en Europa: objetivos, instrumentos y empresas beneficiarias. Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 17/06 Modelo de red de cooperación en los parques tecnológicos: un estudio comparado. Autora: Beatriz González Vázquez. 18/06 Explorando la demanda de carburantes de los hogares españoles: un análisis de sensibilidad. Autores: Santiago Álvarez García, Marta Jorge García-Inés y Desiderio Romero Jordán. 19/06 Cross-country income mobility comparisons under panel attrition: the relevance of weighting schemes. Autores: Luis Ayala, Carolina Navarro y Mercedes Sastre. 20/06 Financiación Autonómica: algunos escenarios de reforma de los espacios fiscales. Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Javier Loscos Fernández, María Antiqueira y José Manuel Tránchez. 21/06 Child nutrition and multiple equilibria in the human capital transition function. Autores: Berta Rivera, Luis Currais y Paolo Rungo. 22/06 Actitudes de los españoles hacia la hacienda pública. Autor: José Luis Sáez Lozano. 23/06 Progresividad y redistribución a través del IRPF español: un análisis de bienestar social para el periodo 1982-1998. Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández, María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde y César Pérez López. 24/06 Análisis descriptivo del gasto sanitario español: evolución, desglose, comparativa internacional y relación con la renta. Autor: Manuel García Goñi. 25/06 El tratamiento de las fuentes de renta en el IRPF y su influencia en la desigualdad y la redistribución. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 26/06 La reforma del IRPF de 2007: una evaluación de sus efectos. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez, Fidel Picos Sánchez, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Lucía Torrejón Sanz y María Antiqueira Pérez. 27/06 Proyección del cuadro macroeconómico y de las cuentas de los sectores institucionales mediante un modelo de equilibrio. Autores: Ana María Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 28/06 Análisis de la propuesta del tesoro Británico “Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU” y de sus implicaciones para la política económica en la Unión Europea. Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández.

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29/06 Choosing to be different (or not): personal income taxes at the subnational level in Canada and Spain. Autores: Violeta Ruiz Almendral y François Vaillancourt. 30/06 A projection model of the contributory pension expenditure of the Spanish social security system: 2004-2050. Autores: Joan Gil, Miguel Ángel Lopez-García, Jorge Onrubia, Concepció Patxot y Guadalupe Souto. 2007 11/07 Efectos macroeconómicos de las políticas fiscales en la UE. Autores: Oriol Roca Sagalés y Alfredo M. Pereira. 02/07 Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: an analysis from the fiscal theory of the price level. Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 03/07 Contraste empírico del modelo monetario de tipos de cambio: cointegración y ajuste no lineal. Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández. 04/07 An empirical analysis of capital taxation: equity vs. tax compiance. Autores: José M.a Durán Cabré y Alejandro Esteller Moré. 05/07 Education and health in the OECD: a macroeconomic approach. Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 06/07 Understanding the effect of education on health across European countries. Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 07/07 Polarization, fractionalization and conflict. Autores: Joan Esteban y Debraj Ray. 08/07 Immigration in a segmented labor market: the effects on welfare. Autor: Javier Vázquez Grenno. 09/07 On the role of public debt in an OLG Model with endogenous labor supply. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 10/07 Assessing profitability in rice cultivation using the Policy Matrix Analysis and profitefficient data. Autores: Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, Ernest Reig y Vicent Estruch. 11/07 Equidad y redistribución en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: análisis de los efectos de las reformas autonómicas. Autores: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta y Marta Melguizo Garde. 12/07 Valoración y determinantes del stock de capital salud en la Comunidad Canaria y Cataluña. Autores: Juan Oliva y Néboa Zozaya. 13/07 La nivelación en el marco de la financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde y Jorge Martínez-Vázquez. 14/07 El gasto en defensa en los países desarrollados: evolución y factores explicativos. Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 15/07 Los costes del servicio de abastecimiento de agua. Un análisis necesario para la regulación de precios. Autores: Ramón Barberán Ortí, Alicia Costa Toda y Alfonso Alegre Val. 16/07 Precios, impuestos y compras transfronterizas de carburantes. Autores: Andrés Leal Marcos, Julio López Laborda y Fernando Rodrigo Sauco.

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17/07 Análisis de la distribución de las emisiones de CO2 a nivel internacional mediante la adaptación del concepto y las medidas de polarización. Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 18/07 Foreign direct investment and regional growth: an analysis of the Spanish case. Autores: Óscar Bajo Rubio, Carmen Díaz Mora y Carmen Díaz Roldán. 19/07 Convergence of fiscal pressure in the EU: a time series approach. Autores: Francisco J. Delgado y María José Presno. 20/07 Impuestos y protección medioambiental: preferencias y factores. Autores: María de los Ángeles García Valiñas y Benno Torgler. 21/07 Modelización paramétrica de la distribución personal de la renta en España. Una aproximación a partir de la distribución Beta generalizada de segunda especie. Autores: Mercedes Prieto Alaiz y Carmelo García Pérez. 22/07 Desigualdad y delincuencia: una aplicación para España. Autores: Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernando Martín Mayoral y Pablo de Pedraza. 23/07 Crecimiento económico, productividad y actividad normativa: el caso de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. 24/07 Descentralización fiscal y tributación ambiental. El caso del agua en España. Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 25/07 Tributación ambiental en un contexto federal. Una aplicación empírica para los residuos industriales en España. Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 26/07 Permisos de maternidad, paternidad y parentales en Europa: algunos elementos para el análisis de la situación actual. Autoras: Carmen Castro García y María Pazos Morán. 27/07 ¿Quién soporta las cotizaciones sociales empresariales?. Una panorámica de la literatura empírica. Autor: Ángel Melguizo Esteso. 28/07 Una propuesta de financiación municipal. Autores: Manuel Esteban Cabrera y José Sánchez Maldonado. 29/07 Do R&D programs of different government levels overlap in the European Union. Autoras: Isabel Busom y Andrea Fernández-Ribas. 30/07 Proyecciones de tablas de mortalidad dinámicas de España y sus Comunidades Autónomas. Autores: Javier Alonso Meseguer y Simón Sosvilla Rivero. 2008 11/08 Estudio descriptivo del voto económico en España. Autores: José Luis Sáez Lozano y Antonio M. Jaime Castillo. 12/08 The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: evidence from a multilevel analysis. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 13/08 Fiscal decentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data. Autores: Andreas P. Kyriacou y Oriol Roca-Sagalés. 14/08 The effects of multinationals on host economies: A CGE approach. Autores: María C. Latorre, Oscar Bajo-Rubio y Antonio G. Gómez-Plana.

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15/08 Measuring the effect of spell recurrence on poverty dynamics. Autores: José María Arranz y Olga Cantó. 16/08 Aspectos distributivos de las diferencias salariales por razón de género en España: un análisis por subgrupos poblacionales. Autores: Carlos Gradín y Coral del Río. 17/08 Evaluating the regulator: winners and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distribution (1988-2002). Autores: Leticia Blázquez Gómez y Emili Grifell-Tatjé. 18/08 Interacción de la política monetaria y la política fiscal en la UEM: tipos de interés a corto plazo y déficit público. Autores: Jesús Manuel García Iglesias y Agustín García García. 19/08 A selection model of R&D intensity and market structure in Spanish forms. Autor: Joaquín Artés. 10/08 Outsourcing behaviour: the role of sunk costs and firm and industry characteristics. Autoras: Carmen Díaz Mora y Angela Triguero Cano. 11/08 How can the decommodified security ratio assess social protection systems?. Autor: Georges Menahem. 12/08 Pension policies and income security in retirement: a critical assessment of recent reforms in Portugal. Autora: Maria Clara Murteira. 13/08 Do unemployment benefit legislative changes affect job finding? Evidence from the Spanish 1992 UI reform act. Autores: José M. Arranz, Fernando Muñoz Bullón y Juan Muro. 14/08 Migraciones interregionales en España y su relación con algunas políticas públicas. Autora: María Martínez Torres. 15/08 Entradas y salidas de la pobreza en la Unión Europea: factores determinantes. Autores: Guillermina Martín Reyes, Elena Bárcena Martín, Antonio Fernández Morales y Antonio García Lizana. 16/08 Income mobility and economic inequality from a regional perspectiva. Autores: Juan Prieto Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 17/08 A note on the use of calendar regressors. Autor: Leandro Navarro Pablo. 18/08 Asimetrías y efectos desbordamiento en la transmisión de la política fiscal en la Unión Europea: evidencia a partir de un enfoque VAR estructural. Autor: Julián Ramajo. 19/08 Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas. Autores: Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba y Alberto Penadés. 20/08 A field experiment to study sex and age discrimination in selection processes for staff recruitment in the Spanish labor market. Autores: Rocío Albert, Lorenzo Escot, y José A. Fernández-Cornejo. 21/08 Descentralización y tamaño del sector público regional en España. Autor: Patricio Pérez. 22/08 Multinationals and foreign direct investment: main theoretical strands and empirical effects. Autora: María C. Latorre.

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23/08 Una aproximación no lineal al análisis del impacto de las finanzas públicas en el crecimiento económico de los países de la UE-15, 1965-2007. Autor: Diego Romero Ávila. 24/08 Consolidación y reparto de la base imponible del Impuesto sobre Sociedades entre los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea: consecuencias para España. Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 25/08 La suficiencia dinámica del modelo de financiación autonómica en España, 2002-2006. Autores: Catalina Barceló Maimó, María Marquès Caldentey y Joan Rosselló Villalonga. 26/08 Ayudas públicas en especie y en efectivo: justificaciones y aspectos metodológicos. Autores: Laura Piedra Muñoz y Manuel Jaén García. 27/08 Las ayudas públicas al alquiler de la vivienda. un análisis empírico para evaluar sus beneficios y costes. Autores: Laura Piedra Muñoz y Manuel Jaén García. 28/08 Decentralization and spatial distribution of regional ecomonic activity: does equalization matter?. Autores: Santiago Lago-Peñas y Diego Martínez-López. 29/08 Childcare costs and Spanish mothers’s labour force participation. Autora: Cristina Borra. 30/08 Pro-poor economic growth, inequality and fiscal policy: the case of Spanish regions. Autores: Luis Ayala y Antonio Jurado. 2009 01/09 Does the balance of payments constrain economic growth?. Some evidence for the new EU members. Autores: Oscar Bajo-Rubio y Carmen Díaz-Roldán. 02/09 Imputación a valor de mercado de los rendimientos de la vivienda en Propiedad del IRPF. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 03/09 Income poverty and multidimensional deprivation: lessons from cross-regional analysis. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado y Jesús Perez-Mayo. 04/09 Reglas fiscales activas: el caso de España (1981-2007). Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández. 05/09 Índices trimestrales de volumen encadenados, ajuste estacional y Bechmarking. Autores: Ana M.ª Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 06/09 Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in OECD countries: matching spending wit revenue decentralization. Autores: Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller e Ismael Sanz. 07/09 Una estimación del voto estratégico en las elecciones generales españolas, 2000-2008. Autores: Enrique García Viñuela y Joaquín Artés. 08/09 La tributación del transporte como instrumento frente al cambio climático. Autor: Miguel Buñuel González 09/09 The ins and outs of unemployment and the assimilation of recent immigrants in Spain. Autores: José I. Silva y Javier Vázquez. 10/09 Decomposing the determinants of health care expenditure: the case of Spain. Autores: David Cantarero Prieto y Santiago Lago-Peña.

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11/09 La clase beta de medidas de desigualdad. Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Elena Bárcena Martín y Encarnación M. Parrado Gallardo. 12/09 Right incentives to enhance efficiency in public expenditure. Autor: Tamón A. Takahashi Iturriaga. 13/09 Fiscal decentralization and public sector employment: a cross-country analysis. Autores: Jorge Martínez-Vázquez y Ming-Hung Yao. 14/09 Factores explicativos de los resultados de las Comunidades Autónomas Españolas en PISA 2006. Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Eva Crespo Cebada y Daniel Santín González. 15/09 A proposal to empirically evaluate the sensitivity of the speed of convergence in the EU. Autoras: Sonia de Lucas Santos, Inmaculada Álvarez Ayuso y M.ª Jesús Delgado Rodríguez. 16/09 An assessment of the sustainability of current account imbalances in OECD countries. Autores: Mariam Camarero, Josep Lluís Carrion-i-Silvestre y Cecilio Tamarit. 17/09 Tax mimicking among local governments: some evidence from Spanish municipalities. Autores: Francisco J. Delgado y Matías Mayor-Fernández.

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