The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness Second Edition

Edited by

Susan Schneider and Max Velmans

This edition first published 2017 © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148‐5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley‐blackwell. The right of Susan Schneider and Max Velmans to be identified as the authors of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data Names: Schneider, Susan, 1968– editor. | Velmans, Max, 1942– editor. Title: The Blackwell companion to consciousness / edited by Susan Schneider and Max Velmans. Description: Second edition. | Hoboken : John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016059944 (print) | LCCN 2017000216 (ebook) | ISBN 9780470674062 (cloth) | ISBN 9780470674079 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781119002239 (Adobe PDF) | ISBN 9781119002208 (ePub) Subjects: LCSH: Consciousness. Classification: LCC BF311 .B5348 2017 (print) | LCC BF311 (ebook) | DDC 153–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016059944 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Cover image: © Anikakodydkova/Gettyimages Cover design by Wiley Set in 10/12pt Warnock by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents Notes on Contributors x Introduction xix Part I

The Problems of Consciousness 1

1 A Brief History of the Scientific Approach to the Study of Consciousness 3 Chris D. Frith and Geraint Rees 2 Philosophical Problems of Consciousness 17 Michael Tye 3 The Hard Problem of Consciousness 32 David Chalmers Part II

The Origins and Distribution of Consciousness 43

4 Consciousness in Infants 45 Colwyn Trevarthen and Vasudevi Reddy 5 Animal Consciousness 63 Colin Allen and Michael Trestman 6 Rethinking the Evolution of Consciousness 77 Thomas W. Polger 7 Machine Consciousness 93 Igor Aleksander 8 Panpsychism 106 Philip Goff Part III

Some Varieties of Conscious Experience 125

9 States of Consciousness: Waking, Sleeping, and Dreaming 127 J. Allan Hobson

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Contents

10 Affective Consciousness 141 Jaak Panksepp 11 Clinical Pathologies and Unusual Experiences 157 Richard P. Bentall 12 Altered States of Consciousness: Drug‐Induced States 171 David E. Presti 13 Anomalous Experiences 187 Etzel Cardeña 14 Mindfulness 203 Peter Malinowski 15 Altered States: Mysticism 217 David Fontana Part IV

Some Contemporary Theories of Consciousness 227

16 The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness: Predictions and Results 229 Bernard J. Baars 17 The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: An Outline 243 Giulio Tononi 18 The Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness 257 Jesse Prinz 19 Representationalism about Consciousness 272 William Seager and David Bourget 20 Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness 288 Peter Carruthers 21 Quantum Approaches to Brain and Mind: An Overview with Representative Examples 298 Harald Atmanspacher 22 Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness 314 Susan Schneider 23 Biological Naturalism 327 John Searle 24 Emergentism 337 Gerald Vision

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25 Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism 349 Max Velmans 26 Naturalistic Dualism 363 David Chalmers 27 Physicalist Panpsychism 374 Galen Strawson Part V

Some Major Topics in the Philosophy of Consciousness 391

28 Anti‐materialist Arguments and Influential Replies 393 Joe Levine 29 Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument 404 Torin Alter 30 Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness 415 Brian P. Mclaughlin 31 Functionalism and Qualia 430 Robert Van Gulick 32 The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness 445 Jaegwon Kim 33 The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness 458 Pete Mandik 34 Self‐Consciousness 472 José Luis Bermúdez 35 Philosophical Psychopathology and Self‐Consciousness 484 G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham 36 Coming Together: The Unity of Consciousness 500 Barry Dainton 37 Consciousness and Intentionality 519 George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson Part VI

Major Topics in the Science of Consciousness 537

Topics in the Cognitive Psychology of Consciousness 38 Studying Consciousness Through Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness, and the Attentional Blink 539 Michael A. Cohen and Marvin M. Chun

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39 Conscious and Unconscious Perception 551 Sid Kouider and Nathan Faivre 40 Conscious and Unconscious Memory 562 John F. Kihlstrom, Jennifer Dorfman, and Lillian Park 41 Consciousness of Action 576 Marc Jeannerod Topics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness

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42 Methodologies for Identifying the Neural Correlates of Consciousness 591 Geraint Rees and Chris D. Frith 43 Conscious Processing: Unity in Time Rather Than in Space 607 Wolf Singer 44 Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: Some Ontological Considerations 621 Giulio Tononi 45 Split‐brain Cases 634 Mary (Molly) Colvin, Nicole L. Marinsek, Michael B. Miller, and Michael S. Gazzaniga 46 Duplex Vision: Separate Cortical Pathways for Conscious Perception and the Control of Action 648 Melvyn A. Goodale 47 Altered States of Consciousness after Brain Injury 662 Johan Stender, Steven Laureys, and Olivia Gosseries 48 Anesthesia and Consciousness 682 John F. Kihlstrom and Randall C. Cork 49 The Neuropsychology of Conscious Volition 695 Aaron Schurger First-Person Contributions to the Science of Consciousness

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50 Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness 713 Shaun Gallagher 51 Neurophenomenology and the Micro‐phenomenological Interview 726 Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmengin 52 Descriptive Experience Sampling 740 Russell T. Hurlburt

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53 Experiential Neuroscience of Pain 754 Donald D. Price 54 An Epistemology for the Study of Consciousness 769 Max Velmans Resources for Students Index 788

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Notes on Contributors Igor Aleksander is an electrical engineer who has researched artificial intelligence, cognitive systems, and the analysis of conscious organisms. Author of fourteen books and over 200 papers, in 1987 he was elected to the Royal Academy of Engineering, and in 2000 was awarded a Lifetime Achievement medal for Informatics by the Institution for Electrical Engineering. He is currently Emeritus Professor in Neural Systems Engineering and Senior Research Investigator at Imperial College, London. Colin Allen is Provost Professor at Indiana University, where he teaches in the Cognitive Science Program and the Department of History & Philosophy of Science & Medicine. He has published numerous books and articles on topics spanning animal cognition, artificial moral agents, and digital methods in philosophy and history of science. His work has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and he is a member of a group of five faculty at Indiana University working on the evolution of human cognition and expertise with a multi‐year grant from the Templeton Foundation. Torin Alter is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama. He spe cializes in philosophy of mind and language, with a special interest in consciousness, intentionality, and the mind–body problem. He has also written on free will and personal identity Harald Atmanspacher works at Collegium Helveticum, University and ETH Zurich. Until 2013 he was head of the theory group at the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology at Freiburg, and is currently President of the Society for Mind‐Matter Research, and editor‐in‐chief of the interdisciplinary international journal Mind and Matter. His fields of research are the theory of complex dynamical systems, conceptual and theoretical aspects of (algebraic) quantum theory, and mind‐matter relations from interdisciplinary perspectives. Bernard J. Baars PhD is an affiliate research Fellow of the Neurosciences Institute in San Diego, California (www.nsi.edu). He is the author of A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988), In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind (1997), and editor of Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2003, with William P. Banks and James R. Newman). Baars was founding co‐editor of the Elsevier/Academic Press journal Consciousness and Cognition with William P. Banks. Recent journal articles have appeared in Trends in Cognitive Sciences and Trends in Neurosciences.

Notes on Contributors

Richard P. Bentall is Professor of Clinical Psychology at Liverpool University and has previously held chairs at Manchester University and Bangor University. His research interests have mainly focused on psychosis. He has studied the cognitive and emo tional mechanisms involved in psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations, paranoid delusions, and manic states, using methods ranging from psychological experiments and experience sampling to functional magnetic resonance imaging. He has published over 200 peer‐review papers and a number of books including Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature (2003) and Doctoring the Mind: Why Psychiatric Treatments Fail (2009). José Luis Bermúdez is a Professor of Philosophy and the Director of the Philosophy‐ Neuroscience‐Psychology program at Washington University in St Louis. He is the author of The Paradox of Self‐Consciousness (1998), Thinking without Words (2003), and Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (2005). Michel Bitbol is a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, based at the Husserl Archive, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris (France). He successively received an MD, a PhD in physics, and a “Habilitation” in philosophy. After starting in scientific research, he turned to philosophy, editing texts by Erwin Schrödinger and formulating a neo‐kantian philosophy of quantum mechanics. He then studied the rela tions between the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, working in close collaboration with Francisco Varela, and is currently developing a phenomenological critique of naturalist theories of consciousness. David Bourget is completing his PhD at the University of Toronto and is currently on exchange to the Australian National University. His work centers around the topics of consciousness and representation, although he has recently published an article on quantum mechanics and consciousness in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Etzel Cardeña holds the Thorsen Professor Chair at Lund University. His PhD is from the University of California, Davis, and he was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University. A fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Studies, and other societies, his areas of research include anomalous experiences, dissociation and trauma, hypnosis, and the stream of consciousness. His more than 300 publications include the books Varieties of Anomalous Experience, and Altering Consciousness. Peter Carruthers is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Maryland (College Park). He works primarily on issues in the philosophy of psy chology: on consciousness, on modularity, on innateness, on the nature of intentional content, and on the place of natural language in human cognition. David Chalmers is a Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University, and an ARC Federation Fellow. He works especially in the philosophy of mind, and in related areas of philosophy and cognitive science. He is especially interested in consciousness, but also in philoso phical issues about meaning and possibility, and in the foundations of cognitive science.

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Marvin M. Chun is the Richard M. Colgate Professor of Psychology at Yale University with joint appointments in the Cognitive Science Program and the Yale School of Medicine Neurobiology Department. His research program uses brain imaging to study visual attention, perception, and memory. Michael A. Cohen is a postdoctoral fellow at the McGovern Institute of Brain Research and Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His work focuses on the capacity limits of visual cognition and visual awareness. He has published on these topics in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, and Psychological Science. Mary (Molly) Colvin is a staff clinical neuropsychologist at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and an Instructor of Psychology at Harvard Medical School. She completed a doctorate in cognitive neuroscience at Dartmouth College, mentored by Michael Gazzaniga. Her clinical training included a graduate program in clinical psy chology at Suffolk University, followed by an internship and postdoctoral fellowship in clinical neuropsychology at MGH and Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston, MA. Her current research relates to clinical syndromes and brain function. She has particu lar interests in understanding the emergence of atypical patterns of lateralization across the lifespan and in the development of systems involved in emotional and behavioral regulation. Randall C. Cork was a Professor in the Department of Anesthesiology and Director of the Pain Management Clinic at the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center. He received his PhD in Electrical Engineering from Arizona State University and his MD from the University of Arizona. Barry Dainton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool, and author of Stream of Consciousness (2000) and Time and Space (2001). Jennifer Dorfman received her PhD from the University of California, San Diego, and has been a Visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley. Nathan Faivre is a cognitive neuroscientist working at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (Switzerland). His work focuses on the interplay between perceptual consciousness and the sense of self. He studied the behavioral and neural bases of unconscious processing in different sensory modalities including vision, audition, and touch. His recent work on self‐consciousness focuses on the multisensory integration of bodily signals and metacognition. David Fontana (1934–2010) was Reader in educational Psychology at the University of Cardiff, visiting Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of the Algarve, and a visiting professor of Transpersonal Psychology at Liverpool John Moores University. He authored over 150 papers and over 30 books translated into 26 languages that include The Elements of Meditation, The Secret Language of Symbols, The Meditator’s Handbook, Learn to Meditate, and The Secret Language of Dreams. He was a co‐founder and for many years chair of the Transpersonal Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society.


Chris D. Frith FRS FBA is Emeritus Professor of Neuropsychology at University College London and Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London. His publications include The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia (1992/2015), and Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World (2007). Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He has a secondary research appointment at the University of Wollongong, Australia and is Honorary Professor at Durham University and the University of Tromsø, Norway. Most recently he was Senior Research Visiting Fellow at Keble College, Oxford and previously held visiting positions at Cambridge, Copenhagen, Paris, Lyon, and Berlin. He currently holds the Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier Research Award. Michael S. Gazzaniga is the Director of the SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind and a Professor in the Psychological & Brain Sciences department at UCSB. He is also the presi dent of the Cognitive Neuroscience Institute and the Founding Director of the MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience Project and the Summer Institute in Cognitive Neuroscience. Gazzaniga’s research on split‐brain patients has expanded our understanding of interhemispheric communication and functional lateralization in the brain. Philip Goff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Central European University in Budapest. His research interests are in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a special emphasis on the mind‐ body problem. In his book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (forthcoming with Oxford University Press) Goff argues against physicalism, the view that fundamental reality is entirely physical, and in favour of panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are conscious. Melvyn A. Goodale holds the Canada Research Chair in Visual Neuroscience at the University of Western Ontario. He is best known for his work on the functional organi zation of the visual pathways, and was a pioneer in the study of visuomotor control. Together with David Milner, he has provided compelling arguments that the brain mechanisms underlying our conscious visual experience of the world are quite separate from those involved in the visual control of skilled actions. Olivia Gosseries is a neuroscientist working on consciousness and its disorders follow ing severe brain injury. She works at the Coma Science Group at the University of Liège, Belgium as well as at the Department of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin‐Madison, USA. She has published numerous journals articles and book chapters on disorders of consciousness. George Graham is A. C. Reid Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University. He writes on topics in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics of consciousness, and philo sophical psychopathology. His most recent book is the Oxford Textbook in Philosophy and Psychiatry (with K. W. M. Fulford and T. Thornton, 2006). J. Allan Hobson is Professor of Psychiatry Emeritus, Harvard Medical School and Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Centre. His books include Dreaming: An Introduction to Sleep Science (2002), The Dream Drugstore: Chemically

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Altered States of Consciousness (2001), Dreaming as Delirium: How the Brain Goes Out of Its Mind (1999), and Consciousness (1998). Terence Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is author of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson, 1996), and is a con tributor to the following collections: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (2002), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind (2003), and The Externalist Challenge (2004). Russell T. Hurlburt is Professor of Psychology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He pioneered the investigation of inner experience (thoughts, feelings, etc.), inventing (in 1973) the beepers that launched “thought sampling.” He originated “Descriptive Experience Sampling” (DES), the attempt to apprehend inner experience in high fidel ity, leading to six books including Investigating Pristine Inner Experience: Moments of Truth and a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (2011) was devoted to his work. Marc Jeannerod (1935–2011) was Emeritus Professor at the Claude Bernard University, Lyon, France. He is the author of The Brain Machine (1985), The Neural and Behavioral Organization of Goal‐Directed Movements (1988), The Neuroscience of Action (1997), Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition (with P. Jacob, 2003), and Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self (2006). John F. Kihlstrom is Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is also the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor in the Division of Undergraduate and Interdisciplinary Studies. He received his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania, and previously held faculty positions at Harvard, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Yale. Jaegwon Kim is the William Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Brown University, where he has taught for over 30 years. He was educated at Seoul National University, Dartmouth College, and Princeton University. His books include Supervenience and Mind (1993), Philosophy of Mind (1996), Mind in a Physical World (1998), Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (2005), and Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (2010). Sid Kouider is a cognitive neuroscientist working at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris, France) on the neurobiological and psychological foundations of consciousness. His work focuses on contrasting conscious and unconscious processes, both at the psychological and neural level, using various behavioral and brain imaging methods. Recently, he extended this line of research to study the neural correlates of consciousness in preverbal infants. Steven Laureys is Director of the Coma Science Group at the University of Liège, Belgium. He is Research Director at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research and Clinical Professor in Neurology. He is chair of the World Federation of Neurology Applied Research Group on Coma and the European Academy of Neurology Subcommittee on Disorders of Consciousness. He has written four books and over 300 scientific papers on the subject of disorders of consciousness.


Joe Levine is a Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University. He is the author of numerous articles as well as the book, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness (2001). Peter Malinowski is Reader in Cognitive Neuroscience, Founding Director of the Meditation and Mindfulness Research Group at the Research Centre for Brain and Behaviour, Liverpool John Moores University, and Honorary Lecturer at the University of Liverpool. His research focuses on the psychological and neural effects of meditation practice and on their preventative use, for instance, regarding age‐related cognitive decline or the development of chronic pain. Pete Mandik is professor of philosophy at William Paterson University in New Jersey, USA. He is author of This is Philosophy of Mind (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013) and Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (Continuum, 2010). Nicole L. (Nikki) Marinsek is a Dynamical Neuroscience PhD student at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She uses behavioral and neuroimaging techniques to research the neural dynamics of inferential reasoning, explanation, and belief updating. She has received several fellowships and awards, including an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, a SAGE Center Graduate Student Fellowship, and a Doctoral Scholars fellowship. She was also selected to attend and present at the Nobel Laureate Meeting in Lindau, Germany. Brian P. McLaughlin is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, and philosophical logic. He has published numerous papers in each of these areas. In the philosophy of mind he has, among many other things, defended a theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which types of states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with neurobiological states. Michael B. Miller is a professor and vice‐chair in the Psychological & Brain Sciences department at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He uses a variety of tech niques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), event‐related poten tials (ERP), split‐brain studies, and signal detection analysis, to study the psychological and neural processes underlying human memory and decision‐making. Miller is also the vice‐director of the SAGE Center and editor of The Year in Cognitive Neuroscience. Jaak Panksepp holds the Baily Endowed Chair of Animal Well‐Being Science in the Neuroscience Program of Washington State University’s College of Veterinary Medicine and is Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor of the Department of Psychology at Bowling Green State University. His research pioneered the neuroscientific study of primary‐process emotions in mammals, with the goal of understanding the evolution ary infrastructure of human emotional feelings. He coined the term “affective neurosci ence” as the name for the field that studies the neural mechanisms of emotion across species. His books include Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford, 1998) and the Archaeology of Mind (Norton, 2012). Lillian Park received her PhD from UC Berkeley and is Associate Professor at the State University of New York College at Old Westbury.

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Claire Petitmengin is Professor at the Institut Mines‐Télécom (Télécom EM) and member of the Husserl Archive, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. She completed a PhD thesis in cognitive science under the supervision of Francisco Varela, and received a "Habilitation" in philosophy. Her research focuses on the micro‐dynamics of lived experience and “first‐person” methods enabling us to become aware of and describe it. She studies the epistemological conditions of these methods as well as their educa tional, therapeutic, artistic, and contemplative applications. Her research also addresses the process of mutual enrichment of "first‐person" and "third‐person" analyses in neurophenomenological projects. Thomas W. Polger is Professor and Head in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati. He is the author of numerous articles and chapters in philoso phy of mind and neuroscience, with particular focus on the phenomenon of multiple realization. He is the author of Natural Minds (The MIT Press, 2004) and, with Lawrence A. Shapiro, The Multiple Realization Book (Oxford University Press, 2016). David E. Presti is Teaching Professor of Neurobiology, Psychology, and Cognitive Science at the University of California in Berkeley, where he has taught for more than 25 years. He also worked for more than a decade in the clinical treatment of addiction at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in San Francisco. And he teaches neuroscience to Buddhist monks and nuns in India and in Bhutan. Donald D. Price (1942–2016) combined neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy to explore and understand mind‐brain‐body relationships. These relationships are discussed in depth in his book with James Barrell entitled Inner Experience and Neuroscience – Merging Both Perspectives (MIT Press, 2012). He has over 300 publica tions on mechanisms of pain, placebo analgesia, and hypnotic analgesia. He was Professor Emeritus in the division of neuroscience, Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, University of Florida, USA. Jesse Prinz is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, The Emotional Construction of Morals, and The Conscious Brain (forthcoming). Vasudevi Reddy is Professor Developmental and Cultural Psychology at the University of Portsmouth, UK. She is interested in the origins and development of social cognition, mainly in young infants, and has focused on phenomena familiar to parents but neglected in science – such as teasing, clowning, showing off, and feeling shy. She directs the Centre for Situated Action and Communication at Portsmouth, and is author of How Infants Know Minds, published by Harvard University Press. Geraint Rees is Dean of Life Sciences and Wellcome Senior Clinical Fellow at University College London. He has published widely in the peer‐reviewed literature on the neural basis of human consciousness. Susan Schneider is an associate professor of philosophy and cognitive science at the University of Connecticut, and a member of the technology and ethics group at Yale


University. Her work is on the nature of the self and mind, which she examines from the vantage point of issues in philosophy of mind, ethics, cognitive science (especially neu roscience and AI), and metaphysics. The topics she’s written about most recently include superintelligent AI (consciousness and control), intelligent life in the universe, whether thought is physical and computational, the mathematical nature of physics, whether the mind is a program, and the nature of the person. Aaron Schurger is Associate Professor (CR1) with the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research (Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale or INSERM). He is based at the NeuroSpin Research Center on the campus of the CEA‐ Saclay near Paris, France. He is known for his research contrasting conscious and non‐conscious forms of sensory information processing and on the neural basis of spontaneous self‐initiated action William Seager is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto Scarborough where he has taught for the last 30 years. His main interests are in the philosophy of mind, especially in the area of consciousness studies. He also works in the philosophy of science and, occasionally, in the history of modern philosophy. John Searle is Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of numerous articles and over a dozen books on the philosophy of mind, including Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), The Construction of Social Reality (1995), and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004). Wolf Singer studied Medicine in Munich and Paris, obtained his MD and PhD in Munich. He is Director Emeritus at the Max Planck Institute for Brain Research in Frankfurt, Founding Director both of the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies (FIAS) and of the Ernst Strüngmann Institute for Brain Research (ESI), and Director of the Ernst Strüngmann Forum. His research is focused on the neuronal substrate of higher cognitive functions. Johan Stender is a medical doctor and neuroscientist with an interest in the neurology of consciousness after brain injury. He has published in The Lancet, Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism, and several other journals on this topic. He works at the Department of Neuroscience and Pharmacology at the University of Copenhagen and the Coma Research Group of Liège University. G. Lynn Stephens is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has published in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychopathology. He is the co‐author of When Self‐Consciousness Breaks (with George Graham, 2000). Galen Strawson taught at Oxford University from 1979–2000 and at Reading University from 2001–2012. He is currently the President’s Chair of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. His books include Freedom and Belief (1986), The Secret Connexion: Realism, Causation, and David Hume (1989), Mental Reality (1994), Selves (2009), Locke on personal identity: Consciousness and Concernment (2011), and The Evident Connexion: Hume on personal identity (2011).

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John Tienson is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Memphis. He publishes on metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the foundations of cognitive science. He is author of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with Terence Horgan, 1996). Giulio Tononi is a neuroscientist and psychiatrist at the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he works on the nature of consciousness and the functions of sleep. Michael Trestman received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of California, Davis, and has held postdoctoral fellowships at the University of Utah and Indiana University, the latter funded by the National Science Foundation to work on issues in the evolution of consciousness. He has published related articles in Biological Theory, Philosophical Psychology, Erkenntnis, and Biology & Philosophy. He is currently develop ing software in the Bay Area. Colwyn Trevarthen is Professor Emeritus of Child Psychology and Psychobiology at the University of Edinburgh, Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and a Vice‐ President of the British Association for Early Childhood Education. He has researched complementary forms of consciousness in the hemispheres of the human brain, and how motives and emotions shared with infants promote cultural learning in intimate relations. With musician Stephen Malloch he edited Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of Human Companionship. Michael Tye is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He has published extensively on phenomenal consciousness and is a leading advocate of the representationalist approach. Robert Van Gulick is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Syracuse University. He is the co‐author of John Searle and His Critics, and has published on mind and consciousness in a variety of journals and volumes including the Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Topics, and the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Max Velmans is Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, and has been involved in consciousness studies for over 40 years. His main research focus is on integrating work on the philosophy, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology of consciousness, and, more recently, on East‐West integrative approaches. He has over 100 publications on these topics including The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews (1996), Understanding Consciousness (2000, 2009) and Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness (2017). Gerald Vision is Professor of Philosophy and an adjunct in the Neuroscience Program at Temple University. He has published a number of books and articles in Metaphysics, the Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy of Language. He is the author of Re:Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in the Material World (2011).

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Introduction Susan Schneider and Max Velmans Every moment of your waking life, and even when you dream, there is something it feels like to be you. When you see the rich hues of a sunset or smell the aroma of your morn ing coffee, you are having conscious experiences. And it is this that makes it wonderful to be alive. The phenomenon of consciousness can be studied from two different vantage points: from the “inside” perspective of a conscious being, and from the “outside” vantage point of any of the academic fields that study the mind. Over the last 25 years or so, many scholars have developed a special interest in consciousness, and amazing discoveries have been made. All this interest has given rise to a new discipline, called “Consciousness Studies” that has consciousness as its primary focus. Over the brief period of its exist ence this multidisciplinary field has grown, drawing from work in neuroscience, phi losophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, and more. For example, as we write this introduction, a Google Scholar search yields over 2,800,000 books and articles with “consciousness” in the title! This second edition of the Companion contains chapters that introduce and refine ideas that are at the heart of this new discipline. We are pleased to include 18 entirely new chapters in the volume, and whenever possible, to include updated versions of many chapters. In particular, we are pleased to expand our coverage of intriguing new work on panpsychism, as well as many new offerings in science, including discussions of how to combine issues in neuroscience with first‐person investigations of the mind. We hope that those new to Consciousness Studies will use this book to learn the main trends and issues in the field, and thereby be better able to navigate through its exten sive publications. In addition to this function, we hope that this book makes it possible for academics in one discipline to have better access to relevant work in other disci plines. The book is also designed to serve students by both introducing issues key to their own primary areas of study, and forging connections to work in other areas of Consciousness Studies. It is our view that if students fail to take an interdisciplinary approach to consciousness, they risk being unaware of work outside of their own disci pline that has a direct bearing on the questions they wish to address. Given that our readers will include both students and seasoned members of the Consciousness Studies community, we have encouraged our authors to offer new infor mation or a fresh perspective, while at the same time providing comprehensive, acces sible surveys of the terrain. For example, where authors were invited to present their

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own, well‐known views, they were also encouraged to deal with any major objections to those views, especially new ones. Many of the chapters also detail new areas of work. Unusually, for a book of this kind, a wide range of contemporary experts, including an extensive editorial advisory board, have been involved in the selection of chapter topics and authors. In addition, nearly all chapters, including those of the editors and advisory editors, have been anonymously refereed, following procedures more common to academic journals than to edited books. We have been fortunate in that many of the 54 chapters in this volume have been written by some of the best writers, researchers, and thinkers in the field. Inevitably, even with 54 chapters, there were many fine authors that we could not include. In some cases these authors were kind enough to act as advi sors or referees. In other cases, competing commitments, illness, or even death, sadly intervened. Given the wide range of the chapters and the extensive bibliography, we nevertheless hope that most authors who have made a major empirical or theoretical contribution to contemporary Consciousness Studies will find some reference in the Companion to sources of their work, and we offer our sincere apologies to those that we have missed.

The Scope of the Volume As will be clear from the table of contents, the book largely focuses on Consciousness Studies as it has developed in the West over the last one hundred or so years, particu larly in psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, and related disciplines. While this has mainly been a development within conventional third‐person science, it has also tacitly and, at times explicitly, drawn on and developed a form of first‐person science (a systematic examination of consciousness viewed from a first‐person perspective), and in this regard, along with recent work, we are pleased to be able to include some overviews of more ancient traditions of consciousness studies that have developed in the East. The Table of Contents has been subdivided into five broadly themed parts: Part One aims to provide some background to current research and controversies in the field – how empirical studies of consciousness originally developed in psychology and related sciences, and what the unique, enduring philosophical problems surround ing consciousness seem to be. Part Two charts the origins and distribution of consciousness that have been the subject of investigation and speculation, ranging from consciousness in young infants, non‐human animals, and machines, to panpsychism, the possibility that experience is a component of everything in the world, because it inheres in the elementary particles themselves. Part Three explores some of the varieties of conscious experience that are most easily studied in human adults, and here we deal both with the states of the brain that condi tion their presence or absence in waking, sleeping, dreaming, and coma, and with some of the forms (both normal and abnormal) that consciousness takes within those states. For example, in this section, we focus on some aspects of cognition and emotion that might have a particular bearing on an understanding of consciousness, and then deal with a wide range of altered states of consciousness, such as drug‐induced altered states of consciousness, clinical pathologies of consciousness, anomalous (non‐pathological) experiences, mindfulness meditation, and mystical states.

Introduction

Part Four turns to contemporary philosophical and scientific theories about the nature of consciousness that address the following fundamental questions: What is consciousness? Where is it? What does consciousness do? How does the phenomenology of consciousness relate to the workings of the brain? Are the problems of consciousness ones that can be resolved by empirical research, or are there aspects of consciousness that cannot be under stood without major changes in the way that we conceptualize those problems? And what are the implications of the major positions on the nature of consciousness for our under standing of mind, human nature, and the physical world? Finding answers to such questions is widely thought to present a major challenge to contemporary science, and in this section we deliberately sample from a wide range of approaches and theories that reflect the con troversy and ferment in this field. To some extent, these wide differences in theory reflect fundamental philosophical differences, for example, between those who believe that every thing of interest about consciousness can be explained in physical terms or the functionalist terms used by cognitive science, and those who believe that what it is like to be conscious (from a first person perspective) requires something more. While some readers may ini tially find such controversies confusing, their resolution is likely to have far‐reaching impli cations for the ways that we think about ourselves and the world in which we live. Part Five deals with some of the topics that currently attract special interest amongst professional philosophers. In many cases, work has been included because it is highly interdisciplinary, bringing together key issues in both the philosophy and science of consciousness, and having an important bearing on both. Indeed, philosophers have increasingly become engaged with scientific research. The chapters on self‐conscious ness and the neurophilosophy of consciousness are excellent examples of this tendency. In addition to including philosophical work that draws from science, the remainder of the chapters concern topics which are largely philosophical in nature, such as state of the art reviews or opinion pieces on topics of central import to philosophical thinking on the nature of consciousness. Many of these chapters take as their point of departure the simple observation that there is something that it is like to be conscious; that is, there is a felt quality to experi ence. At least prima facie, it is difficult to grasp how an underlying scientific account of neural processes captures the essence of felt experience. Philosophers are very con cerned with the relationship that subjective, first‐person conscious experience has to the objective world that science investigates. Questions addressed include: is conscious experience entirely determined by the underlying states of the brain? Is conscious expe rience capable of causing events in our brains and the larger world? What is the rela tionship between the felt quality of experience, on the one hand, and the representational aspect of certain conscious states, on the other? Philosophical work on such questions is key to understanding foundational problems concerning the nature of consciousness – an issue that also concerns many scientists (see below). Part Six focuses on further, cutting‐edge, empirical studies of consciousness. The bulk of contemporary Consciousness Studies is empirical, so this section is the largest in the book. For convenience, the chapters are roughly grouped according to investiga tive approach, that is, according to whether they adopt cognitive psychological, neuro scientific, or first‐person investigative methods. It will become apparent, however, that no clear separation can be made between these. Depending on the problem, one might use one or two of these investigative approaches simultaneously, or all three. Cognitive studies of consciousness try to locate conscious experience within the human information processing system, for example, by specifying what kind of processing takes

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place before consciousness arises, the conditions that determine whether and when consciousness arises, and the function of consciousness (if any) once it does arise. Following classical traditions in this area, the cognitive chapters begin with studies of attention, long thought to be one of the gateways to consciousness in human beings. The chapters then turn to contrasts between mental processing that is unconscious, precon scious, or conscious in perception and memory, as well as preconscious versus conscious processing in motor control. Such studies follow the traditional “method of contrasts.” In contrasting conscious with nonconscious processing, researchers hope to discover what might be special about conscious processing – although there are various ways of inter preting such contrasts; for example, there is an enduring debate, dating back to the time of Descartes, about what role consciousness experience might play in the mental processing that it accompanies (see Velmans, 1991, 2009, chs. 2 to 5). Neuroscientific studies of the mind focus on the brain hardware (sometimes described as “wetware”) that embodies mental processes of the kind studied by cognitive psy chologists, and neuroscientific studies of consciousness traditionally focus on finding its neural causal antecedents and correlates. Consequently, this section begins with a broad review of the neuroscientific methods used to study the neural causes and correlates of consciousness along with some overall conclusions that one might draw from them. This is followed by two chapters on what the neural correlates of normal human con scious experience might be, focusing on large‐scale temporal coordination in the brain and on “integrated information theory,” a variant of traditional information theoretical approaches that is currently attracting wide attention. The section then turns to broad insights that have arisen from studies of dissociations of consciousness in split‐brain cases, and to surprising evidence that conscious visual experience may be at least partly dissociated from the visual feedback required for motor control. The section goes on to review broad insights that have been gained into conditions required for human consciousness arising from studies of its global disorders, and a review of the conditions that determine presence or absence of consciousness in anes thesia. The section then concludes with an area of neuroscientific research that has some particularly interesting philosophical as well as scientific implications: the neuro science of free will: are voluntary actions determined by conscious choices, by precon scious processes in the brain, or by both – and what are the implications for ethics and legal responsibility? Readers will note that scientific controversies about the neural causes and correlates of consciousness and about the implications of such empirical findings are just as common as are controversies about some of the global, philosophi cal issues discussed in Part Four. While all these chapters review extensive evidence in support of their theoretical positions, and while their conclusions are convergent in some respects, they also have some major differences. As elsewhere in the book, our aim in the Companion is simply to present a representative sample of current research and opinion in this field. In the final section of Part Six, “First‐person contributions to the science of Consciousness,” we return to the question of how one can investigate conscious experi ence as such (as opposed to its functionally or physically specified causes and corre lates). This raises issues that have concerned researchers from the dawn of psychological science, which, at its inception, was thought of as the study of conscious experience. Although for much of the twentieth century, psychology ostensibly tried to rid itself of the problems associated with such a first‐person science, it never did so consistently. For example, in studies of perception, cognition, emotion etc., researchers commonly

Introduction

relied to some extent on subjective reports of experience, whether in the form of verbal reports, or some other overt response, e.g., pressing one button if subjects could see a difference between two stimuli and another button if not, placing a mark on a rating scale, filling out a questionnaire (about their feelings, thoughts, behavior) and so on. Once consciousness itself becomes the topic of study, such methods become particu larly important. For example, although the neuroscientific investigations introduced in the previous section are a very clear example of how Consciousness Studies has become part of normal third‐person science, nearly all of these investigations rely to some extent on subjects being able to report (at least in a minimal way) on what they currently experience – for the reason that without such reports it is impossible to know how observed activity in the brain relates to what subjects experience. In other areas of psychological and social science research there has been a renewed interest in investi gating how subjects experience what it is like to be in different social situations with the use of “qualitative methods” as well as “quantitative methods,” and there has also been a revisiting of European and Eastern phenomenological traditions, which suggest that by refocusing and training attention it is possible to investigate the finer detail of one’s own conscious experience. The section begins with a review of European phenomenological traditions that have long defended first‐person approaches followed by a review of neurophenomenology and the “micro-phenomenological interview,” a particularly well‐ developed example of how phenomenological methods can be applied in practice. This is followed by a review of “descriptive experience sampling” – an alternative method that can be used to sample what it is like to experience in everyday situations, and by a review of “experiential neuroscience” – a well‐formulated procedure for bridging neu roscience, psychophysics, and phenomenological enquiries. The section, and the book, then closes with a re‐examination of the epistemic status of the different first‐ and third‐person approaches to the investigation of consciousness in ways that integrate these approaches, with accompanying subtle changes in the ways that we normally think about the nature of science.

Acknowledgements and Caveats We would like to thank our many authors for their inspiring contributions and also give special thanks to our advisory editors for both editions 1 and 2 of this book for their guidance at many points in the planning. All of these editors have been enormously help ful in advising us about which pieces to include, and many have anonymously reviewed one or more chapters, as have many of our authors. These editors are Jeffrey Gray, John Kihlstrom, Phil Merikle, Stevan Harnad, Zoltan Dienes, Geraint Rees, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Jose Bermudez, Brian McLaughlin, and George Graham. We would also like to thank Jenelle Salisbury for her careful editing of many of the philosophy chapters and for writing the appendix to the volume. We would also like to thank the editor of the first edition, Jeff Dean, and our assistant editor, Danielle Descoteaux, for their very thoughtful editing. We are also very grateful to Marissa Koors, Deirdre Ikson, Allison Kosta, Victoria White, Jordan Ochs, Manish Luthra, and Anandan Bommen for their help on the second edition. We also want to thank the following external referees for their valuable comments in the development of the two editions including (in alphabetical order) Elena Antonova, Michael Arbib, Mark Bickhard, Andy Bremmner, Jonathan Cohen, Michael Corballis, Antonio Damasio, Stan Dehaene, Ralph Ellis, Lisa Geraci, Mark

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Haggard, Charles Heywood, Michael Huemer, Glyn Humphreys, Karl Jansen, Jason Mattingly, Colin McGinn, Thomas Metzinger, Mike Morgan, Erik Myin, James Pagel, Chris Richards, Alan Richardson‐Klavehn, Milan Scheidegger, Mark Solms, Sean Spence, Adam Wager, Alan Wallace, Doug Watt, and Eran Zaidel. Sadly, Jeffrey Gray, one of our valued advisory editors, passed away before he could complete his own chapter for edi tion 1 of the book – but his final thoughts on consciousness can be found in his 2004 book. Francis Crick, one of the founders of the modern neuroscience of consciousness studies also sadly died, and his chapter in the first edition of the Companion, co‐ authored with Christof Koch, is one of his last writings on this subject. Since that time, David Fontana and Marc Jeannerod have also died, but in the light of their continued importance to the field of Consciousness Studies, we have included their original chapters in edition 2. In September 2016, Don Price, a leading expert on the “experien tial neuroscience” of pain also died, and his chapter in this book is again one of his last writings on this subject. We hope that we have kept errors and omissions to a minimum, and we take full responsibility for those that have crept in. Although it was impossible to include work by all of the leading scholars in this field, we have drawn from a wide spectrum and endeavored to present a balanced sample. The aim of the Companion is to present a fair account of the field as it is – intriguing, full of controversy, and constantly extending the boundaries of our knowledge.

References Velmans, M. (1991) Is human information processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14: 4, 651–69. Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, 2nd edn. London: Routledge/Psychology Press.