Dec 2, 2010 - CORTON, Lars & IHRE, Rolf & SANDEVARN, Arne(1999), Ship Broking and. Chartering Practice, LLP Limited Reference Publishing Division.
The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics
ƔVolume 26
Number 2
December 2010
pp. 247-261 Ɣ
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions* 1)
6DQJFKHRO68+
ā1DPN\X3$5. *** 2)
3)
Contents , ,QWURGXFWLRQ,97KH(TXLOLEULXP&KDUWHUDJH ,, /LWHUDWXUH5HYLHZ9&RQFOXVLRQ ,,,7KH%DUJDLQLQJZLWK$V\PPHWULF,PSDWLHQFH
Abstract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¶VDQGWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUWRQLQWKHFXUUHQWPDUNHW .H\ZRUGV(TXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJH5XELQVWHLQWKHRUHPLQFKDUWHUGHOD\ FRVWSHUGD\&KDUWHUDJHZLWKJDPHWKHRU\
7KLVLVWKHSDSHUZKLFKZDVSUHVHQWHGDW&RQIHUHQFHRI,$0(LQ&RSHQKDJHQ'HQPDUN
*UDGXDWHVWXGHQWRI7RQJP\RQJ8QLYHUVLW\LQ%XVDQ.RUHD(PDLOFDOHEVXK#WXDFNU
3URIHVVRURI7RQJP\RQJ8QLYHUVLW\LQ%XVDQ.RUHD(PDLOQNSDUN#WXDFNU 247
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
I. Introduction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¿IWHHQVKLSEURNLQJFRPSDQLHVWKHVKLSRZQHUWULHVWR¿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
248
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
HTXLOLEULXPIUHLJKWLQEDUJDLQLQJZLWKDV\PPHWULFLPSDWLHQFHRI5XELQVWHLQ RQWKHEDVLVRI1DVKHTXLOLEULXP7KHSDSHUWULHVWRDQDO\]HWKHGHOD\ORVV FRVWSHUGD\EHWZHHQWKHFKDUWHUHUDQGWKHVKLSRZQHU,IWKH\VHQGRQHURXQG RIFRXQWHURIIHUWRHDFKRWKHUWKH\ZLOOLQFXUDGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\7KH HTXLOLEULXPSULFHIRUVXUSOXVZKLFKRFFXUVEHWZHHQWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VDQG FKDUWHUHU¶VUDWLRRIGHOD\ORVVSHUWRQSHUGD\KDVEHHQFDOFXODWHGE\XVLQJWKH 5XELQVWHLQ VIRUPXODZKLFKLVWKHIRUPDOWKHRU\RIEDUJDLQLQJGHOLYHUHGIURP -RKQ1DVK¶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
II. Literature Review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
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
GHWHFWHGEHWZHHQPDUJLQDOFRVWDQGVSRWSULFHLQWKHHTXLOLEULXP2) 7LPRWK\1&DVRQ 6WDQOH\65H\QROGVVWXGLHGWKDWWKHSDSHUZKLFKLV WKHVXFFHVVLYHEDUJDLQLQJWKHRU\ZDVIRFXVHGRQKRZVHTXHQWLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ RQH VHOOHU DQG RQH EX\HU RU WZR PRUH EX\HUV LQIOXHQFH PDUNHW UHVXOWV%\PHDQVRIWKHPRGHOLQJZKLFKWKHUHVHDUFKHUGHYHORSVWKURXJK VRPHDVVXPSWLRQVWKHVHOOHU V¿UVWSULFHRIIHULQ1DVK(TXLOLEULXPIDOOVDVWKH GLVFRXQWIDFWRUWRZHUXS7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHUHVXOWVLVWKDWDQDSSURDFKWR HTXLWDEOHFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVQRWRQO\WKHZD\WRGHVFULEHWKHVHGHYLDWLRQVDQG WKDWERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\DQGULVNDQWLSDWK\DUHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDUHDVRQDEOH UDWLRRIWKHGHYLDWLRQVWREHREVHUYHGLQWKLVJDPH3) ,QWKHVKLSSLQJWKHFKDUWHULQJLVWKHSURFHVVWR¿QGRXWWKHHTXLOLEULXPSRLQW E\ PHDQV RI G\QDPLF QHJRWLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUWQHUV ZKR KDYH XQEDODQFHG SRZHU7KH SUHOLWHUDWXUH UHYLHZ FRQVLVWV RI WKH VWXG\ RI HFRQRP\ WKHRU\ GHWHUPLQLQJHTXLOLEULXPSULFHE\GHPDQGDQGVXSSO\DQGJHQHUDOWKHRU\RI 5XELQVWHLQDERXWG\QDPLFEDUJDLQLQJ7KLVSDSHUWULHVWRFRYHUWKHVKRUWRI SUHVWXG\DQGDOVROLQNVDV\PPHWULFLPSDWLHQFHJDPHWKHRU\WRWKHFKDUWHULQJ SUDFWLFH LQ RUGHU WR ILQG WKH IHDVLELOLW\ RI 5XELQVWHLQ WKHRU\LQ FKDUWHULQJ VKLSSLQJ
III. The Bargaining with Asymmetric Impatience 2QEDUJDLQLQJWKHRU\ZLWKDV\PPHWULFLPSDWLHQFH+6FRWW%LHUPDQDQG /XLV)HUQDQGH]VKRZHGDQLQWHUHVWLQJFDVHIRUPDNLQJHDV\XQGHUVWDWLQJ 7KH\VXSSRVHGWKDWWKHGHOD\LVPRUHFRVWO\WRVHOOHUZRPDQ WKDQWREX\HU PDQ VD\EHFDXVHVKHLVPRUHLPSDWLHQWWRUHFHLYHWKHLQFRPHWKDQKHLV WR UHFHLYH KHU VHUYLFH ,Q SDUWLFXODU VXSSRVH GHOD\ UHGXFHV VHOOHU¶V JDLQV IURPWUDGHE\EXWUHGXFHVEX\HU¶VE\RQO\,QWKLVFDVHWKHSOD\HUV KDYHDV\PPHWULFLPSDWLHQFH,WUHPDLQVRSWLPDOIRUVHOOHURIIHUDSULFHRI LQWKHWKURXQGVLQFHVKHNQRZVEX\HUDFFHSWLWEXWQRZEX\HU¶V RSWLPDORIIHUWRVHOOHULQWKHWKURXQGLVQRW,QWKHWKURXQG 7H]XND ,VKLL SS 7LPRWK\1&DVRQ 6WDQOH\65H\QROGV SS 250
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
VHOOHUNQRZVWKDWEX\HUZLOODFFHSWDJDLQIURPWUDGHRIRI VR VKH ZLOO RIIHU WR VXSSO\ KHU VHUYLFH WR KLP IRU DQGVR RQ7KH VKDUHVIURPVRPHRIWKHRSWLPDORIIHUVDUHJLYHQLQWDEOH%X\HU¶VRSWLPDO LQLWLDORIIHULVQRZZKLFKVHOOHUDFFHSWVUDWKHUWKDQQHHGOHVVO\GHOD\ VHWWOHPHQW1RWLFHWKDWWKHVSOLWRIWKHVXUSOXVLVDSSUR[LPDWHO\7KLVLVQR FRLQFLGHQFH%HFDXVHERWKRIEX\HUDQGVHOOHUKDYHHDFKGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHU URXQGFRQFOXVLYHO\DVIROORZLQJVERWKRIWKHPVKRXOGDFFHSWSURSRVDOSULFH ZKLOHURXQGLVRQHIRUVDYLQJWKHLUWLPH1DPHO\WKLV¿UVWSURSRVDOSULFHZLWK VXUSOXVSD\RIIVLVHTXLOLEULXPSULFH 7DEOH!1DVKHTXLOLEULXPRXWFRPHRIWKHEDUJDLQLQJJDPH ZLWKDOWHUQDWLQJRIIHUVEXWDV\PPHWULFLPSDWLHQFH 5RXQG1XPEHU
2IIHU0DNHU
6HOOHU¶V6KDUH
%X\HU¶V6KDUH
6HOOHU
%X\HU
6HOOHU
%X\HU
6HOOHU
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
ā
6HOOHU
3
%X\HU
2
6HOOHU
1
%X\HU
+6FRWW%LHUPDQ /XLV)HUQDQGH]SS 251
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions )LJXUH!7KH¿UVWWKUHHVXEJDPHVRI5XELQVWHLQ¶VDOWHUQDWLQJ RIIHUEDUJDLQLQJJDPH
(DFK RI WKH SUHYLRXV H[DPSOHV DVVXPHG WKDW WKH QXPEHU RI URXQGV ZDV IL[HG,QPRVWEDUJDLQLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKRXJKWKHQXPEHURIURXQGVRI RIIHUV DQG FRXQWHURIIHUV LV HVVHQWLDOO\ XQERXQGHG$Q LPSRUWDQW UHVXOW LQ PRGHUQ EDUJDLQLQJ WKHRU\ DWWULEXWHG WR$ULHO 5XEHQVWHLQ LV WKLV W\SH RI JDPHKDVXQLTXHVXEJDPHSHUIHFWHTXLOLEULXP6XSSRVHWZRSOD\HUV6DQG %DUHEDUJDLQLQJRYHUWKHGLYLVLRQRIDVXUSOXVXVLQJDOWHUQDWHRIIHUV3OD\HU %PDNHVWKH¿UVWRIIHU7KHUHLVQROLPLWWRWKHQXPEHURIRIIHUVWKDWFDQEH PDGHERWKSOD\HUVKDYHGLVFRXQWIDFWRUVRIįVDQGįEDQGSOD\HUV DFFHSWRIIHUVZKHQWKH\DUHH[DFWO\LQGLIIHUHQWDERXWDFFHSWLQJRUUHMHFWLQJ WKHP7KHQWKLVEDUJDLQLQJJDPHKDVDXQLTXHVXEJDPHSHUIHFWHTXLOLEULXP LQZKLFKSOD\HU%LPPHGLDWHO\RIIHUV6WKHIUDFWLRQVįE įVįE RIWKH VXUSOXVUHWDLQLQJįV įVįE IRUKLPVHOIDQG6DFFHSWV
252
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
IV. The Equilibrium Charterage 6KLSRZQHU DQG &KDUWHUHU QHJRWLDWH ZLWK DV\PPHWULF LPSDWLHQFH7KH VKLSRZQHU¶V GHOD\ ORVV FRVW SHU GD\ LV SXW WRJHWKHU XVLQJ RSHUDWLRQ FRVW DQGGHSUHFLDWLRQFRVWSHUGD\,QWKLVFDVHVWXG\FDSHVL]HEXONHULVXVHGIRU FDOFXODWLQJWKHVKLSRZQHU VGHOD\FRVWDVZHOODVWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VGHOD\FRVW 7KHVKLSRZQHU¶VDQGWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VVXUSOXVLVHVWDEOLVKHGDVWKHUDWLRRI HDFKORVVFRVWSHUWRQDQGSHUGD\DQGLV86 GHULYHGIURPWKHGLIIHUHQFH RIWKHLUUHVHUYDWLRQSULFHV 1. The Case Study : Coal 6XSSRVHWKHUHDUHWKHWZRSOD\HUVRQHLV&&KDUWHUHU DQGWKHRWKHULV6 6KLSRZQHU 7KHZHLJKWRIFRDOLVWRQVDQGWKHFKDUWHUDJHSHUWRQ LV86/D\FDQLVIURP0DUFKWKHVWWRWKHWK/RDGLQJSRUW LV5LFKDUGV%D\DQGGLVFKDUJLQJSRUWLV5RWWHUGDP$FFRUGLQJWRVKLSSLQJ PDJD]LQHDQGVKLSSLQJVLWHDWWKDWWLPHWKHFKDUWHUDJHRIFDSHW\SHLV¿[HG EHWZHHQ86DQG86SHUWRQQDJH7KLVFDVHVKRZVWKDWFKDUWHUHU V UHVHUYDWLRQSULFHLV86SHUWRQDQGVKLSRZQHU¶VUHVHUYDWLRQLV86 SHUWRQDQGHDFKSULFHLVQRPRUHDQGQROHVV7KHFDSHVL]HEXONHULV':7 EXLOWLQDQGWKHYHVVHOZLWKWKHFRDOFDUJRWRQVRUGHU LVFKRVHQIRUDFDVHVWXG\7KHIL[HGFKDUWHUDJHDWWKDWWLPHLV86SHU WRQLQYR\DJHFKDUWHU)RU¿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¶VUHVHUYDWLRQSULFH86' ,QGH[PXQGLFRPKWWSZZZLQGH[PXQGLFRPFRPPRGLWLHV"FRPPRGLW\ FRDODXVWUDOLDQ PRQWKV 253
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
5XELQVWHLQ¶V IRUPXOD LQYHQWRU\ FRVW SHU GD\ LV 86 7KH FRVWIRUFXVWRG\SHUPRQWKRIFRDOLV86SHUPRQWKSHU0ðVRXUFHG IURP ,QFKHRQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SRUW FRUSRUDWLRQ 7KH FRVW RI FXVWRG\ SHU PRQWK LV PXOWLSOLHG E\ 7KH FRVW RI FXVWRG\ SHU PRQWK LV 86 $FFRUGLQJWRIRUPXODWKHFRVWRIFXVWRG\SHUGD\LVGHULYHG DV867KHFKDUWHUHUތVFDUJRGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LVWRDGG LQYHQWRU\FRVWSHUGD\DQGWKHFRVWRIFXVWRG\SHUGD\&KDUWHUHU VFDUJRGHOD\ ORVV FRVW SHU GD\ ZDV FDOFXODWHG DV 86 ,I 86 SHU WRQ SHU GD\ LV GLYLGHG E\ WKH VXUSOXV RI WKH UHVXOW LV FDOFXODWHG DV DQGFKDUWHUHU VGLVFRXQWIDFWRULVFDOFXODWHGZKLFK LV FDOOHG įF$FFRUGLQJ WR 5XELQVWHLQ IRUPXOD WKH FKDUWHUHU¶VIUDFWLRQ RI VXUSOXVįV įVįF LVFDOFXODWHGDV$VWKHVXUSOXVLV86 FKDUWHUHU¶VVXUSOXVSD\RIILVGUDZQDV ,Q WKH FDVH RI WKH VKLSRZQHUތ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ތVGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LVFRPSRVHGRIWKHRSHUDWLQJFRVWSHUGD\DQG ,QFKHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSRUWFRUSRUDWLRQ 1LJHO*DUGLQHU 6KLSRSHUDWLQJFRVWVDQQXDOUHYLHZDQGIRUHFDVW'UHZU\SXEOLFDWLRQV'UHZU\VKLSSLQJFRQVXOWDQV /WGS 6WHHORQWKHQHWFRPKWWSZZZVWHHORQWKHQHWFRPFRPPRGLW\BSULFHVKWPO 1LJHO*DUGLQHU 6KLSRSHUDWLQJFRVWVDQQXDOUHYLHZDQGIRUHFDVW'UHZU\SXEOLFDWLRQV'UHZU\VKLSSLQJFRQVXOWDQV /WGS 254
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
GHSUHFLDWLRQFRVWSHUGD\,IWKHWZRNLQGVRIFRVWVDUHVXPPHGXSWKHVKLS RZQHU VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LVGUDZQ86DQGVKLSRZQHU¶V GHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUWRQSHUGD\LV86$V86GUDZQIURP86 VXUSOXVLVWRFRQYHUWWRWKHHTXLYDOHQWYDOXHEHWZHHQWKHUDQJHPRUHWKDQ DQGOHVVWKDQ86LVGUDZQIURPFRQYHUVLRQSURFHGXUH $FFRUGLQJWRIRUPXODVKLSRZQHU VGLVFRXQWIDFWRULVFDOFXODWHGDV ZKLFKLVFDOOHGįV7KHVKLSRZQHU¶VIUDFWLRQRIVXUSOXVįVįF įVįF LVFDOFXODWHGDVDQGVKLSRZQHU¶VVXUSOXVSD\RIILVFDOFXODWHG 7KH¿QDOHTXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJHLV86 2. The Case Study : Ore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įFLVFDOFXODWHGDV7KHUHIRUHFKDUWHUHU VVXUSOXV SD\RIILVGUDZQDV86 ,QWKHFDVHRIVKLSRZQHUDFFRUGLQJWRPDUNHWSULFHRIWKHVDOHDQGSXUFKDVH IRUVKLSWKHSULFHRI':7FDSHVL]HEXONHULV86PLOOLRQ ,QFKHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSRUWFRUSRUDWLRQ KWWSZZZLFSDRUNULQIRIHHLQIRMVS 255
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
7KHRSHUDWLRQFRVWSHUGD\LV86$VUHIHUUHGWRWKHFRDORIFDVHVWXG\ WKHGHSUHFLDWLRQFRVWSHUGD\LV866KLSRZQHU VGHOD\ORVV FRVWSHUGD\LV86DQGKLVGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUWRQSHUGD\ LV86$V86GUDZQIURP86VXUSOXVLVWRFRQYHUWWRWKH HTXLYDOHQWYDOXHEHWZHHQWKHUDQJHVPRUHWKDQDQGOHVVWKDQ86 LV GUDZQ IURP FRQYHUVLRQ SURFHGXUH7KH GLVFRXQW IDFWRU įV LV FDOFXODWHG DV DQG VKLSRZQHU¶V VXUSOXV SD\ RII LV FDOFXODWHG DV 86 (TXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJHLV¿[HGDV86RIERWK FKDUWHUHUDQGVKLSRZQHU 3. The Comparison of Equilibrium Charterage & Surplus $VVKRZQLQWDEOHWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LQWKHFDSH VL]HLVPRUHWKDQWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LQUHYHUVHWKHVKLS RZQHUJDLQVWKHVXUSOXVSD\RIIZKLFKLVOHVVWKDQFKDUWHUHU VVXUSOXVSD\RII $PRQJRUHDQGFRDOWKHVKLSRZQHUJDLQHGPRUHFKDUWHUDJHWKDQHTXLOLEULXP FKDUWHUDJH ZKLFK LV QRW UHDVRQDEOH VKDULQJ RI VXUSOXV SD\RII EHFDXVH WKH GHOD\ORVVFRVWLVQRWLQFOXGHGIRUERWKFKDUWHUHUDQGVKLSRZQHU 7DEOH!7KHFKDUWHUDJHDQGVXUSOXVRIFDSHVL]HEXONHULQ 'HOD\ORVVFRVWGD\86
6XUSOXV86
&DUJR
256
&KDUWHUDJH86
&KDUWHUHU
6KLSRZQHU
&KDUWHUHU
6KLSRZQHU
0DUNHW SULFH
(TXLOLEULXP SULFH
&RDO
2UH
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions )LJXUH!7KHHTXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJHRIFDSHVL]HEXONHU
1RWH(EODFNSRLQWLVWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VDQGVKLSRZQHU¶VHTXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJHDQG0 UHGSRLQWLVWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VDQGVKLSRZQHU¶V¿[HGFKDUWHUDJHLQWKHPDUNHW
$VVKRZQLQILJXUHWKHHTXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJH( LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK 1DVKHTXLOLEULXPLVWKDWFRDOLV DQGRUHLV ,Q FDVHRIFDSHVL]HYHVVHOWKH¿[HGFKDUWHUDJH0 RIFRDOLQWKHPDUNHWLV86 DQGRUHLV867KHUHDVRQDEOHFKDUWHUDJHKDVWREHGHWHUPLQHG LQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHORVVFRVWRISHUWRQDQGSHUGD\RIERWKWKHFKDUWHUHU WKHVKLSRZQHUE\DSSO\LQJ5XELQVWHLQIRUPXOD,QFRPSDULQJWZRSULFHV HTXLOLEULXPSULFHLV¿[HGORZHUWKDQWKDWRIPDUNHWSULFH7KDWPHDQVPDUNHW SULFHGRHVQRWFRQVLGHUGHOD\FRVWRQVLGHRIERWKFKDUWHUHUDQGVKLSRZQHU
257
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions )LJXUH!7KHVXUSOXVRIFDSHVL]HEXONHURQGLIIHUHQWFDUJR
1RWHEODFNSRLQWLVWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VDQGVKLSRZQHU VVXUSOXV
$VVKRZQLQILJXUHWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VDQGVKLSRZQHU¶VVXUSOXVSD\RIILQ DFFRUGDQFHZLWK1DVKHTXLOLEULXPLVWKDWFRDOLV DQGRUHLV 7KHFKDUWHUHUJDLQVPRUHVXUSOXVSD\RIIWKDQWKHVKLSRZQHUEHFDXVH FKDUWHUHUތVGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\LVOHVVWKDQWKHVKLSRZQHULQDFFRUGDQFH ZLWK5XELQVWHLQWKHRUHPRQWKHEDVLVRI1DVKHTXLOLEULXP
V. Conclusion 1. The Summary of Research 7KLV VWXG\ DLPV DW ILQGLQJ WKH HTXLOLEULXP SULFH ZLWK WKH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH GHOD\ FRVW RQ WKH VLGH RI ERWK WKH FKDUWHUHU DQG WKH VKLSRZQHU LQ VSRWPDUNHW7KHHTXLOLEULXPLVFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHVXUSOXVRI5XELQVWHLQ¶V 258
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
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¶VPLQLPXPUHVHUYDWLRQSULFHLV PLQLPXPSULFHLQWKHPDUNHW2IFRXUVHLWLVREYLRXVWKDWWKHVKLSRZQHUZLOO SURSRVHPD[LPXPSULFHDQGFKDUWHUHUZLOOVXJJHVWPLQLPXPSULFH*HQHUDOO\ VSHDNLQJRQHWKLQNVWKDWWKHSULFHGLYLGHGE\KDOILVHTXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJH EXWLWLVQRWWKHFDVHLQYLHZRI1DVK¶VHTXLOLEULXPWKHRU\,QDFDVHVWXG\ ZKHQ RQH URXQG FRXQWHURIIHU RFFXUV WKH GHOD\ ORVV FRVW SHU GD\ EHWZHHQ WKHFKDUWHUHUDQGWKHVKLSRZQHUPXVWEHFDOFXODWHGWRHQVXUHWKHVKDULQJRI VXUSOXVEHWZHHQERWKRIWKHPXVLQJ5XELQVWHLQIRUPXOD7KHGLVFRXQWIDFWRU LVGH¿QHGDVGHOD\ORVVFRVWLQXQLWSHUGD\DQGSHUWRQQDJHRIVKLSRUFDUJR ,WVKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKDQ]HUREXWOHVVWKDQRQH7KHUHIRUHGLVFRXQWIDFWRU LQVXUSOXVLVFDOFXODWHGZLWKVKLSRZQHU VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUWRQDQGSHUGD\ DVZHOODVWKHFKDUWHUHU VORVVSHUWRQDQGSHUGD\5HVHDUFKHUHVWDEOLVKHGWKH DYHUDJHORVVSHUWRQDQGSHUGD\WREH867KLVLVWKHGLIIHUHQFHRIWKH VKLSRZQHU¶V DQG WKH FKDUWHUHU¶V UHVHUYDWLRQ SULFH DIWHU WKH UHGXFWLRQ DQG LQFUHPHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHPDUNHWSULFH ,QWKHQH[WVWHSWKH1DVKHTXLOLEULXPSULFHFDQEHVXJJHVWHGZLWKLQHDFK VXUSOXV SD\RII FRQVLGHULQJ VKLSRZQHU¶V PLQLPXP UHVHUYDWLRQ SULFH DIWHU DSSO\LQJ 5XELQVWHLQ¶V IRUPXOD:LWKRXW 1DVK HTXLOLEULXP FKDUWHUDJH WKH FKDUWHUDJHIRUHYHU\FDUJRLQPDUNHWLVPRUHH[SHQVLYHRULQH[SHQVLYHWKDQ HTXLOLEULXPSULFHEHFDXVHWKHVXUSOXVSD\RIIZLOOEHGLYLGHGZURQJO\EHWZHHQ WKHWZRSDUWLHV'H¿QLWHO\WKHPDUNHWSULFHLVQRWUHDVRQDEOHLQWHUPVRIGHOD\ FRVWFRQVLGHUDWLRQZLWKRXWHPSOR\LQJ1DVKHTXLOLEULXPWKHRU\7KHVXUSOXV SD\RIIFDQEHFKDQJHGEHWZHHQWKHFKDUWHUHUDQGVKLSRZQHULQDFFRUGDQFH ZLWKWKHDJHDQGVL]HRIYHVVHODQGWKHSULFHRIFDUJR7KHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH
259
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
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¶VDQGWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUWRQLQWKHFXUUHQW PDUNHW 2. The Limit of Research ,QFDOFXODWLQJWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VFDUJRGHOD\FRVWSHUGD\WKLVSDSHUSURSRVHV DQLQYHQWRU\FRVWDQGWKHFRVWRIVWRUDJH,QPRVWFDVHVWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VFDUJR GHOD\ORVVFRVWLVOHVVWKDQVKLSRZQHU VGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\7KHUHDVRQ ZK\WKHVKLSRZQHU¶VFRVWLVKLJKHULVWKDWWKHVKLSSULFHLVUHODWLYHO\PRUH H[SHQVLYH+RZHYHULQVSHFLDOVLWXDWLRQVVXFKWKDWWKHFKDUWHUHUKDVWRGHOLYHU FDUJRXUJHQWO\WKHYHVVHOXVHGLVYHU\ROGWKHUHYHUVHUHVXOWPD\RFFXU7KLV VSHFLDOFDVHLVQRWKDQGOHGLQWKHFDVHVWXG\*12)
Acknowledgment 7KLV UHVHDUFK ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH 0.(7KH 0LQLVWU\ RI .QRZOHGJH (FRQRP\ .RUHD XQGHU WKH ,75&,QIRUPDWLRQ 7HFKQRORJ\ 5HVHDUFK &HQWHU VXSSRUW SURJUDP VXSHUYLVHG E\ WKH 1,3$1DWLRQDO ,7 ,QGXVWU\ 3URPRWLRQ$JHQF\ 1, 3$ &
'DWHRI&RQWULEXWLRQ$XJ 'DWHRI$FFHSWDQFH1RY 260
The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions References .2,&+,52 7H]XND ,6+,, 0DVDKLUR ³6WUDWHJLF EHKDYLRU DQG WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIVSRWSULFHVLQVKLSSLQJIUHLJKWPDUNHWV$JDPHWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFK´ ,$0(&RQIHUHQFH3URFHHGLQJV'DOLDQ &25721 /DUV ,+5( 5ROI 6$1'(9$51$UQH Ship Broking and Chartering Practice//3/LPLWHG5HIHUHQFH3XEOLVKLQJ'LYLVLRQ 6723)25'0DUWLQ Maritime Economics3XEOLVKHU5RXWOHGJH8. *$5',1(51LJHO Ship Operating Costs Annual Review and Forecast-2007/08 'UHZU\SXEOLFDWLRQV'UHZU\6KLSSLQJ&RQVXOWDQV/WG %,(50$1 + 6FRWW )(51$1'(= /XLV Game theory with economic applicationsQGHGLWLRQ$GGLVRQ:HVOH\3XEOLVKLQJFRPSDQ\,QF &$6217LPRWK\ 1 5(