The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with ...

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Dec 2, 2010 - CORTON, Lars & IHRE, Rolf & SANDEVARN, Arne(1999), Ship Broking and. Chartering Practice, LLP Limited Reference Publishing Division.
The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics

ƔVolume 26

Number 2

December 2010

pp. 247-261 Ɣ

The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions* 1)

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The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions

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