The Effects of Intragroup Forces on Intergroup Conflict ... - Science Direct

ORGANIZATIONAL BEtIAVIOR AND tIUMAN" PEtlFORMANOE 8, 363--383

(1972)

The Effects of Intragroup Forces on Intergroup Conflict Resolution 1 RICHARD J. KLI?C[OSKI2 The Ohio State University

Forces which are part of a representative's role as he negotiates intergroup disputes were examined in a laboratory experiment. Prenegotiation experience, cohesiveness, and evaluation potential were manipulated in the context of a union management bargaining problem to determine their effect on the length of time needed to reach ,agreement, It was found that the , effects of prenegotiation experience in previous research were likely to be confounded with the latter two independent variables. Further, these variables interact in complex ways to produce longer negotiation times for representatives who faced postnegotiation evaluation by a cohesive group. This study examines the effects of forces impinging upon representatives involved in intergroup negotiations , forces which stem from the representative's relationship with his group. A representative or spokesman is usually thought of as being concerned with the negotiation process itself and in dealing with the influence or pressures from his counterpart at the bargaining table. Yet there is evidence that a negotiator is also affected by the relationship that exists between himself and the group he represents (e.g., Bass, 1966; L a m m & Kogan, 1969; T u r k & Lefcowitz, 1962; Julian & McGrath, 1963; Stevens, 1963; Vidmar, 1971; Walton & MeKersie, 1965). For example, in both Stevens (1963) and Walton and MeKersie, (1965) there is a discussion of intraorganizational bargaining or internal conflict that must be managed successfully before intergroup negotiations can take place. They see the negotiator as the "man in the middle" experiencing a great deal of pressure as he attempts to fulfill a set of performance criteria that are often incongruent. Indeed, this often 1A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 43rd Midwestern Psychological Association Conference, Detroit, MI, 1971. 2This manuscript is based on the author's dissertation which was submitted to the Graduate School of Psychology at Purdue University, 1970. It was supported in part by a grant from the Krannert School of Industrial Administration. I would like to thank D. C. King, M. Patchen, and R. Pritchard (dissertation committee) for their helpful comments and criticisms. I am particularly indebted to H. L. Fromkin (chairman) for his invaluable guidance throughout the research which included a thoughtful review of the present manuscript. I would also like to thank Liz Hawk and Kitty Ball for their help in conducting the research. 363 Copyright © 1972 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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becomes manifest in the difficulty he has in achieving ratification of the agreement that comes out of bargaining. Two views stressing the role of the representative are provided by Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) and McGrath and his associates (e.g., NfcGrath, 1966). Both emphasize the importance of negotiators in reducing intergroup conflict and acknowledge the existence of tension due to demands inherent in the negotiator's role. For Turk and LefcowRz accommodation between representatives is necessary for intergroup coordination but dysfunctional for solidarity within the groups affected since new expectations are required of both sides. To the extent that the members have well-defined expectations, a representative's act of accommodation can be seen as a direct refutation of his group's standards and is likely to produce tension and dissent within his group. This, in turn, reduces a negotiator's power to influence and commit, both with respect to his own group and the other party in the conflict relationship. Similarly, McGrath's tripolar model of the negotiation situation emphasizes that the relationships between the representative and his constituency serve to complicate the negotiator's role and alter his behavior. This model has received support in several studies dealing with a negotiator's perception of the situation (e.g., Vidmar & McGrath, 1965), behavior patterns in negotiator's (e.g., McGrath & Julian, 1962; McGrath, 1966), effectiveness and timing of third party (i.e., mediator) intervention (i.e., ¥idmar, 1971), and group attitude heterogeneity (e.g., Vidmar & McGrath, 1965). These and other studies have determined that a negotiator's representational role obligations are central to the negotiation process. Yet, they have demonstrated the complexities of group forces while only alluding to their actual dynamics. This absence of dynamics is an important deficiency. For in the final analysis, it may be only possible "to understand many aspects of truly intergroup relations through careful examination of the process of representation" (Turk & Lefcowitz, 1962, p. 341). Many forces arise from characteristics of a reference group or from the relationship between a representative and his group which may exert an influence on intergroup conflict resolution. Yet the few studies which have attempted to examine these forces have neglected to control for alternative dynamics which may be responsible for the results. For example, Druckman (1967) felt that if teams in conflict were to adopt a position on crucial issues before negotiations, it would make negotiations more difficult. He was also concerned with the forces on a team representative as compared to a person representing only himself in negotiations. While he attempted to manipulate these factors independ,

INTERGROUP CONFLICT RESOLUTION

365

ently, both appear to be confounded with a third factor of interpersonal attraction or cohesiveness. Indeed, his procedures could have also produced a fourth force involving the dynamics of evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969). This ambiguity also exists in other investigations in this area (e.g., Friedn~lan & Jacka, 1969), and suggests the need for research which controls for key variables. Ideally, an experiment should be performed which manipulates them in a single design. The present study attempts to do this as it investigates three group related phenomena which appear to affect representatives in negotiations. These are: (a) the formulating and adopting of a group position; (b) the existence of high interpersonal attraction between the representative and his group; and (c) the potential for evaluation of the representative's performance. These three variables have been confounded in earlier research, perhaps because they may be in reality difficult to separate. However, they are conceptually distinct and would seem to affect negotiator behavior.

Adopting a Group Position Studies of intergroup relations have demonstrated intense feelings of competition and noncompromise behavior when teams independently adopt a position or group product (Bass, 196,6; Bass & Dunteman, 1963; Blake, 1958, 1959; Blake & Mouton, 1961a, 1961b, 1932a, 1962b; Druckman, 1967, 1968; Kirkpatrick, 1960; Mack & Snyder, 1957). The adoption of a position and the one-sided evaluation that accompanies it is thought to cause distortion of the value of a group's product, the inability to understand an opposing group's position and nonyie]ding in negotiations. Consequently, representatives committed to established positions are less free to act and come to view compromise in negotiation as tantamount to capitulation (Blake, Shepherd, & Mouton, 1964). Two authors who have dealt directly with the effects of formulating a group position on conflict resolution are Bass (1966) and Druckman (1967, 1968). Bass found that when negotiators studied the problem from a bilateral perspective, i.e., from both points of view, and did not adopt a position, compromise was more likely to result. Druekman also supports this notion: when positions or strategies were adopted before bargaining, negotiators were more resistant to compromise than when they merely discussed the issues together or in their own groups during this period, a Yet the two authors do not agree on the existence of unique pressures on representatives; where Bass found it made a difference whether a person was representing himself or a group, Druckman did not. ~owever, this may be due, in part, to the fact that in both research programs subjects knew they were not the sole negotiator for their team, thus allowing a range of interpretations of their role. See also Druckman (1971), ~idmar (1971).

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RICHARD J. KLIMOSKI

While it appears that prenegotiation position adoption does have a consfstent effect on the behavior of group members in negotiations, it is not clear how it affects those who act as the sole representative for their group. The present study examines this effect. On the basis of previous research it would be predicted that representatives w h o came from a group that has adopted position on issues before negotiations will find it more difficult (e.g., take longer) to bargain over these issues.

Negotiator's Attraction to His Group In much of the published research, the effects of adopting a group strategy or position are confounded with forces such as interpersonal attraction arising out of group membership. In these studies, either position adoption or affective commitment to a group could be responsible for nonyielding behavior on the part of negotiators (el., Blake & Mouton, 1962a; Lamm & Kogan, 1969; Bass & Dunteman, 1963; Friedman & Jacka, 1959). For example, Friedman and Jacka (1969) stressed the importance of mutual attraction (cohesiveness) in making negotiators rigid in a bargaining setting where a group position existed. However, their definition of cohesiveness and their procedures make it appear more likely that they were measuring the effects of position adoption. Bass (1966) and Druckman (1967) also acknowledge the importance of commitment to the group as it affects negotiator behavior but do not effectively control for it. Indeed, while Druckman attempted to create team identification he was not satisfied with his procedures, and, in any event, no measure of attraction was taken. 4 The attraction a representative feels for his group may be an important factor in his behavior in negotiations. It is related to the amount of influence the group can and does exert on him (el., Cartwright, 1968; Loft & Loft, 1965). That is, a representative is more likely to abide by the dictates and conform to the goals of a group which he finds attractive. Or, if specific positions are unknown, he should "hold out" to maximize gains for his group. To the extent that group memberships is seen as valuable, it is something one does not casually jeopardize. Consequently, one might expect caution or reticence when such a representative, is faced with the need to compromise in bargaining. There is some evidence that attraction to the group does affect the way members or representatives deal with competitive situations. Mack and 4 The confusion t h a t exists between Cohesiveness and Position Adoption m a y reside in the nature of the p h e n o m e n a themselves. T h a t is, the process of adopting a position m a y also generate cohesiveness, inasmuch as the clarity of a group g0al and the acceptance of these goals have been used as the basis for cohesiveness (Cartwright, 1968). ttowever, there are several ways to conceptualize cohesiveness.


36,7

Snyder (1957) in their review of intergroup conflict, repeatedly emphasize the importance of the "degree of unity and kinds of relationships among members" (p. 245) in understanding and predicting the outcome of negotiations. This point of view supported by Joseph and Willis (1963) and Schelling (1957). Thus, competing individuals find it easier to resolve conflict (Vegas, Frye, & Cassen, cited in Bass, 1966) than representatives of competing groups (e.g., Bass & Dunteman, 1963). Similarly, bias toward a group position is found to be related to attraction to a group independent of position formation (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964) and Vidmar and McGrath (1965) can report "the stronger the attraction of negotiators toward their own reference group . . . the less successful they were in producing a good negotiation solution" (p. 41), a finding consistent with Vidmar's (1971) interpretation of his results. Clearly, forces stemming from cohesiveness seem to be impel%ant and relevant to the understanding of the behavior of group representatives.

Potential ]or Evaluation by the Group (Accountability) In several studies concerned with tile effects of group position adoption on negotiators, procedures are used which make it likely that still another factor is operating. This is the force stemming from accountability and the negotiator's desire to be evaluated positively by those around him, particularly by the group he represents. For example, in a study by Bass (1966), the need to do well in front of colleagues, particularly if they were teammates, may have been an overriding factor in causing difficulty in negotiations. Similarly, Druckman's (1967) procedures for creating team "identification" seem to guarantee that the forces of evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969) would be at work. Additional studies containing examples of this confounding (cf., Friedman & Jacka, 1969) could be cited. Therefore, it is possible that being accountable to others for bargaining performance could have produced some of the above results. There seems to be some support for this accountability phenomena in the literature on leadership. A consistent theme is that elected leaders are more responsive to group pressures than are leaders who come to power by other means. Julian, Hollander, and Regula (1969) found that elected (vs appointed) leaders seem to be faced with more strict or demanding expectations on the part of their group. These expectations, conveyed to the leader in no uncertain terms, could include the possibility of removal from office or expulsion from the group. Support for this notion is found in the works of Blake (1958, 1959), Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965), Lamm and Kogan (1969), Dubin (1962), and Stogdill (1964). Finally, in the actual context of negotiations, Walton and

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RICHARD J . KLIMOSKI

McKersie (1965) and Stevens (1963) note the additional (accountability) forces operating on those union representatives or leaders who must have the contracts they have worked on ratified by their constituency. I t is likely that these forces of evaluation operate in complex ways. For example, to the extent that clear group goals (position adoption) exist, a criterion of negotiation effectiveness also exists. Hence, one would expect that evaluation forces would be stronger (or perhaps only present) under these conditions. A similar interaction with cohesiveness can be suggested. For persons who are highly attracted to their group the possibility of evaluation by the group should increase the total amount of influence that the group can wield over its members. But for those who are not attracted to their group, evaluation should not be as great a concern. In general then, it appears that representatives who perceive that they can be evaluated by, or are accountable to, their group should be more cautious and possibly less flexible in bargaining. However, this should occur most in cases where cohesiveness or clear goals or positions exist within the negotiator's group. In conclusion, the three factors: adopting a position in a group, the negotiator's feeling of attraction to the group, and the potential for his evaluation by group members, appear to be related to noncompromise behavior by representatives involved in intergroup negotiations. METHOD

Subjects Subjects were 240 male undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Purdue University who participated in the experiment as part of an Introductory Psychology course requirement. Subjects were allowed to sign up for an experimental session that fit into their personal schedule. Only information concerning the data and time, a male-only restriction, and session length (2 hr) was given on the sign-up sheet. Eight subjects participated during each experimental session.

Overview of the Design Subiects progressed through the three phases of the study in the following order: an introduction, where perceptions of attitude similarity or dissimilarity were created to produce differing feelings of group cohesiveness (first independent variable) ; a prenegotiation segment where strategy formation was either required or forbidden (second independent variable); and a third phase where expectations or negotiator's accountability were created (third independent variable), and where the actual negotiations took place. During the third phase, behavioral data


369

were collected and served as dependent variables. The experiment may be summarized as a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design with degree of group cohesiveness (high vs low), prenegotiation experience (adopting a strategy or position vs general discussion), and accountability of the negotiator (facing his teammates after negotiations vs not seeing them again) as the independent variables. There were 24 subjects, i.e., 12 pairs of negotiators, randomly assigned to each cell of the design. Procedure At least 2 days before arriving at the experimental session, subjects filled out a self-administered questionnaire that asked for their attitudes and opinions on "a set of important issues facing youth today." Upon arrival for the experiment, each was assigned to one of two four-man teams which were placed in separate rooms. A standardized videotaped introduction was given to both teams which included the nature of the study (a union-management bargaining session), its purpose (to gather information on the bargaining process), and its importance. Subjects were then informed how and why they were assigned to their team (see attraction manipulation below). Lastly, they were given background information and examples of the task. The four-man teams were then randomly assigned, asked to adopt either a union or management position and entered into a 35-rain prenegotiation session (see position adoption manipulations below). A~ the end of this session all subjects opened an envelope, removed and privately filled out a form to evaluate their group experiences. This was immediately collected. Next, subjects began the actual negotiation phase of the study in individual cubicles. In this period it was alleged that only one member from each team was chosen at random to be the team spokesman or representative. While he negotiated a contract with his counterpart, the remaining team members would be working on a related task. In reality, all subjects were spokesmen for their team. At this time postnegotiation events were also described (see accountability manipulation). Instructions on how to conduct the bargaining session were given and a 30-minute time limit was imposed. After this, negotiators lifted a partition that separated them, started an electric stopclock (Standard @MS60) and began negotiating. Each negotiating pair worked face to face but were told to keep on their earphones in order to hear one another and any further instructions from the experimenter. The collective bargaining task in this study was adopted from Druckman (1967, 1968). Similar versions have been used Bass (1966) and Campbell (1960). Each team received four issues to be resolved: wages, off-the-job training, hospital and benefit plan, and paid vacation. These

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RICHARD J.

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could be dealt with in any order, no ranking of importance was specified. Starting positions and possible compromises were listed for each issue. For each compromise, the estimated cost to the "company" for a contract's duration was indicated. Subjects were given videotaped instructions and an example of how to deal with this information (see Klimoski, 1970, for a more complete discussion of the task). The representatives from each team had up to 30 min to settle the four issues in order to achieve a signed contract. This time was divided into 5-min intervals each representing a 24-hr period. In order to make the given time more realistic, each period of negotiation was made costly to both sides in terms of lost wages or profits. In order for a contract to be settled, agreement must have reached on each of the four issues. If all four issues were not resolved in the 30-rain period, a deadlock was declared and negotiations were over. In either event, after 30 rain subjects were asked to complete a "negotiation reaction" questionnaire.

Independent Variables G~'oup cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness is defined in the present study as the amount of interpersonal attraction that exists among members of a group. Several procedures were used to induce cohesiveness. First, based on: the extensive literature establishing a relationship between attitude similarity and attraction (cf., Byrne, 1968), relative differences in feelings of cohesiveness were created by allowing subjects to believe they held attitudes that were quite similar or not at all similar to their teammates on a number of social issues (cf., Baron & Kepner, 1970; Baron, 1970). Ostensibly, previous research showed that teammates with similar attitudes like each other and get along well together. Consequently, falsified results of a computer grouping technique was used to produce teams that, under High Cohesive conditions, reflected "unusually good matching" and under Low Cohesive conditions was "not able to perform a good match" (see Klimoski, 1970, for complete procedures). In this way expectations of attraction were created which were likely to affect subjects' perception of their teammates and the nature of their interaction. Second, prior to prenegotiation discussion phase subjects in High Cohesive groups were asked to introduce themselves to their team and to write their first names on a card tha~ would be visible to their team. During this time subjects in the Low Cohesive conditions were told to sit quietly. Immediately after the prenegotiation discussion, subjects privately filled out a short questionnaire which included two items that asked for an evaluation of fellow teammates. Information about these evaluations was offered to each subject just before he actually negotiated and while he was isolated. A subject in the High- Cohesiveness condition was told that,

I N T E R G R O U P CONFLICT RESOLUTION

371

consistent with expectations and based on the team's responses, his group got along very well and indeed, team members liked one another quite a bit. Conversely, a subject i n the Low Cohesiveness condition was told that there was very little liking among team members in his group, hence he was told, as predicted, low interpersonal attraction existed in his team. In fact, the rating forms were not reviewed at this time. Relying on a state of "pluralistic ignorance" (i.e., no one person knowing the true feelings of the others) subjects were given the feedback appropriate to their condition of their responses. ~, Prenegotiation discussion. Following Druckman (1967), subiects w.ere placed in one of two conditions. Under Position Adoption conditions: subjects in teams of four were given 25 minutes to discuss the issues facing them from either a union or a management point of view. During this time they were required to formulate a team position (e.g., maximum and minimum demands) and a strategy (the means of achieving a given outcome, rationale , arguments, etc.) which would be "specific enough to guide a spokesman in negotiations with the other team." These were written down by one member of the group (person in position A) on a special ,Group Position Sheet" which was passed to each group member for his inspection at the end of the session. Under general discussion conditions subjects were told, during the 25-rain period, to discuss the issues informally among themselves in order to gain a "better perspective of the situation facing them." They were not allowed to formulate specific strategies or positions and could not write anything down. , Evaluation~accountability. Immediately before they entered into bargaining subjects in the No Evaluation condition were told that because of time restrictions they would not meeting with the their team again. They were to pass the results of their bargaining to the experimenter. This would not be made available to their teammates. Under Evaluation conditions, subjects were told when they finished bargaining they were to bring the results of their efforts back to their team where they would present them as in a report. Following this, team members were to rate them on :effectiveness. In addition, team members would vote as to whether they would ever want them as a negotiator or spokesmen under any other circumstances.

Dependent Variables Time to complete a contract. The primary dependent variable was the amount of time needed to agree on a contract. It was assumed that the amount of time required to settle a contract reflected the ease or difficulty of bargaining. The more time needed, the more difficult the conflict resolu-

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RICHARD J.

KLIMOSKI

tion (ef., Druckman, 1967). Moreover, difficulty in reaching agreement was felt to be a result of noncompromise behavior or rigidity on the part of one or both negotiatiors (cf., Blake & Mouton, 1961a, 1961b). Number of deadlocks. Subjects were given up to 30 rain in which to settle a contract. If subjects failed to agree on all four issues in this period, a deadlock was declared.

Manipulation Checks Included in the negotiations reactions questionnaire were items probing the subjects' perception of the experimental situation. In addition, the two items from the rating form administered prior to the negotiation session which were used to strengthen the cohesiveness induction were also used to determine the success of the cohesiveness manipulation.

Debriefing At the end of each session, subjects were involved in a discussion of the experiment. The true nature of the study, the need for and nature of the deception used and specific experimental predictions were disclosed. Questions were answered and the relevance of the study to the subject and the larger society was explained. RESULTS

E f/ectiveness of Manipulations All subiects completed a "Negotiations Reactions" questionnaire at the end of their experimental session. Items to assess subjects' reactions to and perceptions of the experimental situation were included in this form. Separate three-way analyses of variance were performed on the data from each of these items. Attraction to the group. Several items were used to determine the extent to which subjects in the High Cohesive conditions (HiCo) felt more attracted to their teammates. Immediately after the interaction in the prenegotiation session, but before negotiations, subjects were asked to indicate, on a 40-point scale: (1) "How much did you like your teammates," and (2) "How much did you enjoy working with your teammates?" Analysis of variance yielded significant cohesiveness main effects for each item. Subjects under HiCo conditions preferred their teammates more (i~ = 32.74) than those under LoCo (X = 27.07) conditions IF = 28.22, p < .001], and enjoyed working with them more [HiCo mean-33:23 vs LoCo mean = 28.45; F = 19.50, p < .001]. Other items were used to check the effect of manipulation of cohesiveness. Compared ~o LoCo subjects, those under HiCo conditions gave significantly different

INTERGROUP

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

373

responses in that they: would more like to be a member of the same group in a continuing study [X = 28.30 vs )~ = 23.22; F = 9.74, p < .002]; couldn't have done a better job choosing group members IX = 24.12 vs 19.64; F = 11.04, p < .001] ; had a greater desire to work with their teammates on another -task [:~ = 27.65 vs 22.22; F = 29.37, p .001]. I t appears that the cohesiveness manipulation was perceived as intended. Evaluation~accountability. Subjects were asked "how much of the results or outcome of your bargaining will be known to your team?" and responded on a 40-point scale anchored "none of i t " - " a l l of it." Subjects in the Evaluation Possible conditions indicated that more (X 33.30) of the results of their negotiation would be known to their team than those in No Evaluation conditions IX = 19141; F = 89.36, p < .001]. Another item requested subjects to indicate on a scale ranging from "no opportunity" to "plenty of opportunity" the amount of opportunity their group would have to say how successful their bargaining was. Evaluation Possible groups (X = 31.31) indicated greater opportunity than No Evaluation groups IX = 16.24; F = 150.6, p < .001]. Using the same scale as the previous item, a third item asked "will your team have the opportunity to rate your performance?" Evaluation Possible groups (X = 30.43) stated that their team would have more opportunity to rate their performance than No Evaluation groups [X = 14.72; F = 131.32, p < .001]. It appears t h a t the potential for evaluation manipulation was perceived as intended. Prenegotiation discussion. The procedures used by this study to manipulate prenegotiation discussion activities were taken from D r u c k m a n (1967). As noted earlier, it was expected to contain several components which could affect negotiator behavior, e.g., group agreement or consensus, personal position adoption or personal commitment. Subjects were asked to indicate "how much agreement existed among your group members as to what position a representative of y o u r team should take in bargaining?" on a 40-point scale with end points labeled "no agreement at all" and "complete agreement." The summary of an analysis of variance using the data from this item is reported in Table 1. The analysis of variance yielded only three significant effects. A Cohesiveness (attraction) main effect revealed that subjects who were more attracted to their teammates saw greater consensus (:~ = 30.66) among their teammates than those who were not IX = 26.88; F = 12.37, p < .001]. A Position Adoption main effect revealed t h a t subiects in Position Adoption conditions perceived greater agreement on a team position (X = 30.59) than those in the general discussion groups [X = 26.94; F = 11.57~ p < .001]. A two-way interaction Position Adoption

374

RICHARD

ANALYSIS

oF

J. I(LIMOSKI

TABLE 1 SUMMARY F O R THE AMOUNT

VARIANCE

ON

A

OF

AGREEMENT

GROUP POSITION

Source

df

Attraction (A) Prenegotiation discussion (B) Evaluation (C) AX B AX C B X C AXB X C Error (within)

1 1 1 1

1 1 i

184

MS

F

686.30 641.67 22.01 312.63 3,26 .88 97.76 55.48

12.37 b 11.57 b .40 5.64 ~ .06 .02 1.76

ap < .05. bp < .01. and Cohesiveness was also found. A post hoc analysis of the means for the AB interaction plotted in Fig. 1 is reported in Table 2. It reveals that high cohesive manipulations (which involved attitude similarity) or position adoption experience tends to produce perceptions of consensus and unanimity and that only under conditions of low interpersonal attraction do the general discussion produce less agreement. In addition to perceived agreement, personal position adoption was another component of the manipulation. An A N O V A was performed on responses from a questionnaire item that asked subjects to indicate "on how m a n y issues did you personally take a position before you entered negotiations?" with scale values which ranged from zero (no issues) to ATTRACTION

52

-

HIGH

-

------

LOW

5O 'k

hJ

X k k \ X X

g N 24

N \ k \ I.

22

0

I GENERAL DISCUSSION PRE-NEGOTIATION EXPERIENCE

POSITION ADOPTION

FIG. I. The significant interaction (p < .02) of attraction and experience on degree of agreement on team position.

prenegotiation

375


TABLE 2 ~/[EANS FOR AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT ON A GI~OUP POSITION Prenegotiation experience

Attraction

High Low

Position adoption

General discussion

31.21a~ 29.98~

30.10~ 23.775

Entries sharing a common subscript do not differ significantly (p < .05) using Duncan new multiple range test. four (all of them). No significant differences were noted. In fact, despite instructions, subjects in both Position Adoption and General Discussion conditions personally adopted positions on at least half the issues involved (_~ = 2.48 and 2.65, respectively). Another item requested subjects to "indicate how committed you felt to any positions that you or your team took before negotiation?" on a 40-point response scale ranging from "extremely committed" to "not at all committed." The data indicate that subjects in neither condition felt particularly committed (overall mean = 26.37) to the position they adopted. No significant differences were found on this item. Thus, regardless of instructions, subjects under both conditions personally adopted a position on several issues while not committing themselves to these issues to any great degree. Based on these items, three points might be noted. First, the replication of Druckman's procedures in this study for General Discussion conditions does not prevent personal position adoption by subiects. Second, manipulations for Position Adopting do not in themselves, contain elements of commitment. Finally, as suggested earlier, the data indicate that one cannot easily separate cohesiveness and perceptions of agreement or consensus. In the present study manipulated cohesiveness lead to perceptions of position agreement as well. While in fact the reverse may operate just as effectively where manipulations of agreement (cf., Friedmank&-Jacka, 1969) may produce cohesiveness. Ancillary findings. In this study all subjects were randomly assigned to a union or management team position. In the postnegotiations questionnaire they were asked, "How well did your assigned position as union or management in the study coincide with your own general beliefs and attitudes?" and responded on a 40-point scale with end points "completely coincided/not at all." All subjects felt that the assigned position was reasonably consistent with their orientation (overall iX = 24.30). An analysis of variance was performed using this item as

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RICHARD J. KLIMOSKI TABLE 3 C E L L I-V~EANS FOR THE AMOUNT OF TIME NEEDED TO NEGOTIATE

Evaluation Possible

Not possible

Prenegotiation experience

Position adoption

General discussion

Position adoption

General discussion

Attraction High Low

25.58 22.56

25.41 20.56

21.22 20.86

18.85 21.88

a dependent variable and yielded no significant (p < .05) effects. A similar analysis of a 40-point item asking "Indicate the degree to which you wanted your team to come out favorably in negotiations,"--"very much/not at all"--yielded a positive response from all negotiators (overall X = 33). ~ o systematic differences were associated with the independent variables. Similarly, an item responded to immediately after the prenegotiation session that asked the subject "How successful do you feel your team would be in negotiations?"--"completely unsuccessful/completely successful." The responses to this item also are not systematically related to the manipulations. Thus, it appears that independent variable manipulations did not produce differential acceptance of assigned positions or different levels of expected success. Dependent variable. The primary dependent variable used in this study was the amount of time required for each pair of negotiators (or dyad) to settle a contract. It was assumed that because time was costly, greater TABLE 4 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR AMOUNT OF TIME USED TO NEGOTIATE ANOVA Summary Source

df

MS

F

Attraction (A) Prenegotiation discussion (B) Evaluation (C) A X B A X C B X C AXB X C Error (within)

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 184

40.47 18.49 191.28 3.66 166.56 .98 40.94 40.91

.99 .45 4.684 .09 4.07 ~ .02 1.00

~p < .05.


377

time would reflect increased difficulty in reaching agreement on the involved issues in the task. A three-way analysis of variance performed on the mean decision times yielded only two ( p ~ .05) significant effects. A summary of this analysis is reported in Tables 3 and 4. From this summary it can be seen that only two effects were significant. :Negotiators who faced evaluation (X = 23.53) by their teams were more resistant to compromise than those who did not IX = 20.70; F = 4.68, p ~ .05]. However, inspection of the significant IF--4.07, p ~ .05] Cohesiveness × Evaluation interaction for negotiation time indicates that this was true only for those subjects who were attracted to their teammates (see Figure 2). For these subjects the possibility for evaluation by their group causes them to spend significantly more time working out a settlement than when no evaluation exists IX = 23.53 vs 20.70; F = 4.37, p ~ .05]. There were no significant main effects due to either the position adoption factor or the attraction factor. That is, whether or not groups nominally adopted a position had little effect on negotiation time. Similarly, negotiators who were attracted to their group did not differ appreciably in the amount of time spent from those who were not as attracted to their group. Another measure of difficulty in negotiating is the number of negotiating pairs who actually do not settle their differences before the maximum time limit occurs, i.e., the number of deadlocks. A chi-square analysis using number of deadlocks as a dependent variable yielded no significant differences due to experimental treatments. In fact the number of deadlocks were small only occurring in 10 pairs out of 96. In summation, after examining the impact of the independent variables on the behavior of pairs of subjects as they bargained, the evaluation factor as it interacts with Cohesiveness appears prepotent, leading to more time in bargaining. With regard to the amount of time used, subjects who faced the possibility of evaluation by their group took more time 26 EVALUATION - POSSIBLE "~POSS[BLE

24 Ld 22

t.~. I

f

HIGH LOW ATTRACTIONTOTHEGROUP FIa. 2. The significant interaction (p ~ .05) of attraction and evaluation oil time to negotiate.

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KLIMOSKI

only .if they were attracted to their group while those who did not face the possibility of rejection took significantly less time in negotiations. DISCUSSION This study examined the competitive nature of forces that operate on group representatives as they negotiate. Previous research identified primary influences stemming from the process of Position Adoption prior to negotiations. However, under conditions replicated in the present study it appears that the situation is more complex and includes confounds of other factors that may account for some of the results obtained. Contrary to Druekman (1967), Bass (1966), and others, the present findings show that position adoption process in and of itself as it leads to preceived consensus may be of minor importance. Instead, it is the increased cohesiveness or positive affect that becomes generated under these circumstances that influences negotiator behavior. Similarly, several o~her studies (e.g., Friedman & Jacka~ 1969) have used procedures which contain elements on accountability. According to the present data, accountability forces are particularly powerful and may have both direct and indirect consequences for behavior. Thus, feelings of attraction based on agreement or accountability may be the relevant forces reported Position Adoption effects. Additional support for this view comes from the fact that despite the relatively low levels of reported commitment to positions taken which occurred in the study (and positions were taken by most subiects prior to negotiation), significant differences in negotiator behavior were found. Given minimal commitment to the values reflected in the positions adopted,, the greater time used by the High Attraction/Evaluation Possible negotiators could reflect a process of public compliance (Kelman, 1958). Because of perceptions of competition surrounding the task, perhaps due to public stereotypes of union/management negotiations, most negotiators saw their job as to hold out for the best terms. But the effect of this perception is relative. Groups in the High Attraction-Evaluation Possible conditions were in the best position to monitor and punish negotiators who didn't do a "good" iob (i.e., hold out). Not only was the group cohesive, exerting influence over its members, but the group would have an opportunity to evaluate the group member-negotiator, to be able to use this influence to reward or punish him for successful or unsuccessful negotiations. Consequently, this could cause them to take more time. This was indeed the ease. That is, although a "good" solution should include consideration of the cost incurred to both sides because of the time needed to negotiate, these negotiators held out longer. Conversely, negotiators who were attracted to their teams b u t did not face the. possibility of evaluation, according to a "time" criterion, were more effective for their teams. They were able to achieve a settled contract in less time, ap-


379

parently not responding to their team's expectation to hold out. Thus, the various forms of nonrational and emotional behavior characteristic of groups in conflict (cf., Blake et al., 1964) also existed in the present study, inasmuch as a partisan perspective or lack of flexibility was likely to inhibit compromise under conditions of evaluation and greater cohesiveness. While there are these clear differences in the amount of time needed to negotiate, the outcome of bargaining, i.e., the "quality" of a settled contract did not vary greatly across conditions. Analysis of the settled contracts indicates that negotiating pairs, on the average across the four issues to be resolved, agreed on a position at the midpoint of the scale representing each issue. This is, final contract outcomes favored neither the union nor the company. This equality of outcome may be a function of the balanced set of forces operating on each negotiator in a bargaining pair; they experienced the same combination of independent variable manipulations prior to negotiations. Another possible explanation is that the American "split-the-difference" tradition was operating. However, it took some negotiating pairs more time and effort to reach this point than others. What is needed is more research to unravel the many implications of the present study for negotiations between groups. Regardless of the actual contribution of specific forces, the present data suggest that they are bound up in complex ways. Forces stemming from Position Adoption, Cohesiveness, or Evaluation were found salient in ad hoc laboratory groups, they should be even more powerful in continuing relationship involving episodic conflict (cf., Pondy, 1969). For example, situations of intraorganizational or lateral conflict between functional departments of organizations (e.g., sales and production), conflict between labor and ,management groups, between university administrators and student groups, etc., will all produce these forces. Indeed, perhaps it is because of this that effective negotiators must resort to a number of tactics to reduce their influence (cf., Stevens, 1963; Walton & 1VieKersie, 1965; Turk & Lefcowitz, 1962). Based on the present study, several suggestions might be made. For examp]¢, given the existence of group forces, it may be advantageous to rely less::on the personal abilities of the negotiator to deal with them and more on a restructuring of the negotiator's role. That is, perhaps there should be a greater reliance on third-party agents (cf., Pruitt & Johnson, 1970; Walton, 1967; Walton, Button, & Cafferty, 1969) in mediating, or more likely arbitrating intergroup disputes. Then, negotiators could be ~reated as the partisan advocates that group pressures cause them tO be. Thus, the strength of their case would rest more on the data they could muster and present to a (presumably) neutral third party than on the

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RICHARD J. KLIlYIOSKI

magnitude of emotion that could be maintained. Concessions made in this context would relieve negotiators any sense of personal weakness, i.e., perhaps "mediation provides the negotiator a face-saving device whereby he can retreat without feeling he has capitulated" (Pruitt & Johnson, 1~70, p. 246). At the level of the group and its representative, other changes might serve to reduce pressures stemming from the group. For example, there is some evidence that limiting the role of the group in the actual negotiations, from prenegotiation discussion to the observation of negotiations, will reduce the pressure on representatives (McKersie, Perry, & Walton, 1965). However, just what part the constituency should play in the bargaining process is still unsettled and seems to depend on the focus of the writer and whether he is intent on reducing the pressures on representatives (e.g., Turk & Lefcowitz, 1962) or guaranteeing the rights of the constituency (Katz, 1959). And, looking at the representative himself, research on the ability of persons to resist group pressure (e.g., from cohesiveness) suggests that persons who are highly esteemed (possessing "expert" or "referent" power) may make effective representatives. They would have greater freedom to deviate from group expectations because their behavior has rewarded the group in the past (cf., Hollander, 1958; Hollander, 1960). A real question exists however, as to how far "idiosyncrasy credit" can take a person representing a group in a conflict situation that is continuous, or at least episodic. However, in summary, what is clear is the fact that group identification and negotiator accountability in such conflict situations are important forces to be considered and must be dealt with in order to create a milieu that is more conducive to agreement. This study demonstrates the importance of these forces as they affect the ease with which group representatives negotiate. While such forces have been recognized in anecdote and in the few tentative models of intergroup conflict resolution that exist, they have not been the obiect of such experimental research. One possible reason for this is the complexity with which these forces operate, a fact the present study can support. However, by recognizing their existence and b y independent manipulation, research can be designed that will ultimately lead to a better understanding of intergroup conflict. The key to this understanding may indeed lie in the intricate relationship that binds a representative to his group. REFERENCES BARo~¢, R. A. Attraction toward the model and model's competence as determinants of adult imitative behavior. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology~ 1970, 14, 4, 345-351.


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BARON, 1%. A., & KEPNER, C. 1%. Models behavior and attraction toward the model as determinants of adult aggressive behavior. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14, 4, 335-344. BAss, B. M. Effects on the subsequent performance of negotiators of studying issues or planning strategies alone or in groups. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 1966, 80 (6, Whole No. 614). BASS, B. M., & DUNTEMAN, G. Biases in the evaluation of one's own group, its allies and opponents. Journal o/ Conflict Resolution~ 1963, 7, 16-20. BLAKE, 1%. Heroes and traitors--two patterns of representing groups in a competitive situation. International Journal o/Sociometry, 1958. BLAKE, R. 1%. Psychology and the crisis of statesmanship. American Psychologist, 1959, 15, 87-94. BLAKE, 1%. 1%., & MOUTON, J. S. Comprehension of our and of outgroup position under intergroup competition. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1961, 5, 304-310. (a) BLAKE, l~. 1~., & MOUTON, J. S. Loyalty of representatives to ingroup positions during intergroup competition. Sociometry, 1961 24, 177-183. (b) BLAb, R. R., & MOUTON, J. S. The intergroup dynamics of win lose conflict and problem-solving collaboration in union-management relations. In M. Sherif (Ed.), Intergroup relations and leadership. New York: Wiley, 1962. Pp. 94-140. (a) BLAb, 1%. 1%., & MOUTON, J. S. Overevaluation of our group's product in intergroup competition. Journal o/Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 64, 237-238. (b) BLAKE, 1%. i~., SHEPARD,H. A., ~Z MOUTON, J. S. Managing intergroup conflict in industry. Houston, T X : Gulf Publishing Company, 1964. BVaNE, D. Attitudes and attraction. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. IV. New York: Academic Press, 1969. Pp. 35-89, CAMPBELL,1%. J. Originality in group productivity: III. Partisan commitment and productive independence in a collective bargaining situation. The Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1960. CARTW~IG~T, D. The nature of group cohesiveness.. In Cartwright & Zander (Eds.), Group dynamics. (3rd ed.) New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Pp. 91-109. DRUCKMAN, D. Dogmatism, pre-negotiation experience and simulated group representation as determinants of dyadic behavior in a bargaining situation. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 279-290. DRUCK~AN, D. Prenegotiation experience and dyadic conflict resolution in a bargaining situation. Journal o] Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 367-383. DRUCKMAN, D. On the effects of group representation. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 18~ 2, 273-274. DUBIN, 1%. Leadership in union-management relations as an intergroup system. In M. Sherif (Ed.), Intergroup relations and leadership. New York: Wiley, 1962. PERGUSON, C. K., • KELLEY,H. H. Significant factors in overevaluation of owngroup's product. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 223-228. FRmD~AN, M. I., & JACXA, M. E. The negative effect of group cohesiveness on intergroup negotiation. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25(1), 181-194. HOLLANDER,E. P. Conformity, status and idiosyncrasy credit. Psychological Review, 1958, 65, 117-127. HOLLAlVDER,E. P. Competence and conformity in the acceptance of influence. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 365369. JosEPh, M., & WmLIS, 1%. An experimental analog of two-party bargaining. Behavioral Science, 1963, 8~ 117-127.

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JULIAN, J. W., HOLLANDER,E. P., & REGVLA, C. R. Endorsement of the group spokesman as a function of his source of authority, competence, and success. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11(1), 42-49. JVLIA~, J. W., & MCGRATH, J. E. The influence o] leader and member behavior on the adjustment and task effectiveness o] negotiation groups. Technical Report 17, Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1963. KATZ, D. Consistent reactive participation of group me.tubers and reduction of intergroup conflict. Journal o/ Conflivt Resolution, 1959, 3, 28-40. ~4~ELMAN, I-I. Compliance, identification and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1958, 2, 51-60. KIRK~ATRICX, I. Open covenants~but unopenly arrived at. New Yor]~ Times Magazine, May 15, 1960, 19, 108-109. •LIMOSKI, R. J. Intragroup forces and intergroup conflict resolution. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Purdue University, Lafayette, IN, 1970. LAM~, It., & t(OGAN, N. Risk taldng in the context of intergroup negotiation. Research Bulletin 69-35. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ, 1969. LOTT, A. J., & LOTT, B. E, GI:oup cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: A review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 64(4), 259-39, McGuAT~, J. E., A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation. In P~. Bowers (Ed.), Studies on behavior in organizations. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, !966, Pp. 101-134. MCGRAT~, J. E., & J~LIAN, J. W. Negotiation and conflict: An experimental study. Technical Report No. 16, Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1962. MCKERSIE, R. B., PERRY, C. :P~., & WALTON, 1:~. E. Intraorganizational bargaining in labor negotiations. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9, 4, 463=-481. MACK,-R. W., & SNYDER, 1~. C. The analysis of social conflict--toward an overview and synthesis. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1957, 1(2), 212-248. PONDY, L. (Ed.), Conflict within and between organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1969, 14, 4. : PUUITT, D. G., & JoHNson, D: F. Mediation as an aid to face saving i n negotiation. Journal o] Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14, 3, 239-246. ROSENBERe, M. J. The conditions and consequences of evaluation apprehension. In R. R osenthal & 1~. Rosnow (Eds.), Arti]act in behavioral research. New York: Academic Press, 1969. . . . . . SAWYER,J., & GVETZKOW, 1~. Bargaining and negotiation in international relations. In tI. C. I