The importance of survival units for Norbert Elias's ... - SAGE Journals

The importance of survival units for Norbert Elias’s figurational perspective

Lars Bo Kaspersen and Norman Gabriel Abstract In this paper, we argue that Norbert Elias’s concept of survival unit is a distinctive part of the development of his figurational sociology and one of the most consistent contributions to relational thinking. The survival unit is a particular form of figuration which provides security and the material foundations for life such as food and shelter. Every human being is born into a survival unit. This unit is a relational concept which cannot be conceived outside a relationship with other survival units. By introducing the concept of survival unit Elias overcomes one of the key problems in relational sociology: how to demarcate primary social relations. Elias argues that human societies from very early on have been divided into survival units. These survival units are demarcated and constituted in their relationship to other survival units. Consequently, their boundaries are generated in a confrontation with other survival units. This relationship can be peaceful or conflict ridden but in the last resort it can end with violent confrontation. Only the survival unit with the ability to defend a domain of sovereignty will survive. This observation places Elias among the few sociologists with an understanding of the role of warfare in social relationships.

Introduction Norbert Elias (1897–1990) was a sociologist who was particularly dedicated to developing a relational sociology throughout his whole career. This paper will explore some of the strengths of Elias’s relational perspective. The structure of the paper is as follows: we begin by discussing the relational perspective and the unresolved problems and challenges faced by sociologists who wish to adopt relational thinking. Here we use the often quoted article ‘A Relational Manifesto’ by Mustafa Emirbayer which has been important in recent debates on relational theory (1997).1 We then explain Elias’s figurational approach, arguing that this approach is an important step forward in providing answers to the issues raised by Emirbayer and the basis for his major contribution to sociology. And lastly, we draw attention to some of the tensions in Elias’s own thinking about the development of survival units. The Sociological Review, 56:3 (2008) © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, 02148, USA.

The importance of survival units

Relational sociology The majority of social scientists conceive the social world as consisting ‘primarily in substances or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding relations’ (Emirbayer, 1997: 281). A whole range of sociological theory is embedded in rational-actor and norm-based models, functionalism, structuralism, statistical ‘variable’ analyses – all theories in which the entities are seen as prior to relations. As Emirbayer points out the alternative is a relational perspective that depicts ‘the social’ as dynamic, continuous and processual (1997: 281). What can a relational perspective offer? According to Emirbayer there is a fundamental shift from pre-given units and their pre-given attributed properties to a perspective in which ‘the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction’ (1997: 287). The transaction or relational process becomes the point of departure for analysis. By quoting Cassirer, Emirbayer emphasizes that things are not assumed as independent existences present anterior to any relation, but . . . again their whole being . . . first in and with the relations which are predicated of them. Such ‘things’ are terms of relations, and as such can never be ‘given’ in isolation but only in ideal community with each other’ (Cassirer, 1953: 36 – quoted from Emirbayer, 1997: 287). Emirbayer argues that relational theorists reject that we can posit discrete pre-given units such as individuals and society as the point of departure for a sociological analysis. Individuals, persons, or organization are inseparable from their relational context. They are always embedded in social relations and, consequently, they are not substances stepping into a relationship but they are elements which are articulated and constituted in social relations. This shift of perspective has a number of implications. A relational perspective leads to a reconstruction of our key concepts. These concepts are no longer conceived as a pre-defined entity. They must be redefined as relational concepts which imply that they are constituted in a process or in a process of ‘structuration’. In other words, a concept such as society is dissolved from being conceived as an ‘autonomous, internally organized, self-sustaining system with naturally bounded, integrated, sovereign entities as national states or countries’ (Emirbayer, 97: 294) to ‘a diversity of intersecting networks of social interaction’ (Mann, 1986: 16).2 A corollary of this theoretical and methodological shift implies that our concepts need to be redefined as relational concepts and processes and so it becomes more difficult to begin our analysis. How do we demarcate our unit of study? How do we apply our concepts? If there is no longer a clearly demarcated entity such as society which hitherto has provided us with a framework for our analysis, how do we know how to ‘draw lines across relational webs possessing no clearcut natural boundaries’ (Emirbayer, 1997: 303). © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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Lars Bo Kaspersen and Norman Gabriel

As Emirbayer points out the problem of boundary setting also raises some ontological questions (1997: 304). If we can demarcate a set of social relations – a matrix of transactions in Emirbayer’s terminology – with borders, how does one characterize what is inside the boundary? What sort of ontological status do we give to this ‘entity’? Do we regard it as a ‘substance’, an ‘entity’, or a ‘thing’?3 We might end up in the position we attempted to avoid. We agree with Emirbayer that in most relational social theory there are a couple of unaddressed problems concerning the demarcation of social relations and the problem of the primary unit or ‘entity’. These problems are addressed by Norbert Elias, but surprisingly he is only briefly mentioned by Emirbayer. We argue that Elias’s concept of survival units, conceived as a processual structure – or in Elias’s terminology a figuration – is a sophisticated answer to the problems raised by Emirbayer. Elias carefully develops the concept of survival unit or more precisely the relationship between survival units as a point of departure for his sociological perspective. We will argue that the survival unit should be seen as a figuration which does not exist prior to the processes in which it is always involved. These very processes in a social relationship define and constitute this very ‘entity’. Now we will turn to Elias’s version of relationalism.

From homo clausus to figurations: Elias’s version of relational sociology Elias drew upon thinkers such as Simmel, Cassirer and Mannheim to produce an alternative to the sociology that dominated the first part of the twentieth century such as Marxism, functionalism, phenomenology,Weberian theories of social action and Durkheimian theories (Kilminster, 1993; Kilminster and Wouters, 1995). He was critical of most key concepts in social theory such as individual, society, power, structure and action, developing an alternative vocabulary with concepts such as figuration, power-ratio, process, habitus, network, web and interdependence. As an example we can mention his critique of Weber’s notion of the individual and his methodological individualism (Elias, 1978: 116–118). The human individual is regarded as a homo clausus – a closed box.The individual seems like a ‘completely self-reliant adult, forming no relationships and standing quite alone’ (Elias, 1978: 118). In The Civilizing Process he writes The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who ultimately exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the image of human beings in general. Every other human being is likewise seen as a homo clausus; his core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including every other human being (2000: 472). 372

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Elias’s response to this problem of the closed individual is again stated in The Civilizing Process: The image of the human being as a “closed personality” is here replaced by the image of the human being as an “open personality” who possesses a greater or lesser degree of relative (but never absolute and total) autonomy vis-à-vis other people and who is, in fact, fundamentally oriented towards and dependent on other people throughout his or her life. The network of interdependencies among human beings is what binds them together. Such interdependencies are the nexus of what is here called the figuration, a structure of mutually oriented and dependent people. Since people are more or less dependent on each other first by nature and then through social learning, through education, socialization, and socially generated reciprocal needs, they exist, one might venture to say, only as pluralities, only in figurations (2000: 481–482). The innovative concept of figuration is also an attack on and replacement for other concepts such as actor, society and system as long as these concepts retain their character as substantives and refer to isolated objects in a state of rest (Elias, 1978: 118). The concept of system is further criticized for indicating harmony and integration. It originates in the notion of organism and the idea of equilibriums and harmony. Systems tend to overemphasize the harmonious aspect of human relationships, ignoring conflicts. Power is another related concept which is reconceptualized from a reified concept to a relational concept. Most often power is conceived as a substance, an object which can be possessed. Elias prefers to discuss power as power-ratios. According to van Krieken this is also an attempt to transcend another dichotomy – the problem of freedom and determinism. From Elias’s discussion of homo clausus it is clear that no human being can possess absolute autonomy or freedom (van Krieken, 1998: 55–57). Autonomy and freedom have to be seen in relation to the web of interdependencies in which human beings always find themselves. We always find ourselves caught up in a figuration which provides us with opportunities and constraints. In order to properly understand our constraints and opportunities we must understand ‘the shifting balances of tensions’ or power-ratios. Human beings are always embedded in these figurations which take different forms and contain different power-ratios. A figuration is dynamic and it changes all the time as a consequence of unplanned processes, unintended consequences and human purposeful and planned activities. In The Civilizing Process Elias states that from the interweaving of countless individual interests and intentions – whether tending in the same direction or in divergent and hostile directions – something comes into being that was planned and intended by none of © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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these individuals, yet has emerged nevertheless from their intentions and actions. And really this is the whole secret of social figurations, their compelling dynamics, structural regularities, their process character and their development (2000: 312). The key elements in Elias’s version of a relational sociology can be summarized as an understanding of social life as the planned and unplanned, intended and unintended outcomes of human purposeful action. Human beings are social beings always embedded in figurations which are interdependent webs and networks which are always moving, changing and developing. In other words, Elias focuses on relations, processes and change in figurations rather than on static structures and states. So far we have provided a brief presentation of Elias’s relational sociology and his key concept, figuration. Does Elias overcome some of the main problems in relational sociology? Does he for example avoid substantialism? Why do humans bond? Is it a human attribute? Is it a property located in each and every individual? We will argue that Elias does not fall into the substantialist trap. He develops a consistent and relational framework. Elias discusses affective bonds and in his critique of Parsons emphasizes that it is often forgotten that each person’s striving for gratification is directed towards other people from the very outset. Nor is gratification itself derived entirely from one’s own body – it depends a great deal on the other people too. Indeed this is one of the universal interdependencies which bind people together (Elias, 1978: 134–35). Our next issue concerns the important contribution of Elias’s relational sociology. As several scholars have pointed out aspects of Elias’s sociological relationalism can be found elsewhere, for example, in Dewey and Bentley’s work (see van Krieken, 1998: 75–76; Dewey and Bentley, 1949). Although this is accurate we find Elias’s attempt to rethink all sociological categories from a relational point of view to be much more consistent.

Survival units as key figurations Why are human beings bonded to one another? In his discussion of figurations and human interdependencies, Elias addresses the problem of human social bonds. Human beings are always bonded to each other, they always exist in interweaving social relations and they can never be seen as isolated closed entities. Elias identifies various affective and sexual bonds as being important but he does not reduce human bonding to sexual or emotional needs (1978: 134–136). Subsequently, he argues that besides interpersonal bonds people are connected by symbols to larger units, ‘to coats of arms, to flags and to 374



emotionally-charged concepts’ (1978: 137). These forms of emotional bonds are no less important than interpersonal bonds. Blended with other more impersonal types of bond, they underlie the extended ‘I-and-We’ consciousness, which hitherto has always seemed indispensable in binding together not only small tribes but large social units like nation-states encompassing many millions of people. People’s attachment to such large social units is often as intense as their attachment to a person they love. The individual who has formed such a bond will be as deeply affected when the social unit to which he devoted is conquered or destroyed, debased or humiliated, as when a beloved person dies (Elias, 1978: 137). Elias is very much aware that sociologists in the twentieth century have tended to stress the I-identity development (2001: 156), based upon the individual or in recent years processes of individualization. They have neglected that larger units, most often states, have been an object of common identification.4 Elias asks the pertinent question: ‘Why do emotional bonds to state-societies – which nowadays are nation-states – take priority over bonds to other figurations?’ (1978: 138). Can we cautiously interpret this question to suggest that Elias is arguing that some figurations in some situations are more important than others? In the book What is Sociology? (1978) Elias characterises how these various figurations at different stages in human history ‘have bound individuals to them by this type of predominating emotional bonds’.5 Elias argues that a common feature of these figurations is their attempt to exercise ‘strict control over the use of physical violence in relationships between their members’ (Elias, 1978: 138). Moreover, he continues that these figurations have accepted – at times even encouraged – ‘their members to use physical violence against non-members’. This has a positive function for the ‘we-I-balance’. A ‘we’ is generated in this process. These figurations knit ‘people together for common purposes – the common defence of their lives, the survival of their group in the face of attacks by other groups and, for a variety of reasons, attacks in common on other groups’. He continues, and we quote in length: Thus the primary function of such an alliance is either physically to wipe out other people or to protect its own members from being physically wiped out. Since the potential of such units for attack is inseparable from their potential for defence, they may be called ‘attack-and-defence units’ or ‘survival units’. At the present stage of social development they take the form of nation-states. In the future they may be amalgamations of several former nation-states. In the past they were represented by city-states or the inhabitants of a stronghold. Size and structure vary: the function remains the same. At every stage of development, wherever people have been bound and integrated into units for attack and defence, this bond has been © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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stressed above all others. This survival function, involving the use of physical force against others, creates interdependencies of a particular kind. It plays a part in the figurations people form, perhaps no greater but also no more negligible than ‘occupational’ bonds. Though it cannot be reduced to a function of ‘economics’ neither is it separable from it (1978: 138–139). Here it may seem that Elias is suggesting that survival units and occupational groups are figurations at the same level. This might be the case seen from the point of view of the individual embedded in an occupational group or a survival unit. There is, however, an important difference. In another context, Elias criticizes community-studies for a sociological disease: they are shrouded in a voluntaristic twilight. They blur the distinction between human bonds that can be made and unmade at will by those concerned, and human bonds which cannot be made and unmade at will . . . More recent examples are concepts like ‘role’, ‘interaction’ and the ubiquitous ‘human relations’. Their use can easily give the impression that the central task of sociology is to study how individual people act or behave when they make contact or form relations with each other. The implications appear to be that human beings are always free to act, to interact, to form relationships as they like. In actual fact their ability to do this is limited and sociological studies are very much concerned with the problem of how limited it is and why (1974: xviii). Elias demonstrates that there is a distinctive difference between figurations which can be formed and not formed by free will. Do we find a figuration in which we are embedded neither by will nor decision but by destiny and fate? Yes, one particular form of figuration – the ‘survival unit’ or ‘defence or attack’ unit. Whether we like it or not we are all born into a survival unit. It is a fact that human beings cannot escape. We are not members by decision, volition or consent. An occupational group is joined by some form of volition or consent. The survival unit is a figuration which in a Hegelian sense is a ‘community of fate’. Since we all are born into such a structure these survival units are figurations with some form of primacy. By applying a relational approach Elias, unlike other relational thinkers, provides us with an answer to the problem of demarcation raised by Emirbayer: how do we know how to ‘draw lines across relational webs possessing no clear-cut natural boundaries?’ (Emirbayer, 1997: 303). A part of Elias’s response refers to his empirical observation of human history as a process of interdependent survival units competing and co-existing. We can observe survival units in relation to other survival units and therefore there is a demarcated figuration with primacy in his sociological perspective. New forms of survival units emerge and old forms decline. Social life is organized around survival units and they demarcate themselves against other units. 376



Another part of his argument is that social life is conceived as a web, a process of interdependent and interweaving social relationships. Demarcation arises out of these relationships. The relationship is a confrontation which generates identities and boundaries. This was first developed by Hegel in his conceptualization of the state. A state becomes a state when it is in a social relationship with another state. It is exactly in the very moment when two or more states are interacting that they constitute each other as states (Hegel, 1991: 359–371). Hegel explains exactly that the concept of state is unthinkable unless we see a state as a part of a social relationship – vis-à-vis another state. Similarly to an individual who cannot become self-conscious and know that ‘I’ is me before ‘another’ has recognized me – ‘I’ – from the outside, Hegel clearly sees that a state can only become a state with a bounded territory when the boundaries of this territory are drawn from outside. Elias follows a similar kind of relational thinking by stressing the importance of the relationship for the ‘entities’ – the survival units. In this very relationship boundaries are created from ‘outside’. The survival units are demarcated by other survival units and not just by the members of the survival unit itself. Their very relationship constitutes survival units.6 Survival units also take on the role as the ‘primary’ figuration in Elias’s perspective because of their high degree of autonomy which no other figurations have. Of course, these figurations are also interdependent with other figurations but they have autonomy to the extent they can ‘fulfil effectively for their members their function as self-reliant and self-regulating defence and survival units’ (Elias, 1974: xxii). Their high level of autonomy consists in their ability to defend and survive. As long as a unit can defend its own domain of sovereignty (whether this is a territory, hunting fields, or seaways), it can be argued that it has autonomy. If no other unit can encroach upon your domain of sovereignty you are autonomous. When no figuration exists above your unit with the ability to conquer you – you are as autonomous as you can be. This is a crucial difference between survival units and other figurations such as families, occupational groups, or companies. Families or companies can very rarely protect themselves from internal and external enemies.7 As long as the survival unit is capable of preventing external enemies from encroaching upon its domain of sovereignty, there will be some degree of freedom and autonomy for families, individuals, and businesses. Another characteristic of a survival unit is the level of integration.8 A survival unit – for example, a village state or a nation-state – represents the highest level of integration in social life at a given time (Elias, 1974: xxv–xxvi). It can consist of elderly leaders in a village, the wealthiest burghers in a town, the king and the court, or a government. When a survival unit becomes particularly strong, as in late renaissance Europe with the new court society, a monopolization process develops with larger, stronger and more territorially demarcated survival units. The centre based upon the court becomes in some respect the knot in the figuration – a knot around which integration is struc© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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tured. The very character and structure of the court society in several European countries paved the way for a strong centralization and territorialization of these survival units. These processes are self-perpetuating and the centre becomes an even stronger integrating force. This process is far from without conflicts. Consequently, Elias points to the fact that we can see a constant shift and struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The struggle takes place, however, because there is a centre in these webs which leads to some level of organization. These centres then become the integrating and organizing force for survival units. In looking at the key role of survival units, Elias also emphasises the problem of violence. He argues that a survival unit has a double function – attack and defence – and economic reproduction of its population – in other words, a political as well as an economic function (1978; 1987b: 226ff). This political and economic relationship is closely intertwined, but it is important to emphasise the violent aspects of a survival unit. Consequently, a polity such as the European Union cannot be characterized as a survival unit because it has no control of the means of violence. It cannot be characterized as an attackand-defence unit because the EU cannot defend itself – it is entirely dependent on NATO and the USA for its security. In Involvement and Detachment Elias also argues that the violent aspect of the survival unit is in the last instance the key dimension of the survival unit (1987a: 74–86). In a discussion of the cold war dynamic between the two super powers, the USA and former USSR, he emphasizes how this social dynamic creates competitive pressures which continually change and move these states. Their violent potential is the key means to maintain and improve the position of a state in a system of states. Nothing is more characteristic of the structure of inter-state relations than this fact. It indicates that human beings, at the level of inter-state relations, are still bound to each other at the primeval level. Like animals in the wilderness of a jungle, like tribal groups in humanity’s early days, like states throughout history, so the states of today are bound to each other in such a way that sheer physical force and cunning are, in the last resort, the decisive factors in their relationships. No one can prevent a physically stronger state from control over weaker states, except another state which is its match in terms of physical force. If another such state exists, the two experience one another, with great regularity, as rivals, each trying to prevent the other from attaining hegemonial power. Thus, unless a state is checked by another state that is militarily its equal, there is nothing to prevent its leaders and the people who form it from threatening, exploiting, invading and enslaving, driving out or killing the inhabitants of another state (Elias, 1987a: 74–75). This inter-state dynamic is a life-and-death struggle which consists of the use or threat of the means of violence. There are many different forms of survival units which are all interdependent because they are competing with each other 378



in a struggle for survival. It is a contest without rules but it is not chaotic. The struggle between survival units is ‘a primal contest’. Two survival units struggle for survival – whether it is about prestige or scarce resources – they are dependent on each other. Each and every step taken by each of the two parties is watched over by the other. As enemies they perform a function for each other and each move of one survival unit determines each move of the other survival unit and vice versa (Elias, 1978: 76–80). In the very conflict and in the struggle of survival an order emerges. The struggle for survival creates a dynamic relationship with crucial implications for figurational relations within survival units: The internal arrangement in each group are determined to a greater or lesser extent by what each group thinks the other might do next (Elias, 1978: 77). This interdependence exists as a precondition for and influences the character and nature of the internal structure of survival units. In modern terms the organization and structure of society is to a large extent determined by the intensity of the struggle between states. The character and organization of internal social structures is a function of external structures. Their function for each other is in the last resort based on the compulsion they exert over each other because of their interdependence. It is not possible to explain the actions, plans and aims of either of the two groups if they are conceptualized as the freely chosen decisions, plans and aims of each group considered on its own, independently of the other group.They can be explained only if one takes into account the compelling force groups exert upon each other and their bilateral function for each other as enemies (Elias, 1978: 77).9 The crucial difference between inter-state and intra-state relations is the presence and the restrained use of the means of violence. Elias draws upon Weber in his understanding of the survival unit by arguing that the use of violence is an ever-present threat and the normal instrument of last resort in inter-state relations. The use of physical violence has almost been eliminated from normal relations within developed states.This is not only indicative of the fundamental difference between the structure of human relationships within states, but also that of the relationships between states.This significantly means that human beings live simultaneously at two levels whose structure is not only different, but in some respects contradictory. At one level it is strictly forbidden to be violent and to kill people; at another, it is demanded as a duty to prepare for, and to use, violence in relations with other humans (Elias, 1987a: 80). Elias points out that there is a clear difference between, on the one hand, figurations called survival units, for example, states which are interrelated in a state system and, on the other hand, figurations found at the intra-state level such as families, companies and voluntary associations. The existence of monopolies of the means of violence within states and the non-existence of © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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such monopolies at the inter-state level can clearly explain differences in social structure. A given state-society – a network of functionally interdependent human beings – has a structure of its own. They are bound to each other in specific figurations whose dynamics have a constraining and compelling influence on those who form them: The existence of a monopoly of physical force within states and its nonexistence in the relationships between states is an example of the firmness of the structure which interdependent human beings form with one another. It also shows the far-reaching effects which these structures have on those who form them (Elias, 1987a: 79). Elias is also well aware that these survival units take on different forms in different periods in history. He does not develop a ‘typology’ but he mentions different forms of survival units. He argues that human populations have always been divided into survival units of one kind or another. Over time they have grown in size. From small bands, tribes, city-states, village-states, to modern large-scale states and nation-states (Elias, 1987b: 225–231). Thus he discusses village states as one form of figuration which is characterized by a much less differentiated society and which has to rely on its own resources. Another and more ‘advanced’ form of figuration serving the same defence and survival purpose is the nation-state but due to its complex character and higher level of interdependence it has to organize the fulfilment of these functions entirely differently. Elias’s relational perspective is based upon an attempt to explain that social life is embedded in interdependent and interweaving social relations. By conceiving social relations in a figurational perspective – perennial interdependency between social units and human beings – we might wonder where to start our sociological analysis. Do we find any figuration with some primacy? How can we demarcate a figuration? Is it possible to detect a demarcated figuration with autonomy? Yes, according to Elias, one particular form of figuration takes on some primacy – the survival unit. He provides a theoretical-empirical answer to this problem. We can observe that human beings have always existed in survival units and these survival units always exist in a larger system of multiple survival units. His answer has four aspects: first, the survival unit has primacy compared to other figurations because a survival unit is the figuration with the highest level of autonomy. No other figuration stands above the survival unit. If a survival unit cannot prevent a neighbouring survival unit from intervening in its domain of sovereignty, thereby providing protection and generating material resources such as food and shelter for its members, then it is no longer a survival unit. A survival unit is only a survival unit as long as it succeeds in preventing encroachment. In similar terms a modern form of survival unit – the state – is only a state if the state can uphold its domain of sovereignty by securing its population from foreign intervention (either by cunning, 380



alliances, or military defence). No other figuration has this level of autonomy. Companies, cities, towns, trade unions, or multinational corporations are not as autonomous because they are all dependent on a figuration superior to them – the survival unit. Only the survival unit gives other figurations some form of freedom to act and this freedom is entirely dependent on the autonomy of the survival unit. The second aspect concerns the character of the survival unit as a particular form of figuration. We are born into a survival unit whether we like it or not. It is our fate. A survival unit is a ‘community of fate’. Whereas in principle other figurations can be joined by any social group or person the survival unit is an inescapable figuration. Whether we are born into Assyria in 2000 B.C. or today in Denmark or Britain we are born into a survival unit. All other forms of categorizations such as class, caste, nationality and ethnicity are different from time to time and place to place. These categories are not ‘universals’. A survival unit is a universal – only its form varies. Moreover, more often than not emotional bonds to survival units take priority over bonds to other figurations. No matter what character and form the survival unit takes (feudal castle, town, village state, nation-state, or empire), the survival unit represents the highest level of integration in social life. The third aspect of Elias’s argument concerns the character of the overall figuration in which the survival units are embedded – in modern times the state system. This figuration might or might not be normless – it still creates an order in which the survival unit emerges, consolidates and declines. This figuration has an enormous impact on the emerging, internal social order. The state system – or the system of survival units – can according to Elias be conceived as a primal contest. The contest takes place in an environment which at the outset is not norm-regulated but neither is it anarchy or chaos. The interdependent structure of the system and the relationship between the survival units generates a particular order but no norms can be unilaterally forced upon the members for a long period of time because no survival unit can rule and survive forever. The last and fourth aspect concerns the crucial difference between the survival unit as a figuration and other figurations dependent on this survival unit. Survival units seem to have exercised comparatively strict control over the use of physical violence in relationships between their members. In different historical contexts monopolization of the means of violence have developed – at least since the Neolithic period and the emergence of agricultural modes of production, physical protection of a domain has been crucial. Since survival units tend to monopolize the means of violence other figurations need survival units to protect them. Without protection and security it is hard for social life to develop into stable figurations with the production of food and shelter. The function of a survival unit controlling the means of violence is that ‘it knits people together for common purposes – the common defence of their lives, the survival of their group in the face of attacks in common on other groups’ (Elias, 1978: 138). © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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Tensions in Elias’s relational thinking Has Elias developed a clear-cut and consistent relational theory by taking his point of departure in the concept of the survival unit? Elias has made a convincing and significant contribution but some problems and tensions remain in his thinking. The problem we will address here concerns the future development of the survival units and the figuration of survival units. The current dominant form of survival unit is the territorial state. Will we see the world developing towards one global survival unit – one global state? To answer this question, it is important to look at some of the problems that Elias identifies with the formation of a European nation-state: There is clearly a split in the situation of nation states at present. On one hand the survival of the nation state as a self-ruling and independent society, as a sovereign state, has an important function for people living in it. This function is often taken for granted, and one can imagine it might be useful to breach this tacit acceptance and expose the function of membership of a nation for the people concerned to impartial public discussion. For there are, on the other hand, unquestionable structural features of the present stage of the development of mankind that run counter to national sovereignty and tend increasingly to curtail it. This fundamental split, and its far-reaching implications, are not at present the subject of much objective discussion (Elias, 2001: 221). A tension is also present in Elias’s own discussion in The Society of Individuals, between the movement towards the greater integration of humanity and the we-feelings associated with belonging to the nation-state.At certain points, he argues that ‘sentimental idealism’ is preventing a recognition of ‘the fact that humanity is increasingly becoming the primary survival unit for all people as individuals and for all subgroups of mankind’ (Elias, 2001: 230). Yet on the same page, he is much more tentative, stating that ‘as far as states are concerned we are continuing to live in the tradition of the sovereign princely state’. Apparently, Elias seems indecisive about the future development. He is indecisive because there is tension in his relational approach. Based upon his theory about survival units, it is, however, possible to provide a consistent answer to the problem of the potential of a global unified survival unit. His response and discussion can be clarified in the following way: a relational perspective excludes the presence of only one state or survival unit because the very relationship constitutes and defines the state/survival unit. Without at least two conflicting survival units it does not make any sense to describe these units as survival units. They are simply defined by the very struggle of survival against each another. In Hegelian terms a survival unit always needs another to recognize you. Without ‘the other’ recognition is not possible. Carl Schmitt 382



(1888–1985) agrees with the Hegelian idea that the very struggle between two entities constitutes their relationship and their identities. He says . . . the political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state.A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe. . . . The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world (Schmitt, 1976: 53) According to Schmitt the world is a pluriverse and this is also a consequence of Elias’s theory. As a thought experiment we can imagine one survival unit swallowing the others and turning them into one unit. This will, however, only last a brief moment. Like a nuclear atom turning into a fission process the global survival unit will split up in many new units and, again, become a pluriverse. This will happen because according to Elias (and Hegel) only external struggle and pressure will provide the energy and compelling power to create an internal social order. When this external pressure has gone, nothing can tie the internal elements together and the unit will divide into a multiple of new and smaller units. Elias’s approach should enable sociologists to provide an answer to the possibility of one global survival unit, but he is reluctant to point us in a clear direction. There is a tension in Elias’s thinking between, on the one hand, analysing the human world becoming more and more interdependent and increasingly entangled in the same global figuration and, on the other hand, a figuration of survival units implying the existence of at least two survival units. Elias’s explanation excludes the social development of one global figuration, even though other aspects of his work on development still leaves open the possibility of one survival unit. He explains social development as a move towards more social differentiation, an extended division of labour, and longer chains of interdependence – these social processes are not linear, because civilizing processes sometimes can go in reverse and be replaced by de-civilization but, overall, history is two steps forward and one step back. This conceptualization of human development shares some similarities with Durkheim’s evolutionary approach towards more interdependence. He expected a global interdependent world with no violent conflicts because all actors would be prevented from waging war due to the interdependent character of the world (Durkheim, 1992; Giddens, 1986). Although Elias points to war as a universal process the implication of his analysis of social development is similar to Durkheim: a move towards one global survival unit. The implication of Elias’s explanation of survival units is the opposite – as we have demonstrated – the co-existence of at least two survival units and therefore not one global figuration. © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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Concluding remarks In this paper we have argued that Elias has developed an important contribution to a more coherent relational perspective. By taking his point of departure in the relations between survival units, Elias explains why survival units possess a high degree of autonomy and therefore are the most important figurations for sociological analysis. They are constituted in a struggle of survival. There is no authority above survival units, only their own struggle can enable them to survive as independent survival units. Any other figurations must be regarded as more dependent figurations – armies, people, companies or cities are dependent on a survival unit. Elias overcomes some of the major deficiencies usually found in relational perspectives. He addresses the problem of boundary setting in social relations by developing the concept of survival unit. This is a figuration (existing in a larger figuration consisting of at least two but often more survival units) which is demarcated with other survival units, and in that very relation constitutes other survival units and generates a demarcation. As an important figuration, the survival unit can be seen as one of the most significant contributions in Elias’s sociological analysis. We now wish to raise an often posed question concerning relational theory and Elias: where to start our analysis? We have argued that the survival unit is the primary unit of analysis because any other figuration is always dependent on the survival unit. One could argue that our interpretation of Elias would lead us to the conclusion that any good sociological analysis would need to start with the survival unit. This is not the implication of our argument. We are not arguing that all social analysis has to start off with the study of the relationship between survival units, but it must start with the set of interdependent social relations that are of interest to the investigator whether it is the family, the relationship between employers and employees, or people playing music. Once an ‘object of investigation’ (a specific set of social relations as part of a particular figuration) has been determined, the analysis will then develop into a historical and process-orientated study of these selected social relations. Eventually, the investigator might choose to study how these relations that are embedded in a figurational context are dependent on the survival unit. Without relating these social relations to the figuration with the highest degree of autonomy – the survival unit – it is difficult to analyse the interrelated levels of relation between different figurations. Another aspect of the survival unit that we wish to emphasize concerns the relationship between the external enemy and defense of the survival unit and its internal pacification. These are apparently concomitant processes. Elias always focused on how processes are intertwined and why it is pointless to seek mono-causal chains between social phenomena. However, there are some indications that he gave primacy to the external enemy or defense.10 When a survival unit is situated in relation to another survival unit, they are dependent 384



on each other. This relationship compels the two units to develop an internal arrangement which can respond to the move taken by the other survival unit. Elias demonstrates this in his example of the primal contest: The internal arrangement in each group are determined to a greater or lesser extent by what each group thinks the other might do next . . . Their function for each other is in the last resort based on the compulsion they exert over each other by reason of their interdependence. It is not possible to explain the actions, plans and aims of either of the two groups if they are conceptualized as the freely chosen decisions, plans and aims of each group considered on its own, independently of the other group. They can be explained only if one takes into account the compelling forces the groups exert upon each other by reason of their interdependence, their bilateral function for each other as enemies (Elias, 1978: 77). Elias, however, does not fall into the trap of one dimensional causality. This means that the struggle for external sovereignty does not automatically lead to processes of internal pacification. The European experience as studied by Elias demonstrates that the struggle for internal ‘national’ sovereignty presupposes an external defense against enemies. The Treaty of Westphalia, for example, was important for the emerging state system in Europe. This Treaty contributed to a reduction in the level of international religious conflict which created a space for European states to gain more control over their societies – processes of internal pacification (Hirst, 1997: 218–219). In other words, the ability to prevent any survival unit from encroaching on a domain or territory can provide a precondition for internal pacification but it cannot cause it – there is no inherent causality. Throughout the paper we have emphasized the demarcated aspects of survival units. It must, however, be stressed that the Eliasian concept of demarcation involves a processual character. The demarcation and the boundaries of a survival unit are never fixed. Demarcation and boundary making processes are always volatile, precarious and open ended processes. Conflicts between different survival units and between different groups within these units generate a very dynamic process in which boundaries constantly undergo change. Some examples can illustrate the dynamic processes involved in the development of an Eliasian framework. Modern Italy has for many decades been challenged as a survival unit by the existence of the Mafia which has been a constant threat. The Italian state has often struggled to sustain its monopoly of violence. Thus the struggle and tension between the Italian state and the Mafia has demonstrated that the demarcation, autonomy and monopoly of the means of violence are never fixed and are always contested. Modern forms of ‘terrorism’ are another example.The attack on the USA on September 11 2001 by an Islamic group al-Qaeda effectively applied the means of violence to challenge the US state’s ability to maintain its demarcation and autonomy. Al-Qaeda was not from the outset a survival unit but the wars in Afghanistan © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review

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and Iraq since 2001 and 2003 have increasingly led to its emergence. As the coalition has moved forward and applied more coercion, a clear enemy has emerged. The Eliasian framework allows us to see the confrontation between the coalition and the resurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan as a strategic relationship in which the very struggle will constitute new survival units. Eventually these resurgent groups might become new survival units recognized by other states and international organizations such as the UN. If the resurgent movements in, for example, Iraq can hold and maintain a demarcated territory, a new survival unit will be borne. This was exactly what happened in the former Yugoslavia where Croatia, Slovenia and later Bosnia succeeded in defending a territory by force and, consequently, created new survival units in the violent confrontation with Serbia.These emerging survival units defended their territories and achieved international recognition. These illustrative examples demonstrate the process character of Elias’s concepts and how his dynamic framework can provide us with some of the analytical tools that can facilitate research in the study of violent conflicts and the formation of new and old survival units in the 21st century. University of Plymouth and Copenhagen Business School

Received 30 October 2007 Finally accepted 8 May 2008

Notes 1 Emirbayer’s article is one of the most quoted articles on relational theory in recent years. For example in the Social Science Citation Index, it has been cited 112 times. 2 It is interesting that Emirbayer refers to Mann’s theory of social power. He seems to argue that Mann rethinks the notion of society in a more relational perspective. Mann, however, remains deeply embedded in a substantialist approach because his theoretical point of departure are human beings who are ‘restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so’ (Mann, 1986: 4). The human being is a pre-given entity with a fixed set of properties and attributes – exactly what Emirbayer warned against. 3 We find the same problem in discourse analysis. Having defined a discourse and having selected or observed a discourse one runs into the the same problem. Is a discourse ‘an entity, a thing, a substance’? What kind of ontological status do we describe to a discourse? 4 Exceptions are theories of nationalism and of the mass such as G. le Bon, E. Canetti, and G. Tarde. 5 He points out that at other stages of social development these figurations were towns, villages or tribes – but today they are states. 6 Elias is well aware that boundaries can take different forms from loose geographical frontiers to city walls and modern territorial nation-state borders. 7 These figurations are very often dependent on protection and the conditions of existence provided by the survival unit – in modern terms a state. Previously we find examples of companies with this ability to defend such as the Dutch East India Company – in Elias’s terms this company could almost be considered as a survival unit. 8 When Elias is talking about the level of integration this is not in the functionalist understanding of the term. If the level of integration constitutes a certain order, Elias does not equal order with ‘orderly’:‘One is talking about an order in the same sense that one talks of a natural order,

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The importance of survival units in which decay and destruction as structured processes have their place alongside growth and synthesis, death and disintegration alongside birth and integration’ (Elias 1978:76). 9 Warfare and violence are important themes in Elias’s explanation of the formation of states. Apart from The Civilizing Process (2000), The Germans (1996) is the most significant study of the relationship between war and state formation (See also Fletcher 1997). 10 A good example is Elias’s (1987, p. 298) identification of the defeat of Carthage for the changing balance of power between the sexes in the Ancient Roman state: ‘Thus it is perhaps useful to sum up some of the salient aspects indicative of the balance of power between men and women of the Roman upper classes before the change set in, and to confront them with the new setting. The change did not come suddenly; it was a gradual change. But the turning point was, as I have said, before the final defeat and destruction of Carthage which made Rome’s hegemonial position in the Mediterranean almost irrevocable.’

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