The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies

VOLUME 9 ISSUE 1

The International Journal of

Interdisciplinary Global Studies __________________________________________________________________________

State Authority in Bulgaria A Post-Colonial Balkan National Community

BENEDICT E. DEDOMINICIS

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State Authority in Bulgaria: A Post-Colonial Balkan National Community Benedict E. DeDominicis, Catholic University of Korea, South Korea Abstract: The state develops through a historical process of collective learning as community values evolve through societal experience. Imperial control characterizes the context in which this learning has occurred in Bulgaria. Bulgarian political behavioral attitudes toward official authority reflect this long history of external domination. Though sovereign since 1989, Bulgarian attitudes regarding government official ability are likely to produce leaders that reflect a dependent, patronage-focused political culture. It stands in contrast to European Union ideals that emphasize obedience to the rule of law in the form of adherence to formal policies and procedures. Government authority performance is therefore more likely to be seen as corrupt, particularly by strong Bulgarian EU self-identifiers. A historical analysis of imperialism in Bulgaria provides insights into the relative lack of societal consensus on obeying formal rules and procedures and instead engaging in clientelism. Bulgarian nationalism shapes the development of the state in the context of this imperial legacy. This legacy includes elements of shared pan-Slavic Communist identity as well as traditional ethno-sectarian Orthodox, Turkish, and Muslim identities of varying intensity. Developing a more effective and efficient Bulgarian state requires a long-term political evolutionary process. This political course ideally will contribute to cultural convergence promoting societal attitudinal consensus on the behavioral and emotive meaning of being a good Bulgarian EU citizen. It will require generations. Corruption will therefore remain a notable challenge in Bulgaria into the foreseeable future, as it has been in Italy. Keywords: Bulgaria, Corruption, European Union, Imperialism, Nationalism, Social Movements

Introduction

B

ulgaria entered the European Union on January 1, 2007. Simeon Diankov was a deputy prime minister and finance minister in the 2009-13 GERB (“Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria”) government under Boyko Borisov. (Gerb is also the Bulgarian word for “shield.”1) Diankov had previously been a senior World Bank economist and policy adviser. In the run-up to the July 2009 Bulgarian parliamentary election he stated, “The level of corruption here is mind-boggling. I have worked for the Bank in more than 90 countries and I have never seen anything like it.” 2 Societal disputes revolve around the perceived trustworthiness of competing elite factions among mobilized segments of the public. The failure to address the general public’s social welfare expectations has encouraged charges of pervasive corruption among these factions and their respective core constituencies. Disillusionment and frustration is played out within the overarching framework of European Union integration. Factions simultaneously contest and interact with the hegemonic European discourse frames used by all political party contestants.3 Parties seek to harness Bulgarian nationalist public political mobilization capacity to achieve their respective objectives. Oppositional discourses often borrow from the language of those they oppose. They interact and mix with them to produce unintended and contradictory consequences for social movement development (Steinberg 2002, 208). An emotive community consensus on the ideals of Bulgarian citizenship is comparatively weak. This incoherence is due significantly to Bulgaria’s history of contention with its 1

The writer thanks Professor Emilia Zankina of the American University in Bulgaria for this insight. “Frustration at slow progress in EU,” Financial Times, June 18, 2009, accessed October 10, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df055168-5c20-11de-aea3-00144feabdc0.html. 3 e.g. The website of the militant Bulgarian nationalist xenophobic “Attack” party since at least 2009 has featured a picture of French National Front founder Jean-Marie Le Pen either holding a copy of Attack, the daily newspaper of the Attack party, or raising hands clenched with its leader, Volen Siderov (http://www.ataka.bg/) (Accessed July 19, 2014). The message is clear: the Attack party is a legitimate party because it is part of a broader set of militant nationalist forces in the European Union, including in France, a founding state of postwar European integration. 2

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dependent, colonial status within the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-twentieth century, Bulgarian sovereignty was lost under the totalitarian Soviet Communist-dominated, informal/neo-colonial development of the Bulgarian state. Manifestations today include a comparative absence of strong state institutions and their underlying foundational social and legal norms. They are necessary for protecting property rights as well as regulating market transactions (Tzvetkova 2008, 348). The roots of this weakness lie in the relative lack of societal consensus on the norms of legitimate political behavior as a consequence of this history of dependent development (Tudoriou 2011, 374, 76-78). The cause of this lack of consensus derives from the consequent attitudinal polarization among the Bulgarian titular majority public (Giatzidis 2004, 435-37, 4750). This analysis focuses on the Bulgarian case to highlight the contemporary policy process implications of the historical relationship between ethnos and state in the colonial development of a Balkan national community (Žižek 2009). Bulgaria is a small national people subject to imperial control for most of its history since the late medieval period. Bulgarian political behavioral attitudes today reflect this developmental environment of the state acting as a control agent for an external other. Today’s extensive corruption is a consequence due to the widespread cultural habituation into clientelism (Bulanova 2008). It is an attitudinal consequence of generations of circumventing formal policies and their rules and procedures traditionally imposed by external imperial authorities. Corruption will remain a long term issue in Bulgaria because political cultural change happens slowly (Lauth 2004). This analysis aims to demonstrate that the problem of corruption in Bulgaria is due significantly to political cultural facets of this national community that derive from the circumstances of its colonial development. Reducing corruption therefore requires more than a technocratic policy focus. It requires socialization of succeeding generations of Bulgarians into new attitudes of political participation. The articulation of these new attitudes references European Union ideals that have given prevailing symbolic substance to Bulgarian nationalism since the end of the Cold War. Bulgarian social movements may exploit societal participatory opportunities through European integration to internalize these ideals to slowly modify Bulgaria’s political culture. The analysis begins with a presentation of the relationship between political culture and state authority and legitimacy. It then focuses on the political psychological consequences for the Bulgarian national community of its centuries-long domination by external powers in various forms. It explores the political attitudinal consequences of the great sacrifices and disappointments that grew out of the nationalist phase of Bulgarian state policy beginning in the late nineteenth century. It concludes with a focus on the collapse of the Communist regime and the political cultural implications of the Europeanization of Bulgaria through integration into the European Union.

Democracy and Legitimacy No necessary link exists between democracy and legitimacy as the experience of Eastern European states shows (Chen 2005, 9). In this context, widespread systemic corruption emerges. The relative lack of societal consensus on public authority behavioral norms weakens the enforcement power of the state. A result is the emergence of a rent-seeking nouveaux riche that exploits networks of patronage amidst factions from among the old Communist nomenklatura and its political leadership (Kudelia 2012, 151). The leading figures at the pinnacle of these patronage structures within this new bourgeoisie in post-Communist Europe include the wealthiest and empowered, e.g. so-called oligarchs. 4 In Bulgaria as well as in many former 4 Jack Ewing and Georgi Kantchev, “Feud Between Oligarchs Seen as Cause of Bank Run in Bulgaria.” New York Times, June 30, 2014. Accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/international/feud-betweenoligarchs-seen-as-cause-of-bank-run-in-bulgaria.html; “Bulgarian Oligarchs Richer than Russia’s.” Standart, July 11,

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DEDOMINICIS: STATE AUTHORITY IN BULGARIA

Soviet states, a vibrant dissident intellectual movement did not exist prior to the collapse of Communism. Such a dissident movement gives visionary leadership to an incipient social movement (Ibid., 153). While this leadership was present in Poland, it was not present in Bulgaria (Library of Congress 1992). Consequently, the power of the state today is more likely to be seen as a resource to be exploited for parochial gain by governmental official patrons and their clients and constituencies. Militant pro-Western elements of the Bulgarian public employ EU ideals to legitimate their opposition to their adversary domestic societal factions and constituencies.5 They tend to characterize the latter’s behavior and policies as the living legacy of the Communist past, based on remnants of the old security apparatus becoming patronage networks.6 Institutionalization of liberal democratic norms may require a sufficient degree of political attitudinal behavior consensus that permits trust to permeate society. This “social capital” is relatively lacking in many post-Soviet societies and Bulgaria in comparison with Central and Eastern Europe (Kudelia 2012, 153). Focusing on post-Soviet states, Kudelia argues that the sources of this relative weakness of civil society include the comparative absence of sustained social mobilization. The latter is due to the absence of shared beliefs and a set of common longterm interests (Ibid.). The People’s Republic of Bulgaria acquired the reputation as the closest ally of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact (Katsikas 2012, 5-6). Understanding the Bulgarian case will assist in Western policy strategy towards the post-Soviet states. Kudelia asserts that “… the Eurasian imperial legacies express themselves in the culture of passive path-dependency, tolerance for corruption and double standards, therefore making electoral revolutions an aberration across post-Soviet space” (2012, 153). This analysis aims to elucidate “Eurasian imperial legacies” using selected social movement literature insights in combination with a theory of stereotype formation. Thereby, it aims to explain the relative lack of societal norm consensus during transitions that make institution of the rule of law a greater challenge. For this study, political culture is the term for the aggregation of public political behavioral norms. Richard D. Lewis describes “a nation’s culture as its blueprint for survival and, hopefully, success. It is an all-embracing pattern of a group’s entire way of life, including a shared system of values, social meanings, and agendas passed on from generation to generation” (Lewis 2007, xxiii). Hofstede and Hofstede define it as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (2005, 4). Evaluation of culture is relative and comparative. Corruption is an issue because evaluative standards of behavior exist that deem other patterns to be illegitimate. These standards in Eastern Europe are largely set by the heretofore Western Europe-dominated European Union. These standards do not necessarily reflect the objective reality of Western Europe, but rather community ideals that have been politically created. Western European societies (e.g. Italy and its organized crime challenge) themselves may fall notably short of these same standards and criteria despite generations of European integration (e.g. Duplat et al. 2012, 274). These EU standards/ideals create discourses for regional and domestic politics. They provide an array of symbols for manipulation to attempt to legitimate/delegitimate authority and policy and thereby to influence individual and group behavior.

2014. Accessed July 11, 2014, http://paper.standartnews.com/en/article.php?article=37745; Frances Coppola, “The Bulgarian Game of Thrones.” Forbes, July 15, 2014. Accessed July 16, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/07/15/the-bulgarian-game-of-thrones/. 5 Reinhard Veser, “How to Get Sofia Back on Track?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 2013. Accessed July 12, 2014, http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/4002931-how-get-sofia-back-track (Translated from the German by Anton Baer). 6 Toni Nikolov, “Power Grasping in the Dark.” Kultura. July 24, 2013. Accessed July 12, 2014, http://www.voxeurop. eu/en/content/article/3998521-power-grasping-dark.;”‘Europe, where are you?’ Bulgarian protesters appeal to the EU.” Euronews. July 18, 2013. Accessed mid-July 2013, www.euronews.com/2013/07/18/ europe-where-are-you-bulgarianprotesters-appeal-to-the-eu/

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Prevailing societal attitudinal orientations towards Bulgarian authority evolve as in other nation state polities. This evolution results partly as a byproduct of the ongoing process of struggle for influence among competing elite factions and their constituencies. Facets of this struggle include broader public appeals to Bulgarian national identity that today tends more to associate with symbolic European/EU ideals and norms (Stoytchev 2008). It largely consists of competing, dynamic patron-client constituency relationships centering to varying degrees on elite leadership figures, party organizations and informal structures. These socio-political relationships constitute competing social influence networks that constitute a clash of “networks of meanings” (Diani 2003, 5). These networks of meanings may be a focus of strong emotional feeling, rooted in strong communitarian affective ties by developing and reaffirming identity and solidarity (Ibid., 8). This strong emotive substance is particularly evident in significant challenges to the status quo which successfully emphasize symbolic appeals (Ibid., 9). Mario Diani highlights the importance of taking this symbolic, cultural approach to the study of social networks and social movements (2003). Intense self-identification with a particular national culture community generates emotional sentiment that political entrepreneurs exploit through symbolic, stereotyped appeals (e.g. Smith 2013, 34-35). A cultural approach requires inclusion of a conceptualization of national stereotypes (Meardi 2011, 343-44). Nationalistic community predisposition affects the political capabilities and challenges confronting social networks in movements in any Eastern European case. An anti-corruption strategy should include promotion of transformational social movements that build upon pro-European/EU national identity political self-identification tendencies. Such tendencies exist to varying degrees of intensity among current and aspiring political, cultural and economic elites and their respective constituencies. Promotion of these proEuropean/EU participatory networks of meaning can help promote the civil societal foundational allies for implementation of the rule of law. Since the issue is one of cultural change, it will require a long-term, generational perspective. EU integration has had a marginal impact on Bulgarian political culture (Mitropolitski 2013, 378-89). Systematic corruption will remain a long-term problem in Bulgaria as it has in Italy.

Bulgarian Images of Self and Other Bulgaria’s European integration interacts with a collective historical legacy of domination by others (Latcheva 2010, 188). Bulgaria’s history has led the polity collectively to tend to see challenges from Great Power actors historically perceived as superior both in capability and cultural level (Promitzer 2010, 48, 58-59). Using the political psychology framework developed by Cottam and Cottam, this perceptual pattern is labeled as the imperial stereotype (2001). Internalization through socialization of its concomitant, i.e. the inferior, colonial/client selfimage, can be the basis of a modern, neo-colonial relationship with an imperial power (Ibid., 9192, 111-16, 118-20, 273-74). Due to this historical legacy, according to prevalent Bulgarian political attitudes, Bulgaria’s success requires alliance with a Great Power patron. This writer taught at the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) during 1994-2009, established in 1991 under the auspices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 7 The likelihood that Russia or neighboring Serbia would accept such a US government-funded development assistance project on their respective territory seems implausible (Landry 2011, 2-8, 20, 2-24). This unlikelihood stems from differing Serbian and Russian political attitudes towards external political involvement in their internal polities. After 500 years of Ottoman control, the Bulgarian 7

Estimates of the amount of US governmental financial support AUBG has received vary. The AUBG president in early 2008 stated that the total amount of financial grants AUBG had received from external sources was between $30 and $40 million (AUBG president email communication, January 8, 2008) (DeDominicis 2013). One former AUBG president estimates that as of 2013, AUBG received an estimated more than $120 million from USAID and its subsidiarity organizations alone (former AUBG president personal email communication, January 31, 2014) (DeDominicis 2014). George Soros provided additional substantial scholarship funding.

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state had much of its foundations laid under the “Sultanism” of the decades-long Soviet proxy dictatorship of Todor Zhivkov (Eke and Kuzio 2000, 531). In sum, the state is seen in popular attitudes as a distant, threatening, powerful entity serving its own interests. Gene Sharp is an analyst of non-violent direct action challenging the status quo that characterizes critical social movement reform activity. He portrays this stereotype as a monolithic or self-sufficient image of the state and its power capabilities (1973). It stands in contrast to a popular consent-based image of the state and its power (Ibid., 73-75; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, 8-9). The immediate post1989 political cultural legacy of colonialism in Bulgaria prevalent among the public has been that the authorities are to be circumvented or supplicated. They are less likely to seen as representative of the nation as the legitimate, final arbiter in social relations. In this stereotype, the authorities serve themselves and a small group of constituencies who seek personal enrichment (Petrunov 2006, 298-304, 320-23). Individual and group advancement occurs through cooptation into patron-client dependency relationships, with the top patron at the top of the pyramid being the imperial power. These parochial power relationships determine outcomes, not rights, rules and procedures for fair competition. In this Weberian ideal type dependent development legacy worldview, corruption is common because law traditionally has ultimately served an imperial other. John Dyer, who taught journalism at the American University in Bulgaria, quotes Vessela Tcherneva, an analyst at Sofia's Center for Liberal Strategies, “There is still a very strong notion the 10th of November [in 1989, the date of the collapse of the Communist regime (BD)] was a coup engineered by the communist elite for the sake of holding on to their privileges … The Bulgarian transition has been perceived as something relatively unfair. And rightly so. People don’t really see 1989 as something they have ownership over.” 8

Imperialism and Control The polarizations, paradoxes and dilemmas in Bulgarian national identity significantly stem from its largely dependent, colonial Balkan historical political evolution (Crampton 2006; Bickerton 2009, 742-45). A comprehensive understanding of Bulgaria contemporary political attitudes towards formal state authority requires an understanding of Bulgarian politico-sociological progression. It implanted the attitudes towards authority that generations of Bulgarians learned and passed on as political culture to their offspring. Below is a table summarizing the Bulgarian experience of imperialism, i.e. the historically dependent development experience of Bulgaria:

Direct

Indirect

Table 4: Imperialism in Bulgaria Formal Informal 1) Romans 2) Slavs 4) Byzantine Greeks 3) Proto-Bulgarians 5) Ottomans (14-19th century) 6) Russians (immediate 7) Russians/Soviets (1944-89) post-liberation, 1878-88)

The legacies of these imperial experiences affect the process of national value formation and behavioral attitude expression. These legacies include both the prevailing ethno-sectarian community basis for Bulgarian nationalism as well as the prevailing political attitudes that associate with it (e.g. Rock 2008, 49-51).

John Dyer, “Bulgaria won't be celebrating 1989: Bulgarians never reconciled with their communist past, and they worry about the present,” November 5, 2009, Updated May 30, 2010. Accessed January 13, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/europe/091104/bulgaria-communism-wall-berlin?page=full. 8

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In direct, formal colonial rule, the imperial power imposes its ultimate control through placement of a supreme political authority publicly representing the sovereign authority of the occupying state. This type of colonial experience has a greater potential to unify the native political elite of different constituencies in the community in the course of resistance to it. This form of imperial control is probably the least detrimental in terms of its legacy for state-society relations. The nationalist, local population at least can more clearly identify who the enemy is. In contrast, indirect-formal rule is in place when local, traditional elites rule in the community under the direction of the imperial power in the form of advisors, security arrangements, etc. It characterized immediate post-liberation Bulgaria. Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov expelled the Russian military advisers stationed in the country until the late 1880s following Bulgaria’s liberation from Ottoman rule in 1878. Indirect-informal imperial control is maintained without the overt presence of imperial personnel. Instead, the imperial power continues to exercise ultimate control through a local proxy elite. During the postwar period, Moscow exercised control through its client elite in local Communist parties and the respective security apparatus in each Warsaw Pact country. If these control mechanisms collapsed, the USSR would directly intervene, as in East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The USSR did not have ground troop bases in Bulgaria, unlike in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Kristen Ghodsee notes that Volen Siderov and his Bulgarian militant nationalist “Attack” party campaign in opposition to Bulgaria’s NATO membership. Siderov reiterates that throughout its history Bulgaria has never agreed to the long term stationing of foreign troops on its territory, not even Russian ones. Yet, as a result of NATO membership, Bulgaria is preparing to host several thousand US troops. Bulgaria is a more likely target of terrorist attacks as a result of such transparent support for US military activities in the neighboring Middle East (2008, 36-37).9 However, Katsikas notes that the Soviet navy did have permanent access to Bulgarian port facilities, stationing nuclear weapons at these sites. The Bulgarian Communist authorities denied their presence (2012, 28). Indirect imperial rule typically means that the imperial power does not acknowledge that it has ultimate authority within the country. It has only an embassy and the imperial power works through the local bureaucracy (Chandler 2010, 148-60). David Chandler (2006) argues that imperial powers today do not admit that they control countries because it is no longer publicly acceptable. Finally, in informal, direct imperial control, the imperial power invades and becomes the ruling class (e.g. Arabs into Egypt, Normans into England, Slavs and then Proto-Bulgarians into Illyria, Moesia, Macedonia and Thrace, Zionist Jews into Palestine, European settlers into pre-1994 South Africa). For individual social mobility through assimilation during the Ottoman period, conversion to Islam was beneficial. At the time of the 1878 beginning of the separation of the Bulgarian lands from the Ottoman Empire, at least 50% of the population of this area was Muslim (Brubaker 1995, 192). The period from 1888-1944 was a period of sovereign independence. But this period of independence also witnessed great national aspirations and great national defeats. 1888-1944 was a 56-year period in which the “national ideals” were ever present as an intense, if not always salient, foreign policy motivation not only among Bulgarians, but among all Balkan nations (Sardamov 1998, 4).10 These ideals were the liberation and unification, through war if necessary, of all of the Bulgarian lands into a sovereign Bulgarian nation state. It was briefly and tantalizingly achieved with the Treaty of San Stefano, the first treaty ending the 1877-78 RussoTurkish War. This war was fought under the banner of humanitarian intervention to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire who were in revolt. Russia’s intervention in support of 9

In July 2012, a suicide bombing of an Israeli tour bus in the Bulgarian port and resort city of Burgas killed seven (BBC, “Hezbollah linked to Burgas bus bombing in Bulgaria,” February 5, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21342192.) 10 The “national ideals” was a concept and phrase this writer first encountered among his Bulgarian students at the American University in Bulgaria.

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a Bulgarian uprising initially enticed with the prospect of the creation of a new Bulgarian state with territory substantially larger than the one that exists today:

Figure 1: “Differences in the boundaries of Bulgaria according to the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty” Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bulgaria-San_Stefano-Berlin_1878.jpg

British fears that Bulgaria would be a Russian satellite threatening British imperial interests in the region led to a reduction in Bulgaria’s territory at the subsequent 1878 Congress of Berlin (Haigh 1990, 266-67). A major focus of Bulgarian irredentist foreign policy and recurrent, devastating wars until 1944 remained reestablishing the San Stefano borders. In two world wars, Bulgaria allied with Germany against Serbia and Greece, the Balkan allies of France and the UK that conquered most of Macedonia in 1912-13. The final result is today’s borders (maps not to scale):

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Figure 2: Contemporary Bulgaria (postwar) Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bulgaria.jpg

The Legacy of Communism Communist Bulgaria bordered on two NATO member states and traditional adversaries: Greece and Turkey. To the west lay Tito’s Yugoslavia which laid claim to the Pirin region of southwestern Bulgaria (the location of AUBG, in Blagoevgrad) as part of the historic region of Macedonia. 11 Communist Bulgaria first attempted to accommodate this claim by forcibly designating the indigenous population in the region as Macedonian in individual identity documents. The policy generated hostility from Bulgarian national self-identifiers. Then it rejected this same policy following the state of relations between Belgrade and Moscow, the latter being Bulgaria’s superpower patron. After the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, Bulgaria withdrew “Blagoevgrad” is the postwar name for “Gorna Dzhumaya.” The latter name combined Slavic elements (e.g. “Gorna,” i.e. “High,” “Top,” “Upper,” “Mountain”) with old Turkish (“Dzhumaya,” i.e. ~ “Friday,” i.e. ~ “Market”). The Communist authorities changed the name to commemorate Dimitar Blagoev, an Aegean Macedonian (i.e. from what is today part of Greece) refugee and the founder of what became the Bulgarian Community Party at the turn of the century. Unlike other Bulgarian cities, the post-1989 authorities decided not to revert to the pre-Communist era name. Gorna Dzhumaya [“GD,” in Latin (not Bulgarian Cyrillic) letters as written] remains the name of a popular brand of cigarettes in tobacco-producing Bulgaria, an economic occupation associated today with the Bulgarian Turkish minority (Neuberger 2013, 226-27). 11

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from a Yugoslav plan to create a Balkan federal state including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. Romania and Greece would have joined later (Katsikas 2012, 25). Immediately upon his arrival at AUBG as a new faculty member in 1994, a student presented to this writer as a gift a 900+ page volume of documents. Translated into English, it is entitled, Macedonia: Documents and Materials, compiled, edited and published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1979. Originally published in Bulgarian in 1978, “The documents in this volume demonstrate not only the inseparable ties of the population in Macedonia with the population in the rest of Bulgaria’s territory, but also its direct participation in the all-Bulgarian historical process and in the entire political and cultural history of the Bulgarian people” (5-6). The totalitarian component of Soviet imperialism left a significantly different ideologicalattitudinal legacy in Bulgaria in comparison with Poland, for example. This legacy interacted with the earlier collective memory of Slavic Orthodox Russia’s critical role in Slavic Orthodox Bulgarian national liberation in 1877-78.12 According to Vodenicharov, the new Bulgarian Communist authorities succeeded in fusing Communism with the prevailing, traditional parochial clan and patriarchal authority structures. The imposition of de facto political caste privileges on the basis of the mythos of rank in the antifascist struggle was readily accommodated in Bulgaria. After centuries of feudal domination, including five centuries within a Muslim empire, in the 1970s the Communist authorities sought to reconstruct Bulgarian national identity. It was part of their legitimation formula. The focus was on autochthonic themes: Bulgarian territory as a place of unique history and an indigenous spiritual community with roots in Thracian civilization and Bogomil Christianity. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was relegated to a secondary status in this secular religion. The policy focused on fusing the intelligentsia with the Communist nomenklatura to strengthen its control (2005, 8791). A Bulgarian counterpart to the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland as an institutional shelter for dissidents and organized dissent did not exist (Kubik 1994). Katsikas notes that Lyudmila Zhivkova, daughter of the Bulgarian Communist Party General Secretary Todor Zhivkov, promoted Bulgarian nationalism beginning in the 1970s. Her campaign intensified after the mid-1970s when she received far-reaching powers over television, radio and the press. She aimed to promote a sense of Bulgarian separateness and to increase national selfconfidence. She opened many theatres and opera companies in the capital and supported monumental preservation in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Moscow and Oxford-educated (history PhD), Zhivkova died in July 1981 at age 39 from a cerebral hemorrhage, never challenged despite widespread suspicion she was murdered. Her funeral witnessed the greatest public outpouring of grief since the death of King Boris III in 1943 (2012, 19-20).13 Meznik and Theime assert that no counter elite existed in Communist Bulgaria claiming moral entitlement, for example, as in Poland (2012, 198-99). The extent of this comparative lack of intelligentsia dissident community experiential knowledge, for example, is indirectly evident by comparing access to expatriate resources. Hundreds of thousands of Poles had left Poland 12 e.g. In downtown Sofia across from the national parliament building stands the turn-of-the century monument to the “Tsar Liberator.” While the figure on a horse lacks a specific name, it is clearly Alexander II of Russia, who ruled during 1877-78 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monument_to_the_Tsar_Liberator). The seat of Bulgarian Orthodox patriarch in Sofia, the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, is named after a heroic Russian medieval prince and Orthodox saint, with work beginning immediately after 1878 to commemorate Russian war casualties. Its name was briefly changed during World War I when Bulgaria and Russia were in opposing alliances, to Sts. Cyril and Methodius Cathedral (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Nevsky_Cathedral,_Sofia). The latter referred to the 9th century Byzantine (Greco-Slavic?) missionary brother saints traditionally credited with initiating the Cyrillic alphabet to translate the Bible and proselytize Orthodox Christianity among the pagan Slavs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyril_and_Methodius). Bulgarian nationalists often claim them as Bulgarian, while Macedonian nationalists claim them as Macedonian, while their place of birth, Thessalonica, today is the second largest city in Greece. 13 e.g. During this writer’s tenure 1994-2009 in Bulgaria, Lyudmila Zhivkova’s portrait remained in the wall mural in a conference hall of the National Palace of Culture that opened in 1981, “the largest multifunctional conference and exhibition centre in south-eastern Europe. It was opened in 1981 in celebration of Bulgaria's 1300th anniversary” [sic] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Palace_of_Culture).

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during and after the Second World War to live and work in western countries (Pacyga 2004, 26062). Many Poles with higher education returned to post-1989 Poland to contribute with varying degrees of commitment, and for varying degrees of time (Górny and Osipovič 2006, 44-101). Some western-educated offspring of senior Bulgarian Communist nomenklatura did the same, along with the return to Bulgaria of Simeon Saxecoburgotski, the son of Boris III. The Communist-era numbers of Western-educated Bulgarian elite offspring were comparatively quite small (Rossi 2010, 14). Some had a high profile during the transition particularly under the patronage of Simeon Saxecoburgotski, prime minister during 2001-5. 14 This difference was partly due to the fact that previous generational outward migration by the Bulgarian Orthodox Slav ethnic majority was comparatively low (Markova 2010, 2-6). Migration of a more tragic form involved resistance to forced assimilation of the Bulgarian Turkish and Muslim minorities. These forced assimilation policies happened regularly throughout Bulgarian post-liberation history since 1878, most recently in the 1980s. At the time of liberation of what is now Bulgaria, the Muslim population at least equaled in size the Orthodox, but subsequent violence drastically reduced the former to ~ 10% today (US Marine military training manual 1993, 81). Dr. Krassen Stanchev, the Director of the Sofia-based Institute for Market Economics, notes that in the most recent case, up to 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and Muslims resisted by moving to Turkey. Bulgaria at the time had a population of 8.5 million. They left their possessions and real estate, which were expropriated [Stanchev 2011, 6; Stanchev 2004, 6 (ft 1)]. These periodic expulsions had the effect of providing an economic plunder windfall for a significant number of beneficiaries among the remaining inhabitants. Comparatively, pre-1919 Versailles Treaty Poland experienced German, Austrian and Russian occupation since the late eighteenth century partition along with steady outward migration. Unlike the Poles, the post-1989 Bulgarian regime had neither the diaspora numbers nor a pro-Western, anti-Russian/anti-Soviet elite motivational mindset of comparable intensity to help drive reforms. The Bulgarian intelligentsia generally has been more likely to recognize the Communist period as one historical stage in the development of their nation. 15 The Polish intelligentsia, in contrast, has a more internally divisive, contested relationship to the Polish People’s Republic. The latter is more likely to be perceived as a manifestation of foreign, imperial occupation, particularly among the émigré population (Górny and Osipovič 2006, 32). Most convincing is the standard contemporary Polish discourse reference to the First (pre-18th century partition), Second (interwar Poland), and Third (1989-present) republics of Poland. The Communist People’s Republic of Poland is thereby marked as an alien regime (Chwalisz). Developments during this time are more likely to be contested rather than consensually accepted as national achievements. In sum, Meznik and Theime conclude that in Bulgaria right wing militant nationalist parties cannot ignore the Communist era. National Communism is part of a chain linking with the pre1918 and interwar periods in terms of being a nationalist spiritual community. Consequently,

For a description of the most prominent with Western business pedigrees, see Tom Buerkle, “All the king’s men,” Institutional Investor Magazine, September 1, 2002. Accessed July 18, 2013 at http://www.institutionalinvestor. com/Popups/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=1027272. 15 e.g. This writer purchased a 70 page large, illustrated children’s book published in 2003 in Bulgaria for adolescents entitled Владетели на България: Ханове, царе, държавници [“Rulers of Bulgaria: Khans, Kings, Statesmen” (BD)] Проф. д-р Милчо Лалков, съдействието на проф.д-р Драгомир Драганов [Prof. dr. Milcho Lalkov, with the collaboration of Prof. dr. Dragomir Draganov (BD)] includes book cover and internal picture illustrations and descriptions of Georgi Dimitrov (the first postwar Communist leader) and Todor Zhivkov (the Communist ruler of Bulgaria for 35 years). http://www.bookpoint.bg/ (Accessed July 19, 2013) ISBN: 9544743332, Издател: Кибеа, Издадена: 2003. The book description: “Тридесет и два исторически персонажа: ханове, князе, царе и държавници с доказана власт и влияние от времето на хан Кубрат до наши дни. Славата и драматизмът в управлението на една държава, призвана да бъде обетованата земя на българите.” [“Thirty-two historical personages: khans, princes, kings, and statesmen with demonstrated power and influence from the time of Khan Kybrat to our day. The glory and drama in the governance of one state, recognized to be the promised land of the Bulgarians.” (BD)] 14

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neither in Bulgaria nor in the academic literature is there a consensus on what kind of political extremism exists today in Bulgaria (Meznik and Theime 2012, 198-99).

The Bulgarian Transition The Bulgarian 1989 transition was surprisingly non-violent despite the systematic, stateauthorized violence against the Bulgarian Turks occurring so recently in the 1980s. The so-called “Regeneration” process of the Communist authorities aimed to force the Bulgarian Turks to Christianize their names and the names of their ancestors on all official documents. According to Amnesty International, hundreds of people died in resistance (“Turks of Bulgaria”). The Regeneration process was a futile appeal to Bulgarian ethno-chauvinism against minorities to stabilize the disintegrating Communist regime. This failure problematized subsequent appeals to Bulgarian ethno-sectarian nationalism for framing political reform and democratization entreaties (Kolev). This situation stands in contrast, for example, to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic who emerged on appeals to Serbian unity and irredentism. These appeals were first framed in terms of an “anti-bureaucratic” revolution against the pan-Yugoslav Communist party apparat, disintegrating under nationalist attacks (Silber and Little 1997, 58-69). In the Bulgarian case mass appeals employing ethno-sectarian romantic nationalist symbols are more likely to generate a more problematic response. These appeals include use of nostalgia for the romanticized positive aspects of the Communist period (Todorova and Gille, eds. 2010; Todorova, ed. 2010). Soviet aid to Bulgaria included large economic subsidies from Moscow and favored treatment within the old Communist regional “Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.” Bulgaria acquired, for example, designation as the Eastern bloc’s center for computer technology development (Katsikas 2012, 19). This designation continues to pay off today in Bulgaria. It continues to attract capitalist foreign direct investment in the computer software development sector because of its personnel resources in this area. 16 Bulgaria also attained another badge of modernity and national development during the Communist period. It acquired nuclear technology with the construction of the Soviet-designed Kozlodoj nuclear reactor complex. Mastery of nuclear technology is a globally recognized marker of achievement of national development (Sabato and Ramesh 1980). This infrastructure allowed Bulgaria to be a high-tech regional energy exporter until the European Union required closure of the older, Chernobyl-type reactors. Doing so was a prerequisite for EU accession, to the discontent of many in Bulgaria. 17 In early 2008, the Bulgarian Socialist (i.e. post-Communist) Party government under Sergei Stanishev agreed to accept Russian economic loans and terms as part of an energy package. It included construction of new, Russian-designed nuclear reactors at Belene. Belene had been the site of a notorious forced labor camp under the Communist regime. 18 Russian participation in the nuclear reactor project was part of a broader set of energy agreements between Moscow and Sofia under the Bulgarian BSP government. It included Bulgarian participation in the Gazpromled “South Stream” gas pipeline plan to supply the rest of Europe. 19 Under domestic and international pressure, the successor GERB-led Borisov government then prevaricated on how to proceed with the nuclear project. The role of Russian economic actors was a major topic of

US Embassy Sofia, 2006 Press Releases, “AES and Hewlett Packard Launch Major Investments in Bulgaria,” June 6, 2006. Accessed May 30, 2009, http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/aes.html. “Bulgaria faces a challenging year,” SETimes.com, February 16, 2009. Accessed May 29, 2009, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2009/02/16/reportage-01. 18 Anna Mudeva, “Bulgaria opposition urges freeze of nuclear project,” Reuters, April 21, 2009. Accessed May 29, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssIndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUSLL62127720090421. 19 Theodor Troev in Sofia and Ed Crooks, “Putin strikes deal with Sofia on South Stream.” Financial Times, January 18 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ba220f5a-c5bb-11dc-8378-0000779fd2ac.html 16

17

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dispute.20 Amidst the turmoil over Ukraine, this $45 billion “South Stream” gas pipeline has been blocked due to EU pressure on this poorest EU member state. It led to the resignation of the Socialist Party-led Oresharski government and calling new elections three years ahead of schedule in mid-2014.21 In early December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the South Stream project to deliver natural gas to Europe by a new pipeline through Bulgaria had been scrapped. Putin claimed that in bowing to EU pressure to halt construction in June, Bulgaria had forsaken up to $500 million in annual transit fees by being "deprived of the opportunity to act as a sovereign state." 22 This resignation occurred after many months of continuous protests starting against the earlier, GERB government of Boyko Borisov. 23 The instigator was alleged to have been involved in corruption and kleptocracy in electrical utility privatization deals with foreign partners leading to large rate increases. 24 Borisov’s resignation led to elections and the formation of the BSP Oresharski government. The latter was also quickly condemned in daily demonstrations for oligarchical corruption and kleptocracy focusing on exploitation of the internal security and intelligence ministries.25

Conclusion: Europeanization of Post-Colonial Bulgaria Media reports highlight EU leadership warnings of failure to improve Bulgaria-EU relations because of Bulgarian governmental inefficacy in combating official corruption. Specifically, the concern is that it may result in a strengthening of Russian influence in Bulgaria. 26 The Financial Times quotes from the report on the work of a panel of EU experts advising the Bulgarian government on combating corruption: “A close consideration of Bulgaria’s social and political situation leads one to think that there are risks for the nation’s stability. It seems important for the EU to acknowledge these risks and avoid any action that could lead to radicalisation.” 27 Russian displeasure over NATO-promoted regime change in Libya and elsewhere helped instigate its suspicion of EU partnerships with former Soviet republics including Ukraine. 28 The high public expectations deriving from the prospect of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in January 2007 have given way to widespread frustration and anger. They derive from the perceived failure of the Bulgarian authorities to exploit the opportunities available for improving the lives of Bulgaria’s citizens (Vassilev 2008). These failures include corruption, which of course the political opposition fiercely exploits against their governing opponents. Bulgaria, a country today of 7.6 million has the reputation of being the poorest and most corrupt member of

20 Sofia News Agency, “Bulgaria Ex Envoy in Moscow: Borisov, Exit Belene in Peace!.” August 13, 2011. Accessed January 1, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=131108. 21 Kit Gillet, “How Bulgaria fell victim to the tug of war over Ukraine.” Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2014. Accessed July 3, 2014, at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/0702/How-Bulgaria-fell-victim-to-the-tug-ofwar-over-Ukraine 22 Andrew Roth, "Putin, in Defeat, Diverts Pipeline." New York Times, December 2, 2014, http://search.proquest. com/docview/1629138674?accountid=10373. 23 “Bulgarian government resigns, early elections looming.” IntelliNews Today, February 21, 2013. Accessed mid-July 2013. Emerging Markets Information Service 24 “Bulgarian PM seeks to calm protests.” Agence France-Presse. February 19, 2013. Accessed mid-July 2013. Emerging Markets Information Service. 25 Diana Simeonova, “Shaky start for Bulgaria's new government.” Agence France-Presse, June 18, 2013. Accessed midJuly 2013. Emerging Markets Information Service. 26 Tony Barber, “Bulgaria ‘risks falling under Russia’s influence’,” Financial Times, July 20, 2009. Accessed October 30, 2009 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9fb8436e-7519-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html. 27 Ibid. 28 Text of report "Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the III Moscow International Security Conference, Moscow, 23 May 2014" published in English on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on 26 May, “Russian foreign minister addresses Moscow security conference – transcript,”BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, May 27, 2014. Accessed July 4, 2014 at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1528475524?accountid=14872.

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the EU. 29 It lost 520 million Euros in EU development funds because of EU Commission concerns about failures to act more forcefully and effectively against official fraud and corruption.30 Bulgaria is the first EU country ever to undergo such a sanction. 31 The humiliation from this invidious comparison with other European countries generates support for the political opposition against whoever is in power. They of course promise to expunge corruption involving organized crime from among the elite. The emotional intensity of the issue is reinforced by the universal Bulgarian awareness that 1 million people, disproportionately the young and most educated, have left Bulgaria since 1989. They did so because of the comparatively dire and frustrating economic and political conditions in the country (Vassilev 2008, 2). Bulgaria already had the reputation of being tardy in implementing the benchmark panoply of necessary economic reform transition policies. Ghodsee notes that these policies were familiar from very recent experience in other East European states for moving from a command to a market economy after 1989. Finally, 1997 was the year when new Bulgarian governments proceeded with these necessary economic changes following hyperinflation due to previous halfhearted economic reforms (2007, 32). Midway through its electoral mandate the Bulgarian Socialist Party government under Zhan Videnov resigned as a result of direct action throughout Bulgaria. The significance of these events included the use of “repertoires of contention” inherited from the Communist era’s educational system (Tarrow 2011, 39-41). Demonstrators in southwestern Bulgaria in Dupnitsa (40 kilometers north of Blagoevgrad), for example, blockaded transport routes to Greece from Sofia. In taking the national lead in action, they drew upon Bulgarian Communist education in which Dupnitsa was portrayed as an interwar national leader in revolutionary activity (USAID, 17). Indeed, at Dupnitsa along the Dupnitsa-Kulata road to Greece, stands a Communist-era monument to the “Dupnitsa Commune” established in the municipality in the early 1920s. The post-1989 authorities saw fit to allow it to continue to stand, albeit with no maintenance or upkeep as of 2009. 32 It symbolizes the generational challenge confronting Bulgaria, twenty-five years since the end of Communism, to reform the state on the foundation of a new national political culture.

Acknowledgement This article was produced through the support of the Catholic University of Korea research fund and with the support of the University of Illinois Summer Research Laboratory on Russia, East Europe and Eurasia. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful evaluations. The author would also like to thank the students at the American University in Bulgaria and the Catholic University of Korea whom the author had the privilege to teach for their insights and comments. Any errors are solely the author’s.

Doreen Carvajal and Stephen Castle, “Bulgarian corruption troubling EU.” New York Times, October 15, 2008. Accessed June 23, 2009 at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/world/europe/15iht-bulgaria.4.16989483.html? pagewanted=4&_r= 1; Stephen Castle, "SOFIA JOURNAL: 'Batman' Sets His Sights On Bulgaria's Godfathers." New York Times, July 21, 2011. Accessed August 3, 2011 at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E0D9133CF932A15754C0A9679D8B63&ref=stephencastle. 30 Kerin Hope and Theodor Troev, “Bulgaria loses €520m EU funds,” Financial Times, November 26, 2008. Accessed June 2, 2009 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b297b0f6-bb14-11dd-bc6c-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=62398742-53ce-11db8a2a-0000779e2340.html. 31 Ibid. 32 e.g. Alison Furuto, “Forgotten Monuments From the Communist Era in Bulgaria.” arch daily. (January 10). Accessed July 5, 2014, at http://www.archdaily.com/101626/forgotten-monuments-from-the-communist-era-in-bulgaria/. 29

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Benedict E. DeDominicis: Assistant Professor, Political Science, International Studies Department, Catholic University of Korea, South Korea

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The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies is one of eight thematically focused journals in the collection of journals that support the Interdisciplinary Social Sciences knowledge community—its journals, book series, conference and online community. The journal investigates the dynamics of globalization and the transformation of the local. As well as papers of a traditional scholarly type, this journal invites case studies that take the form of presentations of practice—including documentation of socially-engaged practices and exegeses analyzing the effects of those practices. The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal.

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