Irrigation and Drainage Systems (2006) 20: 205–223 DOI: 10.1007/s10795-006-9003-1
C
Springer 2006
Farmers’ perception on self created water management rules in a pioneer scheme: The mula irrigation scheme, India JENNIFER McKAY1 & GANESH B. KEREMANE2 Centre for Comparative Water Policies and Laws, School of Commerce, City West Campus, University of South Australia, Adelaide, SA-5000, Australia E-mail:
[email protected] E-mail:
[email protected]
(Received 15 July 2005; accepted 17 January 2006)
Abstract. During the past two decades with farmer participation in irrigation management moving to center stage, the traditional view of having a centralized control over the water resources for better management has changed. Nevertheless, success of irrigation management transfer depend on a whole set of institutional arrangements or the rules-in-use and the willingness of the users to comply and enforce and/or change the rules in the light of changing circumstances. There are many institutional analyses of water sector, much of them touch on law, policy and administration, and characteristics of the users. The present paper is based on the study carried out to examine the institutional arrangements in one of the water users association that was first in the Maharashtra state. It focuses on the institutional arrangements governing water use and distribution and attempts to elicit the perceptions of the members regarding the rules-in-use. The findings reveal that the WUA has been successful in devising and enforcing the rules for water distribution, fee collection and conflict resolution for over a decade. However, current socio-economic developments such as political heterogeneity have required explicit conflict resolution mechanisms. These issues have now become issues demanding immediate attention and may be use of existing courts or legal institutions will help the WUA sustain in future.
Key words: irrigation management transfer, institutional arrangements, rules-in-use, conflict management
1. Introduction During the past two decades there has been a major shift in the policies for irrigation development and reforms throughout the world. The traditional view of having a centralized control over the resources for better management has changed. Transferring partial or full management responsibility of the canal systems to the local farmer groups or water users associations (WUAs) is
206 a solution that has been tried around the world to counter the inadequacy of the public agencies to keep the irrigation systems in proper shape. As a result, farmer participation in irrigation management has moved from a peripheral issue to center stage (Meinzen-Dick, 1997) and the irrigators who were considered as beneficiaries are now considered partners in planning and development of irrigation (Parthasarathy, 2000). Transfer of irrigation management responsibilities from government agencies to farmers is now an important policy in many countries, including India. Farmer participation once limited to the traditional small-scale irrigation systems has now extended to even the major and medium irrigation projects throughout the country and Mula irrigation project is one of these and the first to initiate efforts in this direction. An analysis of the experience of irrigation management transfer programmes around the world shows that farmers’ involvement in water management has indeed led to a better and smoother performance of the systems (Kolavalli & Brewer, 1999; Vermillion, 1997; Kloezen et al., 1997; Thiruchelvam, 2004; Lam, 1996; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; Holm-Muller & Zavgorodnyaya, 2003; Narayanamoorthy & Deshpande, 2004; Parthasarathy, 2000). These studies further indicate that the success of management transfer ultimately depends on a whole set of institutional arrangements. Similar views are expressed by researches who have studied self-governed irrigation systems (Ostrom, 1992; 2000; Tang, 1992). Simply put, institutional arrangements are a set of rights that the users possess, and the rules that define their actions in utilizing the resource in question. However, institutional arrangements can be defined as “an organized, established, procedures that are represented as constituent rules of society or rules of the game” (Jepperson, 1991 cited in Bandaragoda, 2000). A similar interpretation is provided by North (1991) who defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human action”. According to MacDonald and Dyack (2004), “institutional arrangements are defined to include both administrative arrangements and the way rules that regulate water use and reuse are defined”. Thus, institutions set the ground rules that govern specific activities of the irrigators or the parties involved. In context of irrigation systems – institutions generally include the rules applied to operation and maintenance of the systems, designing cropping patterns, allocation and scheduling of water, conflict resolution, and to maintain a coordinated flow of action and transactions in the society (Commons, 1931; Marothia, 2002, 2003; Herath, 2002; Saleth, 2004). Although vast number of studies on management transfer around the world is available in the literature, most of these studies have focused on the impact of management transfer on the performance of the system (Lam, 1996; Brewer & Sakthivadivel, 1999; Kolavalli & Brewer, 1999; Sam-Amoah & Gowing,
207 2001). But Shah (2005) argues that, “analysis cannot be complete without understanding the institutional arrangements, which represent the working rules/the rules-in-use”. The present study is a part of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) project aimed at studying the water management institutions in India. It examines the institutional arrangements/working rules of the first water users association formed in Maharashtra state and attempts to elicit the perceptions of farmer-members regarding the working rules. The paper has five sections: section two gives an overview about the irrigation management transfer (IMT) process in Maharashtra with particular reference to the icon nature of the particular irrigation system under study. Section three explains the methodology adapted for the study and highlights the features of the WUA selected for the study. Section four includes discussion of the results under various sub-headings which is followed by the final section-conclusions.
2. Overview of irrigation management transfer in Maharashtra The long tradition of farmer participation in irrigation management in Maharashtra can be linked to the existence of the Phads-group of farmers maintaining the physical system, water allocation and distribution on small river diversions for the last four centuries (Datye and Patil, 1987). The early efforts to form a water users’ society in the State were made in 1937 by forming the Bagaitdar (irrigator) society at Samvastar village in Ahmednagar district (Lele and Patil, 1994). Similarly, during the 1972–73 droughts in the State, Pani Panchayats1 were formed in Pune district which demonstrates another instance of community participation for water management. However, these efforts were all limited to traditional, small-scale irrigation systems and have seen a decline over the period of time. But in the recent past, increased pressure on existing water resources, inefficiency of the public agencies to manage the resource system and pressure from donor agencies such as the World Bank has made the planners and policy makers in India and elsewhere to give emphasis to users’ participation in water management. The initial efforts towards irrigation management transfer in Maharashtra gained impetus in 1985, when the Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India issued a circular to all the States emphasizing the need for farmer participation in management of irrigation projects commanding an area of 500–1000 hectare and suggesting involvement of voluntary organizations to persuade farmers to organize for this purpose. The process gained further momentum with the incorporation of the irrigation management transfer (IMT) concept in the National Water Policy announced in 1987. Following these policy changes in the state, the Centre for Applied Systems Analysis in
208 Development (CASAD) a voluntary organization/NGO in collaboration with the Irrigation Department (ID) came forward to initiate an action research programme in one minor of the Mula irrigation project in Ahmednagar district. Consequently, the first WUA in the state was registered in 1989. Since then the process of devolution in Maharashtra has come a long way – the State Government took a policy decision to adopt a clearly defined and codified policy on formation of cooperative WUAs and handing over irrigation management responsibilities to them on all irrigation projects in the State (Naik & Amar, 1998). Further, the State government has recently brought in the Maharashtra Management of Irrigation System by Farmers Ordinance, 2004 (Mah. Ord. XXIII of 2004) which highlights that “water will be supplied only to WUAs on volumetric basis,” making formation of the WUA mandatory for the irrigators in order to receive water. At present about 822 WUAs are functioning at different levels in the State (Narayanamoorthy & Deshpande, 2004). 3. Methodology The Sri Datta Co-operative Water Distribution Society– the first WUA to be formed in Maharashtra was selected for the study. The society operates on minor 7 of the Mula irrigation project, which takes off from the Mula right bank canal (MRBC) and passes through Chanda and Rastapur villages (see Table 1 for additional features). Chanda village which happens to be the exact study area accounts for more than 60 per cent of the total command area of the minor and is 5 km off, to the east of the Ahmednagar-Aurangabad highway, Table 1. Features of the Water Users Association (WUA). Feature
Details
Name of the WUA Location
Sri Datta Water Distribution Co-operative Society Minor 7 of Mula Right Bank Canal (MRBC) Chanda and Rastapur, Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra 1989 306
Villages served Year of transfer No. of members No. of beneficiaries (including non-members) Cultivable Command Area (CCA) Irrigated Command Area (ICA) No. of sample farmers Source. WUA office records, 2005.
400 495 ha 361 ha 70
209 in Newasa Taluka, Ahmednagar district. The cultivable area in this region is estimated to be 4485 ha with about 500 ha of irrigated land. Surface and ground water are the major sources to irrigate sugarcane, jowar, wheat, bajra, and groundnut – the major crops grown in this region. Maratha is the dominant caste and together with Mali community account for more than 80 per cent of the landholders. More than 70 per cent of the farmers in the region have marginal and/or small holdings. Data for the present study was obtained through face-to-face interviews with the irrigators (members of the WUA) and key-informants which included officials from the Irrigation Department (ID) and office bearers of the WUA. The questionnaire used for the study was designed after considerable literature survey, consultation with ID officials, local key researchers, and also to fulfill the project brief from ACIAR. It used a number of 10 point likert scales translated into Marathi (local language) allowing the respondents to mark the document when asked for their perception whether they agreed or disagreed with the propositions. Enumerators were employed for conducting the interviews. Respondents were selected randomly from the list of members provided by the secretary of the WUA. A total of 70 respondents were selected so as to include at least 20 per cent of the total number of members. The data collected was statistically analyzed using SPSS statistical software to produce frequency tabulations and graphical representations. Cross-tab statistics and chi squared tests were conducted to examine possible significant relationships in responses like attitudes towards water allocation rules versus age and/or farm size groups.
4. Results and discussion The main focus of this study was to elicit farmers’ perception about the institutional arrangements governing water use and distribution in minor 7 after the transfer of management responsibilities to the WUA by the ID. Therefore, the data included limited socio-economic information helpful to make a post classification of the respondents into different categories based on farm-size and age group (Table 2). Distribution of the farmers across the different categories shows that marginal and small farmers together accounted for more than 70 per cent of the respondents. A similar distribution was observed for the entire region wherein marginal and small farmers constituted more than 75 per cent of the total population (Lele and Patil, 1994). The chi square estimate (3.90, p ≤ 1) is not significant suggesting that the sample is the same as the population. Majority of the respondents were in the middle age (64%) while the percentage of respondents in old age and young groups were 22.8 and 12.9 per cent respectively.
210 Table 2. Distribution of respondent’s across age and farm-size groups. Age group Young age (up to 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50 + years)
No. of respondents 9 (12.9) 45 (64.3) 16 (22.8)
Farm-size group Marginal (4ha)
Total
70 (100.0)
Total
No. of respondents 23 (32.8) 31 (44.3) 13 (18.6) 3 (4.3) 70 (100.0)
Note. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers.
4.1. Reasons prompting to form a WUA In India, water has always been delivered with substantial involvement of the state governments. But failure of the public agencies to manage the system efficiently resulted in pressure to find new ways for efficient water distribution to the farmers. To mention a few, Warabandi, Shejpali2 , Block system, and Rotational Water Supply (RWS) systems evolved and these water delivery systems prevail in many irrigation projects that are still under public management (see Lele and Patil, 1994 for further details). However, in this particular case (Mula irrigation project) the RWS system was adopted by the farmers and was a success. According to Mr. Nanasaheb Shinde (per. comm., 2005), “the success of RWS system followed on minor 7 of the Mula irrigation project was the driving force behind the process of forming the first WUA in the state”. Further, discussions held with the farmers and various stakeholders (ID officials, WUA leaders, NGO representatives) revealed that the process of forming a WUA was driven by several factors. The important among them as perceived by the farmers are water shortage, inefficiency of the ID, government policies, encouragement by a key person, and influence of other farmers (Table 3). Around 71 per cent of the farmers indicated water shortage was the main reason for forming a WUA. Seven per cent indicated inefficiency of ID as the most important reason. Surface water is the main source of water for irrigation in the region because series of droughts and depleting groundwater resources have made water a scarce resource. But inconsistency in water delivery during the ID regime worsened the situation as farmers were unable to receive the right quantity at the right time. Around eight per cent perceived that government policies related to water was the
211 Table 3. Reasons for forming a WUA as perceived by farmers. Reasons
Number of farmers
Water shortage Inefficiency of the irrigation department Key person influence Government policies Influenced by neighbouring farmer Total
50(71.4) 5(7.1) 2 (2.9) 6 (8.6) 7(10.0) 70(100.0)
diver for forming a WUA. Any effort that involves community participation is driven by some ‘local champions’ and likewise there were some farmers who believed that influence by others, either key persons3 or neighbouring farmers was instrumental in forming a WUA. 4.2. Farmer perceptions of the WUA administration The survey intended to understand what the members felt about the general administrative process of the WUA. A range of statements were proposed and the farmers were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statements. Results presented in Table 4 reveal that only about 18 per cent farmers perceived Table 4. Farmer perceptions of the administrative processes.
Age/farm size category Young age (up to 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
Process of forming the committee is fair
All caste Process of Committee members Bigger farmers choosing is fair in its have equal have greater leader processes hearing influence
1 1
6 32
6 36
4 19
4 16
11
12
11
7
3
20.88; p ≤ 0.001 1 1 11 0 28.12; p ≤ 0.001 13 (18.5)
2.78 13 24 11 2 8.03 50 (71.4)
1.63 18 23 11 1 9.34 53 (75.7)
0.56 7 15 6 2 4.26 33 (47.1)
2.72 7 11 5 0 5.73 23 (32.8)
Note. Only the number of farmers agreeing is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers.
212 the process of forming the committee to be fair. The field observations and discussions held during the survey indicate that over the period of time many political parties have emerged in the region and every party wants a stake in the management of the irrigation system. This sometimes posed problems in the process of forming a committee and it is understood when most of the respondents remained neutral to this proposition. Around 71 per cent agreed that the process of electing a leader was fair and more than 75 per cent agreed that the committee was fair in its processes. Although, Maratha is the dominant caste in the region, when asked whether members from all castes received equal hearing during the meetings, around 47 per cent agreed and more than 50 percent remained neutral. Therefore, drawing a conclusion that all castes received equal hearing and social disabilities of scheduled castes and other disadvantaged classes do not exist would be inappropriate (Lele & Patil, 1994). Further, when asked if the respondent perceive that bigger farmers have greater influence, about 33 per cent agreed with the statement. It is important to note that although the number of large farmers was relatively low they owned one third of the command area which was higher than any other farm-size groups (Lele and Patil, 1994) and it is plausible that they have greater influence in the proceedings of WUA. Chi square tests were carried out to check if age and/or the size of holdings influenced farmer’s perception regarding the administrative processes. Except for farmers’ perception regarding the process of forming the committee across different categories chi square estimates were not significant (Table 4). 4.3. Farmers’ perceptions on institutional arrangements It is understood that the process of devolution demands certain form of collective action (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). Collective action in general, refers to activities that require coordination of efforts by two or more individuals (Agarwal & Ostrom, 1999; Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999; Dantiki, 2005) and it enables the farmers to co-operate in the operation and maintenance of the resource system. Nevertheless, the incentive for individuals to cooperate is shaped up by a whole set of institutional arrangements. Therefore, institutional arrangements are the crux of collective-action problems as they make collective action more efficient for some tasks (Tang, 1992; Meinzen-Dick et. al., 2000; Marothia, 2003). Under any management regime, institutional arrangements play an extremely important role in managing the resource in question. In simple terms these arrangements are the working rules that define what actions the user(s) can take in utilizing a particular resource. In case of water resources management, the working rules refer to the rules for using or refraining from using the resource, and/or for monitoring, sanctioning and dispute resolution. It is
213 recognized that the rules to manage the resources devised and enforced by internally generated users’ group results in better outcomes than when they are externally imposed (Ostrom 1990; Tang, 1992; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; Rasmussen 1995; Lam, 1996; McCarthy, 2002). These rules are crafted to suit the local conditions (Ostrom, 1992) and hence vary considerably across regions/irrigation systems/users groups. On similar lines, the farmers in the study area report that they have been successfully devised and effectively enforced the rules for water distribution, fee collection and conflict resolution (Kolavalli & Brewer, 1999; Brewer & Sakthivadivel, 1999). But, after almost 15 years of experience in irrigation management by adapting these self-created rules, what is the perception of the farmers about these rules? What follows are the farmer’s perceptions regarding some key rules adapted for water distribution, fee collection and conflict resolution in the WUA under study. The results are presented in Table 5 through to Table 9. 4.3.1. Rules for water distribution In irrigation projects where the WUAs are operating the generally the ID delivers water in bulk to the WUA at the head of the minor on volumetric basis. This is based on the requirement submitted by the WUA for every season. Table 5. Farmer perceptions of the rules governing water use and distribution.
Age/farm size category Young age (up to 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4 ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
Having crop Regulating restriction is groundwater good use is fair
Water trading Water Present between distribution basis for members on crop-area charging should be basis is good water is fair allowed
2 23
8 33
2 5
6 26
0 6
6 4.45 11 13 7 0 8.51 31 (44.3)
12 9.94; p ≤ 0.05 18 25 7 3 5.53 53 (75.7)
1.94 4 3 2 0 3.31 9 (12.8)
9 4.02 14 19 6 2 3.09 41 (58.6)
0 3.91 1 3 2 0 1.93 6 (8.6)
Note. Only the number of farmers agreeing is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers.
214 A stage level recorder is installed on the Standing Wave Flume (SWF) constructed at the head regulators of the minor which helps to measure the water flow with reasonable accuracy. The recording of flows is done jointly by the canal inspectors from the ID as well as the WUA. Further distribution of water to individual farmers is done by the WUA on crop-area basis after comparing the quantity of water demanded (by WUA) and the amount sanctioned (by ID). When asked for their perception about this rule for water distribution only about 13 per cent agreed that the rule was good (Table 5). The farmers expressed that water distribution on volumetric basis would be a better idea. However, the WUA officials had their reasons for not delivering the water on volumetric basis. They believed that measuring the flows, computing the quantity of water, and maintaining individual farmers’ accounts were difficult and hence they followed the crop-area basis for water distribution. Chi square estimates indicated that all farmers; irrespective of their age group or land holdings had a similar perception about this rule. 4.3.2. Water charges and fee collection In most of the irrigation projects across the state where the WUAs are operating, the water charges for the societies is fixed by the ID on a volumetric basis (Rs/1000 m3 ) and the societies in turn decide about the water fees to be charged to the farmers. The societies are free to decide upon the basis to fix the water fees – crop-area, volumetric or hourly charges. However, charging on crop-area basis was widely adapted in the region and so is the case with the WUA under study. The water fees charged by the WUA were similar to that charged by the ID in projects which were still under government management. The fees included the operation and maintenance costs and varied across seasons and crops. In this case the farmers also paid nominal service charges at the rate of Rs. 30 per hectare to meet the overhead and administration costs in addition to the regular water fees. Members were interviewed to understand what they thought about the present basis of charging water fees. Around 59 per cent of the respondents thought that it was fair (Table 5). Although the farmers seemed satisfied with the prevailing basis to fix water fees, the survey went on to ask them if there was any independent body to fix water charges and also, their preference between alternative bodies who could fix the water charges (Table 6). Results indicate that all the respondents were aware that there was no separate body to fix the water charges. Around 96 per cent perceived that the managing committee decides the water fees in a meeting participated by the members. Recovery of water fees is one of the major functions of any WUA. In this case, the office records showed that the water fee recovery percentage was around 80 per cent as against 90 per cent in the initial stages (Lele and Patil,
215 Table 6. Farmers’ perception regarding decision on charging for water use.
Age/farm size category Young age to (up 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4 ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
Is there any independent body for fixing water fees?
Government
0
0
0
Who decides the water fees Management committee
Leader
Canal operator
9
0
0
0
44
0
1
0
0
14
0
1
0.56 0 0 0 0 1.27 0 (100.0)
− 0 0 0 0 − 0 (100.0)
2.04 21 30 12 4 1.01 67 (95.7)
− 0 0 0 0 − 0 (100.0)
0.99 1 1 0 0 0.66 2 (2.9)
Note. Only the number of farmers answering YES is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers who said yes.
1994). The decline in the recovery percentage indicates that there are cases of default payments. This was further supported when discussions with farmers and key persons revealed that there were defaulters. Hence, the farmers were asked about the possible reasons for default payments (Table 7). As the results indicate majority of the respondents (66%) perceived that lack of money to pay water fees was the main reason for default. Series of droughts in the region prior to the study period had resulted in severe shortages of water which further led to no or very less crop production, just sufficient to meet the family requirements. Moreover, there has been a substantial hike in the water fees over a period of time. For instance, the water charges in case of sugarcane over a period of four years (2000-2004) have shot up extremely. The water fees per hectare during 1990-91 for kharif, rabi and summer were Rs. 88, 132, and 407 respectively which increased to Rs. 1259, 2099 and 2939 per hectare respectively for kharif, rabi and summer in 2004–05. From the WUA’s point of view the hike in water charges has resulted in making profits, thus enabling it to maintain the subsystem at a satisfactory level. A previous impact study of IMT in Maharashtra indicates that Sri Datta WUA recorded the maximum profit out of water charges collected (Pant, 1999). However, from individual farmers’ point of view this hike is far-reaching. Given that majority of the farmers
216 Table 7. Farmers’ perception about reasons for default payment. Age/farm size category
Lack money
Don’t pay intentionally
Not satisfied with service
Others∗
Young age (up to 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4 ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
5 31 10 0.68 15 19 9 3 1.09 46 (65.7)
3 7 4 1.80 5 8 1 0 2.67 14 (20.0)
1 3 1 1.53 1 1 3 0 2.87 5 (7.1)
0 4 2 1.16 2 3 1 0 0.34 6 (8.6)
Note. Only the number of farmers answering YES is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers. ∗ Others include emergencies like marriage, health care, etc.
interviewed were small or marginal, the reason of no money to pay these heavy water charges is understandable. Above all, the latest development in the Maharashtra State water policy in the form of the just-passed (April, 2005) ’The Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority Bill’ will put irrigation beyond the reach of most of the farmers. According to one of the clauses (clause 14) of the bill, “farmers with more than two children will now get irrigation water on 1. 5 times the payment set for others”. Among several things listed in the bill one thing of particular concern is “drastically increasing and rationalizing current water rates” (Sainath, 2005). It is understood that the poor have larger families and so it will be them who will pay the price under the new bill, which will worsen the situation of the small and marginal farmers in the state. The other reasons for default as perceived by farmers were default with intention (20%) and dissatisfaction with the delivery services (7%). The chi square estimates were not significant indicating that farmer’s perceptions about fee collection across different age and farm-size groups were similar. 4.3.3. Water management by crop restriction The members of WUA had no restrictions on crops able to be grown. Nevertheless, the WUA encouraged the farmers to take up less water intensive crops, particularly during summer in order to sustain large areas within the allocated water quota. When farmers were asked whether having restrictions on crop is good as in case of Pani Panchayats which were quite popular in
217 the state (see Deshpande & Reddy, 1990 for more details), around 44 per cent of the respondents agreed that the proposition of water management by crop restriction was a good idea (Table 5). 4.3.4. Conjunctive water use and water trading During the field walks in the area it was observed that some farmers had their own private bore wells as an alternative source of irrigation (mostly owned by non-members). Although detail information about the total volume, cropped area etc. related to groundwater were not collected, farmers expressed that the resources were depleting and so the farmers were asked about their views on regulating the groundwater use by restricting farmers from digging own bore wells. Though the bore wells were owned mostly by non-members it is important to note that even they were entitled to receive water from the canal. More than 75 per cent agreed that restricting farmers from digging bore well is a good idea (Table 5). The chi square estimate was significant indicating that perception about groundwater regulation varied with the age and most of the farmers who agreed were middle age. However, there was no difference in the perception of the farmers across different farm size groups. The interview included a proposition on allowing the farmers to sell their allocated water to the neighbouring farmers. By “selling” we meant sale of water for cash or kind and not switching turns which is sometimes followed by the farmers in the study area. Given the facts that water was a very scarce resource in the study area and farmers felt the present amount of water allocated to them was not sufficient to irrigate their own lands (particularly in dry seasons), it is clear why only eight per cent agreed that farmers should be allowed to sell their allocated water to the neighbouring farmers. These farmers were mostly who had a private bore well as an alternative source for irrigation. 4.3.5. Conflicts and conflict management Conflicts in natural resource management arise due to disagreement over access to, and control and use of, natural resources (Matiru, 2000). Discussions with the ID officials, leaders of WUA and farmers in the study area revealed that, conflicts in any irrigation project (particularly in Maharashtra state) arise over four major issues viz., unauthorized use of water (without allotment); breaking the rotational sequence; illegal use of water (damaging canals, disturbing field channels etc.), and wastage of water. So was the case with the project under study. The ID dealt with the conflicts prior to the formation of the WUA through a process known as Panchanama4 which is still practiced in schemes still under public control. However, since the WUA is formed the conflicts are handled internally and there is a mention about handling the conflicts or disputes in the agreement signed between the ID and WUA which states that, “in the event of any disputes between and within WUA it will
218 Table 8. Farmer perceptions on conflict and its management. Age/farm size category Young age to (up 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4 ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
Conflicts between members are common
The conflict resolution mechanisms are clear
Head-reach members take too much water
2
2
3
10
13
7
2 4.64 7 6 1 0 6.27 14 (20.0)
6 2.74 7 9 4 1 1.06 21 (30.0)
5 5.54 6 8 1 0 5.93 15 (21.4)
Note. Only the number of farmers agreeing is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers.
be resolved by a panel of representatives of the WUA, ID and the voluntary organizations in presence of the accused and the complainant.” The discussions with WUA leaders indicated that there were no conflicts since the formation of the WUA. Moreover, there were no documents with the WUA about any complaints being registered. However, the survey went on to know what the farmers thought about the conflicts and its management (Tables 8 and 9). Around 20 per cent of the farmers perceived that conflicts were common within the WUA while most of them remained neutral (65%). As a proxy to check occurrence of the conflicts farmers were asked if they thought head reach farmers took more water than farmers at the tail, since this in most cases result in conflicts. Around 21 per cent perceived that head-reach farmers along the minor took more water and again around 41 per cent were neutral. Therefore, based on the study results and field observations, it is clear that, though not common, there were conflicts between members of the WUA regarding water distribution. So when asked about their satisfaction with the way conflicts were resolved, around 30 per cent were satisfied as they perceived the conflict resolution mechanisms to be clear and explicit. But, in reality, the WUA has no explicit mechanism to resolve conflicts like the Panchanama. As mentioned by the leaders of the WUA, subjecting the accused to ‘social pressure’ (which we took to mean social isolation) will resolve the conflicts. But, when farmers were asked about the actual process adopted to resolve the conflicts, 90 per cent of the farmers said it was done through intervention of an
219 Table 9. Farmers’ perception regarding conflict resolution mechanism. How are the conflicts between members resolved? Age/farm size category
By users themselves
By management committee
Canal operator intervention
Intervention of external agency
Young age (up to 30 years) Middle age (31–50 years) Old age (50+ years) Chi square-χ 2 Marginal (4 ha) Chi square-χ 2 Total
3
2
2
9
2
1
1
41
1
1
3
13
1.05 2 3 1 0 1.71 6 (8.6)
− 2 1 1 0 − 4 (5.7)
1.60 3 1 1 0 1.84 5 (7.1)
− 21 26 12 4 − 63 (90.0)
Note. Only the number of farmers answering YES is tabulated figures in parentheses indicate percentage of sample farmers.
external agency (NGO/ID). The actual process as described by one of the member, “whenever there is a conflict, it is reported to the management committee through the patkari (canal operator). Later, in a meeting held on the previously informed date, the committee decides about the actions to be taken against the offender in presence of the members and representative of the NGO and ID.” It is in line with the process mentioned in the initial agreement signed between the ID and the WUA while forming the water users’ society. The chi square estimates indicated that farmers across different age and farm-size groups had similar perception about the conflict and the resolution process adopted by the WUA. 5. Conclusions The studies on common pool resource management have established that self-governing institutions can manage the systems more effectively than the government (Tang, 1992; Ostrom, 2000, Lam, 1998 cited in Ostrom, 2000). But, success of these institutions depends largely on the effective design and enforcement of self-created rules/working rules which are more relevant to local circumstances and based on the farmers’ own experience and knowledge of the resource (Tang, 1992). Normally, institutional analysis of water sector focuses on law, policy and administration, the three pillars of water institutions
220 without understanding the institutional arrangements. Therefore, the present study focuses on the institutional arrangements governing water use and distribution in Sri Datta Cooperative Water Distribution Society, Maharashtra, India and tries to elicit the perception of farmer-members regarding the same rules. The findings reveal that since its inception the WUA has successfully devised and enforced the rules for water distribution, maintenance, and fee collection. It appeared that farmers had no major problems with the existing water allocation method (based on crop-area) but they expressed that volumetric deliveries was desirable. Although, the WUA has its reasons for following this method there is always an opportunity to break away from this rule and follow allocation by time as this leaves up to individuals to decide how to use water on their lands. Similar method is being followed by the Ozar WUA5 in the neighbouring district Nashik which is quite successful. Regarding conflict management, although there are no clear rules to handle the conflicts, the WUA is doing well to resolve the conflicts by relying on social isolation of the accused. But, given the current socio-economic developments such as political heterogeneity in the region, such circumstances would not be effective because under politically heterogeneous situations the sustenance of group efforts is doubtful (Narayanamoorthy & Deshpande, 2004). One solution may be to subject decision making to external scrutiny through tribunal or court. The results of this study are the perceptions of the farmers who are directly involved in the processes of the WUA. The suggestive findings of this study can therefore be used to mitigate problem areas and bottlenecks and thus, using Shah’s (2005) expression, “prevent the institution from being temporarydisappear/decline/stagnate”. Acknowledgments The authors thank the following: Australian Center for International Agriculture Research (ACIAR) and the University of South Australia for providing financial support to carry out this study; the respondents, WUA office bearers, and the Irrigation Department officials for their kind cooperation during the study; A. Naryanamoorthy and people at SOPPECOM for their guidance and support during the field survey. The authors also thank G. S. Naik and family for their continuous support throughout the study. Finally, the authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. Notes 1. Pani Panchayats are the innovative community lift-irrigation schemes operating in Pune district, Maharashtra, India.
221 2. Shejpali is the traditional water distribution system in Maharashtra state wherein water supply is by turns from tail to head. 3. Mr. G. A. Shete, a farmer and Mr. Nanasaheb Shinde, a teacher with interest in farming were the two local key persons along with the people from CASAD. 4. Panchanama is a statement showing the details and nature of irrigation offences recorded by the canal operator and signed by two witnesses 5. Ozar WUA was studied as a separate case under the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) Project aimed at studying the water management institutions in India.
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