The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe Tomasz Zarycki

Copyright  1999 Tomasz Zarycki

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I. General introduction

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I. General introduction Goals of the study The main aim of the present study is to analyze the structure of regional political cleavages in the Central Europe. After the break-up of the Communist system, we are witnessing the emergence of the new political systems in the newly democratized states. This process is followed by numerous observers in the academic, political and other communities. One of the major questions arising in this context is concerning the structure of the political cleavages, which will define the logic of political systems in the post-Communist states. Over the last period, we could follow the constant flow of publications presenting several more or less successful hypotheses concerning the new cleavage structure and later increasingly documented empirical studies presenting results of more or less systematic research. A part of the later kind literature will be discussed in the present study. The coverage of the subject by the classical political science and sociological studies seems to be increasingly satisfactory. This is especially true about the Visegrad countries and even more specifically Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. These states have been already analyzed quite systematically both by the local and foreign specialists. We also have a considerable set of studies prepared from the international comparative perspective. The situation is less optimistic in the states 1 of the former Soviet Union , where in most cases neither the political scenes nor the political studies are fully developed. However, for all countries we have more or less systematic knowledge about their political systems structures. In the meantime, this is not the case with the regional aspect of the political processes. Spatial differentiation of political and social phenomena remains one of the relatively neglected aspects of the study of Central European transformation. It concerns first of all the lack of comparative studies which are already relatively copious in the area of political science. The study of regional structures of political processes can have several important benefits. First, it allows learning how significant is the spatial differentiation of the political and social space of the post-Communist countries. Such knowledge will help to overcome often quite simplified perceptions of the countries, which are sometimes perceived as homogenous territories and associated with stereotypical images. In most cases, Central European countries should be rather seen as having complex, multi-dimensional spatial structures and especially interesting differentiation of electoral behavior, all related to numerous underlying factors. The other benefit of regional (or in more general terms 'ecological') analysis is that it can be regarded as an important supplement of the classical sociological and political science analyses. It can reveal several unknown or unnoticed aspects of political structures and conditions of voting behavior. We can adduce here the examples of strong regional traditions, historical heritage, or regional differences in economic situation. As we will show, the ecological analysis offers attractive methods of international comparisons, allowing to discern the multi-dimensional political structures on the base of their regional basis. A very useful procedure, which will be performed in the present study, is the comparison of the results of the political structures obtained as result of classic survey based studies of political scene with outcomes of the regional analysis. Summarizing, the main goals of the present study could be formulated in the following way: - To investigate the political cleavages structure in the Central European countries on the basis of regional differentiation of the voting preferences. The investigation would include establishing the structure of significant cleavages and their political and geographical interpretation - To visualize (map), describe and study spatial patterns of the revealed factors.

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Probably Russia has the best coverage in the region since it attracts the attentions of numerous researchers. Most often other republics of the former Soviet Union lack serious and systematic studies of their political systems.


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- To establish the regional factors related to the spatial patterns of revealed regional political cleavages. - To analyze the relations between regional patterns and general political cleavages revealed in political and sociological studies. - To perform the international comparison of the four above-mentioned problems in order to establish to what extent the regularities observed in particular countries have universal character. One of important aims of this study will be also to try to interpret the structures of Central European regional political cleavages against the background of the Western theories on the subjects.

Approaches to the study of cleavages The analysis of political cleavages is one of the important tools of the political sciences and political sociology. While cleavage seems to be one of the core concepts of these disciplines, its meanings and operational definitions remain highly diversified. It is not surprising since "cleavage" can be understood in different ways and analyzed from different point of views with use of different techniques. This work will also be an example of such plurality in conceptualization of notion of cleavage. Let me remind at the beginning some of the complexities related to the notion of cleavage. First of all, the question of relations between political and social spheres could be mentioned. 'Political cleavages' are first of all political concepts, defined in terms of political attitudes and behaviors. However, social factors, usually provide the basic underlying structures on which political cleavages emerge. The interpretation of the cleavages is often impossible or impaired without the analysis of the social aspects of political divisions. Quite often political conflicts may seem to be identical with important social cleavages, this however, at least from the methodological point of view does not imply that they are the same thing. Political cleavage exists in a separate, political dimension. Bartolini and Mair (1990) consider establishing a theoretically autonomous definition of cleavage as a concept which links social structure and political order. It would have a similar character to the Marxist conception of class and be considered as a purely descriptive notion or a tool of analysis. On the other hand, the same authors point out to the independent, objective existence of political cleavages, which once they become institutionalized, they develop their own strength and start to influence the social, cultural and political life. Thus, cleavages have their own histories, independent of their social bases and may even reveal a stabilizing influence on political and social system. This dichotomy in the ontological status of the cleavage is also reflected in the different ways of practical analysis of political system. On one side, when cleavages are defined as "the criteria which divide the members of a community" (Rae and Taylor, 1970) the analysis of cleavage system is based on the examining of the political relevance of different social criteria. On the other hand, from the point of view of "independent" understanding of the cleavage we should first look for important dividing lines in the political system and only them analyze their social bases. It may appear that some of the cleavages, even those having considerable political importance do not have clear social basis. The reasons could be different. First a cleavage, even if originally aroused on the social conflict could, as we have already mentioned, evolve into a new independent structure and occupy new positions far from its original social roots. However, the reason for the lack of the correlation between some of the political and social lines of division could lie in the nature of the data we have on the social structures. They may always turn out to be incomplete or not sufficiently detailed or compatible with our political data. The number of possible social indicators one could imagine is in unlimited and it usually not easy to predict which of them could have political relevance. Taking into account these and other arguments in this study, we base our analysis on the second type of the theoretical definition of cleavage and its practical way of analysis. Another problem relates to the scope of definition of the notion of cleavage. Rae and Taylor (1970) distinguish between ascriptive (trait) cleavages (e.g. race or caste), attitudinal (opinion)

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cleavages (e.g. ideology or preference) and behavioral (act) cleavages (e.g. voting and organizational membership). From such perspective, we would understand political cleavage in this study in its third meaning. However, Bartolini and Mair (1990) consider the three categories of Rae and Taylor could be perceived as three constitutional aspects of every cleavage - empirical, normative and organizational/behavioral or in other words social-structural, cultural and political. Thus, according to them, "the cleavages can not be reduced simply to the outgrows of social stratification; rather social distinctions become cleavages when they are organized as such". The triple-component model of cleavage seems to be an elegant solution for theoretical definition the relations between different aspects of the phenomena. It can not however solve all practical problems, which appear in the analysis of cleavages. The most influential model of the system of political cleavages in Europe has been proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Let us remind that they have argued that four main political cleavages in the countries of the Western part of the continent could be discerned. They could be seen as the outcomes of the two revolutions. National revolution has produced religious (religion-secularism or Catholicism vs. Protestantism) and cultural-ethnic (center-periphery) conflicts which later become the bases of the modern political cleavages. Industrial revolution resulted in emergence of the urban-rural (agriculture-industry) and class (employers-employees) conflicts, and finally political cleavages. Since the time of the publication of the works of Lipset and Rokkan, several other authors have presented their supplementing or alternative visions of the cleavage systems in Europe. In the approach of Lijphart (1984) the four classical cleavages should be supplemented with two others: conflicts over support of liberal-democracy (with communists and fascists opposing it) and conflict over foreign policy (national isolationism versus national integrationists). Several other theoretical propositions have been put forward. Among the most prominent the impact of the state on the producing sectorial divisons of interests (e.g. Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985) and the emergence of the post-industrial cleavage produced by expanding education and changes in economy (e.g. Inglehart 1977) should be quoted. In the first case, the main axis of conflicts appears to be between public vs. private sectors, also public vs. private housing tenure. In the case of the second cleavage conflict runs between adherents of the new 'postmaterial' values (e.g. ecology, and those following the 'old' style of thinking. Kitschelt (1995b and 1997) on the other hand supports the classification of political cleavages into three main classes taking instead of the historical starting points, on which the Lipset-Rokkan approach was based, more abstract criteria of the main groups of principles according to which the societies are organized. The first group of cleavages concerns the definition of citizenship, where on one hand universal individual rights are provided to everyone, whereas in the opposite conception the citizenship is defined by ethnic and cultural status. The second group of cleavages concerns the choice of governance structures such as political participation and individual liberalism. On this cleavage, social and political liberalism is contrasted with social and political authoritarism. The third type of cleavages concerns the economic system solutions, mainly the rules of resources redistribution. Thus, we find here the classical opposition between free-market economic liberalism and economic populism calling for wide state-led redistribution. Although in most cases this general classifications fits much easier to different cleavages in several countries that the Lipset-Rokkan system, on must stress that while emphasizes the essence of the political conflicts it does not help to understand its roots and contexts. Another interesting problem is related to the configuration of cleavages system in different countries. The simplest classification would be between single-cleavage and multi-cleavage political systems.

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The analysis of cleavages can be performed from different angles. One of the methods is the mass survey, where people are asked about their voting preferences, views on different issues as well as about their social characteristics. Such data allows to define the profiles of the electorate and determine the main issues dividing it. Even more detailed data could be gained through the expert jury assessment of the party positions. Interviews with competent specialists offer a possibility of asking more precise and straightforward questions concerning for example the importance of particular issues for different party positions. We are also able to compare the assessment of the position of the same parties by different experts and judge in this way the diffuseness of party location. In his case however, we do not have fully representative picture since the expert's opinions not necessarily reflect the popular perceptions of political parties. However, as several examples show, the results of elite and mass analyses of structures of political scenes are usually comparable. This was for example noticed by Kitschelt (1995) in the case of four East-Central European countries. The other approach, assumed in the present work, is the so-called ecological analysis using as its main basis the results of elections and socio-economic data on the aggregate level. Most often regional units of different scale are used, since most electoral and statistical data are provided according regional breakdown. Ecological analysis has of course several deficiencies. One of the best known limitations of the method is the so-called ecological fallacy. It points out to the fact that the inference about individual behavior on the basis of ecological analysis is not justified. In this approach to the study of cleavages, it is also much more difficult to relate concrete issues to the lines of the political divisons. Usually we use in this case indirect reasoning and speculate about issues related with cleavages on the base of the knowledge of parties and their electorates. On the other hand, many authors point out to unique advantages of the ecological method. First, in countries of the credible votes counting systems the official election results could be regarded as more reliable than 2 survey results and fully representative for the whole adult populations of countries . Secondly, ecological analysis allows to reveal the characteristics of particular regions and social milieus, which are not equal with the individual electoral behaviors. The ecological analysis basing on regional data can be also extended with the geographical and historical examination of spatial pattern. This is an excellent way of integration of contemporary statistical data analysis with the general sociological and historical knowledge which become the background for interpretations. At this point, we can see how the analysis of the political cleavages from the ecological point of view becomes an interdisciplinary undertaking. Besides political science and (political) sociology 3 obviously most important in this kind of research, history and social geography play equally important roles. History helps us here with tracing back the roots of political conflicts and together with geography, it may allow to explain the persistence of some regional patterns. One of the earliest and most famous geographical studies of the stability of regional voting patterns in the department of Ard che has been published by French geographer André Sigfried. In his study, Sigfried showed not only the persistence of regional differentiation of electoral preferences over the period of the Third Republic. He also has explained some of the spatial patterns in terms of the environmental influences. His analyses could not be however regarded as an example of simplistic environmental determinism which has been a sin of several of the early geographers. Several other studies have analyzed other unusual persistence of the historical regional patterns. A good example is the study of Italy and France by Dogan (1967) where he shows for example the persistence of the anticlerical political climate in some of the regions over the long period of time. More recently influential book of Putnam (1993) has attracted new wave of interests in the historical roots of the political differentiation of Italy.

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Especially, if we assume that non-voting is a form of political choice.

In some cases not only social by in some sense even physical geography may be useful in electoral analysis when looking for cases of environmental determinism.

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While comparing the sociological and geographical approaches in the study of political and social cleavages, we can be confronted with another theoretical problem. It seems quite obvious to make a distinction between cleavages based on regional and structural foundation. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) distinguish in this case between functional and regional (center-periphery) axes on which they have placed their four basic political cleavages of Western Europe. In such context conflicts between subject vs. dominant culture (center-periphery) and primary vs. secondary economy (urban-rural) cleavage were assessed as related to the particular place(region) in contrast to religious and class cleavages. However, we must notice that any kind of cleavage (also those not included in the LipsetRokkan schema) usually inhibits regional variations, often quite considerable. It is almost impossible for any social or political indicator to have completely equal value in the whole territory of a country. While at the beginning some of these regional particularities may have clear structural sources (e.g. high concentration of the workers in a given region) with time, their political effects can become the stable characteristics of given territory. Thus, a region can retain its left-wing political climate even after the marginalization of the working-class population. In other words the structural effect may become independent of its social base and in this way result in a regional effect. In French school of social geography, the particular characteristics and traditions of are often called the spirit or personality of region. Besides this, we can never be sure if the cleavages we are classifying as regional in contrast to structural (or functional) were not induced by some structural traits we are not aware of. In such case, there is always a possibility that separate class of "regional cleavages" could be used as a wastebasket for all cleavages of unclear social basis. Another theoretical issue is the configuration of cleavages observed in different countries. Kitschelt (1997) has singled out in this context three main types of party systems in Europe. The first one has "unidimentional left-right division in which the class cleavage over property rights and income distribution is structurally most salient." Such countries as Britain, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and most Mediterranean countries (France, Greece, Portugal and Spain) were included into this category. In Central Europe, the Czech Republic has been found to fall into this group. In the third type of party systems in Kitschelt's classification we observe two (or "one and a half competitive dimensions") main cross-cutting cleavages - class and religion. Three main political camps are discerned by Kitschelt in this context: first secular socialist and communist parties, second secular bourgeois parties, third strong religious parties. In this category of party systems Kitschelt includes such countries like Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, while in Central-Eastern Europe, Hungary, Poland and some unspecified Baltic countries. The third category was defined as multidimensional, where often ethno-cultural conflict cross cuts other dimensions. In Europe Kitschelt sees Belgium as the best example of such party systems and several unspecified countries in Eastern and Central Europe .

Methodology In our study we have decided not to present any detailed description of the patterns of support of the particular political parties or candidates in every country, which is usually a part of the studies on electoral geography. For those interested in such descriptions, we are giving several references to publications contacting such analyses. Instead, we have decided to present a synthetic image of the electoral geographies of all countries, which we believe, will be much more useful in comparative analysis. The main statistical tool used in the present study is factor analysis. It will be used to analyze the results of the elections in the regional breakdown. Votes for parties receiving over 2 or 3% (depending on the country) in the regional breakdown (e.g. according to voivodship in case of Poland) are included in computations. In result of factor analysis we obtain a limited number of factors which are defined by values of factor loadings of all included parties and share of the total variance they explain. On this basis, we undertake an attempt of interpretation of the nature of factors. This is of course possible only with the knowledge of the political profiles and other characteristics of studied parties as well as results of previous studies on political cleavages.

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It is worth to notice that such application of the factor analysis overcomes one of the major deficiencies of the use of this method, namely arbitrary selection of variables, which appear quite often to be interrelated, redundant and/or irrelevant (e.g. Janson, 1969). In numerous comparative studies, the same variables turn out to be not completely comparable. In other cases comparable variables may be not available for some countries. In our case, the set of variables is stable, well defined, complete and fully comparable since we deal only with the same kind of data - votes for political parties. Occasionally, some factor analysis of the social and economic data will be performed in this study, which will of course not meet such high standards, but the importance of their precision for our study is secondary. After the interpretation of factor structures is completed, we are preparing the cartographic representations of the factor patterns based on factor scores calculated for each studied spatial unit for each factor. This allowed first of all a visual study of the regional patterns of factors and their comparisons with other available maps. Besides, calculation of factor scores gives the opportunity to correlate them with different social and economic indicators. In effect, we posses several methods of assessing the relations between political structures and other spatial patterns. Combined they seem to be a good tool of analysis giving an important and often unique insight into the genesis and different aspects of causes of differentiation in electoral behavior. Finally, the method allows performing interesting international comparisons, on basis of analysis of the presence or absence of particular cleavages in political spaces of different countries and similarity of their structure. Application of factor analysis gives a synthetic image of electoral geographies of particular countries, allowing to avoid lengthy and chaotic descriptions of voting patterns of several tens of parties, which can be not only difficult to identify at one moment for many readers, but which are in most cases difficult to compare directly. Instead of this, we operate on the level of factors which, summarizing the information on voting on particular parties, allow for a simple comparison. Such method seems to be especially useful in the newly democratized countries, as Central Europe, where the abundance of parties and other political organizations is still a very common problem. Another advantage of using of the above-described methodology is overcoming of the problem of arbitrary classification of parties into different categories which is often a problem in similar studies. Such classifications, inevitably personalized, are moreover distorted by usually unclear criteria on which the generalizations are made. It is in fact quite often difficult to decide whether to classify parties according to their programs, ideological declarations, their self-qualifications (e.g. left, right, social democratic, conservative etc.), profiles of leaders, adopted policies, voting in parliament or prevailing popular perceptions of parties. In some studies not only the location of parties on issue dimensions remains arbitrary but also the question of definition of issues dimensions and their structure is problematic. This is for example the case of international comparisons where the same two-dimensional scheme is used arbitrarily for several countries (e.g. Vanlaer 1991, Antoszewski and Herbut, 1997). In our study, not only the location of particular parties on different dimensions is determined by the precisely defined statistical procedure, but the very structure of cleavages is independent of arbitrary decisions (the only exception of relatively low importance is the selective use of rotations in order to make the structure of factors more clear and interpretations which determine the factors explaining the lowest share of variance as politically relevant or not). We could also remind that the factor structure of the political space of the country allows comparisons with results of the analysis of political scenes performed by political scientists and sociologist. As we have already mentioned, they are usually basing on completely different data bases - mainly mass or elite survey results allowing to identify the position of particular parties or/and their electorates on the so called issues spaces. In these analyses very similar statistical techniques are used, most often different data reduction methods, including factor analysis adopted in this study. It appears that the main "issue dimensions" determined in general political and sociological analysis are largely comparable with the regional cleavages discerned in ecological analyses. As we will see, several differences may appear, in different approaches, but they seem unavoidable since even in political or regional analysis we encounter several different versions of the same political scene or structure of


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cleavages (e.g. elaborated by different author, based on different data set, or calculated for different elections). However, even these differences can be seen as a useful starting point for the considerations on the nature, adequacy and possibilities of different interpretation of calculation results. Finally, this is a basis for a deeper reflection on the relations between social structures observed in the regional differentiation and those discerned in representative groups for whole societies or just among political actors. In some cases, they are regarded as completely different and incomparable structures. On the other hand, we have cases when they are not distinguished. This is especially the case of Poland, where as we will show, the political and regional structures are very 4 similar and stable . The schema of analysis of each of the country cases has been summarized in the table below. We have distinguished two main components of the interpretation process: political and geographical. The first one based on the political sciences methodology and knowledge of party organizations (ideological profiles, positions on issue dimensions etc.) and the second one based on analysis of spatial differentiation, geographical knowledge and methodology. In this way we wanted to underline the cross-discipline approach of this study and show how both methodologies are integrated in the same study and lead to the same goal of interpretation of the nature of particular cleavages. In the table it is also visible that the main interpretative components of the study are located after the statistical analysis part, so that our possibly subjective interpretations do not influence the calculation results. SCHEMA OF ANALYSIS OF CLEAVEGE SYSTEMS IN COUNTRY STUDIES 1.

Preparation of voting results in regional breakdown (most often according to administrative units) for parties (or candidates in presidential elections) obtaining over 2 or 3% of votes. If possible data from for two latest general elections.

2.

Factor analysis

3.

Preliminary interpretation of results

4.

Possible varimax rotation (when factor structure not clear)

5.

Reduction of number of factors -elimination of factors explaining lowest share of variance and irrelevant politically.

6.

POLITICAL SCIENCE COMPONENT Interpretation of structures of factors as political cleavages on the basis of differences in party positions in factor loadings space.

7.

Correlation of factor scores of relevant factors (cleavages) with: - other elections results (if possible also in form of factor analysis results) - socio-economic data (when justifies also in form of factor analysis results) - turnout (when available)

8.

Preparation of maps of factor scores for each relevant factor (cleavage)

9.

GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENT Interpretation of cleavages on the basis of the geographical differentiation of factors scores and correlation analysis results.

10.

Confrontation of results of ecological and survey-based analyses. Comparison of the cleavage structures obtained in the present analysis and available results of survey-based analyses of structures of political scenes for particular countries.

4

A good example of such approach not distinguishing between regional and general cleavages is the article by Ostrowski and Przeworski (1996).

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The region The group of studied countries included the following states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. There were several reasons for choosing such group of countries. First of all they, represent the core countries of the Central European region. The Visegrad group was an obvious choice for reasons of its location, political and economic advancement in transition and good coverage by the academic literature, and accessibility of data. This group was supplemented by the two post-Soviet states with very different characteristics but both bordering directly with the Visegrad group and not belonging (at least partly) to the Eastern Europe region. However, one should not see only the trait former belonging to the Soviet Union as the main factor differentiating our group internally. We could find several examples of other crosscutting divisions, but let us mention only some here. Hungary, Lithuania and Poland are the three countries which despite their dissimilarities share the common feature of the well-known "returns of post-communist " i.e. victories of the left parties in the elections of respectively 1994, 1992, 1993. One could probably suppose that the importance of the catholic religion in these three countries could be seen as one of the factors explaining this similarity. Other examples of crosscutting dimensions of similarities between countries of our group could be related to the traditions of statehood. Ukraine and Slovakia are the youngest states in our group. Although they experienced earlier episodes of having their own national governments, the independence obtained respectively in 1991 and 1993 created the first stable and sovereign states of these nations in modern history. Czech Republic and Lithuania share some of the similarities of the XIX century process of revival of their national languages and cultures. Hungary and Poland on the other hand share trait of having the strongest and best developed national identities in the group. In general, Central Europe in this study is understood as a region between Germany and Russia. Our definition is of course an arbitrary one and should not be regarded as an attempt of the formal delimitation of the region. It resulted however in exclusion from the analyzed group several countries often regarded also as Central or Central-Eastern European. Thus, none of the Balkan countries were included. Belarus was excluded for technical reasons. Availability of credible electoral data in the country was highly doubtful. Already in the case of Ukraine we had encountered several problems in collecting the necessary data. Our group is of course a much-diversified one from other different perspectives. This could be regarded both as an advantage and obstacle in our analysis. It makes the comparisons more interesting but in the same time more difficult or even risky. A particularly difficult venture is elaboration of the conclusions and generalizations of the processes and structures observed in the region. They must be of course always treated with a great deal of caution. What should be especially dissuaded is the use of the generalizations proposed in the present study for all other countries of Central and Eastern Europe not included in the present study. The example of Lithuania may well prove that most findings observed in this country can not by any means valid even for other Baltic States - Latvia and Estonia, which differ dramatically in most social and political aspects. The same is true about almost of others possibly seemingly similar countries . In historical maps No. 1 and 2, we are summarizing the main border changes, which have taken place in the Central European region over the period of last one hundred years. The political situation before and after the First World War was sketched on the background on the present-day political divisions. The maps show well the instability of the political frontiers in the region. On the other hand, many of the lines from historical maps appear to be still visible in the electoral and socioeconomic patterns of spatial differentiation. Several cases of such persistent historical divisions will be discussed in the present study. Let us now review shortly some of the recent literature on political and geographical structures emerging the Central European region after the collapse of Communism. First, we will discus the political sciences perspective concentrating mainly on the emerging system of political cleavages.


9

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Herbert Kitschelt, known for his works on Western European politics seems to be also one of the leading researchers of the political systems of the Central European region. In one of his theoretical articles on the region, he proposes an interesting classification of countries related to his more general typology of political cleavages discussed above. He distinguishes three main types of post-communist countries from point of view of the characteristic of their former communist systems, which appear today to be very good predictors of the configuration of contemporary cleavage systems. First, there are the patrimonial communist countries, where the most important political questions are law, order and decommunization, but rarely family questions and morality. Both post ant anti-Communist as the main actors on the political scenes support different aspects of authoritarian agenda. It is not quite clear for us which countries would fall into this category according to the author's intentions. The other version of the system was called bureaucraticauthoritarian communism. Countries of this type of communist system were are characterized by the early industrialization, secularization and strong working-class movements. Their strength contributed to the marginalization of the religious cleavages and domination of the political scenes by the economic conflict. Kitschelt compares this type of post-communist systems with western unidimensional class-dominated type and thus sees Czech Republic as its best example. The third type of the old system is national communist regime. In countries of this type of communist systems we witnessed the negotiated transitions and early market reforms. Today we observe here two basic dimensions of political conflict. Thus, this group of countries is compared to the third group in the general classification with Hungary and Poland as the classic examples in the Central-Eastern Europe. A series of comparative analyses of political scenes has been published under the title "Studies in Public Policy" by the Center for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Stathclyde directed by Richard Rose. They have all been prepared by members of a group of political scientist cooperating in the framework of different projects analyzing Central European party systems. They include studies by Kitschelt (1995, based on elite surveys in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Markowski (1995, based both on elite and mass surveys, same countries as in Kitschelt) and Tóka (1997, based on mass surveys conducted in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). More detailed presentation of findings of these studies will be divided among national sections of the main part of this paper. The same authors have published widely on the similar subjects in other places, however in this study we will use first of all their above mentioned publications. There have been several others articles on system of cleavages in Central Europe published. They often present quite subjective image of the political scenes of the countries and present unorganized discussion based on very selective sources. Let us quote the example of the article by Rivera (1996) who has discerned the following cleavages in the second post-communist parliamentary elections in the region. In Czechoslovakia (1992): Reform-anti-reform, centerperiphery, state-church, in Hungary (1994): reform-anti-reform, land-industry, state-church and in Poland (1993) land-industry, reform-anti-reform. Evans and Whitefield (1993) have presented another image of the "bases of party competition in Eastern Europe". In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland they see only one dimension of political conflict on the base of socio-economic cleavages: "Redistributive, authoritarian, anti-West versus pro-market, liberal, cosmopolitan". In Slovakia with "lack of market success meaning little social basis for party competition" they observe limited dimensionality and "valence issues of anti-West, economic competence. Community defense among ethnic minorities". Similar lack of socio-economic party competition and even stronger ethnic background of cleavages is observed in Ukraine. Valence issues are identified as nation-building, antiWest, economic competence. In addition, community defense for Russians is perceived as important factor. Finally in Lithuania (I am only discussing the cases include in this study, not all countries analyzed by Evans and Whitefield) they see mainly socio-economic bases of competition and the following main dimensions: "redistributive versus market for all groups Lithuanians nation building, Russians/Poles community defense.".

5

Among his latest studies two books should be mentioned as most important: "The transformation of European Social Democracy" (1994) and "The Radical Right in Western Europe" (1995)

10


Several other points of view concerning the structures of the political scenes in particular Central European countries will be presented in the sections on country analyses. As far as the analysis of the system of cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe from the geographical point of view is concerned, the article of Jean Vanlaer (1991), seems to be one of the most comprehensive efforts at the analysis of the electoral map of the region. Although it uses a very simplified model of political scene for countries of the region and is based on the results of the elections only until 1990, it has several strong points. First of all, as many as 7 countries were compared (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia). Since Vanlaer included in his study several orthodox countries, he was able to show the importance of the religious divisions on the political map of the region. He was also able to show the impact of the historical borders mainly between the great empires of the XIX century. The most important aspect of the XIX century heritage is, according to Vanlaer, the difference in the scope of industrial revolution, which has been considerably advanced in the Prussian/German states and the Austrian part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In the same time, as Vanlaer reminds, Russia and especially Ottoman Empire remained largely agrarian and feudal societies. As a results of his study Vanlaer presents a synthetic map of the main types of political regions classified from the point of view of electoral behavior. The first type is "central regions with strong centrist and westerners support" which appears only in Bohemia. The weaker type of this zone is to be observed in some of the Polish towns, Moravia, northwestern Hungary, and Budapest. The second type of regions are catholic regions with the hegemony of the populist, right-parties. Polish part of Galicja (former Austrian sector during XIX-century partitions) is the only region of this kind. Most of the Polish territory belonging to Russia during the partition period ('Congress Kingdom' or Kongresowka) and Kaszuby region (Gdansk voivodship) were classified as a zone of the same type but with the very strong (not hegemonic) right wing parties support. The weakest type of this zone with strong right wing parties is to be found on the remaining part of the Polish territory, in almost whole Slovakia with the exception of the Hungarian dominated belt along Danube and in majority of Hungary with the exception of Northwest and Budapest. The rest of the map (Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) is dominated by zones of peripheral orthodox regions with different influence (from hegemonic to strong) of ex-communist parties and zones of dominance of ethnic and regionalist parties. As far as the electoral geography of the region is concerned, several separate studies have been published. The collection of articles edited by John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten (1993) covers several countries of the region (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Soviet Union) but lacks any wider synthetic regional comparison of electoral patterns. Bivand (1994) analyses regional patterns of electoral behavior in Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, his analysis is very much concentrated on technical aspects of application of spatial data analysis methods. In effect paper does not provide many generalizations from the comparative study. A very ambitious task of preparing synthetic electoral map of Central and Eastern Europe has been undertaken in the framework of the Atlas of Eastern and southeastern Europe published as a series by Österreichisches Ost- und Südosteuropa Institut in Vienna. Although a very large area has been covered by the map (Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, all republics of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the following Soviet republics: Belarus, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia and Ukraine) condensing the information in one map made it hardly readable. An interesting accompanying text by Weilgni et all (1992) concerns only the profiles of parties and candidates included in a map and presents a short history of elections in the area, while ignoring complete the regional questions and interpretation of the map. Besides, data included in the Atlas concerns only 1990 elections. Several other works on the electoral geographies of particular Central European countries and their structures of regional cleavages will be mentioned in the section of country analyses.

11


Before turning the main part of this work, we would like to make some technical remarks. The first on will be related to the terminology. Since the political systems of the Central European countries are relatively young, their images in the scientific, political, press, and other discourses are often described in several conventions, having often contradictory character. The lack of terminological consensus is best visible in the case of the "left" and "right" use. Both terms are of course very common tools of description of political scenes in all countries, but their understandings, connotation differ considerably depending on the country, political sympathies of the speaker/writers, context of use etc. In several countries, we can even come across the whole debates on the correct use and understandings of "right" and "left". In many cases, even in the academic literature, we can find the remarks on the alleged and "true" political "left" or "right" meanings. In most cases the problems and ambiguities result from the use of the left-right dichotomy for identification of differences in ideological and/or economic positions, sometimes even more specific issues as for example attitudes towards the communist period, without clear specification of the scope of the used term. Similar problems, which are related to "left-right" use, concern also the "liberal" and "conservative" labels as 6 well as several others . The other problem stems from the fact that terms "communist", "anti-Communist", "postcommunist" have also quite emotional connotations in the context of Central-European countries. One must be aware that in many cases use of the term "communism" does not refer to ideological profile of parties or persons described but rather to their historical institutional links with the communist apparatus. In Poland for example "communist" or "post-communist" label may even not imply any 7 left-wing propensity but only the opportunist character of a given person or organization. I must also point out to my very context-dependent use of "center" and "periphery" notions, as well as several others terms. Finally, some remarks concerning the formal problems in the comparative study of the selected countries must be added. First, important differences between the analyzed countries relate to the electoral systems, which are not the main interest of this study, but have an fundamental impact on the kind of data we are able to use. The most obvious cases are those of Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary where the direct presidential elections are not held. The other special case is Ukraine, where the electoral law makes the results of parliamentary elections hardly useful for the purpose of the analysis in our study. A more detailed description of this problem will be presented in the Ukrainian chapter. Another technical comparative problem relates to the considerable differences in the size and number of the regions used as reporting units in different countries for electoral statistics. The most problematic is the Hungarian case where we have only 19 administrative units, which probably 8 influenced the quality results of the computations . Availability of data was of course an important problem. Not all results of all post-communist countries could be collected. In some cases, we lack the data on more than one elections. However, the major problems appeared in the availability of comparative social and economic statistics in the same regional breakdown as the electoral data. In most cases the available data sets are quite different for different countries what makes it difficult to precisely asses the influence of particular factors on voting behavior in all compared countries. One must also be aware of the fact that in different

6

For example, Markowski (1995) presents an interesting discussion of different aspects of the left and right meanings and uses in different countries of Central European region. 7

In Russia, for example, the terminological conventions are completely different. The equivalent for Polish meaning of "Communist" would be probably "pragmatic", while in Poland Russian "Communist" should be probably translated as for example "fanatic Bolsheviks". 8

The rather unclear structure of Hungarian factor analysis results may not necessarily be caused by the low number of units. We have performed the similar analysis on different levels for Poland and Czech republics and irrespectively of the level of data, the results were very similar. In the Czech Republic analysis on the level of 8 big electoral regions (kraje) and 89 electoral districts (okresy) the main structure of cleavages remained the same, although they hierarchy changed.

12


countries the definitions and way of counting the seemingly same social and economic indexed may differ considerably.

13

II. Country analyses

II. Country analyses 1. Czech Republic In the analysis of the Czech case results of the last parliamentary elections of 1996 were used as the main base of analysis. They were also compared with 1992 parliamentary elections.

1.1. The factor structure. Factor analysis of the Czech data revealed two main factors to explain 74% of the variance in regional patterns of party support. The first factor accounting for 55.4% of variance could be labeled as the "left-right" axis in the specific understanding of these terms. Here on one hand we find the two liberal Civic Forum heirs - ODS and ODA. On the other side radical SPR-RSC party is the clearest opposition, next to Communist (KSCM) and slightly farther Social Democrats (CSSD). The Pensioners (Dochodci za zivotni jistoty) are loading on the left side of the spectrum with rather moderate values. What can be found to be the common feature of the parties grouped on the "left" side of this spectrum is their opposition to liberalism. We could also notice that their they represent political opposition until 1998, and were largely disappointed electorate, in most cases the losers of the economic reforms. However, one must also be aware that each of the parties in the anti-liberal group proposed quite different alternatives for currently adopted economic and social solutions and concentrated their critiques on different policy areas. Their programs were sometimes even contradictory as in the case of extreme-right SPR-RSC with their anticommunist rhetoric and nonreformed communist of KSCM. What can be however a common denominator for them, as some observers consider (e.g. Fitzmaurice, 1997) is their extremism. The second factor has quite simple structure. It is based on the clear opposition "KDU-CSL versus others". This axis can be interpreted as the "catholic, traditional option versus others". The comparison of the 1996 results with the factor analysis performed on the 1992 data shows that there were no major shifts in the structure of political space of the republic in the last period. The two main factors explained 61% of variance in 1992. They had a similar character to these observed in 1996 but the opposite order. The second (same as first in 1996) factor pitted ODS, ODA and OH against Communists and SPR-RSC. On the same left side Social Democrats and Pensioners could be found, although with lower factor loading. In the case of the first 1992 factor we can observe the opposition of the Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) and Association for Moravia and Silesia 9 (HSD-SMS) to all others, especially Pensioners and ODS. The correlation between factor scores of the 1992 and 1996 elections proved very high stability of regional patterns of both factors. (r=.8999**, .8794**). Taking into account this high similarity of both elections, in the remaining part of the study only 1996 results will be analyzed.

1.2. Geographic interpretation The spatial pattern of the first factor scores is not easy to interpret. On the one hand, we have clear white spots in the biggest cities of the Republic. Prague is a class of its own. Next follow Plzen, Brno, Ceske Budejovice but together with them some not highly urbanized areas. The big city of Ostrava has a middle factor score. This seems to confirm the liberal character of one of the poles of this cleavage. On the other side, we find first the regions of the northwestern Bohemia, especially on the border with Germany, and some of the Silesian regions (Bruntal, Karvina). Regions with medium factor scores can be found all over the Czech Republic. There are no strong correlates of the first factor in our data set. The highest relevant value of correlation coefficient is attained by the index of registred abortions (0.5979**). However its correlation coefficient with the second factor is just slightly smaller (0.5093**). Thus, the correlation of the first factor with the index of unemployment (0.5770** the lower the unemployment the higher

9

This regionally supported party was not included in 1996 calculations because the party received less than 2% of votes.

14


level of liberalism) seems to have more importance as an exclusive relation. What is very significant in this case is complete absence of the dependence on the index of urbanization (0.0838). The reason for this lies in the fact that the many of the regions on the both extremes of the first factors have high urbanization indexes. It is especially important in the case of the characteristic northwestern belt along the German border. This highly industrialized region which is the stronghold of the populist SPR-RSC has in the same time one of the highest shares of the formally urban population in the Czech Republic. However, we have another interesting index of the similar character which, in contrast to the urbanization, reveals some dependence on the first factor - the number of private entrepreneurs per 10 1000 inhabitants (0.5349**) . The difference between the two coefficients shows quite different character of the formally similarly urbanized areas in the Czech Republic. In the most general terms, we have on one hand well developing and relatively rich and well-educated metropolis and on the other hand industrialized regions with population suffering from serious social problems. The correlation coefficient shows also that regions that are more liberal tend to be slightly younger and have higher birth rate. When discussing the geographical dimension of the first factor, its complexity must be once more stressed. Non-liberal option on this axis is differentiated strongly not only in the programic dimension but neither it is consistent geographically. Although the Social Democrats (CSSD), Communists (KSCM), and Republicans (SPR-RSC) have many voters living in the same regions, patterns of their support differ considerably. As it was already mentioned the northwestern border belt is the stronghold of the Republicans. Besides already mentioned characteristics of this region several others could be added. Is have the largest concentrations of Romany populations in the Republic. The share of Romany, according to Kostelecky's calculations explained 35% of the variance of the SPR11 RSC support in 1992 . We should also remember that the population of the region has been almost entirely recently settled, since this is the region from which once dominating German population has been expelled after the World War II. The new inhabitants of the regions were coming often from socially depressed areas to find jobs in the regional industry. This exchange of population, which occurred on these territories produced a new kind of local community largely, deprived of traditions and social links and selected on the basis of negative criteria. For Social Democrats the Northern Bohemia is also one of the most important support areas, however its voters are not concentrated in the border belt. Pattern of support for CSSD, reveals similarities to the geography of support of the 12 pre-war Social democratic party , which displays the traditional character of the considerable part of its electorate. In 1996 its most consolidated stronghold appeared to be located in Silesia and Northern Moravia. SPR-RSC on the other hand, bases its support first of all on the anti-Romany, ant-German, anti-Prague sentiments resulting from the social processes taking place in the recent past. Nevertheless, it is possible to note considerable exchange of voters between all "anti-liberal" parties. As Fule (1997) estimates of the base on the ecological analysis, 32% of CSSD voters in 1996 voted for Republicans in 1992, and 18% for Communist. On the other hand 18% of the SPR-RSC voters in 1996 voted on Social Democrats in 1992. The geographical image of the second dimension is based first of all on the regional division of the Czech Republic. Here difference between Moravia, especially its southern part and Bohemia, especially its northern part plays a major role. Moravia appears to be the most traditional and catholic region in the Republic. Several indexes could be quoted to prove this thesis. We find the highest correlation coefficients with the share of those declaring to be of Roman Catholic confession (.8476**) on one hand, and atheists on the another (.8179**). The level of dependence on the share of

10

We expect, on the base of the visual analysis of map patterns (data could not be find) the first factor to be correlated with the index of education of population, at least at the same level, as the entrepreneurs' index. 11

However in 1996 elections the correlation of Romany's populations was only slightly higher with the first factor (.5471**) than with the second one (.5099**). In 1992 the correlation was considerably higher with the first factor (i.e.1996 second factor). The highest dependence on Romany's pattern was however noted in the case of turnout (.7331**) 12

Comparison of the pre-war, 1946 and 1990 Czech elections, including the comparisons of patterns of support of Social Democrats, was presented by Jehlicka and Sykora (1991)

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those declaring to be of Moravian nationality is only slightly lower (.7306**). In our list of statistical data factor we find also high correlation coefficients with the level of crime (0.6240 lowest crime rates in the regions voting for KDU-CSL), the index of divorces (0.6023**) and the already quoted index of abortions. The traditional regions seem to have more stable populations as show the coefficients of correlation with indexes of emigration and immigration (0.4930** and 0.5084** respectively). We should also note that some dependence on the urbanization level is visible in the case of the second factor (correlation coefficient 0.3140**). This is also visible on the map where city of Brno clearly contrasts with the rural districts of its region. We find also inhabitants of more conservative areas to be worse paid. The correlation coefficient between mean salary and factor two amounts to 0.4351**. The above-presented regularities show that the endurance of tradition is possible in rural areas even after the collectivization of agriculture. The link with the past in case of the second factor is also well documented by the continuity of the pre-war People's Party support pattern and its post 1989 continuation. The study of Jehlicka and Sykora (1991) presents excellently the remarkable stability of the People's Party electorate since 1920 up to present times.

1.3. Political scene and regional cleavages. Fitzmaurice (1997) describes Czech political scene in the framework of the classic left-right spectrum. He classifies the main parties into the following categories: Communists as the far left, Social Democrats (CSSD) as the moderate left, Free Democrats as Center, People's Party (KDUCLS), ODS and ODS, as center right, and Republicans SPR-RSC as far-right. In Toka's (1997) analysis, three dimensions of party competition (1992) were discerned. The first one, accounting for 50% of the variance concerned first of all economic issues. It opposed on one side ODS and ODS to Communists (KSCM) and Social Democrats (CSSD) on the other. The second dimension accounting for 18% of variance related almost exclusively to religious issues like of church influences and abortion. The structure of the factor was based on the opposition People's Party versus all others. The third factor, accounting for 18% of variance was based on the similar opposition: Republicans (SPR-RSC) versus all others. Here such issues like decommunization, foreign policy, and patriotism appeared to be the most relevant. Kitschelt (1995) on the base on his elite pools discriminates two dimensions in the Czech issue space. The first one accounting for 57% of the variance is called "Capitalism versus Socialism". It is related first of all to economic issues, but also to some extend to the issue of decommunization. Here ODS, ODA and just behind them KDU-CLS are opposed to the Left Block and Social Democrats (CSSD) and Liberal Social Union. The second dimension accounting for merely 12.3% of the variation was called "Libertarian versus Authoritarian" concerned mainly issued of asylum seekers and individualism. On this factor the main opposition could be seen between the Republicans and the others, first of all Civic Movement (OH) and next ODA. Is worth to note however that Kitschelt did not include the religious issues in his research, which was probably the reason for absence of the factor based on distinctiveness of the electorate of Christian Democrats. Markowski (1995) basing also on the elite pools discern even four dimensions of the Czech political scene, underlying however that the first one has a clearly dominant position. Thus, as he maintains the Czech Republic electoral space can be perceived as one broadly one-dimensional. The first factor accounting in Markowski's analysis for 44.8% of variance was called "economic populism versus market liberalism". As in the Kitschelt analysis apart from economic issues like scale and rules of redistribution, it was slightly connected to the problem of decommunization. On this dimension traditionally ODS and ODA were confronted with CSSD and LB. The second, "religion/morality vs. market liberalism" factor accounted for 12.8% of variance. In this case, the People's Party (KDUCSL) together with small Christian Democratic Party (KDP) are opposed to all others. The third factor, politically least relevant "libertarian environmentalism versus authoritarian industrial growth" accounted for 9.7% of variance. The last, forth factor "acceptance vs. rejection of asylum seekers" accounting for 7.7% of variance had a character of the Republicans versus others axis.

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Kostelecky (1995) basing on the works of L.Brokl discerns two main dimensions of the Czech politics: state interventionism versus liberalism and traditionalism versus modernization and individualism. If we compare the results of factor analysis of the regional election results with the survey results and other classification, the case of the Republican party seems to be the most problematic. We could see that SPR-RSC either classified as far right party or appears in "its own" special dimension, outside the main, classical left-right axis. Since Republicans are sometimes called the mild fascist party, the result of the regional analysis showing the very similar regional base of both Communist, Republicans and Social Democrats could be regarded as an argument in the theoretical discussion over the nature of fascism. As some argue it is an extreme right wing phenomenon, and as other insist, 13 it has typical left nature . Others will explain the proximity between Republican and Communist voters only within the already quoted "extremist" framework. In such case instead of linear, the circle model of the political spectrum is often invoked. In such scheme left and right extreme, meet crating opposition to the moderate center.

2. Hungary In the analysis of the Hungarian political space we will use results of the Parliamentary Elections of 1990 and 1994.

2.1. Factor Structure The political space of Hungary appears as relatively weak structured. In Hungary, we are also confronted with the case where the factor structure changes radically between the two elections. Let us first look at the 1990 factors structure. Two main factors were extracted, which accounted for merely 51% of the explained variance. Their interpretation is not always easy. The first factor explaining 30.7% of variance could be seen at the first sight as the rural-urban cleavage. The main reason for such interpretation is that on one side of the axis we find right-wing Smallholders (FKgP) and Agrarians (ASZ), parties of very different political profiles, having in common mainly the rural character of their electorate. The problem appears however with the third party known for its largely rural support - Christian Democrats (KDNP). KDNP's electorate was, as a matter of facts slightly less rural in its character than that of Smallholders (Martis et al. 1992) but this would not in any case justify the structure appearing in the result of factor analysis. KDNP emerges as the main opponent on the would be "urban" side. How this could be explained? The reason is that FKgP and KDNP, have completely different patterns of support. Smallholders received their highest 14 support in the southern and eastern plain areas, where the agricultural sectors still dominates . In the same time, Christian Democrats received the majority of their votes in the northern and western Hungary. The pattern of their support is considered to be closely connected with the deployment of 15 the areas of the high religious activity in Hungary . Moreover, KNDP voters concentrate in the areas of traditional Christian social parties support. (Kovacs, 1993). The dependence on the traditional prewar electorate is also clear in the case of the FKgP, which was one of the several Hungarian parties claiming to be the direct heir of the pre-communist period organization. Thus, one of the reasons of the confusing structure of the first factor lays in the dependencies on historical allegiances.

13

The adherents of this view remind often that the German fascist part was the "National Socialist" party.

14

As Karpati (1991) underlines FKgP demand of restoration of property of the nationalized farms relating to idea of "garden-Hungary" could mobilize 'agroradicalism' in the deteriorating rural areas in eastern and southern Hungary. 15

e.g. Kovacs (1993 or 1997). Unfortunately we do not posses any statistical data on regional differentiation of religiosity in Hungary.

17


Next to KDNP on the same axis we find liberal Free Democrats (SzDSz) and Young Democrats (FIDESZ). Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the winner of the 1990 elections remains neutral in this dimension, probably due to massive support, on the base of "catch all" character of its appeal. The second factor accounting for 20.8% of variance in 1990 had more clear structure. It could be defined as post-communists versus all others. On the "left" side of the axis we find Socialist Workers Party (MSzMP) and the Socialist Party (MSzP). On a much less radical position, but still "on the left" side we find the Social Democratic Party (MSzDP). On the "right" side, we do not find any party to load extremely high in opposition to post-communist. The highest factor scores were attained by Democratic Forum (MDF) and Free Democrats (SzDSz). In 1994, we find a very similar structure to that just described in the case of the first factor accounting for 33.7% of variation. Socialist Party together with Workers Party constitute the "left" side of the axis and are confronted with "all others", especially Democratic Forum (MDF) and Free Democrats (SzDSz) on the "right". The second factor in 1994 elections, explaining 23% of the variance, is difficult to interpret. It represents the opposition between Smallholders (FKgP) and Young Democrats (FIDESZ) on one hand and Workers Party (MP) together with KNDP, on the another. We find difficult to assess if there is any possible connection between these pairs of parties, which could serve as a valid interpretation of this structure. The greatest difficulties in interpretation of 1994 elections are probably related with the relative leveling of the regional support of most parties if compared with 1990. Kovacs and Dingsdale (1998) write in this context about "geographical dispersal" of the support for the main parties and suggest this is a prove of formation of a national appeal in the party platforms and unifying trend in the interest group duality of Hungarian politics. With less pronounced geographical differences between patterns of spatial support of different parties, the factor analysis results became less significant and more difficult to interpret. In such circumstances, the local factors influencing the voting behavior may change the whole structure of observed cleavages. The analysis may be also less effective, as we have already mentioned, due to the large size of administrative units (counties) of Hungary which were used as the basis for our analysis. Unfortunately because of technical capabilities we were unable to use the data on the commune level, which is the only alternative for big counties (there is no intermediate administrative level). We could also note Hungary has been considered by Markowski (1997) as the country where the consistency between results of elite and mass surveys is lowest.

2.2. Geographical interpretations Analysis of the correlation between factor scores confirms the existence of relation between the second factor of 1990 and the first of 1994 (post-communist versus others). However the correlation coefficient is relatively low (0.5932**) and moreover just slightly higher than correlation between second factors 90/94 (0.5088*), and first factor of 1990 and the second of 1994 (0.5180*) The geographical analysis of the factors is not easy. In most general terms, we could say that the first factor of 1990 reflects the north-south division of the country, whereas the second dimension could be interpreted as the East-West division. The first 1994 factor is of course also having the eastwest character. However the major exception of the Somogy region must be noted, which despite its 16 western location reveals extreme "eastern traits" , is even more distinct in 1994 than it was in the case of 1990 elections. In the case of the second 1994 factor, the main differentiation appears to be between the northeast (especially Nograd department) and the rest of the country. Correlation of factor scores with the modest set of statistical data we dispose shed some light on the character of both factors. The first 1990 factor is best related with the rate of suicides (0.5660**, the more suicides the higher scores of the rural option (FKgP, ASZ)). Although there is no dependence on the level of urbanization there are some other relations which seem to confirm to

16

According to Karpati (1991) Somogy is a traditional agrarian region.

18


certain extend the urban-rural character of the axis. Namely the correlation with wage level (0.4803*), the share of the village population (-0.4573*), birth rate (-0.4706*) and density of population (0.4330). Nevertheless, we should talk of this axis as a North-South division, rather than urban-rural cleavage, since as the analysis of Kovacs and Dingsdale (1998) show the relations between the size of settlements and support of parties is not always simple. The most visible dependence appeared in case of FKgP and KDNP support of which increased with the decrease of the size of settlement. However, in case of socialist and liberal parties, surprisingly, support is relatively high in Budapest, but there is a clear tendency for their vote to be at its highest in the medium-sized country towns and than decreasing as the size of settlement decreases. Smallholders (FKgP) popularity in the southern eastern plain, as we have already mentioned, was explained not only by the importance of the agricultural sector in this region but also by the strong pre-war political traditions of voting for this party. Thus, apart from the structural factors we have to take into account the historical aspect of this division. In the case of the second 1990 factor, identified above as "post-communist versus others", we note some higher correlation coefficients. The highest dependence appeared to be on the level of unemployment (0.7457**). Is it worth to note the relations between the second factor and share of Romany (0.6501**) and Hungarians (.4712*) are noticeable. In the case of the first factor of 1994, similar as we remember to the 1990-second factor, we observe the comparable pattern of correlation, however in most cases on the lower level. The second 1994 factor is practically not related to any of our statistical indexes. The East -West axis of Hungary seems to be on of the most important patterns of social and economic differentiation of the country. Western Hungary, especially along the Budapest-Vienna corridor, is more western-oriented, has higher education and urbanization level. The East is worse educated and more rural. Karpati (1991) traces the roots of the differentiation between more advanced West of Hungary and backward East back to the Roman times. He shows the long history of eastern provinces misfortunes as for example the Turk occupation leading to the present day spatial pattern. The Communist regime after its establishment in Hungary after the Second World War decided to artificially equalize the regional differences of the country. The plan of fast industrialization of eastern provinces was adopted. However, as it appeared, forced industrialization of the northeastern provinces and collectivization of agriculture did aggravated the regional disparities instead of reducing them. According to Karpati "by pushing the expropriated mass of agricultural labor to the new industrial zone new social peripheries were created, first of all on the Great Plain (South-East Hungary). This gave the impetus to the traditionally present plebeian radicalism in this area, while a new uprooted 'socialist' working class was manufactured in the North". The newly industrialized East appeared to be in a deep crisis in the new economic and political circumstances of the post-communist period. Thus it is not surprising that among other factors having the East-West pattern of spatial differentiation we find of course already mentioned unemployment, and the level of foreign capital investment. Observing these dependencies Kovacs and Dingsdale (1998) conclude that the victory of the postCommunists was a result of the protest of the disillusioned economic "losers" of the transformation. Kovacs and Dingsdale classify eastern region as the most unstable in respect of party support. In contrast, the West (and the city of Budapest) is politically the most stable part of the country. The center was classified to be of mixed type with several regional particularities. The Nograd region was labeled as Christian and socialist dominated, the Bacs-Kiskun and Csongrad regions were assessed as Agrarian (dominance of FKgP) and Somogy region as Agrarian and Socialist. The pattern of turnout seems to unify the two dimensions of 1990 election (East-West and North-South). The activity of voters is clearly highest in the northwestern region, reaching the maximum values in the counties on the Austrian border and in Budapest. The lowest turnout is in the southeast of the country. One must also stress that the eastern part of the Hungary is the only region where the conservative faction of the former communist party- Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP)

19


collected most of its votes. What seems to be worthwhile noticing is that in the northeastern regions, especially the region of Nograd the votes for radical Workers Party and Christian Democrats largely coincide. This is one of the reasons for the strange structure of the 1994-second factor.

2.3. Political scene and regional cleavages. For Korossenyi (after Karpati 1991) the left parties in Hungary are SzDSz, FIDESZ, MSzP (Socialists) , MSzMP (Workers Party) and MSzDP (Social Democrats). The main attributes of the left according to Korossenyi are: internationalism, secularity, urbanism, industrialism, disarmament and liberalism (human rights).The right parties according to this classification are MDF, FKgP and KNDP. This option is defined by the following traits: nationalism, religiousness, ruralism, agrarianism, defense, and conservatism (authority). According to Evans and Whitefield (1995), the Hungarian party system is structured mainly by issues of social liberalism, prejudice, and attitudes towards the position of Hungarians abroad. In their analysis, they have discerned two salient ideological dimensions of party competition in Hungary. The first one accounting for 52% of the variance is identified by them, as related with cultural and national issues, where stances vary form liberal to illiberal positions. The second one explaining 33% of variance has economic character, where in addition the pro-market loading are associated with proWest and nationalism. On the first dimension, the MDF loads in a mildly illiberal direction by comparison with the strongly illiberal KNDP and Smallholders. Socialists (MSzP) and Free Democrats are on liberal side, however not far from the center. On the second dimension, we find on one hand Socialist and next to them Smallholders, and on the another most prominently the Democratic Forum (MDF) and Free Democrats (SzDSz). Here the most interesting finding is the closeness of Socialist and Smallholders, which is suggesting according to Evans and Whitefield, that "the campaign for land restitution waged by the FKgP connects with a populist position on the economy and the poor position of those in the agricultural sector rather than as an example of support for privatization and economic liberalism". The fact that the first factor is clearly dominating is interpreted by the authors as the indicator the fact that the ideological differences between parties are more about lifestyles, prejudice and nationalist issues rather than economic interests. Thus the differentiation on this cleave is best explained by religiosity and education. Fodor, Hanley and Szelenyi (1997) present the similar, two-dimensional image of the political scene of Hungary. One can say however, that instead of seeing the glass half empty, the see it half full. They contrast the so called "Theory of Liberal/Conservative Cleavage" according to which postcommunist politics is fought mainly around ethical and worldview issues to the "Theory of Two Axes" which assumes that the Left/Right (economic) division of political space is as important as the Liberal/Conservative one, though as yet, during the early post-communist transformation, it is not clearly articulated. They suggest than that politics in Central-Eastern Europe moves from a politics of symbols to a politics of interests (i.e. from liberal-conservative cleavage towards left-right conflict. However, in the same time they must admit that the symbolic cleavage still predominates and church attendance remains to be the best predictor of the political profile of voters. According to Kitschelt (1995) Hungarian "issue space" can be described in the framework of two factors. The first one accounting for as much as 65% of variance was called "Right-libertarian versus left authoritarian". The second of the factors accounting for 10% of the variance was labeled "Social Welfare versus Market Austerity". On the first factor, two main groups could be discerned. On the "left-authoritarian" side KDNP, MDF and FKgP and on the "right-libertarian" side SzDSz and FIDESZ. In this dimension MSzP, take rather neutral position, slightly on the libertarian side. However, on the second "economic" axis it forms a pole of the "social welfare" option. Thus, it is contrasted with all other of just mentioned parties, which are to be found on the "market austerity" side with the most radical position of FIDESZ in this dimension. Markowski (1995) discerns three dimensions of party positions in Hungary. The first one accounting for 47.6% of variance was labeled "libertarian, secular cosmopolitan versus authoritarian,

20


religious, nationalists". Here first of all MSzP, next SzDSz and FIDESZ were opposed to primarily FKgP, and to the lesser degree KNDP. MDF stayed almost neutral being positioned slightly on the authoritarian side. The second factor "economic populism vs. market liberalism" explained 13.3% of variance. On this axis, MSzP is confronted first of all with FIDESZ and next SzDSz. MDF is on the moderate "pro-market" positions. FKgP and KNDP practically stay neutral, but on the "populist" side. The third factor "environmental protection versus industrial growth" explains merely 7.5% of variance and can be assessed as unimportant. Finally, Toka (1997) discerns two significant dimensions of party competition in 1992 Hungary. The first one explaining 56% of variance relates mainly to church influences, abortion, patriotism etc. Here MSzP, SzDSz, and FIDESZ are contrasted with FKgP, MDF, and KNDP. On the second factor, accounting for 27% of variance the most salient issue is that of decommunization. Here surprisingly MSzP together with KNDP are contrasted with all others. As we can see, the structures presented above do not reflect the structures appearing in the geographical analysis. This fact again is confirming that the Hungarian case could be regarded as he most complicated and complex. Regional analysis could not reveal the nuances of the liberalconservative cleavage, so important for Hungarian politics. However, it pointed out to the existence of the "post-communist" electorate, visible at least in geographical dimension, which was not discerned in the political analysis. On the other hand geographical approach could not reveal the economic axis in the form at is was defined in the above discussed political science models. However, the regional analysis pointed out to the existence of the rural populist electorate. One of the reasons of the considerable incompatibility of the results of political and regional analyses may lay in different set of parties included in different analysis. The most striking is probably lack of Social Democratic party (MSzDP), Hungarian Workers party (MSzMP) and Agrarian Alliance (ASZ) in most of the political studies.

3. Lithuania The analysis of the Lithuanian data encounters a serious problem of incompatibility of regional divisions used for statistical purposes and different kinds of elections. Regional statistics, presidential elections, and referenda results are reported according to basic administrative divisions. Parliamentary elections on the other hand are reported according to electoral districts used because of the mixed electoral system. This makes it impossible to analyze the statistical relations between the results of parliamentary and presidential elections and social differentiation of the country. On the other hand, a statistical database of the results of the elections allows analyzing the stability of regional differentiation. We have analyzed the results of parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996, presidential elections of 1993 and 1997, and two of the early referenda.

3.1. Factor structure As far the presidential elections of 1993 are concerned, their structure is indisputably onedimensional since only two candidates were running for the office. Brazauskas representing the left and Lozoraitis as the candidate of the right. The cleavage was thus obvious and simple. In presidential elections of 1997 there were already seven candidates officially registered by the electoral commission. However, two of them received less than 1 % of the valid votes and practically only three names appeared to be politically relevant figures: Arturas Paulauskas, Valdas Adamkus and Vytautas Landsbergis. The factor analysis of the regional results of the five best candidates reveals two significant factors of which only the first one, explaining 46.5 % of variance, seems to have a real political importance. It is the cleavage between the main candidates of the right and the left. Namely between Paulauskas representing the left and Adamkus representing the right. The second factor, explaining 21.2% of variance, is based on the contrast between the secondary candidates – Bobelis

21


and Andrukaitis and thus seems to be only transitory structure dependent on the purely temporary, personal circumstances. The dependencies between 1993 and 1997 presidential elections are strong in the geographical dimension. The correlation coefficient between votes for Brazauskas (or Lozoraitis) and factors scores of the first factor in 1997 amounts to 0.7301**. Correlation between votes for Lozoraitis and Adamkus in the second round, the main candidates of the right in 1993 and 1997 is even higher – 0.8102**. The parliamentary elections reveal more complicated spatial structures. Both in case of 1992 and 1996 elections three-dimensional structures appear where the two main factors have a considerable significance and stability. However their order and of course the part of the explained variance changes. The first factor of the 1992 elections was the left-right axis (LDDP versus Sajudis and “Januoi Lietuva”). It explained 32% of variance. The same factor felt in 1996 into second position explaining 22.3% of variance. The second factor of 1992 elections was Poles vs. others. It explained than 20.7% of variance. In 1996, it assumed the first position with 25% of explained variance. It is interesting to note that in 1992 the main opposition on this axis to Polish Lithuanian Union was LSP, the Social Democratic Party, clearly left wing but anticommunist and patriotic Lithuanian party. In 1992 LSP was interestingly clearly on the right side in the first factor dimension, just next to Jaunoi Lietuva. However in 1996 factor analysis results it clearly moved from light into left side in the second dimension. Besides it was no longer the main contrariety of the Polish Electoral Action. The nationalistic "Januoi Lietuva" took the place. Both factors reveal considerable geographical stability. The correlation coefficient between factors loading in 1992 and 1996 are as follows. For the “Polish factor” 0.8719**, and for the “LeftRight” factor 0.7476**. The third factor is of minor relevance given the marginality of the main parties involved in it and the small part of the explained variance. However, it appears as an independent dimension with its own structure and medium geographical stability. Its main component is the LCS – Lithuanian Center Movement. In 1992, it was clearly opposed to LKDP – The Christian Democratic Party and LTS – National Union of Lithuania. In 1996, the contrast was much smaller but the main opponent of the LKDP still remained the main opponent of LCS in this dimension. The third factor explained 14.7% of variance in 1992 and 12.9% in 1996. The correlation between factor scores in 1992 and 1996 amounted to 0.5356**.

3.2. Geographical interpretation As it was already explained above, the analysis of statistical relations between the geographical patterns of voting and other phenomena is possible only in case of presidential elections where the standard administrative division of country has been adopted as reporting units. A factor analysis of the demographic data set has been performed. It produced three factors: the first one was a clear urban-rural axis, the second of national character contrasted Lithuanian and nonLithuanian populations. The third one concerned on the one hand the intensity of migrations and on the other first of all the share of Poles in population, as areas inhabited by them appear to have the most stable populations. Only two first factors could be regarded as significant since they have explained respectively 33.6, 19.3 % of variance, while the third one only 9.6%. The relations between political factors revealed in electoral and demographic data sets are not straightforward. The left-right dimension revealed in the results of presidential elections of 1997 is, as expected, better correlated with second, national of the two dimension main of the demographic regional data set. However the level of the correlation coefficient is low – 0.4386. Moreover the correlation with the first demographic factor is only slightly inferior – 0.4191. However the most

22


surprising is the highest level of correlation coefficient was attained in the case of the third, demographic factor – 0.5033. The Polish aspect of the third factor should probably explain this. It is confirmed by "direct" the correlation coefficient between the “Left-Right” factor and the share of the Poles in district population, which amounts to 0.7698. In the same time the correlation with the share of Russians amounts only to 0.1333 and is thus statistically insignificant. In case of Belorussian population which is in part native and inhabits South-Eastern part of Lithuania, such relation is noticeable (r=0.4532). The analysis shows that the right option support is related with the share of the Lithuanians in the population and especially absence of larger communities of Poles. It is also slightly related with the degree of urbanization (r=0.3359). The same tendency can be observed in the poll data, which prove slightly more urban character of the right wing electorate. Clark (1995) reports that in 1992 the two main parties of the right coordinated their electoral campaign strategy. Sajudis concentrated its activities in urban areas, while LKDP campaigned mainly in the countryside. As the main reason of the peasant support of the left, especially LDDP, Clark sees the disappointment with the land privatization program introduced by the right-wing government. The program resulted in popular perception in the impoverishment of the rural population and undermining their pre-independence social-benefits. It is also possible to show that the stability of the left-right cleavage over the period of last years is considerable. The 1997 first factors scores correlate highly with the results of 1991 referendum on independence, 1992 referendum on withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Lithuania, and 1992 presidential elections. The respective coefficients are as follows: 0.8130 (votes against), 0.8833 (votes against), and 0.7301 (votes for Brazauskas or Lozoraitis). It is also interesting to look at the relations between political orientations, demographic factors, and level of electoral participation. The dependence between the left-right dimension and the turnout is quite high and persistent (r=0.7353 for the first round of the 1997 elections). The right option is related with the higher level of participation). As far the demographic factors are concerned the turnout is in most cases highly related with the number of Poles (r=-0.8158 for the first round of the 1997 elections). The regions inhabited by the Polish minority reveal the lowest rates of turnout. There is no such relation with Russian population (r=0.1699), nor Ukrainian, while it exists in case of Belorussians (r=0.4302). The level of urbanization is slightly related with the level of turnout (r=0.3997). Since the similar analysis could not be performed for the results of parliamentary elections, we can only try to propose some interpretations on the base of the visual map patterns comparisons. The first and most important difference between the presidential and parliamentary elections concerns the Polish ethic factor, which has its own dimension in the case of Sejmas (parliamentary) elections. It not only enriches the structure of the analysis but also radically changes the left-right dimension by subtracting from it many of the Polish votes. Thus, we observe two completely different spatial patterns, which in the case of the presidential elections are merged in one. The left-right dimension (first factor in 1992 and the second in 1996) pattern has its most stable point in Kaunas and its district, which is the main stronghold of the right. This could be probably explained by the historical (the city was the inter-war capital of the country) as well demographic factors (relatively small share of ethnic minorities in the population of the city). Some districts around Kaunas, especially in the South also reveal clear right wing propensities. Other region of the solid right wing support is to be found in the West of the country. First of it is the Silale region and most of the coastal regions around Klaipeda. The city of Panavezys and its region, especially in 1992, voted also clearly on the right. The main strongholds of the left are to be found in the northern part of the country, especially in its central and eastern part. Here the district of Zarasai near Latvian town of Daugapils, the district of Pasvalys, also on the Latvian border should be mentioned together with three other district forming a characteristic corridor from the Latvian border till the center of country: Pakruojis, Radviliskis and

23


Kedainai. It is difficult to explain the basis of such a strange but persistent regional pattern. It resembles very much the extend of the siauliskai dialect but it probably rather casual convergence. Clark (1995) quoting an interview with Valdas Adamkus interprets the strong support of the left in the North as the combination of historical tradition support for socialist and radical ideas and rural poverty. Support for the left is also strong in some Southern regions, especially near to the meeting point of the Russian and Polish borders (e.g.Vilkaviskis) and along Belarussian border, especially in its northern part (e.g. Ignalina). Clark explains support for the left in the south by the poor economic conditions and alienation of peasantry from the political right. The Vilnius region and especially Polish inhabited areas are of course known for their massive support for the left-wing candidates in presidential elections and much stronger support for the LDDP than TS(LK). But since in parliamentary elections they are supporting first of all Polish list and nether the left nor right, Lithuanian parties receive a lot of support in relation to their country wide average. On the factor loading map, the region is thus not particularly visible. The opposite situation is to be observed in the other dimension: the national factor (first in 1996, second in 1992). Here the belt on the border with Belarus and especially the Salcininkai district dominated by the Polish population are the extreme pole of the country. The rest of Lithuania is practically not differentiated in this dimension. The third factor seems difficult in geographical interpretation. The main stable points of support for the LCS (Center)-side of the dimensions are Siaulai City and Jonava region. The ChristianDemocratic-side has its most stable stronghold in the Kaunas region (not the city).

3.3. Political scene and geographical cleavages. Two models of the political scene of Lithuania have been found in the literature. The first one presented by Kavaliauskas (1993, 1995) defines two dimensions. Left right and conservatives vs. radicals. LDDP and Polish Union are classified as left-wing groups, LKDP as right wing (in the 1995 version LCS is the main right wing party). Most of the others are to be found in the “center” group. Kavaliauskas sees LDDP as the main conservative party (together with LKDP in the 1995 version of his model) and Januoji Lietuva as the main radical group. Most of the other parties are classified as moderates. Kavaliauskas (1995) offers also a “traditional”, one-dimensional model of Lithuanian politics based on the simple left-right dichotomy. LDDP is in this schema the main left wing party, TS(LK) and LKDP, main right wing parties, while JL, LSP, LCS, Poles and Liberal are to be found in the center. The other model has been proposed by Żydowicz (1996) and seems to be much more adequate and well grounded. The first of the axis proposed by Żydowicz is defined by the relation of parties towards the problem “nation and the state”. On one side parties advocating the ethnic-based model state have been grouped, on the opposing side those supporting the model of citizenship based on universal, instead of ethnic criteria. The other axis is defined by the attitude towards the problem “the economy and the state”. Liberal economic views are contrasted with those of advocates of redistributive policies. Author claims to have assessed the positions of particular parties on the base of their actual policies rather than official declarations. Thus, in the economic dimension, as far as the main parties are concerned, Żydowicz classified on the left side Social Democrats (LSP), Poles and LCS (Centrum). On the right (liberal) side besides small radical Liberal Party, Christian Democrats (LKDP) occupy the major position. Both LDDP and Conservatives (TS-LK) were located exactly in the middle of the scale. In the “ethnic” dimension the most distant opposite sides are occupied by Poles on one side and Januoji Lietuva on the another. LDDP is on a position close to the center on the left side. Conservatives are on the moderate right position; LKDP and LCS on slightly less engaged right locations.

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If we compare the above described models of the political scene with the results of our factor analysis it seems that none of them can be regarded as fully comparable. Actually, it seems that the combination of the two proposed models could produce the optimal comparable solution. The two dimensional model of Kavaliauskas seems not to be equivalent in any of its dimensions to the regional model. However, the “traditional” left-right one-dimensional Kavaliauskas scheme corresponds very well with our main left-right axis. In Żydowicz’s model the “ethnic” dimension seems be very similar to the “Polish-Lithuanian” factor of the factor analysis. The second of the Żydowicz’s factors which is probably an important political issue, does not appear in such restricted form in the regional dimension.

4. Poland In the analysis of the Polish case, we will use the results of the last presidential (1995) and parliamentary (1997) elections. Some general reference to earlier elections will be also included, 17 mainly based on my earlier studies .

4.1. Factor structure The Polish politics is very well structured in its geographical dimension. The analysis of the election outcomes in regional breakdown since 1990 yields almost the same results. We are observing a two-dimensional structure in which the most important evolution was the recent change in the hierarchy of factors. Let us look at the results of the 1995 presidential elections. The two factors are accounting for as much as 70.1% of the explained variance. The first factor, accounting for 41.2% of the variance, can be easily identified as the urban-rural (city-country side) dimension. The leader of the Peasant Party (PSL) W.Pawlak appears to be confronted with the group of liberal politicians supported by the urban electorate, especially the intelligentsia. On the second factor, explaining 28.9% of the variance, we find the politicians who loaded indifferently on the urban-rural axis. Here the main conflict is related with the attitude towards the communist past of the country, and the Catholic Church. The factor pits the post-Communist leader of the Social Democratic Party (SLD) Kwaśniewski against anti-Communist: famous ex-leader of "Solidarity" L.Wałęsa and J.Olszewski. Very similar results were obtained from the analysis of the Parliamentary elections of 1997. The share of the explained variance is in this case smaller (56.2%) since the dispersion of votes was higher due to the large number of parties, programs and local candidates. Another difference in relation to 1995 elections (and elections of 1990, 1991, and 1993) is the sequence of factors. Now, the post vs. anticommunist factors explaining 32.2% of variance comes as the first one. The structure of the factor is very similar to that one obtained in the analysis of presidential elections. The polarization is between broad anti-Communist coalition "Solidarity Electoral Action" (AWS) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (the electoral block lead by Social Democrats - SdRP). Radical anti-Communist ROP (under the leadership of J.Olszewski) loads on the "right" side and the leftist Labour Union (UP) on the left. The second, urban-rural axis, accounting for 23.9% of explained variance, pits Peasant party against liberal Freedom Union (UW) and Union of the Real Politics (UPR), both parties supported mainly in urban areas.

4.2. Geographic interpretation The geographical dimension of both factors is quite well structured and stable. As several analyses have shown not only political but also social and economic space of the country can be regarded as two-dimensional. We have performed the similar analysis on the set of statistical data obtaining expected two-dimensional result. The first factor, accounting for 44% of variance, could be in mots general terms identified as the urban-rural cleavage. We find several others indicators to be related in a more or less rigid way to this general pattern. First of all, we observe the migration

17

e.g. Zarycki 1997a, 1997b

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balance to be related to the first factor (the net movement of population is of course from rural to urban areas). Next, the GDP per capita index is closely related with the same axis, as well as the average salary or the number of cars per inhabitant or the level of education. In Poland, as it is visible in our calculations, the urbanization is also related with the level of industrialization. The second factor explaining 21% of variance is defined in the strongest way by the index of share of inhabitants born in the place of their residence. This is the basis for calling the factor "traditional versus new communities" axis. We find several other indicators to be related with the same spatial patterns. Both factors display dependence on agriculture, but in quite different ways. In contrast to the first factor, where the dependence was on the share of population employed in agriculture irrespectively of form of the ownership, in the case of the second factor we find strong relation with the share of private farms in the total area of arable land. The main regional differentiation of this index is of course between the eastern (or south-eastern) part of the country still dominated by the small private farms and the west where until recently big state farms prevailed on the former German territories. The unemployment which occurred first of all as the effect of unprepared dissolution of state farms (PGRs) strongly influencing the regional pattern of the share of persons without permanent job. This seems to be the main reason for the relations of the unemployment index with the second factor. Other related indexes are typical characteristics of the traditional/new territories cleavage. They include, among other indicators, the share of population in the post-productive age, the index of divorces per inhabitant, crime level and the indirect measure of religiosity in the form of index of priests per 18 inhabitant . The relations between political (electoral) and general socio-economic factors are quite strong. As we could expect, the urban-rural factors are closely related in both aspects (0.679** in case of 1995 Presidential elections). Thus, we can conclude that liberal votes, as we could expect, are concentrated in urban, richer and better-educated areas. The relation between the second, "traditional versus new territories" axis in political and socio-economic dimensions are also visible. In this case most of the ant-communist, conservative votes are cast in the areas inhabited by stable communities (locally rooted), characterized by the high share of private farms, lower levels of divorces and crime and higher religiosity. The analysis of the spatial patterns of the both factors scores will shed more light on the sources of the above-described structures. The first, urban-rural factor surprisingly, does not have its highest factor score in the main metropolis of the country, the capital Warsaw. Although Warsaw is scoring high on this factor the highest values can be seen elsewhere, as for example in Poznan, Łódź or Wrocław. The two other big cities of Poland, Krakow, and Gdansk, also score not in the highest range. These interesting phenomena could be probably explained first of all by the fact that the capital, as well as the two other above mentioned cities are to the large extend dominated by the leftright or post versus anti-Communist conflicts. As the main actors of this battle - Kwaśniewski and Wałęsa reveal average loadings on the urban-rural cleavage, their popularity automatically influences the scores of the first factor by reducing the extreme values. Nevertheless, all largest towns in the country score high (even if not extremely high) on the urban-rural axis. Besides this regularity, we 19 find however, a very clear east-west divide in the same pattern. If analyzed more precisely the pattern reveals strong dependencies on the XIX century divisions of the country between Prussian, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires. The area of the lowest "liberal (urban)" votes is very clearly related to the former Russian sector. Here we find only solitary urban islands, on the area dominated by largely peasant vote. The former Austrian sector of the present Polish territory, known as Galicja, reveals slightly higher scores on the urban-rural factor. Although it is characterized by the highest density of the rural population in Poland, the region has not so clearly peasant political preferences.

18

No official statistics of share of Roman Catholics, other confessions and atheists or in the regional break down (on the voivodship level) were available. 19

The analysis of the same patterns was performed also on the much more detailed level of communes (2468 units, in place of 49 voivodship used in the present calculations). It confirmed all above presented findings, and supported especially the thesis on the dependence of the electoral maps on the heritage of the XIX century partitions of Poland. For a more detailed discussion of these findings see Zarycki (1997a) or (1997b)


26

As we will see in the next paragraph, Galicja is strongly anti-Communist region. This involvement in the left-right conflict automatically reduces the extreme values on the urban-rural score (as in the above mentioned case of the capital and some other cities). Besides, the Peasant Party (PSL) as the heir of the communist period ZSL - ally of the Polish United Workers Party, can not be so popular in the anti-Communist Galicia. In contrast to former Russian and Austrian territories, the western part of the country appears to be much more urban and thus liberal. The main reasons for such political differentiation of the country lie in the fact that western Poland has much smaller share of rural population. In the case of the former Prussian sector (dominated by the region of Greater Poland Wielkopolska) the structure of the agriculture was always more advanced, the average size of farms larger that in the rest of the country and the relative employment in agriculture smaller. The western and northern pre-war German territories were in the considerable part dominated by large state farms and thus they are today automatically characterized by reduced rates of traditional rural electorate. 20

The second "anti- versus post-communist" (left-right) axis spatial pattern reveals also strong dependencies on historical heritage. The former Austrian sector, Galicja, appears to be the main stronghold of the anti-Communist camp. The XIX-century borders of the Austrian-Hungarian empire are visible very clearly on the present-day electoral map, especially along the Vistula river. The most radically right-supporting area is to be found in Galicja in the very south of the country, in the Tatra mountains and Podhale mountain region. This is probably the most conservative and religious region in Poland. The other traditional and anti-Communist region can be found in Gdansk voivodship. Kaszuby, as its cold, is also a strongly Catholic region with a stable population and its own culture and language. Another reason for the massive support for the right option in the region is related to the Gdansk as a hometown of Lech Wałęsa and birthplace of the "Solidarity". Warsaw, the capital 21 appears also as a clearly right-wing region . To the lesser extend it is the case of Krakow and 22 industrial region of Katowice . Several other big towns display relatively stronger right-wing scores than their surroundings. This is the case of Łódź, Lublin, or Wrocław. In the list of traditional Catholic regions, one should also mention Podlasie in the southeastern Poland, in Łomżyńskie and Białostockie voivodship. In Białostockie voivodship we find also a region inhabited by the Belarussian minority which is supporting unanimously post-Communist SLD and its candidates in all consecutive elections. In effect the second factor scores in the Białystok voivodship are average. Regions with the highest left factor scores are to be found first of all in the central Poland, in the former Russian partition-sector. One of the most clearly post-Communist areas is also to be found in the northwestern region of Western Pomerania, which is the part of the pre-war German territories 23 characterized by the lowest stability of population and highest unemployment rates . In general, former German territories score rather clearly on the left side of the second axis with the major exception of Upper Silesia, Opole Silesia, and some major cities. Apart from the two dimensions of political scene, it is worthwhile to look at the geographical pattern of the turnout which is a rather stable structure reemerging with slight changes every next election since 1989. Here as in the case of political patterns, the dependency on the historical heritage

20

The political interpretation of the second factor remains a controversial issue, especially in the context of Polish politics. Some (as for example H.Kitschelt) prefer to use here terms like "libertarian versus authoritarian politics" (as some political scientists are doing, as shown below). The "left" and "right" usage will be based here mainly on the conventions adopted in the Polish political discourse and self-identification of the main political camps. It should not be regarded as the attempt of incontestable classification of ideological profile of involved parties. 21

Data on the commune level shows that the strongest support of right parties comes from the Warsaw's suburban areas. 22

One must stress however that Katowice voivodship is strongly internally differentiated. The main line of division is related to the XIX century border between Prussia and Russia. The former Russian part of the voivodship - "Zagłębie Dąbrowskie" coal basin has old socialist tradition and until today is one of the leftstrongholds. 23

As already mentioned highest unemployment rates in Western Pomerania are conditioned first of all by the dissolution of state farms once dominating in this region.

27


is unexpectedly strong. The highest turnout is observed in the whole territory of the former Prussian sector. Some analysts attribute this tendency to the "Prussian discipline" adopted by Poles living in this region. However, the more plausible explanation of this phenomenon seems to lie in the strong 24 dependency of the turnout pattern on the level of education (e.g. the lowest literacy rates ). The second place in the turnout hierarchy of regions is taken by the former Austrian Galicia region where the level of basic education is considerably lower than in Grater Poland, but still higher than in the former Russian sector (Kongresówka) which has, with the exception of urban areas and some regions, the lowest turnout in country. In case of Galicia several authors insist that the higher rates of political participation are also related to the "democratic experiences" of the Austria-Hungary, which in the last years of its existence introduced democratic electoral reform.

4.3 Political scene and regional cleavages 25

Kitschelt (1995) distinguishes two significant dimensions of the Polish political scene . The first factor of the "Polish issue space" was called "Left-authoritarian versus Right Libertarian" and explained as much as 46.3% of total variance. It concerned first of all economic and social policy issues. On the "right-libertarian" side the most extreme position was taken be the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD). Democratic Union (UD) appeared to be less liberal in this dimension. On the "leftauthoritarian" side the most prominent position has been taken by the Peasant Party (PSL). Almost the same loadings are shared by Christian-National Union (ZChN), "Solidarity" Trade Union and Confederation for Independent Poland. The second factor "Religious-capitalist versus SecularSocialist" is accounting for 31.6% of variance. It is related first of all to questions of the role of the church, abortion, and decommunization. In this case the polarization appears to be between left Labour Union (UP), post-Communist SLD and Christian National Union (ZChN) and antiCommunist Center Alliance (PC). According to Markowski's (1995) elite 1994 survey analysis there are two significant issue dimensions of party positions in Poland. The first one accounting for 37% of variance was named "economic populism versus market liberalism". The factor based mainly on the economic issues pits first of all liberal KLD against left Labour Union (UP). On the liberally engaged position, we find also Democratic Union, whereas on the left side the visible parties are PSL and "Solidarity" Trade Union. The second one "secular libertarian cosmopolitans versus religious authoritarian nationalists" is accounting for 28.8% of the explained variance. Here the structure of party loadings is similar to that one presented in the Kitschelt's variant. ZChN and PC are contrasted with SLD and UP. In Toka's (1997) approach, there are three ideological dimensions of party competition, which do not seem to have very consistent structure. The first one accounting for 44% seems to be dominated by the questions of decommunization and church influences. In this factor, the main confrontation is between post-Communist SLD and PSL on one hand and anti-Communist PC and ZChN on the other. The second factor explaining 30% of the variance, although also connected with the church and abortion issues seems to be dominated by economic questions (privatization, free market etc.). Here liberal KLD and UW load decisively on the right side, while ZChN mildly on the "left". The third factor explaining 15% of variance does not seem to have a clear structure, which could be easily interpreted. It pits KPN against ZChN. Żukowski is another author presenting his views on the structure of the political scene of Poland. In his several articles based on the mass-survey results, the same two-dimensional structure appears. Żukowski (1996) claims the first factor, which he calls "the axis of interests" to be related first of all to the economic issues. It is differentiated between "liberal" and "social" options. The second factor was called "the axis of values" and is related with the attitudes toward the church,

24

The dependency in case of turnout is significant only in case of the elementary education rates, not university level education which is strongly related to the scores of the first, above described factor. 25

Kitschelt includes in his table also the third one named "Old Regime versus Solidarnosc", but since its eigenvalues amounts only to 0.63 and share of the explained variance to 4.4% it can not be regarded as relevant one.

28


toward the communist past and abortion or decommunization. Here the differentiation is from "lay" to "Catholic" option. Żukowski publishes regular updates on the precise position of main parties on the above-defined two-dimensional issue-space. The locations are in their most general arrangement similar to these presented by earlier mentioned authors. Another author presenting similar model of the Polish political scene, basing however on the entirely different data set is Jasiewicz (1995). On the base of the panel research from 1991 he distinguishes five factors in the issue set. The two most important are "secularism versus religious fundamentalism" and "political and economic liberalism versus populism". The first factors pits (only most extreme cases mentioned) the Catholic ZChN against post-Communist SLD, the second, liberal KLD against peasant PSL. As we can see from the above presented discussion of the different models of the Polish political scene, in most cases the similar two-dimensional pattern appears and can be identified as having almost stable structure. Moreover this two-dimensional structure is in most general terms almost identical with the structures obtained as a result of the geographical analyses, which seem to be a unique case in our six-countries study.

5. Slovakia In the analysis of the Slovak political space, we have used the results of the 1994 parliamentary elections.

5.1. Factor structure The factor analysis has revealed three significant factors accounting in total for 82% of the variance. The first one explaining 33.8% of the variance pits liberal parties as Democratic Union and Democratic Party together with the left SDL against all others, most visibly Hungarians and the lesser extent HZDS. The connection between liberals and SDL can be explained by the findings of V.Krivy (1995). He shows how SDL electorate decreased and changed considerably between 1992 and 1994 elections due to the pro-transformation change of the party profile. The change has attracted some voters; the most visible example was the increase in the party support in Bratislava. However, even more of the previous SDL voters reacted negatively since, as Krivy puts it "they did not change their populist value orientations, but they did change party." Most of the 1992 SDL voters have been overtaken by populist ZDR, HZDS, and Communists. The second factor accounting for 27.7% of variance reflects polarization between Hungarians and "others" or "Slovaks", the former represented first of all by Meciar's HZDS, Christian Democratic KDH and KSU. What could be assumed, as a common denominator for these parties is probably their "national" (in the pre-1993 context - "separatist") character. This would make this axis similar to the Lithuanian axis defining the attitudes towards the national character of state, where on one hand we found the ethnic minority (Poles) and on the other extreme the Lithuanian nationalists. The third factor explaining 20.6% of variance contrasts the two radically left, in fact Communists parties - ZRS and KSS on one side with right wing nationalistic SNS. Democratic Unions loads mildly on the "right" side, while SDL on the "left".

5.2. Geographical interpretation The geographical dimension of the first factor is not quite obvious, as it was the case with its factor loading structure. On one side, we find the clear urban pole of Bratislava, which is contrasted with southern Hungarian districts and in the same time northern province of Cadaca. We have thus a factor related in some way to the urban-rural cleavage, but far from being equal to it. From geographical point of view it is rather "metropolitan area versus the rest of the country" factor, and probably it can not be simply interpreted as the center-periphery axis. The ambiguous character of the first factor is also confirmed by the statistics. The correlation between the index of urbanization and the first factor scores is low (0.3982**), but higher than with in

29


case of other factors. We observe higher level of correlation between first factor and average salary (0.449**). These correlation coefficients of urbanization and salary levels are even higher in case of the results of voting for the Democratic Union (DU), since the SDL loading on the same side, has pattern of support much different from the urban-rural cleavage, although it get the highest scores in 1992 elections in Bratislava. Apart from these dependencies it is worth to notice relatively significant relation of the first factor with the share of atheists (0.4238**) and Roman Catholics (-0.4506**), which should be probably explained by the lower level of religiosity in the capital. The second factor is neither so clear-cut. From one side it reflects the spatial pattern of Hungarian minority settlements. On the other side, it equalizes the support of set of parties of complex profiles, mostly of the broadly understood "national" character. The highest "Hungarian" factor loading are to be found in districts of Dunajska Streda and Komarno where, the share of Hungarian population amounts respectively to 87% and 72%. The "Slovak" extreme pole is to be found in the district of Dolny Kubin, which was one of the main strongholds of the Christian Democrats (KDH) in 1990 and 1992. However, in 1994 elections the whole north-western region was dominated by Meciar's HDZS, and the core area of KDH is to be found only east of Tatra mountains, in the districts of Poprad or Presov. The disappointment of KDH voters, who were mostly rural areas inhabitants, is most often explained by the drastic lowering of their standard of living during the term of the government with KDH participation. Several authors notice the relations between the pre-war political traditions of the northwestern 26 Slovakia and the current electoral behavior in the region. Jehlicka, Kostelecky and Sykora (1993) show how 1990 elections results were related to the pattern of support of pre-war Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party ("ludaks") strongly emphasizing Catholic, authonomysts and nationalists element in its program. Krivy (1995) shows strong relations between the pre-war support for "the ludaks" and the 1994 elections support for "non-standard" parties, first of all HZDS. Factor scores of the second factor almost fully resemble the ethnic composition of the country. Correlation coefficients with shares of Hungarians and Slovaks are very high, -0.9210** and 0.9212** respectively. Although the relations of the second factors with the measures of religiosity 27 are rather not significant , with the exception of share of Protestants (-0.7581**), some related indicators display higher dependencies with the second factor. First of all the rate of abortions (0.6629**, more abortions on the "Hungarian" side) and natural increase (0.4882**). The "Slovak" regions are also relatively more industrialized - the correlation with the share of the populations employed in industry amounts to 0.4598**. The third factor geographical image is a clear east-west cleavage. It pits especially northwestern Slovakia against the northeastern part of the country. The emerging pattern seems to be historically quite stable spatial structure. It remains to be very closely related to the geography of support of the Communists in the 1990 elections, who got their higher scores in Svidnik and Humene in the east and Martin and Roznava in the center, almost the same places where highest "communist" scores on the third factor appeared. Jehlicka, Kostelecky, and Sykora (1993) show that the support of the KSCM Party in 1990 was very much related to the pre-war patterns of the votes for Communists. Eastern Slovakia is in many respects much more diversified region than the central part of the country. As Mariot (1996) shows, in the east the religious composition of the population is quite complex. Next to Roman-Catholic Church, we find several Greek Catholic and Orthodox communities. It is not surprising than that the correlation coefficients with the indicators of religious denominations are significant. The third factor scores are related to the share of Roman Catholics (0.5953**) and Orthodox inhabitants (0.5392**). Besides, the specific national composition of the eastern part of the country is reflected in the statistics. Concentrations of Romany, as well as

26 27

Also Kostelecky (1996)

Correlation coefficient with the ratio of atheists amounts to -0.3777* and with share of Roman Catholics to 0.2782.

30


Ruthenians in the east are reflected in the correlation coefficients of the third factor scores, respectively 0.7128** and 0.6114**. The social and economic underdevelopment of the eastern part of the Slovakia is another aspect this part of the country. In the post-communist period, the region was suffering from the painful outcomes of the economic transformation. This is quite well reflected in the level of unemployment especially high in the east. The correlation coefficient of the third factor scores with the unemployment indicator amounts to 0.6465**. Another aspect of the third factor dimension could be interpreted as the difference in the structure of the national consciousness. Contrary to the second factor, where the relations towards the Hungarians played major role, in this case the Czech-Slovak relations seem to play more important role. We deal here with the two different approaches to the state conceptions. In the east, the traditional left, internationalist and in the current context, federalist option prevails. The northwest with the high concentration of votes for Slovak National Party represents the traditional right-wing 28 model of national identity with the support for Slovak full sovereignty. As several authors show , eastern Slovakia traditionally supported the federal option and Czechoslovakian parties. Before the war the dominant party of the region were Agrarians, and in 1990 federalist Public Against Violence, both supporting the idea of the common Czechoslovakian state.

5.3. Political scene and regional cleavages Results of Gabor Toka's analysis (1995) include three dimensions of party competition on the Slovak political scene in 1992. The first one is related both to economic as well as political issues. Support for decommunization is connected in this dimension with support for free market option. On the left side of this axis we find Social Democrats (SDL) and Meciar Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). On the "right" side KDH, DS and KSU are placed. The second factor is related to the issues of church involvement in public life. Here the polarization is between KDH and all others. The third factor related first of all to "patriotism" pits Slovak National Party to all others. The free factors are accounting respectively for 56%, 19%, and 17% of the explained variance. Unfortunately, neither Kitschelt (1995) nor Markowski (1995) do not present the full picture of the Slovak political scene. In Markowski's paper, we can only find the location of the Slovakian parties on the one-dimensional right-left continuum. Krivy (1995) makes a differentiation between standard and non-standard parties on the Slovak political scene. In the first group we find KDH, SDL, Social Democrats, Greens and DU. The second is comprised of HZDS, SNS, and ZRS. Surprisingly none of the above presented visions of the Slovak political scene does not resemble the factor structures obtained in the regional analysis of 1994 elections. On one hand Toka's analysis does not discern the urban, liberal cluster of the electorate. On the other hand regional analysis does not reveal the classical left-wing pattern, as in the case of Toka's first factor or Markowski's left-right continuum. It is important to note that Toka's analyses were performed on 1992 data so they could not take into account the above mentioned change in the position of SDL'. The Toka's second, "catholic" factor was as we could see in results of correlation analyses, spread between our first and third one. The Toka's third "patriotic" factor is probably best related to our third factor. The reasons for the absence of Hungarian-Slovak cleavage in Toka's analyses lies in the fact that Hungarian coalition was excluded from Toka's set of parties.

6. Ukraine The present analysis was based on the results of presidential elections of 1994, which appeared to be the most reliable accessible comparative data.

28

e.g. Jehlicka and Sykora (1991) or Jehlicka, Kostelecky and Sykora (1993)

31


Unfortunately, mainly due to the specific electoral law based on the Soviet-era legislation amended in 1993, the analysis of the parliamentary election results appeared to be very difficult. The results of the parliamentary elections were of course used in some analysis but their character seems not to meet the standards of our approach. One of the examples is to be found in the works of Shablyi (1994). He based his measures on the regional political profiles on the proportions of elected candidates supported by three main political forces in the country he has distinguished: left, right (national democratic) and the party of power. However, taking into account the above described character of the majoritarian, personalized electoral system, and the somewhat arbitrary classification of the candidates, the proposed index can not be regarded as a good measure of political differentiation of political preferences (Olszański, 1996) The elections of 1994 were already second presidential elections in Ukraine, but as in 1991 they appeared to be single issue-vote on the fate of Ukraine as a nation-state (Birch 1996). Although 1991 and 1994 elections revealed a very similar one-issue structure one important change must be noted. It concerns one of the two main candidates in both elections - Leonid Kravchuk, who played completely different roles in 1991 and 1994 presidential race. In 1991 although gaining the support of democratic-national camp in the second round, he was the candidate of the communist conservatives and did not have any rivals from the left-side of the political scene. Contrary to this in 1994 Kravchuk appeared to be the most right candidate on the ballot.

6.1. Factor structure As a result of factor analysis performed for the five best candidates, who received over 2% of votes, two significant factors were extracted. The first one accounting for 45.8% of variance appeared to pit all candidates of the secondary importance against two main serious rivals of the elections – Kravchuk and Kuchma. Thus in the first factor relatively similar voting patterns for Babych and Lanovyi formed the main structure of the dimension. One of the possible interpretations of the similarity of their support patterns is their pragmatic image in the electoral campaign. Lanovyi, known as a young economist and Babych claiming unique competence to implement the reforms as an experienced businessperson, both played the roles of independent technocrats. The leader of the socialist party Oleksandr Moroz appeared to have an electorate much less related with the patterns of vote for Lanovyi and Babych. Of course, the ideological interpretation of the first dimension may be risky and we think it can be perceived first of all as an indicator of the intensity of the main political conflict of the Ukrainian political scene. The higher the first factor scores, the less intensive the Kuchma-Kravchuk rivalry. This hypothesis is confirmed by the simple computation of correlation coefficient between the factor scores of the first factor and absolute values of factor scores of the second factor. The coefficient attains the value of 0.876** proving that the high first factor scores imply lesser degree of political polarization in the first round. As has been already mentioned, the main political conflict appeared very clearly in the second factor accounting for 23.8 per cent of the variance. After the varimax rotation, we obtain an almost symmetrical structure of votes for Kuchma versus votes for Kravchuk. Only support for Moroz is slightly related to Kuchma’s pattern. This seems to be quite consistent as socialist Moroz appeal appeared to be closer to Kuchma's voters. Both of them received their best scores in the eastern part of the country. In some of the oblasts’ Moroz managed to gain the advantage over Kravchuk edging him into third place (e.g. Sumy or Luhansk). In this context, it is interesting to look at the factor scores of the first factor before varimax rotation. Here the relation between Kuchma opting for closer cooperation of Ukraine with Russia, socialist Moroz and ethnic Russian Babych is very clear. They are all, together with Lanovyi grouped on the one side, and contrasted with Kravchuk.

32


Summing up, we can clearly see that the statistical analysis confirms the existence of the single politically relevant main geographical dimension, which could be eventually supplemented, with the index of its intensity.

6.2. Geographical interpretations The spatial image of the above-discussed cleavage is well known. In most general terms, it can be described as the West-East breakdown. The highest factor loadings are observed in Russian speaking Crimea and most eastward oblast' of Luhansk. On the other hand, the lowest values are observed in the most western oblasts on the border with Poland. Between these extreme regions, there is relatively smooth transition with the average values in central regions of the country. One can of course point out to significant deviations from the simple West-East divide. The first example could be of the Transcarpatia and Bukovyna, formally belonging to the Western part of the country, but in fact much different from the dominant, northern part of the Ukrainian West, mainly due to different historical heritage and Carpatian mountains separating the region from the rest of the country. Another important distinction should be made between Galicia (formerly belonging to Austria) and Volhyn (formerly belonging to Russia) in the West. Its is striking how the three Galician oblasts reveal very similar values of different indicators is different dimensions. In our analysis it is quite visible on the map of the first factors that Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil oblasts have the lowest values of the scores, comparable only with Crimea. This means the highs level of involvement in the left-right conflict. On the second, main factor, we can similarly observe the three Galician oblasts to have the highest values of factor scores. In fact, they are conditioned by the best results of Kravchuk, who attained in the three regions almost 90% of votes already in the first round (respectively 89, 87, and 90%). The same is true if we look on the turnout map where Galicia forms an island of the highest electoral activity in the country. In case of all above-mentioned dimensions Volhynian oblasts score lower than Galician. These regularities appear also in the Polish part of Galicja if it is analyzed against the background of the rest of the country. This is one of the few places in the present study where one would like to extend the map beyond the present day political boundaries and present the differentiation of the Polish-Ukrainian space political space in order to show the persistence of the XIX century Galician borders. The historical conditioning in this case is besides any doubt and has been noted by several authors. The most important factors adduced in this context are that Galicia had the longest uninterrupted experience of competitive elections. Due to this fact and the general conditions of social and political life in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, it developed several traits characteristic for civil society. Importance of the religiosity, general "rootedness" (stability of population over generations) and political and military resistance against Soviet domination could be seen as another aspect of heritage of the relatively tolerant political system. What is also characteristic for this region is much higher political activity and diversity than in the East, where not only pro-Communist and proRussian attitudes prevail but large part of the population remains indifferent to important political questions and the political spectrum is much narrower. Much more limited electoral participation was observed in Transcarpatia, the region which belonged to the Hungarian part of the Empire in XIX century. This one of the most probable explanations of the lower present day activity of voters. The development of civil society was also slower in formerly Austrian Bukovyna, where martial law imposed by Romania from 1918 to 1928 limited the development of democratic institution. Transcarpatian populations had also its own reasons to be more skeptical towards the Ukrainian right wing than Galicians. Separated from the rest of the country by the Carpatian Mountains the region has mixed ethnic composition and different historical heritage. Birch (1995) notes also some other possible reasons of political differentiation of the Western Ukraine. She notes the religious differences and the differing economic structures of Volhynia and Galicia, of which the later is relatively more industrialized.

33


The spatial structure of the second factor seems to have relatively stable character. As Birch (1995) reports, it was easily noticeable in different forms already in the earlier stages of electoral history of modern Ukraine, as for example Soviet elections of 1989, the parliamentary elections of 1990, or the referendums of 1991. A very interesting question is that concerning the influence of urbanization on the electoral behavior. Birch (1995) suggests that although its importance is rather limited, its influence can be quite opposite in different parts of the country. While the rural areas can be designated as more conservative than cities in all context, the meaning of conservatism can appear quite different in different contexts. Thus in the Western part of the country it implies the right wing tendency, support for the Ukrainian independence. In the Eastern part of the country conservatism means rather reluctance towards the Ukrainian independence and communist sympathies. Shablyi (1994) is of the same opinion about the duality of the political climate of the Ukrainian countryside. He sees the 1930s starvation in the Soviet Ukraine as the crucial factor devastating the traditional structures of the rural society in the Central and Eastern part of the country. One can notice that the border between the two parts of the Ukrainian State appears to be only a part of border between much larger entities. The similar contradictory meanings of rural conservatism for Western and Eastern Ukraine are respectively valid in general terms for Poland and Russia and other states on the east or west of the line crossing the Ukrainian state. Some basic demographic, social and economic data has been analyzed in its regional breakdown. Factor analysis has discerned that in fact the one basic cleavage of real importance dominates the Ukrainian socio-economic space. It combines both levels of urbanization, score of russification, industrial development as well as some demographic indexes as number of pensioners. It comes as no surprise of course that the pattern of this factor is highly interrelated with structures of the political scene. The correlation coefficient of the second factor electoral factor (East-West) with the East-West social-economic factor amounts to 0.7436**. When we look at correlation of individual social indexes with the main (second) political factor we see that the electoral behavior is most related to the pattern of russification (0.8514**), to the lesser degree the unemployment differentiation (0.7490**) and even less directly to the urbanization level (0.6657**). One could also treat as separate factor the religious differentiation. In Galicia the Greekcatholic confession dominates, whereas in Volhynia Orthodoxy is the most influential one with a large portion of the population being non-religious. The similar situation concerns the rest of the Ukraine where orthodox confession dominates together with the large and in several cases dominating groups of atheists (Politichny Portriet Ukraini, 1995). The Greek-catholic Ukrainian church has played an important role in sustaining of the national consciousness of Ukrainians in the Western part of the country. The East is not only much more industrialized but also much better organized as far as trade unions and other organizations channeling social protests are concerned. Much lower consciousness of the group interests in the West has contributed to the practical absence of organized social protest actions. If taken in its most general structures the East-West divide has almost unlimited number of correlates which are in most cases logical implications of the different worldviews of the Easterners and Westerners. Several surveys conducted in Ukraine taking into consideration the regional differentiation of the country provide numerous examples. Let’s quote here the question of support of the devolution of power in Ukraine or in other words federal system of power (Hesli, 1995, Golovakha, 1993), which receives the highest support in the Crimea and smallest in the West. The same pattern can be observed in case of support for Ukraine joining NATO and in general directions of international cooperation and military alliances (Nebozhenko, 1993, Golovakha, Kucheriv, 1997). Other examples can concern the attitude toward the right of dual citizenship (Politichny Portriet Ukraini, 1995), which would concern first of all the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine and thus affect the relations with Russia.


34

When analyzing the West-East divide in a more detailed way, several regional particularities appear. However in this general study we will not extend the our analysis. Let us only notice that the western part of the country is usually stable, as far different social and political indexes are concerned. Whereas in the East extreme values can appear either in Crimea either in Far east oblasts of Luhansk or Donetsk. For example as the level of Russification is the highest in Crimea the level of industrialization and lowest religiosity are observed in Donetsk.

6.3. Political scene and regional cleavages Let us look now on the relations between the structures of the electoral geography of the country and the patterns on its political scene. Not surprisingly, they are quite straightforward. S.Birch (1996) distinguishes four main electoral blocks among the political organizations taking part in the parliamentary elections of 1994. They were national-democratic right, reformminded centrists, the ‘Party of Power’ and leftist block composed of Socialist, Communist, and Peasant parties. Two axes of competition are discerned in this context: economic policy and foreign policy. The first one concerns the vision of economic reforms, the other mainly the relations with Russia. In practice, both dimensions appear to be closely interrelated. The differences among main options as far as the relation between the economic and foreign policy dimensions are concerned, may only concern the significance that is assigned to specific issues by given groups. Therefore, although it is clear that the support for economic reforms is positively related with support for full Ukrainian independence different parties will have different priorities. For nationalist, for example the independence will have much more salience than economic issues. In most general terms however, we can speak about right-left continuum of the four above-mentioned blocks. Most other authors present the similar models of the political scene of Ukraine. Shablyi (1994) distinguishes two dimensions: left-right and independence co-statehood. However looking at his diagram we can easily see that that are closely interrelated. The more a party is on the right side the more pro-independence it becomes. The major exception from this regularity on the Shablyi’s scheme is the Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine, less independentist as it could be established on the basis of its right-wing deviation. Tomenko (1995) perceives one dimension of the Ukrainian political spectrum. It is of course the left-right continuum corresponding with communism versus conservatism axis. Birch (1995) distinguishes between the cultural-historical heritage cleavage from the cleavage Russian versus Ukrainian ethnicity, which is related with the Russian side to the level of education. The first cleavage is of pre-Soviet origin, the other of the product Soviet era demographic pattern but appears to be analogous to pre war ethnic cleavages. According to Birch, these two cleavages can be identified as cross-cutting, giving the Ukrainian space no clear border between the two regions and 29 thus reducing the possible conditions for the split of the country . However, Shablyi (1994) perceives the line of the river Zbruch, the former Austro-Hungarian, and Polish border, as the dangerously persistent fracture of the Ukrainian space. He adduces several examples of differences in voting between Ternopil and Kchmielnitski oblast's which are separated by Zbruch. In several elections and referenda, the voting for national-independent option attained respectively the levels of 80 vs. 20 %. Surveys show also the potential for emergence of another political pattern Center (capital) vs. the rest of the country. Such differentiation could be for example noticed in case of questions concerning the confidence in militia and security service, which had the highest scores in Kyiv. Ukraine seems thus to have not only the most dramatically differentiated political space from all countries analyzed in our study, but the conditions of this differentiation remain deeply regional, historical and not structural.

29

One of the borders is situated on the west (historical-cultural) of Kiev, the other on the east (ethnic) making the central part of the country a transitional zone.

III. Conclusions

35

III. Conclusions Main types of cleavages Let us start with the general summary of the main cleavages discerned in the analyzed countries. We will mention only factors considered as relevant and present their general interpretations. Czech Republic - Liberal center versus anti-liberal (populist) periphery - Traditional, Catholic, rural (Moravia) versus the rest of the country Hungary - Liberal West and the Capital versus anti-liberal, largely post-Communist East - Traditional rural North versus poorer populist rural South (only in 1990) Lithuania - Anti-Communist (Traditional) regions versus post-Communist regions - Ethnic minority (Polish) dominated regions versus the rest of the country Poland - Liberal (urban) center and West versus anti-liberal (agrarian, populist) peripheries - "Old" Traditional (Catholic, anti-Communist) regions versus "New" (secular, postCommunist) territories Slovakia - Liberal center versus the rest of the country - Ethnic minority (Hungarian) regions versus the rest of the country - Nationalist, pro-independence West versus post-Communist, federalist East Ukraine Traditional, nationalist, pro-independence West versus Communist, pro-Russian East. Let me present some of the conclusions of this general summary. It is visible that the structures of cleavages in different countries of the region are quite diversified. The number of relevant dimensions of regional differentiation of political behavior ranges from one in Ukraine to three in Slovakia. However, we can also find several regularities in the emerging picture. We think it is possible to distinguish three general types of cleavages in our group. First, practically in all countries of the region we find a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-)-communist regions and rather secular areas of the higher post-communist support. Of course, its forms may differ in different countries, but the main conflict remains visible. In some countries the "post-communist" side is dominated by the direct heirs of the former "leading forces of nations" which did not even get rid of the communist labels (case of Ukraine, also Czech Republic and Slovakia). In others, Communist parties transformed into the moderate left parties calling themselves usually "Socialist" or "Social Democrats" (case of Poland, Hungary and Lithuania) dominate. In all countries there are also several less historically linked with communists left parties, as for example Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) or Polish Labour Union (UP) but they usually do not play always major roles on political scenes. On the traditional side of the axis we find usually broadly defined right wing parties, most often with more or less important religious connections, nationalist

36

III. Conclusions

character and clear anti-Communist profile. The social basis of this cleavage is defined first of all by the broadly understood traditional traits with the relatively higher level of religiousness as one of the most characteristic factors. We can suppose, although we lack adequate data for all countries, that in most cases the traditional communities will appear to be more stable (locally rooted) and often rural although this type of cleavage can not be simply identified with the urban-rural divide. In some of the countries cleavages of this type inhibit quite peculiar traits. This is first of all the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine. The Czech Republic, is first of all the country where the issues related to the interpretation of the recent past, or in other words the post- versus anticommunist conflict, have minor importance. As aspect of this state of affairs, we can point out to the fact of marginalization of the unreformed Communist party. The pragmatic, usually younger elite of the Party left it soon after the Velvet Revolution, leaving in the party structures the old guard unable and/or unwilling to change the political profile of the party. Kitschelt (1995a) writes in this context about "implosion of elites". As a result, the Communist party as a weak structure could not produce "its own" post- versus antiCommunist cleavage and the potential post-Communist electorate turned out to be dispersed among Social Democrats, Republicans and Communist. Since voters are not mobilized on the basis of moral, historical or cultural issues, the main cleavage appears to have economic character. The relative position of traditional catholic electorate of Moravia, a deeply anti-Communist region, has been also influenced by the weakness of Communists. Although the traditional vs. non-traditional cleavage has appeared in the factor analysis, it strength is relatively small. Moreover it does not pit the Christian KDU-CSL against Communist or left in general, but to "all others". We could suppose that in case of the existence of the strong anti- vs. post-Communist conflict in the Czech Republic this cleavage would occupy the prominent position and would transform into clear left-right opposition. Ukraine, especially its Eastern and Central part, paradoxically resembles the Czech pattern in one respect. The reason is that the former Communist party also has lost considerable part of its dynamic elites, which have moved to several different political organizations. Both former Czechoslovakia and Central and Eastern Ukraine had also relatively unorganized and weak antiCommunist opposition. Therefore, the most special feature of the main Ukrainian cleavage, especially in the case of the analyzed presidential elections, is that both sides of the main political conflict (both Kuchma and Kravchuk) turn out to be the former (but reformed) communists. Their political positions are than, largely contextual, relative than stable. As we have already showed, Kravchuk in the context of first, 1991 elections appeared to play the role of the main candidate of the left, whereas in 1994 configuration he emerged as the main figure on the right mainly due to the lack of competitor on this side of political spectrum of candidates. Some of the observers of the Czech political scene point out to the fact that also in the Czech Republic numerous former high ranking Communist party members play important roles in different places of the political scene of the country. Of course one of the most important differences between the Czech and the Ukrainian political systems is that Czech Communists have been largely marginalized, whereas in Ukraine (especially Eastern and Central) they have preserved much of their potential which is steadily growing, mainly due to the deteriorating economic situation of the country. It is of course not surprising that in Ukraine, especially its Central and Eastern part, structure of political cleavages resembles situation in Russia, where political scene also has been dominated by present and former communist. The conflict between traditionalist and reformists, even if the later happen to resort to anti-Communist rhetoric, should be interpreted as conflict of interests rather than typical anti- vs. post-Communist cleavage based on cultural and moral bases. The dominance of the political scene by economic cleavage (in geographical dimension the economic center versus periphery) and the marginalization of the cultural conflict turns out to be a common trait of both Russia and the Czech Republic. Ukraine could be in this respect divided according to the famous line marking the limits of Western influences related with Catholicism, or Austrian, and Polish zones of influence. The Western part of the country resembles thus clearly the typical Central European model

37

III. Conclusions

of conflict characteristic for Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. The main political conflict has clearly cultural character and is deeply dependent on historical and religious factors. Hungary represents another specific case from point of view of the cleavage of the first type. First of all, as we have already mentioned, the cleavage structure in the spatial dimension is neither clear nor stable. One of the main reasons behind this fact is small and decreasing regional differentiation in voting behavior. Another problem is related with the lack of the sufficient data on country social differentiation, particularly indexes of traditionalism such us level of religiousness. We can only estimate some of the differentiation on the bases of different accounts. On this base we come to the conclusion that north-south cleavage in Hungary could be classified as belonging to our first type from the geographical point of view. This thesis seems also to be supported by the correlation with suicides index which can be related with the level of religiosity, especially in accordance with the famous Durkheim thesis in the catholic communities. Political dimension of this cleavage is however quite strange, since no clear post- vs. anti-Communist differentiation had appeared. Instead we obtained cleavage between two rural patties with rather populist appeal and contrasted with Christian Democrats and liberals. Moreover, this cleavage disappeared in next elections, what makes its interpretation even more difficult. In the same time, the former-Communist vs. non-Communist cleavage appears on the second factor. Here however, the social basis is strongly economic (high dependence on unemployment), although the cultural differences between Western and Eastern Hungary should neither be underestimated. In the political dimension of the east-west cleavage lack of clear internal differentiation between non-communist parties is striking, since we could expect to notice some differences between stronger ant-Communists and liberal moderates, as in the case of Poland. One of the possible interpretations of this unclear situation is that both dimensions of political conflict in Hungary (economic and cultural) largely converge in spatial dimension. Second class of cleavages seems to by typical for Visehrad countries. It is the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan regions, and the different kind of economic periphery, usually with strong populist (or anti-liberal) appeal. This kind of cleavage seems to be characteristic for better developed post-Communist societies. One of the conditions for emergence of the liberal-populist cleavage seems to be the existence of the considerable well-educated class having its core in the national intelligentsia, often regarded as a typical Central European formation. Of course, the liberal option should not be fully identified with the intelligentsia group, since some representatives of the later could be found in other political camps, as conservative for example. Nevertheless, the liberal group has usually clearly pro-market economic orientation and pro-Western international alignment. The second condition of the emergence of the liberal-illiberal cleavage is the more or less decisive overcoming, or at least balancing of the post versus anti-Communist conflict which still dominates the political scenes of weaker countries, as in the case of Ukraine. As we have already mentioned, in the case of the Czech Republic we find the opposite situation, where the conflict over the past seems to be almost entirely marginalized by the economic issues. This, for many of the analysts, is the proof of the relatively highest maturity of the Czech political system in the region. In some countries, of which the best example is Poland, the post- vs. anti-Communist conflict may even intensify in recent period. However, although the ideological dimension overtakes in 1997 election the economic one (liberal versus populist) the former will without any doubts remain strong. Paradoxically, the existence of the backward sector of Polish private agriculture makes the economic axis of the conflict even more intensive and persistent. Here we would like to remind how different character the anti-liberal (eventually populist) peripheries can have. This difference is best visible between Poland (rural periphery) and the Czech Republic (mainly industrial periphery). In Hungary both types of peripheries appear (agricultural in the Great Plain and industrial in the East). Here however, the agricultural periphery has quite different character than in Poland because of its nationalization and depopulation rather than overpopulation like in the case of Poland. Another reason for practical absence of the liberal-anti liberal (center versus periphery) axis in the regional dimension in the case of Lithuania and Ukraine may lay in the weakness of the "central" national cultures. They seem being not able to form the effective political representation of their liberal option. This could be contrasted with the Russian case. Here the liberal camp although

38

III. Conclusions

dominated by the former communists, was able to produce its own political formations (e.g. Yabloko or Demokraticheskiy Vybor Rossi parties and in considerable extent "parties of power") and in effect political cleavage. This proves in my opinion, the obvious strength of the Russian national culture. In Russia however, the center-periphery cleavages seems to emerge on the expense of the completely marginalized post versus-anti communist divide. The more detailed analysis of this problem 30 unfortunately falls behind the scope of this study . The third type of regional factors observed in our analysis is based on the ethnic cleavages. It emerged clearly in the case of Lithuania and Slovakia, where large ethnic minorities exist. For our analysis, based on regional electoral data, its is important that minorities are sufficiently numerous in relation to the population of the country, occupy compound territories and vote in their majority for own ethnic lists. We should however bear in mind that not all ethnic minorities of the region conform to these criteria and thus they did not influenced the structures obtained in our analysis. An important group of national minorities in the countries of Central Europe is composed of those communities which chose to support in their majority the national parties despite of existence of their own minority 31 electoral lists . The most prominent example of such minorities are Belarussians in Poland and Russians (or in general Russian speakers) in Lithuania. In both cases, in their majority these groups support in the general elections the left, reformed-post-Communist parties. The support by these ethnic minorities of the left rather than right parties is easy to explain. They have several positive associations with the Communist period, and the Communists usually were regarded as a guarantee of their status in the environment of Poles and Lithuanians. While in Poland the religious distinction of Orthodox Belorussians from Catholic Poles should be considered as the main source of tension, in Lithuania Russian speakers could feel uncertain because of their perception as occupants. However, the question why neither Lithuanian Russians nor Polish Belarussians do not support their own minority-list is not so easy to answer. In the Polish case, the low prestige of the Belarussian culture and Belarussian State may be adduced as important arguments. Besides, we can mention such factors as very low level of education of the Polish-Belarussian community, a small intelligentsia layer being in its infancy, underdeveloped national identity with the orthodox religion as the main base of the group consciousness. For Belarussians, voting for the left may be also interpreted as a way of manifestation of their distinctiveness from the Polish catholic majority with the protection against the accusation of developing non-Polish nationalistic movement. Most of these factors are not valid in the case of Lithuanian Russians, a mixed group settled in Lithuania mainly after the Soviet annexation of the country. Here lack of strong national consciousness may be explained in the terms of the weakened Russian identity as a result of the Soviet period homogenization. Russian state, although enjoying much stronger prestige than Belarussian one, may be however for most of the Lithuanian Russians less attractive place to live that Lithuania, especially taking into account the fact of their choice of the Lithuanian citizenship. The other case concerns the ethnic minorities, which are too small to be included in our computations. Here the example of the German minority in Poland is the most obvious. Although German lists are getting massive support in the region of Opole Silesia, the number of votes is to small in relation to the country population to include the lists in our computations. The Germans can get elected about two deputies in the Sejm only because of taking the advantage of the exemption from the 5% threshold granted to ethnic minorities. However, including the German votes in our data set would result undoubtedly in emergence of a new factor of a kind "Germans vs. all others". Finally, we should not forget about several other smaller ethnic groups in all countries of the region, like for example Romany which are to sparse and often not integrated to the political systems

30

For more comments on Russian political and regional cleavages see e.g. O'Loughlin, Shin and Taibol (1996) or Zarycki (1998b) 31

Here we can not agree with Clark (1995) suggesting that most Central-European national minorities supported their electoral lists in parliamentary elections.

39

III. Conclusions

of particular countries to form own their political organizations. Few exceptions seem rather to confirm this rule. Apart from regularities and peculiarities in the political structures obtained in the result of the ecological analysis, it is also possible to look at the different spatial patterns from comparative perspective. As we think, in this case one basic pattern could be found as having clear supranational character, namely the West-East divide, which appears in different forms, is several countries as Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, and Hungary. It seems that the importance of the West-East axis, which is visible in many of the Central European countries could be interpreted as one of the manifestations of the general spatial structure of the region located "between the West and the East". The same structure is visible in several other dimensions as for example that of the regional identity based on the attitudes towards the west and east as the main poles influencing the developments in the Central Europe over 32 several ages . In most general terms, the East-West pattern could be interpreted as the heritage of Western and Eastern influences in the economic, social, political and other spheres. They have included military expansions of (first of all of German and Russian states), spread of religions and religious/ideological ideas (Catholicism and Protestantism from the West, Orthodoxy from the East), waves of modernization (mainly from the West) etc. This is very clearly visible in the case of Poland where the XIX-century partitions of the country by Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary could be interpreted exactly in these terms. However, several Polish authors show that the east - west differentiation in Polish economics and society has much older roots and the western regions of the country were more developed economically long time before the partitions of the country. The east-west differentiation of Hungary is clearly also a result of the spatially limited range of the Western European influences. As we have already mentioned, the east-west divide's rotes are identified by some of the authors already in the Roman period. In the case of Hungary the situation is however complicated by clear southern influences of Turkish Empire and several other factors. On the other hand Ukraine could be presented as the clearest example of the west-east spatial structure of the region.

Factors shaping the electoral map of the region Let us now analyze the importance of different factors, which could be assumed as having the influence on political behavior in different regions. First, the influences of historical heritage, undoubtedly having a dramatic significance for the present-day Central Europe societies. As Tworzecki (1996) notices, "it has become almost an article of faith for students of East-Central European politics, that history - even very distant history - is very much alive in the minds of the inhabitants of that part of the continent". However, its relevance is difficult to assess on the equal basis in all countries, since different kind of historical data are available. The most obvious are the cases of Poland and Ukraine where the dramatic changes of political borders took place, especially if compared to the XIX century. The traces of old empires, which occupied the territories of the modern states, can be very easily discerned and in some cases, they have even supra-national character. This is especially the case of the Austrian-Hungarian province of Galicja the influence of which, for example on the relatively higher voter participation is visible both in the part of the region located today in Poland as well as in Ukraine. In both parts of the region we observe also similar traditional communities and strong national parties, Polish in Poland and Ukrainian in Ukraine. In Ukraine, we could also mention the case of Transcarpatia, Crimea and some other regions of the country, which have been incorporated into the modern state relatively recently. They all display a very peculiar voting behavior patterns. The mechanisms of influence of the historical heritage on the present day voting behavior are not so easy to explain. While it is quite clear that former political systems shaped considerably the present social structures of communities, we do not posses much detailed knowledge on how it

32

See my article (Zarycki 1997b) for a discussion on contemporary dilemmas of Central European countries (especially Poland) stemming from their relations toward West and East.

40

III. Conclusions

happened. Still most of the academic works appear to be based on rather stereotypical explanations of these phenomena. One of the reasons why we can not be satisfied with such simplistic interpretations is the fact that regions belonging in the past to the same political units do not necessarily inhibit the same political profiles today. The past influences often turn out to operate quite selectively. In most cases, there are no explanation for such phenomena when a part of the region inherited the particular historical traditions while the other not at all. These questions pertaining to the mechanisms and importance of historical influences concern all historical periods. Besides the XIX century epoch, several authors ascribe considerable importance to the experiences of the inter-war and communist periods. The years of functioning of democratic st governments after the 1 World War in different countries are carefully counted by some authors (e.g. Rivera 1996) and the communist systems of government analyzed. These analyses do not seem to provide satisfying explanations of the present day regional differentiation in political behavior. One of the basic questions in this context most often remains unanswered, namely to what extent new patterns inscribe themselves into already existing structures of spatial differentiation, and to what extend they are crating new forms. Another type of outcomes of border changes are of course already mentioned regions dominated by ethnic minorities. In our group two countries have the most considerable ethnic minorities playing noticeable role on the political scene of countries. The first one is Lithuania, territory of which has been enlarged by the Vilnius area, which belonged in the inter-war period to Poland. The region has today large Polish speaking population, which is especially numerous in rural areas (in Vilnius the Polish population is estimated at about 20%) and influences considerably the electoral map of the country. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia separated from the Hungarian state after the Trianon treaty in 1920 was of course only one of several other ethnic Hungarian regions to be found outside the state borders. A very important type of historical influences are political traditions (in sense of persistent support of particular political options) characteristic for different regions of countries. They are not necessarily related to the history of past political divisions. They are particularly well visible in the case of known pre-war regional patterns of support of particular parties. Examples of such continuity in voting behavior are known first of all in Czech Republic (Czech Peoples Party in Moravia, Social Democrats and Communists in Bohemia) and Hungary (Smallholders in the south, Christian Democrats in the north). Less direct links were traced in Slovakia (areas of support of Hlinka's "ludaks" party) and in Poland (e.g. traditional left support in the industrial basin of Zaglebie Dabrowskie). The problem is however, that the knowledge on these historical factors may be very selective, dependent first of all on availability of archival data and next on the efforts of scholars in particular countries to trace such historical roots of electoral behavior. Another, special kind of historical heritage are the movements of population which occurred after the Second World War as an effect of the conquest of the Central Europe by the Soviet Union. What today would be termed, as "ethic cleansing" was especially important factor influencing the population structure of selected regions in Poland and Czech Republic. In both cases the German populations have been expelled and on their places settlers from other regions of given countries were moved in. The mixed character of the new, artificially created communities has a very significant influence on the voting behavior in these places. They are always more secular than "old" regions and usually more prone to support the left and populist parties. One must however emphasize here considerable differences between Czech and Polish "new" territories. The Polish western and northern former Germany region seem to be much more liberal in their political profile than Czech clearly antiliberal western constituencies. Clear contrasts to the newly settled regions are traditional areas. Their most characteristic traits are first of all the relatively high levels of religiosity and stability of population. In effect, the regions are usually more conservative, especially in the moral and ideological sense of the term, rather than in the economic sphere. In the political dimension this implies most often the support of the right wing, usually religious or at least non-anti-clerical parties. In countries where the anti- versus post-

41

III. Conclusions

communist debate is an important element of the political life, traditional regions tend to display strongly anti-Communist option. Such traditional areas are to be found in all analyzed countries of the region. The relations with the religious activity is perhaps the less documented by our data in the case of Lithuania. Nevertheless, one can expect a very similar complex of political, religious and social characteristics of traditional communities in this country. What is especially worthwhile emphasizing is the persistence of the religious, traditional values in countries being under the strong pressure of the communist system. The system has not only actively fought religion and the Church as an institution but also has eliminated, with the exception of Poland, the most important basis of traditional communities - the private agriculture. This, as we can, see did not resulted in the elimination of the religious traditions. Another important factor, importance of which we would like to discuss, is broadly understood urbanization. Its significance is, at it was already stressed, the most obvious in the Visehrad countries. However, as we could see, not in all countries the meaning of the urban-rural cleavage is the same. The most clear differences between the two sides on this axis are to be found in Poland, where most of the available indicators were following more or less rigidly the same pattern of spatial differentiation: index of urban population, industrialization index, share of population employed in agriculture, level of education, GDP per capita, number of cars per inhabitant, level of foreign investment or entrepreneurial activity etc. In biggest Polish towns, the level of unemployment is clearly lower than the national average. In several other countries, many of the just mentioned differentiation not necessarily follow the same spatial patterns. Urbanization index, as it appeared to be most obvious in the case of Czech Republic, may turn out to be high both in central, metropolitan areas, as well as in depressed, peripheral industrial zones. From point of view political analysis, such formally equally urban social environments may and in most cases do appear as completely different political regions. In such cases, the index of the level of education, or private business activity will allow to discern the other aspect of the urban rural-cleavage. In case of these indicators, the main metropolitan areas will usually appear as the most distinct poles of fully urban option. They will be usually the strongholds of the liberal parties, especially in the economic aspect of this notion. In this context, we can also mention the complex problem of assessment of the outcomes of economic reforms on the voting behavior. The common wisdom is of course that in areas profiting most from the economic transformations will display the most liberal political profile. This is of course most often the case. However, the mechanism of this dependence seems not to be quite obvious. The large cities, metropolitan areas are always the leaders of economic transformation and most of the "winners" of the reforms are to be found there. On the other hand, large cities concentrate, especially in Central European countries, majority of country population having the highest shares of the university-educated population, intelligentsia, and other elite groups. These communities were always characterized by the most liberal outlook and their worldviews seem not to be conditioned strongly by their current economic conditions. In fact, many of the representatives of the educated class, e.g. those employed in the state sector (education, science, health care etc.) may actually be in quite difficult economic conditions. Their support of the pro-reform parties may be rather influenced by the general perception of the Communist system. As for example the study of Powers and Cox (1997) shows, the vote for post-Communists, which are usually regarded as the parties profiting from the economically disappointed electorate, may not be explained in the simple "winners - losers" of transformations terms. The authors conclude their analysis of their 1993 Polish parliamentary elections stating that "although evaluations of individual economic circumstances have a strong effect on satisfaction with reforms, one's view of the history is equally important, and understandings of the past, manifested as a blame attributions, are essential determinants of voting behavior. Satisfaction with economic reforms has some influence on voting, but its effect is not as large as one might expect, given the prominence of market reforms and privatization. The greatly attenuated economic effects and the fact that, for many Poles, non-economic issues are of paramount importance, suggest that the ascendancy of postcommunist parties is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents." Thus we see that urban-rural differentiation can not be regarded as the simple explanation of the voting behavior, especially in the left-right (anti- versus post-communist) dimension. Especially

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III. Conclusions

rural areas are not easily predictable in this dimension. Most often historical traditions, religiosity, and 33 stability of populations have much larger explanatory powers than the rural status of the area .

Central Europe in light of selected Western theories Let us now present a short analysis of the above-described regularities in the light of main theoretical approaches mentioned at the beginning of the present work. Our main classification of Central European cleavages into three basic types, as it easy to notice, corresponds quite well with the basic classification of Kitschelt. Our first type of cleavages (non- or anti- vs. post- or Communist, traditional vs. secular) is corresponding with Kitschelt's conflict concerning the extent and the nature of democratic participation in collective decisions making between "modern libertarians" and "traditional authoritarians". The second type of regional cleavages (urban[metropolitan]-rural, economic center-economic periphery, liberals-populist) corresponds with Kitschelt's conflict on allocation of scare resources between advocates of political principles of distribution (left, populism) and spontaneous market principles (right, liberalism). The third type of cleavages - ethnic dimension clearly corresponds with Kitschelt's conflict over the definition of citizenship between proponents of universalist option and those supporting ethnic, religious or national constrains on the access to citizenship. In our view one important remark should be added to the definition of the cleavage of the first type in the Central European cleavage. In the historical context of the region we would not define it exclusively as conflict between libertarians and authoritarians but rather as between different reactions to the foreign occupation. The foreign domination would first of all be understood as Soviet domination over the region. However, in most countries of our group struggles with foreign domination have much longer traditions and deeply influenced political cultures of all nations. Although the Soviet Empire has collapsed and the question of foreign domination is no more an immediate concern, the old conflicts still persist in most of the countries. The conflict could be thus defined as the cleavage between hard-liners denouncing and compromise with foreign rulers and often advocating active resistance on one side and collaborators, those adopting submissive stance usually justifying it with their realism and lack of any sense of opposition towards the regime. Usually we find more conservative, hard reactions in traditional, Catholic regions, while more cooperative, compromise reactions to the invaders in less traditional and more secular areas. Such cleavage could be probably compared to political axes found in other countries, which experienced foreign occupations as for example Ireland or Finland in some periods of their histories. Although the Soviet domination is over the political cleavage has survived and is based today first of all on issues of decommunization and the interpretation of the communist past. The Central European political and regional cleavages seem in most cases not to be quite easy to interpret in the classical Lipset-Rokkan framework, mainly because of the specific and differentiated forms and timings of the national and industrial revolutions in the region. The occurrences of the national minorities not incorporated in the national political system, which resulted in minority-majority cleavages, could be of course interpreted as instances of centers-periphery structures. The Polish liberal-populist factor is on the other hand the closest to the classical urbanrural cleavage in Lipset-Rokkan model. Because of the above-mentioned heritage of the occupations, the religious cleavages in the region are not so easily interpreted in the framework of the Church versus state conflicts. In many cases Church became the main supporter of the national identity and institutional base for opposition movements what resulted in the special place of religion in the modern societies of the Central Europe. It seems also that the center-periphery cleavage could be interpreted in different ways in the different regions because of its complicated historical pasts. On one hand we could find in most countries clear central regions and more peripheral once where the central national culture has not entirely dominated the local political life. From such point of view, Moravia would be the main Czech

33

Here we may again not agree with Clark (1995) who suggested that in most cases the rural areas of the Central European countries supported the post-communist parties.

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III. Conclusions

Republic periphery. In Poland several regions could be classified as peripheral: Kaszuby, Podhale or Podlasie. Using such approach Polish "new" western and northern territories would fall in the "central" category because of their homogeneity, domination of central political culture and very weak local traditions. On the other hand, we could use the center-periphery schema from point of view of great powers dominating for long time the territories of the modern states. From such point of view the whole region of Central Europe could be defined as peripheral in relation to Western Europe and to some extend to Russia. In the Communist period Central European countries could be perceived as peripheries of the Soviet Empire. Thus, national cultures were fighting for survival under the foreign domination. This is especially the case of the nations incorporated fully into the Soviet Union as Lithuania and Ukraine, which were for long time national, cultural and religious peripheries of Moscow. In the same way, western Poland (former Prussian sector) could be viewed as Prussian periphery, while the Congress Kingdom on the east, Russian western periphery in XIX c. Position of Poles was however much stronger in the Russian part of the divided country. In the same way Austrian province of Galicja divided today between Poland and Ukraine was one of the poorest peripheries of the Empire. In this respect Hungary occupied much more central place in the Habsburg Empire, but Budapest could never outrun the capital Vienna. Czechs and Slovaks were for long time also peripheral nations and regional disappearing cultures. Summing up our discussion of adequacy of western theoretical approaches to Central European region we could point out to the case of Czech main cleavage in our ecological version, which appears to correspond exactly with the Lijphart's conflict over support of liberal democracy with communists and fascists opposing it, which is exactly the case of the Czech Republic. Short concluding remarks concerning the relations between the ecological and survey approaches could be added. As we could see, there is no clear dependency between ecological and survey approach to the analysis of the political cleavages. In the situation of Central Europe these relations range from full adequacy in the case of Poland, where the same two-dimensional structure reveals itself in both types of analysis, to the Hungarian case where there is no resemblance at all in outcomes of both approaches. Probably there is no just one factor, which could be defied as the determinant of this relation. Among most important reasons of incomparability of ecological and survey approaches one should probably point out to the low level of regional differentiation of party support, the low level of structuration of political scene of the country and high volatility both of general political preferences and spatial patterns of support of particular parties. Finally, we would like to present two synthetic maps summarizing some of the findings of the present study. The maps have very general and imprecise character not accidentally but because of our convictions. We believe that international comparative maps of electoral behavior should be prepared with a great deal of caution because of problems with comparability of used data. In fact, no two parties in different countries, even if having very similar ideological profiles, can be considered as identical. They are always functioning in a concrete contexts of national politics. It is sometimes even true that the same party may play quite different roles in different regions in the same country. The excellent example of such phenomena could be found in the pre-1993 Czechoslovakia, where the same political organizations used to have very unlike positions on political scenes of the Czech and Slovak republics. Neither it is possible to use the results of the factor analysis in preparation of such comparative, regional maps, since factors scores values are absolutely incomparable between different set of data. Therefore, in our maps we show only approximate shapes of regions characterized by stable political tendencies in electoral behavior and structural traits.

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IV. Appendixes

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List of the major parties and presidential candidates in the countries of the region Czech Republic ODS – Obcanská Demokratická Strana Civic Democratic Party Heir of OF. The main market-liberal party in the Czech Republic. Lead by Prime Minister Klaus, the main architect of the division of Czechoslovakia together with V.Meciar. Techerist rethorics and rather moderate actual social and economic policies. Support of privatization, low inflation, and low enthusiasm toward the Senate. ODA – Obcanská Demokratická Aliance Civic Democratic Aliance Heir of OF, economic liberalism, moral conservatism, Led by Jan Kalvoda, More support for self-government that ODS, praise for British Conservative Party. A libertarian-leaning party of notables. OH – Obcanske Hnutí Civic Movement – Free Democrats later renamed as SD (Slobodny Demokrati- Free Democrats) Centrist pro-market successor of OF. Leader former Foreign minister Jiri Diensbier. Liberal alternative for conservatives and socialists. Human rights, ecology, anti-corruption. CSSD – Ceská Strana Socialne Demokraticka Czech Social Democratic Party Leader Milos Zeman, Against "economic mafias and seeing out of the national property". Against senate, not related with Communists. A party which "merged" with KSCS after February 1948 coup and was only reorganized after November 1989 revolution. KDU-CSL – Krestanská Demokratická Unie – Ceskoslovenska Strana Lidova

IV. Appendixes

51

Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party Leader Josef Lux. Historical Christian party which used to be one of the satellites of KSCS. One of the government parties since 1992. Strongholds in Catholic regions of Moravia and southern Bohemia. Earlier supported Moravian autonomy. SPR-RSC – Struzeni Pro Republiku – Republikánská Straná Ceskoslovenská Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia Anticommunist, anti-Romany xenophobic party of populist appeal and somewhat socialprotectionistic economic policies. Leader Miroslav Sladek. For death penalty, anti-IMF, against senate, stronghold in northern Bohemia. KSCM – Komunistická Strana Cech a Moravy Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia The major component of the Left Block, formerly KSCM. Marxism without distortions, antiNATO, anti-German. KDS – Krestanskodemokratická Strana Christian Democratic Party Conservatives, emphasis on moral issues, anti-abortion, self-government. Leader Ivan Philip DEU – Demokratická Unie Democratic Union Criticizing Klaus for neglecting moral and justice issues. Emphasis on anti-corruption policy, verification of former communist, reprivatization. Pro-market. HDZJ - Hnutí D chodc za zivotní jistoty Pensioners' Movement for Secure Life A slightly left of the center, single-issue party. HSD-SMS - Hnutí za samosprávnou democracy - Spolecnost pro Moravu a Slezsko. Movement for Self-Governing Democracy - Association for Moravia and Silesia Regional. Against economic shock therapy. Protection for domestic agriculture. LSU - Liberal Social Union Coalition of Agricultural Party, Green Party and Czechoslovak Socialist Party.

IV. Appendixes

52

Hungary MDF – Magyar Demokrata Fórum Hungarian Democratic Forum A Christian-conservative party basing its identity on a strongly patriotic appeal and advocating a social market economy. The main government party between the 1990 and 1994 elections. Earlier wider political spectrum, after 1993 more conservative, pro-European, and Catholic. KDNP – Kereszténydemokarata Néppárt Christian Democratic People’s Party A strongly social-projectionist Christian party, a junior partner in the 1990-94 coalition government. FKgP – Fuggetlen Kisgazdapart Independent Smallholder, Land Laborer and Citizens’ Party Right wing party famous for its demand of reprivatization of land. SzDSz – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége ADF - Aliance of Free Democrats, Free Democrats Social-liberal party set up mainly by intellectuals. Secular, pro-market, cosmopolitan, junior partner in the post 94 government. FIDESZ – Fiatal Demokratak Szovetsege Alliance of Young Democrats Liberal, anti-Communist party based on the young electorate appeal. Reduction of taxes, minimum welfare state. Since 1993 more emphasis on national values. MSzP (MSP) – Magyar Szocialista Part – Szocialistak Hungarian Socialist Party Gyula Horn, social market economy Reformist successor of the former communist party ASZ - Agrarszovetseg Agrarian Alliance MSzDP – Magyarorszagi Socialdemokrata Part Hungary’s Social Democratic Party Social democrats left. Controversial historical record, personalistic infightings. MP (formerly MSzMP) – Munkáspárt, Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Workers Party, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party A small ant-market milieu party with a considerable membership but limited electoral success founded by orthodox communist in late 1989.

IV. Appendixes

53

Lithuania LNP”LP” – Lietuvi Nacionaline Partija ‘Jaunoji Lietuva’ (Krikščioni demokratu ir Lietuviu tautinio jaunimo ‘Januoji Lietuva’ sajungu susivienijamas “Usvieninga Lietuva”. Aliance of the Christian Democratic Union of Lithuanian Youth “Young Lithuania” for a United Lithuania) Radical national right party lead by Stanislovas Buskevicius. Elements of fascism and political irresponsibility. LCS - Lietuvos Centro Judejimas Lithuanian Center Movement Moderate economic liberalism. Enigmatic and incoherent program, critique of scandals and privatization. LKDP - Lietuvos Krikščioni Demokratu Partija Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party A junior partner of the conservatives led by Algirdas Saudargas. Less populist and less Euroenthusiastic. For socially minded market economy. LDDP – Lietuvos Demokratine Darbo Partija Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party National fraction of the former Communist Party of Lithuania led by A.Brazauskas. Social program. Accused by its opponents of support of the wild capitalism, favoring old nomenclatura and criminal world. LSP - Lietuvos Socialdemokratu Partija Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Independentist, anticommunist party led by Aloyzas Sakalas. LTS - Lietuviu Tautininku Sąjunga

National Union of Lithuania Rimantas Smetona, radical anti-Communists TS(LK) - Sajudis / T vyn s Sąjunga (Lietuvos konservatoriai) Sajudis / Homeland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania) Neo-conservatist, anti-communist, main right wing party led by Vytautas Landsbergis. Program described by opponents as "national-socialism". Pro-european, anti-Russian. In general has overcome nationalistic tendencies. LLRA -Lietuvos Lenk rinkimi akcija Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles LLS - Lietuvos Lenk Sajunga Union of Poles of Lithuania Lietuvos Demokratu Partijos Jungtinis Saras Lithuanian Democratic Party LMP - Lietuvos moter Partija

IV. Appendixes

54

Lithuanian Women Party Leaded by K.Prusnkiene, describing itself as liberal and pro-market, but often regarded as a satellite of post-communist LDDP. Accused of left social policy, pro-Russian stance and authocratism of the leader.

Presidential Candidates Arturas PAULIAUSKAS Former attorney general supported by a wide spectrum of forces from ex-communist LDDP to liberals. Valdas ADAMKUS An émigré from USA, centrists Vytautas LANDSBERGIS Legendary leader of Sajudis, right. Vytenis Povilas ANDRIUKAITIS One of the leaders of the Social Democratic party. Kazys BOBELIS Leader of the Christian Democratic Party (LKDP)

Poland SLD - Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej Alliance of the Democratic Left The post-communist electoral alliance led by the Social Democratic Party of Poland (SdRP) the de facto heir of the PZPR. AWS - Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność" Electoral Action "Solidarity" A broad electoral alliance created after 1995 presidential elections with the participation of ZChnN, SKLm PC, part of KPN, „Solidarity" Trade union and some smalle conservative and right wing groups. PSL - Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe Polish Peasant Party Heir of the post-communist satellite of PZPR. UW - Unia Wolności Freedom Union Main market-liberal party lead by finance minister L.Balcerowicz. Set up by notables, created by merger of UD and KLD ZChN - Zjednoczenie Chrześciańsko-Narodowe Christian-National Union The main Christian party. UP - Unia Pracy Labour Union

IV. Appendixes

55

A strongly secular social-democratic party with both Solidarity-origin, and post-communist member- and leadership. ROP - Ruch Odbudowy Polski Movement for Reconstruction of Poland A strongly anti-Communist electoral alliance led by J.Olszewski. KPN - Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej Confederation for Independent Poland Anti-Communist, independent party referring to the J.Pilsudski ideas lead by L.Moczulski.

Presidential Candidates Aleksander KWAŚNIEWSKI Until the 1995 elections leader of the post-communist social democrats (SdRP). Before 1989 member of the government. Young, liberal and flexible, his main election campaign slogan "Let's choose the future!" Lech WAŁĘSA The legendary "Solidarność" leader and former president. Jacek KUROŃ One of the leaders of the liberal Freedom Union (UW) party. Former minister of labor. Socially minded the most popular politician in Poland. Jan OLSZEWSKI Leader of the radical ant-communist Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). Hanna GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ The president of the National Bank of Poland. Conservative directly not related with any party. Janusz KORWINN-MIKKE Former leader of radical free-market Union of Real Politics.

Slovakia HZDS – Hnutie za Demokraticke Slovensko Movement for a Democratic Slovakia A more nationalist and less pro-market fraction of the VPN (Public against violence) lead by Premier Vladimir Meciar. Rather populist, known for its "combatant avocation of a distinctly majoritarian form of democratic government". In foreign policy balancing between the Russian and Western options. DU – Demokraticka Unia Slovenska Democratic Union of Slovakia A party of notables founded in 1994 by prominent defectors from HZDS. Party leader Jozef Moravcik was Prime Minister in 1994 interim government. Pro-European, liberal. KDH – Krestansko Demokratické Hnutie Christian Democratic Movement A right of the center Christian party. Leader Jan Carnogurski. KSU – Krestansko-Socialna Unia Slovenska

IV. Appendixes

56

Christian Social Union Separatist and mildly nationalist Christian party. SNS – Slovenska Narodna Strana Slovak National Party Patriotism, national pride, social protection, death penalty, support for private business. DS – Demokraticka Strana Democratic Party A right of the center historical party favoring the Czechoslovak federation to Slovak independence. Liberal. SDL’ – Strana Demokratickej L’avice Party of Democratic Left Reformed liberal fraction of the former Communist party. ZRS – Zdruzenie Robotnikov Slovenska Workers’ Association of Slovakia Radical, populist left party. MK – Madarska Koalicia Hungarian Coalition Union of several Hungarian organizations SD - Socialna democracia. Forum robotnikov - Strana socialnej demokracie Romov) Social Democracy KSS - Komunistická strana Slovenska Communist Party of Slovakia

Ukraine Valeryi Kheorhyiovych BABYCH B.1952 ethic Russian of Ukrainian citizenship, economic education, businessman, President of the "Ukrainian Financial Group" and East European Congress of Entrepreneurs. Leonid Makarovych KRAVCHUK Born 1934. Ukrainian, economic education. Career in the Communist Party apparatus, responsible for ideological affairs, In 1990 elected the President of the Supreme Council, declared the independence of the Ukraine. Elected the president in the first round of presidential elections in December 1991. According to Birch (1996) in 1991 elections he succeeded in identifying himself with the drive for independence, but was at the same time the choice of the conservatives in the country who saw him as representing a link with the communist past Leonid Danylovich KUCHMA Born 1938. Ukrainian. Engineer. A Russian-speaking representative of the military-industrial complex and former head of world's largest missile factory. Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Prime minister 1992-93. Organizer of the Inter-Regional Block for Reforms. Presented himself as pragmatic and experienced technocrat, and emphasized the need to form closer economic ties with Russia. Volodymyr Timofiyovich LANOVYI

IV. Appendixes

57

Born 1952. Ukrainian, a young economist. Minister of property and entrepreneurship, later minister of economy, ad deputy prime minister. One of the leaders of the "New Ukraine" movement. Oleksandr Oleksandovych MOROZ Born 1944. Ukrainian. Political officer of the Communist Party. Organizer and present of the Socialist Party of Ukraine. Chairman of the parliament Ivan Stepanovych PLIUSHCH Born 1941. Ukrainian. Political officer of the Communist Party. President of the Supreme Council of Ukraine since 1991. Close to Kravchuk in his political positions. Petro Mykhaylovych TALANCHUK Born 1938.Ukrainian. Left the communist part in 1990. Rector of the Kiev Technical University. Minister of Education.

Results of the analysed elections CZECH REPUBLIC 1992 Parliamentary Elections 1. ODS-KDS

33.43

2. Levy Blok

14.48

3. CSSD

6.79

4. SPR-RSC

6.37

5. KDU-CLS

6.07

6. LSU

6.06

7.HDS-SMS

4.9

8. OH

4.73

9. ODA

4.07

10.HDZJ

3.43

---------------------------------11.SCPZR

2.66

12.KAN

2.15

IV. Appendixes

58

CZECH REPUBLIC 1996 Parliamentary Elections 1. ODS

29.9

2. CSSD

25.8

3. KCS

10.5

4. SPR-RSC

8.01

5. KDU-CSL

7.72

6. ODA

6.37

7. HDZJ

3.24

--------------------------------8. SD

2.15

9.Levy Blok

1.4

HUNGARY 1990 Parliamentary Elections 1. MDF

24.73

2. SzDSz (AFD)

21.39

3. FKgP

11.73

4. MSzP

10.89

5. FIDESZ

8.95

6. KDNP

6.46

7. MSzMP

3.68

8. MSzDP

3.55

9. ASZ

3.13

----------------------------------------------10.VP

1.89

HUNAGARY 1994 Parliamentary Elections 1. MSzP

32.96

2. SZDSZ

19.76

3. MDF

11.73

4. FKgP

8.85

5. KDNP

7.06

6. FIDESZ

7.00

7. MP

3.18

---------------------------------------------8. KP

2.55

9. ASZ

2.1

LITHUANIA 1991 Referendum on Independence Yes

90.23

IV. Appendixes

59

No

6.54

LITHUANIA 1992 Referendum on withdawal of Russian Army Yes

90.76

No

7.29

LITHUANIA 1992 Parliamentary Elections 1. LDDP

42.61

2. Sajudis

20.51

3. LKDP

12.22

4. LSP

5.86

5. JL-UL

3.44

6. LCS

2.44

7. LLS (Poles)

2.07

---------------------------------------------------8. LTS-LDP

1.92

LITHUANIA 1993 Presidential Elections A.M.Brazauskas

60.0

S.Lozoraitis

38.2

LITHUANIA 1996 Parliamentary Elections 1. TS(LK)

31.34

2. LKDP

10.43

3. LDDP

10.01

4. LCS

8.67

5. LSP

6.94

6. LNP”JL”

4.01

7. LMP

3.86

8. KDS

3.24

9. LLRA (Poles)

3.13

----------------------------------------------------10. LTMA 11. LTS-LDP

2.56

IV. Appendixes

60

LITHUANIA 1997 Presidential Elections First round 1. A.Paulauskas

45.28

2. V.Adamkus

27.90

3. V.Landsbergis

15.92

4. V.P. Andrukaitis

5.72

5. K.Bobelis

3.96

---------------------------------------------6. R.Pavilionis

0.87

7. R.Smetona

0.36

Second round 1. V.Adamkus

50.31

2. A.Paulauskas

49.69

POLAND 1995 Presidential Elections First round turnout 67.7%

1. A. Kwaśniewski

35.11

2. L. Wałęsa

33.11

3. J.Kuroń

9.22

4. J. Olszewski

6.86

5. W. Pawlak

4.31

6. T.Zieliński

3.53

7. H. Gronkiewicz-Waltz 2.76 8. J. Korwin-Mikke

2.4

------------------------------------------9. A.Lepper

1.32

10. J.Pietrzak

1.12

11. T.Koźluk

0.15

12. K. Piotrowicz

0.07

13. L.Bubel

0.04

Second round turnout 68.23 %

1. A.Kwaśniewski

51.72 %

2. L.Wałęsa

48.28 %

IV. Appendixes

61

POLAND 1997 Parliamentary Elections Turnout 47.93% 1. AW”S”

33.83

2. SLD

27.13

3. UW

13.37

4. PSL

7.31

5. ROP

5.56

6.UP

4.74

----------------------------------------------7.KPiER

2.18

8.KPEiRRP

1.63

9. BdP

1.36

10. Germ.min.

0.72

11. Slavic nat.min.

0.10

12. Samoobrona

0.08

13. PWN-PSN

0.07

SLOVAKIA 1994 Parliamentary Elections 1. HZDS

35.0

2. SDL’

10.4

3. MK (Hungarians)

10.2

4. KDH

10.1

5. DU

8.6

6. ZRS

7.3

7. SNP

5.4

8. DS

3.4

9. KSS

2.7

10.KSU

2.1

IV. Appendixes

62

UKRAINE 1994 Presidential elections First round 1. L.Kravchuk

37.72

2. L.Kuchma

31.27

3. O.Moroz

13.40

4. V.Lanovyi

9.32

5. V.Babych

2.39

--------------------------------------6. I.Pliushch

1.29

7. P.Talanchuk

0.54

Second round 1. L.Kravchuk

45.5

2. L.Kuchma

52.1

Results of calculations Czech Republic Parliamentary elections 1992 Factor Matrix (Unrotated) Factor I

Factor II

CSSD

.63365

.46003

KDU

.86881

.17824

LSU

.06285

.27463

ODA

.40591

.56225

ODS-KDS

.66513

.61265

SPR-RSC

.28019

.66754

OH

.62615

.55245

HDZJ

.77916

.38387

HDS-SMS

.88631

.02828

KSCM

.00903

.75644

Explained variance

36.3

24.8

Cumulated

73.7

IV. Appendixes

63

Parliamentary elections 1996 Factor Matrix (Varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

ODS

.81026

.52811

CSSD

.76368

.23942

KSCM

.80207

.11908

SPR-RSC

.90096

.10312

KDU-CSL

.19574

.91157

ODA

.84986

.21383

HDZJ

.65114

.15919

DU

.50968

.72173

Explained variance

55.4

18.6

Cumulated

74.0

Correlation Factor 1/96

Factor 2/96

Factor 1/92

Factor 1/92

Factor 1/96 Factor 2/96 Factor 1/92 Factor 2/92

1.0000 .0000 .2842* .8794**

.0000 1.0000 .8999** .1176

.2842* .8999** 1.0000 .0000

.8794** .1176 .0000 1.0000

Turnout 96 Abortions Atheists Unemployment Crime

.4021** .5979** .4187** .5770** .0676

.5789** .5093** .8179** .0951 .6240**

.5532** .5124** .8265** .1837 .5763**

.1916 .4208** .1308 .5600** .2041

Emigration

.1904

.4930**

.3562**

.0600

Immigration Industry empl.

.2606* .1942

.5084** .1663

.3509** .0760

.1967 .1435

Moravian nation.

.2526*

.7306**

.8580**

.0080

Births Salary Orthodox Entrepreneurs

.4228** .0527 .4907** .5349**

.1735 .4351** .3115** .2983**

.0907 .4349** .1944 .2524*

.4489** .2264* .3658** .6199**

Roman Catholics

.4342**

.8476**

.8373**

.1317

Romany

.5471**

.5099**

.5475**

.3742**

Divorces

.2442*

.6023**

.6188**

.0323

Ruthenians

.3241**

.4228**

.4952**

.1282

Marriages

.2058

.2755*

.2811*

.1203

Average age

.3955**

.1430

.1016

.3869**

IV. Appendixes

64

Urbanization

.0838

.3140**

.4462**

.0660

Deaths

.1033

.1819

.1104

.1194

Hungary Parliamentary elections 1990 Factor Matrix (Varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

MDF SzDSz

.05947 .45760

.47287 .47634

FKgP

.88398

.24991

MSzP

.18817

.72142

FIDESZ

.59277

.30505

KDNP

.73993

.09246

MSzMP MSzDP ASZ

.15805 .02467 .85765

.86658 .20707 .13227

Explained variance

30.7

20.8

Cumulated

51.5

Parliamentary elections 1994 Factor Matrix (Unrotated) Factor 1

Factor 2

MSzP

.85725

.26183

SzDSz

.59061

.31667

MDF

.64149

.43090

FKgP

.53490

.51875

KDNP

.16420

.61019

FIDESZ

.32394

.64315

MP

.66996

.45117

Explained variance

33.7

23.0

Cumulated

56.8

IV. Appendixes

65

Correlation Factor 1/90

Factor 2/90

Factor 1/94

Factor 2/94

Factor 1/90 Factor 2/90

1.0000 .0000

.0000 1.0000

.4418 .5932**

.5180* .5088*

Factor 1/94 Factor 2/94 Priv. enterpr. Deaths

.4418 .5180* .2030 .1074

.5932** .5088* .3103 .3537

1.0000 .0000 .2074 .0655

.0000 1.0000 .2133 .4598*

Density of pop.

.4330

.0803

.1734

.2568

Romany

.1021

.6501**

.4954*

.3912

Hungarians

.2077

.4712*

.3086

.3943

Industry empl. Infant mortality

.3941 .3573

.1030 .4081

.3280 .5259*

.1729 .0152

Births Natural increase Suicides Unemployment

.4706* .2379 .5660** .2897

.1456 .1144 .0635 .7457**

.3919 .2131 .2657 .6504**

.1351 .3554 .0471 .3305

Urban population

.0067

.0680

.0701

.0247

Village population

.4573*

.3411

.2164

.2157

Salaries

.4803*

.3904

.2291

.0128

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Sajudis

.76886

.18487

.19804

LKDP

.54053

.60161

.17795

LCS

.21004

.12428

.73874

LLS

.05178

.93184

.07545

JL-UL

.55331

.43556

.33768

LTS-LDP

.04525

.01045

.61830

LKDP

.12733

.41244

.65317

LDDP

.95740

.17103

.10278

Explained variance

32.0

20.7

14.7

52.7

67.4

Lithuania Parliamentary election 1992 Factor Matrix (Varimax rotation)

Cumulated

IV. Appendixes

66

Parliamentary elections 1996 Factor Matrix (Unrotated) Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

TS(LK)

.50675

.75682

.08093

LKDP

.57899

.40649

.34047

LDDP

.19393

.73719

.01944

LCS

.07096

.39942

.78516

LSP

.47161

.43817

.39046

LNP”JL”

.64589

.39801

.22361

LMP

.02976

.32925

.43611

KDS

.41521

.32124

.02712

LLRA (Poles)

.89674

.04418

.16526

Explained variance

25.0

22.3

12.9

47.3

60,

Cumulated Presidential elections 1997 Factor Matrix (Unrotated) Factor1

Factor2

V.Adamkus V.Andriukaitis K.Bobelis V.Landsbergis A.Pauliauskas

.80659 .35084 .44492 .61179 .98926

.20672 .71348 .65785 .27190 .04244

Explained variance

46.5

21.2

Cumulated

67.7

10. Correlation Coefficients of the 1997 Factor scores Factor 1

Factor 2

Turnout 97/1st round

Factor 1

1.0000

.0000

.7353**

Factor 2

.0000

1.0000

.1132

Turnout Refer.91

.6561**

.3011*

.7890**

Turnout Refer.92

.5479**

.2090

.6395**

Turnout Elect'93

.4871**

.1029

.7943**

st

.7353**

.1132

1.0000

nd

.7241**

.1455

.9820**

.9670**

.0653

.6644**

.7301**

.1069

.3070*

Turnout Elect'97/1 Turnout Elect'97/2 Adamkus'97/2 Brazauskas'93

nd

IV. Appendixes

67

Refer'91-No-votes

.8130**

.2077

.7403**

Refer'92-No-votes

.8833**

.2340

.7829**

Poles

.7698**

.2163

.8158**

Russians

.1333

.3752**

.1699

Lithuanians

.6489**

.3597**

.6985**

Belorussians

.4532**

.3424*

.4302**

Ukrainians

.0003

.3664**

.0851

Wage

.2516

.3362*

.1148

Urbanization

.3359*

.2015

.3997**

Unemployment

.0995

.0296

.1798

Pensioners

.2780*

.2996*

.1520

Marriages

.1202

.0939

.0866

Industry empl.

.2374

.1813

.1512

Immigration

.3427*

.1834

.2975*

Emigration

.2009

.0542

.0160

Divorce

.2382

.3576**

.1481

Density of pop.

.3223*

.1015

.2405

Crime

.1000

.1747

.0245

Average farm size

.2525

.0145

.2007

Rural population

.3355*

.2013

.4000**

Correlation between Parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996. Factor 1/92

Factor 2/92

Factor 3/92

Factor 1/96

.0090

.8719**

.2630*

Factor 2/96

.7476**

.0019

.0138

Factor 3/96

.2541*

.2650*

.5356**

Turnout 1992

.0375

.6060**

.1861

Turnout 1996

.4192**

.4678**

.1277

IV. Appendixes

68

Poland Presidential elections 1995 Factor Matrix (varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

W.Pawlak

-0.835

0.075

J.Kuroń

0.820

0.349

T.Zielinski

0.804

0.281

J.Korwin-Mikke

0.773

0.002

H.Gronkiewicz-Waltz

0.758

-0.314

A.Kwaśniewski

0.068

0.951

L.Wałęsa

0.209

-0.908

J.Olszewski

-0.158

-0.561

Variance explained

41.2

28.9

Cumulated

70.1

Parliamentary elections 1997 Factor matrix (varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

AWS

-0.847

0.307

SLD

0.830

0.281

UP

0.655

0.131

ROP

-0.348

-0.132

PSL

0.051

-0.884

UW

0.182

0.762

UPR

0.154

0.582

Variance explained 32.3 total

56.2

23.9

IV. Appendixes

69

Social and economic indicators Factor matrix (varimax rotation) Balance of migrations

.813

.094

Pop. the pre-productive age

.813

.580

GDP per capita

.808

.17

Urban population

.782

.519

Cars per inhabitant

.778

.141

Average salary

.77

.09

Employed in agriculture

.758

.599

Literacy

.662

.233

Employment in industry

.652

.433

Stability of population

.180

.885

Share of private farms

.121

.857

Pop. in the productive age

.062

.852

Divorces per inhabitant

.474

.72

Average life expectancy

.354

.706

Unemployment

.598

.676

Crimes per inhabitants

.353

.667

Empl. in the private sector

.607

.666

Priests per inhabitant

.155

.641

Pensioners per inhabitant

.081

.625

Social assistance

-178

-327

Explained variance

44.0

21

Total

65

15. Correlation between 1995 (Presidential elections) and social-economic factor scores Factor 1

Factor 2 (electoral)

Factor 1 (social-economic)

.679**

.106

Factor 2 (social-economic)

.485**

.625**

IV. Appendixes

70

Slovakia Parliamentary elections 1994 Factor Matrix (varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

HZDS SDL' KDH DU

.29499 .86962 .44103 .87656

.83531 .04095 .63619 .03276

.13976 .30944 .03767 .40091

ZRS

.07534

.40456

.81994

SNP

.21032

.37483

.82161

DS.

.90163

.08309

.26914

KSS

.10012

.03589

.88422

KSU

.15965

.79325

.16010

MK

.41154

.88508

.01073

Variance explained Cumulated

33.8 61.5

27.7 82.1

20.6

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Abortions

.0598

.6629**

.2686

Atheists

.4238**

.3777*

.0888

Unemployment

.1410

.3671*

.6465**

Without confession

.3999*

.3341*

.1633

Foreign investment

.0874

.0468

.0517

GDP per capita

.2569

.1163

.0551

Catholics

.4506**

.2782

.5953**

Hungarians

.4063*

.9193**

.0545

Wage

.4449**

.0812

.4714**

Rooms per apartm

.0642

.5862**

.1383

Orthodox

.0144

.1620

.5392**

Entrepreneurs

.1495

.2359

.4647**

Industry empl.

.1924

.4598**

.2590

Natural increase

.2058

.4882**

.3632*

Ref.evangelics

.2447

.7581**

.0761

Roman Catholics

.4505**

.2793

.5965**

Romany

.3819*

.0122

.7128**

Correlation

IV. Appendixes

71

Ruthenians

.0430

.2264

.6114**

Migration balance

.1264

.0853

.0336

Slovaks

.3639*

.9212**

.0645

Average age

.1085

.4929**

.2740

Ukrainians

.0739

.1958

.5690**

Urbanization

.3982*

.0193

.3861*

Hungarians

.4529**

.9210**

.0748

Ukraine Presidential elections 1994 Factor Matrix (Varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

V.Babich

.80971

.08225

L.Kravchuk

.32739

.94329

L.Kuchma

.15743

.95679

O.Moroz

.57019

.36892

V.Lanovy

.92432

.11778

Variation explained

45.8

32.8

Cumulated

78.6

Social and economic indexes Factor Matrix (Varimax rotation) Factor 1

Factor 2

Agricultural dev.

.59743

.62744

Unemployment

.62091

.49504

Pensioners

.81934

.24263

Industrial develop.

.85795

.08840

Migrations

.80984

.06033

Post-productive

.25050

.91225

Population strength

.14308

.80503

Productive age

.81229

.38864

Pre-productive age

.45340

.86849

Natural increase

.48530

.85582

Russification

.81208

.02842

Social develop.

.69701

.05504

IV. Appendixes

72

Urbanization

.88140

.26671

Births

.75080

.60965

Deaths

.15178

.95934

Variance expl.

53.4

24.6

Cumulated 78.0 Correlation of factor scores Factor 1

Factor 2 (electoral analysis)

Factor 1 (soc-econ) Factor 2 (soc-econ)

.1255 .4629*

.7327** .3415

Turnout

.2573

.6954**

Absolute value of factor 1 (electoral)

.8762

Correlation Factor 1

Factor 2

Agricultural devel.

.2839

.6071**

Unemployment

.2462

.7490**

Pensioners

.0110

.3560

Turnout

.2573

.6954**

Industrial develop.

.1050

.4114*

Migrations

.1550

.4746*

Post-product.age

.2396

.0228

Population strength

.3514

.2919

Productive age

.0756

.4332*

Pre-productive

.2947

.5662**

Natural increase

.3442

.6503**

Social development

.0053

.3292

Russification

.2947

.8514**

Urbanization

.0030

.6657**

Deaths

.4133*

.3297

Births

.1508

.7904**

73

Maps Map 1. (CZ) – Factor 1 scores in parliamentary elections 1996

Map 2. (CZ) – Factor 2 scores in parliamentary elections 1996

Map 3. (CZ) – Turnout in parliamentary elections 1996

IV. Appendixes

74

Map 4. (H) – Factor 1 scores in parliamentary elections 1990

Map 5. (H) – Factor 2 scores in parliamentary elections 1990

Map 6. (H) – Turnout in parliamentary elections1994

IV. Appendixes

75

Map 7. (LT) – Factor 1 scores in parliamentary elections 1992

Map 8. (LT) – Factor 2 scores in parliamentary elections 1992

Map 9. (LT) – Factor 1 scores in presidential elections 1997

IV. Appendixes

76

Map 10. (LT) – Turnout in presidential elections in 1993

Map 11. (PL) – Factor 1 scores in presidential elections 1995

Map 12. (PL) – Factor 2 scores in presidential elections 1995

IV. Appendixes

77

Map 13. (PL) – Turnout in presidential elections 1995

Map 14. (SL) – Factor 1 scores in parliamentary elections 1994


IV. Appendixes

78


Map 17. (UKR) – Factor 2 scores in presidential elections 1994

Map 18. (UKR) – Turnout in presidental elections 1994

IV. Appendixes

IV. Appendixes

79

Historical map 1. – Central Europe in the second half of XIX century

st

Historical map 2. – Central Europe after the 1 World War

present day boundaries of selected countries historical boundaries historical internal boundaries between selected provinces

IV. Appendixes

80

Synthetic map 1. – “New” and “Old” regions in Central Europe

“Old”traditional regions, high stability of population, high religiosity

“New” regions, areas of ethnic cleansing after 2nd World War, highly secular

Regions of concentration of ethnic minorities emerged in effect of border changes and supporting own electoral lists

IV. Appendixes

81

Synthetic map 2. – Post-communist, communist support and liberal centers in Central Eastern Europe

Areas of strong persitent post-communists and communists support

Selected liberal centers