The OBJECT Image Schema

Aleksander Szwedek University of Social Sciences Warsaw, Poland

The OBJECT Image Schema Abstract: The OBJECT schema has gained little attention in literature and, with very few exceptions, is mostly only mentioned as one among many other image schemas. This is rather unusual, as we live in the world of objects, the only entities directly accessible to our senses – the essence of embodiment. The present chapter shows that the OBJECT schema is a fundamental mental structure, though its characterization is not easy. The reason for that is the variety of objects in the world, from a dust particle to a mountain, and from an ant to an elephant. The OBJECT schema fulfills Johnson’s (1987) structural conditions – it has parts standing in relations. It also fulfills Grady’s (2005) criterion of perceptual experience. The present chapter will also show that the OBJECT schema is an indispensable element in most, if not all other image schemas. Moreover, the chapter claims that, though most research on image schemas concentrates on the postnatal period and the sense of vision, the image schemas have their beginning in the earliest stages of the prenatal period and are based on the primeval and fundamental sense of touch. If embodiment is to be taken seriously, we have to accept a simple fact that in pregnancy there are two interacting physical objects – the child’s body and the mother’s. Since the nervous system and the sense of touch develop in parallel from about the seventh week of gestation, it is unimaginable that the first tactile experiences of the fetus would leave no impression on the nervous system. Keywords: the OBJECT schema, the OBJECT schema in other schemas, FORCE schemas, prenatal foundations of image schemas, uniqueness of the sense of touch

1. Introduction: a brief survey of problems of image schemas The problem of image schemas (henceforth ISs) has for many years been as popular as it is difficult. The reason is that, being mental entities, ISs escape direct sensory inspection, so the margin of speculation is very wide and the variety of interpretations is considerable. Clausner and Croft conclude that it is difficult if not impossible “to define image schematic domains in terms of some necessary and sufficient conditions. […] One can define image schematic

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domains only by enumeration.” (1999: 21; cf. also Grady 2005: 36). From the very beginning, Johnson cautioned that “[t]here is clearly nothing sacred about 253 patterns versus 53 or any other number of patterns…” (1987: 126). While Johnson’s account of an IS is only a description of its structure (parts and relations – Johnson 1987: XXIX), Grady tries to define what could count as an IS by ruling out “certain schemas that are too general to be associated with any particular type of perceptual experience, or too rich to count as fundamental dimensions of perceptual representation” (2005: 35). Whereas the first criterion eliminates what Clausner and Croft (1999: 14) call nonimagistic domains, such as THOUGHT, DEATH and TIME, etc. which lack images (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 94ff), the borderline at the other end remains vague, leaving the decision to an individual “scholar’s understanding” (Grady 2005: 37).

2. The nature of image schemas Based on Lakoff’s (1987) and Johnson’s (1987) monographs, Hampe (2005: 1–2) proposed six essential features of ISs which are: i) embodied/experiential; ii) preconceptual; iii) highly schematic gestalts; iv) internally structured; v) highly flexible; vi) patterns acquired independently of other concepts. Though all those properties have already been discussed, I will venture a few comments, before discussing the main topics – the nature of the OBJECT schema, its role in other ISs, and their prenatal origin.

i) ISs are embodied/experiential This is the least controversial claim but most, if not all, research has so far been based on vision. Typical is Johnson’s view that ISs “are not tied to any single perceptual modality, though our visual schemas seem to predominate” (1987: 25). However, in a number of studies (Szwedek 2000a, 2009, 2011) I advanced arguments (see section 8.2 for details), that touch is the most unique,

The OBJECT Image Schema

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primeval sense – the fact mostly overlooked by scholars as a consequence of restricting research to the postnatal period.

ii) ISs are preconceptual This point entails the question when ISs are formed. Most scholars have so far discussed ISs formation in the postnatal period (cf., e.g., Mandler 2012, and Johnson’s above quote on vision). Those studies neglect the fact that bodily experience does not begin with birth (cf., e.g., Szwedek 2002 and also Rohrer 2005). The disregard of tactile experience in its earliest stages is a serious methodological mistake. As Neisser asserted, biologically “a schema is a part of the nervous system” (1976: 54).1 If the sense of touch begins to develop in the seventh week of pregnancy (Chamberlain n.d.: 1), simultaneously with the nervous system (Kornas-Biela 2011: 6), it is totally unreasonable to assume that tactile experience has no impact on the nervous system. At these early stages, any form of an IS would be preconceptual and perhaps might be categorized as a “preschema” – a “shortened form of preconceptual preaxiological schema” (Krzeszowski 2016: 198).

iii) ISs are highly schematic gestalts This issue is related to Grady’s (2005: 37) query about the too general vs. too rich ISs, and raises the question of measurability of schematicity, leaving the decision to an individual “scholar’s understanding.”

iv) ISs are internally structured This is Johnson’s observation that an IS consists “of parts standing in relations and organized into unified wholes” (Johnson 1987: XXIX).

v) ISs are highly flexible Flexibility and transformations have been discussed extensively in Nerlich, Todd, Herman and Clarke (2004), and Dewell (1994, 2005) and, as irrelevant to the present chapter, will not be dealt with here.

1 Cf. Dodge and Lakoff’s (2005) view of ISs as neural circuits.

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vi) ISs are patterns acquired independently of other concepts This is a disputable claim. Knowledge is a tightly knit and highly complex network of concepts reflecting our mind’s organization of the complex world, and it is difficult to imagine that ISs would be acquired independently of other concepts.2 Although those issues are not directly relevant to the present chapter, I will refer to them briefly in section 7.

3. The OBJECT schema As Santibáñez aptly observed, “[t]he available literature is rather contradictory as to the status and characteristics of the OBJECT image schema. This skeletal cognitive model is not described in detail in the seminal works by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987), although the former includes it in his inventory of image-schemas” (Johnson 1987: 126). (Santibáñez 2002: 185). Santibáñez is among very few exceptions acknowledging the basic nature of the OBJECT IS (2002: 186). However, he does not go beyond a general postulate to treat the OBJECT schema as basic when he writes that: […] the OBJECT construct may be safely identified as a basic image-schema, i.e. one that provides a blueprint for the orderly activation of additional cognitive material […] The OBJECT image-schema is experientially grounded in our physical and social interaction with our own bodies and with other discrete entities in the world. (Santibáñez 2002: 186).

Though he does not associate the OBJECT schema with any particular experiential modality, one of his main criteria that “we can move and manipulate objects” (Santibáñez 2002: 186) suggests tactility as a basic experience. The most exhaustive discussion of a prototypical object was proposed by Krzeszowski (1991) and considerably modified by Szwedek (2002, 2011).3 As I have demonstrated in a number of papers (2000b, 2002, 2011, 2014), objects are intrinsic to our physical reality, the only elements perceptible via our senses, and also the ultimate domain in metaphorization (Szwedek 2011). Wittgenstein’s words that “[o]ne is unable to notice something – because

2 Cf. works by Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993), Peña (1999) and Santibáñez (2002) who argue for some dependencies among ISs. 3 The importance of objects was also acknowledged by Jäkel (1995), Reddy (1979) and Schneider (1997).


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it is always before one’s eyes” (1953: 30) offer the reason why the role of objects has been overlooked. We always have objects before our eyes, and we only need to give objects specific names. Saying *This is an object, and specifically this is a lamp makes no sense, so we simply say This is a lamp. That point of view is in consonance with Kotarbiński’s ([1929] 1990: 75) conclusion in his theory of reism: “Whatever is, is a thing.” The question is, what form the OBJECT IS might have. Before attempting an answer, let me briefly review the few suggestions found in the literature – Krzeszowski’s (1991: 89) detailed description in terms of prototypicality, supplemented by remarks by Schneider (1997: 95) and Santibáñez (2002: 186). According to Krzeszowski, a prototypical object: 1. is experienced primarily by vision and touch; 2. is a unified whole (also Santibáñez); 3. can be held in one hand (also Schneider); 4. is bounded in space; 5. is three-dimensional; 6. is inanimate rather than animate; 7. is man-made rather than natural; 8. can be manipulated (also Santibáñez); 9. can be pointed to with one’s finger (Schneider). All those features, except boundedness in space, are debatable, and I have questioned most of them (Szwedek 2011) pointing out that: a. touch/tactility is more fundamental than vision, because it is the only sense with which we identify the most fundamental feature of objects – density;4 b. density entails three-dimensionality, manipulability, and pointability; c. animate beings are also physical objects (Kotarbiński (1990 [1929]); d. both man-made and natural things are objects. Thus, an OBJECT schema can be defined as matter, with density as a fundamental property, in some bounded form. All other features are derivative 4 For a detailed discussion of touch and density, see Szwedek 2000a, 2002, 2008, 2011.

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and their inclusion into the OBJECT schema is questionable. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it “the concept of object … is among the most general concepts (or categories) which we possess. It seems very doubtful that it can be defined in more general terms […]” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object). I suggest that my proposal of the definition of the OBJECT schema as bounded matter exhausts Grady’s essential condition of “perceptual experience” (2005: 35) – it is bounded matter whose density is primarily experienced by touch. It may sound controversial, but all matter is somehow bounded, either inherently (solid objects) or externally (liquids and gases). For example, air, doubtlessly material, is bounded by the earth (and all objects on it) at one end and vacuous outer space at the other end. The OBJECT schema is represented by a circle which is used also, among many others, by Johnson (1987: 32–33), Peña (1999: 191), and Langacker (2008: 33), and represents bounded matter. At this point, I wish to make two comments on the diagrammatical representation of ISs. As Langacker remarks, diagrams “are not to be identified per se as image schemas […], but are merely intended to evoke them and suggest their nature” (2008: 32, fn. 6). He adds that “[a]n imagistic approach is no less capable than a propositional one […]. It is arguably advantageous because […] the nature of a mental experience is reflected more directly in a complex image than in a complex formula” (2008: 32–33). Naturally, the symbols used in diagrams are arbitrary, but their variety in Johnson’s (1987) diagrams is needlessly confusing. For example, he uses a triangle, a rectangle, and an “X” for the same OBJECT schema in various ISs, and in some cases, the OBJECT is absent, for example, in POINT BALANCE (1987: 86, Fig. 19) and in COUNTERFORCE (1987: 46, Fig. 8), which, incidentally have the same form. He also uses various shapes of arrows to represent different kinds of FORCES, though, in reality, arrows symbolize only motion. Newton’s formula, F = ma, represents a configuration of and , where is typically an object and represents motion. To make the representation of various dynamic situations (traditionally called “forces”) more coherent and transparent, I use a circle for the OBJECT schema, and an arrow for MOTION.5 5 The conventions used in the diagrams are as follows: – the energy source object will be depicted as a black circle,


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Fig. 1: OBJECT schema.

4. Other image schemas: an introduction One of the main aims of the present chapter is to show that the OBJECT schema is not only a schema in its own right, with structure and orientation, but it is also an inherent component of other ISs. I propose to divide schemas into two major categories: “static OBJECT schemas” describing the structure and orientation of the object, and “dynamic OBJECT schemas” in which objects are dynamically involved in some action. The importance of the dynamic aspect of our experience was very early emphasized by Johnson’s6 (1987: 42) description of force as being everywhere and therefore overlooked. As I mentioned earlier, the role of the object in dynamic schemas was neglected, though clearly, if there are (inter)actions, there must be interactants, “persons or things” (Collins English Dictionary), since only objects have the energy to exert force. To paraphrase Wittgenstein’s (1953: 30) general remark and Johnson’s (1987: 42) words about forces – because objects are everywhere, we tend to take them for granted and to overlook their role in the dynamic (‘force’) schemas. We easily forget that our bodies are physical objects and that every event in our physical world consists, minimally, of objects and dynamic interactions between them. A fairly complete list

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– the white circle will represent the object acted upon or in neutral state, – the solid arrow will represent motion, – the broken arrow will stand for potential motion. Later, discussed extensively by Talmy (1988) and, among others, by Gärdenfors (2007).

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of the ISs most commonly analyzed in cognitive literature can be found in Hampe (2005: 2–3), so for lack of space, I will not repeat them here. The present chapter discusses a selection of those schemas, with emphasis on the structure and orientation of the OBJECT schema in its static form, and its role in the dynamic OBJECT schemas. The accompanying diagrams expose the role of the OBJECT schema in all ISs in a consistent and coherent form. The division into static and dynamic schemas reflects the basic human experiences of objects and their motion. Force is most fundamentally and directly experienced by humans through the sense of touch, that is, on contact of an object with the human body, and extrapolated to other external objects. One of the elements to be also considered is the perspective from which variations of dynamic ISs are seen. For example, while ATTRACTION stresses the dynamics of the energy source object, the BLOCKAGE focuses on the role of the blocking object. This is a considerable departure from physics, just as our cognition differs from the scientific descriptions. According to Newton’s Third Law, the blocking object must have a mass equal to the “ma” of the blocked object in order to stop it. From our perspective, we simply see the sequence: motion of an object A > contact with the object B > zero motion. In the following analyses, each diagram is preceded by a short comment and followed by language examples, both literal and figurative, the latter to show that abstract entities are conceptualized as physical objects (Reddy 1979, Jäkel 1995, Szwedek 2002, 2009, 2011, 2014).

5. Static OBJECT schemas Static Object schemas are divided into those referring to the structure of the object (e.g., PART/WHOLE, SURFACE, FRONT/BACK, etc.7) and those related to orientation of the object(s) (e.g., NEAR/FAR, UP/DOWN, LEFT/RIGHT). PART is identified and conceptualized as a separate object, for example, parts of the body are referred to as if they were separate, independent 7 FRONT/BACK also represent orientations.


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objects, and having parts themselves. For example, OED describes “hand” as “[t]he terminal part of the human arm beyond the wrist, consisting of the palm, four fingers, and thumb.” Fig. 2: PART schema.

Examples: (1) the production of aircraft parts. (AD) (2) Change is part of life. (OED)

FRONT and BACK are conceptualized as parts of objects, or the space8 immediately before and behind an object. Among others, OED defines FRONT as “[t]he part or side of an object which seems to look out or to be presented to the eye; the fore-part of anything, the part to which one normally comes first. Opposed to back…” As is well known, objects without natural fronts and backs have them assigned by convention. (cf. English vs. Hausa). Fig. 3: FRONT schema.

8 But space is also conceptualized as an object – see Langacker’s (1993) example ‘under the bed is dusty’ which he interprets as “naming a spatial region – a type of thing” (Langacker 1993: 16, emphasis mine) and Szwedek’s (2009) SPACE IS AN OBJECT conceptualization.

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Examples: (3) Blear eyes, huge ears, and front of ape. (OED) (4) The very head and front of my offending. (OED)

Similarly, SURFACE, though it is an integral part of any object, is conceptualized as an independent object. Again, according to OED, it is “[t]he outermost part of a solid object…” Fig. 4: SURFACE schema.

Examples: (5) A thin surface has been carried away from the whole bas-relief. (OED) (6) Tom was a womanizer, but on the surface he remained respectable. (AD)

CONTAINMENT is possibly the most common schema discussed in literature. It is characterized by the IN-OUT relationship between a CONTAINER9 OBJECT (cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 31) and CONTAINED OBJECT (CONTENT) (‘X’ in Johnson’s diagram [1987: 23]). Fig. 5: CONTAINER schema.

9 As an object, container has a structure of its own.


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Examples: (7) In a somewhat crowded train. (OED)10 (8) Keeping that fact in mind. (OED)

The pairs NEAR-FAR and UP-DOWN are spatial relations between two objects. NEAR-FAR concepts refer to distance and, since the exact distance is typically indeterminable for the perceiver (P), the judgment is subjective. The perceiver may either be one of the objects (examples 9–12), or external to two objects in the relation (examples 13–16). Fig. 6: NEAR-FAR schemas.

Examples: (9) A bomb exploded somewhere near. (AD) (10) There was uneasiness and fear […] lest some danger might be near. (OED) (11) The mountains far in the distance glowed in the sun. (AD) (12) I felt very far from ferocious. (BNC) (13) the car park near the sawmill. (AD) (14) a shape near to the original. (AD) (15) These two Sees were farre asonder, […], Cauntorbury and Yorke. (OED) (16) I’m not in love with him - nothing could be further from the truth! (CDAE)

10 The examples come from: The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Apple Dictionary based on Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford Thesaurus of English, Apple Dictionary, Wikipedia (AD), The Oxford Learner’s Dictionary (OLD), The Cambridge Dictionary of American English (CDAE), and The British National Corpus (BNC).

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The reference point for the UP-DOWN orientation is the earth. “Up in the skies” is true in any place on the earth. Fig. 7: UP-DOWN schema.

Examples: (17) The tiny aircraft rose from the ground. (AD) (18) Unemployment is up. (AD)

LINK is yet another schema on Johnson’s list, defined as an IS that “consists of two entities (A and B), connected by a bonding structure.” (Johnson 1987: 118). I suggest that LINK is a type of CONTACT, in which CONTACT is a surface-to-surface relation, while LINK requires a bonding OBJECT, with at least two contact points, as the diagrams show. Fig. 8: CONTACT and LINK schemas.


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Examples: (19) And E [is] a link to couple the pin A and the crank D together, so that motion may be communicated to the shaft C. (OED) (20) A link might be established with local groups. (OED) (21) The edges of the wound in the trachea may be … kept in contact. (OED) (22) Bringing it into visual contact with the upright pilasters. (OED)

6. Dynamic OBJECT schemas In dynamic OBJECT schemas, the OBJECT schema enters into numerous and diverse active relations (traditionally called “forces”). Johnson (1987: 42–44) characterizes FORCE in terms of six elements: –– –– –– –– –– ––

force is always experienced through interaction; force has a vector quality, a directionality; there is typically a single path of motion; there is a source and a target of force; forces have degrees of power or intensity; there is always a structure or sequence of causality involved.

The dynamic OBJECT relations involve kinetic energy, experienced by human beings as motion, or, on contact, as touch. Thus, there are no variations of force per se, but only various configurations of mass and motion (Newton’s F=ma), the former typically experienced by humans as solid objects. For example, there is no BLOCKAGE FORCE per se, but a configuration of an object X moving to a (typically) stationary object Y, where the object Y has a mass which, in contact with the moving object X, will act on the object X with a counterforce such that the object X will stop. As cognitive structures, ISs are based on our sensory experience and this is one of the reasons that their nature and number are difficult to define.11 We typically perceive force either in terms of objects’ motion or magnitude of impact, in the latter case, as our feeling of touch by another object, be it a blow of a fist or a whiff of air.

11 Incidentally, Hewitt’s (2006: 75) description of friction, so common in our daily perception, makes it a good candidate for yet another force IS.

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Since the aim of the chapter is to expose the importance of the OBJECT schema, there is no particular order in which the ISs will be discussed. To show the intricacies of the analyses, I will begin with ENABLEMENT since Johnson’s diagram looks relatively simple – a double, broken lines arrow. However, it is incompatible with his interpretation. He identifies two elements of ENABLEMENT, “a potential force vector and the absence of barriers or blocking counterforces” (1987: 47), which we feel as the “power (or lack of power) to perform some action, for example, the power to pick up the baby…” (1987: 47). Firstly, the diagram has no symbol of the potential energy source object, the one that has “the power” to act. Secondly, the phrase “an absence of barriers” makes the absence irrelevant. Notice that in his “you feel able to move a chair” example, he himself uses the word “able”, not “enable”. While “I feel able to move a chair” sounds good, “I feel enabled to move a chair” sounds odd, at best. Thus, his diagram and the description point to the ABILITY schema whose diagram below has the essential elements – an energy source object and the potential action, symbolized by a broken arrow. Fig. 9: ABILITY schema.

How, then, should we interpret and represent ENABLEMENT? Examples 23–26 show that syntactic structures with “to enable” are either complex transitive – X enables DO (direct object), OC (object complement), or monotransitive – X enables Y. (23) The surgery on his knee enabled him to walk again. (BNC) (24) The director has been a great mentor and I’m grateful for the places he’s enabled me to go. (BNC) (25) a new train line to enable easier access to the stadium. (OLD) (26) funds that will enable construction of new schools. (OLD)


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In those examples: a) the grammatical subjects represent activities with implied agents (surgeon’s action, donor’s giving funds, engineer building a train line), or an agent with implied activity (the director’s help); b) the subjects of the to-infinitive OC clause are animate (him, me); c) the DOs in (25) and (26) (access, construction) represent activities with implied agents: a new train line to enable people to access the stadium; funds that will enable investors to construct new schools. Thus, ENABLEMENT is a complex IS (Johnson 1987: 21) consisting of REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT resulting in ABILITY.12 For example, in (23), the patient wasn’t able to walk because of a “blockage” in his knee and regained the ability after the “blockage” had been removed. This complex IS is shown in diagram 10. Fig. 10: ENABLEMENT schema.13

ATTRACTION (Johnson 1987: 47) is a force IS in which an object acts on another object to pull it towards itself. Johnson’s diagram is unclear, as the source and the target objects (squares) look the same, and attraction is represented by a sequence of double, broken line arrows, as if they represented a different kind of force than a single line arrow. In consonance with the convention adopted here, the black circle symbolizes the source of force object, the white circle stands for the affected object, and the arrow indicates the direction of motion of the “attracted” object.

12 The complexity has been noted by Peña who writes that “ENABLEMENT is but a logical entailment of it [REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT], rather than an independent schema.” (1999: 198). 13 The gray circle represents the implied agent.

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Fig. 11: ATTRACTION schema.

Examples: (27) I pulled the door shut behind me. (AD) (28) Anyone can enter the show if they have a good act and the ability to pull a crowd. (AD)

In contrast to ATTRACTION, REPULSION schema refers to a situation in which the energy source object exerts force on another object pushing it away. Fig. 12: REPULSION schema.

Examples: (29) Lydia pushed the door shut. (AD) (30) She had been deeply in love with Jamie, but he rejected her. (AD)

It is rather astonishing that nobody has yet proposed APPROXIMATION and RECESSION ISs though such experiences, of approaching objects or getting away from them, are perpetual in our lives. The APPROXIMATION schema represents motion of the energy source object towards another object (stationary or moving). Fig. 13. APPROXIMATION schema.


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Examples: (31) The train approached the main line. (AD) (32) One must approach the matter with caution. (AD)

As opposed to the APPROXIMATION schema, in the RECESSION schema, the energy source object moves away from another object. Fig. 14: RECESSION schema.14

Examples: (33) Ruth withdrew her hand from his. (AD) (34) The prospects of an early end to the war receded. (AD)

BLOCKAGE (Johnson 1987: 45) is a force schema in which the moving object X is stopped by another object Y, which, if stationary, must have enough mass to stop the motion of the object X. The DIVERSION schema is similar to the BLOCKAGE schema, differing only by the angle of contact and continuation of movement. Fig. 15: BLOCKAGE and DIVERSION schemas.

Examples: (35) He stood up, blocking her escape. (AD) (36) The government tried to block an agreement on farm subsidies. (AD) (37) The bullet ricocheted off a rock. (OED) (38) Words of love are ricocheting all over the place. (OED)

14 Notice that ATTRACTION, REPULSION, APPROXIMATION and RECESSION are all subtypes of CAUSED MOTION (cf. Peña’s (1999) diagram for the latter.)

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Johnson (1987: 46) describes COUNTERFORCE poetically as “two equally strong, nasty, and determined force centres colliding face-to-face, with the result that neither can go anywhere.” Ignoring Johnson’s poetic tenor (why “nasty”?), I note that the colliding objects (Johnson’s “football players”) are absent from his diagram (Johnson 1987: 46; Fig. 8; here Fig 16), as if forces could exist without mass, which my diagram 17 depicts as two equal energy sources.15 Fig. 16: Johnson’s COUNTERFORCE schema.

Fig. 17: My COUNTERFORCE schema.

(39) Two suburban trains collided. (AD) (40) In his work, politics and metaphysics collide. (AD)

Discussing the BALANCE schema, Johnson claims that “there is a prototypical balance schema, consisting of force vectors (which can represent weight, as a special case) and some point […] in relation to which those forces are distributed.” (Johnson 1987: 85). It is illustrated by Johnson’s Fig. 19. (1987: 86; Fig. 18 below). Fig. 18: Johnson’s prototypical BALANCE schema.

There are two problems with Johnson’s interpretation and schema. The first one is how vectors (velocity and direction) can represent weight and, what is more, as a special case. The second problem is that Johnson’s “prototypical” diagram of BALANCE (he calls it POINT BALANCE) is exactly the same as the COUNTERFORCE diagram. Leaving aside cases of asymmetrical 15 The energy source objects are also absent from OED’s definition. More comments on the nature of COUNTERFORCE in light of Johnson’s description and Newton’s Third Law are offered in section 7 on subsidiarity.


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balance, Johnson’s twin-pan BALANCE (1987: 86, Fig. 19) can be depicted in a modified version (Fig. 19 below), with equal energy source objects in equal distance from the fulcrum, pushing in the same direction, so that “neither can go anywhere” (as in COUNTERFORCE). Fig. 19: TWIN-PAN BALANCE schema.

Examples: (41) Strong men … balancing chests of drawers … upon their heads. (OED) (42) She has in no way attempted to alter the balance of the characters. (OED)

The PATH schema involves motion and consists of a starting point, a goal, and a series of intermediate points (Johnson 1987: 113ff). It is necessary to add that if a path is related to motion, there must be an object moving along the path,16 a configuration that can be illustrated crudely by the following diagram: Fig. 20: PATH schema.

16 That object can also be the energy source, in which case it would be a SELFMOTION configuration.

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Examples: (43) Lucia was in the garden, walking up and down the gravel path. (OED) (44) A vegetarian diet could be the path to a longer life. (AD)

I hope to have shown that the few ISs that I selected for analysis must have the OBJECT schemas as necessary elements, and in view of Newton’s Third Law, it is probably true for all dynamic ISs. This is in perfect agreement with Johnson’s (1987) initial, general description of an IS as “consisting of parts standing in relations and organized into unified wholes,” (Johnson 1987: XXIX; emphasis added). It is quite clear that objects, both physical and metaphorical, are parts in relations, which I call dynamic OBJECT schemas.

7. Subsidiarity ISs have been typically listed and discussed in random order. The issue of subsidiarity was raised in Johnson’s (1987: 46) suggestion that diversion is a variation of counterforce. Later, Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993) observed that not all ISs could be ranked on a par. The idea was taken up by Peña (1999) for the PATH–FORCE relation, and Santibáñez (2002) for the OBJECT schema. The present section will first address some general problems with subsidiarity, followed by a few critical comments on Peña’s proposal with the aim to show the complexity and difficulties of the issue. Johnson’s above-mentioned suggestion raises a question, whether other forms of force are not variations of counterforce, which would be in perfect consonance with Newton’s Third Law. Resnick clarifies the Third Law writing that “there is no such thing as a force that is not accompanied by an equal and opposite force” (Resnick 1992: 83), which doubtlessly implies that all forces are indeed just variations of counterforce (see my comments on COUNTERFORCE and BALANCE in the preceding section). However, Resnick’s strictly scientific description has left an opening for cognitive interpretations. He writes that “[i]n some situations, the magnitude and direction of the forces are determined entirely by one of the two bodies” (Resnick 1992: 83) which is precisely how we perceive BLOCKAGE, and “[i]n other situations the magnitude and directions of the forces are determined jointly by both bodies” (Resnick 1992: 83), which is how we perceive many other “forces” (e.g., BALANCE, REPULSION and also complex ISs). What is most important for the present chapter is Resnick’s


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emphasis on the indispensability of “bodies” (objects) in force ISs, which compellingly supports my claim on that matter. Although subsidiarity17 is not one of my goals, I have, in passing, given a few hints on that issue. For example, I have proposed a general division of ISs into static OBJECT and dynamic OBJECT schemas. The static OBJECT schemas are of structural and orientational character, the latter more specifically alluded to by Johnson in terms of VERTICALITY and HORIZON schemas (Johnson 2005: 16), with such distinctions as UP/DOWN, FRONT/BACK, LEFT/RIGHT, etc.18 Similar dependencies can be postulated for the dynamic OBJECT schemas, but the difficulties appear to be enormous, if not insurmountable, for the following reasons: 1. “[T]he number of patterns is not sacred.” (Johnson 1987: 126). 2. “[T]here is no agreed-upon definition of image schemas, [so] degree of specificity remains a parameter that distinguishes one scholar’s understanding from another.” (Grady 2005: 37). 3. ISs “typically operate beneath the level of conscious awareness” (Johnson 2005: 21). 4. Every IS has a number of parameters, each of which is shared with some other ISs. As Johnson writes, “[t]he bodily logic of such force schemas will involve inferences about speed of movement, the rhythmic flow of movement, whether a moving object starts and stops, and so on.” (Johnson 2005: 20). The number of such parameters is yet to be determined, but among them are such distinctions as energy source object (active) vs. neutral (inactive) object, the object’s mass, contact vs. distal (BLOCKAGE vs. APPROXIMATION), energy source perspective (ATTRACTION) vs. target perspective (BLOCKAGE), angle of contact (BLOCKAGE vs. DIVERSION), and simplicity (DIVERSION, ATTRACTION) vs. complexity (ENABLEMENT) and possibly more. Even if we were able to identify the parameters, building a network of subsidiarities looks like an impossible task, and the purpose of it does not seem obvious.

17 Which itself is probably a schema. 18 In that context, cf. also Grady’s (2005: 47) proposal of superschemas.

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As examples of faulty analyses of subsidiarity of ISs, let me briefly discuss Peña’s (1999) claims of the superiority of the CONTAINER and PATH schemas. Peña (1999: 188) claims that the CONTAINER schema is a basic schema “to which the others hold a subsidiary status…” This is surprising because containment derives from three-dimensionality of objects and, therefore, containers are subsidiary to the object. Such an interpretation is evident from Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980: 31) description of “IN-relation” in terms of CONTAINER OBJECT. While it is natural to say “this is an object that is a container”, it is illogical to say “this is a container that is an object”. Peña’s analysis has been definitely repudiated by Santibáñez (2002: 186) who demonstrated that the OBJECT schema is basic, and by Szwedek (2002, 2011) who proved that all abstract entities are conceptualized as physical objects. With regard to the PATH schema, Peña (1999: 188) advanced a claim that “the FORCE image-schema is dependent on the PATH schema,” which she illustrated with the following diagram (Peña 1999: 205; Fig. 1). Fig. 21: Peña’s PATH schema and its subsidiaries.

She based that hierarchy on the following claims (Peña 1999: 188–189): –– motion is important for the PATH schema; –– “motion is caused by some kind of force”;


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–– “ the concept of motion cannot be understood without the notion of path, […] the PATH and FORCE image-schemas are interrelated”; –– “the FORCE image-schema is dependent on the PATH schema.” What is evidently missing in the PATH diagram is MOTION, despite its importance “for the PATH schema” and despite the fact that it is “caused by some kind of force.” Another objection concerns the PATH–FORCE relation. There would be no path without motion “caused by some kind of force” exerted on an object. Thus, force sets an object in motion, and the moving object “draws” the path. So, it is the PATH that is dependent on FORCE (mass x acceleration), i.e. subsidiary to it. Below is a possible sketch of this complex relation. Fig. 22: Dependencies between FORCE, MASS, MOTION and PATH.

It is also doubtful that COUNTERFORCE is subsidiary to BLOCKAGE. Resnick (1992: 83) clearly asserts that “there is no such thing as a force that is not accompanied by an equal and opposite force,” which means that all dynamic interactions are counterforces, and blockage is only one of possible configurations.19 A similar doubt concerns the subsidiarity of ENABLEMENT to REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT. As my diagram 10 shows, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT is a part of the following sequence: there is an earlier motion

19 Cf. my remarks on the relations between BALANCE and COUNTERFORCE, and Hewitt’s (2006: 75) description of FRICTION in the previous section.

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of an object A, which encounters a blocking object B and, having a greater magnitude, removes the object B, making the object A able to move on. The intention of the above remarks has not been to criticize for criticism’s sake, but to draw attention to the difficulties of the cognitive categorization of complex IS configurations, if building a comprehensive network of subsidiarities is at all possible and could be useful.

8. The origin of some image schemas 8.1. Postnatal period As I stated earlier in the chapter, most research on the origin of ISs has focused thus far on the postnatal period and has been based on the sense of vision. For example, Mandler writes about “a wide range of studies of preverbal infants developing an extensive conceptual system during the first year of life.” (Mandler 2012: 21), and Johnson observes that ISs “are not tied to any single perceptual modality, though our visual schemas seem to predominate.” (Johnson 1987: 25). In light of my claim of the prenatal origin of ISs, such statements have to be confronted with other opinions, for example, Neisser’s (1976: 54) firm assertion that, biologically, “a schema is a part of the nervous system.” Likewise, Rohrer (2005: 176) unequivocally points out that “[f]rom the perspective of neuroembriology […], sensory stimuli in general (with the obvious large exception of the visual) do not commence at birth.” The nervous system and the sense of touch, which is indispensable in the perception of density, begin to develop at the same time, in the seventh week of gestation. (Chamberlain n.d., Kornas-Biela 2011). It is unimaginable that the first tactile stimuli would have no impact on the simultaneously developing nervous system. As the earliest sense to develop, touch merits special attention and the following section will expose the primeval nature of touch and its unique character.

8.2. The unique character of touch In my 2000a and 2002 papers, I proposed that the unique character of the sense of touch consists of the following characteristics:20 20 For an extensive treatment of the sense of touch see Hatwell, Streri and Gentaz (2003), and Popova (2005), and also Gärdenfors (2007: 11) who refers to the


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a) The fetus is sensitive to stimulation of the skin, especially in the area around the mouth, by the seventh week of pregnancy (Chamberlain n.d., Kornas-Biela 2011), while “the visual focus and tracking begin around the 31st week” (Chamberlain n.d.: 3). b) Touch, unlike the “telecommunicative” senses (Pöppel and Edingshaus 1994), provides the closest possible experience of the physical world (Popova 2005). c) Touch is the only sense that provides a three-dimensional perception of objects. d) Touch, including the vital sense of taste, is the only whole body sense reaching “full body sensitivity by the 32nd week” (Chamberlain n.d.: 1). e) The most vital haptic organs – the hands and mouth – have the largest neuronal representations in the brain. f) Encyclopedia Britannica notes that “[t]actual sensations enable one to differentiate his own body from the surrounding environment,” where “[t]he body of the individual seems to function as a perceptual frame of reference.” Popova (2005: 401) confirms that “[t]ouch thus incorporates self-awareness uniquely and distinctly from the other senses,” and emphasizes that “the tactile sense is a unique modality in which stimulation is obtained rather than imposed by the stimulus.” (Popova 2005: 401). g) Finally, the fundamental character of touch translates into linguistic structures. In my 2000a paper, I list many examples from various languages illustrating the KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING is TOUCHING metaphor.21 Here are just a few examples: –– English: capture, catch, grasp the meaning; –– German: fassen, begrifen “to understand” (from greifen “to catch”), zur Kenntniss nehmen “to take note”; –– Finnish: käsittää “to understand” derives from käsi “hand”; käsite is a “concept”, i.e. something grasped.

basic character of touch as the first-person experience of forces (powers) that act directly on a person. 21 Cf. Hatwell, Streri and Gentaz’s (2003) book Touching for knowing. Just for the record, Sweetser (1990) proposed two metaphors: KNOWING/ UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, and SEEING IS GRASPING.

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–– Polish: pojąć “to understand”; “jąć” derives from the Slavic root jąć, imać “to take”, of the same etymology as German nehmen, OE naman, from PIE *neme; cf. also chwytać, łapać “to catch” (the meaning). –– Hungarian: ért “to understand” comes from Old Turkish er “to touch”, “to reach”; “touching”, “grasping” is related to “understanding” in the verb fog “to grasp, to hold, to seize”, in several lexicalized words: felfog “to comprehend”. –– Tibetan: go “to understand” derives from “to be full”, “to have enough of something”; dgongs-pa “to think”, “to consider” derives from “to weigh”, “to hold”, and yid-la-’dzin “to think” literally means “to mind-in-keep”.22 In conclusion, the importance of touch through which we experience objects can be summarized in the following way: we can close our eyes and not see, we can plug our ears and not hear, but we cannot stop feeling things – the air, the ground, our clothes, etc., and therefore we hardly notice touching because it is always part of our bodily experience.23 It is especially important in the prenatal period when other senses have not yet fully developed.

8.3. Prenatal foundations of image schemas The problem of the nature of ISs is inseparable from the issue of their origin in the human mind. As I noted in point 8.1, most research on the origin of ISs has focused on the postnatal period (Rohrer 2005 is an exception), and the role of the sense of vision (see Mandler 2012 for a survey of research on these topics). However, there are a number of reasons why the prenatal period cannot be ignored:

22 Those examples were provided by prof. Andrew Chesterman for Finnish, prof. Ferenc Kiefer for Hungarian, and prof. Przemysław Żywiczyński for Tibetan. 23 This is a paraphrase of earlier quotes from Wittgenstein (1953) that we are “unable to notice something – because it is always before [our] eyes” and Johnson (1987) that because “force is everywhere, we tend to take for granted and overlook the nature of its operation.” (Johnson 1987: 42).


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1) Embodied cognition requires inclusion of the development of all senses and the nervous system from their very beginnings. 2) The situation in the mother’s womb is similar to that in the external world – there are two physical objects (bodies) interacting in many ways. 3) Since touch begins to develop in the seventh week of pregnancy, simultaneously with the nervous system (Chamberlain n.d., Kornas-Biela 2011), it would be unreasonable to assume that no interaction takes place between them until the baby is born, that is, that the sensory experiences of the fetus leave no impression on the nervous system. The conclusion is obvious – the most primeval sense of touch interacts with the nervous system, forming some basic neural structures (cf. Dodge and Lakoff 2005) perhaps corresponding to Krzeszowski’s (2016) “preschemas” in the mind.

8.4. Examples of prenatal schemas The present section will offer only very sketchy but mostly self-explanatory accounts of a selection of ISs in the prenatal period. Their descriptions suggest that the diagrams would have the same form as those proposed for the postnatal ISs, and therefore, they will be skipped. Within the schemas related to the structure of the OBJECT, the emergence of the CONTAINER schema is naturally based on the relation between the fetus and the mother’s womb. The PART schema may be the result of the relation between various parts of the body, for example, when the hand grasps the foot, a reciprocal sensation is imprinted in the nervous system. As Chamberlain (n.d.: 1) writes, “Hands are busy interacting with other parts of the body.” The contact with the walls of the womb must result in the fetus’ experience of the SURFACE. The orientational schemas, for example, NEAR/FAR, LEFT/RIGHT, etc. may develop as a result of various positions of the body not only in relation to the walls of the womb but also the interaction of the hands with other, nearer and farther, parts of the body (see Chamberlain’s quote above). The CONTACT schema results from the continual physical connection between fetus and womb.

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Krzeszowski (1997) associates the LINK schema with the umbilical cord, but the amniotic fluid may also be considered as the linking element. Referring to body movements, Chamberlain (n.d.: 1) writes that “[b]etween week six and ten, fetal bodies burst into motion, achieving graceful, stretching, and rotational movements of the head, arms and legs. […]. By 14 weeks, the complete repertoire of fetal movements seen throughout gestation are already in evidence (deVries, Visser, and Prechtl, 1985).” Such movements give rise to the dynamic OBJECT schemas. As I have already indicated, any movement of the fetus necessarily “draws” a path, giving rise to the PATH schema. Though the evolution of BALANCE is usually associated with the postnatal period (Johnson 1987: 74; Gibbs 2008: 234), as Chamberlain (n.d.: 1–2) indicates, the “[t]he vestibular system, designed to register head and body motion as well as the pull of gravity begins developing at about 8 weeks,” which clearly points to the prenatal origin of the BALANCE schema. It is quite evident that the growing body of the fetus constantly interacts with the walls of the womb, thus imprinting in the developing neural system all FORCE variations – such as BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVERSION, REPULSION, FRICTION, etc. The emergence of the MATCHING schema and the resulting SCALE schema can be ascribed to the perception of the different degrees of BLOCKAGE of the body – more flexible in the front and harder in the back of the womb. The different degrees of energy of the mother’s movements may also come into play. Accounts of the CYCLE schema have been based on observations in the postnatal period (cf. Johnson 1987: 119 and Grady 2005: 40). However, referring to the prenatal period, Chamberlain (n.d.: 1) points out that “[m]ovement is spontaneous, endogenous, and typically cycles between activity and rest. Breathing movements […] have begun.” The formation of the CYCLE schema may also be due to the mother’s walk, her breathing and heartbeat.24

24 Cf. Mandler’s (1992) CAUSED MOTION schema.


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Though not exhaustive, the above descriptions indicate clearly why, basing on the tactile experience, we may postulate ISs formation in the prenatal period.

9. Conclusion The present chapter has addressed three issues related to the OBJECT image schema: the nature of the OBJECT schema, its indispensable role in other ISs, and the prenatal origin of many basic ISs described in the literature. With few exceptions, the OBJECT schema has been neglected and mostly treated as just one of many other schemas. Its unique character stems from the fact that, unlike the other ISs, it can be described in terms of matter and boundedness, independently of other schemas. Thus, strictly speaking, it is the only schema that meets Grady’s (2005: 35) condition of perceptual experience. While you can touch and see an object, it is impossible to touch or see forces or other relations. In other words, we cannot touch or see motion; what we really see or can touch are objects changing location in space, which we call motion. Basing on Kotarbińsk’s (1990 [1929]) philosophy of reism, I postulate that all FORCE ISs require an OBJECT schema as an indispensable element of their structure and, thus, are only relations between objects (e.g., one object BLOCKS, DIVERTS, ATTRACTS, COLLIDES WITH another object). Following my 2000a and later papers, I also claim that touch is the primeval and fundamental sense because it is the only sense through which we experience the physicality of objects, that is, the density of matter – the fundamental property of objects. The fundamental character of touch is particularly relevant to the origin of ISs. Most researchers relate the origin of ISs to the postnatal period. The present chapter emphasizes the fact that the sense of touch is the earliest sense to develop, and its beginning coincides with the beginning of the development of the nervous system. Thus, if the sense of touch and the nervous system develop simultaneously, it is unimaginable that the tactile sensation of the fetus would leave no imprint on its developing nervous system. Both, the fetus and the mother’s womb are physical objects and interact in various ways like any other two objects in the world, giving rise

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to such common ISs as the OBJECT schema itself, and most, if not all the other image schemas. Naturally, we do not know what form image schemas have in our minds. We can only assume that in the prenatal period, their form is simpler (cf. Krzeszowski’s 2016 “preschemas”) than in the postnatal period, when they are being enriched by the other senses. However, though neurology gives hope for discovery of the neuronal structures of image schemas, their mental forms may forever remain in the sphere of speculations.

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