Social Identities, Volume 8, Number 3, 2002
In the Name of God and Nation: The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict JONATHAN FOX Bar Ilan University For the past decade and perhaps even longer, ethnic conicts, especially those involving religion and separatism have been gaining increasing attention by the media, academics, and policy makers. Many ethnic conicts involving both religious differences and separatism have become well known. These include the conicts involving the Palestinian minority in Israel, the Tibetan region of China, the Kashmiri and Sikh minorities in India, the East Timorese in Indonesia, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, and the Chechen minority in Russia as well as the various conicts in the former Yugoslavia, to name just a few. As discussed below, both religion and separatism are believed to be among the major causes of violence in the modern era. However, few studies have compared the individual and combined impact of these two factors on ethnic conict. Accordingly, this study addresses the dual issues of religion and separatism in two stages. First, it reviews the literature on the inuence of religion and separatism on conict in order to assess the current perceptions of the impact of these two factors on conict. This review clearly demonstrates that while many studies deal with these two factors individually, few address them in combination. Second, this study uses data from the Minorities at Risk data set as well as data collected independently to assess the overlap between religious and separatist conicts among ethnic conicts, and to assess both the independent and combined impact of religion and separatism on the extent of ethnic rebellion between 1985 and 1998.
Separatism, Religion, and Conict There are few theoretical or quantitative studies that address the combined impact of religion and separatism on conict. Those that do either tend to lump religion in the same category as ethnicity or tend to be discussions of a third topic that is inuenced by both religion and separatism. For instance, Kaufmann (1996, p. 137) discusses the necessity of separating warring religious and ethnic groups in order to control conicts. Ferguson and Mansbach (2000, p. 89) argue that people today are more willing to give their lives over ethnicity or religion than the Westphalian state. Hoffman (1995, p. 272) and Rapoport (1984, p. 659) note that most terrorism in the modern era has been motivated either ISSN 1350-4630 print/ISSN 1363-0296 online/02/030439-17 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/135046302200002999 5
440 Jonathan Fox by nationalism or religion. The lack of studies dealing more actively with the combination of separatism and religion is surprising considering the extensive coverage of both of these factors individually. That separatism causes violence is nearly undisputed in the literature. Separatism or self-determination is an ideology that is considered both a justication and cause for violence, including terrorism and open rebellion (Byman, 1998, p. 162; David, 1997, p. 572; Gurr and Goldstone, 1991, p. 332; Hoffman, 1995, p. 272; and Schultz, 1995, p. 80). States usually consider separatist demands ‘highly threatening because they challenge nationalist ideologies held by most dominant groups and imply the breakup of the state’ (Gurr, 1993a, p. 294). As a result, states are generally unwilling to grant separatist demands and counter separatists militarily (Gurr and Harff, 1994, p. 118). The violence associated with separatism often continues even after a group successfully meets its separatist goals. This is because creating a new state can result in the need to relocate populations, new border disputes that replace a domestic war with an international war, ghting within the ethnic group demanding separatism over the issue of partition itself, and the encouragement of groups elsewhere to demand self-determination. In addition, partition rarely resolves the ethnic hatred that existed before it (Kaufmann, 1996, pp. 169–74; Kumar, 1997, pp. 25–32). In fact, the violence associated with separatism both before and after partition is one of the reasons that Lijphart (1990, pp. 493–94) recommends power sharing over partition as a solution to ethnic violence. However, some do argue that while clearly associated with violence, partition can reduce the overall level of violence in the long term (Kaufmann, 1998, p. 121). The issue of separatism, often under the heading of self-determination, has become increasingly important over the past century. Some consider this a natural outgrowth of the acceptance of the concept of the nation-state (Fuller, 1995, p. 151). Connor (1972, p. 331) notes that the doctrine of self determination did not appear until around World War I and that in its pristine form, the doctrine [of self-determination] makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any selfdifferentiating people, simply because it is a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself. In fact, it can be said that the right to self-determination has replaced the law of conquest as the dening principle of sovereignty (Wilmer, 1993). That is, while in the past, states with sovereignty had the right to use force to achieve their policy goals including conquest, this right has been eroded and justied force tends to be limited to self defence and humanitarian intervention, preferably sanctioned by an international body. Conversely, the use of force in order to gain self-determination is becoming increasingly legitimate (Borntrager, 1999, p. 70) and separating warring populations rather than preserving multiethnic societies is gaining international support (Kaufmann, 1998, p. 120). Given this, it is not surprising that the increased demands for selfdetermination and their growing legitimacy in the international community have outpaced the ability of the traditional principles of international law to
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 441 deal with them (Gurr and Harff, 1994). Thus, not only is separatism associated with violence, this violence is becoming more common and increasingly acceptable in the eyes of the international community. Secession is inuenced by both domestic and international factors. Horowitz (1985, p. 230) argues that whether secessionist movements will arise is dependent on local politics but their success is dependent on international politics. Perhaps the most important variable in determining whether a group will demand self-determination is whether that group has had selfdetermination in the past. In fact, in a quantitative study, Gurr (1993a) found that no single variable inuenced whether an ethnic minority expresses a desire for autonomy or separatism more than whether the group had some form of autonomy in the past. Other important domestic factors include the homogeneity of the region demanding secession, the comparative levels of development in the state as a whole and the region demanding partition, and the extent to which nearby and similar groups are making separatist demands (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 266–72; Ayres and Saidman, 2000). However, in order to be successful, secessionists generally need international support, especially by foreign governments (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 272–76). In fact, secessionist movements often attract international intervention, especially among groups with ethnic afnities (Carment and James, 1996; Davis and Moore, 1997; and Davis et al., 1997). Based on this, many consider the rising levels of separatism a threat to the current international order. For example, Carment and James (1997, p. 260) argue that the concept of self determination can actually undermine multiethnic societies, while Green (2000, p. 73) argues that it can undermine the concept of the monolithic state. This is because all the durable states in the modern world established and consolidated rule over their national territories by the successful use of force: by revolution; by suppressing rebellions and secessions; by forcibly subordinating and integrating. (Gurr, 1988, p. 47) Even those who argue it is not a threat do not disagree with the fact that secession is often violent and can drastically change the international order. For instance, Borntrager (1999, pp. 72–73) argues that while partition may change composition of the international system it will not challenge it and Young (1997, pp. 47, 59) argues that while secession can be peaceful, it is irrevocable and causes serious disruption even under the best of circumstances. In any case, it is clear that secession is a major cause of violence that is becoming increasingly important on the international agenda. The link between religion and violence is also well documented. It is a double-edged sword that can provide support to both regimes and opposition movements (Fox, 1999a; Lewy, 1974, pp. 550–51; and Lincoln, 1985). It is the source of political divisions (Badal, 1990, pp. 263–64; and Williams, 1996, p. 369), including electoral divisions (Don-Yehiya, 1997). It is both a justication for terrorism and an inuence on the nature of the acts and ideologies of terrorists (Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1995; Juergensmeyer, 1997, p. 17; Rapoport, 1984, 1988, and 1990; Ranstorp, 1996; and Martin, 1989, pp. 356–57).
442 Jonathan Fox It has an important inuence on many forms of conict including international conict (Henderson, 1997), international intervention (Fox, 2001), ethnic conict (Fox, 1998, 1999c and 2000c; and Rummel, 1997), state discrimination against minorities (Fox, 2000b; and Little 1991, 1996a and 1996b), and genocide (Fein, 1990, p. 49). Huntington (1993 and 1996) indirectly argues that religion will be a major source of conict in the post-Cold War era by arguing that civilisations, a concept which he bases to a great extent on religion,1 will be the primary basis for future conict. Even those, like Weigel (1991) and Gopin (2000), who argue that religion is a potential source of peace, acknowledge its violent nature. Like separatism, religious-based violence is becoming an increasingly important item on the international agenda. Huntington’s (1993 and 1996) predictions of future conicts being primarily between religiously-dened civilisations has sparked a debate over the issue among both scholars and practitioners of international politics. While his theories are controversial, the argument that seems to have gained the greatest acceptance is that Islam will be the greatest challenge to the Christian West.2 Similarly, Marty and Appleby (1991, 1993, and 1994) in their inuential analysis of religious fundamentalism document the increasing importance of fundamentalist movements in politics and conict throughout the globe. Khosla (1999, pp. 1152–54) and Fox (2001) document that religious minorities attract proportionally more international intervention than any other type of ethnic minority. Finally, in a series of quantitative studies on the inuence of religion on ethnic conict Fox (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a and 2000b) has shown that while only a minority of ethnic conicts are inuenced by religious issues, religion signicantly changes the dynamics of conicts where it is a factor in several ways. First, religion inuences the process that leads to most forms of discrimination against ethnic minorities. Second, religion is signicantly more important an issue in conicts involving Islamic ethnic groups. Third, religious institutions tend to inhibit peaceful ethnic opposition against regimes unless there is some religious issue or value at stake, in which case they facilitate opposition. Fourth, in conicts where religious issues are not at stake religious legitimacy3 facilitates the formation of ethnic grievances over secular issues but when religion is at stake in a conict, religious legitimacy inhibits the formation of grievances over secular issues in favour of facilitating the formation of grievances over religious issues. In all, both religion and separatism have become increasingly conspicuous sources of violence that have been attracting increased international attention, worry, and intervention. In addition, many violent conicts involve both religion and separatism. Despite this, few theoretical or quantitative studies have addressed both these causes of violence in combination. It is important to note that the purpose of this study is not to assess whether religion and separatism individually inuence ethnic conict. This has already been done for both religion (see, for example Rummel, 1997, and Fox, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a and 2000b) and separatism (see, for example, Saidman, 1997, and Ayres and Saidman, 2000). Rather, this study aims to assess the extent to which the presence of these factors individually and in combination inuence the extent
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 443 of ethnic rebellion. This set of questions can be summarised in the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: The presence of separatist desires among an ethnic minority increases the level of rebellion in which that minority engages. Hypothesis 2: If a minority is religiously different from the majority group in its state this will increase the level of rebellion in which that minority engages. Hypothesis 3: If a minority expresses grievances over religious issues, this will increase the level of rebellion in which that minority engages. Hypothesis 4: The combination or religious and separatist factors will produce the highest average levels of rebellion by ethnic minorities. Research Design As noted above, this study uses data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set as well as data collected independently in order to assess the inuence of religion and separatism on ethnic rebellion.4 The unit of analysis in the MAR3 data set is the minority group within a state. For each of the 275 cases there is a minority and a majority group. Thus, the same majority group and the same minority may appear several times in the data set. What is unique to each case is the same pair of majority and minority groups do not appear more than once.5 This study makes use of four variables. First, rebellion is coded for each case each year from 1985 to 1998 on the following scale: 0. 1. 2. 3.
None. Political banditry, sporadic terrorism. Campaigns of terrorism. Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority-controlled regional government here. 4. Small-scale guerrilla activity. (Small-scale guerrilla activity has all these three traits: fewer than 1000 armed ghters; sporadic armed attacks (less than 6 reported per year); and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales.) 5. Intermediate-scale guerrilla activity. (Intermediate-scale guerrilla activity has one or two of the dening traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the dening traits of small-scale activity.) 6. Large-scale guerrilla activity. (Large-scale guerrilla activity has all these traits: more than 1000 armed ghters; frequent armed attacks (more than 6
444 Jonathan Fox reported per year); and attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by group.) 7. Protracted civil war, fought by rebel military with base areas. The most serious occurrence in any given year for a particular ethnic group is coded as the level of rebellion for that year. Second, a variable measuring whether the group is separatist is measured as follows: 0. None 1. Latent: if the group meets any of the following conditions: the group was physically transferred from another region; the territory the group resides in was transferred into another state’s political jurisdiction; autonomy was lost in the past; or if the group was historically autonomous. 2. Historical: the group gave rise to separatist or autonomy movements that persisted as an active political force for 5 1 years in their region of origin between 1940 and 1980. 3. Active: active separatist or autonomy movement(s) in the 1980s or 1990s. The above two variables are available in the MAR data set. The third, which measures whether the minority and majority groups involved in the conict are religiously differentiated is available separately. It is coded into three categories: the groups are not religiously differentiated; the groups are different denominations of the same religion; and the groups belong to different religions.6 The nal variable is also coded separately and measures the extent of grievances over religious issues expressed by a minority group.7 The rst test performed here examines the overlap between religious minorities and minorities which are separatist through the use of a crosstabulation. This will establish whether the populations of ethnic conict in which separatist and religious issues are present are sufciently different to allow comparisons between the two. The second test examines the mean yearly level of rebellion by the following four categories of groups which are based on the religion and separatism variables: minorities which are neither separatist or religiously differentiated; minorities which are only religiously differentiated; minorities which are only separatist; and minorities which are both religiously differentiated and separatist.8 This test is designed to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. The nal test examines the mean yearly level of rebellion among those groups which are both religiously differentiated and separatist controlling for religious grievances. This test is designed to test Hypothesis 3. Given that both religion and separatism are associated with violence, we would expect each to be individually associated with increased violence and that the most violent cases would be those where the minority group is both separatist and religiously differentiated from the majority group and especially those cases where religious grievances are high. The nal two tests are presented on a yearly basis for two reasons. First, if the relationship is consistent over a 14-year period, we can have more condence in the results. Second, relationships can change over time. For example, some such as Huntington (1993 and 1996), who is discussed in more
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 445 detail earlier in this work, predict that the end of the Cold War has resulted in a change in the nature of conict. While this study is not intended to test Huntington’s arguments, it is appropriate to take measures that will reveal if they have an inuence over the results. It is important to note that since the data used here constitute the entire universe of cases, the statistical signicance tests presented here are only a measure of the strength of the relationship. That is, since the data presented here are all the cases that exist, rather than a sample of all cases, any differences found are real differences. For example, election exit poll results usually have an error of a few percentage points because a small number of people, perhaps 1000, are polled in order to estimate how an entire population of millions of people voted. Thus if two candidates are within a few percentage points of each other this difference has no statistical signicance. However, if once the actual votes are counted (‘pregnant chad’ and other difculties or disputes in counting the ballots notwithstanding), one candidate wins by one vote in the nal election, even though that vote constitutes a fraction of a percent difference, the difference in votes between the two candidates is a real difference of one vote and is enough for that candidate to win because it represents a difference in all votes actually cast and not just a sample that estimates what this result is likely to be. Data Analysis and Discussion The rst question asked here is to what extent do religiously differentiated and separatist minorities overlap? As shown in Table 1, there is considerably more overlap than one would expect given random distribution, but the overlap is by no means total. A majority of 64.2% of religiously differentiated minorities show at least a latent tendency toward separatism while about 47.2% of minorities that share religions with the majority group in their state show a tendency toward separatism. Interestingly, minorities that are different denominations of the same religion as the majority group are most likely to be actively separatist (46.9%). Religiously differentiated minorities are also more likely to
Table 1: Likelihood of Ethno–religious Minorities to be Separatist N
Not Religiously Different Different Denominations Religiously Different Chi–square 5 .002
Separatism Index None
Latent
Historical
Active
142
52.8%
7.7%
12.0%
27.5%
32
43.8%
9.4%
0.0%
46.9%
101
35.6%
20.8%
7.9%
35.6%
446 Jonathan Fox Table 2: Mean Levels of Rebellion, 1985–1998, Controlling for Religion and Separatism
Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Separatist only , .05 in 1997 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Separatist only , .01 in 1986, 1987, 1988, & 1990 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Separatist only , .001 in 1985, 1989. 1991, & 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Religious only , .05 in 1998 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Both only , .05 in 1994, 1996, & 1998 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Both only , .01 in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, & 1990, 1997 Signicance (t–test) between Neither and Both only , .001 in 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, & 1995 be actively separatist (36.6%) than non-religiously differentiated minorities (27.5%). Given all of this, it is clear that religiously differentiated minorities are more likely to be separatist than other minorities. The next question asked here is to what extent do religion and separatism, both individually and in combination, inuence minority behaviour. Table 2 assesses the extent of rebellion between 1985 and 1998 by groups possessing all four possible combinations of religious differences and separatism: groups that are neither religiously differentiated nor separatist, groups that are religiously differentiated but not separatist, groups that are separatist but not religiously differentiated, and groups that are both religiously differentiated and separatist.9 The results show that while groups that are neither religiously differentiated nor separatist engage in low average levels of rebellion, groups that are religiously differentiated but not separatist consistently engage in even lower average levels of rebellion though this difference is only statistically signicant in 1998. Conversely, groups that are separatist but not religiously differentiated engage in considerably higher average levels of rebellion than the previous two categories throughout the period covered in Table 2 with these differences being statistically signicant every year except for 1996 and 1998. However, the combination of religious differentiation and separatism increases the average level of rebellion in every year except 1994 but the differences between these two categories is not statistically signicant throughout the period covered by
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 447 Table 2. Thus, all separatist conicts are more violent than non-separatist conicts which is consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1. These results indicate that while separatism is a root cause of rebellion, religion is not. Groups that are not separatist, whether they are religiously differentiated or not, engage in low average levels of rebellion. In fact, in these cases religious differences apparently decrease the level of rebellion. Thus, we must reject Hypothesis 2. However, religion is a factor that can intensify rebellions caused by separatism. Rebellions by religiously differentiated separatist groups reach consistently higher levels than do rebellions that involve minorities which are separatist but not religiously differentiated. These ndings are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 4. It is important to note that the tests, thus far, only measure whether the groups involved in the conict belong to different religions. Thus, it is unclear from the results whether religious differences alone are what cause these dynamics or whether it is because these conicts are likely to involve religious issues which are the real cause of these dynamics. Accordingly, Table 3 compares, among minorities which are both religiously differentiated and separatist, the extent of rebellion between 1985 and 1998 by minorities which express high levels of religious grievances and those which express low levels of religious grievances.10 The results show that except in 1993, those minorities that express high religious grievances engage in a higher average level of rebellion than those who do not.11 In fact, the average level of rebellion by religiously differentiated separatist minorities who express low levels of religious grievances is approximately the same as the average level of rebellion by separatist minorities which are not religiously differentiated (shown in Table 2). Thus, it is most likely that it is the presence of religious issues in a conict rather than merely the presence of religious differences, which combines with separatism to increase the average level of rebellion.12 These ndings are consistent with the predictions of Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Table 3: Mean Levels of Rebellion, 1985–1998, Among Minorities that are both Religious and Separatist, Controlling for Religious Grievances
None of the differences are signicant (t–test ,
.05)
448 Jonathan Fox Conclusions The most obvious, and perhaps most important, conclusion that can be reached based on the analysis presented here is that separatism appears to be a direct cause of ethnic rebellion but religion does not. However, the relationship between religion and rebellion is more complicated than this simple statement implies. When religion and separatism are combined, the average level of rebellion increases, especially if the rebellion involves the expression of religious grievances by the minority group which is rebelling. In contrast, when separatism is not an issue, religion does not seem to increase the level of rebellion. In fact, among non-separatist ethnic minorities, those who are religiously differentiated engage in less rebellion than those who are not. Thus, even though religion does not seem to be a direct cause of ethnic rebellion, it can increase the violence of an ethnic rebellion. In addition, because there is considerable overlap between religious differences and separatism it is arguable that religion may contribute to separatism. This is consistent with Smith’s (1999) argument that religion is a major source of nationalism.13 To return to our hypotheses, Hypothesis 1, that separatist conicts are more violent, is the only one of the four which has unqualied support in the data. Hypothesis 2, that minorities of different religions from the majority group engage in more rebellion, is clearly incorrect. Hypothesis 3, that the expression of religious grievances by a minority increases its level of rebellion is only correct if the conict is also a separatist one. Finally, Hypothesis 4, that the combination of religious and separatist factors in a conict produces the most violent conicts is correct but only when religious grievances are expressed. The other religious factor, if the minority is a different religion than the majority, does not increase the level of rebellion in separatist conicts. Nevertheless, this study does clearly show that both separatist and religious factors inuence conict with separatism being a basic cause and religion being an exacerbating factor. Several examples taken from the MAR data set help to illustrate this. The Copts in Egypt are a religious minority that is not separatist. They belong to a Christian sect that predates the arrival of Islam in Egypt. Their complaints against the state include the fact that they are ofcially considered second class citizens due to their religion. As a result, they suffer from political and economic discrimination in their ability to be elected into the government, their access to other high level government jobs, their ability to obtain employment, access to university education, and their right to openly practice their religion. In addition they are often the victims of violence by Islamic militants. Yet despite all this they engage in no rebellion.Similarly, the Baha’i in Iran suffer from severe political economic, political and religious discrimination, but express no desire for separatism. The Iranian Shi’i Muslim clergy considers the Baha’i to be heretics and has opposed them since the inception of the Baha’i religion. The Baha’i in Iran have, accordingly, been persecuted almost from the inception of their religion. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the situation of the Baha’is has worsened dramatically. In addition to many types of overt discrimination and repression, the Baha’i faith is considered heretical in Iran,
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 449 meaning that they are subject to prosecution on the basis of their belief. In addition, since matters of personal status, including marriage, are determined by clergy in Iran, a Baha’i who marries under the auspices of his faith is considered by the government to be living in sin with his spouse and, thus, subject, to prosecution. Despite all this, the Baha’i in Iran engage in no rebellion. The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq are probably among the most separatist of ethnic minorities in the Middle East. In Iraq, they engage in the highest level of rebellion coded by the MAR data set, during the 1985–1998 period covered by this study. Similarly in Turkey the level of rebellion by the Kurds ranged between ‘small-scale guerilla activities’ and ‘protracted civil war’ during the same period. Thus in both countries the separatist struggle of the Kurds remained violent throughout the 1985–1998 period, reaching the highest levels of violence measured in the MAR studies during a portion of this period. The Kurds are ethnically but not religiously distinct from the majority groups in Turkey and Iraq. The Christian Animists in south Sudan are a minority that is both separatist and religiously differentiated from the country’s Muslem majority. In addition, the separatist demands are, at least in part, motivated by religion. The rebellion by the southerners began in 1956 with the independence of Sudan from British rule and continued until 1972 when the Addis Ababa Accords guaranteed the south local autonomy, which included freedom from the imposition of Islamic laws. In 1983 the government broke the accords and reimposed Islamic law on all of Sudan which resulted in a renewal of the rebellion by the southerners, led by the mostly Christian Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). For the entire 1985–1998 period covered in this study, this rebellion has been coded as a ‘protracted civil war’ by the MAR data set. Thus, the combination of religion and separatism in Sudan has resulted in one of the most protracted and violent ethnic conicts in the world. Similarly, the rebellion by the Hindu Tamils in Buddhist Sri Lanka combines religion and separatism. The Sinhalese Buddhists believe that Buddha charged them with preserving the true Buddhism — Therevada Buddhism — and gave the Island of Lanka to the Sinhalese to create a ‘citadel of pure Buddhism’. This ideology has resulted in repression against the Tamils, murderous riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983, and massacres of Tamils by extremists within Sri Lanka security forces since then. As a result, the Sri Lankan Tamils have waged a bloody rebellion that reached the level of ‘protracted civil war’ in the MAR data set for every year covered in this study save 1988 and 1989 where the conict is coded as ‘small-scale guerilla activity’.14 Thus, religious differences alone are not generally associated with ethnic rebellion. This is illustrated by the cases of the Baha’i in Iran and the Copts in Egypt, as well as the fact that in 1998 only one out of 35 minorities that are religiously differentiated but not separatist engaged in any rebellion.15 However, as is illustrated by the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the southerners in Sudan, the combination of religious differences and separatism can be very volatile, especially when religion is an important element of the conict. Be that as it may, it is important to reiterate that these ndings apply only to ethnic conict. The cases included in these studies are ethnic conicts like
450 Jonathan Fox those noted above and not conicts within the same ethnic group such as the civil war in Algeria between the government and Islamic militants. Thus, in the non-ethnic context, it is clear that separatism, an issue that is generally found only in ethnic conicts, it is not necessary for religion to become involved in violence. However, it is possible that a closer examination of such cases may nd that other non-religious elements are necessary before religion will contribute to conict. In all, this study provides evidence that contradicts the common perception that religion is a root cause of violence in ethnic conicts. The results presented here show that separatism, and not religious differences, is both a necessary and sufcient cause of ethnic rebellion. However, the results presented here are not sufcient fully to rule out religion as a cause of conict for several reasons. First, while religion alone is not enough to cause ethnic rebellion, it is associated with an intensication of separatist conicts. Second, the overlap between religious differences and separatism leaves room for the argument that religion may be a contributing factor to separatist ideologies, thus making it an indirect cause of ethnic rebellion. Third, this study applies only to ethnic conict, hence the ndings do not rule out the possibility that religion contributes to other forms of violence. Fourth, previous studies have found that religion inuences the dynamics of ethnic conict in multiple ways. Thus, while religion is not a primary cause of ethnic conict, it would be difcult to fully understand the dynamics of ethnic conict without taking religion into account. Jonathan Fox may be contacted at the Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, e-mail:
[email protected]. Notes 1. Huntington (1996, p. 47) admits his denitions are, to a great extent, based on religion. He denes the Sinic/Confucian civilisation as the Confucian Chinese, Chinese minorities outside of China and ‘the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea’. As noted above, this is operationalised here as including the Chinese and Buddhists. The Japanese civilisation appears to include the Japanese and only the Japanese. The Hindu and Islamic civilisations appear to be wholly dened by religion, even if Huntington claims otherwise. The Slavic-Orthodox civilisation seems to be a combination of the Orthodox Christian religion and a common historical experience. The Western civilisation is basically the US, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand which are mostly Protestant Christians but include some Catholics. The Latin American civilisation is distinguished by being Catholic and ‘incorporates indigenous cultures’. Finally, the ‘possible’ African civilisation is based on a developing common identity. 2. Even some of Huntington’s most vehement critics like Hassner (1997) and Heilbrunn (1998) believe that there may be some truth to Huntington’s arguments with regards to clashes between the Western and Islamic civilisations. However, others like Fuller and Lesser (1996) and Halliday
The Overlapping Inuence of Separatism and Religion on Ethnic Conict 451
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8.
9.
(1996) argue that Islam is not the threat many believe it to be. Similarly Kader (1998), and Monshipouri (1998), argue that conicts occur more often within the Islamic civilisation than between it and other civilisations. Fox (1999b, p. 297) denes religious legitimacy as ‘the extent to which it is legitimate to invoke religion in political discourse’. The MAR data, the supplemental data and a full description of these data sets are available at the Minorities at Risk website at www.cidsm. umd.edu/inscr/mar. It is important to note that some, including Fearon and Latin (1997), have criticised the MAR data on grounds of selection bias. Gurr (2000, pp. 10–13) addresses these criticisms. Arguing that the project has systematically collected a list of groups which are treated differentially and/or politically active. Thus, the project represents a reasonably record of all serious conicts between ethnic groups and governments. This variable is available in ‘data set2’ of the ‘Jonathan Fox — Project Operationalizing Huntington’s Civilizations’ section of the Minorities at Risk links webpage. This variable, ranging from 0 to 24, is a composite variable measuring the grievances expressed by the minority group over religious issues in 1994– 1995. It is based on the strength of grievances expressed in general as well as over the following issues: observance of festivals, holidays and/or other forms of public observance; building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship; the imposition of religious laws on the group; maintaining formal religious organisations; maintaining religious schools and/or teaching the religion; observance of religious laws concerning personal status, including marriage and divorce; and ordaining and/or having access to clergy. Each of these categories is coded on the following scale: 0 — none; 1 — the issue is of lesser importance or of major concern to only one faction of the group; 2 — the issue is signicant but its relative importance can not be judged; 3 — the issue is important for most of the group. For the purposes of this study, this variable is divided into two categories, low grievances (the original variable equals 2 or less) and high grievances (the original variable is 3 or higher). Because this variable was collected before several of the groups in the MAR data set were included, three cases are excluded from the test involving this variable. This variable is available in the ‘Jonathan Fox — Religion and Ethnic Conict Project’ section of the Minorities at Risk links webpage. For the purposes of this test separatist minorities are those that are actively separatist and religious minorities are those that are of different religions than the majority group in their state. To be coded as religiously differentiated, the minority must be a different religion than the majority group and to be coded as separatist the minority must have been actively separatist. Accordingly, out of 275 groups, there are 120 groups that are neither religiously differentiated nor separatist, 65 groups that are religiously differentiated but not separatist, 54 groups that are separatist but not religiously differentiated, and 36 groups that are both religiously differentiated and separatist.
452 Jonathan Fox 10. There are 20 such groups which express low levels of religious grievances, 13 which express high levels, and three for which there is no information and are accordingly excluded form this test. 11. A similar test performed on minorities which are religiously differentiated but not separatist shows that the presence of high levels of religious grievances increases the average level of rebellion from 1985 to 1996 but not in 1997 and 1998. However, the average level of rebellion for both of these categories remains below 1 in all years tested. 12. While these differences are not statistically signicant, probably because of the low number of cases (33), they are all of the cases which t the criteria of minorities which are both religiously different from the majority group and separatist. Thus the differences between the two categories are real differences and can be considered important. 13. Smith (1998, pp. 97–116) also argues that nationalism fullls the same roles in modern society as did religion in the past. This argument is echoed by Juergensmeyer (1993). 14. For more on Buddhism and conict in Sri Lanka see Manor (1994). 15. This minority is the southerners in Chad who are seeking to change the government structure and more representation. References Ayres, R.W. and S. Saidman (2000) ‘Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer? Testing International and Domestic Explanations’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 6 (3): 91–113. Badal, R.K. (1990) ‘Religion and Conict in the Sudan: a Perspective’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 21 (3): 263–72. Borntrager, E.W. (1999) Borders, Ethnicity, and National Self-Determination, Austria: Braumuller. Byman, D. (1998) ‘The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism’, Studies in Conict and Terrorism, 21 (2): 149–69. Carment, D. and P. James (1996) ‘Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conict in the Balkans and South Asia’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 29 (3): 521–54. Carment, D. and P. James (eds) (1997) Wars in the Midst of Peace, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Connor, W. (1972) ‘Nation Building or Nation Destroying?’, World Politics, 26: 319–55. David, S.R. (1997) ‘Internal War: Causes and Cures’, World Politics, 49: 552–76. Davis, D.R. and W.H. Moore (1997) ‘Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior’, International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1): 171–84. Davis, D.R., K. Jaggers, and W.H. Moore, (1997) ‘Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conict’, in D. Carment and P. James (eds), Wars in the Midst of Peace, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Don-Yehiya, E. (1997) ‘Religion, Ethnicity, and Electoral Reform: the Religious Parties and the 1996 Elections’, Israel Affairs, 4 (1): 74–102.
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