The Rise of Mass Deportation in the United States

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The Rise of Mass Deportation in the United States Daniel E. Martínez, Jeremy Slack, and Ricardo Martínez‐Schuldt

By the end of fiscal year 2016, the Obama administration had formally removed (i.e., deported) more than 3.4 million noncitizens from the United States—exceeding the 2.2 million deported during G. W. Bush’s term, as well as the nearly 870,000 during the Clinton administration (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016a, 2016b). In fact, the Obama administration deported more noncitizens than any other presidential administration and was “on pace to deport more people than the sum of all 19 presidents who governed the United States from 1892–2000” (Rogers, 2016). As a result, many immigrant rights groups criticized the Obama administration and often referred to the President as the “Deporter‐in‐Chief ” (Dickson, 2014, para. 1). Other scholars argue that these criticisms are misguided for several reasons. First, when considered within the broader historical context of total repatriations (i.e., “removals” and “returns”), fewer noncitizens have been repatriated from the country in recent years relative to the 1990s and 2000s (Rosenblum & Meissner, 2014; US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b). Second, many of the policies that led to mass deportation preceded the Obama administration (Golash‐Boza, 2015; Rosenblum & Meissner, 2014), including the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the 1996 Anti‐Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), among others. Finally, the Obama administration exercised prosecutorial discretion, as outlined in the 2011 Morton memos and the 2014 Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which limited the deportation of noncitizens “outside established priority categories” (Rosenblum & Meissner, 2014).

The Handbook of Race, Ethnicity, Crime, and Justice, First Edition. Edited by Ramiro Martínez, Jr., Meghan E. Hollis, and Jacob I. Stowell. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Daniel E. Martínez, Jeremy Slack, and Ricardo Martínez-Schuldt

President Obama also implemented two high profile immigration‐related executive orders: the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and 2014 Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). DACA provides deportation relief to unauthorized immigrants who were under the age of 31 when the executive order was signed, were brought to the United States before the age of 16, have continuously remained in the country since 2007, earned a high school degree or equivalent, and do not have a criminal record (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2016). Alternatively, DAPA would have provided deportation relief for eligible parents of US citizens and lawful permanent residents, but this executive order was ultimately enjoined in 2015 by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Shear & Preston, 2015). We recognize that the Obama administration’s role in contributing to mass deportation is much more complex and nuanced than suggested by the moniker of “Deporter‐in‐Chief.” But the fact that more migrants have been formally removed (i.e., deported) in the past decade than ever before is not trivial or simply a matter of semantics. Rather, deportation carries a host of notable legal and social risks for migrants and their families, many of which result in serious unintended social consequences, including subsequent criminalization, family separation and dissolution, and psychological problems. Furthermore, deportations are likely to increase during Trump’s presidency. On January 25, 2017, after a successful campaign fueled by anti‐ immigrant rhetoric and xenophobic discourse, President Trump signed two executive orders that will increase immigration enforcement and place a notable emphasis on expanding the deportation apparatus. For instance, the Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States executive order terminated the 2014 PEP, restored the Secure Communities initiative, and called for an additional 10,000 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents (US Department of Homeland Security, 2017a). In a similar vein, the executive order entitled Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements reinstituted and expanded the 287(g) program, which allows local law enforcement agents in certain states to enforce immigration law as originally outlined in the section of the 1996 IIRIRA for which the program was named (US Department of Homeland Security, 2017b). The “Border Security …” executive order also expanded the use of expedited removals in the border region, increased Border Patrol staffing by 5,000 agents, mandated the detention of immigrants apprehended for unlawful entry, and prioritized criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses committed at the border (US Department of Homeland Security, 2017b). Although DACA was still in effect at the time of our writing, it is possible that the Trump administration will not authorize DACA renewals, which must take place every two years. In other words, those who have found temporary relief from deportation under DACA may no longer be protected. Given these changes, Trump is positioned to become the new “Deporter‐in‐Chief.” Despite deportation being a major component of US immigration enforcement, the social implications of deportation have been relatively underexamined by quantitative sociologists. We begin this chapter by describing the historical trends in

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total repatriations from the United States. We detail how fluctuations in these trends are the result of important policy changes in the 1990s and 2000s that led to the devolution of immigration enforcement from the federal to the local level. In addition, we note that these changes created the sociolegal conditions that gave rise to the current mass deportation regime and increased the intersections of immigration and criminal law, leading to the “criminalization of immigration law” (Stumpf, 2006; see also Coleman, 2007; De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Golash‐Boza, 2015). We then provide a brief overview of the deportation literature and argue that there is a relative dearth of empirical studies examining the material consequences and realities of the diverse processes that lead to deportation. We also outline the ways in which border enforcement has moved away from a strategy rooted in general deterrence (i.e., the “prevention‐through‐deterrence” strategy) to one based on specific deterrence and actuarial justice (i.e., the Consequence Delivery System), within which immigrant detention and deportation have played integral roles. Finally, drawing on a unique data source of recently repatriated Mexican migrants, the Migrant Border Crossing Study (MBCS), we illustrate that the individuals who bear the brunt of criminalization and deportation possess strong social ties to the United States. We conclude by cautioning against mass deportation and the continued criminalization of unauthorized migration, as the long‐term social consequences of these approaches to immigration control are not yet fully understood by social scientists.

Linking Immigration Policy to Repatriation There are several ways that noncitizens can be sent back to their countries of origin. But generally speaking, these modes of removal tend to consist primarily of what the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes as a “return” or a “formal removal” (i.e., deportation). According to DHS, a return (i.e., “voluntary return” or “voluntary departure”) is “the confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States not based on an order of removal” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b, Table 39, n2), whereas a removal (i.e., deportation) is defined as “the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b, Table 39, n1). One important distinction between “returns” and “formal removals” is that being removed carries serious “consequences for deportees, including lengthy bars on legal readmission and potential criminal charges and prison time for those who return illegally” (Rosenblum & McCabe, 2014, p. 4). In other words, the 3.4 million noncitizens who were “formally removed” from the United States during the Obama administration are at greater risk of subsequent criminalization if they attempt to return to the country without authorization when compared to the nearly 3 million who were “returned” during the same period.


176 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000

Returns Apprehensions Removals

1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000

19 6 19 0 6 19 2 6 19 4 6 19 6 68 19 7 19 0 7 19 2 7 19 4 7 19 6 7 19 8 8 19 0 8 19 2 8 19 4 8 19 6 8 19 8 9 19 0 9 19 2 9 19 4 9 19 6 9 20 8 0 20 0 02 20 0 20 4 06 20 0 20 8 1 20 0 1 20 2 1 20 4 16

0

Figure 8.1 Returns, Formal Removals, and Southwestern Apprehensions by US Authorities, FY 1960–2016. Source: US Department of Homeland Security (2016a, 2016b).

When placed in the broader historical context of repatriations from the United States, there are actually fewer total repatriations today than in prior decades (Rosenblum & Meissner, 2014; US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b). This is reflected in Figure 8.1, which illustrates “returns,” “removals,” and southwestern Border Patrol apprehensions between fiscal year 1960 and 2016. As depicted in Figure 8.1, “returns” exceeded “removals” between 1960 and 2011. Historically, “returns” have also made up a much larger proportion of total repatriations relative to “removals.” But this began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 1996 IIRIRA, which restructured US immigration laws, expanded the list of deportable offenses, and established protocols for federal and local government cooperation in immigration law enforcement, and the 1996 AEDPA, which securitized international migration policy and increased categories of excludible aliens, served as important catalysts for this shift in immigration enforcement (Rosenblum & McCabe, 2014). The “1996 laws,” as they are often described by immigration scholars, also “eliminated judicial review of some deportation orders, required mandatory detention for some noncitizens,” expanded the definition of an aggravated felony, and mandated deportation if an immigrant was convicted of such an offense (Golash‐Boza, 2015, p. 105). The effects of the 1996 laws are illustrated in the slow but steady increase in “removals” and the precipitous drop in “returns” in the late 1990s and 2000s. We must note, however, there was a slight decline in removals between 2014 and 2016 after a peak in 2013. This decrease was due to the use of prosecutorial discretion as outlined in the 2014 PEP (Rosenblum, 2015).


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An estimated 87 percent of the 11 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States fell outside of the 2014 enforcement priorities (Rosenblum, 2015), shielding many people from deportation. But this encouraging turn in deportation policy was short‐lived. The Trump administration terminated the 2014 PEP during its first month in office, which means that removals will likely increase again in the coming years. In 2011, and for the first time on record, the number of “removals” exceeded “returns”—a trend that has continued in subsequent years. Historically most unauthorized Mexican immigrants apprehended while crossing the US–Mexico border agreed to a “voluntary return” and were repatriated to Mexico; however, apprehensions have mirrored removals since 2011, suggesting that a greater proportion of border‐crossers are being deported today than in the past. This notable shift in the relationships between “returns,” “removals,” and border apprehensions across time can be explained by several key structural and political transformations. First, unauthorized migration from Mexico has slowed considerably since the late 2000s. Scholars largely attribute this to the lasting effects of the 2008 Great Recession, increased border enforcement efforts, an increase in permanent settlement rather than seasonal migration among unauthorized migrants, and demographic transformations in Mexico, including decreased fertility rates (Passel, Cohn, Krogstad, & Gonzalez‐Barrera, 2014). Second, interior immigration enforcement efforts, which were facilitated by the 1996 laws and the “war on terror,” increased formal removals from the interior United States. The implementation of the 1996 laws was predicated upon the identification and removal of deportable “criminal aliens” from the country’s interior. However, 58 percent of formal removals between 2008 and 2015 (data for 2016 were not yet available) were of noncriminals (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b). Because of this we call into question the state’s use of the term “criminal alien” and echo a previous study asserting that the term has amounted to a sleight of hand used to redefine what it means to be an undocumented immigrant residing in the United States (Ewing, Martínez, & Rumbaut, 2015). The trope of the “criminal alien” often conjures up images of serious or violent offenders. But most “criminal aliens” removed from the United States do not fit this profile. For instance, over 30 percent of all criminal removals carried out in 2013 consisted of people “convicted exclusively of immigration offenses” (Rosenblum & McCabe, 2014, p. 14), while only 11 percent were of people convicted of index crimes (i.e., aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder, robbery, arson, burglary, larceny‐theft, or motor vehicle theft). Finally, zero‐tolerance policies adopted near the border have effectively increased formal removals and decreased voluntary returns granted to Mexican border‐crossers over the past decade (Rosenblum & Meissner, 2014). This last point is illustrated in Figure 8.1 by the inverse relationship between returns and southwestern apprehensions beginning in fiscal year 2011. In other words, unauthorized Mexican immigrants apprehended within 100 kilometers of the US–Mexico border in recent years are more likely to be formally removed than voluntarily returned relative to previous years.

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In sum, we contend that increased interior immigration enforcement and the recent zero‐tolerance policy changes near the border have set a historical precedent for increased deportations relative to voluntary returns. We contend that this is problematic because such policies continue to contribute to the criminalization of immigrants and family dissolution, both of which will only intensify during the Trump administration. In the following section we further describe impact that the 1996 laws and the “war on terror” have had on the criminalization and deportation of hundreds of thousands of noncitizens from the United States. We follow by providing an overview of the Consequence Delivery System, which has contributed to a zero‐ tolerance approach to immigration enforcement near the border, including deportation. We then provide a brief review of the extant deportation literature and suggest there has been a relative absence of surveys of deportees focusing on the material consequences of deportation. We attempt to address this gap by highlighting the characteristics and experiences of formally removed Mexican migrants—a group that made up roughly 71 percent of all removals between 2008 and 2015—by drawing on data collected through the second wave of the Migrant Border Crossing Study.

Deportation and Criminalization of Immigration Deportation as a subfield of immigration studies has developed quickly over the past decade. Important works by De Genova (2002), De Genova and Puetz (2010), and others (Heyman, Núñez, & Talavera, 2009; Núñez & Heyman, 2007) have developed the concept of deportability, which is generally treated as one’s potential for removal. This has produced important insights about how removal works as a form of social control, limiting people’s mobility, as well as access to spaces of social reproduction and economic activity. However, only a limited number of studies have focused on the actual mechanisms of removal and the disjunction between official state policies and how these policies are implemented on the ground. In order to accomplish this, additional research with migrants post‐deportation is necessary. Scholars have begun to explore the social consequences of deportation; however, the majority of this work focuses on issues of stigma and the difficulty of reintegration into countries of origin (Boehm, 2011, 2016; Brotherton & Barrios, 2009, 2011; Golash‐Boza, 2015, 2014; Hiemstra, 2012). These authors have found that the stigma produced by removal, as well as the separation from family, leads to a number of problems for reintegration. Due to this stigma, deportees may struggle to find work and feel rejected by a country many no longer know. However, when discussing the mechanisms for removal and their unique position within the social and legal framework, the border has largely been neglected despite representing a particularly important component of immigration enforcement. There are opportunities within the current deportation literature to highlight the importance of the border as a multiplier force


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of criminalization processes, describe the specific policies and practices of removal, and call attention to the consequences that these processes have for deportees and their families. There has also been an increased focus on the impacts that the 1996 laws and the “war on terror” have had on the lives of noncitizens and their US citizen family members. These policies led to an increased intersection between immigration law and criminal law, added to the list of deportable offenses, expanded the definition of aggravated felonies, limited judicial review in immigration cases, and allowed for the use of secret evidence in certain cases (Coleman, 2007; Golash‐Boza, 2015; Stumpf, 2006; Welch, 2003). Together, these pieces of legislation have resulted in the current mass deportation regime. Specific policy changes related to deportable offenses and aggravated felonies have been applied retroactively, meaning that some immigrants were deported for crimes for which they were previously adjudicated, including instances where individuals pled guilty to certain offenses in exchange for probation rather than risk serving jail time, and even in cases where no formal sentence was given (Coleman, 2007; Welch, 2007). This led to the landmark Supreme Court decision (Padilla v. Kentucky) that now requires criminal defense attorneys to inform their clients of the immigration consequences of their convictions or plea deals (Kanstroom, 2011). Deportation’s unique position as an administrative process allows the federal government to skirt the traditional protections afforded to defendants in criminal court, including the disclosure of evidence as well as the right to legal counsel. In the context of immigration law, deportation is not considered a punishment; therefore, people do not have the right to an attorney unless they are being tried for criminal immigration violations (Kanstroom, 2007). Furthermore, when it comes to immigration matters, the burden of proof is also on the individual and not the state. Immigration courts have been largely ignored from a public policy perspective, with average wait times for the completion of cases stretching over 560 days as of 2016 (TRAC Immigration, 2016), and little debate has been had about increasing funding for the Bureau of Immigration Appeals. Academics, too, have failed to study these important sites of contestation, with some notable exceptions related to asylum and refugee cases (Ramji‐Nogales, Schoenholtz, & Schrag, 2011), which have demonstrated drastic variations in the decisions taken by immigration judges for similar cases. In a recent book Macías‐Rojas (2016) contends that the 1996 laws specifically, and the Criminal Alien Program more broadly, were enacted to “relieve prison overcrowding” in a post–civil rights era of mass incarceration “by deporting noncitizens from jails and prisons” (p. 9). These policies facilitated this process by increasing interior immigration enforcement and deportation by devolving immigration enforcement from the federal level to the local level. The Secure Communities and 287(g) programs, which were part of the larger Criminal Alien Program during our study period, relied on local law enforcement officials to identify and detain unauthorized migrants for removal by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In short, these programs consisted of an effort between local law enforcement

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agencies, correctional facilities, jails, or prisons, and ICE to identify and remove all “deportable aliens” residing in the United States who come into contact with the criminal justice system (for a detailed discussion of Secure Communities, see Kubrin, 2014). Scholars and immigrant rights activists have levied serious criticisms against interior immigration enforcement—including the Criminal Alien Program, Secure Communities, and 287(g). For example, some have contended that these programs undermine community policing efforts and strain community–police relations in immigrant communities by focusing on relatively minor offenders rather than serious, violent offenders (Kubrin, 2014; Martinez & Iwama, 2014). Others have argued that interior immigration enforcement has separated US citizen children from their noncitizen parents through increased deportation (Slack, Martínez, Whiteford, & Peiffer, 2015). Due to mounting political pressure, the Obama administration eventually folded the 287(g) program into Secure Communities, and by the summer of 2015, had completely replaced Secure Communities with the 2014 Priority Enforcement Program. However, Trump’s 2017 executive order terminated the 2014 PEP, reauthorized Secure Communities, and reinstituted and expanded the 287(g) program. Other scholars have also begun to critically examine the “immigration industrial complex” (Golash‐Boza, 2009, 2015) in order to identify the vested economic and political interests that detention and deportation have served for large corporations and policymakers. The heavy reliance on immigrant detention and formal removals has resulted in a growing group of people with criminal records for simply having crossed the border without authorization, something that in the past had largely been treated as a civil, administrative violation. This shift has coincided with the proliferation of private immigration detention facilities throughout the Southwest operated by entities such as the CoreCivic (formerly the Corrections Corporation of America) and the GEO Group (Golash‐Boza, 2009, 2015; Martínez & Slack, 2013). Finally, others have recently called attention to the moral and social implications of the private prison lobby (Alexander, 2012; Gilmore, 2006) by questioning the role of noncitizens in the future of incarceration in the United States as crime rates continue to decline and decarceration processes begin to unfold, albeit slowly (Dowling & Inda, 2013; Loyd, Mitchelson, & Burridge, 2013). However, it is difficult to ascertain the full impact that the rise of private prisons and security companies has on the increased criminalization of migrants, as noncitizens remain an extremely small proportion of all individuals incarcerated in the United States. What is certain, however, is that the mechanisms most responsible for sending noncitizens to federal prison deserve greater attention. Despite these growing literatures, little work has focused exclusively on the ways in which policies carried out near the US–Mexico border have played a key role in the criminalization process, namely through the Consequence Delivery System (CDS), which focuses on delivery of increasingly harsh penalties for repeat border crossings (US Congress, House of Representatives, 2011). The CDS has led to a dramatic shift in border enforcement, which in turn has changed the demographic


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profile of so‐called “criminal aliens,” oftentimes making it increasingly difficult to determine who has been charged and convicted of a non‐immigration criminal offense, and who is simply being charged for a criminal immigration violation that was seldom previously enforced. In the next sections we discuss the CDS and how this new strategy has further escalated the criminalization and mass deportation of noncitizens from the United States.

The Consequence Delivery System During the 1990s and 2000s, the United States adopted the “prevention through deterrence” strategy, which relied largely on militarizing the US–Mexico border (Andreas, 1998, 2000; Cornelius, 2001; Dunn, 1996, 2009; Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003). The aim of the prevention‐through‐deterrence strategy was to deter would‐be border crossers and funnel unauthorized migration into remote areas of the border where US authorities would have a tactical advantage in apprehending undeterred migrants (Cornelius, 2001; Rubio‐Goldsmith, McCormick, Martínez, & Duarte, 2006). Until recently, apprehended Mexican migrants would have typically agreed to a “voluntary return” to a Mexican border town. This approach resulted in a “voluntary departure complex” (Heyman, 1995) in which unauthorized Mexican migrants simply kept attempting to cross the border until they successfully avoided detection. Overall, the prevention‐through‐deterrence strategy largely failed to deter unauthorized border crossers (Dávila, Pagán, & Soydemir, 2002), but drastically increased the number of migrant deaths in certain regions of the US–Mexico border (Cornelius, 2001; Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Hernandez‐Leon, & Bailey, 1999; Martínez, Reineke, Rubio‐Goldsmith, & Parks, 2014; Rubio‐Goldsmith et al., 2006). In 2011, the same year that “removals” exceeded “returns” for the first time on record, US Customs and Border Protection adopted the Consequence Delivery System. Unlike the prevention‐through‐deterrence strategy, which was largely predicated on the logic of general deterrence, CDS is aimed at reducing the probability of subsequent unauthorized reentry and is therefore largely rooted in specific deterrence. The CDS is a suite of enforcement programs “that guide management and agents through a process designed to uniquely evaluate each subject and identify the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity” (US Congress, House of Representatives, 2011). These programs include Operation Streamline, which is a mass trial system for people apprehended at the border, the Alien Transfer and Exit Program, which moves people laterally from one sector to another, the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program, which repatriates people to Mexico City instead of the traditional deportation sites along the US–Mexico border, and the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security. In the coming sections, we focus exclusively on Operation Streamline, as this program has been responsible for systematically criminalizing and incarcerating tens of thousands of unauthorized immigrants since its inception.

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The focus on individual consequences for actions follows a long current of eoliberal trends for the management of behaviors deemed deviant in society n (Zilberg, 2011). However, this approach marks a significant departure from the 1990s prevention‐through‐deterrence strategy that relied almost exclusively on physical infrastructure, equipment, staffing, and the natural hazards of the desert to deter potential border crossers. By enacting an escalating level of punishment on the individual for each act of subsequent unlawful reentry, the full weight of the punitive state is brought down upon immigration offenders. Ultimately, this approach is tailored specifically to punish individuals based on their propensity to remigrate, rather than promoting general deterrence as was initially intended under the prevention‐through‐deterrence strategy. One of the primary CDS programs is Operation Streamline, which is a “zero tolerance” trial en masse that processes 40–80 apprehended border‐crossers on a daily basis, ultimately convicting them of either “unlawful entry” (8 USC § 1325), which is a misdemeanor, or “unlawful reentry” (8 USC § 1326), which is a felony. This program—which was carried out in all US Border Patrol sectors except San Diego, El Centro, and Big Bend during our study period—led to higher federal conviction and incarceration rates of noncitizens for immigration‐related offenses (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2016; Light, Lopez, & Gonzalez‐Barrera, 2014). In 1992, less than 5 percent of all federal convictions were for immigration crimes (Light et al., 2014). By 2015 federal immigration offenses accounted for 29 percent of all federal convictions, second only to drug convictions at 32 percent (US Sentencing Commission, 2016). And although several sectors have recently discontinued Operation Streamline due to a precipitous drop in unauthorized immigration, these sectors continue to convict border crossers of unlawful entry and unlawful reentry on an individual basis in a more traditional legal setting through “fast‐track” proceedings (US Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Fast‐track sentencing allows federal prosecutors to “offer a below‐Guidelines sentence in exchange for a defendant’s prompt guilty plea and waiver of certain pretrial and post‐conviction rights” (Gorman, 2010, p. 479). Fast‐track sentencing may reduce the length of sentences associated with federal immigration crimes, but it also ensures that d istrict courts process more cases and secure more guilty pleas. Operation Streamline has been widely questioned and condemned by advocates and nongovernmental organizations, but has received relatively little attention from social scientists (for exceptions see Amuedo‐Dorantes & Pozo, 2014; Lydgate, 2010; Martínez & Slack, 2013; Migration and Refugee Services [MRS]/United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB], & Center for Migration Studies [CMS], 2015). Operation Streamline has been criticized for violating migrants’ constitutional right to due process and for diverting federal resources away from the prosecution of more serious crimes such as human and drug smuggling (Lydgate, 2010). Others have called attention to the ways in which the program serves the economic interests of private corporations that have secured federal contracts to house immigrants in detention facilities (Martínez & Slack, 2013; MRS/USCCB, & CMS, 2015).


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Critical scholars and immigrant rights groups have also pointed to the possible unintended negative social consequences of processing largely economic migrants as criminals through Operation Streamline and incarcerating them alongside more serious criminal offenders (Martínez & Slack, 2013). Government official have also questioned the program’s effectiveness. A recent report by the US Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General criticized Operation Streamline for not collecting sufficient data to be able to track the long‐term deterrent effect of the program. In other words, information has not been adequately collected to be able to measure the impacts of the program on people’s likelihood to remigrate. In a similar vein, the costs of the program have not been disaggregated from other enforcement measures, making it impossible to determine the cost‐benefit ratio of the program. Moreover, the program does not offer agents guidance in terms of how to ensure that asylum seekers are treated in accordance with international treaty obligations (US Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Despite these broad critiques, there have been few empirical studies describing the profiles of people who have actually been prosecuted through Operation Streamline and detailing the way in which they are affected or impacted. Deportations from the United States have clearly increased over the past 10 years. The mass deportation regime has been set in motion by several important policy changes, namely the devolution of immigration enforcement from the federal to local level, the increased criminalization of immigration, and more recently, the increased use of zero‐tolerance programs near the border such as Operation Streamline. Nevertheless, there has been limited empirical scholarship exploring the impact of the shift in these enforcement procedures on unauthorized Mexican immigrants (Amuedo‐Dorantes & Pozo, 2014), and even less scholarship that has actually conducted surveys with people who were processed through programs such as Secure Communities or Operation Streamline. Who exactly is being processed through these programs? To what extent are they socially connected to the United States? Do they intend to return to the United States post‐deportation? In what follows, we address these questions by drawing on the second wave of the Migrant Border Crossing Study to examine the characteristics of individuals who were caught through interior immigration enforcement efforts (e.g., Secure Communities), as well as those who were processed through Operation Streamline. Currently there is very little information about the actual process dictating why certain people are selected for these immigration enforcement programs. Addressing these questions will give scholars and policymakers a better understanding of the mechanisms of criminalization and help us understand who is being disproportionately affected. We assert that these programs largely impact people with strong social ties to the United States, particularly those with US citizen children as well as those who consider their home to be located in the United States. However, before doing so, we provide a demographic profile of the typical MBCS respondent and describe their most recent migration, apprehension, and deportation/repatriation experience.

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The Migrant Border Crossing Study Mexicans represent roughly 70 percent of all immigrants deported from the United States each year (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b). We examine the characteristics of unauthorized Mexican migrants deported as a consequence of interior immigration enforcement efforts (e.g., Secure Communities) and zero‐ tolerance policies near the border (e.g., Operation Streamline) as well as those who were likely granted a “voluntary return” by drawing on data gathered through the second wave of the Migrant Border Crossing Study (N = 1,109). Unlike other surveys of recently deported migrants, the MBCS is able to specifically identify migrants who were processed through one of these programs. The MBCS is an unprecedented cross‐sectional survey of Mexican migrants who attempted an unauthorized border crossing and were apprehended by any US authority or who succeeded in traversing the border but were eventually caught via interior enforcement efforts and ultimately returned to Mexico. Interviews were completed with migrants in person at ports of entry and in migrant shelters immediately following respondents’ most recent repatriation experience. We selected shelters that work directly with the Mexican government (although none were government owned), because Mexican authorities directly transport migrants to these shelters from ports of entry upon repatriation, thus providing the most representative sample. The MBCS limits its sample frame to individuals 18 years of age or older, who had not previously been interviewed for the study, who crossed the US–Mexico border without authorization post‐September 11, 2001, and who had been deported to Mexico within one month of the interview (Slack, Martínez, Whiteford, & Peiffer, 2013). Potential study participants were randomly selected using a spatial sampling technique, screened for eligibility, and invited to participate if they met the eligibility requirements. These criteria were established to allow for reasonable comparison between cases within a specific timeframe, most notably during an era of increased border and immigration enforcement. Interviews lasted around 45 minutes and were completed in Spanish by graduate students and professional interviewers. The response rate for the survey was approximately 94 percent. As illustrated in Figure 8.2, the surveys were completed in Tijuana and Mexicali, Baja California; Nogales, Sonora; Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Mexico City between 2010 and 2012, with the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of interviews being completed in 2011. All respondents surveyed in Mexico City had participated in the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program, which provides flights to Mexico City among an eligible subsample of people apprehended in the Tucson sector during the summer. Of all migrants repatriated to Mexico in 2011, 66 percent were returned to one of these six cities (Slack et al., 2013). And although surveys were only carried out in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the southern border, all sectors are represented in the survey in terms of where recently deported migrants had attempted their most


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N

Yuma El Centro

San Diego Tijuana Mexicali

Tucson

Nogales

El Paso Marfa

Ciudad Juárez

Legend

Del Rio

Nuevo Laredo

Mexican border cities

Laredo

Rio Grande Valley

Border Patrol sectors on the US–Mexico border

Figure 8.2 Map of Mexican Border Cities and Border Patrol Sectors. Source: Rolando Diaz Caravantes, El Colegio de Sonora, Mexico.

recent border‐crossing attempt. The MBCS is therefore generalizable to repatriated Mexican migrants to the six study cities during the study period.

Results Demographic Profile of Repatriated Mexican Migrants Table 8.1 provides an overview of the demographic profile of MBCS respondents. The typical respondent can be described as a male (90 percent), between the ages of 18 and 34 (61 percent), from West‐Central or Southern Mexico (61 percent), with about eight years of formal educational attainment, whose household earned about $350 dollars in monthly income before migrating to the United States. Just less than half lived in households with three‐to‐four other individuals, excluding the respondent. Forty‐two percent noted that they were the sole economic provider for their household. Consistent with the extant migration literature, about 72 percent indicated they had left Mexico the last time they were living there due to economic reasons.

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Table 8.1 Selected Demographic Characteristics of MBCS Sample Characteristic Gender Male Female Age 18–24 years 25–34years 35–44years 45+ years Region of origin in Mexico North West‐Central (“traditional”sending‐region) Central South Language use (in addition to Spanish) Indigenous Language Speaker English Language Proficient Educational attainment Household income Household size (not including respondent) 0 people 1–2 people 3–4 people 5–7 people 8+ people Sole economic provider of household? Reason for leaving Mexico Economic Social Other Social ties to the United States Lived in US? Years lived in United States Family members with citizenship? US citizen child? US citizen spouse? Home in US?

Percent/Mean 90% 10% 22% 39% 30% 9% 20% 35% 19% 26% 8% 11% 8.1 years $346 6% 13% 48% 24% 9% 42% 72% 10% 17% 75% 8.8 years 49% 41% 17% 30%

Source: Migrant Border Crossing Study, second wave (weighted). Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

MBCS respondents, like many repatriated Mexican migrants, possess strong social ties to the United States. Seventy‐five percent had lived in the United States at some point in their life for an average of nine years. Nearly half indicated that they had at least one US citizen family member. Among MBCS respondents with US


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citizen family members, 41 percent stated they had a child with citizenship and 17 percent a spouse with citizenship. When asked if they considered their current home to be located in the United States or Mexico, 30 percent reported that their home was in the United States, with this share increasing to 40 percent among those with prior lived US experience.

Border‐Crossing Experience Table 8.2 describes MBCS respondents’ border‐crossing experiences. In terms of lifetime crossing attempts, only 16 percent of respondents were first‐time border crossers, while 59 percent had attempted to cross the border two to five times, 11 percent six to nine times, and 15 percent ten times or more. As noted in prior research, migrants’ cumulative lifetime crossing attempts generally exceed the number of times they have been apprehended, which suggests people continue to try to cross until they successfully reach their desired destination in the United States. When asked when they most recently crossed the border, 85 percent indicated they had done so sometime between 2009 and 2012, 11 percent between 2005 and 2008, and 4 percent between 2001 and 2004. In other words, the overwhelming majority of MBCS respondents had crossed the border in an era of increased border and immigration enforcement as well as after the 2008 Great Recession. Among our sample, 32 percent indicated that their most recent crossing attempt had taken place in the US Border Patrol’s Tucson Sector, 24 percent in the Laredo Sector, 17 percent in the San Diego Sector, and 11 percent in the Rio Grande Valley Sector. Most (73 percent) relied on a coyote (human smuggler) to cross the border, agreeing to pay on average $2,313 dollars for their services. Typically, respondents walked for about two days before either being apprehended by US authorities or picked up by a raitero (driver) and proceeding to the next stage of their journey. In terms of the geographic variation in migrants’ desired US destinations, 49 percent indicated they were trying to reach a destination in the West (e.g., California, Arizona),while 38 percent were on their way to a destination in the South (e.g., Texas, Florida). Thirty‐nine percent reported reaching their desired destination, while 61 percent were apprehended by US authorities before arriving.

Apprehension and Repatriation Experience Give the selection criteria used in the second wave of the MBCS, all respondents had attempted an unauthorized border crossing along the US–Mexico border, were apprehended by US authorities, and ultimately repatriated to Mexico. In other words, each respondent had at least one experience being apprehended and physically removed from the country, either through a formal removal (e.g., deportation) or voluntary return. As noted in Table 8.3, 24 percent of the respondents had been

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Table 8.2 Migration Experience among MBCS Sample Variable Number of lifetime crossing attempts First‐time crosser 2–5 times 6–9 times 10+ times Number of lifetime apprehensions Once 2–5 times 6–9 times 10+ times Year of most recent crossing 2001–2004 2005–2008 2009–2012 Sector of most recent crossing San Diego El Centro Yuma Tucson El Paso Big Bend Del Rio Laredo Rio Grande Valley Mode of crossing Coyote Family or Friends (but no coyote) Alone Coyote fee (among coyote users) Days spent crossing Region of desired US destination West Midwest Northeast South Succeeded in reaching desired destination?

Percent/Mean 16% 59% 11% 15% 25% 58% 9% 8% 4% 11% 85% 17% 9% 0% 32% 3% 0% 2% 24% 11% 73% 17% 10% $2,313 2.2 days 49% 9% 4% 38% 39%

Source: Migrant Border Crossing Study, second wave (weighted). Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

processed through Operation Streamline, which includes a formal removal and carries additional criminal consequences for “subsequent reentry owing to the fact of the removal” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016b, Table 39). In other words, immigrants who have been processed through Operation Streamline face


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Table 8.3 Recent Apprehension and Repatriation Experience among MBCS Sample Variable Enforcement program Operation Streamline Interior Enforcement (e.g., Secure Communities) Mistreatment by US authorities Verbal abuse Physical abuse Sent to detention after apprehension? Length of detention 4–30 days 31–60 days 61–90 days 91+ days Did you sign documents prior to repatriation? Did someone explain to you what you were signing? Did you feel that your were forced to sign the documents? What documents did you signed? Deportation Voluntary Return Expedited Removal Don’t Know Sector of repatriation DF (Mexican Interior Repatriation Program) San Diego El Centro Yuma Tucson El Paso Big Bend Del Rio Laredo McAllen Lateral repatriation Possessions taken and not returned prior to repatiration?1 Repatriated between 10 PM and 5 AM? Were you assaulted, robbed, or kidnapped after being repatriated

Percent/Mean 24% 25% 20% 12% 39% 45% 13% 18% 24% 96% 72% 33% 38% 33% 1% 28% 2% 17% 24% 2% 17% 3% 0% 0% 34% 1% 13% 27% 20% 7%

Does not include food or water. Source: Migrant Border Crossing Study, second wave (weighted). 1

further criminalization and likely incarceration if they attempt to reenter the United States without authorization and are caught. About a quarter (25 percent) reported they had been apprehended by local law enforcement officials and subsequently turned over to immigration authorities through an interior immigration

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enforcement program (most likely Secure Communities). Consistent with prior research and reports by immigrant rights group, we found systemic problems with migrants being mistreated by US authorities while in custody. For example, 20 percent reported having experienced verbal abuse (e.g., racist, homophobic, sexist remarks or sexual harassment), while 12 percent experienced some form of physical abuse (e.g., excessive use of force or physical blows). We were also interested in differentiating between short‐term detention (up to three days) and long‐term detention (four days or longer) (Table 8.3). If a migrant is apprehended by US Border Patrol and granted a “voluntary return,” processing time can regularly take up to 72 hours. Nearly 40 percent indicated they were detained by immigration officials for more than three days, most likely in an immigration detention facility, federal prison, or local jail. Among those who were held in long‐term detention, 45 percent were held for 4–30 days, 13 percent for 31–60 days, 18 percent for 61–90 days, and 24 percent for 91 days or longer. The increased criminalization of immigration law and the myriad of agencies and institutions involved in immigration enforcement have led to a complex system that is often difficult for migrants to understand. For instance, when asked if they signed any documents while in US custody, 96 percent of respondents noted they had, with only 72 percent noting that someone explained to them what they were signing, and 33 percent expressing that they felt forced to sign the documents. When asked what documents they signed, 38 percent indicted they had signed a deportation, 33 percent a voluntary return, and 1 percent an expedited removal. Nearly one in three stated that they did not know what they signed. Nevertheless, there was clear confusion on the part of migrants in terms of what exactly they were signing. For example, 27 percent of people processed through Operation Streamline, which results in a formal removal, thought they had signed a voluntary return, while 24 percent did not know what they had signed. This is problematic not only because removals carry harsher penalties for subsequent reentry when compared to voluntary returns, but also because people processed through Operation Streamline are convicted of either unlawful entry (8 USC § 1325), which is a misdemeanor, or unlawful reentry (8 USC § 1326), which is a felony. Although all immigrants processed through Operation Streamline have the right to legal counsel, these inconsistencies seriously call into question the quality of the legal representation they receive. In terms of the geographic variation, 34 percent of respondents stated they were returned to a Mexican border town corresponding to the Laredo Sector of the Border Patrol on the US side, 24 percent were repatriated to the El Centro Sector, and 17 percent to the San Diego Sector. Among recent border‐crossers (i.e., those who didn’t make it to their desired destinations), 13 percent noted they were deported to a sector other than the one through which they had crossed, which suggests they were processed through the Alien Exit and Transfer Program. We also found notable issues pertaining to the handling of migrants’ personal belongings during apprehension, processing, detention, and repatriation. Twenty‐ seven percent of respondents noted that they had their possessions taken and not


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returned prior to being repatriated to Mexico, including identifying documents and money. For example, among those who were carrying some form of Mexican identification when they were apprehended, approximately 66 percent of respondents, 19 percent noted that they had their documents taken and not returned. Nevertheless, this is much more prevalent among people who are processed through Operation Streamline, caught through Secure Communities, or sent to long‐term detention. For instance, 30 percent of people processed through Operation Streamline had their identifying documents taken and not returned compared to 15 percent of those not processed through the program (p