1 THE ROLE OF INFORMAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN TRADING AND M ARKET SECURITY: THE CASE OF ACIDA LIVESTOCK MARKET IN SOKOTO Dr Fatima L Adamu Dept of Sociology Usmanu Dan Fodiyo University Sokoto
[email protected] * This paper was developed under a networked research programme funded by the UK Department for International Development. The paper provides the views of the authors only and not necessarily those of the other contributors to the programme or the funder. The Department for International Development can accept no responsibility for any information provided or views expressed.
1.1 INTRODUCTION Traditional forms of production and marketing have been the dominant feature of Nigerian livestock commodity and they operate at two levels. At one level are millions of individual and household producers who own a few sheep, goats and poultry and supply the market to supplement their income. At the second level are cattle holders (mostly Fulani), who owned large herds of cattle for supply into the market. The trading and marketing side of the livestock is dominated by the Hausas both at local and national levels. It is within the dominance of this dual group, Fulani and Hausas in the Nigerian livestock production and distribution that Sokoto region dominated by the two groups becomes relevant. Sokoto region (comprising of Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states) is a major supplier of livestock for the country’s meat and leather needs on which the majority of Nigerians depended on for their protein intake. The dominance of the Hausas in market and trading activities is not restricted to the livestock commodity or within Nigeria. The settlements of Hausa traders located across West African countries and their impact on the existing local market and trading activities have been well documented (Adamu, 1978 and Hill, 1972). The Hausa traders are known to have dominated trade in some commodities and impacted on the trading practices of such commodit ies as grains, vegetables, Kola nut and livestock across the country. Thus, Hausa traditional market institutions (norms and structures) are found in the above commodities chains and their impact stretch beyond Nigeria (Adamu, 1978). It is the importance of these informal institutions in livestock marketing and trading in Nigeria that is the concern of this research. What is the nature of livestock marketing and trade in Nigeria? What are the institutions and actors involved? What roles do they play? How do these institutions and actors influence livestock trade, thereby impacting on its availability in the Nigerian markets and its accessibility to the Nigerian poor? To answer these research que stions, Acida Livestock market with particular focus on cattle was selected for in-depth study. It is the biggest livestock destination from neighbouring Niger Republic and villages/towns from Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi States as well as
2 livestock outlets in the region, supplying livestock to neighbouring markets as well as to other livestock markets across the country. The report of this study is presented in six sections. Section one introduces the research with back ground information on the nature of livestock trading and market presented in the second section of the report. The scope and methodology of the research is discussed in the 3rd and 4th sections of the report. Discussion on the findings of the research is presented in the fifth sector of the report, while the implications of the findings are presented in section six. 1.2 NATURE OF LIVESTOCK TRADE AND MARKETS IN NIGERIA This section provides information on the nature of livestock trading and marketing in Nigeria. Many factors such as individual actors, institutions and structures play major roles in determining the nature and dynamics of livestock trading and the operation of livestock markets in Nigeria. The dynamics and actors in livestock trading and market in Acida livestock market are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1. Figure 1: Livestock Trading Chain in Acida Kara Market Breeders
Rural Assembler
Acida Market
Dillali Breeder Retailer
Butcher Consumer
Dillali in a city livemrk
Consumer
Butcher
Consumer
Long distance trader
Dillali
Butcher
Consumer
Consumer
Consumer
3 Going by the cha in above, it is very clear that many actors and processes are involved in the livestock trade in Acida with the chain moving at different directions . Central to the livestock commodity chain in Hausa society is the Kara, a name for livestock market in Hausa. There is normally a Kara in every town or village. However, wit hin a region one kara may emerge as the dominant one, for which Acida market represents. At every kara are breeders who sell their livestock either to Assemblers, or bring it directly to the market. Sources of livestock in Acida kara are breeders from villages and towns of Niger republic, Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi states. Once in the market, the sale is done by a Dillali (dillalai- plural, dillanci the system or practice) for a commissioned fee. The sale could be done either direct to a consumer, to a whole seller, to a butcher or to a long distance trader. At what ever stage, we have the drovers (Yan’kora,) who transport the livestock by foot to the abattoir, to the resident of a buyer or to the long distance trade section of the market for loading to other markets. A whole seller would establish another chain at Sokoto and other towns Kara markets. For the long distance trader, other actors come in the chain for the purpose of transportation. Once in another market say in Ibadan a similar chain is established.
Another central institution is the dillanci practice found at every stage of the livestock chain both in Sokoto region and beyond. It is one of the Hausa traditional trading institutions that spread beyond Hausa society. According to Madhin (2003 and 2001) the dillanci practice or system has played a major role in food trade of the western Sudan and they are linked to the presence of Hausa traders. From the above explanations , it is very clear that many actors are involved beyond the chain above. The actors are presented in Table 1 below. Table 1- Actors in Acida Kara Market Actors
Local Terms
Roles
Characters of the Actors Breeders Ma kiyaya Producers of livestock Men & women, Hausa and Fulani Brokers Dillalai Connecting sellers and buyers- Men, Hausa selling to buyers at a % commission Transport Yan’kwamishon Linking long distance traders Men, Hausa Commissioned with drivers. Mostly retired agents. Also act drivers. as NURTW Long distance Falake Transport to sell livestock at a Men, Hausa, traders long distance market Fulani Whole sellers Yan Kasuwa Buy and sell in bulk Men, multiple ethnic groups Retailers Masu Saye da Buy and Sell in smaller Men, Hausa,
4 Sayarwa Drovers
Loaders Guardsmen
Miyyati Allah
Butcher chief
Consumers
Fulani Chief
Butcher Vigilante Vetinary/health officer
Police
quantity
few Yoruba and Igbo Yan’kora They are transporters of Young Men, livestock by foot for loading Fulani and within the market or to various Hausa destinations out of the market. Yan,lodi They load and off- load the Men, Hausa animals into a trailer Yan’gadi Those who spend the night in Men, Hausa, the market to guard the cattle Fulani pending the time of transportation. Kungiyan A Fulani socio-economic Men, Fulani Fulani organisation that facilitate interactions between the Fulanis and other ethnic groups and actors in the market Sarkin Pawa Responsible for the Abattoir, Man, Hausa, meat sections of the market and the activities of the butchers and facilitates interaction between butchers and meat consumers relationships. He is the overall chief in the market and therefore manages the affairs of the market in consultation with other authorities in the market Masu saye Buy and consumers of meat Men and women of all tribes Ardo (in Fulbe) The chief of fulanis in Acida Men, Fulani who is also the town and doubled in the Chairman of the market as Chairman of the Kara market market Ma hauchi Who slaughters and sells meat Men, Hausa in the market Yan’banga Provide security in the market Men, Hausa Malamin A veterinarian officer who Man, dabbobi supervise the health of Hausa/Fulani animals and the safety of the meat in the market Yan’sanda Provide security in the market Men of all tribes
5 Food sellers
Masu Abinci
Sell cooked food and snacks prepared from the home and hawked by the girls or prepared in the market by both men and women.
The girls are generally Hausas, while the snack and meal cooked in the market are made mostly by Hausa and Yoruba women and men
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY Going by the above, it is very clear that livestock trading in Nigeria operates within the informal sector. The actors involved, the trading processes and the operation of the livestock market have remained in the hand of the informal sector. There is little evidence of formalities. The Local Government Authority visits the market, in most cases to collect revenue only. There are various sources of revenue for the Local Government Authority such as collection of revenue at the gate, dues from the members of the various institutions in the market such as dillalai and yan’kwamishon. Police have just been recently called in temporarily by the Sarkin Pawa because of increase in pick pocketing in the market. Another formal structure operating in the market is the Vetinary officer. Thus, the role of informal and formal actors and institutions in the overall livestock trading and market is diverse and overwhelming. The general aim of this study therefore is to research into the roles of these informal institutions within the Kara market. By Informal institution we mean the rules of the game within which market operates. They are norm-based institutions. They include actors, structures, the norms, convention etc that provide structures for transactions within the market. The info rmal institutions are the ones generally available within the market and are more likely to be utilised by the poor because of their simplicity, familiarity, and cost less. They are the main sources of market and trading information, provide credit and market security, enforce trade agreement and resolve conflict. Because of the broad and diverse roles/coverage of the informal institutions, we focused specially on their roles in providing security in the market. What security outfits and problems exist in the market and in livestock trading in Nigeria? Who are the actors? What roles do the informal institutions play? How do they regulate market practices? How do they relate with the formal institutions in the market? How do they impact on meat accessibility to the Nigerian poor in terms of its availability and price?
1.4 M ETHODOLOGY As earlier mentioned, the objective of this research is to have an understanding of the operation of livestock market and trading, particularly the role of informal institutions in the provision of market and trading security. The issue of market and trading security is vital not only in providing security and a safe market environment for people and for businesses to flourish, but also because of its direct linkages with other trading and
6 marketing operations such as transportation, market information and labour market. To be able to have an understanding of these complex social issues and the fact that livestock trading and marketing has remained within the informal sector, (both factors are difficult to quantify) the methodology used for this study is qualitative. Qualitative method is used to enable us not only understand the actors and the nature of their interactions in the markets, but also to understand the processes and dynamics of livestock markets. The sampling techniques used in the selection of our informants were two. First, the informants were selected purposively on the basis of certain characteristics such as those involved in market security. Market and trad ing security operate at two levels- within the market and in the processes of transporting goods to the market. People of different social backgrounds such as those occupying leadership positions and those who do not were purposively sought out and interviewed. Other relevant characteristics such as ethnicity and gender were also considered in the sampling. Secondary literature and the experience of the researcher in the environment and in market research have provided us with information on the possible actors in the market. So, possible actors in market security were identified prior to visit to the market for interview. However, the above secondary information was inadequate. In our first visit to the market, new actors were identified and added into the list of actors. Going by the relevant actors identified, a total of 28 people that are relevant for security in the market and in the overall livestock trading, particularly in the area of transportation were interviewed. Table 2 in the appendix provides list of our informants. Snowballing technique was also used in a limited way to seek the leaderships in the market. The sarkin Pawa was first identified for interview and permission and he later introduced us to other officials of the markets. The sarkin pawa also introduced us to his lieutenants or assistants. Similar process applied to the transportation section of the market where the chairman of the long distance traders introduced the researcher to other traders and members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers. For the collection of data, three methods were used. The first one was the lurking approach to act as a pilot. The market was visited to familiarise myself with the environment and also to observe what is happening in order to sharpen and refine the research methodology. This approach proved useful in modifying the list of actors drawn and in redefining the research to include the issue of transportation as a focal area of the research. The second data collection technique used was unstructured interview. List of issues for interview such as Market operations, views on market actors and structures, transportation of livestock, trading of livestock, security in the market and on the road etc were identified and the informants were allowed to talk freely on the issues in relation to security. The questions were open and probing. The interview situation was very informal except during the interview with the Sarkin Kasuwa. The last technique of data collection used was secondary materials from the market such as notices and published materials on market operations. The analysis of the data is descriptive using qualitative technique of data analysis and presentation such as field notes, case studies, quotes and documentation of local phrases
7 and key concepts in the research. The presentation of the findings is done or organised on the basis of four focal areas- Structure of the Acida Kara Market, Trading activities in the market, Transportation of the livestock and security situations within and beyond the market. On the basis of the research findings, conclusion and policy implications were drawn and presented. Social research has a social world of its own where the environment of the research, the researched and the researcher do have impact on the quality and quantity of information collected. For example, the socio-economic position of the researcher such as ethnicity, religion, gender, class can be a hindrance or a facilitator in a research setting. For this research the researcher’s status as a woman was anticipated to be a hindrance. So, the researcher’s husband contacts in the market were capitalised. He made contacts and other underground work as well as linked up the researcher with one of the actors in the market. This enables the researcher to have access to the gatekeepers of the market. Feeling that the gender of the researcher may inhibit them from talking freely, a male research assistance always opened the discussion and intervened when the researcher wants to add a question or probe an issue. However, other factors work to the researchers favour such as coming from the area and therefore familiar with the phrases used in the discussion as well as the social relationships of the area. For example, the researcher exploited the system of joking relationships in Hausa society to get my informant to relax. For instance, the researcher claimed to be a blacksmith because of the joking relationship that exists between the Blacksmith and Butchers and also that the researcher’s husband is Fulani, to allow for the establishment of informal and jovial environment during the interview with the Fulani. However, as a member of the Hausa culture the researcher has to observe certain decorum and respect while interviewing the Sarkin Fulani/Pawa which made the interview with them stiff and formal.
1.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATIONS This section provides an analysis of the data collected in the field and is divided into five subsections. The first section discusses the structure and operations of the Acida Kara market; and it is followed by presentation on trading practices in the market. The third section presents an analysis of the linkages between trading practices and the transportation arrangement in and outside the market. Analysis of the security situation and provision in the market is presented in the last part of the section.
1.5.1 Operations of the Market There are two forms of market in Hausaland- Markets for every commodity and specific commodity based market. The features of the general markets are; that they operate daily, transact in all sorts of goods and are located in towns and cities. While the commodity based markets transact in single commodity and its related components, they generally operate on a weekly or forth nightly basis and are located in villages or towns. Acida market is one example of such single commodity market. It is a livestock market (Livestock market is called Kara in Hausa, thus the market is referred to as Acida Kara) and it operates every Wednesdays. The market is organised into sections - the section of
8 cattle, sheep and goats, Donkeys, camels and horse, butchers, Abattoir, transportation section, food sellers, grilled and roasted meat and offices. Historically market is viewed as a political, commercial and social centre in Hausa land and was therefore located at the centre of the town, close to the Emirs palace. Its operational structure follows the same Hausa political structure (Furnis, 1996, Adamu, 1978). In the village or town are the Sarki and his titled council members with different levels of authority and jurisdiction. This hierarchical structure is replicated at the different guilds and organisations that existed and still exist in Hausaland. Thus, we have sarkin Noma, Makera, Aski, Pawa, Kasuwa etc (Chief of the farmers, blacksmith, Berbers, Butchers, Market respectively) and their titled council members such as Waziri, Dangaladima and Barade. Acida market has similar operational structures. Outside the market is Maigarin Acida (Sarkin Acida ) - one of the traditional royalty that have responsibility over the whole of Acida town and its environs. Within the Acida Kara market we have the Sarkin Kasuwa who double as Sarkin Pawa (butchers) and his council members comprising leaderships of all the different actors/components of the market such as the fulanis (Ardo) who doubled as the chairman of the market, transporters (shugaban kwamishon), brokers (shugaban dillalai) etc. The components of the markets are again structured in similar pattern. The structure of authority in the market is arranged in a similar hierarchical manner and is presented in a chart below Figure 2: Structure of Acida Market Authority
Sarkin Kasuwa/Pawa Butcher
Sarkin Fulani
Shuagaban Yan’kwamisho
Shugaban Dillalai
Breeders
Transport workers
Commissioned agents
Some of the above positions are hereditary and appointed by the Sarkin Acida (village head of Acida) such as Sarkin Pawa. The Chairman of the market, leadership of transporters, commissioned agents (dillalai) are elected by members and endorsed by the Sarkin Pawa. According to the Sarkin Pawa, membership to the market associations is open to everybody through registration and payment of dues. In terms of the structure and operation of the Acida market certain issues are worth noting.
9
1
2
3
4
5
There are certain external institutions/actors whose presence may or may not be visible in the market, yet they have profound influence on the operation and security at the market. They are the Village head of Acida, the Local Government Authority, the Police force and the Vigilante group. These institutions in collaboration with the institutions within the market ensure the smooth running of the market. Some of the market institutions appear to be in transition. Those that are able to organise themselves may be trans formed from traditional institutions into formal ones, but still retaining the traditional function of the institutions, hence referred here as semi- formal. The transformation is necessary because of changes in scope of their activities (covering more then northern part of the country) and their source of legitimacy (beyond power of the Hausa traditional authority). Such institutions as Miyyati Allah and Road Transport workers performing the functions of Ardo and Dan-kwamishon but in a different name and operating in a different format. Such positions have been formalised with elections and written rules and regulations governing the conduct of their activities. For instance, the institution of Yan’kwamishon has been part of the traditional Hausa structure, however, with the establishment of national union of transporters, the institution transformed itself into such a union. However, the Associations of long distance traders (Fatake) are in the process of such transition and have been trying to get its association registered as a union for over ten years, but they are not successful. So, they have to continue operating within the traditional structure which is limited to local environment and which make it difficult for them to lobby and take action nationally. Some of the above structures are hereditary, others are not. The sarkin Fulani and Sarkin pawa said they inherited the positions from their families and they expect the positions to remain within the ir families. While the chairmanship of transport and commissioned agents are not hereditary, and do not expect the positio ns to remain in their families even though the uncle of one of them had held similar position. Women as a group is completely absent in the market structures. They exist as food sellers, the business of cooking of snacks and meals, the preserve of women is being shared by the two sexes as well as other ethnic groups. There exist no consumer group or structure in the market. Some of the institutions in the market are expected to protect the interest of the market consumers according to many of my informant. The chairman of the market and the sarki Kasuwa are there to protect the interest of both the consumers and the traders. Sarkin Pawa is responsible for complaints from consumers on meat, Shugaban dillalai is responsible for complaints from livestock owners as regards to payment of livestock etc. The conflict of interest that is likely to emerge as a result of the Sarkin pawa position in protecting the interest of both the butchers and the consumers seems to be neutralised through the people’s perception of the Sarki as father of everybody. This observation is supported by secondary data where Adamu (1978:12) observes that one of the basic characteristics of the market system in Hausaland “was and still is the strict observance by the buyers and
10 sellers of the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa appointed by the chief of the town”. From the foregoing discussions it is evident that both formal and informal institutions operate in the market and they are presented in the table below. Table 3 Market Institutions in Acida Kara Market Formal
Semi- formal
-Local Government -Miyyati Allah -Police -Road Workers -Ministry of Union Agriculture
Informal
Norms/practices
-Traditional Authorities -Long distance traders -Dillanci -Commissioned agency -Vigilante
-Trust -Dillanci (brokerage) -System of La’ada -System of Reciprocity -System of Patronage/clientele -System of Heritage ship
As the table indicates, there are three formal institutions operating in the market. The Local government Authority und er whose jurisdiction the Acida market operates. The local Government Authority has an officer who collects revenue in the market. The Authority is also responsible for infrastructural provision in the market. Another government agency operating in the market is a livestock officer who monitors the health and safety of livestock and meat. The semi formal institutions are Trade based organisations that are established and registered by the government to provide support to and protect the interests of its members. Such institutions include Miyyati Allah, an Association of Cattle rearers and Road Transport Workers. Miyyati Allah is an association of cattle breeders mostly dominated by the Fulani. Membership of the association is opened to all ethnic groups according to its chairman. The Association functions in all major cities of Nigeria where livestock passes through or where trading in livestock exists. Thus, Miyyati Allah association is commonly found in most of the livestock markets in Nigeria. Leadership of the Association is elected and they perform several functions such as mediating between the livestock breeders and other stakeholders involve in livestock trade, providing security in livestock markets. In Acida Kara for example, the Association charges N20 for every cattle sold in the market. The table also indicates overlapping relationships among the existing institutions in the market. For instance, the police visit the market only at the request of the Sarkin kasuwa, or if there is a security concern or complain from citizens. Otherwise the police maintain a distance from the market. Similar co-operation exist between the Local Government Authority and the Traditional Authority as presented in box 1. Box 1: Example of Co-operation among Institutions in Acida market The Chairman of the Miyyati Allah group in the market provided us with an example of the nature of the co-operation that exist among the market institutions. According to him, “there was a time when the market was congested with cattle, sheep and goats crammed in one place- as a result security and hygiene was difficult to maintain and crowd difficult to manage and control. The space was insufficient- so we called on to the Sarkin Pawa for the re-organisation of the market. He agreed and took the issue to His Royal Highness Dan Maliki and his highness took the issue to the Local Government Authority. The Authority then separated Cattle and
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1.5.2 Trading Practices in the Market Trading in Acida Kara market is carried out in livestock and in raw and grilled meat form. Other minor traders of food and snack and other goods also exist in the market. Central to the livestock trading is the institution of Dillanci. All livestock brought into the market either by breeders or merchants is handed over to a dillali for sale. The buyers range from housebound breeders, merchants, butchers, and individuals for family consumption and for food businesses. For each livestock sold, the dillali gets a fee. The fee is not fixed, but it is a requirement that a dillali is paid. The amount quoted ranges from N150-N250 for smaller remnants and N500-1500 for cattle depending on the size of the animal and what is negotiated. A dillali can transact in tens of livestock in every market, an average of 20 animals per market day was often quoted. On the basis of the market information on prices provided by the Dillali, the livestock owner fixes a minimum and a maximum fee for his livestock. The owner can decide to stay around or not, it does not make any difference. If a buyer comes, it is the dillali that negotiates the price and sells within the price fixed. If the market prices have fluctuated, the dillali seeks out the owner and informs him of the changes for a new price to be fixed or the owner may decline to sell. No sale is made without the consent of the livestock owner. All the dillalai in Acida kara are male because of the commodity (livestock) involved, for other commodities, there are female dillaliya in Hausa society that dominated marketing in female dominated commodities. To become a dillali in Acida market, one has to pass through the Sarkin Pawa for allocation of space in the market. The requirement to become a dillali includes the origin of the person, that is whether he or his family is well known and respected, the character of the person and the person has to be of relative means. A dillali plays a central role in Acida Kara market. According to almost all the informants, it is difficult, close to impossible to sell livestock in the market premise without using the dillali. All the spaces in the market is allocated to a dillali, who utilize his space to sell livestock. A livestock owner cannot have space within the market to transact trade with a buyer directly and selling outside the market is illegal. This therefore leaves the livestock owner little choice but to utilize the dillali. When the Sarkin pawa was asked abo ut the possibility of selling livestock without using the dillali he responded by saying that;
12 “No, whoever wants to sell livestock within the market premises will have to do it through a dillali. It is a law. Every selling or buying without dillali is illegal and therefore not acceptable”. The roles the dillalai played in Acida market are: First, they regulate livestock supply and demand in the market by provid ing price and other market information to livestock owners and buyers. Second, they provide informal security in cases of livestock lost, theft and death. Third, the livestock owner fetches high price for a livestock if sold through a dillali than without dillali. If sold without dillali people may suspect that the livestock is stolen or that the owner is hard pressed for cash and therefore price the animal very low. Dillalai are sources of revenue to the Local Government Authority where a dillali pays N100 per week. Lastly, they played a major role in settling disputes related to livestock transactio n.
Related to the system of dillanci is the practice of la’ada. La’ada is the commissioned fee paid to the dillali or any person that may have witnessed and contributed in the trading negotiations. In the past, at the final selling of a good, the decision may be taken whether it is going to be paid by the owner and therefore la’ada ciki (fee payment within the selling price) or by the buyer and therefore la,ada waje (fee payment out of selling price). However, with the expansion of Shariah to cover commercial and criminal law, the requirement to pay laada is discouraged in the market according to the Sarkin Pawa. It is optional rather than a requirement. The decision to pay and the amount to pay to people or person who witnesses a transaction is left at the discretion of the livestock owner. Central to the dillanci system and the entire trading practice is the issue of trust which is built, in the case of dillanci, on the basis of religion, language and family background . The trading exists without any formal or written agreement between the dillali and the livestock owner. The livestock owner must have trust on the dillali he met for the first time to hand him over his livestock for sale and to expect the dillali to pay him the correct selling price. Similarly, the dillali must have trust on the livestock owner not to hand him stolen livestock for sale. The effectiveness of the trust lies in the permanency and reliability of the dillanci and other commissioned systems. It is the responsibility of the market traditional authorities to ensure that such trust is not violated. For instance, many cases of the dillali paying money to the wrong owner is reported by our informants and the traditional market conventions and authorities require the dillali to pay the livestock owner and bears the cost of the duping. The role of dillali in mitigating transaction risks and costs is central in a market that is temporary, transitory and most of its customers are from distance areas. Cases of selling of stolen livestock are reported in the market. The dilali and the Dan kwamishon provide some elements of permanency and reliability in the market where people from far distance places come and go with their goods. Faulty good bought can be returned to the dillali who is a per manent figure in the market. Another important practice is the norm of reciprocity which acts as insurance policy for the livestock traders. There existed a practice of helping one another in a period of crisis
13 or calamity. A dillali who was duped was assisted by his fellow colleagues to raise money to pay the livestock owner so also a falke (long distance trader) who lost his whole capital to armed robbers. Related reciprocal norms existed in terms of taking over a customer from a fellow dillali or trader. In fact it is an offence in the market to draw a customer from a fellow trader and it is socially and economically costly for a trader to violate such reciprocal rules and conventions. He can be fined ostracized and even expelled from the market by Sarkin Pawa if he is found to maintain such habit. So these kinds of norms and conventions seem to manage competition between traders and therefore, ensure a healthy environment for trading in the market. An important reciprocal relationship that exists is over shelter. A dillali is able to hold onto his customers of long distance livestock traders through provision of free shelter to them. A livestock trader transporting livestock to a far away and foreign distance, would require an accommodation, market information, food, water and other logistics to effectively function. Such services are provided by a trader’s dillali. If the trader incurs some lost, or the market is saturated and therefore, the trader is not able to sell, the dillali can assist the trader with some part payment to enable the trader to go back home and return later after the animals have been sold by the dillali. After the animals are sold, the trader pays the dillali his fee according to the quality of services he receives. This system of shelter provision operates in all the livestock market Centres of the North and South. Perhaps another important trading practice is the patronage -clientele relationship that was part of Hausa social system. Market is not a free and equal environment, social stratification on the basis of patronage exists and both the patron and the clients are expected to conduct their activities within an acceptable practice. For one to become an established dillali he must work and operate under a more established dillali. The apprentice gets his skills, garnered his customers and builds his reputation as a trust worthy trader through relating with his patron. Most of the dillalai, Falake (long distance traders), transporters, butchers and so on have their own boys who assist them to conduct their businesses and in the process learn the tricks of livestock trading and build their networks. A master may have as high as 7 boys under him and do also assist their boys with credit and capital to start business. Obedience to establish traditional authority is an important norm that facilitates trading in the market. Every actor in the market is expected to obey the authority of the person above. The market customers are expected to accept the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa, similar expectations exist between a patron and his boy. Where the boy errs, it is the responsibility of the traditional authority to call the boy to order, discipline him and call the police if it is necessary. An informant said “all these boys you see in the market they assist us with our business- if they misbehave, it is we who call them to order and discipline them and they stop, but if they did not stop, they are taken to the police”. Phrases such as ‘my boys’ ‘our boys’, ‘this boy’s etc were used by many of the informants to describe their senior position in relation to their boys who are themselves traders in their own right. Once trading is transacted and livestock is bought the next task is the transportation of the livestock. How is livestock transport organised in the market?
14 1.5.3 Transportation of Livestock in the Market Informal and semi- formal institutions dominate livestock transportation in the market. Once a livestock is bought, it can be transported by foot by the ya’kora or by a lorry arranged by the yan’kwamishon (transport commissioned agents). The yan’kwamishon are mostly retired drivers and conductors. The yan’kora may transport livestock to a buyer’s car outside the market or to the resident of the buyer in a neighbour ing village or town. Livestock may come from as far places as Zamfara state and which may take yan’kora five to seven days to reach their destination. For instance, one of the yan’kora contends that it takes him 5 days to bring livestock from Sabon Birni in Zamfara state to the Acida market. Another form of transportation in the market is by cars and Lorries to neighbouring livestock markets and to long distance markets of Southern Nigeria. On the average, 10 lorries of different sizes leave Acida market for markets outside the Sokoto region. In terms of transportation cost, it costs N2000 as transport fare per cattle to the South. Other costs are levy paid to the union of transporters, Local Government, Acida market authority and payment of taxes at about 8 checkpoints from Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger States to Kogi, Kwara, Oyo and Lagos States. In each of the state, there is at least one checkpoint where revenue is collected ranging from N50-N100 per cattle. In fact tax, levy and other charges is a major complain among the livestock traders. Many actors are involved in the conduc t of livestock transportation business. The first actor is the long distance livestock trader called falke (falake, plural). The falke buys from Acida market and other neighbouring marke ts for sale markets in Southern Nigeria. After a purchase the falke informs his Dan’kwamisho of his or his group transport requirements. The livestock are looked after and guarded by the Maigadi until the following day for loading into the lorry the Dan’kwamisho has arranged. The Dan’kwamisho makes contact among his pool of lorry owners and drivers and negotiate with them on the fare on behalf of the trader. The dan’kwamisho performs similar function as that of the dillali such as mediating between livestock traders and drivers, provides security and insurance by settling the problem of stolen animals, issuing ticket to departing vehicle which is useful in the case of accident on the road or problem in area of destination etc. Every livestock originating from the market is to be transported through yan’kwamishon, unless by foot. Through his networks of road transport workers across the country and now facilitated by the mobile phones, the Dan’kwamisho would be able to provide the trader with price informatio n of all the livestock markets in the country. Armed with this information the trader can decide where to send his livestock to for sale. The livestock trader may or may not accompany the driver, but most of them said they select one of them to go with the animals but the person may not stay until all the livestock are sold. Some of the traders may return with the sales they have made before the week runs out to trade again in the Acida next market day, leaving the unsold livestock with a dillali to sell. Central to livestock transportation by road is masu lodi, that is, those who load and off load the livestock. Payment for the services of Yankwamisho, yanlodi, yankora are supposed to be a fixed fare, but the informality in the transactions has made most of the payment to be negotiated.
15 1.5.4 Market and Trading Security in Acida Kara Market The major focus of this study is the market security, particularly the role of informal institutions in market security in Acida market. The foregoing provided us wit h a picture of many informal institutions operating in the market, what roles do they play in providing market security? What is the security situation in the market? By security we mean both physical and transaction vulnerability in the conduct of livestock trading. Security in livestock trading is analysed at two levels- at the level of the markets and at transportation level. Market Security Security situation at the Acida market is reasonably good compared to the general security situation in the country. The physical side of the market security has improved since the walling and reorganization of the market according to the market officials. Before then, many of the informants narrate that the security situation in the market was bad. According to one: “We used to have insecurity when the market was an open spaceafter complain ts to the Sarki dan Maliki- he asked us to form a group and we did and he presented our case to the Local Government and that is how we got the market walled. Before then we had many cases of stolen cattle The present market security situation indicates that there are few cases of stolen livestock and this occurs mostly when the animals are being loaded into lorries. There are two ways in which the cattle are lost, the first is during the commotion that is associated with loading, somebody will just drive the livestock out of the market pretending the ownership of the animals. Before the owner realises that his animals are missing it is always too late. The second way is the animals themselves run away as a result of the commotion and they are hardly found . The informants and the officials of the market cannot give records of the number of times such incidence occurred last year and the number of cattle that were involved. As quoted by the informants the number of times this occurred in the last year ranged from 3 to 12 times. Similarly, the market officials did not disclose the exact number, claiming that it did happen several times, especially in recent years. The failure to collect accurate statistics on stolen animals could be attributed to one, the unwillingness of the officials to disclose the number of such cases for fear of the market loosing its reputation as a secured Kara market. Second, it is possible that the statistics are just not available considering the informality involved and the fact that no information on the market is recorded or documented. Whatever the reason for the nonexistence or non-release of information on stolen animals, it is apparent that it is a major area of concern to the officials of the market. Both the Sarkin Kasuwa, Chairman of the market and the livestock market traders have mentioned it as a major security problem. Throughout our discussions with the market officials concern over the problem of stolen animal was mentioned several times. They keep on coming to it as the following encounter with the chairman of the market indicatesQuestion: What is the security situation in the market?
16 Answer: We have problem of insecurity and livestock theft. Yes it is a major problem, we need it solved- people’s livestock are stolen regularly here we cannot allow it to continue. Question: How many cases of stolen animals did you have last year? Answer: I do not know, but it happens regularly Question: How many cattle were stolen? Answer: Oh many stolen- I cannot give the precise number but lots. Question: Why the insecurity? Answer: The reason is because all sort of people exist in the market- the good ones and the bad. That is why I mentioned earlier that once it is 7 pm everybody be sent out of the market leaving only the guards to guard the animals under the ir care. That is what I am proposing. Another area of security concern in the market is the incidence of stolen livestock brought into the market for sale. It was reported that in many cases stolen livestock are handed over to dillali for sale. Before the animal is sold, the owner may come to the market to check for his animal. In that situation the thief never shows up again and the dillali is implicated. Transaction related security problem involved duping of dillali. One of the dillalai explains it thus; “A person brings his livestock into the market- he gives it to a dillali who is to sell on his behalf. In the process problems occur. The dilali may not know that this is a stolen animal- many cases of that happen. Or a livestock owner gives his animal to dilali for sell- the owner may be moving with a thief- the dilali assumes they are together. The owner goes his own way to do other businesses. The thief hangs around - when a buyer comes and the price is being negotiated, the thief comes closer and acts as if the animal belongs to him by agreeing to the price- the dillali assumes they are together and hands over the money to the thief who runs away with the money. The cattle owner comes back and asked for the condition of his cattle and the dillali tells him that it has been sold, the owner demands for his money and the dillali says I have given it to the person you were together with. Then he will reply we were not together. You see the cattle owner will not agree, the dillali will have to pay the money. It is a risky business. Something has to be done about it”. Smaller actors in the market such as the yan’kora and masu gadi equally experience some level of insecurity. According to one of them; “That is the security problem- you buy a cattle and you arrange with the dan-kora to take it home for you. The dan-kora ties the animal waiting for the day time to transport the animal for you. He is gone somewhere before he comes back somebody has taken the animal away or got it loaded into a lorry. This happens. Hence, our call for an end to movement of animals in the night- either to go out or for loading.
17 The foregoing provides information on secur ity situation within the market, what about outside the market? Trading Security Trading security problems in Acida livestock market cover the insecurity experiences of livestock traders out of the market, particularly in transporting livestock to markets. Most of the informants consented that transporting the livestock to Acida market is secured. Few cases, of robbery, if any occur. However, transporting livestock to other states in the country, particularly to the South West is not secured. All the informants have one story to tell about their experiences or other people’s experiences with armed robbers on the road to Lagos, Warri or Ibadan. One of the informants explains the problem of insecurity in livestock long distance trading below. “Problem of transportation to the South is armed robbery, there are many cases of robbers on our roads. For instance, out of these lorries you see; at least one would encounter robbery on the road- it is a certainty. Robbers are many- they rob in the night, evening and the day time. Once you take your cattle to the Kurmi (South) to sell, you never know the money is yours until you get into your house. In as close as Sifawa (30 km away from Acida), our people were robbed of their money around 8 pm. That is on the part of cattle traders. For the drivers- the major problem is that since the drivers do not have money, and the robbers can not steal cattlethey beat up driver s, sometimes even kill them. In the past, they block the roads, and when the lorry falls down they attack. Now they are bolder. They come out and stand by the two sides of the road. The driver is driving, there is no blockage, and the next thing he hears is bullet hitting tires or the driver. Either way is problem. If it is the tire, the lorry comes down, and if it is the driver the same thing happens. If he has something they take the money, the remaining people in the lorry would run away into the bush. The cattle run into the bush too.” Another one narrates: “We have robbers on our roads, two months ago- we were stopped by robbers around 8.00 am along Zuru road. I lost over four hundred and 80 thousand Naira. We were 8 in number and we all lost money to the robbers. We use to take 20 cattle every market to the south, now we can hardly afford 5 cows. If no t because of the sutura (protection) of this business we would not have been able to have 5 animals to trade today”. Another problem as narrated by one informant is : “If there is any accident on the road our animals run away and we hardly find them. Five of my cattle disappeared last year after an accident and I am yet to get them. O ne of our boys even died” For the market securit y in the destination market, particularly the Southern cities of Nigeria, majority of the informants agreed that there is secur ity in many of the Southern
18 markets. One narrates that “there is no stealing in the Lagos kara- however, we have thieves who hang around watching you, watching the car you board. In the bush, they stop the car and then ask you to give them your money. You have no protection you have to give the money”.
Social Security and Insurance in Livestock Market and Trade From the foregoing it is evident that the livestock traders and consumers suffer loses as a result of insecurity in the market or on the road. How do they cope with such loses and how are they able to continue with the business? Is there any insurance arrangement (formal or informal) from which the traders can draw from? All the informants have indicated how insecure they feel towards their business and income as a result of robbery and duping in the market and on the road, yet none have sought for redress or to upset such loses through any formal means available such as banks and insurance. Once they incur some loss or misfortune in their trade, they seek solace in God. On what they do if they are duped or robbed of their capital or animals, they said they search, if they do not find their animal or money they resign to fate and seek for Allah’ s protection against another time. Resigning to God is perhaps the best way to cope with such misfortune in a system where the formal security system has failed to protect its citizens. This is perhaps the only response by a group of vulnerable traders who are powerless to do anything about insecurity on our roads. For practical purpose, informal means are use to serve as insurance for loses incurred through trading. Social networks and support from fellow traders and dillalai have pulled a number of the respondents from the brink of ruin. One of the informa nts quoted elsewhere describes such kind of support from fellow traders as sutura (cloth), signifying the protection, care, and status their network provides to one another. All the market Associations have the practice of helping one another in a period of crisis or calamity. If a member incurs any lost, he is assisted by his fellow colleagues either through a fixed amount charged to all members. The total amount raised is handed over to the affected person. If what is raised is inadequate, the association may lend the affected person some money to continue with the business. Thus, although majority of the livestock traders and drivers do not utilize formal insurance services for obvious reason of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system in Nigeria, they have nonetheless being able to utilize and benefit from informal insurance services from family, friends and importantly, association and its membership. 1.5.6 Role of Informal Institutions in Market and Trading Security in Acida Market. The informa l institutions engaged in market security are many and they can be classified into external agency like the Vigilante, Market traditional authorities (Sarki), and the internal market Associations such as Miyyati Allah, Yan’kwamisho, dillalai and the market workers such as yan’lodi, masu gadi and yan’kora. Each one of them contribute collectively or singly in market security in Acida kara.
19
Vigilante Yan’banga is a vigilante group that emerged in the mid 1980s to provide alternative security protection in the North because of the failure of the government security forces to deal with increasing security problems in the country. It is organised and managed by the community, under the authority of the traditional authorities. Majority of communities in the North fund and utilise the services of Yan’banga. The yan’banga in Acida provides security to Acida town and as the security situation in the market worsens, they were invited by the market traditional authorities to deal with the problem. The Acida vigilante group is inadequate to provide security in the market, so Yan’banga from neighbouring towns are invited to assist the Acida Yan’banga every market day. According to the Chairman of the Market as well as the Chairman of the Yan’banga in Acida, the Yan’banga provides security in the market by patrolling the market day to monitor and flush out suspected thieves. If a known thief is found in the market, he is asked to leave the market or apprehend ed and released at the end of the market day. The view of market customers on Yan,banga in the market ranges from indifference to support. There was only one informant with negative view on the security role of vigilante. He believes that security provision should be the role of the police, not the Yan’banga. However, for the majority of market users, yanbanga is a positive addition to the market security. In fact, they are preferred more than the police because of their closeness with the community. According to the market chairman “Dan’banga knows the bad eggs more than we (market customer) do because they interact with them outside the market. They know them and they ask them to leave the market or hand them over to the police. Similarly, a long distance trader said “we prefer the yan’banga than the police because the yan’banga are community members and therefore know the bad eggs in our midst, hence, they are likely to be more effective. It was when yan’banga starts operating in this market that theft reduced”. People have confidence on the yan’banga because of the belief that the yan’banga use charms for protection against fire arms. In fact, one of the dan’banga interviewed appealed for assistance from the public for funding to pay for such charms as it is now more expensive to pay for such charms. The above statement is confirmed by the Chairman of the Yan’banga. He states that “whoever said there is no yan’banga in this market is telling lies. There was a time in this market when people were forcefully stopped and robbed of their wealth because of lack of security. This has stopped for over 8 -10 months now. Nobody can complain of such insecurity now because we are active in the market”. From the above it is very evident that market security is provided by yan’banga in collaboration with the police. Perhaps one of the most important non-security structures engaged in market security is the traditional authorities. The traditional authorities are responsible for the management of the market and in the process responsible for market security. The traditional market authorities such as Sarkin Pawa and market chairman established some rules from time to time for market security and safety. The last rule passed is over taming animal when
20 taken round the market. It is made a market rule that animals moving around the market must get their front and back legs tied up to prevent causing injury to people. The next rule under consideration is banning loading after 7 pm. They are also said to be responsible for calling to order disobedient ‘boys’ in the market and disciplining them as long as the offence is not criminal, if it is criminal, the offender would be handed over to the police. All the informants mention the role of Sarkin Pawa in conflict management and dispute resolution. According to a Dillali, the Sarkin Pawa patrols the market in order to settle conflict and disagreement between people in the market. He is also responsible in protecting trading norms of trust and reciprocity in the market. A butcher said Sarkin Pawa “patrols the market all the time to prevent any conflict or theft. For example, if a dillali sells an animal and give the money to a wrong owner, the sarkin pawa intervenes to ensure that the issue is resolved by forcing the dillali to present the person who collected the money from him or pay the livestock owner. Or if a butcher buys an animal and refuses to pay the money, the Sarki pawa intervenes and forces the butcher to pay the person”. Market Associations in Acida market also play an important role in market security. The Miyyati Allah acts as a mediator between the Fulani and other market actors and also on issues related to cattle and Fulani. The Association also helps to detect and prevent stolen animals being sold in the market. So, every market day, the officials of the Miyyati Allah assemble in Acida to ensure smooth running of the market. In addition, the dillali accepts animal for sale from an unknown trader only after confirmation from the Miyyati that the animal is not a stolen one. The miyyati also assists and intervenes to resolve conflict in the market. Furthermore, for the majority of our informants, the dillali do not perform any function, however, one contends that the market has few cases of insecurity because of the trusted and reliable dillalai trading system in the market. Other workers in the market were also said to play some roles in market security. A trader said “We do not want any security personnel in the market unless invited. There is a group of boys who provide protection to our animals. They are called yan’lodi and Yan’gadi. A person buys and leaves his animals with the yan’lodi and Yan’gadi, and no matter their size if you return the following days- you will meet them”. Similarly the roles of the Yan’lodi and Yan’gadi was narrated by a trader, he said “in this market we protect our own cattle. We have our boys. We buy cattle, we give them out for identification marks and bring them to the loading sites for our boys to stay overnight to guard them. In the morning they are loaded. Our labourers do the protection. Not the police”. 1.5 The Relationship between the Informal Market Security Institutions and the Police
21 It is apparent that the police operate in the market only when they are invited, otherwise they operate outside the market and come in only to apprehend a suspected criminal offender. Thus, the police operate in the market to supplement efforts of the informal market security arrangement s and they are invited only as the last resort. When invited they collaborate with traditional security outlet as Yan’banga. According to the Chairman of Yan’banga, they go on market patrol with the police- “we go on patrol with them right from 12.00 am till 6.00 am. We know the bad eggs in our community. That is why we get the support of the police, trad itional authority and Local Government Authority. This car I am driving belongs to the LGA”. The role of police in market security is not viewed favourably in the market by majority of the non- market officials. At best it is viewed with sceptism, and at worst with dislike and suspicion. Referring to the problem of pick pocketing in the market, a consumer said “let the police helps with the pick pocketing problem. They know them, let them deal with them, they cannot”. A trader said “if there is breakage of law and order you do not see them. They do not provide security to us ”. Another one said “no, we do not relate with them since they do not protect our animal- you only see police if there is breakage of law for them to get what they can out of it. Similar view was also held by a Butcher where he said “we have nobody to protect us. Look, what we want from the Local Government is the building of shelter for our boys and for them to send the police to protect us not to collect our money. If they are coming to provide security, not to disturb and harass us they are welcomed. What we do not want is for them to come and be harassing us”. A trader could not see the usefulness of the police inside the market since “if anything happens that will affect the butchers we have sarkin pawa, if it is about cattle, we have sarkin Fulani. They intervene to quench any dispute and resolve any disagreement. If the case requires going to the police, they take the case to the police and that is outside the market”. The sceptism is not related to the police alone, even the role of the Sarkin Pawa was questioned by two of our informants as the interview below illustrates; Question: What about Sarkin Kasuwa- what is his function? Answer: I do not know his function. Question: Meaning what? Answer: I do not know his relevance- he may have relevance but I do not know. What is relevant to us traders is for the market officials to build rooms so that our people who transport animals by road can rest and spend the night-but they did not. So for me I am yet to see his relevance except of course revenue collection The foregoing indicates the relevance of informal institutions in the overall management and running of Acida market. Without them, one cannot see how trading in livestock could be smooth and effective. How can they be improved? What is the policy implication of their dominant role in the livestock trading? 1.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
22 Improvement in market transaction and trading business cannot be achieved without understanding the social context within which the market operates and the norms and relations that define trading practices. It is in this light that the findings of this research and the conclusions drawn are important. Women and other Nigerian ethnic groups seem to be excluded from the market transaction and institutions in Acida kara. There also appears to be no role for women in the overall livestock trading chain. The importance and dominance of informal institutions and social networks in market and trading businesses in Nigeria is obvious from the research findings. What is also evident from the research findings is the low level of involvement of the formal institutions in the market. How the interactions between the two can be used to improve market transaction is a challenge that must be faced and achieved. Equally relevant is the reliance of both the rich and poor livestock traders on the informal market institutions. Despite the effectiveness and advantages of the informal institutions in Acida market and livestock trading, the increased insecurity in the transportation of livestock across the country makes the integration of formal institutions, particularly banking and insurance institutions with the livestock marketing almost a necessity. In this modern time of money transfer, it is absolutely unacceptable to have livestock traders loosing their capital to arm robbers on our roads. A programme of campaign needs to be embarked to enlighten the traders on the availability and advantages of lodging their money in a bank for collection at their destination. A bank can be designated for that purpose. For the success of the programme, the designated bank should establish branches in all the major livestock markets in the country and make money transfer as simple and easy as possible. The above intervention is also likely to make an impact on insecurity in Acida livestock market and trade as well as on the income of all the major actors in the business. A Similar situation applies to the role of the vigilante in market security. The main reason why it is popular and effective as a means of security provision is its origin from the community. The new initiative of community policing should be encouraged and the yan’banga can be integrated into the community policing. This is an initiative currently piloted in Enugu and funded by DFID. Such initiative need to be expanded. While the Acida market does not have its own vigilante, as it is obtainable in Kano kara, nonetheless, the role of Acida yan’banga in Acida market security is important and effective. Thus, improvement on the few existing formal institutions in Acida market to complement, not to replace the informal institution is strongly recommended. The practice of commissioned agents is a good practice, despite its limitation of denying the livestock owner to sell directly to the buyer thereby reducing transaction cost and affecting the cost of livestock and meat in the Nigerian markets.
23 At the Local Government Level, there is the need to put in place a modality for opening and closing times for the market. Equally important is the need to provide more infrastructural facilities in the market as requested by many informants.
Implication for the Poor The relevance of livestock trade for the poor in Nigeria is less in the area of consumption as meat has become a commodity that is beyond the reach of the poor. Its importance lies in the inter-ethnic relation that it fosters. The production of livestock is mostly done in the North and most of the consumption done in the South. Thus, while the North is dependent on the South for livestock market, the south is equally dependent on the North for the supply. The inter-dependency that cut across different ethnic groups that the livestock trade builds is therefore relevant in a country like Nigeria that experiences many cases of inter-ethnic conflict. Consequently, livestock production and trade is a means through which Nigeria can build in trust among different ethnic groups thereby fostering inter-ethnic understanding and unity. Equally important is the role of livestock trade in employment generation. All categories of people, rich and poor are employed through out the market chain. And the employment opportunities cut across ethnic barriers. Another implication of livestock trade to the poor is in the area of saving and investment. Livestock breeding to the majority of the poor and the vulnerable in the North is a form of banking where a small amount is invested through buying a small animal, reared and then sold for a larger amount. With reference to the involvement of women in livestock production in the North, Simmons (1976: 10) writes thus, “small livestock production, a source of income for many women, is considered to be good “banking” procedure rather than an occupation. Sheep, chickens and goats serve as stores of value in a bankless rural society, bearing interest in the form of offspring and remaining available for liquidation when cash is required”. This is the relevance of livestock production and trade for the poor.
References Adamu, F.L., (1991) “The participation of Hausa Women in livestock production and management”, presented at the 16th annual conference of the National Association of Livestock Production and Management, Sokoto. Adamu, M., (1978), Hausa Factor in the West African History, Ahmadu Bello University Press.
24 Furniss, G, (1996), Poetry, Prose and Popular Culture in Hausa , Edinburgh University press for International African Institute, London. Hill, P., (1972), Rural Hausa- A village and Setting, Cambridge University Press. Gabrin-Madhin, E., (2001), Market institutions, transaction costs, and social capital in the Ethiopian grain market, Research Report of International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Gabrin-Madhin, E., (2003), Of Markets and Middlemen: Transaction costs, and Institutions in the Ethiopian grain market, paper presented at the 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, Hungary. Simmons, E, (1976) Economic Research on Women in Rural Development in Northern Nigeria, OLC, paper No. 10 World Bank (2002), Building Institutions for Markets, 2002 World Development Report
Appendix Table 2: List of Informants Informants 1. 2 Livestock breeders 2. Sarkin Fulani/kasuwan kara 3. Sarkin Pawa 4. Dangaladiman sarkin pawa 5. Baraden Sarkin pawa 6. Chairman, Miyyatti Allah Associations 7. Chairman, Vigilante group 8. 2 members of the vigilante group 9. 3 Livestock market traders 10. Chairman of long distance traders for Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states 11. Chairman of long distance traders of Sokoto state 12. 3 Long distance traders 13. 2 Brokers (dillalai) 14. 2 Butchers 15. Chairman, National Union of Road Transport workers 16. 2 Drivers 17. Senior Livestock officer of the market 18. 2 consumers
