This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article ...

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Civil Wars on 26 Jul 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205565

Söderström, Johanna. (2016). The Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed: Party Mobilization among Former M19 Combatants. Civil Wars, 18(2), 214-233.

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The Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed: Party Mobilization among Former M19 Combatants

Johanna Söderström, PhD Department of Government, Uppsala University, Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. +46-18471 27 93, [email protected]

The Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed

The Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed: Party Mobilization among Former M19 Combatants ABSTRACT Armed groups often transform into political parties, which involves a profound transformation of the organizational culture. How these parties condition the continued political mobilization of their members is unclear. Using life history interviews with former combatants of the armed group M19 in Colombia this article demonstrates what aspects of the party mobilize and stymie their political mobilization. Through exploring three typical political life paths the Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed - this article demonstrates the long term challenges of post-war politics, the role of the party, as well as the personal journey from (war and) peace to democracy. Keywords: party mobilization, life histories, political participation, ex-combatants, post-war, Colombia, M19, armed groups

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INTRODUCTION Moving from war to peace is an overhaul of society, and the dynamics of this process are often studied with a focus on institutional change and macro-politics. This article, however, is rooted in the personal experience of this transition through attempting to understand the political life path of former combatants after disarmament. In a democratic society political participation of the citizenry is pivotal, yet after war former combatants are often portrayed as a problem and cause for concern. After war, the transformation of armed groups into political parties has become an integral part of peacebuilding (Lyons 2010), and an increasing number of armed groups transform into political parties and enter electoral politics (see the discussion in the introduction to this special issue). Yet, the transformation of an armed group to a political party has rarely been problematized from the perspective of the rank and file members, resulting in an implicit assumption of its benign influence on the political mobilization of the individual members of these groups, although systematic evidence is lacking. At the same time, political associations of veterans are often assumed to be problematic for society at large and associated with fear, even though veterans’ associations have also been positive for democracy (see among others Dean 1992, Prost 1992, McMullin 2013, pp. 45-77, Englander 1994, Allport 2009, p. 185). In this article, I scrutinize the political mobilization after disarmament among former combatants and whether the development of the political party shaped this. Research on the transformation of armed groups into political parties has focused on explaining the transformation itself (see e.g. Berdal and Ucko 2009, Söderberg Kovacs 2008, Manning 2004, De Zeeuw 2007, Berti 2013, Dudouet 2009), rather than its effects on individual ex-combatants (or indeed the long term workings of such parties). This research has focused on explaining successful transformation and describing the new party, noting that a united leadership and popular support are critical for explaining their success as political parties. Recently there has been an effort to study and define political reintegration for the individual ex-combatant (see e.g. Söderström 2015, Humphreys and Weinstein 2009, Pugel 2009, Porto et al. 2007, Mitton 2008, Özerdem 2012, Nussio and Oppenheim 2014), yet attempts at explaining successful reintegration has failed to consider the role of the armed group’s transformation. These two processes have been assumed to function in tandem, even though no systematic study on the relationship between these two levels has been carried out (Söderström 2015, pp. 6-17). Whether and how the political engagement of individual excombatants is conditioned by the process of transforming armed groups into political parties deserves scrutiny as the political culture within armed groups is often described as ‘militant, hierarchical, sectarian and internally undemocratic’ (Söderberg Kovacs 2008, p. 135). If such practices continue, it may be hard to promote democratic practices among its followers. Whether or not this is a challenge that plagues all armed groups is of course an empirical question, but it highlights the severe demands which a transformation from an armed group to a political party entails in terms of how the relationship between individual members and the organization is reshaped. Another shortcoming of the work on ex-combatants in politics is the limited temporal scope (see e.g. Christensen and Utas 2008, Porto et al. 2007, Blattman 2009, Söderström 2013, Ucko 2009, Denissen 2010, Maclay and Özerdem 2010, Hauge 2008, Metsola 2006, with some notable exceptions Allport 2009, Mettler 2005). Yet there are good reasons to expect different dynamics during different periods of the ex-combatants’ life, thus highlighting the importance of taking into account a longer time frame in order to clarify what issues condition successful political reintegration. For instance, family life can compete with a political life, at least in the short term where social and economic concerns take precedence (Stoker and Jennings 1995). Relatedly, Katz has noted a lack in research focusing on party attachment and why people join political parties (Katz 1990, p. 159). More work has been done on the functions members have for political parties, rather than the other way around (see Scarrow 1994). Recent work 3


has shown the importance of parties through the networks as well as patronage and other material benefits they provide (Thachil 2014, Samuels and Zucco 2014, Frye et al. 2014, Utas 2012, Wiegink 2015). At the same time we also know that activism in social movements carry important consequences for political involvement even after such membership is terminated (Giugni 2004, p. 496). This highlights the importance of delving deeper into the role of the party for former M19 guerrillas. The legacy of militant activism should be important. But perhaps there are other things provided by the party which also encourage political mobilization. This article will describe what aspects of the party matter for its individual members. The dynamics of political mobilization after war is explored in the case of the small guerrilla group M19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) in Colombia, as the party that developed from this group varied in its success. This guerrilla movement formed in 1974 among ‘urban middleclass progressive activists, intellectuals, communist youths, disgruntled members from Alianza Nacional Popular’, with a Marxist agenda (Guáqueta 2007, pp. 421, 425). Largely, their ideology can be described as nationalist and socialist. They demobilized in 1990 after peace negotiations, and together with other groups formed the political party M19 Democratic Alliance (AD/M19). As such, this case provides a long time frame to examine the dynamics of political mobilization among its former members after war. In addition, the party achieved large electoral success initially, resulting in an important role during the re-writing of the constitution. However, during the mid-90s the party dwindled and disappeared. Some sections continued together with, and under the banner of other parties.1 This variation in the trajectory of the party makes it a useful case to explore how former members respond to the party development in terms of their own political mobilization. The study aims to describe the long term political mobilization of former M19 combatants in Colombia, and uncover what role the new party had in this. The article begins with a description of M19’s trajectory, before delving deeper into the collection of life histories. Using life history interviews with former rank and file members of the armed group M19, this article depicts the political mobilization of these individuals across their lifetime focusing on the post-disarmament and post-electoral failure phases. The analysis of the article divides the political life paths into a threefold typology: the Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed. This study shows how the levels of interest and participation varied in the post-disarmament phase. The endurance of the political party is not decisive for individual mobilization, even if some individuals are more vulnerable to the trajectory of the party. TRAJECTORY OF M19 AFTER DISARMAMENT M19 was an urban guerilla with a Bolivarian, nationalist and socialist ideology, which made demands for democratic reforms. Undogmatic ideology and room for personal autonomy are ingredients Le Blanc argues enabled strong personal attachment among its members (2013, p. 123). To characterize the political culture of M19 is somewhat difficult; as an armed group it is clear that the organization was hierarchical and non-democratic, yet the clandestine nature of the group also meant that some degree of autonomy existed for different units. In 1990, 791 combatants disarmed and demobilized, but other estimates suggest M19 consisted of about 2,000 individuals, as distrust caused some to abstain from the government-led disarmament and demobilization process. During the 80s and just after disarmament several M19 leaders and members were assassinated (for more on this, see Dudouet et al. 2012, Le Blanc 2013). Just after disarmament the leader Carlos Pizarro Leongómez was killed, and Antonio Navarro Wolff took over instead and ran for president. Together with other groups they formed the political party M19 Democratic Alliance (AD/M19) (for more on M19 in general see Florez1

Individuals and networks originating from M19 have been a part of several political parties since its demobilization, such as: Polo Democrático Independiente (PDI) (2003); Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) (2005); Partido Verde Colombiano (2005); Movimiento Progresistas (2011) (list is not exhaustive, nor does it make claims about the degree of M19 penetration).

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Morris 2005, Le Blanc 2013, pp. 103-167, for more on the political party development, see e.g. García Durán et al. 2008, Rampf and Chavarro 2014, Boudon 2001, Osterling 1989, pp. 300-307). In 1990 they gained 12.5 per cent of the presidential ballot, and became the second largest party in the National Constituent Assembly with 19 out of 70 seats, and in 1991 they had a central role in rewriting the constitution, (Guáqueta 2007, p. 428f, Rampf and Chavarro 2014, p. 15, Villamizar Herrera 2014). The success of M19’s transformation has been attributed to their political legitimacy in the country, because of their willingness to participate in peace negotiations (Guáqueta 2007). By 1994 the success of the party had stopped in its track. Guáqueta argues that the limited connection with the base eroded the party (2007, p. 430); similarly Boudon argues that the failure was due to poor leadership and organization (2001, p. 88). Villamizar (a scholar and former M19 combatant) notes that the failure to crystalize a new organization and the autocratic leadership of Navarro Wolff were responsible for the party failure, but also the alliance with other groups: It wasn’t just an Antonio Navarro’s problem, not at all, that was a problem of all of us, and it was a problem of that political alliance. We lost our identity. We lost our track. We lost ourselves in the middle of Conservatives, Liberals and Communists (2014).

Colombian party politics are personalized, clientelistic and rigid. The Liberals and the Conservatives have dominated politics in Colombia since the mid-19th century. Historically, programmatic differences have not been central to party practices (Martz 1992, Osterling 1989, pp. 157-198). Hence, it is no surprise that several of the leading figures of M19 have remained in politics and continue to have a public political profile, such as the current mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro and his Progresistas. The name, M19, is reused among various groups today such as student groups and Facebook groups. The existence of such individuals and the use of the name M19 suggest that the network, identity and symbolic value associated with M19 are still present, even if the armed group and party are not. This article differentiates and depicts the trajectories of former members of M19 and how the variations in the party’s success played into their lives and political mobilization. LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEWS Life history interviews are in-depth interviews aimed at capturing the individual’s entire life course, focusing on transitions and trajectories (see e.g. Bertaux and Kohli 1984, Plummer 2001, Söderström 2016, Bertaux 2003). Using life history interviews with M19 excombatants, this article maps shifts in political interest and participation over the entire course of their lives, thereby enabling a long term perspective. The interviews focused on watershed moments in the political lives of these ex-combatants (cf. "global watersheds" as discussed by Miller et al. 2003), as well as the interaction between a societal process (moving from war toward peace and democracy and the party development) and the individuals’ interpretation of, and choices in relation to said process. In 2012 and 2014, 24 former M19 combatants were interviewed in Bogotá. The number of interviews was a result of both theoretical saturation and recruitment possibilities. The main target was rank and file members of the armed group. For an overview of the interviewees, see Table 1 and list of interviews in Appendix. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, with an interpreter, and transcribed and translated to English. < Table 1 about here. > Sampling stigmatized or hidden groups involves relying on multiple access points, who are familiar with the population in question and who the participants have confidence in, such as veterans’ organizations or party functionaries, but also relying on interviewees’ ability to identify additional participants. As identifying ex-combatants in a post-war setting is often 5


sensitive, it was important to ensure the privacy and security of the participants. The dependency within the sample was reduced due to seven entry points of varying types and origins. Despite diverse starting points, the same names were eventually recommended; suggesting a close-knit and small network even many years after the group was formally dispelled. Finding individuals willing to identify as a former M19 member in Colombia was not problematic, as many were open with their M19 identity. Many were happy to be identified in the resulting work from this research; a topic that was discussed before and after the actual interview. However, as some individuals wanted their identity to be confidential I have used pseudonyms when referencing these interviews (the use of pseudonyms is however not an unproblematic practice, see Lahman et al. 2015). Similarly details of places and events have been removed. One challenge, however, was to identify former members who had distanced themselves from the party. Access points were often close to the party structure and elite, even if subsequent interviewees were more distant (the most four steps removed). The participants drew a political timeline of their lives, focusing on political activity and political interest, as a way to measure political mobilization. The interviews were not solely chronological; starting with an overview of their life as a whole, noting some major events and then returning to different time periods and discussing those more in detail. Often the high point in their political mobilization was identified and used as a reference point for describing other parts of the diagram. The temporal perspective and focus of the participant therefore structured the interview. The conversations centred on the contrast between their interest in politics, their desire to participate and their actual political participation (including participation through extra-representational channels) (see e.g. Brady 1999, p. 737 for a definition of political participation). These issues were then related to their membership in M19, and the larger political developments related to M19. The diagram already included a horizontal timeline where the participants could then draw levels of political activity (in black) and political interest (in red), moving between low and high on the vertical axis. This allowed the participants to identify turning points and general trends in their political mobilization, as well as gaps between the two lines. As such, the drawing of, and discussion of, the diagram enabled adjustments and clarifications during the interview. The diagram stimulated reflection concerning the temporal development of mobilization or removal from politics and the role played by the party (e.g. the electoral failure of the party). Drawing the life diagram was described as a catharsis and resulted in interviews of a personal and deeply felt nature, where many shared intimate life choices in the interview. With two exceptions (Alfonso and Gregorio), the participants made full use of these diagrams and the resulting diagram itself was used in the analysis. Most participants expressed considerable satisfaction with the life diagram and telling their complete story, and not just their armed mobilization or their struggles at disarmament. The analysis used the transcripts but also the life diagrams themselves. The resulting typology is a function of the diagrams themselves, which were scrutinized for patterns and trend similarities. The diagrams have also been contrasted with their oral description of their life story. The categorization of each individual into a type was uncomplicated with one exception.2 In the identification of these trends, three events were used: the time of joining M19, disarmament and the failure of the party. The failure of the party was not always obvious in the diagrams themselves, depending on how identifiable this event was in the life of the participants. The analysis presents the material in reduced form as types of stories and paths, focusing on shared meaning within each trajectory (others have made similar usage of typologies of life paths, see e.g. Linden and Klandermans 2007, Passy and Giugni 2000). Examples of specific life stories are used as illustrations within each typology, but also because they demonstrate the deeply personal transition moving from war to peace is. 2

Celestina’s diagram and account of her life diverged somewhat. In her diagram she drew a diminishing curve, while her description of her current and past political activity showed her to be a resilient type.

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PATHS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION The levels of political interest and political activity generally reached their maximum at the time of M19 membership, whereas the levels of interest and participation varied in the postdisarmament phase. The political life paths can be categorized as belonging to one of three types: the Resilient (11 individuals), the Remobilized (8 individuals) and the Removed (5 individuals). This typology of political life stories is based on the paths and trajectories of political mobilization noted in the interviews. Within each type, the push and pull factors associated with the party are also discussed, but the typology is descriptive and equifinal (different causes can lead to the same life path). Within each path, inflection points in their political life diagrams in general as well as some specific examples are detailed. In all cases disarmament and entry into formal politics was a challenging and deeply felt time in their lives. Many saw the move from an armed group to a political party as a significant change, but giving up arms in themselves was not seen as problematic as it only shifted the means of the struggle, not altered their political goals. This organizational change, and also loss of security for some, happened in conjunction with a shift in the personal life of individual members, who moved from one extreme point of (sometimes clandestine) armed combat to another extreme, lived peace. Through these interviews, it was evident that the movement from war to peace is experienced at the macro level as well as on a personal level. The creation of the party AD/M19 was for some seen as a break with the M19 heritage, as when other party alliances and formations occurred. Others saw a clear lineage from M19 to the political party in question. Those that saw this direct lineage, were often more satisfied with current party behaviour, whereas those that saw it as a break had often removed themselves from the new party due to the lack of continuing the legacy. In these life histories, political parties appear as shape shifters, and opinions differ as to whom and what is the heir to what. Some saw the re-birth of the M19 legacy in the form of the party Progresistas and their lead man, Gustavo Petro (a former member of M19). His character and political style reminded them of the old M19 agenda, which promoted their return to party politics. Several were active with this party, and returned to politics due to this newfound enthusiasm. Other individuals noted small changes in their own mobilization in the wake of changes at the party level. For them, the difficulties at the party level translated to small variations in their own participation, momentary downward drops, which were then followed by a readjustment, or finding other outlets for their mobilization. Finally, for some individuals, the armed group and party was the main vehicle for political mobilization, as will be discussed further. The former M19 members exhibited large variations in terms of their resilience to party level changes. The Resilient

The Resilient are defined by a sustained or increasing political mobilization post-disarmament and after the failure of AD/M19. Many of the members demonstrated an ability to shift their participation between arenas as well as between parties (Eduardo, Gerardo, Jaime, Juan and Javier). Many of the Resilient were either connected with the elite layers within the group or were well-educated. Among the Resilient not all continued within former M19 networks of politics (Resilient stayers); some found other political parties (e.g. Felipe) and others found new arenas to express their commitment with transforming Colombia (Resilient leavers). As Felipe noted: I have always been in political projects. Not necessarily political parties, but movements, expressions, but yes, always. My first militancy was in the M19, and afterwards I have never stopped to be involved, I have always been there.

Several also shifted their political mobilization to social movements, NGOs, or even their own workplace (e. g. Dante, Federico, Celestina, Catalina and Alice), and in part due to a disappointment with the party. Several managed to make their work part of their political project,

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either because they had found employment via NGOs that worked on issues they cared for, or with public agencies, or had founded NGOs, or used their own company as a vehicle for labour rights etc. Jaime is an example of someone immersed in the group and despite challenges around disarmament his political participation has remained high over the years, today working in the mayor’s office. He describes his continued mobilization as follows: Most of the people from the M19 we have not ceased to be part of M19, even when M19 as such disappeared, but we keep the concept, the behaviour, we continue to vindicate. […] We have not stopped, it has not stopped. Surely there have been some failures, but we maintain the activity. […] this activity is always present. (Jaime)

He found employment after disarmament through M19 contacts. When the party failed he turned toward NGO activities instead, sustained by the same network of people. Eventually he took on leading political positions within new parties, which formed from the same network. However, he abstained from membership in other parties developed from the same network. Jaime followed the organizational structure and people that grew out of M19, and to some degree his continued mobilization was dependent on the patronage of certain individuals. His life course changed due to party development, even if the failure of AD/M19 had no real adverse effects on him per se. He interprets the party’s failure as a result of the political system itself, rather than as evidence of an internal failure even if he also questions the delivery on their political ideals: ‘It was an electoral alliance and it was successful. […] But four years later none of them managed to be congressmen. It is a contagion from the practice of politics in Colombia, clearly bureaucratized, parliamentarian.’ (Jaime). Those who remained mobilized and stayed close to M19 heritage in various political parties, also exhibit a degree of flexibility as to the agenda of the group, and an acceptance of the agenda changing over the years. Juan notes, for instance: “I’ve always looked for a way to remain with the political process of the M19.” (Juan). The M19 identity was especially visible among the Resilient. M19 is part and parcel of the life conceptions they offered: M19 is central to who they have been and who they are, as well as who they will be. An example of someone who felt this way quoted a song ‘In Praise of the Fighters’ from Bertolt Brecht’s play the Mother: There are men who struggle for a day, and they are good. There are others who struggle for a year, and they are better. There are some who struggle many years, and they are better still. But there are those who struggle all their lives, and these are the indispensable ones. (Gerardo).

This man saw his whole life as part of the same struggle, using different means (arms or peaceful politics). Similarly, Felipe noted: ‘I've never stopped, I think I'm from the militants of the M19 who never demobilized’ and continued to describe the various ways in which he has been active in politics. He ends this description, with: ‘Having belonged to the M19 is the best thing that happened in my life.’ Among those that turned away from the M19 network most strongly, it was often the female interviewees who expressed fatigue with the macho culture within the group and party. They also expressed disappointment with the party organization itself, an experience shared with Federico and his choice to relocate in the political arena. They felt they did not receive enough support from the party when they ran for office. Alice, while initially immersing herself in party politics, turned toward civil society instead when her disappointment became too large: ‘We had a duty to do something new. We had a duty to build the discourses in a different way. We had a duty to build the party in a new way. But we took the model of the traditional parties.’ In contrast, Estella who had a similar reaction to the lack of support within the group, ended up removing herself from politics instead of finding alternative channels as Alice has (see section on the Removed). However, Alice’s shift occurred much later than the failure of AD/M19, and her M19 identity remains intact:

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But no, this is the life that I wanted, this is the one that I want, this is the one that I made. And this is the one that fills me up with personal satisfactions, because I can say that I have done things for this country, and I have done it with all the pleasure and I am proud of whom I am. […] I think that the commitment with the M19 is the one that has defined my whole life.

Another person who maintained her political activity after disarming was Catalina, despite several challenges and deaths in her family. Her political mobilization even increased sharply post-2000, in a fashion similar to the Remobilized. She describes herself as a political activist, who is more committed and convinced today then during the armed conflict. Catalina has found an outlet through her work for her political commitment and activism and she feels more empowered today than when she was a combatant. She was disappointed with AD/M19’s failure, but notes that ‘now I understand that the political dynamics are very complex and that we weren’t prepared to be in power and govern. Now we are prepared but we are much divided.’ Celestina is an example of someone who often changed the arena where she has been active, often making her work an arena for politics. Lately, she has been focused on environmental work. Over the years she has identified with parties that grew out of M19, like the Polo, yet today Celestina notes: ‘And I don’t feel out or inside neither political party’; and: But I don’t know at this moment where I belong, the only thing I have in mind is that I am not going to work for a rightist group. For me is not possible to stay still, to stay quiet, and not to react against something, to settle. Your mind has changed in life and I am going to die this way. I am thinking about contributing every single day of my life.

As an individual she expresses an extreme attachment to specific individuals within the group, and disappointment with specific individuals was a large part of her removal from M19dominated activities. The Resilient life stories demonstrate great adaptability and flexibility, shifting arenas and agendas too sometimes. Some remained within M19 networks, while others shifted away from their political origins, even if their M19 identity is intact. The role played by the electoral success and failure of the party was minimal, whereas the lack of direct support from the party pushed some individuals to find other political homes. The Remobilized

The Remobilized are defined by decreased political participation at some point after disarmament followed by a re-mobilization in politics up until today. Just as the Resilient, the Remobilized are currently politically mobilized. The decrease in political mobilization coincided for some with the failure of AD/M19 (Gregorio and Alfonso), for others the watershed came later (Joaquin and Julio), even if it was related to the political development of the group. Usually, they experienced an inability to identify with the new costume of the party. Some disappeared from politics at the time of disarmament (Emilio and José), and others had different reasons for the decreased mobilization (Amadeo and Camilo). Hence, the timing and reasons for the drop varied a lot. Again, the failure of the armed group as a party is not pivotal for the political mobilization of its members. Much of the initial experience of those that remobilized is shared with the more permanently removed from politics. In contrast, they differed in their response to Gustavo Petro and his administration. Most of the Remobilized have been inspired by his leadership and believe he epitomizes their M19 ideals (Camilo, Joaquin, Julio, José, Gregorio and Alfonso). Thus, Petro’s M19 connection and identity have been crucial in remobilizing these individuals. For others the recent peace process with FARC has invigorated their mobilization (Emilio and Amadeo). Camilo is an example of someone who displayed a remarkable remobilization, shifting between several arenas. This man went into exile for several years to Europe for private reasons, but recently returned to Colombia and started working in the mayor’s office. The M19 network facilitated his return to Colombia and employment. During exile, he shifted his political focus to non-partisan politics, such as human rights issues, honour based violence issues, and 9


became involved in global social movements. At the start of his time abroad he distanced himself from politics, and it was the encouragement from his family which made him return to politics. Camilo initially experienced a conflict between his private life and political commitment. Yet, Camilo expressed a deep commitment stemming from the sacrifice of other members in the group, which made him return to politics in Colombia: my former experience here [in Colombia] was with people that had been killed, who had put their heart and their minds in this project of the M19, were too strong, I believe it like that. So for me it was, it’s not like saying, no more and I will forget my past, no, not…

Emilio is someone whose disarmament and demobilization challenged his political mobilization. His activity dipped between about 1990 and 2011, followed by an increase in particular in his political interest. His disappearance from politics was partly due recovering his own private life after disarmament. Today his political role is more engaged than during the 90s: ‘I am a new political militant with better convictions and contributing in my tasks to the city development […] talking about the peace process, and engaging.’ His participation in the armed group (and his sister’s) had severe consequences for his family. These sacrifices and the torture he experienced underlined his commitment further. The failure to realize their ideology and live up to M19 ideals, especially among the leadership, caused his disappointment with the party. He believes the movement did not fail, however, as individuals within it are still trying to achieve things. Thus, Emilio was not impervious to the failure of the party, but the impact was dependent on other factors in his life occurring simultaneously. The political commitment of the Remobilized is obvious, and their M19 identity and history as combatants underscore this position. For instance, Julio notes that while for him M19 is no longer a political organization, its spirit is still alive: ‘It is a part of my life. It determines every activity I engage in.’; and declares that ‘I never stopped being a part of M19.’ José, also very disappointed with the realization of the group’s political trajectory, is still committed: Well, I do it [politics] all the time; it’s my life’s project. Nowadays I have two challenges: the consolidation of my family in terms of education and well-being, and to accomplish the political objectives within the movement, or what is left from the movement because it is diluting.

Alfonso was very dependent and invested in the M19 struggle and network, and remobilized due to his identification with Gustavo Petro. Besides his disappointment with the leadership when AD/M19 tried to establish itself as a party, Alfonso also revealed some of the difficulties he felt in adjusting to a political life: It was hard for us, because I was not a politician of certain level… because you have to have a skill for achieving in a political level, with the political proposals. During this period, it was really hard for me. […] Because I didn’t have… because for that you need to have the experience, the knowledge, the words, you have to have proposals, you have to have voice! […] That was hard, it was hard adapting to that environment, not because you didn’t want to, but in terms of the skills, concrete skills with the people, for going to a meeting, for an assembly. You have to be prepared, you have to have basic knowledge about the processes, the laws, and of course you have to express at that level your political proposals.

Alfonso, in contrast with many others, lacked higher education and M19 was the main vehicle for his advancement in life in general, which made him vulnerable to the failure of the party. Another example within this path is Amadeo whose removal from politics was unusual in that it happened prior to the group’s disarmament. He was told not to participate in one military operation, despite a long track record of operations; subsequently he felt betrayed and left the group. Despite this, his M19 identity remained intact over the years: ‘I consider myself as part of the M19. I have always lived around the M19.’ Describing his temporary dip in mobilization, Amadeo noted ‘the political interest remained inside me’. Over the years, his party attachment has varied, and Amadeo has aligned himself with various parties, some linked to

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M19 and some not. Today he identifies with the Green Alliance, yet his current political activities are linked to the peace process with FARC and their future in politics. For Amadeo and others the loss of leaders within M19 reinforced their commitment to the cause. The symbolic sacrifice of leaders and any personal sacrifice experienced reinforced the will and pressure to continue the fight. The pivotal role of specific individuals was due to both ideals and patronage. Their network was sensitive to the role played by specific individuals, linking them to the rest of the group and associated employment opportunities and/or political mobilization for a specific political party or in general. For some it meant that their mobilization for a specific party was negatively affected, whereas for others their entire political mobilization was affected. Within this path the reasons for a decreased mobilization varied, and only in some cases linked to the electoral failure of the party. That the M19 identity is alive in all of them is not surprising as they have all remobilized. The remobilization is largely due to Gustavo Petro and his movement in Bogotá, the role of specific M19 individuals and their visions. The legacy of armed combat also shaped political engagement among these individuals in ways not linked to the development of the political party per se. The M19 identity itself and the experience of risk in the past tended to structure their political mobilization. The Removed

The Removed are defined by a decrease in political mobilization sometime after disarmament lasting until today. Again, the time of pulling away from political participation varied significantly, and only for some did it coincide with the failure of AD/M19. The reasons for removing themselves, and the extent of their disengagement varied as well; some left party politics altogether but felt politically aware (Angela), others were removed (Mario and Camila) but also noted that if their old connections called on them to remobilize they would. Again others displayed more of a struggle and mainly decreased their involvement even if it was not reduced to zero (e.g. Maria and Estella). Within this group as well, several made their work a space for their political convictions (e.g. Angela, Estella and Maria). In some ways, this group represents a reserve of political mobilization, because most still carry a very strong political identity as M19. Some may even have appeared as quite resilient for many years, only recently removing themselves from politics like Maria. The removal from politics displayed within this trajectory, if not caused by old age, was often linked to a disappointment with current practices of politics in Colombia. The disappointment with the party and decrease in mobilization was also associated with a lack of patronage. Their connection to the network was vulnerable to the disappearance of individuals within the leadership, or mid-level commanders. Some of those interviewed described how specific individuals were killed (assassinated post-disarmament) and how this cut them off from potential employment and decreased motivation. However, the patronage function of the group was not only visible in terms of employment opportunities, but also through being included in a network of attention. Being seen, and listened to by others within the network, was also sought after, and sorely missed when this was lacking. Not being recognized by someone higher up in the group’s hierarchy stymied their mobilization in general. This theme was shared between this group and among those in the Remobilized trajectory as well. An extension of this was the lack of support as candidates by the party (various ones) noted by women in particular, where many of them felt abandoned and left to their own devices: ‘So we were orphans in the political sense, the party didn’t support us.’ (Maria). Estella’s tough time supporting herself and her daughter when she demobilized in conjunction with a disappointment with the leadership of M19 in the political arena made her turn away from political mobilization. Instead, she turned towards working with environmental issues, as a way both to support herself and as a way to channel her political commitment. She believes the socioeconomic difficulties she and others faced just after disarmament made political mobilization hard: ‘it leads to individual frustrations and the falling of a political

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movement.’ This combined with the leadership’s failure to integrate those voices and present a political vision Estella believes faltered the party and her mobilization: For me the great shortcoming, precisely in M19’s leadership is that there is no clear political vision […] That’s why when you say a party, M19 never became one, it is the big failure of M19 as a political option. […] it wasn’t a movement that formed their people politically. For example the entire base was fucked up. Peasants who didn’t know what to do and the reinsertion wasn’t a project that included people in politically or economically sustainable projects. […] There was a huge demoralization and the moment is lost, it falls apart because of its own structure.

Disappointment with specific individuals and the faltering ability of political parties to function as political parties pushed these individuals away from political mobilization: But I learned that the issue of the political parties is a mess. […] There are good people and there are people who only have personal interests. Hence, if I have to be honest, I don’t really like the political parties and I don’t believe in any of them. What I think is interesting is the posture of the people, there are certain people who have their ideals. […] I think I learned that I don’t want to get involved in any party, because it generates conflicts between people. (Angela)

Within this group the M19 identity is perhaps the most weak, yet even here many note a strong attachment and the importance of this legacy in their lives today. Again, this identity was reinforced by the loss of central figures: ‘love, made me stay long with the ideals of M19. I admire Jaime Bateman’s ideas, the M19 founder, and have always been caring for Gustavo Petro’s ideas. Besides, a lot, a lot of partners that I knew were killed during the struggle so I feel committed with them.’ (Maria). Notably, Angela who had removed herself the most from the group said: For me M19 has always been the best thing that has ever happened to me. […] The M19 was the one that gave birth to me politically, and you can never renounce your mother, the one who gave birth to you […] I mean, my identity base is M19. […] Today I identify people from the M19 as very spiritual people, very open, life lovers too. So I think that what I did was following the M19 path. (Angela)

The reasons for, and timing of, their decrease in political activities varied a lot; just as within the Remobilized. The palpability of the M19 identity is clear even among the Removed. They display a continuity of an identity, a political identity often reinforced by the sacrifices made by themselves and others, which continue to guide them today. Rather than the electoral failure being an important determinant, the lack of patronage and access to both attention and employment were features of the party that shaped their removal from politics. It is striking that more women appear in this category, suggesting that the party had a harder time to support and encourage women’s political mobilization. Within all three trajectories, the Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed, most described a long-lasting identification with M19. Having been an armed member was a central part of their identity, and what they have decided to do in life after active combat. Many of them did not see disarmament as their exit from the group; being an M19 combatant is equally true for them today, even if the group does not exist legally or organizationally: ‘I never stopped being part of M19’ (Julio); and ‘We have always been with the M19, in good and in bad times’ (Mario). Many felt they carried a personal legacy due to their involvement with the group, which is in line with the expectations developed from research on social movements (see e.g. Giugni 2004). Their M19 identity carries long-term implications for who they are and the life choices that they make, politically and non-politically. As noted by one man: ‘It is a part of my life. It determines every activity I engage in’ (Julio). Similarly, others noted strong emotional attachments to the group, and a fraternity with the group. The legacy of M19 membership was identifiable in every interview, and captured by Joaquin:

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We all have a big heritage from M19, independently of the path that each one of us decided to follow, or the different actions we took during the militant period, our way of thinking and acting has a trace of the times when we were militants.

CONCLUSION This article has examined how the new political party shaped the political mobilization among individual ex-combatants, in the case of M19 in Colombia. Individual political mobilization varied across the failed trajectory of M19 as a political party. The viability of the party was not the sole determinant of their political mobilization, although, some individuals are more vulnerable to the failure of the party than others. Electoral success, nor electoral failure, was enough for sustained, or broken, political mobilization among its members. The mobilization of individual members is only partially dependent on the political reintegration of their armed group. Political mobilization, while a dominant theme in their lives, was cyclical across their lifetime. The long-term perspective employed in this article was crucial for revealing these trends. Three main life paths were detailed: the Resilient, the Remobilized and the Removed. I suggest this typology can be useful in other cases, for both describing the paths taken among other armed groups, and explaining such variation. This article underscores how conflict identities in general can remain intact over long periods of time, which can lead to either protracted armed conflict or discordant party politics. Importantly, other arenas of politics were open to former M19 combatants – they could continue within M19 ranks or move into other arenas of politics; in contexts were former combatants are shunned such reorientation is unlikely. Overall, the interviewed were very involved in politics, and expressed a strong attachment to both the M19 group and to politics. The development of the party post-disarmament was not irrelevant in conditioning their form of participation and for some it was even pivotal. Importantly, the perception of the group’s agenda, and the leadership development within the party, as well as specific individuals’ role for mobilization was evident in the interviews. The group was also important to the degree that it offered patronage and supported the continuation of the network. For some these factors caused them to move away from the party created in the wake of M19’s disarmament, and into other arenas of politics, for others these factors helped sustain their political engagement post-disarmament. For lower ranking combatants, the party and group was the main vehicle for their political mobilization, and thus the failure of the group had severe repercussions at the individual level. Their peripheral position in the network also made them vulnerable to the disappearance of single individuals. The centrality of the M19 identity to all the life paths explored in this study is striking. The legacy of experiencing armed combat within this group has shaped the political mobilization of these individuals. For many the experience of armed combat and the political ideals developed during the conflict was a bigger determinant of their political mobilization after disarmament than the trajectory of the party. Experiences of risk and nostalgia have also shaped the development of a political life post-disarmament and the continuation of their M19 identity. The experience of risk in the past created an ongoing cycle of having to justify past behaviour through continued political mobilization. Feelings of nostalgia resonated more with those removed from politics post-disarmament. The M19 identity and legacy were felt throughout their life, and formed the basis for many of their life choices, and political choices. It seems partisanship (or armed group membership) is largely a question of a social identity for the individual member, even if the party itself does not exist in its original form (see also Lupu 2013, Green et al. 2002). Despite the failure of the group as a party, ideological attachment and group identity remain strong among former M19 combatants, long after the end of the armed conflict. For some, M19 has been a factor in their life for 40 years. Thus, this article underscores the importance of taking the creation of a social identity into account when trying to explain the role played by political parties in the lives of its members. Looking to the chal13


lenges facing Colombia today, members from FARC are less likely to be received into other political groups with the same ease as M19 was, and the longevity of the conflict is likely to have engrained the social identity of being a FARC member to a greater extent. This is a formidable challenge as Colombia hopes to move from war to democracy in the years to come.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is indebted to numerous people for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article (Véronique Dudouet, David Rampf, Enzo Nussio and the IP/COMP seminar at my department), as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. A special thanks to Enzo Nussio, Stefan Quiroga Fajardo, María Camila Perez Bonila, Usdin Leonardo Martínez Orellanos, Natalia Gutiérrez Trujillo, Arlene B. Tickner, Patricia Bohórquez and Ana Maria Rodriguez Alfonso for their help in Colombia. The study was made possible by a generous grant from the SYLFF/Tokyo Foundation and the Atmer Foundation, for which the author is very grateful. Her most heartfelt thanks go to the interviewees who graciously decided to share their life with the author. NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR Johanna Söderström, PhD in political science, is a researcher at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. Her research focuses on the political reintegration of excombatants and political behaviour in post-war contexts, and on democratic challenges related to peacebuilding. E-mail: [email protected].

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APPENDICES INTERVIEWS Pseudonym Gerardo Federico Javier Juan Camila Mario Joaquin Julio Estella Alice José Jaime Camilo Gregorio Emilio Eduardo Felipe Dante Catalina Alfonso Celestina Maria Amadeo Angela

Age 52 55 67 45 67 71 47 53 64 65 58 50 56 60 51 61 50 53 62 59 48

Position during conflict* elite elite elite base base base base base base base base base base base base elite base base base base base base base base

Date of Interview Oct 16 2012 Oct 19 2012 Oct 21 2012 Oct 24 2012 Oct 25 2012 Oct 25 2012 Oct 26 2012 Oct 27 2012 Nov 17 2014 Nov 18 and 21 2014 Nov 18 2014 Nov 19 2014 Nov 20 2014 Nov 21 2014 Nov 23 2014 Nov 24 2014 Nov 24 2014 Nov 24 2014 Nov 26 2014 Nov 26 2014 Nov 27 2014 Nov 27 2014 Nov 28 2014 Nov 28 2014

*The level within M19 noted is the position that overall best describes their position within the M19 hierarchy during the conflict.

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TABLES Table 1: Characteristics of interviewees Total no No of females Year of birth 24 7 Ranged from 1941 to 1967.

Year of joining M19 Ranged from 1970 to 1987.

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Age when they joined M19 Average age 23 years old.

Educational background Ranged from primary school to a master’s degree.


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