To Have or Not to Have: Striking a Balance

To Have or Not to Have: Striking a Balance An examination of efficiency, constraints, motivation and rewards within bureaucratic structure Bureaucratic requirements for timeliness and efficiency require an organizational hierarchy, rules, regulations and established procedures. Can the existence of such constraints simultaneously induce commitment, high levels of motivation and innovative results, or are they mutually exclusive? The purpose of this research will be to examine differences in bureaucratic protocol and response to events within the organizational culture of the US Intelligence Community. Public and private institutions will also be investigated. Finally, the research will briefly examine the specific advantages and disadvantages associated with a centralized bureaucracy and attempt to determine whether the existence or absence of profits or rewards plays a significant role within those specific bureaucracies.

The American Military University Graduate Program in Intelligence Studies INT 604 Interagency Operations Instructor: Dr. Darrell Driver

To Have or Not to Have: Striking a Balance - A Research Assignment By James P. Welch December 16, 2012

Disclaimer: All work contained herein is my own unless otherwise cited or attributed.

Introduction “If you have a reputation as a big, stiff bureaucracy, you're stuck.” —Jack Welch, former CEO of GE.

Bureaucratic systems are often cited as the bane of modern living; an unfortunate necessity. Nevertheless, such a view is often exaggerated and taken for granted, despite the fact that it is both distorted and flawed. When individuals speak of bureaucracy, oftentimes the initial images are of “red tape,” complications, poor service and lazy employees, living off the generosity of public coffers. One statement made by Professor Amy in his article, which was otherwise devoid of academic merit, due to its strong and obvious anti-conservative bias, rang true, “Yet they are one of the most maligned groups in our society. They are constantly the butt of jokes and are stereotyped as being lazy, ruse, rigid, arrogant and controlling.” 1 The fact is that many civil servants and public administrators do an outstanding job and provide excellent service, despite limited compensation and the harsh and restrictive conditions in which they are forced to accomplish their tasks. It is often, their personal sense of mission and inherent professionalism, which serves as their primary driving force. The purpose of this research is to examine whether the constraints of bureaucracy; timeliness, and efficient performance, can be synonymous with motivation and innovation. There are many variables involved in such an undertaking. The current research is limited, in both space and time, in order to cover such a vast and complex topic. Some of the aspects and disciplines involved in this research will necessarily include: social psychology, organizational bureaucracy, 1

Amy, Douglas J. "The Case FOR Bureaucracy." Government is Good. 2007. http://www.governmentisgood.com/ (accessed November 9, 2012).

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human relations and political psychology, to mention but a few. When considering a few of the numerous constraints which limit bureaucracy, there is no better source than the seminal work by James Q. Wilson, who summarizes in his own introduction “One of the central themes of this book is that the management of government agencies is powerfully constrained by limitations on the ability of managers to buy and sell products or hire and fire people on the basis of what best serves the efficiency or productivity of the organization.” 2 While many efforts have been made to close this gap between public and private bureaucracy much still remains to be done. Due to the various differences which make up public and private bureaucracy, it is doubtful that the gap between the two shall ever be fully breached. Thus the thrust and the thesis behind this research is that: While it is preferable and desirable to reduce certain differences between public and private bureaucracy, certain fundamental features, by necessity, must remain intact in order for each to function more effectively.

Literature Review – PT I - Public & Private Management Timeliness, efficiency, motivation and innovation are several of the key variables common to an efficient and competitive organization. The choice of the above epigraph, attributed to Jack Welch, is intentional and reflects his business acumen, while at the same time marking his epic failure in regards to intercultural awareness. Much like bureaucracy, there are both positive and negative aspects involved. Jack Welch, American industry’s shining star faded into oblivion, following the disastrous GE – Honeywell ill-fated merger attempt in 2000. Thus, it is possible to have all the essential elements for success and still fail the test. As Wilson points out the prerogative to hire and fire, remains a strong suit of the private sector. T.R. Reid, writing about

2

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989.p. ix

2

Welch’s hiring and firing practices notes, “Welch thought the nagging fear that your job might be the next to go was a useful motivator. He insisted that each of his top managers fire the worst 10 percent of their subordinates each year, and was astonished when some of them actually tried to protect loyal underlings who were on the borderline.” 3 This is a stark example of the difference of the limitations in hiring and firing practices, between the public and private sector. Such ruthless and indiscriminate behavior would not be possible in a public bureaucracy. Here an important lesson and vital key seems to be; striking a balance. Jack Welch’s infallible business sense was not sufficient to save him from a ruined marriage and loss of reputation, career and fortune. There does appear to be a need to balance efficiency and humanity, and this shall be discussed in the analysis and findings of the current research. Referring, once again, according to Reid, Jack Welch’s success came less from his aggressive personnel policies as it did from his purchasing of other companies. Reid notes, “But Welch’s greatest success—and the key to the enormous growth in sales and profits during his tenure—came in buying new companies to add to the GE fold. Over twenty years, he merged some 900 outside firms into General Electric.”4 This stands in stark contrast to the constraints placed upon government bureaucracies and their limitations. Managers in the public sector are, by necessity, much more risk adverse and regulation oriented. The reasons for these limitations will be examined further in the analysis and findings portion of the current research. This then, represents an engaging example of some of the advantages and disadvantages faced by both the public and private sectors on questions of motivation, efficiency and productivity. The question of bridging the public-private sector, mentioned previously, has received increased and serious interest over the

3

Reid, T.R. The United States of Europe. New York: Penguin, 2004. p. 93

4

Ibid: p. 93

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past few years. This might be one method of getting the “best of both worlds.” The trend has been away from public sponsored administration and more toward privatization. Randal Fitzgerald writes, “Privatization is gaining increasing support as an alternative to a number of publicly operated enterprises, from garbage collection to prison management.”5 There are, understandably, proponents and critics on both sides of the issue. While the US military, for example is a volunteer organization, the structure and control is that of a government agency run under the auspices of, and answerable to the Department of Defense. “Proponents of privatization argue that privately managed services are better able to meet the needs of the public though market forces: Needs are seen, and immediately met, bypassing governmental “red tape” and giving power back to the people,” 6 according to Fitzgerald. One possibility for the improvement of government operations to make them more efficient and remain viable, was pointed out by Rick Thorpe, “British Columbia’s Minister for Small Business and Revenue and minister Responsible for Regulatory Reform.” 7 Coleman citing Minister Thorpe states, “As Minister Thorpe has said on a number of occasions, sound financial management is essential for government if it wishes to create prosperity. One way of managing finances is to streamline processes, making it easier to function.”8 While this makes much sense, expediting such processes might prove a more arduous task in reality. The established hierarchy and constituent demands upon legislators remain but two of the many obstacles standing in the way of a more streamlined and discretionary process. Coleman also interviewed Harinder Takhar, Ontario’s Minister for Small Business, who developed a similar approach to improving business through 5

Fitzgerald, Randall. "Privitizing Government." In When Government Goes Private: Successful Alternatives to Public Services, by Randall Fitzgerald, 330. New York: Universe Books, 1988. 6

Ibid.

7

Coleman, Robert. "Strategic and Streamlined." CMA Management, 2007. p. 48

8

Ibid: p. 48

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less regulation and streamlining regulation. One noted example is that of the body shop industry. Coleman, citing Takhar, “Right now we have a pilot project in which the body shop industry has all the rules and regulations that affect it put online for them—they are all in one place online, so that they understand what affects them and how.”9 While this may be a laudable effort at incorporating new technology, one hopes that there are sufficient hard copies, available for consultation, in the event of a power failure. One very promising avenue of development broached in the Coleman article is the concept of cooperation between government and business, through the use of new technology, notably the Internet. This could, conceivably present a host of possibilities for future cooperation and enhancement of activities on both sides of the spectrum. There is very little literature dedicated to the glories of government bureaucracy. On the other hand there is no dearth of writing on the failings of public mismanagement and government maladministration. A brief perusal of some of the pertinent literature will highlight some of these problematic issues. One of the major stumbling blocks to efficient public and government service lies in the often monolithic composition of statutes and rules, which serve to regulate and guide the conduct of public business. Such an example is pointed out by Wilson, “Those criteria [decisions on fair purchasing] are spelled out in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, a complex document of over six thousand pages.” 10 Of course, the obvious question which arises, when faced with such a mind boggling statistic, is such a voluminous document even a valid or useful instrument? Such regulations, it should be noted, are often presented in the form of standard operating procedures, (SOPs). Many of these constraints are directly related to the politics of government agencies and the legislators who must answer to their

9

Coleman, Robert. "Strategic and Streamlined." CMA Management, 2007: p. 50.

10

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989. p. 127

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constituencies. As Wilson reiterates, “The argument is that political supervision of the factors of production [both goods & services] leads managers to become constraint-oriented rather than task oriented.”11

Literature Review PT II - Bureaucracy and Intelligence One completely distinct problem, specific to the field of Intelligence analysis and bureaucracy, is the politicization of intelligence in response to criticism. The fiasco which led to the invasion of Iraq, based upon false estimates of Iraq’s supposed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities, resulted in distorted and incorrect estimates, such as the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). John Bolton in a highly critical, report writes, “We are still paying the price for this bureaucratic insurrection, as information emerges about Iran’s extensive efforts to conceal its nuclear program.”12 Bolton takes a stand on removing the bureaucratic and hierarchal constraints that have plagued the US Intelligence Community (USIC) over its history. His argument is succinctly stated, “The IC’s problem stems from a culture of anonymous conformity. Greater centralization will only reinforce existing bureaucratic obstacles to providing decision makers with a full range of intelligence analysis.” 13 Four major, well founded, yet highly controversial suggestions made by Bolton are:   

Elimination of the office of the DNI. Bolton sees this, quite rightly, as an added and superfluous layer of hierarchy. Abolition of the National Intelligence Estimate and other similar time wasting products. The opening of intelligence as a product in a competitive market place of ideas.

11

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989.p. 125

12

Bolton, John. "Let's Take the Bureaucracy out of Intelligence." The Wall Street Journal, 2010: N.P.

13

Ibid

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

Altering the vacillating and risk tolerant attitudes ingrained within the current [Obama] administration.14

While these suggestions are indeed radical and highly contentious, they do make sense and offer a possible solution to the current bureaucratic stagnation and mismanagement that has increasingly proven the nemesis of good intelligence analysis. A model, based upon the fusion of public- private cooperation, was developed out of necessity, during the advent of the Iraq and Afghanistan incursions. This need for additional assets, led to the employment of large numbers of private civilian contractors within the structure of the Department of Defense and the US Intelligence community. Lieutenant Colonel Voelz, in a very precise and extremely enlightening report, points out, “Only in the wake of several high-profile incidents involving contractor misconduct and innumerable reports of lax oversight did questions begin to arise whether privatization efforts had gone too far, too fast.” 15 Thus, this example provides clear evidence that the concept of public – private fusion may not be as promising as many would like to believe, or at a minimum there must be strict control and oversight. In light of this dilemma, Voelz calls for “improved management protocols and procedural safeguards,” which brings the issue full circle to the fundamental structure of more rigid bureaucracy, applied to an essentially private enterprise. This issue will be discussed in further detail in the analysis section. Guidelines for such oversight would include:    

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Clarification of contractor responsibilities. Clear legal guidelines and limitations. Improved oversight and management controls. Identification of risks and dangers to national security. 16

Bolton, John. "Let's Take the Bureaucracy out of Intelligence." The Wall Street Journal, 2010: N.P.

15

Voelz, Glenn J. "Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2009: p. 587 16

Ibid p. 587

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In essence, Voelz is recommending the instauration of SOPs for application to the private sector, a difficult task at best. Nevertheless, it would appear that the trend, at least for the foreseeable future, is an enhanced augmentation of civilian contracting forces and integration, within the nucleus of the intelligence machine[disclaimer: there is a rather similar phrasing within the work of Voelz but this was purely coincidental]. Voelz significantly points out, “A 2007 analysis conducted by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reinforced the general outline of these estimates [c.f., increased contractor participation in intelligence activities at all levels], noting that approximately forty percent of analytical functions in the community were being provided by contractor support.”17 When considering these events it does not really come as a surprise. The history of the US intelligence community was originally, in true “chicken or egg fashion,” a private affair prior to becoming a federal venture. In a similar, yet different vein, Anthony Olcott, a Central Intelligence Agency Officer in Resident, at Georgetown University, offers an interesting view of conflict between the office of the Director of National Security (DNI), who wishes to reach out to private industry, academia and even foreign assets and those who would defend single-agency supremacy and security, at all costs. Commenting on Jane Jacobs’s book, Systems of Survival, Olcott remarks, “But if Jacobs is correct, perhaps even more important is her warning that the attempt to meld those competing interests without “knowledgeable flexibility” will lead to what she dubbed “monstrous hybrids,” or systems that exhibit the worst aspects of both sets of interests with none of the benefits of either.”18 Jacobs draws up an interesting matrix of two opposing yet

17

Voelz, Glenn J. "Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2009: p.588 18

Olcott, Anthony C. "The Challenges of Clashing IC Interests." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2010: p. 623 - 624.

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complementary “valued behaviors, or “precepts.” These are labeled as Guardian and trader variables and related quite closely to the characteristics involved in both public versus private enterprise, as well as with open and closed intelligence analysis, which ties these two reviews together quite nicely. This matrix is included, at the end, in Annex A, of this research. There is also the issue of bureaucratic ‘stovepiping’ of information, which takes place due to factors surrounding organizational culture. This creates an invisible wall, an organizational divide, which prevents collaboration and more efficient intelligence analysis. This creates an inherent stalemate, between security and secrecy and the necessary sharing of information and knowledge. Olcott, citing Kenneth Liberthal’s Brookings Institute study, emphasizes, “The security people have no responsibility for having the IC produce useful or relevant analysis. Their overriding concern is to make sure the IC is not penetrated from outside or undermined by bad apples on the inside.”19 The previous two sections have discussed the issues surrounding public and government, versus private corporate management. Aspects of public-private function and considerations of efficiency, timeliness, constraints and opportunities have been discussed within the limited confines of allocated space. An attempt has also been made to clarify some of the dilemmas and problematic questions raised, while shedding light upon some possibilities in the future for enhanced and more efficient bureaucracies. The following section deals with the analysis, findings and recommendations drawn from this research.

19

Olcott, Anthony C. "The Challenges of Clashing IC Interests." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2010: 628

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Analysis and Findings Attempts to Render Public Service More Amenable As mentioned previously, an effort to combine the best of both worlds, through a mixture of the strong points of public and private systems, might appear to be an elixir for the problems of modern bureaucracy. But much like those touted tonics of yesteryear, there is little hope for a lasting ‘cure.’ To remain realistic, there is a limited possibility to streamline bureaucratic process, up to a given point, and to provide greater discretion to managers. However, as pointed out this will always remain limited in scope, so long as legislators have ultimate responsibility over government operations. Several note-worthy past attempts bent on improving the bureaucratic process in government operations, have been both attempted and implemented. Among these was the famed Clinton initiative, the creation of the “National Performance Review (NPR) often referred to as reinventing Government, or REGO.”20 Not all attempts at improving government performance are equal however; in fact, some are utter disasters. Prior to the Clinton initiative during the 1970s, the pendulum had swung in the opposite direction, creating an unwieldy and cumbersome bureaucratic glut. An example of such a system being attempted and coming bottoms up in failure is provided by the China Lake, Naval Weapons Center dilemma, discussed in Wilson’s Bureaucracy. Essentially, attempting to apply stringent enforcement of bureaucratic procedures to civilian personnel has the effect of reducing both the number and quality of prospective candidates.

20

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989.p. ix

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Organizational Culture as a Factor of Motivation Organizational culture is based upon the history of a given organization and is composed of its past glories, icons, rituals and practices. The down side of organizational culture is a tendency toward parochialism and protectionism and privileging the organization over that of the goals or the ultimate mission. There is an upside, and this is represented in the personal organizational pride which can serve as a powerful motivational factor when used correctly. Recently, there have been many efforts to increase interagency and interdepartmental collaboration at the expense of organizational culture and specialization. While greater cooperation is desirable, it does not necessarily follow that it must come at the price of the effacement of organizational culture. Indeed using the best parts of an organizational culture can offer opportunities for increased cooperation while maintaining individual unit integrity and cohesion. Efficiency and production can be tied into personal unit pride as a method of enhancing overall output. When considering the factors of motivation through collaboration Bardach makes a interesting and pertinent observation, “It is not necessary to assume that collaboration is motivated by managers’ interest in creating public value. Indeed, careerist and bureaucratic motivations are often quite important source of collaborative effort.” 21 Inherent Limitations of the Hierarchal Structure The existence of a well-defined hierarchy is the cornerstone of most public administrations. While it is unlikely, if not impossible, to rid the bureaucracy of this vital element, it may be, nonetheless, possible to reduce the layers of ineffectual bureaucracy which tend to slow down the entire process and, thus, render any given bureaucracy more streamlined and efficient. The 21

Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1998. p. 9

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two impediments to such a restructuring are connected to striking a balance between rewards and increased responsibilities. By reducing the hierarchal levels of a bureaucracy one is automatically engendering an increased workload and associated responsibility for the remaining cadre. Part of this increased workload and responsibility may be offset by a system of bonuses and rewards. A portion of the savings gleaned, on a reduced work force, could be rechanneled back as an incentive for enhanced productivity. The fact that there is a “House that Jack Built,” process involved in the intelligence production cycle renders things no easier in an effort for systematic improvement. In other words, the producers of the intelligence product are answerable to the legislators and policymakers who oversee their process. They, themselves are, in turn, responsible to their respective constituencies. Finally, there is the different, yet related, problem of keeping the machine turning regardless the rate of success or failures. This blind production model is the ghost which has haunted bureaucracy in general and intelligence specifically, from the outset. In many ways then, the intelligence cycle becomes the unwilling Siamese twin of the bureaucracy cycle. This bureaucratic dilemma of production versus quality is clearly indicated when Olcott writes, “While not as “monstrous” as the USSR as a whole, the current “intell production” model too closely resembles that of the Soviet Book publishing bureaucracy, which paid authors and publishing house, according to the number of books printed, rather than the number sold.” 22 While rules and regulations are, of course, necessary, they can also become top heavy, cumbersome and at times even overwhelming. John Gravois supports this view when he writes, “And if Congress and the administration could agree to lift some of the outdated procedural requirements and redundant reporting demands that are the bane

22

Olcott, Anthony C. "The Challenges of Clashing IC Interests." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2010: p. 634

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of the average civil servant’s life, it might be possible for agencies to fulfill their mission as well or better with fewer people.”23 Impediments to Cooperation If one were to inquire as to the most salient problem facing efficient public or government cooperation, the answer might likely be interagency or interdepartmental cooperation. It is a frequent occurrence, enshrined within the epithet, “the right hand does not know what the left is doing, ”that government and public service agencies are held up due to a lack of cooperation or efficient communication. In this specific case, the problem also defines the answer. Enhanced cooperation and improved systems of communication could do much to improve the quality of government and public service. An obvious sticking point has been the guarantee of job security offered in both public administration and government employment. An individual in one of these positions has greater job security than in the private sector, and cannot lose their position, unless there has been serious misconduct, or a breach of the stipulated regulations and security protocols. Such job security has been an impediment, in the past to both effective cooperation and overall organizational effectiveness. One of the few options open to managers is the reassignment of such individuals to unwelcome tasks in the hopes of their resigning their post. The civil service system is geared toward protectionist policies, in such a way that those who are fired and appeal their case are most likely to receive favorable adjudication. On the side of interagency cooperation there are a plethora of variables which lead to failure. Organizational culture can inevitably lead to a ‘turf war,’ where one agency falls into confrontation with another over the sharing of power or assets. The CIA and the FBI are a classic example of this long

23

Gravois, John. "More Bureaucrats Please." The Washington Monthly, 2011: 8-13.

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standing rivalry. While many attempts at “fixing the problem” have been attempted legislatively, the true solutions will only come through forced interagency cooperation and enhanced education of both actors. Conclusions: Although some truly innovative and novel approaches have been made in recent years to streamline bureaucracy and enhance interagency and interdepartmental cooperation, much still remains to be done. Recent programs such as the Security Cooperation (SC) dual-key initiative, which joins formal rival agencies, the Department of Defense and the State Department, are certainly promising and a step in the right direction. Nonetheless, it is not through the expansive creation of yet more agencies and more programs that a solution is to be found, rather by building better and more efficient frameworks for already existing structures and organizations. As John Gravois points out, “Many agencies, for instance, exhibit excessive layering in their management ranks (think job titles that start with “deputy-” or “under-“).”24 Industry and the private enterprise can learn from their counterparts in government and the public sector and viceversa. The key to advancement is to know and recognize the strengths and weaknesses of each system and to take advantage of opportunities, whenever and wherever possible. A greater cooperation between these two major spheres of influence could greatly assist in the exchange of knowledge, managerial skills and best business practices. Finally, an interesting commentary on the intelligence side of bureaucracy and proposed improvements can be offered. Following each and every intelligence failure, be it: the unforeseen Chinese involvement in the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs Fiasco, or the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction debacle, there are calls for

24

Gravois, John. "More Bureaucrats Please." The Washington Monthly, 2011: p.13

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reorganization within the intelligence community. Related to these calls are accusations of a failure of interagency collaboration. While this may well have been a significant factor at the organizational level, as mentioned above, the remedial approach was entirely unsuitable. Taking a page out of Bardach offers a glimpse at a more reasonable alternative, “The solution I explore in this book is collaboration across agency lines. It is behavioral and process oriented; it is not structural—that is, it is not looking to formal reorganization.”25 Considering the most recent failure, of intelligence and policymaking in Benghazi, Libya; Bardach’s words ring truer than ever, more than a decade after they were first written.

25

Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1998.p.16

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REFERENCES

Amy, Douglas J. "The Case FOR Bureaucracy." Government is Good. 2007. http://www.governmentisgood.com/ (accessed November 9, 2012). Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1998. Bluedorn, Nathaniel, and Hans Bluedorn. THeFallacy Detective. Muscatine: Bluedorn, 2009. Bolton, J. (2010, Jan 11). Let's take bureaucracy out of intelligence. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/399126000?accountid=8289 Colman, Robert. 2007. "Strategic and Streamlined." CMA Management 81 (2): 48-50. http://search.proquest.com/docview/197811089?accountid=8289. Calfee, Sharif, Joseph Lee, Peter Crandall, and Young Rock An. "Enhancing Interagency collaboration." Joint Force Quarterly, 2011: 102-107. Champion, Brian. "Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintilligence (Taylor & Francis Group LLC.) 21 (2008): 530-564. De Bono, Edward. De Bono's Thinking Course. New York: Facts on File, 1994. Driver, Dr. Darelll. "Military Organizational Cultures." INTL 604 Interagency Operations Week Three. APU, November 2012. Easter, Cornelius. "Organizational Climate Building and Cultural Integration in Coalition Warfare." Strategy Research Project, 1996: 1-31. Fitzgerald, Randall. "Privitizing Government." In When Government Goes Private: Successful Alternatives to Public Services, by Randall Fitzgerald, 330. New York: Universe Books, 1988. Gravois, John. "More Bureaucrats Please." The Washington Monthly, 2011: 8-13. Hermann, Margaret G. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework." International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (2001): 47-82. Honig, Arthur. "The Impact of CIA's Organizational Culture in its Estimates Under William Casey." Interntional Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2011: 44-64. 16

Huse, Morten, Donald O. Neubaum, and Jonas Gabrielsson. 2005. "Corporate Innovation and Competitive Environment." International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 1 (3): 313-333. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11365-005-2596-2. http://search.proquest.com/docview/883623378?accountid=8289. Intelligence, Select Committee on. Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. Unclassified with minority views, Washington, DC: N.P., 2006. Jervis, Robert. "Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash." Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 2 (2010): 185-204. —. Why Intelligence Fails. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. N.A. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Official Government Edition, Washington DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006, 1 -585. Olcott, Anthony C. "The Challenges of Clashing IC Interests." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2010: 623 - 635. "Privatizing Government." 1989.The Futurist 23 (2): 55-55. http://search.proquest.com/docview/218583836?accountid=8289. Randall Amster J.D., Ph.D. Humanizing Our Engagement with Others. May 6, 2012. http://www.newclearvision.com/2012/06/05/the-war-drones-on/ (accessed June 18, 2012). Reid, T.R. The United States of Europe. New York: Penguin, 2004. Richelson, Jeffery T. The US Intelligence Community. Boulder: Westview Press, 2012. Sloan, Stanley R. Permanent Alliance? New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2010. Smith, Martin A. "US Bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq." Contemporary Politics, 2008: 91-105.Thomas, E. Boyt, F. Lusch Robert, and K. Schuler Drue. 1997. "Fostering Esprit De Corps in Marketing." Marketing Management 6 (1): 20-27. http://search.proquest.com/docview/194192754?accountid=8289. Voelz, Glenn J. "Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2009: 586613. Welch, David A. "A Positive Science of Bureaucratic Politics." International Studies Review 422 (1998): 210-216. Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

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Epigraph: By Jack Welch http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/jackwelch458945.html#LJda7VS2Ws53Zc8E.99

Images : Disclaimer: All images are reproduced under USC title 17 for educational purposes under the fair usage clause. Cover image: The maze of bureaucracy. http://middleeasttribune.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/bureaucracy-maze.jpg

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APPENDIX A Jacobs Model of “Precepts” or Valued Behaviors

Examining this model closely it becomes readily apparent that there are possible applications. For instance, the Guardian syndrome is highly representative of a stylized tightly knit bureaucracy such as is seen in government. The Trade Syndrome, on the other hand, is far more representative of the more loosely organized principles represented by private enterprise. Again, there is yet another interesting corollary if one considers the Guardian Syndrome to represent the interventionist stance of the Department of Defense and the Trade Syndrome, that of the more diplomatic approach of the State Department. Finally, this matrix could also be viewed through the prism of an individualistic versus a collectivistic view.

Guardian Syndrome Shun Trading Exert Prowess Be obedient and disciplined Adhere to tradition Respect Hierarchy Be Loyal Take Vengeance Deceive for the sake of the task Make rich use of leisure Be ostentatious Dispense largesse Be exclusive Show fortitude Be fatalistic Treasure honor

Trade Syndrome Shun force Compete Be efficient Be open with inventiveness and novelty Use initiative and enterprise Come to voluntary agreements Respect contracts Dissent for the sake of the task Be industrious Be thrifty Invest for productive purposes Collaborate easily with strangers and aliens Promote comfort and convenience Be optimistic Be honest

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APPENDIX B James Q. Wilsons Four Models of Bureaucracy Matrix

MODEL

EXAMPLE

OUTPUTS

OUTCOMES

IRS – USPS – SSA* OSHA – DoD* (peacetime)

Observable

Observable

Observable

Not Observable

CRAFT

DoD (wartime) USFS *

Not Observable

Observable

COPING

LE – DoS*

Not Observable

Not Observable

PRODUCTION PROCEDURAL

* Abbreviations: IRS: Internal Revenue Service; USPS: United States Postal Service; SSA: Social Security Administration; OSHA: Occupational, Safety and Health Administration; DoD: Department of Defense; USFS: United States Forest Service; LE: Law Enforcement; DoS: Department of State.

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