Trends in Organized Crime

2 downloads 0 Views 564KB Size Report
Andreas, Peter (1998) “The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico. ... (posted November 29) (www.narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristin-.
Trends in Organized Crime Drug Trafficking, Corruption, and Violence in Mexico: Mapping the Linkages --Manuscript Draft-Manuscript Number:

TIOC-200R1

Full Title:

Drug Trafficking, Corruption, and Violence in Mexico: Mapping the Linkages

Article Type:

Mexican Cartels

Corresponding Author:

Stephen Morris Middle Tennessee State University Murfreesboro, TN UNITED STATES

Corresponding Author Secondary Information: Corresponding Author's Institution:

Middle Tennessee State University

Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution: First Author:

Stephen Morris

First Author Secondary Information: Order of Authors:

Stephen Morris

Order of Authors Secondary Information: Abstract:

Drug trafficking, drug-related violence and drug-related corruption have come to dominate Mexican politics in the late 2000s. Most consider corruption central to both the illicit trade and to the government's war on it. But such relationships have yet to be fully examined and raise a number of questions. This paper explores the links among these variables. The opening section grapples with the theoretical puzzle. It lays out the different types of drug-related corruption and violence and explores in detail the three binary relationships with particular attention to plomo o plata and the possible inverse connection between corruption and violence. Noting that corruption was once associated with relatively peaceful drug trafficking under the PRI but today is tied to violence, the second section addresses the historical puzzle and asks how the complex relationship among these variables has changed in recent years. The final section explores the various dynamic linkages between drug-trafficking violence and corruption. The theoretical discussion is supplemented by examples from Mexico during the current period.

Powered by Editorial Manager® and Preprint Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation

Title Page w/ ALL Author Contact Info.

Drug Trafficking, Corruption, and Violence in Mexico: Mapping the Linkages

Stephen D. Morris Middle Tennessee State University [email protected]

Abstract Drug trafficking, drug-related violence and drug-related corruption have come to dominate Mexican politics in the late 2000s. Most consider corruption central to both the illicit trade and to the government’s war on it. But such relationships have yet to be fully examined and raise a number of questions. This paper explores the links among these variables. The opening section grapples with the theoretical puzzle. It lays out the different types of drugrelated corruption and violence and explores in detail the three binary relationships with particular attention to plomo o plata and the possible inverse connection between corruption and violence. Noting that corruption was once associated with relatively peaceful drug trafficking under the PRI but today is tied to violence, the second section addresses the historical puzzle and asks how the complex relationship among these variables has changed in recent years. The final section explores the various dynamic linkages between drug-trafficking violence and corruption. The theoretical discussion is supplemented by examples from Mexico during the current period.

*Manuscript (must not contain author information) Click here to view linked References

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Drug Trafficking, Corruption, and Violence in Mexico: Mapping the Linkages1

Abstract Drug trafficking, violence, and corruption dominated Mexican politics under President Felipe Calderón. Most observers consider corruption central to both the illicit trade and the government’s war on it. But such relationships raise a number of questions that have yet to be fully examined. This largely exploratory paper focuses on two puzzles. The opening section grapples with the theoretical puzzle linking drug trafficking, violence and corruption. It explores the possible inverse connection between corruption and violence and lays out the different types of drug-related corruption and violence. Noting that corruption in Mexico was once associated with relatively peaceful drug trafficking but today is tied to intense violence, the second section addresses the historical puzzle and asks how the complex relationship among these variables has changed in recent years. This section presents a series of hypotheses drawn from the recent literature to account for the historic shift. Building on this, the final section explores the dynamic relationship linking drug-trafficking violence and corruption.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Introduction By most accounts corruption plays a central role in the drug trafficking, organized crime, and violence that have rocked Mexico in recent years. In considering the nature and role of corruption in this equation, this paper seeks to analyze two puzzles: one theoretical and static, the other historical and dynamic. The theoretical puzzle relates to the triangular relationship linking drug-trafficking, violence, and corruption (see figure1 below). One side of the triangle features a strong consensus tying drug trafficking to corruption; another depicts a similar, though somewhat more tenuous, consensus fastening drug trafficking to violence. Both consensuses hold that, in essence, the former cannot exist without the latter. The precise nature of the relationship linking corruption to violence, the third side of the triangle, however, is less clear. Many suggest a positive connection, which would be mathematically consistent with the other two sides of the triangle. Whereas some suggest that drug-related violence and corruption are directly and intimately linked, feeding on one another, others envision a more indirect relationship whereby both stem from weak or ineffective institutions. Yet, others contend that drug-related violence and corruption are opposites, inversely related, representing mutually opposed tactics available to and employed by the traffickers in their quest to influence the state and state officials. Captured in some way by the popular expression plomo o plata (translated in English as “silver or lead”), the basic contention is that state officials acquiesce, cooperate and join forces with drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in return for an illegal payoff, or suffer violent consequences if they refuse. Mathematically inconsistent with the other sides of the triangle, this view crystallizes the theoretical puzzle: a positive linkage between drug-trafficking

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

and corruption, and drug-trafficking and violence, and yet an inverse relationship between drugrelated violence and corruption. The second puzzle deals by and large with the same theoretical issues, but from a historical and dynamic perspective. Here, on one side of the historic divide, observers point to corruption as a key factor facilitating a relatively peaceful, non-violent period of drug trafficking operations in Mexico during the long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (19292000). And yet today many associate corruption with the dramatic and disturbing rise in drugrelated violence. During a public meeting of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública in 2008, President Felipe Calderón clearly expressed this view: a view he has repeated on many occasions: “Crime cannot be understood without the cover of impunity and the corruption of the police” (Milenio August 27, 2008).2 Hence the historical puzzle: whereas corruption seemingly facilitated in some manner the lack of a direct connection between drug-trafficking and violence in the past, it now stands front and center in helping to wed the two. These puzzles raise a number of questions. If corruption and violence represent tactical opposites, does an increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico point to some sort of decline in the level of corruption? In other words, has a decline in corruption forced cartels to resort to greater violence in dealing with the state and/or one another? Has a reduction in corruption or perhaps a change in the patterns of corruption triggered more inter-DTO violence? Or has Mexico experienced an increase in both drug-related violence and drug-related corruption in recent years, suggesting that the two – corruption and violence – indeed work in tandem? If so, then how could corruption facilitate a relatively peaceful form of drug trafficking during one period and yet a more violent form during another: the second puzzle? Despite blanket statements regarding “corruption” are the nature or types of corruption marking the two historic

2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

periods in Mexico fundamentally different? Is it possible even that the corruption touted by scholars and politicians alike to explain the past or recent events is overblown, encompassing a wide range of factors that upon closer examination actually do not constitute corruption, and that corruption may, in part at least, be a sort of amorphous and easy conceptual scapegoat utilized to divert blame from other policy failings or determinants? In grappling with these questions, this largely exploratory paper strives to assess the nature of the relationships linking corruption to drug trafficking and drug-related violence in Mexico. The first of two sections examines the theoretical linkages, discussing each of the three dyadic relationships of the triangle. This section also briefly explores the different types of corruption and violence linking drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to the state. Building on this, the subsequent section examines the broader changes affecting the nature of the triangular relationship in Mexico. Based on a review of recent literature on the topic, this section presents a series of hypotheses to account for the surge in violence in recent years and the role of corruption.

The Theoretical Puzzle Analysis of the theoretical puzzle focuses on the binary relationships linking the three variables – drug trafficking, drug-trafficking related corruption and drug-trafficking related violence – as depicted in Figure 1. [Figure 1 here] 1. Drug trafficking and Corruption. The most formidable of the three sides of this triangle seems to be the one connecting organized crime, including drug trafficking, to corruption. A huge literature along with popular rhetoric sustain the notion that organizations providing contraband

3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

goods and services (aka organized crime, including drug trafficking organizations) cannot operate without the existence of some form of corruption: that the two are intricately and inherently linked (see, for instance, Andreas 1998; Beittel 2011; Hanson 2008; Naylor 2003, 2009; O’Day and López 2001; O’Day 2001; Pimental 2003; Shelley 2005). Studies of prohibition in the U.S. and the operation of gambling and prostitution in major cities today, for instance, all highlight the role illegal payoffs to police and local officials have played and continue to play in not only allowing these businesses to operate, but also in helping to maintain them within certain political and geographic bounds (Naylor 2003). In Mexico, of course, scores of analysts and politicians echo this point (see Lupsha 1995). “Doing business entails bribing and intimidating public officials and law enforcement and judicial agents,” as Laurie Freeman (2006, 12) notes, “organized crime cannot survive without corruption, and it looks for opportunities to create and deepen corruption.”3 But despite this strongly asserted proposition, some doubts can be raised. First, it is useful to acknowledge that many factors besides corruption facilitate the rise and operation of organized crime. Impunity, a variable sharing top billing alongside corruption for facilitating drug trafficking, for example, can stem from a wide range of factors besides corruption, including gross inefficiencies within the institutions charged with investigating, prosecuting and punishing crimes, the lack of resources relative to the magnitude of the problem, poor or inadequate training and weak professional standards, and competing political priorities, to name just a few. In the case of Mexico, the extremely high levels of impunity found within the criminal justice system, estimated to be as high as 97%, cannot be attributed solely to corruption (see Zepeda 2004).4 Nor can the lack of reporting of crime by the public. In other words, the failures of law enforcement in Mexico to fight drug trafficking are not exclusively the result of

4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

corruption, thus raising the question of whether drug-trafficking indeed even requires corruption in the face of such widespread impunity, institutional weaknesses, and minimal public support of law enforcement institutions. Second, it should also be acknowledged that this symbiotic linkage does not seem to apply to individual criminal acts. Rarely does anyone categorically associate everyday forms of crime (non-organized crime) with corruption even though the level of impunity may be equally high. It is only organized crime that seems to work in conjunction with and require corruption. This suggests that corruption may be, in part at least, a scapegoat (see discussion below) and that the positive relationship linking organized crime to corruption may not be as formidable as many believe. Nonetheless, the literature and popular wisdom share a strong consensus on the positive linkage. 2. Drug-trafficking and violence. Like its association with corruption, the view linking drug trafficking to violence is also widely shared, and many consider drug trafficking inherently violent. For most this argument stems from the fact that DTOs lack access to the legal means to resolve conflict, enforce internal norms, or prevent law enforcement from intervening in their operations, thus leaving violence as a natural and inevitable by-product of their business model. As June Beittel (2011, 2) asserts “violence is an intrinsic feature of the trade in illicit drugs.” Phil Williams (2009), in fact, compares the situation facing DTOs to the anarchy of the Westphalian nation-state system where states must utilize power to assert their interests vis-à-vis other states. The recent uptick in drug-related violence in Mexico certainly seems to confirm this intimate connection. Yet, numerous studies as well as Mexican history suggest otherwise: that there is no inherent relationship linking drug trafficking to violence (Friman 2009, Naylor 2009, Williams 2009). First, violence is costly and bad for business (Bailey and Taylor 2009; Naylor 2009).

5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Criminal organizations consequently try to avoid violence and prefer to operate under the radar by cooperating with one another and “corrupt[ing] enough state officials to maintain sufficient freedom of action for their activities” (Williams 2009, 325). As Andreas and Wallman (2009, 227) succinctly point out, the drug smuggler “prefers to bypass or buy off the police rather than bully them.” A second indication that the connection linking drug-trafficking to violence may be weaker than imagined is the considerable variations found across and within sectors of the illicit economy (Andreas and Wallman 2009; Naylor 2009). According to Naylor (2009), businesses operating in such illicit, contraband markets as illegal wildlife, stolen art, counterfeit products, contraband cigarettes, and even marijuana, for example, rarely exhibit much violence despite not having access to legal means to resolve conflict. Indeed, Naylor finds that only in the drug and sex trades is violence possible though even in these sectors it is rarely found associated with all four areas of the business chain (production, marketing, product distribution, and profit distribution). Finally, as noted above and explored in greater detail below, Mexican history suggests that the two – drug trafficking and violence -- are not inevitably woven together. The long period of PRI domination features the coexistence of drug trafficking and relative peace. Of course not all drug-related violence is the same. In considering the theoretical linkages related to drug-related violence, it is critically important to distinguish between at least three forms or directions of violence as laid out in Table 1: (a) State violence  DTOs; (b) DTO violence  State officials; and (c) violence within and between DTOs (inter- and intra- DTO violence). Beittel (2011) contends that the violence intrinsic in drug trafficking relates primarily to violence among and within DTOs (type c) rather than violence against the state. But while some, including Beittel (2011) see this form of violence as intrinsic, others, such as Friman (2009, 286), suggest that even violence among criminal groups is not inevitable and is more

6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

likely to occur only under certain conditions, like during disputes over lucrative distribution networks and market share. Violence against the state (type b), he contends, is more likely when law enforcement tries to curtail the business or pursues broader political goals.5 But while these distinctions on the surface may seem intuitive, the presence of corruption creates many potentially grey areas. So what may appear as (type a) State violence  DTOs (i.e. law enforcement), for instance, may actually be a form of (type c) inter- and intra- DTO violence if it involves corrupt state officials selectively using state machinery to go after particular organizations while in the pay of others; and what may appear as (type b) DTO violence  State officials (confrontation) may also be a form of (type c) inter- and intra- DTO violence if the organization is targeting corrupt state officials working for rivals (intra-DTO violence) or betraying the “purchased” trust of the state official (inter-DTO violence).6 [Table 1 here] 3. Corruption and (drug-related) violence. This side of the triangulated equation seems to enjoy less attention than the other two and less consensus. Some analysts portray a strong positive relationship linking corruption with drug-related violence, particularly at the aggregate level. Le Billon (2003, cited in Beyerle 2011), for instance, finds that countries suffering higher levels of corruption tend to suffer higher levels of political instability, including violence. Beyerle (2011), in turn, notes the various ways that the two work hand-in-hand. Parties use fraud and bribery to acquire weapons for violence, for example, or endemic corruption generates social unrest and violent conflict. Human Rights Watch (2007, cited in Beyerle 2011) also points to a direct relationship between the two, but inverting the source of the violence wherein state officials use corruption to support their violence against citizens. The formal model developed by Dal Bó et al. (2006) also points to the coexistence of bribes and violence, or plomo and plata, at the

7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

aggregate level. Others, by contrast, point to a more indirect though still positive association linking the two factors. Kaufmann (2006, cited in Beyerle 2011) and Ackerman (2012), for example, contend that corruption and violence both stem from weak institutions and impunity. On the surface, the current dynamic in Mexico seems to support this view: a point explored in the next section. Drug-related violence, which is much easier to track, has clearly skyrocketed, alongside indications of a similar climb in the levels of corruption. Others, however, suggest an inverse relationship linking the two. In his seminal work on political development, for example, Samuel Huntington (1968, 59-64) touted corruption as a substitute for political violence. Hidden from the public, corruption facilitates arrangements among the elite that the public might consider illegitimate, especially the inclusion of excluded groups, but which work to ensure political acquiescence toward the regime, and thus preclude the use of political violence. Though Huntington was certainly not referring to drug-trafficking, other writings focusing on the drug trade suggest a similar sort of relationship. As just noted, violence is widely considered bad for business, particularly illegal businesses. So from a business perspective, DTOs would prefer to evade or corrupt state officials rather than confront them violently (Bailey and Taylor 2009). This means that the primary purpose of bribes paid to state officials in return for protection is precisely to lessen the likelihood of both State  DTO violence, and of DTO  State violence. Under these circumstances, public officials refrain from enforcing the law in exchange for a share of the profits (payoffs) or rents, while drug-traffickers secure their business through the least costly avenue. This linkage is also consistent with the formal model developed by Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009) wherein corruption cements informal institutions of state-sponsored protection and, as a result, violence remains low.

8

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

The classic phrase plomo o plata captures this inverse relationship linking corruption and violence. It underscores the notion that while the threat of violence goes hand-in-hand with corruption, actual violence is prevented if the bribe option is selected. Indeed in the formal model developed by Dal Bó et al. (2006) focusing primarily on the quality of a country’s public officials, plomo and plata represent two distinct mechanisms by which groups attempt to influence policy. Though they find that groups must use both bribes and threats (p. 46) and that at the aggregate level societies suffering high levels of violence also experience more corruption (p. 42), at the individual level they nonetheless treat the two, plomo and plata, as substitutes and hence opposing strategies of political influence (p. 47).7 In considering the complex relationship between drug-trafficking violence and corruption three points should be noted. First, part of the distinction between the two positions relates to distinct levels of analysis and the underlying ecological issue. While research shows that corruption and violence coexist at the aggregate level, at the individual level where dyadic corrupt exchanges occur they appear as largely opposing or mutually exclusive strategies or techniques employed by the actors to gain influence. In a single state-society interaction, plomo o plata represents a binary choice and are thus inversely related, but through repeated state-society interactions some combination of both strategies co-exist since each interaction carries potentially different outcomes (Dal Bó et al. 2006). If that is the case, then the more state-society interactions of this nature that take place, the more of both corruption and violence. So at the societal level, both could be increasing simultaneously. Even so, this raises the question of the conditions that would tip the balance in one direction or the other: toward greater corruption or greater violence at the aggregate level. To reiterate one of the primary questions presented

9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

earlier: Does an increase in violence at the aggregate level, for instance, suggest a decrease or an increase in the level of corruption? Beyond this simple individual versus collective dimension lies the key issue of the homogeneity versus heterogeneity of the actors involved or monopoly control versus competition at both the state and DTO levels. As Bailey and Taylor (2009, 11) point out, the problem with the model characterizing corruption and violence as opposites is that it assumes that both the state and organized crime are unified and monopolizing actors, that they are distinct actors, and that only one tactic is in use at a particular time. Under competitive conditions of multiple state and criminal actors, it is possible for one criminal organization to use payoffs to get state officials not only to refrain from enforcing the law against that group, but in turn to enforce it selectively against a rival organization using state violence. In this case, the corruption/violence nexus turns positive. Moreover, for corruption to undermine the tendency toward violence, the state must be capable of carrying out enforcement, which may not always be the case, especially if the state is more divided or unorganized. There still remains the possibility that the relationship is largely spurious and that both violence and corruption stem from a third factor such as institutional weakness as noted by Kaufmann (2006, cited in Beyerle 2011) and Ackerman (2012). This relationship suggests that by increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement (i.e. strengthening state institutions) would have the effect of lowering both the level of corruption and the level of drug-related violence primarily. While this proposition certainly makes sense, there is a major conceptual challenge here in separating weak institutions from corruption.8 In other words, how could we operationally define weak institutions independent from corruption? (i.e. can a strong institution suffer high levels of corruption?) Nonetheless, the narrative associating both crime and

10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

corruption with weak institutions correctly points to state institutions (and the corruption) as the primary target of reform. For largely descriptive purposes, Table 2 lays out the different forms of corruption related to drug trafficking. Though additional explanation is not needed, it is nonetheless important to highlight two broad forms of corruption distinguished by the direction of influence. In one, organized crime uses payoffs to influence policy or its implementation in ways that facilitate the operation of their businesses, hence reducing costs and increasing profits (Scott 1972). This form of corruption, referred to simply as bribery, implies a situation in which groups within civil society influence, penetrate or capture the state. In the other form, however, state officials use (and abuse) their authority to largely control and influence the activities of organized crime, enjoying a portion of the business’ profits (rents) in the process through a form of extortion. In this case, the state penetrates or captures civil society organizations (Andreas 1998, 161) and corruption constitutes a sort of informal tax on the operations of the illicit business. As we see in the subsequent discussion, many associate this latter type of corruption with the period of PRI rule. In both scenarios, however, violence can be used by the societal organization or the state to reign in those not abiding by the implicit agreements or informal institutions, or to demonstrate the dangers of not accepting the bribery/extortion option. [Table 2 here] In sum, despite the coexistence of drugs, corruption and violence in contemporary Mexico, the popularly held assumptions regarding the relationships between these are not fixed, and instead seem contingent. This not only raises the question of how specific factors have changed to shape the current alignment in Mexico, but also suggests that targeting the three may

11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

first require some sort of de-linkage. I attempt to build on this by turning now to the historical puzzle.

The Historical Puzzle The historical puzzle, as noted earlier, finds corruption and drug-trafficking disassociated with violence during one period of time and wedded to it during another. The initial part of this argument enjoys substantial support in the literature (see, for instance, Andreas 1998; Astorga and Shirk 2010; Flores 2009; Lupsha 1995; Shelley 2001; Shirk 2010). As Howard Campbell (2009, 271) explains: “During the PRI’s seventy-one-year reign, Mexico suffered from endemic corruption and drug trafficking flourished, but at least there was a type of stability, since a small group of powerful traffickers and PRI government officials maintained relatively predictable relationships.” According to this widely-shared view, Mexican traffickers operated for years under a single hierarchy with public officials essentially extorting from them while organizing and protecting them. Capturing the extent of the corruption involved, Peter Lupsha (1995) contends that “Mexico’s justice agency was in reality an arm of drug trafficking, and organized crime’s government intermediary...Key traffickers and trafficking routes in a centralized authoritarian system like Mexico always needed the ‘con permiso’ of those within the Federal District.” But despite (or because of) the corruption, the PRI-led state still exercised a degree of control and enforced certain norms of operations on and among the drug groups. The arrangement with drug trafficking organizations even went beyond the sharing of profits as criminal groups assisted the police and the political system by providing token cases for the judicial system to bolster legitimacy and helping ensure PRI electoral victories. As George Grayon (2010, 29) posits,

12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Relying on bribes or mordidas, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities, frequently through ad hoc pacts that might last days, weeks, or months. [Under the prevailing] rules of the game, [the authorities] allocated ‘plazas’ based on a formula. Drug dealers behaved discretely, showed deference to public figures, spurned kidnapping, appeared with governors at their children’s weddings, and, although often allergic to politics, helped the hegemonic PRI discredit its opponents by linking them to narco-trafficking. When conflict among organizations emerged, state governors, under the direction of central authorities, would resolve it. Although the dominance of one political party did not contribute to the development of the rule of law, as Louise Shelley (2001, 215) notes, it did contribute to a law of rules, or informal institutions and mechanisms that governed the relationship between drug traffickers and the state. Above all, this state-sponsored racket resulted in lower levels of violence (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009, 262): a situation that prevailed well into the 1980s and 1990s. Narcoviolence was even kept at bay during the “extensively corrupt Salinas de Gortari administration” (Celaya Pacheco 2009, 1024).9 Recent years, however, suggest a different logic: one linking drug-trafficking and corruption to violence. President Calderón asserted this connection on numerous occasions as illustrated earlier and many analysts echo this point. In recent reports to the U.S. Congress on the Mexican situation, for example, corruption stands front and center as both directly facilitating the operation of the drug traffickers (the corruption/ drug trafficking link noted earlier), and indirectly aiding it by undermining law enforcement efforts to stop it (see Beittel 2011; Cook 2008; Simser 2011). But the key to this dilemma does not really relate to contentions linking

13

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

drug trafficking to corruption, but rather to the presence or absence of violence and hence the link between drug-related corruption and violence. Earlier, I discussed the theoretical question regarding this relationship. Here, the question centers more on explaining the changes in the past decade, particularly the stunning rise of violence, and the related role of corruption. But rather than presenting one answer to this dilemma, I present and review here various theses drawn from recent writings that seek to account for this historic shift. The theses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The idea here is to highlight the impact of recent changes on corruption and to set the stage to explore the historic dilemma and recent developments in a more systematic manner. Thesis 1: Political Changes within the State eliminated the centralized control over DTOs. Perhaps the most prominent explanation in the literature centers on the underlying political changes taking place in Mexico over the past decade or so. The stylized argument holds that the rise of political competition and democratization essentially undermined the prevailing patterns of corruption by hampering PRI’s capacity to control the enforcement and non-enforcement of the law (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009, 262). As opposition parties began to capture control of state and local governments, this had the effect of increasing the number of potential protectors and prevented a centralized state from being able to guarantee its side of a corrupt bargain. In short, as local power fell outside the PRI-controlled network, federal agents, local police and corrupt officials all began acting more autonomously, undermining the PRI’s monopoly (Grayson 2010, 31). With upper level officials now unable to fully control lower level officials, political decentralization altered corruption from a single-agent game to a multiple agent game thereby affecting the price of bribes, government’s incentives to enforce the law, and even political violence (Rios 2011). This lack of a unified, overarching hierarchy of corrupt state

14

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

officials also contributed, in turn, to the fractionalization of the DTOs, furthering the level of violence among DTOs even more (Shirk 2010, 11).10 As O’Neil (2009) starkly concludes, “by disrupting established payoff systems between drug traffickers and government officials, democratization unwittingly exacerbated drug-related violence.” Escalante Gonzalbo (2011) offers a similar argument: The municipal police, corrupt, inefficient and abusive as they can be, have to organize the informal and illegal markets...Where a local force capable of ordering the informal and illegal markets is lacking, the result is perfectly predictable, because the uncertainty generates violence. This thesis suggests, in short, that centralized state authority (monopoly state) may be a necessary condition for corruption to facilitate a non-violent form of drug trafficking. A centralized state is able to engage in a form of extortion (or taxation) vis-a-vis the DTOs and exert a certain degree of control over lower level officials and the DTOs, to determine the conditions under which DTOs operate, both of which in turn help check the various levels of violence. Decentralization of the state or a loss of monopoly control, however, undermines this system, weakens the state, and thus engenders greater competition among the DTOs as they seek to reestablish influence over a wider range of state officials through bribery. Facing a less monolithic state unable now to enforce previously agreed boundaries feeds the uncertainty and instability which coupled with heightened inter-DTO competition triggers all three forms of violence. Under such conditions, violence thus becomes a substitute for the prior corrupt agreements, as suggested by the theoretical triangle. Moreover, the decentralization of the state weakens the state potentially to the point of exposing it to being captured or colonized by DTOs. Rather than a strong state extorting from DTOs and establishing boundaries and assuring

15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

stability, corruption increasingly centers on penetrative bribery and state capturing/colonization, but with state officials now unable to maintain corruption within the confines of contributing to centralized, institutional goals.11 Essentially, the fundamental pattern of corruption shifts away from extortion to bribery and state capture. Thesis 2: Strengthening of DTOs as a result of Changes in their Business model. A second prominent thesis offered to account for the current explosion of violence and the break in the historical relationship linking corruption and drug trafficking to the absence of violence relates more to changes in the nature of the drug business itself rather than changes in the Mexican government. As many analysts have documented, U.S. Government’s efforts in the 1980s to upset the Colombian supply chain through south Florida forced the Colombian cartels to turn to Mexican suppliers, resulting in the dramatic growth of their operations and profits (see Carpenter 2005). A few years later, NAFTA further eased illicit trade via Mexico (Grayson 2010, 56; O’Neil 2009). Together, these changes funneled vast fortunes to the Mexican organizations which, in turn, heightened the degree of competition among them. According to Grayson (2010, 31), these changes multiplied the number of organizations, raised the stakes, and, in the process, made them more violent. The influx of Colombian traffickers also made the task of coordination more difficult, while also increasing the level of brutality. As the number of organizations and competition grew, they began to “vie for influence at both the national and sub-national level” (Shirk 2010, 11). For Louise Shelley (2005), this brought about a qualitative change. The older crime groups, which were dependent on existing institutional and financial structures to move their products (these groups minimized the risk of prosecution and did not fear the power of state institutions because they had “corrupted or developed collusive relations with state institutions”) were replaced by new criminal groups that do not possess long-term financial strategies and tend

16

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

to link up with terrorist groups. These new organizations do not profit from state contracts, she contends, and tend to thrive on a shadow economy and “the violence and disorder of the state” (Shelley 2005, 103). Consistent with this approach, Beith (2010) specifically blames Joaquin “el Chapo” Guzman of the Sinaloa cartel for launching the war among the DTOs in 2008 following the break-up of the Federation. Such strategies by DTOs undermine previous pacts carefully crafted via corruption. “[T]he incursions by the Zetas,” for example, “interrupted a long-standing coexistence between the Gulf cartel and the state and local governments in Tamaulipas” (Justice in Mexico, December, 2010). According to this perspective then, the strengthening of the criminal groups facilitated their ability to corrupt state officials, on the one hand, and their use of violence against one another, on the other. If we assume that these organizations prefer corruption (collusion) over confrontation as Bailey and Taylor (2009) argue, then certainly the level and reach of corruption would grow under these conditions, but not necessarily the level of violence targeting the state, though it does suggest a dramatic increase in violence among the rival groups now unrestrained by the state. Given the rise in the number of organizations and increased competition among them, this should make corruption all the more important and actually bid up the prices of buying the support of state officials. This suggests an increase in the scope and level of corruption. But now buying state officials becomes not only part of the day-to-day operations of the enterprises, but also important in the turf battles and inter-DTOs wars. While certainly increased competition feeds inter- and intra-DTO violence, it is here where violence against the state takes the form of DTOs attacks on corrupt state officials. Such a scenario thus envisions both a rise in corruption and a corresponding rise in violence.

17

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

This hypothesis is consistent with the view that sees the new generation of groups emerging from this dynamic as more violent. According to Grayson (2010, 31), for instance, these new groups like the Zetas, La Familia, and other new generation groups moved away from old ways of doing business, preferring now to intimidate police and local officials. This view is consistent with analysis by Robert Bunker and colleagues (2011) regarding the changes in the nature and tactics among Mexican criminal organizations. The new organizations emerging from the recent dynamic have not only adopted a more diverse business model, becoming engaged in a wider range of criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and prostitution, but challenge the state, seek power, and are far more violent than those of the past. Thesis 3: The Weakening of DTOs as a result of Political Changes (simultaneous weakening thesis). The first thesis pointed to a weakening of the state and the state monopoly. In a slightly different version of this view – and in stark contrast to the prior thesis regarding the strengthening of the DTOs– Viridiana Rios (2011) contends that the weakening of the state via decentralization has had the effect of actually weakening organized criminal organizations because they now face two levels of government: at the top level they must deal with federal police and prosecution, while at the lower levels with local police who cannot prosecute, but who can oversee their actions and alert federal authorities. It is within this context that Rios rejects the notion that DTOs have grown stronger in recent years and thus rejects a violence/corruption opposition. According to Rios (2011, 11): Such a theory [that violence and corruption are inversely relates], which assumes that bribes (silver) and political violence (lead) are substitutes, can only make sense of recent political violence trends by arguing that traffickers have become relatively more powerful over time, which has lead them to substitute bribes for killings.

18

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Instead, she argues that over the past five years as violence has increased, DTOs have actually become weaker: “This is the story of an organized crime that boomed quietly, and weakened loudly” (Rios 2011, 11). This weakening stems from now having to confront multiple state actors, an increase in state capacity measured by the capability of government to prosecute, and as a result of intra- and inter- DTO territorial battles. It is within this context of multiple layers of government and the weakening of the DTOs that both corruption and violence increase in unison rather than moving in opposite directions. Under centralized PRI-regime, it was not necessary to corrupt local politicians, for instance. Now even mayors are killed because traffickers need them. “The recent independence of sub-national figures made sub-national corruption a possibility” (Rios 2011, 12). Mayors are being killed not because DTOs are more powerful, but because mayors now have the power to influence the trafficking business by endorsing or rejecting federal policies: a power they acquired with decentralization. “Mexican politicians seem to be increasing their capability to get silver, at the same time that they are getting more lead” (Rios 2011, 12). The impact on corruption here is clear. First, and consistent with thesis 1, decentralization creates both more points of corrupt contact with state officials and provides fewer and less reliable returns or guarantees to the DTOs for their bribes. A much more sophisticated and vast corruption network is therefore needed in order to operate. At the same time, however, the weakening of the drug-trafficking organizations makes corruption even more critical to their continued operations. This pattern combines, however, with the sort of violence noted earlier in which violence among criminal organizations climbs as does the violence against corrupt state officials working for rival groups. Decentralization and weakening of both the state and DTOs thus result in both a pattern of increased violence and increased corruption with key aspects of

19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

corruption triggering violence. Under a more centralized setting, a DTO can largely operate without threat from rival DTOs and safely utilize corruption to prevent law enforcement activities. Yet under extreme decentralization on both sides, competing DTOs will still use corruption to operate, but will now have to compete with rivals to gain the acquiescence of state officials. Under these circumstances, DTOs will rely on violence to target rivals and their corrupt state allies. At the same time, more state officials now face more DTOs who require state allies to operate. Hence under these conditions, the rate of violence and corruption will both increase. Thesis 4: Weakening of DTOs as a result of the Strengthening of State Enforcement. One of the most significant changes from the past, in addition to the broader political changes or changes in the DTOs, is increased law enforcement. Amidst growing pressures from the United States dating as far back as the Nixon administration, Mexico has progressively dedicated more of its scarce resources and energies to fighting drugs. Between 1987 and 1989, it tripled its federal anti-drug budget, and tripled it again in the 1990s (Andreas 1998). During the following decade, public security budgets increased 565%, while the number of federal police climbed 51% (between 1999 and 2007), and the number of agents within the AFI shot up almost 100%. The budget for the federal public security ministry doubled again from 2000 to 2008 and the PGR budget increased 94% over the decade (Latin American Mexico & NAFTA Report, September 2008 RM-08-09). Such changes have come with major administrative reforms. This began, as Snyder and Duran-Martínez (2009) point out, with reforms within the PGR prior to the collapse of the PRI that transformed the geography of enforcement, altering the ratio of protectors to organizations, and shortening the time horizons of public officials. Such reforms included restructuring, mandated relocation of personnel, and mass firings of corrupt officials. It included purges, increased turnover and swifter assignment rotations. And it encompassed

20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

decentralization including the creation of three new subprocuradurias with each controlling noncontiguous states, and increased responsibilities and autonomy of state governments and PGR field offices. This change allowed hometown cops to act with greater independence from the federal authorities. Capping this tendency, President Felipe Calderón employed tens of thousands of military troops to police the streets of key states and intensifying the use of force against the cartels. The level of spending on security as well as the number of arrests, prosecutions, extraditions, and killings of those involved in drug trafficking and organized crime all increased dramatically during his term. According to México Evalúa, public security spending increased seven times the rate under Calderón as during the Fox administration (Justice in Mexico, August 2011). The number of extraditions of cartel leaders to US has gone from 15 in 2000 to 63 in 2006, 95 in 2008 and 100 by November 2009 (Justice in Mexico, November 2009). Parallel to the enhanced crackdown, the state has also cracked down against corruption. At one level, the number of police, military, customs officials, and even mayors arrested for cooperating with DTO’s as well as the number of purges of federal and local police, customs officials and others have all climbed. In late August 2010, Federal Police dismissed 3,200 agents or 10% of the workforce due to failure to conform to internal norms such as passing exams that test honesty and reliability (Justice in Mexico, September 2010). In 2009, the customs service replaced all of its 700 inspectors with new agents trained to detect smuggling (Justice in Mexico, August 2009). In 2009, 357 Mexican law enforcement officers were detained, 90% of which belonged to local police force (see La Reforma September 25, 2009, “Halla nacro socio dentro de Policia” cited in Justice in Mexico, October 2009) (on police reforms see Sabet 2010, 2012).

21

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

According to this thesis, the heightened pressures by the state brought about by both sustained enforcement and attacks on institutional weaknesses, including corruption, have had multiple effects. First, they have put DTOs on the defensive, forcing them to fight back by whatever means available against a far more aggressive state. This includes an increased reliance on both violence and corruption vis-à-vis state officials to protect themselves from capture, death, or loss of product. Second, increased enforcement has triggered an explosion of inter- and intra-DTO violence. The attack on rival groups by the state clearly sets the stage for other groups to contest control of key plazas, while the removal of cartel leaders sets in motion internal battles for control of the organizations: intra- and inter-cartel violence (Hernández 2012, 231). Or as Grayson (2010, 51) notes, “the capture of some cartel leaders was tantamount to kicking around hornets’ nests without having the means to spray the rattled insects.” Indeed, this represents the most violent and barbaric side of the Mexican “war.” As for corruption, the situation exhibits countercurrents. On the one hand, state reforms particularly among police (via confidence exams, training, etc.) seek to lower the level of corruption, thereby strengthening the effectiveness of law enforcement. And yet, on the other hand, the strengthening of some DTOs, the weakening of others, and the fractionalization producing numerous small groups, reinforces their need to employ corruption not only to operate the daily business, but more importantly now to defend themselves against an aggressive state and opportunistic rivals. Such enforcement, however, implies the lessening of the types of corruption marking the PRI period that tended to stabilize drug-trafficking operations and restrain the violence. This decentralized setting thus features a combination of corruption and high violence.

22

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Assessing this hypothesis is not easy. It centers largely on asking whether the war (on drug trafficking and corruption) is being won or lost. The first possible scenario, occupying the pessimistic end of a continuum, is that the arrests/purging of criminals and their state allies simply pale in comparison to the sheer magnitude of the problem and thus have had little net effect. As Tim Padgett (2008) contends referring to Operación Limpieza in which dozens of local officials in the state of Michoacán were arrested for aiding organized crime but eventually released, the breadth of the corruption “seems to make a mockery of Calderón’s efforts to stamp it out.” Indeed, despite the periodic dissolution of entire federal police forces like the INCD (eliminated in 1997) and FEAD (eliminated in 2003), the purging of local police, or the thousands of sanctions against public officials, the level of corruption within the criminal justice sector and the political system overall seems largely unchanged (Morris 2009). As Charles Bowden (2010, 109) notes, “In over a half century of fighting drugs, Mexico has never created a police unit that did not join the traffickers.” On the more optimistic end of the continuum, however, lies a second possible scenario: that the arrests, purges and reforms are slowly weakening the DTOs ability to operate, while efforts at strengthening state institutions is simultaneously enhancing the state’s ability to fight them. Within this scenario of slow but steady progress, the heightened violence can be interpreted as an indication of the growing weakness of the DTOs. This is consistent with the view championed by the Calderón administration and even some in the U.S. government (see Beittell 2011). The violence is also an indication that the measures to disrupt the corrupt alliances are working, forcing the DTOs more and more to confront the government with violence since corruption is no longer as effective a tool. Still, this scenario embraces the assumption that corruption and violence are polar opposites.

23

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

A third scenario, however, avers that both the increased arrests and purges feed a dynamic in which they paradoxically contribute to the net growth of the problem, making it virtually impossible to make any headway; where every step forward merely expands and magnifies the scope of the problem itself. Indeed, many analysts agree that heightened law enforcement has done little to stem the flow of drugs and actually has increased both the level of corruption and the level of violence (Hernández 2012). According to Andreas (1998, 161), as enforcement increases, so too does the need to corrupt those doing the enforcing: the reality is that the business “has thrived in the face of intensified Mexican drug control efforts.” 12 In like manner, increased enforcement heightens the degree of violence. Celaya Pacheco (2009), for instance, attributes the rise in violence to increased enforcement particularly along the USMexico border, while Grayson (2010) and Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009) link the increase in violence to the administrative changes. This has certainly been the pattern with the recent Calderón crackdown and his non-negotiating position (Celaya Pacheco 2009). 13 Commenting on specific actions, Ted Carpenter (2005, 3) posited that the federal takeover of law enforcement in Nuevo Laredo in June 2005 “had no meaningful impact on the violence” and that instead the number of killings went up. Overall, Bricker (2009) argues that the quantitative results of the crackdown have been poor. The tendency for increased enforcement to generate both violence and corruption occurs in a number of ways as suggested in much of the prior analysis. First, the proliferation of enforcers and erosion of centralized control lead cartels to acquire their own means of protection and to create paramilitary structures, so in the absence of state-sponsored protection rackets, the violence increases (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009, 264). Second, the increased enforcement undermines business operations and triggers violence within and among DTOs (Shelley 2001).

24

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

The arrests or killings of key figures in the drug organizations creates power vacuums that frequently ignite conflict within organizations as the lieutenants vie for internal control, and among DTOs vying for control of plazas. As these internal struggles grow, DTOs in turn enlist the support of corrupt state officials to help tilt the balance in their favor. But as Freeman (2006, 6) notes, “anything public servants do that is interpreted as benefiting one group – such as trying to take down its rival – makes them the target of the other.” Shelley (2001, 214) highlights the inherent paradox: that combating one or two organizations only strengthens the capacity of their rivals, but launching a simultaneous attack on all is beyond the state’s capacity. Finally, increased enforcement leads more directly to violence as the state employs it to fight DTOs and the DTOs, in turn, fight back. Though most of the killings are among DTOs (with cops and enforcement officials often working for the DTOs), Rúben Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda (2009) contend that perhaps what are portrayed as violence among drug traffickers may really be the work of state officials.14 Thesis 5: Preferential State Enforcement This thesis represents a slight modification of the explanation of the PRI period coupled with thesis 4. It posits a high-level corrupt relationship among officials of the Calderón administration and the Sinaloa cartel somewhat reminiscent of the PRI period and, simultaneously, the targeting of state enforcement at the rivals of the Sinaloa cartel. Anabel Hernandez (2008, 2010, 2012) is outspoken in her contention that both Fox and Calderón made a pact to protect the Sinaloa cartel led by Joaquin “el Chapo” Guzmán (see also Aponte 2011; Burnett et al. 2010; Ravelo 2012). According to Hernández (2012, 243), The government of Felipe Calderón’s protection of the Sinaloa cartel is evidenced by the dozens of ministerial testimonies of protected witnesses before the attorney general’s

25

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

office, which as part of the government, does not deeply investigate the presumed protection of el Chapo Guzmán. This alliance centered on upper-level connections and deep-seated corruption linking the cartel to the secretary of public security, Genaro Garcia Luna, and encompassed a range of upper-level military officials. According to Hernández (2012, 173), federal police under Garcia Luna acted like mercenaries, accepting money from all the cartels but only protecting the Sinaloa cartel. During the period of the Federation linking the Sinaloa cartel to the Beltran Leyva brothers and the Tijuana and Juarez cartels, the administration targeted its enforcement at the Gulf cartel and its allies, the Zetas. With the rupture in 2008 following the arrest of Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, not only did violence between the DTOs explode, but the government shifted its attention to attacking the Beltrán Leyva group: the new rival of the Sinaloa cartel. Part of this alleged arrangement is that the Sinaloa cartel provides information to state officials to enlist their support in fighting the cartel’s rivals (Aponte 2011). Like hypothesis 4, this hypothesis suggests a rise in State-DTO violence but against non-Sinaloan organizations, and an increase in corruption as these organizations seek to use pay-offs to survive the onslaught, pitting not only DTOs against one another, but state agencies against other state agencies (as seen in the shootout at the Mexico City airport in 2011). On top of that, it suggests a level of corruption linking state officials to the Sinaloa cartel and a mutual arrangement whereby the cartel supplies information that facilitates the state’s efforts against other cartels.15 Thesis 6: Corruption as Scapegoat. Though not presented in the literature, a final hypothesis to account for how corruption prevented violence during one historic period and facilitated it under another is that either or both contentions simply exaggerate the role of corruption. This can occur at various points in the respective arguments. As noted in discussing the first puzzle, even while

26

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

corruption may be a necessary condition for contraband trade, it is not a sufficient condition for its existence. As such, its role may be exaggerated. Similarly, corruption’s role behind violence or non-violence may be important, but not crucial. Indeed, political rhetoric tends to hint at this exaggeration and scapegoating tendency: a point made in endnote 6’s discussion on plomo o plata. On the one hand, the rhetoric points to the dual role of corruption: first in facilitating drug trafficking directly by allowing DTOs to operate, and second, indirectly by undermining the enforcement measures needed to detect and capture the criminal operatives. It thus blames corruption for the problem itself and for the challenges in addressing it. And yet, on the other hand, the rhetoric captured in the idea of plomo o plata largely suggests that the corrupt officials supposedly facilitating this evil essentially have no choice in the matter and are simply acting rationally. In circular fashion, then, corruption is in the first instance blamed for the problem and then dismissed as a result of the weight of the problem itself.

Discussion The various theses just explored are certainly not mutually exclusive (though some are) and can be pulled together in a number of different ways. In terms of corruption, despite the possibility of thesis 5 and upper-level corruption supporting the Sinaloa cartel, there seems to be a shift in the dominant pattern of corruption. First, the weakening of the centralized power of the state coupled with the growing power and presence of DTOs fundamentally altered the balance of relative power, resulting in a move away from extortion forms of corruption that seemed to characterize the PRI years to a more pernicious form of bribery today. Now rather than centralized political authorities “managing” the drug businesses and keeping the DTOs within certain boundaries, as once occurred, the DTO’s increasingly call the shots, dictating the terms of

27

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

the relationship, and perhaps even maintaining the State within certain boundaries (rather than vice versa). As O’Neil (2009) notes: [Under Fox] “drug-trafficking organizations took advantage of the political opening to gain autonomy, ending their subordination to the government. They focused instead on buying off or intimidating local authorities in order to ensure the safe transit of their goods.” Second, the decentralization of authority coupled with stepped-up enforcement and even selective enforcement has opened up many more points of corrupt entry and in a sense effectively decentralized corruption. By blurring the lines of authority it has become necessary to grease more palms. According to Snyder and Duran-Martínez (2009, 264), there has been an “increase in the number of actors who needed to be bribed and it became far more difficult to determine whom to bribe in order to guarantee the transit of drug cargoes across the country.” With the proliferation of rival groups and their use of corruption to enlist the support of state officials, this has pitted state actors against one another, fueling even more violence across lines. Third, the growing strength and prowess of DTOs have led them to flex their political muscle at different and deeper levels. As Lupsha (2005) notes, “rather than protection percolating up through the PJF, PGR, or military to the party and the private secretaries and bag men around ‘Los Pinos,’ it now appears transnational organized crime and narco power are attempting to operate directly in public and private sector board rooms, with Cabinet level staff and secretaries to plan and coordinate activities for mutual benefits, development, and free trade.” The growing concern here is that the influence of DTOs extends beyond the criminal justice system to elected officials at the local and national levels. Indeed, concerns that drugrelated funds are being channeled into political campaigns have grown manifold in recent years.

28

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Mapping the Corruption-Violence Dynamic Whereas the first puzzle pondered the static theoretical relationship linking drug trafficking, violence and corruption, and the second puzzle discussed Mexico’s historical trajectory, this last section seeks to pull the two parts of the discussion together and lay out the dynamic relationship linking corruption and violence. Table 3 thus draws on the earlier discussion, but focuses more specifically on the dynamic relationship linking drug-trafficking related violence and corruption. It offers a first attempt at mapping how changes in corruption facilitate changes in the level of violence and vice versa. [Table 3 here] Conclusion This paper is exploratory in nature. The focus is on corruption and its relationship to drug-trafficking and violence at both a theoretical level and in Mexico. But rather than providing answers, it raises a series of questions. Does the increase in violence in recent years, for example, mean that corruption in Mexico is down, or has the heightened presence of DTOs and their violence (plomo) expanded the level and scope of corruption (plata)? Does the increase in violence (and perhaps a decrease in corruption) suggest that Calderón’s strategy is actually working? How did corruption facilitate a less violent form of drug-trafficking in the past, but now seems to fuel a more violent form? The foregoing analysis, though tentative, highlights a number of critical factors in understanding the relationship linking corruption to drug-trafficking and violence. The first is to recognize that not all forms or patterns of corruption are the same and that different forms of corruption may carry distinct consequences. Centralized control under the PRI meant that the corruption was somewhat more managed and largely held the DTOs in check, preventing the use

29

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

of violence by the state against DTOs as well as DTO violence against the state or other organizations. More akin to the extortion form of corruption, the state held a degree of control that the DTOs did not seem to want to challenge. But political changes in Mexico undermined this more centralized system and hence corruption’s role in containing the drug-trafficking organizations. This decentralization weakened the state vis-à-vis the DTOs altering the form of corruption and its impact. Rather than the state using corruption in a coordinated way to manage the DTOs, the DTOs began to rely increasingly on corruption to control segments of the state and use them for their purposes. Second, the decentralization of the state and the changing forms of corruption, combined with changes in the nature of the drug business, nurtured divisions and conflict within and among the DTOs. Such inter-DTO conflict enhanced both the level of violence and the need to employ corruption to fight rivals and protect the business. Third, the crackdown by Calderón under these conditions further ignited the violence. Already handicapped by enforcement institutions riddled with corruption, the government lacked the capacity to control the conflict, but did have the capacity to worsen it.16 But now, the government faced a multi-front war, battling the cartels on the one hand, and, owing to the corruption, itself on the other. Within this volatile and even paradoxical setting, it seems that real efforts to reign in the cartels through enforcement and to curb corruption fed a dynamic by which the level of violence increased and perhaps even the level of corruption as DTOs employed both strategies to survive.

30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

References Ackerman, John (2009) “Mexico on the Brink.” Guardian.co.uk. January 30. --- (2012) “El naufrago nacional.” Proceso 1833. Aguilar, Rúben V. and Jorge G. Castañeda (2009) El Narco: La Guerra Fallida. Mexico: Punto de Lectura. Andreas, Peter (1998) “The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico.” Current History April: 160-165. Andreas, Peter and Joel Wallman (2009) “Illicit Markets and Violence: What is the Relationship?” Crime, Law, and Social Change 52: 225-229. Aponte, David. 2011. Los Infiltrados: El narco dentro de los gobiernos. Mexico, DF: Grijalbo. Astorga, Luis and David A. Shirk (2010) Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, April. Bailey, John and Matthew M. Taylor (2009) “Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico.” Journal of Politics in Latin America. 2: 3-29. Beith, Malcolm (2010) The Last Narco: Inside the Hunt for El Chapo, the World’s Most Wanted Drug Lord. New York: Grove Press. Beittel, June S. (2011) Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 7-7500 (June 7). Beyerle, Shaazka (2011) “Civil Resistance and the Corruption –Violence Nexus.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 38 (2): 53-77.

31

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Bowden, Charles (2010) Murder City: Ciudad Juárez and the Global Economy's New Killing Fields. New York: Nation Books. Bricker, Kristin (2009) “The Numbers Don’t Add Up in Mexico’s Drug War” The Narcosphere (posted November 29) (www.narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristinbricker/2009/11/numbers-dont-add-me...) Bunker, Robert J., ed. (2011) Narcos over the Border: Gangs, Cartels, and Mercenaries. London and New York: Routledge. Burnett, John, Marisa Peñaloza and Robert Benincasa (2010) “Mexico Seems To Favor Sinaloa Cartel In Drug War.” All Things Considered, NPR, May 19 http://www.npr.org/2010/05/19/126906809/mexico-seems-to-favor-sinaloa-cartel-indrugwar Campbell, Howard (2009) Drug War Zone: Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso and Juárez. Austin: University of Texas Press. Carpenter, Ted Galen (2005) “Mexico is Becoming the Next Colombia.” Foreign Policy Briefing 87. Cato Institute (November 15). Celaya Pacheco, Fernando (2009) “Narcofearance: How has Narcoterrorism Settled in Mexico?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32: 1021-1048. Cook, Collen W. (2007). “CRS Report for Congress: Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” RL 34215, October 16. Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella (2006). “Plata o Plomo? Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence.” American Political Science Review 100 (1): 41-53. Escalante Gonzalbo, Fernando (2009) “Homidicios 1990-2007.” Nexos, September, pp. 25-31.

32

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Flores, Carlos (2009) “Drug Trafficking, Violence, Corruption and Democracy in Mexico.” November. Freeman, Laurie (2006) “State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico.” WOLA Special Report, Washington Office on Latin America, June. Friman, H. Richard (2009) “Drug Markets and the Selective Use of Violence.” Crime, Law and Social Change 52: 285-295. Grayson, George W. (2008) “Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel.” E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute (May) (www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html) --- (2010) Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Hanson, Stephanie (2008) “Mexico’s Drug War.” Council on Foreign Relations. November 20. Hernández, Anabel (2008) Los cómplices del president. Mexico, DF: Grijalbo. --- (2010). Los Señores del Narco. Mexico, DF: Grijalbo. --- (2012) México en Llamas: El legado de Calderón. Mexico, DF: Grijalbo. Human Rights Watch. (2007). “Corruption, godfatherism, and the funding of political violence.” Human Rights Watch. October. Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kaufmann, D. (2006). “Human rights, governance and development: An empirical perspective.” Special Report. Development Outreach, 15-20. Kelly, Robert J. (2003) “An American Way of Crime and Corruption.” In Roy Godson, ed. Menace to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the World. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, pp. 99-136.

33

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Le Billon, P. (2007) What is the impact: Effects of corruption in postconflict. Thought piece for The Nexus: Corruption, Conflict and Peacebuilding Colloquium. The Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Boston, MA. Retrieved from http://fletcher.tufts.edu/corruptionconf/pdf/LeBillion.pdf Llana, Sara Miller (2010) “Halting Drug War Corruption: What Mexico can learn from Colombia” Christian Science Monitor January 12. Lupsha, Peter (1995) “Transnational Narco-corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico.” Transnational Organized Crime 1. Morris, Stephen D. (2009) Political Corruption in Mexico; The Impact of Democratization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Naylor, R. T. (2003) “Predators, Parasites, of Free-Market Pioneers: Reflections on the Nature and Analysis of Profit-Driven Crime.” In Margaret E. Beare, ed. Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption. University of Toronto Press, pp. 35-54. Naylor, R. T. (2009) “Violence and Illegal Economic Activity: A Deconstruction.” Crime, Law and Social Change 52: 231-242. O’Day, Patrick (2001) “The Mexican Army as Cartel.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17: 278-295. O’Day, Patrick and Aneglina López (2001) “Organizing the Underground NAFTA.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17 (3): 232-242. O’Neil, Shannon (2009) “The Real War in Mexico.” Foreign Affairs 88 (4): 63-77. Padgett, Tim (2008) “In Mexico’s Drug War, Bad Cops Are a Mounting Problem.” Time November 22.

34

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Pimental, Stanley A. (2003) “Mexico’s Legacy of Corruption.” In Roy Godson, ed. Menace to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the World. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, pp. 175-198. Ravelo, Ricardo (2012) “Vengativo...impune.” Proceso 1853 (6 de Mayo), pp. 39-40. Rios, Viridiana (2011) “Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? A model of competitive corruption.” Unpublished. Sabet, Daniel (2010) “Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance: The Relationship between Law Enforcement and Organized Crime in Tijuana.” Mexican Law Review 2: 3-29. --- (2012 forthcoming) Police Reform in Mexico: Informal Politics and the Challenge of Institutional Change. Stanford University Press. Scott, James C. (1972) Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Serna, Enrique (2009) “La corrupcion invicta.” Nexos April, pp. 19-22. Shelley, Louise (2001) “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17 (3): 213-231. ------ (2005) “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2): 101-111. Shirk, David (2010) “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009.” TransBorder Institute. Simser, Jeffrey (2011) “Plata o plomo: penetration, the purchase of power and the Mexican drug cartels,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 14 (3): 266-278. Snyder, Richard and Angelica Duran-Martínez (2009) “Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets.” Crime, Law, and Social Change 52: 253-273.

35

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Williams, Phil (2009) “Illicit Markets, Weak States and Violence: Iraq and Mexico.” Crime, Law and Social Change 52: 323-336 Zepeda Lecuona, Guillermo (2004) Crimen sin castigo: Procuración de justicia penal y Ministerio Público en México. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo and Comisión Federal de Electricidad Zimring, Franklin E. (2008) “Violence and Drugs: Divide, Then Conquer?” Brekeley Review of Latin American Studies. Spring.

36

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

ENDNOTES 1

This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the XXX International Congress of the Latin

American Studies Association, San Francisco, California, May 23-27, 2012. I want to thank Robert Bunker and the anonymous reviewers at TIOC for the help on the revisions. 2

All translations are by the author.

3

Despite the almost axiomatic connection tying drug-trafficking and corruption, the direction of

causality remains unclear and may move in both directions. One view, perhaps the more commonly-held position, is that organized crime corrupts state officials through the seductive power of bribes (that organized crime  corruption). The 1967 Task Force Report on Organized Crime was quite explicit on this point: “all available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted public officials” (cited in Kelly 2003, 128-129). Examples from Mexico are (too) abundant. Operación Limpieza in October 2008, for example, uncovered payments, some as high as US $450,000 a month, to over 30 officials of SIEDO (Subprocuraduria de Investigacion Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada) in return for providing confidential information on law enforcement operations to the Sinaloa cartel, including those of the DEA (Latin American Mexico & NAFTA Report, November 2008; Padgett 2008). But as Peter Andreas (1998, 161) points out, corruption is a two-way street and “involves not only the penetration of the state, but also penetration by the state.” Indeed, a second type of linkage reverses this causal error and depicts corruption as an independent variable that produces and hence promotes drug trafficking operations (corruption  organized crime). Rather than envisioning organized crime exerting its influence and control through payoffs, this pattern finds state officials using (and abusing) their authority to largely control and influence the activities of 37

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

organized crime, enjoying a portion of the business’ profits in the process. Though at times difficult to distinguish bribery from extortion, as we see later, this sort of theoretical linkage seems to have great historical significance to Mexico. A third way of linking the two envisions them as largely indistinguishable. This includes instances where police directly engage in criminal activity, but not in a way that most would call corruption (see SourceMex June 26, 2006 and September 3, 2008). Citing statistics from the SSP, Excelsior reported, for example, that 56 of the 897 kidnappers arrested from 2001 through the first half of 2008 were active or former members of a police department or the military (SourceMex September 24, 2008). Indeed, initial investigations into the high-profile Fernando Marti kidnapping and killing in August 2008 pointed to the involvement of federal agents and judicial police from the Federal District (Milenio August 18, 2008; Latin American Mexico & NAFTA Report, September 2008 RM-0809). This blurring of the lines can also be seen in revolving-door corruption where state officials leave office to work for the companies they had been policing. Indeed, many former police and military officers in Mexico have gone on to pursue careers with DTOs, including the infamous Zetas drawn largely from the ranks of the Mexican military special forces (Grayson 2008, 2010). The irony here, of course, is that the purging of police as part of an anti-corruption effort can bolster the ranks of DTOs, providing personnel already trained in the areas of security and the use of violence. 4

John Ackerman (2009) cites an independent study showing that only 17% of suspects arrested

for drug offenses were actually brought to court in 2008. 5

Franklin Zimring (2008) contends that drug violence is contingent in part on the degree of

violence within the culture. Enrique Serna (2009, 20) makes a similar argument with regards to corruption and illegality. Portraying the government as a reflection of society, he contends that 38

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

“No civic sermon has been able to eradicate from the national soul the propensity to view the state coffers as spoils...No official loses friends when they enrich themselves from one day to the next; on the contrary, their social success increases at the same rate as their bank account.” In the end, he posits, the culture applauds delinquent activity. 6

Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify violence along these lines. It is known that despite the

high number of violent deaths in the past few years, only a small fraction involves state officials. One report noted an average of 508 police killed between 2008 and 2012 and a total of 45 mayors and ex-mayors murdered from 2006 to 2012 (Justice in Mexico, December 2012, p.2). The government contends that only 7% of killings are law enforcement. Of the 34,612 murders from 2006 to January 2011, for instance, 30,913 were registered by the government as “execution-style killings,” 3,153 were considered the result of “shootouts between gangs,” and only 546 deaths involved “attacks on authorities” (Justice in Mexico, January 2011). But the extent to which this involves officials refusing to participate in corruption (the classic plomo o plata scenario) or who are targeted for being in the corrupt pay of rival organizations, or for betraying the trust purchased through a bribe is not known. If the situation is indeed one of plomo o plata, then apparently most officials act rationally and accept the latter. 7

On the surface, at least, the plomo o plata choice makes sense. And yet, a number of questions

arise which I believe help highlight the distinction of the triangular relationship linking drug trafficking, violence, and corruption. First, why does the choice include the threat of violence (plomo)? Rarely do bribery exchanges involve the threat of violence or actual violence. Surely Wal-Mart’s numerous extra-legal payments to local officials in the mid-2000s to expand their stores in Mexico at breakneck speed did not include any explicit threat of violence. Of course, the case of drug trafficking is different in that the public official has the legal responsibility of 39

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

confronting the DTO using state-sanctioned violence if necessary. And even though the DTO might prefer to buy-off the official and prevent that confrontation from occurring, if unsuccessful in buying off the state official the DTO would then face a situation of perhaps having to resort to violence in order to protect the business against state enforcement. But this suggests a more implicit and diffuse threat of violence, whereas plomo o plata seems to point to a more specific and explicit form. It suggests that rather than the uncooperative official facing DTO violence during the normal course of enforcing the law at some point in the future, that the official is actually targeted by those offering the bribe and sanctioned for not accepting it. The violence, then, is more targeted and offensive rather than the sort of defensive violence that might occur during a confrontation between law enforcement and DTOs. Second, if the threat of violence is sufficiently strong then why would the choice not simply be cooperate or plomo? If the threat of violence is strong and compelling enough it should ensure compliance without even having to pay a bribe which cuts into profits. This scenario is somewhat akin to simple extortion, used by state officials to extract “bribes” from citizens or businesses by threatening the use (or abuse) of state violence (i.e. depravation of freedom). Of course, for the DTOs, bribes provide predictability, fundamental to operating any business enterprise including an illicit one, which might explain the payoff in part. According to Dal Bó’s et al. (2006, 46) model, threats provide greater profits than bribes alone in that threats effectively lower the price of bribes. Even so, this point raises a third query: is it the seductive appeal of the bribe that shapes the decision of the state official faced with plomo o plata or the nature and perceived seriousness of the threat? Are public officials faced with plomo o plata really being bought-off, or are they merely selecting the lesser of two evils? Observers frequently point to either the low pay of cops (particularly municipal level police) and/or the huge bribes offered by 40

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

DTOs to describe the situation behind drug-related corruption, suggesting that it is the bribe that holds sway (with an implicit hint of greed involved, perhaps, depending on the level of the public official). Yet in some ways, plomo o plata represents a Hobson’s choice and accepting the bribe simply means survival. In the first narrative, the threat of violence plays at best a secondary role, but in the latter scenario, it drives the decision. But in order for the threat of violence to drive the decision that threat must be credible. This suggests that at an aggregate level at least some violence against the state officials must occur in order to make the threat credible enough to convince an official to accept the bribe and avoid the sanction. Coupled with the earlier points, this once again suggests an inverse relationship between the two components of the equation that goes beyond the simply binary form to focus more on the specific quantities of each. In other words, it may not merely be plomo or plata, but rather the greater the credibility of the threat of plomo, the less plata needed and vice versa (see Dal Bó et al. 2006). A final question in this brief detour: to what extent does plomo o plata move in the opposite direction: from state to DTO? Intelligence operations require information from the inside, and the state often acquires this information through the threat of violence (i.e. legally, higher prisons terms, extradition; illegally, torture) and/or bribes (cash payoffs to informants, immunity from prosecution, immunity and a new life [protected witness program]). Indeed, much of the information surrounding some of the big cases in Mexico in recent years stems from captured DTO members turning states evidence (see Aponte 2011; Hernández 2008, 2010, 2012). Of course, the government can use this form of bribery to “convince” or “coerce” members of DTO’s to provide false testimony against rivals within the state itself. According to Hernández (2012, 115-162), such was the case against General Tomás Ángeles Dauahare, among others, who was arrested in 2012 and accused by two protected witnesses, Jennifer and Mateo, of 41

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

receiving payoffs from the Betlran Leyva brothers. In many ways, this form of corruption seems to operate by a similar logic depicted earlier and suggests a direct inverse relationship between violence and corruption. The greater and more credible the threat of violence by the state, the more likely that the captured DTO member will accept the payoff, engaging in a form of corruption by violating the norms of her/his formal role within the organization or as an agent disobeying his responsibility to the principal. Even so, despite the rhetoric, in some cases plomo o plata does not seem to adequately capture the nature of the corrupt arrangement linking DTOs to the state. Part of the arrangements between DTOs and public officials find the DTO’s not only promising not to use violence against the state official in return for a payoff, but a mutual commitment to help one another. The DTO might provide the state official strategic information about the operation of rival organization, facilitating the enforcement efforts of the state. This, of course, helps the DTO in its turf war against rivals. 8

By contrast, it is much easier to conceptually separate corruption from impunity since

corruption is just one of many factors influencing impunity. Of course, impunity, arguably, in turn, would influence the level of corruption, but at least the two are analytically distinct. 9

Former President Ernesto Zedillo called it foolish (“una tontería”) to think that earlier

governments had made pacts with the cartels, claiming that what is occurring today has nothing to do with what happened 15 to 20 years ago (Milenio October 8, 2011) (http://impreso.milenio.com/node/9040114). 10

The largest spikes in violence took place in response to splits among former allies. The first

major spike occurred in 2008 when El Chapo, El Mayo, El Azul and Ignacio Coronel broke with Beltran Leyva following the arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva E. This prompted Arturo Beltran 42

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Leyva to align in turn with the Juarez cartel, the Zetas, and the Valencias. This, in turn, prompted the Calderón administration to attack the Beltran Leyva group, killing Arturo in December 2009 (Hernández 2012, 232). Executions also spiked rose in 2011 following the split in Nuevo Leon between Gulf cartel and the Zetas and the escalation of violence in Guerrero, Jalisco and Coahuila due to the fragmentation of the Beltran Leyva and La Familia cartels (Justice in Mexico News Monitor December 2012, p.2). 11

This view certainly fits the historic patterns. One problem, however, relates to Calderón’s

efforts from the beginning to federalize the fight by empowering the military and federal police, eclipsing the role of local and state police, and thus try to reverse the degree of decentralization. If decentralization broke the link between corruption and non-violence, these efforts to concentrate and recentralize power have the potential of reducing violence. Many believe that this may be the strategy of current president Enrique Peña Nieto. Of course, perhaps at this point it has become too late to return to the patterns of the past. 12

More troubling, the deployment of military forces to contain drug trafficking have wrought an

increase human rights abuses. “Troops dispatched to try to wrest control of states where the drug trade has escalated are also accused of violations against the very civilians they are sent to protect” (SourceMex March 4, 2009). 13

Aguilar and Castañeda (2009) question Calderón’s strategy and reasoning for launching the

war. They present data that fail to confirm the supposed increase in the use of drugs in Mexico or even a dramatic increase in violence. What has changed, they contend, is the perception of violence. One reason for launching the war, they note, is for the state to regain control: that the state has lost its monopoly control over the legitimate use of force, to collect taxes, etc (Aguilar and Castañeda 2009, 51; see also Escalante Gonzalbo (2009). 43

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

14

Though I have seen little evidence to support this allegation, given the weakness of the judicial

system to process and prosecute criminals, it seems plausible. 15

These charges, to be sure, are aggressively and summarily dismissed by the former

administration. At times, the administration challenged the thesis by pointing to its strikes against the cartel’s interests, like the arrests of Noel Salgueiro, ‘El Flaco,” in October 2011, of Jose Manuel Garcia Simental, or Raydel Lopez Uriarte in February 2010 (Justice in Mexico News Report, February 2010, October 2011). At other times, however, the administration suggested that it did differentiate and strategically target its limited resources at the more violent cartels like the Zetas and La Familia. 16

This point was suggested to me by John Bailey.

44

Tables

Figure 1

Drug trafficking (organized crime)

(+)

Violence

(+)

(-)/(+)

Theoretical Puzzle

Corruption

Table 1: Drug-related violence and the State Types or Direction

Motive

State officials  DTO (non-corrupt) (type a) State officials  State officials (non-corrupt) (corrupt) (type a) DTO  State officials (non-corrupt) (type b)



Law enforcement-related confrontation



Law enforcement-related confrontation against DTO’s allies within the state

 

Defensive – to protect self, goods or shipment To influence the level or pattern of state enforcement Revenge against prior state actions To a specific official for refusing to accept a bribe (plomo o plata) To influence elections Defensive – to protect goods or shipment from law enforcement

  State officials  State officials (corrupt) (non-corrupt) (type b) DTO  State officials (corrupt) (type c)

   

State officials  DTO (corrupt) (type c) State officials  State officials (corrupt) (corrupt) (type c)

 

Enforcement of business code of conduct among personnel (corrupt official working for the same DTO) Attack rivals or for revenge against rivals (corrupt official working for rival DTO) Attack or revenge against cartel rivals

Similar to intra- or inter-DTO violence using corrupt state officials.

Table 2: Types of Drug-related Corruption Payoff to... Police, military all levels

Form of payoff  Money, favors  Information on rivals  Drugs

Purpose of payoff ...  Physical protection of shipments or personnel  Manpower to unload shipments  Information (warning) on police or military actions  Non-enforcement of law  Information on rivals  Actions against rivals  Influence personnel decisions o move certain elements to critical positions or areas o infiltrate law enforcement (Shelley 2001, 216)

Ministerio public Judges

Money, favors Money, favors

Mayors, governors, high level bureaucrats or politicians

 Money, favors  Campaign contributions

Prison officials

Money, favors

Customs officials

Money, favors

Societal actors  bankers/financial personnel  journalists Members of drug cartels (by state officials)

Money, favors

Avoid indictment, misplace evidence, etc. Avoid prosecution, reverse sentence, grant amparos  Influence orders and/or personnel of police and MP  Influence policy decisions  Gain privileges within prison, including continued operation of drug trafficking  Escape Avoid detection entering or leaving the country with contraband  Money laundering  Positive coverage or not reporting (Freeman 2006, 7)  Information on drug traffickers and operations  Testimony or false testimony against state officials

 Money, favors  Lesser charges, reduced sentence, immunity from prosecution, nonextradition  No torture

Table 3: Possible Corruption-Violence Linkages Impact on the Independent variable dependent variable More violence

Explanation > Corruption undermines enforcement and yet facilitates inter-cartel violence. > The more state officials working for rivals, the more violence against the state is used to counter that support.

More corruption  Less violence

> Corruption undermines enforcement diminishing the use of violence between the state and cartels. > DTOs completely capture the state and end the state’s assault on their organizations and operations (narco-state). > State completely captures DTOs and enforces informal rules of operations to minimize internal conflicts and state violence against DTOs (i.e. narrative on PRI-gobierno).

More violence

> More effective law enforcement (less corruption) means more violent confrontations by the state against DTOs. > More effective law enforcement (less corruption) weakens the corruption option and forces greater reliance by DTOs on violence to operate and survive. > More effective law enforcement (less corruption) disrupts organizational structures and triggers greater inter- and intra-cartel violence

Less violence

> More effective law enforcement (less corruption) weakens DTOs capacity to use violence.

More corruption

> Inter- and intra-cartel violence enhances need to corrupt state officials to operate business and survive. > Increased state violence against DTOs enhances the need to corrupt state officials.

Less corruption

> Increased state violence (without prior reduction in corruption of state institutions) can diminish the presence of DTOs and thus the level of corruption linking DTOs to the state.

More corruption

> Unclear how a lessening of state violence against DTOs and/or a lessening of inter-DTO violence might result in more corruption. It is clear, however, that a lessening of violence would not eliminate corruption within the sector. > A lessening of state violence against DTOs and/or a lessening of inter-DTO violence would minimize the need to bribe state officials to protect business operations against the state or against rivals and result in a level of corruption for the normal operation of the illicit businesses.

Less corruption 

More violence 

Less violence 

Less corruption

*Response to Reviewer Comments (must not contain author information)

I have made minor revisions to my paper, trying to incorporate the concerns and recommendations of you and the reviewers. I understand that the paper is somewhat different from the normal paper you publish, and appreciate the fact that you find it of sufficient interest to warrant publication. Briefly, I have made the following changes: * Incorporated references to Dal Bó et al's piece in the APSR on plomo o plata. * Moved the extensive discussion on plomo o plata to an endnote. While interesting, the extensive discussion seems slightly tangential. * Incorporated discussion on monopoly control by state and DTOs. This was more a matter of emphasis since the discussion already included references to centralization versus decentralization at the state and DTO levels. * Incorporated more details from the drug war based on recent works. Many of these found their way into endnotes. * Strengthened the analysis under hypothesis 5 based on recent works. * Tried to be more a bit more explicit about the exploratory nature of the paper. Rather than present one clear theory to account for recent changes, the paper seeks to develop a series of hypotheses based on the literature. * Translated Spanish quotes to English.