Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's

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Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse Author(s): Gabriele Ferrazzi Source: Publius, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 63-85 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331088 . Accessed: 16/01/2014 13:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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Usingthe"F" Word: Federalismin Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse Gabriele Ferrazzi BrandonUniversity infavorofa unitarystate. Soeharto's centralization IndonesiacastoffDutch-imposed federalism theconcept is re-emerging, tabooin theNewOrder.In thecurrent reform period,however, madefederalism has yettobe discussedin an open,inclusive,and balancedmanner.Decentralization butfederalism thepoliticaldemandsofthelargerprovince.Thispolicyis policyisfocusedon thedistrict, neglecting and misleading discourse thatis consistent withtheideology bya confused official ofpower accompanied retention and maintenance democratization ofpatrimonial governance.As a resultofgreater ofthe is slowlyentering in theshorttermremain polity, federalism officialdiscourse.Althoughitsprospects withinIndonesia'sunitarystructure. dim,supportmaygrowforfederalprinciples

The currentreformperiod in Indonesia has unleashed a torrentof regional discontent. The centralizationof power and resourcesis being reviled. Politicalupheaval has facilitatedTimor Loro Sae's exit fromthe republic,plus secessionistmovementsin theprovincesofAceh,WestPapua, and Riau. All provincesare demanding a betterdeal, makingclear that widerformsof autonomy,and possiblyfederalism,maybe the price to pay for national peace. Regional unresthas highlighteddeep divisionsand divergentinterestsin the nation. Polls indicatethatthe populace is deeply worriedabout separatism. There is pressureon the national government to hold Indonesia together,and yetcome to termswiththe root causes of regional dissatisfaction. Politicians are anxious not to preside over Indonesia's disintegration, but the new government of President AbdurrahmanWahid (Gus Dur) appears unable to generatea genuine diaeven utteringthe word logue. The presidenthimselfhas great difficulty "federalism"when pressed to discussthe issue. This essayexaminesbackgroundon federalismin Indonesia to explain the strongresistanceto the federalmodel. It drawson a reviewof government documents,proceedingsof variouspublic fora,participantobservation,and personalinterviews. Followinga briefintroductionto theanalytical the historical roots thatshed lighton center-regionrelations framework,

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge Bernhard May, Luc de Meester, and Erita Nurhalim Zusammenarbeit team members to the Support for DecentralizationMeasures (Gesellschaft fiir Technische projectof the Governmentof Indonesia) forprovidinginformationand viewsthatwere helpfulin updating the doctoral researchworkthatunderpins thisarticle.

? Publius: TheJournal of Federalism30:2 (Spring 2000)

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are examined in orderto understandthe center'stendenciestowardunification and integrationas tools fornation-buildingand domination. The currentpolicyof emphasizingthe smallersecond-tierregions (more than 300 districtsand cities), ratherthan the largerfirst-tier regions (26 provinces)' wherefederalistmodels mightbe more applicable,is placed in historicalcontext.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK The treatment of discourse about the state should be linked to and historicalfactorsthatconditionits organizationand "sociostructural For Indonesia, thismeans highlightingthe state'spatriadministration."2 and character monial examiningthe debate on federalismin termsof the materialinterestsof the dominantcentralelite. Patrimonialism Imperiled Decentralizationhas become a two-edgedswordforthe fractiousposteliteincludesmanyofthesame elements Soehartoelite. The reconstituted thatmade up the Soeharto elite. This is particularlytrueforthe bureaucracy,wherethe patrimonialstyleof governanceof the New Order contina precious commoditytoday,the elite ues to prevail. To gain legitimacy, mustundertakedecentralization.In doing so, it is undercuttingitspower base and, thus,the sources of legal and extra-legaltributesthatwere commonplace in Soeharto's patrimonialregime.3Herein lies the tensionthat infusesthe regionalautonomypolicies of the governmentand the official discourseon alternateformsof decentralization. Compounding the tensionis the significantdegree of democratization yieldedbythe centralelite in the earlydaysof the reformmovementthat toppled the New Order. Exacted fromthe Soeharto elite as the price of stayingin the game (avoidingrevolution),the new freedomsare making the old communicationstrategiesof the governmentless effective.As a to earn, and result,the legitimacyof governmentpolicies is more difficult thisis evidentin the government'sdecentralizationpolicies. Reduced legitimacythreatensthe elites' tenuous hold on power and the "tribute" streamsthatflowtowardcentralizedpower. Discourse Analysis The discourse analyticalperspectiveis gaining attention,particularly due to its abilityto link micro-levelinteraction to macro-contextsre'Having recentlylost a province,Indonesia is makingup forit by dividingprovinceselsewhere,in WestPapua (formerlyIrianJaya)and Maluku; however,these controversialcreationsare in limbo. 2AndresPerez, "Legitimacyand the administrative capacityof the state:public administrationin deSciences57 (December 1991): 646. ReviewofAdministrative velopingcountries,"International Functionsto Sub-nationalGovernments:Selection and 3GabrieleFerrazzi,"CriteriaforTransferring of Guelph, 1998). Applicationin Indonesian DecentralizationInitiatives,"(Ph.D. diss.,University

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search.4 It startswiththe identificationof actors and theirinterestsand positions. Communication patternscan then be analyzed to note how the dominant ideology,political power,and governmentalrelations are sustained. In Indonesia, the lack of open high-levelpolicy discussion is in part compensated by the ubiquitous seminar and workshop circuit, in the past largelysponsored or dominated by the government. The seminar/workshopapproach to communication,persuasion,and mobilizationhas been takenup withgustoin the post-Soehartoperiod by civilsocietyand quasi-government organizations.A more aggressivepress is also generatingmore commentariesand exchanges thatenlarge the politicaldiscourse,adding opportunitiesto note lexicon and rhetoricalstrategies of governmentofficialsand otherplayers.5 Federalism's Meaningin theIndonesianContext If gettingthe formof the staterightmatters,it is unfortunateforIndonesia thatmostwritingson the originsof federalismare historicalexplanationsof "causes thatimpel variouspoliticalunitsto come togetherto form a federalunion."' Littlehas been writtenon whyand how unitarynations shed theirunitarystatusfora federalform.The literatureon federalismis especiallysparsewhenitcomes to experiencesof "nationsaving."Belgium is the notable exception,havingrecentlycompleteda longjourneyfroma unitaryto a federalstructure, althoughthejuryis stillout on whetheritwill survivein itsnew form. Some international researchand reflections on federalism can be usefulto theIndonesiancontext.RonaldWattsarguesthatfederalnationsunderstress should forgea "strategy thatcombinesboth efforts to strengthen a federal focusof loyalty and an accommodationof the majorconcernsof disaffected Anotherinsightis givenbyCherylSaundersin herreviewof regionalgroups."7 is notcreatedbyfederal European experience. She cautionsthat"federalism institutions and rulesalone,butdependsalso on attitudestowardstheprocess ofgovernment.Thus,some oftheadvantagesoffederalismmaybe obtained withouttraditionalfederalstructures.Equally,theymaybe lostin a country whichotherwise isfederalinform."8 Analysismustgo beyondoutwardappearance. AsWilliamRikerobserved,"one does notdecide on themeritsoffeder-

4See, forexample, Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse and Society:A NewJournalfora New Research Fo1 (July1990): 5-16. cus," Discourseand Society 5Fora descriptionof these elementsof discourse,seeJohn Gastil,"UndemocraticDiscourse: A Review of Theoryand Research on Political Discourse,"Discourseand Society 3 (October 1992): 469-500. 6Raphael Zariski,"The Establishmentof the Kingdom of Italyas a UnitaryState: A Case Studyin 13 (Fall 1983): 1-19. Regime Formation,"Publius:TheJournalofFederalism in the1990's (Kingston,ON: InstituteofIntergovernmental FederalSystems 7RonaldL. Watts,Comparing Relations,Queen's University, 1996), p. 104. 8Quoted inJoachimJensHesse and VincentWright,"FederalizingEurope: The Path to Adjustment," and Preconditions eds. JoachimJens Hesse Federalizing Europe?The Cost,Benefits, ofFederalPoliticalSystems, and VincentWright(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1996), p. 378.

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alismbyan examinationoffederalism in theabstract, but ratheron itsactual meaningforparticularsocieties."' One meaning that may have relevance to Indonesia is "federalismas covenant." In thesame veinas Saunders,Daniel Elazar explained thatfederalismdoes not entaila quest fora particularsetofinstitutions, butrather "a particularkindofrelationshipamong theparticipantsin politicallife.""' Whatis more important,then,are federalprinciples. In Elazar's view,the federalmodel can accommodateculturalcleavagesbycombiningethnicity and consentinto both territorial(expressingcleavage) and non-territorial (crosscutting)polities. In Indonesia, federalismis debated in language thatexpressescompeting visionsand values." It is a fluidconcept thathas been linked witha varietyof autonomyarrangements. It has been proposed as a balm for regional discontentand, at the other extreme,as a regional power grab thatcould lead to the "disintegration of the state." It is the appropriation of meaning and its rhetoricaluse thatis of interesthere, ratherthan the possiblemechanicsofestablishinga federalsystem.The eventualmeaning and connotationsattachedto the termwilldecide if the federalformwill be adopted, and withwhatdegree of power-sharing.

FEDERALISM IMPOSED AND REJECTED There is wide agreementthatthefederalsystembriefly adopted byIndonesia in 1949-1950was a Dutch imposition,and it maywell have been a "divide and rule" strategyof the retreatingDutch. Its unpopularityis not in doubt,as indicatedbyGeorge Kahin: dissatisfied withthe ofIndonesianswereprofoundly The greatmajority withwhichtheyhad been saddledbytheHague Agreefederalsystem soon beganto Dutch-created ment. In all fifteen states,thisdiscontent manifest itselfin spontaneousand widelybasedpopulardemandsfora and federalism scrappingofwhatwasconceivedto be an alien-imposed theliquidationofthesestatesand theirmergerwiththeold Republic."2 Accordingto Kahin,thisreturnto theunitaryideal as proclaimedin the 1945 constitutionwas also backed bysupportersof federalismwho wished to fashiontheirown formof federalismratherthan livewith"an artificial legacyof theirold colonial master." 'William Riker,Federalism:Origin,Operation,Significance (Boston, MA: Little,Brown and Company, 1964), p. 10. Constitutional and CivilSociety-The MatrixofModernDemocracy (New Brunswick, 'ODanielJ.Elazar,Covenant NJ:TransactionPublishers,1998), p. 302. "This is truein othercountriesas well. See, forexample,JohnKincaid, "Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism,"Publius:TheJournalofFederalism 25 (Spring 1995): 29-44. 'George McTurninKahin, Nationalismand Revolutionin Indonesia(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1952), p. 450.

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Understandably,the impulse of the founding"fathers"was to forgea unitarystateto meld the diverseregionsthatwere spanned by the Dutch colonial masters. The domino-styleconsolidationand eventualreintegration into a unitarystatethatoccurred in 19501' were as much an elite response to power dynamicsas theywere the resultof a widespreadpublic awarenessand favorablesentimentstowardunitarygovernance. The subfacedin framingan alternateconstitution to thatagreed sequentdifficulties in The Hague (when Indonesia livedwitha temporaryconstitution)attests to the lack of unanimityon the role and formof the state. The regional autonomyceded in the 1950s did not satisfythe regions. Some regionsconsidered it theirrightto be self-governed.In theirview, coming togetherto seek independence did not encompass supportfora centralizedstate.14Regional unrestdrewconcessionsfroma weak central government(favorablelawson regionalgovernmentforinstance),but this turmoilwas in turna factorin Soekarno's decision to impose "Guided Democracy"in 1959, returningIndonesia to the 1945 unitaryconstitution; ironically,thiswas achieved in an even more constitutionally questionable stylethan the Dutch-imposedfederalmodel.'5 The 1945 constitutionguaranteesthe divisionof the countryinto "large and small" regionswithconsiderationof the "consultativeprinciple"and the traditionalrightsof special regions. This provided the basis for the New Order to establishprovincialregions and smaller districtregions'6 withinthemthatwereostensiblyautonomousand non-hierarchical in principle (achieved throughLaw 5/1974). Because regional autonomyis not itsbounds mustbe setin laws. Given explained in detailin theconstitution, the executive'sextremelystrongpowersunder the 1945 constitution,"the presidentis thusempoweredto determinethenatureofregionalautonomy.

NEW ORDER DISCOURSE The New Order period,coveringSoeharto'sreignfrom1965 to 1998,was a timeofnation-building, characterizedbythe consolidationofpowerat the center and the eliminationor reduction of resistancefromany quarter. Pemerintahan DaerahDi 'SForan account of the states' consolidation,see The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan NegaraRepublikIndonesiaEdisi Kedua, JilidI (Yogyakarta:Liberty,1993), p. 192. 14TheDutch onlyovercame centralJava in 1825-1830,all ofJava and much of Sumatraby 1850, and the Islamic SultanateofAceh and South Sulawesibythe firstdecade of the twentiethcentury.Submission to Dutch rule, and subsequentlyto the Indonesian central government,has never been ingrained in manypartsof the archipelago. Mohammad Hatta,held Soekarno's decree on returningto the 1945 15Indonesia'sfirstvice-president, constitutionto be unconstitutional;see Mohammad Hatta "Demokrasi Kita, Pustaka Antara," (Jakarta: PustakaAntaraPt, 1966), p. 6, 17, 18, as reportedin Muhammad RidhwanIndra, The1945 Constitution-A Human Creation(Jakarta:CV Haji Masagung, 1990), p. 27. 16After losingEast Timor,and splittingIrianJayaand Maluku (though thesedivisionsmaynot "hold"), therewere 29 provincesand more than 300 districtsand cities (the latterare all commonlyreferredto as districts). PositionUnderthe "7Fora descriptionof these powers,see Muhammad RidhwanIndra, ThePresident's 1945 Constitution (Jakarta:CV Haji Masagung, 1989).

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The regions,particularlythe provinces,were held in check, even as the rhetoricpromisedregionalautonomy. as Nation-Building Centralization SoehartocontinuedSoekarno'sdriveto stateconsolidationand national integration.In practice,thismeantcentralization,evidencedin economic concentration,a suppressed civilsociety,and centralgovernmentpower relationsweredescribed overregionaland local governments.Center-region in termsof regional autonomy,but the rhetoricwas not supportedbythe facts.Over time,about 90 percentof governmentrevenuesaccrued to the withconditions center. This imbalance gave riseto large centraltransfers, thatgreatlyrestrictedregionalautonomy.The centerinexorablytightened itsgripon the regionsand villages. was also seen in the New Order."8ProxA resurgencein patrimonialism imityto the centerbroughtpower and claims over resources. Legal and extra-legalresourcestreamsbecame the life-bloodof the politico-administrativesystem;retainingpower was essentialto centralofficialsintenton exploitingpublic office. Decentralizationhad littlechance of success in this context. Responding to foreigndonors promotinggreaterregional autonomy,Indonesian officialsmaintainedthat"autonomyin Indonesia is not the same as the autonomyknownin Palestine,Moro or Kashmir."19 usefulfortheirwarningofimpendingstrife, These referenceswereprimarily ifthewrongtypeof autonomywas selected,as fortheirdescriptionofwhat the Indonesian typemightbe. The typeofautonomyofficialshad in mind can, however,be gleaned fromthe 1993-1998statepolicies: the nationaldevelopment, stateand smoothen theunitary To strengthen that in theregionis basedon autonomy ofgovernment implementation with and in conformity and responsible, is real,dynamic, "harmonious," deconcentrated oftheregioninundertaking thecapability decentralized, in ofautonomous tasks.The implementation and assistance governance to encourin development theregionshouldspurpeople'sparticipation theland to realizetheNational throughout age equitabledevelopment NationalResilience.20 Ideal and strengthen

8BenedictAndersonwas an earlyproponentof thefitbetweentheprecolonialJavanesekingdomand Weber's patrimonialstate;see Benedict Anderson,"The Idea of Power inJavaneseCulture,"Cultureand Politicsin Indonesia,eds. C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1972). See also Hans I. Bakker,"The Hindu-JavaneseWorldView inJava:The StructuralRoots of the Pancasila State,"Managing eds. J. Bernardi,G. Forthand S. Niessen, (OtGlobalConnections, Asia: Local Identities, Changein Southeast tawa: Canadian Council forSoutheast Asian Studies XXI, 1995), pp. 189-205. For an argumenton the Shadowsand Re-emerresurgenceof patrimonialism,see Gabriele Ferrazziand Hans I. Bakker,Of Vestiges, in theIndonesianPolity(Universityof Guelph, unpublished, Prebendalism ofPatrimonial gence:ThePersistence 1998). "Soemitro Maskun,"OtonorniDaerah adalah ProgramPemerintah,"Prisma4 (April 1995): 44. 20 Majelis PermusyawaratanRakyat,GarisBesarHaluan Negara1993-1998,(Jalarta:Republik Indonesia,1993), p. 26.

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By "real,"officialsmeant thatautonomywould onlybe givenin accordance withcapabilitiesto handle autonomy.By"harmonious,"policymakers meant thatautonomyshould strengthenratherthan dissolveor corrode bonds between the center and the regions. By being "responsible,"the regionsrecognizedthatautonomyis more of a dutythan a right: the duty being to achieve national goals and strengthenthe unityof the nation. In line withthe above policyprinciples,the regionis viewedas an "integral part"of the national entity:"Pusatpusatnyadaerah,dan daerahdaerah pusat" (the centeris the region's center,and the region is the center'srefurnished verityultimately justificationforhigher gion). This oft-repeated oflowerlevelgovernments.Thus, levelcontroland incursionintotheaffairs whilelegislationat timesappeared to assignentirefunctionssectorally, subshowed the model to Indonesian entail a more sequent regulations generic divisionof labor,withpolicy and regulationsset at the center,provinces given coordinationand supervisionduties (as agentsof the center), and the districtsheld responsibleforimplementation.As the formerMinister forStateReformT. B. Silalahi remindedthe regions,whatis transferred is "onlyimplementation,"withthe policycomponent to be stillheld by the center.21Districtofficialsoftenlikenthisassignmentoffunctionsto a farm animal thathas been entrustedto another'scare, withthe ownerinsisting thathe mustcontinue to hold onto the beast's tail (teruspegangekornya).22 This diminutionof provincialand districtautonomywas internalizedover timebymanyregionalofficials.23 Discontentwithdecentralizationdid arise froma fewbold lowerlevel officialsand some non-government actors. Though blunt at times,it was within limits. The for State Reform, Sarwono Minister always was in his direct Kusumaatmadja, quite warningabout how decentralizationin the early1990s was to be interpreted:"This step is purelybased on developmentefficiencyand effectiveness.So don't politicizeit."24 Such warningsabout decentralizationissuesmerelyreflectedthe broader political discourse,itselftruncated. For example, in the contextof the 1997 economic downturn,the military warnedagainstpoliticizingthe country's financialwoes lest it lead to "instability."25 More subtle bounds were exin terms. For the pressed positive example, generalsupportof the military forautonomywas invariablyfollowedwiththe caution thatautonomymust supportthe"unityofthenation,""nationalresilience,"and "nationalism."26

21"Pemdaagar Sungguh-sungguhMensukseskanOtonomi Daerah," Kompas,31 January1995, p. 13. Functionsto Sub-nationalGovernments." 22See Ferrazzi,"CriteriaforTransferring 23See,forexample,thecommentsofthe EastJavagovernorin "Otonomi Perlu,tapi Bertahap,"Kompas, 10 October 1990, p. 1. 24"Penataan Kembali Otonomi DaerahJangan Dipolitisasi,"JawaPos, 4January1991, p. 1. 25"Don'tPoliticiseFinancial Woes,JakartaMilitaryWarns,"StraitTimes,28January1998, p. 11. 26"L.B.Moerdani: Otonomi Harus Tunjang Ketahanan Nasional," Merdeka,13 May 1991, p. 1.

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Only in donor-supportedforacould explorationthatwentbeyond the officialdiscoursebe found. Even so, donorsrecognizedtheexistingtaboos and sensitivities and did not encourage anydiscussionof alternatemodels of stateformation,but merelywiderformsof autonomy.27 In general,thedecentralizationdiscussionin Indonesia waseitherinternal (and notverytransparent)or in theformof speeches at seminars,with littleopportunityforinteraction. The officialdecentralizationdialogue, and betweenthe centerand the regions,was low keyand veryfragmented, not alwaysintelligible.It was markedbyexplanationsthatplaced the spotlighton the perceivedweaknessof the regionsratherthan on the failings of the centralgovernment.Centralgovernmentcharges thatthe regions werenot "mampu"(capable) or not "dewasa"(mature)werecommon. Even governmentofficialswho evidentlychafed under the slow pace of decenframeddistralizationnonethelesswereforcedto keep withintheofficially "mature centre-immature and The "father-child" cussion.28 region"analogies werepervasivein the autonomydiscourse,29and reflectedthe broaderdiscourse regarding the political maturityof the people or the regions. a title Soeharto's role as "Fatherof Development" (Bapak Pembangunan), Consultative him the bestowedupon Assembly(MPR), by People's officially fed thisanalogy. Other termsused in relationto regional autonomyare also revealing. Forinstance,regionswereexpectedto implement(melaksanakan) autonomy, and theywerejudged as doing thiswell or poorly. Here, autonomyis seen as a task,givenbythe centerto the regions,thatmustbe handled properly withcentralexpectations. This formulation by the regionsin conformity resonateswithLaw 5/1974 statingthatthe irresponsibleapproach to autonomyof thepastwould be supplantedbytheprinciplethat"autonomyis more of an obligationthana right." KeepingProvincesin Check

Regional autonomywasgivenlegislativeattentionin theNew Order,but legal instrumentswere rarelytranslatedinto meaningfulpractice. Provinces and districtswere autonomous largelyin name. The keylegislation designed to greatlyenhance autonomy (Law 5/1974 and the follow-up Regulation45/1992) emphasized the second-tierregions. Even so, little headwaywas achieved, though an effortwas made to push ahead witha

27See,forexample, the workofprojectslike the SupportforDecentralizationMeasures located in the of Home Affairsand supportedbythe GermanGTZ, and the Municipal Finance Project,located Ministry in the Ministryof Finance and supportedby USAID. 28See,for example,J.B. Kristiadi,"Mencari KriteriaAlokasi Dana Regional-Prospek Kebijaksanaan yangIdeal," Prisma8 (April 1991): 44-48. 29See,forexample, the governorof WestSumatra,in his use of the analogyin relationto the second region governments,"GubernurSumbar Drs. Hasan Basri Durin akui: Masih BanyakAparat Pemerintah di Daerah Ini Terjebak Pola PikirLama," Haluan, 15 February1995, p. 1.

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the meager Notwithstanding pilot projectfocused on districtautonomy.30 progress,the rationaleforthe emphasis on second-tierregionsillustrates the politicaldynamicsthatunderpin the stance towardfederalism. The officialreason fora districtfocuswas,and presumablycontinuesto be, thatthislevel of governmentis "closestto the people.""' However,this can be onlya partialexplanationbecause the hamlet (dusun),village,and traditionalmulti-villageorganizations(e.g., Nagariin West Sumatra) are even "closer"to thepeople thandistricts.Flowingfromthislogic,anyor all of these levels should be given autonomous statuswithgreateremphasis than thatof the provinceor districts.The average district(7,800 sq. km., withan averagepopulation of 670,000) is indeed a suitablelevel formany decisions and services,but itssize nonethelessraisesissuesof externalities and administrative capacity.On theface ofit,a good numberofsignificant functionsdo not lend themselvesto managementby the districtor lower levels (e.g., certainaspectsof secondaryand tertiary education and health of Considerations scale and care). (size population) providestrongargumentsforthe continued existence,or even the strengthening, of provincial autonomy. In officialpolicy and discussion,however,the option of enhancing or even maintaininga strongprovincialrole was conspicuous foritsabsence. The more likelymotivationof Indonesian policymakers forbypassingor reducingthe autonomyof the provinceis likelyto be twofold.First,secesforcesare more easilygeneratedin the sionist,centrifugal,disintegrating provinces,requiringthattheybe keptin check. Second, the complexityof non-hierarchicalautonomous regionsis too great a burden; diminishing the provincialrole reduces the complexity.The firstrationalewas rarely acknowledgedor discussed in public fora.32One argumentin the public arenajustifiedtheabolitionofprovincialautonomybyreferenceto history, holding that provinceswere created by the Dutch, withno real roots in Indonesian tradition;the Mataram and Majapahit kingdomsonly recognized district(kabupaten)and village (desa) autonomy.33 JosefRiwuKaho cites the fearsand preferencesexpressedbyBung Hatta, a founderof the republic,regardingthe problem of too manyautonomous layers,the appropriatenessof the scale of the districtforconnectingto the people, and the danger thatwillcome fromregionalmovementsifthe provinciallevel is retained. S3Foran account of the 1995 district-autonomy pilot program,see Christoph Beier and Gabriele Ferrazzi, "The DistrictAutonomyPilot Program:A New Approach to Decentralization in Indonesia." XI (April 1997): 94-101. Nord-Siid "3SeeRepublic ofIndonesia, "GovernmentRegulationNumber45/1992 concerningthe implementation of regional autonomywithemphasis on Level II." 32One exception is JosefRiwu Kaho, "JumlahTingkatan Daerah Otonom: Suatu Analisis," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan, Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990). 33Ibid.,19.

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Quite aside fromthe real level of autonomyaffordedin ancient times, the above argumentforneglectingor eliminatingthe autonomous status of the provincesdoes not come to termswithcontemporaryregionalidentityand power balance. As well, the argumentneglectsthe factthatthe perceived danger emanatingfromlower level governmentsalso was the cause forscrappingthe formalautonomyof a thirdlevel of government. The experimentwithformalautonomy(throughLaw 1/1957) at the third III) was stillbornbecause of fearthat"theformation regionallevel (tingkat of the thirdautonomousregioncould be used to achievecertainintentsby one certainpolitical force,which could harm national stability."34 Here, is to the one Communist force, adept at Pamudji undoubtedlyreferring massmobilizationat thegrass-roots.Hence, anti-provincial policiesshould sentiment be seen as partof a largerreaction;the targetof anti-autonomy and policies emanatingfromthe center is whateverentityhas sufficient autonomyand/or potentialpoliticalclout to challenge the center. There is littledoubt thatthe chiefconcern in decentralizationwas the rebirthofregionalpowerthatcould viewiththatofthecenter.The growth in the numberof provincesin the turbulent1950s (16 new provinceswere born between1956 and 1960) had alreadyworriedBung Hatta,who maintained thatmakingprovincesstrongerwould incite more groups to seek Ironically,thisdilutionof powerthroughtheformation provincialstatus.35 of newprovinceshelped to keep thelid on theboilingregionalpot. Nonetheless,the dilutingeffectof provincecreation did not workto appease existingprovinces,and the centercontinuedto fearthe latentthreatfrom all provinces. Appeasementof theregionsturnedto more politicallyrepressivestrategies under the New Order. In thewake of the failed"communistcoup" of 1965, Soeharto feltthathe had the opportunityto consolidate his power against political forces,includingthe regional elite calling for resources and powersharing.The tamingof theprovinceswas achievedin a number of ways. At the rhetoricallevel, promiseswere made to enact laws that would give"real autonomy"to the regions (ostensiblyto all regions,provor cities). Atthesame timehowever,thecentralgoverninces,and districts mentmade clear thelimitsofautonomy,indicatingthatregionalautonomy as had been would no longer be the "broadestpossible" (seluas-luasnya), laws.Accordingto theNewOrder thecase underpriorregionalgovernment government, ". .. based on experienceto date,thistermseeminglycan give

"4S.Pamudji,"TitikBeratOtonomi Pada Daerah TingkatII (Landasan PembinaanSistemPemerintahan Daerah Di Indonesia)," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitiandan Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990), p. 8. 35MohammadHatta, "Demokrasidan Autonomi,"Harian KengPo, 27 April 1957, in The Liang Gie, DaerahDi NegaraRepublikIndonesia,Edisi Kedua, Jilid I (Yogyakarta:Liberty, Pertumbuhan Pemerintahan 1993), p. 301.

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rise to thoughttendencies thatcan endanger the integrity of the Unitary State .. ."36 The trauma of regional unrestweighed heavilyon the New Order, and centralization,under the guise of a new kind of regional autonomy,was the answer.Hence, the modernizedregionalgovernmentlaw of 1974 made the provincialgovernordirectlyresponsibleto the central governmentand maintainedthe principlethatthe autonomyof provinces and districtsis non-hierarchical(meaning,in essence, thatboth were beholden to the center;the provincecould not act as superiorto the districts unless specificallytaskedto do so). Furthermore,the futureemphasison regionalautonomywould fallon thesecond-tierprovinces,not on thefirsttierprovinces. in workingwithparallel autonomous regionswere felt The difficulties the New Order period. Throughsheerintransigence, theprovthroughout inces introduceduncertainty in decentralizationinitiatives, forcingthecenterto respond and adjust to different provincialwantsand circumstances. This mightbe describedas the essence of autonomy,but the centerwas ill prepared in practice (and psychologically)to make these adjustmentsfor anylevel ofgovernment.Centralgovernmentofficialswerealso not happy about provincesbeingable to thumbtheirnose at thecenter,howeverrarely thisoccurredduringthe New Order period. The burden of trouble shootingfrequentconflictsbetween the provinces and the second-tierregionsimposed a heavyburden on the center.37 Confusionovertherole of theprovincesin supervisingand controllingthe lower levels was in part generated by the lack of clarityand operational consistencyin the non-hierarchicalconcept.38Furthermore, manyofficials were unclear about the technicalguidance role the provinceoughtto play in viewofthe existenceofdeconcentratedcentralunitsalongsidethem. In these conflictingand confusingsituations,the second tierusuallylost,in large partbecause theprovincefeltlike itwas the seniorof the twolevels,a feelingno doubt supportedby the dual/hierarchicalrole of the regional heads. This feelingof hierarchyin practicemayalso derivein partfrom the 1950s'formulation ofdecentralization laws,wheretheautonomouslevels were clearlyhierarchical.39

36RepublikIndonesia, "Penjelasan Atas Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1974 Tentang Pokok-PokokPemerintahanDi Daerah," (Jakarta:MenteriNegara SekretarisNegara), p. 2. 37See,forexample, MashuriMaschab, "Mengapa Tidak Satu TingkatDaerah Otonom?" and Ichlasul Amal, "Otonomi Tingkat Dua," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitiandan Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990). has been acknowledgedbyprovincialofficialsifnot the center;see the commentsof "3Thisdifficulty governorof Bali, Ida Bagus Oka, "FungsiPemerintahDaerah TingkatI Dalam Pelaksanaan TitikBerat Otonomi Pada Daerah Tingkat II," (paper delivered by the governorof Bali at the Seminar Otonomi Daerah, Jakarta,16 April 1997). "3SeeIsmail Husin, "Daerah Besar Dan Daerah Kecil Dalam SistemPemerintahanDaerah Di Indonesia," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990).

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Bytakingawaythe second tierfromthe provinces'jurisdiction,the cencommitteditselfto sortingout the meaning of non-hierarterunwittingly chical regionalautonomyat the provincialand second-tierlevels. Despite regional requestsfor clarification,an effectiveworkingmodel was never developed. It was onlythe continuedcommand chain throughthe Kepala was Wilayah(regional head as agent of the center) that "simplification" attainedduringthe New Order,at the expense of any real autonomyfor the districts. Concerns about provincialpower and about the complexitiesof multilevelnon-hierarchical autonomyeventuallypushed thepolicyofprovincial to its subjugation logical conclusion; Soeharto and his officials,near the end of theirreign,concluded thatitwould be best to relegatetheprovince to the statusof mere administrative territory (wilayah),shornof itslegislatureand regionalhead (Kepala Daerah). The governorwould then purely be the representativeof the presidentin the province. This notion had been circulatingin "captured"academic circlesforsome time,40but was when it receivedthebackingof Rudini,thenminister onlyaired forcefully in 1990.41 Rudiniframeditas theonlyviableoptionthrough ofhome affairs, whichtheemphasison autonomycould be realizedon thesecond regional level. The tuggingbetween the provinceand districtswould be avoided because the functionswould be divided between the center and the diswiththe provincebeing merelythe extensionof thecenter,fulfilling tricts, a supervisory, guidance, and controlfunctionon behalfof the centralgovernment. A strongreactionto this"plan" came fromprovincesand some centrallevel stakeholders,withthe resultthatthisfasttracktowardenhanced districtautonomypracticallydisappeared fromofficialdiscourse. However, the general objectiveremained alive,guidingthe long-termcourse of decentralizationand regional autonomy. This can be seen in the districtautonomypilot program of 1995, where the Ministryfor State Reform whittledawayat the autonomyof the provinces,and let it be knownthat thiswould continueuntilitwasapparentto all thatautonomywasno longer warrantedat thislevel. but in the Argumentsfora strongersecond-tierrole have some validity, New Order,theywere the public face of a decision thathad roots in the politicalcommitmentto denythe provincea strongautonomousrole,parthe second tier. Removingthe autonomyof the province ticularlyvis-fi-vis themultiple-level wouldindeed simplify autonomyconundrum,butitwould Below-LocalInitia40B.Zainun, "DecentralizationforRural Developmentin Indonesia," Buildingfrom in Asia and Pacific,ed. A. Bhattet al., (Konrad Adenauer Stiftungand the tives Development forDecentralized Asia and PacificDevelopment Centre, 1988), 3:104-128. 41Theidea "officially" came fromthe Litbangsection of Home Affairs,throughthe letterof its chair dated 4June 1990/No. 188.2.294/Litbang.

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be politicalsuicide and a recipe fordisasterifapplied unilaterallyand in the contextof risingprovincialexpectations.

HABIBIE'S REFORMS AND POLICY CONTINUITIES B. J. Habibie came to power in May 1998, when Soeharto stepped aside under immense studentpressureand general unrest. While some democraticreformswere ceded, Habibie undertookother reformsnot only to colorsbut also to maintainthe basic featuresof the patshowhis reformist rimonial systemof governance. Regional autonomyreformswere thus flawed,and the possibilityof federalismwas fiercelyattackedby the "reform"government. toProvincial Continued Aversion Autonomy Soeharto's abdication in May 1998 in favorof his proteg6,Habibie, led to a transitiongovernment,42 national legislature(DPR), and people's asthat were (MPR) sembly eager to place some distancebetweenthemselves and theNew Order,butwerenonethelessshorton legitimacy.To make his markas a reformer, Habibie eagerlygrasped at the decision of the special session of the MPR to move forwardon decentralization.43 Althoughofficialscharged withdraftinga new decentralizationframeworkfeltpressureto make some "breakthroughs," therewas littlediscussion of the goals to be emphasized, and little time to embark on a to policy-formulation process and preparationof operationalinstruments make the effortboth technicallyand politicallyacceptable. The president wantedhislawsquickly,and he wantedto displaythesebeforetheMPR and the nation in his accountabilityspeech scheduled forlate 1999. The regional governmentand center-regionfinancial relationsbills, rushed throughparliamentaryapproval in May 1999,44 promisedbroad autonomy (otonomiyangluas) to the regions (but not the "broadestpossible" autonomy). Despite some progressiveelements,much continuity can be found withthe New Order. The focus is again to be placed on districtautonomy,while provincialautonomyis to be restricted(terbatas). The provinciallegislature(DPRD) muststillconsultthe choice of provincial head (governor)withthe president. This is not the case withthe diswherethe Bupatiand Walikotais freelychosen bythedistrictand trict/city, citylegislaturerespectively.Deconcentratedfunctionsgivento the governor willbe dischargedthroughthe same provincialagencies undertaking autonomous functions,invitingconfusionand the dominance of vertical 42LastingfromMay 1998 to November 1999. 43RepublikIndonesia, "TAP MPR No. XV/MPR/1998" (regardingthe Implementationof Regional Autonomy;a JustRegulation,Division and Utilizationof National Resources and the Balancing of Center-RegionalFinances withinthe frameworkof the UnitaryRepublic of Indonesia). Daerah (regional governmentlaw) and Undang-undang 44Undang-undang tentangPemerintahan tentang Pusat dan Daerah (center-regionalfinanceslaw). Perimbangan KeuanganantaraPemerintah

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prerogativesin provincialdecision-making.As well,the non-hierarchical principlebetweenprovinceand districtsis made even more explicitthan in the New Order laws. Federalism whileDiscrediting SellingAutonomy In the run up to theJune 1998 elections,contendingpartiesappeared reluctantto put forwardalternativesto governmentdecentralizationpolicies. Only nine of the 48 approved partiescanvassedby the dailyKompas made knowntheirdecentralizationprogram.45On the whole, these nine favoredbroaderprovincialautonomy.Anothersurvey, elicitingviewsfrom both contestingand "unqualified"parties,revealedsupportforgivingthe provincesa largerrole and share of resources. No partyin eithersurvey explicitlyfavoredenhancing the autonomyof the second regional leveldistrictsand cities-aspreferredbythe transitiongovernment.46Mostwere, however,adamant (at least to be on record) about protectingthe unitary sentimentsof thesenewpolitistate. It mayeven be thatthe pro-provincial cal actorswereheld largelyunawareofpastand intendedgovernmentpolicies favoringthe district.Regardless,the promptallegiance to the unitary model suggeststhatthe federalismtaboo was stillin place severalmonths afterSoeharto'sfall. was generally Public reaction to Habibie's decentralizationframework NGOs had before its sixteen reasons. Even for approval, negative, many on the draft bill record as on regionalgovernment(among "refusing" gone themOXFAM,Wahli,MitraTani,and PACT). The generalobjectionraised and was thatthe draftlaw was not prepared democratically, transparently, withparticipationby the public.47 Manyfound the finalversionto be subweak, lacking in clarity,and overlydependent on government stantively fiat.48However,some governmentofficialswere perturbedby its radical departurefromincrementaldecentralization,fearingthatitwas federalin nature and thatit "has the potentialto disintegratethe nation.""49Stakeholdersremindedthegovernmentof the need fora wide public discourse, formerEnvironmentMinisterEmil Salim among them.5' This was also the byvariousdonor agencies, thoughthe mesmessage conveyedinformally sage was not veryinsistent.

45Seespecial summaryedition on the parties,Kompas,6 March 1999. Can itkeepIndonesiatogether? 46GabrieleFerrazzi,Decentralization (Jakarta:Almanac of IndoneReform: sian PoliticalParties,1999). ""16 LSM Tolak RUU PemerintahanDaerah," Suara Pembaruan,3 March 1999, p. 15. 41See, forexample,ArifAryman,directorof Econit economic researchagencyin Antara,"Autonomy: Bill on Financial Balance Needs Revising,SaysObserver,"7 April1999; http://www.antara.co.id/rx/eng/ curr/national/1999/04/07/ANT28537.html. "9CooperativeMinisterAdi Sasono in "Decentralizationof State Finances Needs More Time," Bisnis Indonesia,5 April 1999 (Netscape version). 5?EmilSalim, "Otonomi Daerah," Kompas,11 Februari 1999, p. 2.

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Only twoaspiringleaders broke rankwiththe elite and tooka standfor federalism. Even so, Amien Rais, of the National Mandate Party(PAN), soon softenedhis stance,indicatingthathe merelysupporteda dialogue on the issue and that the federalmodel may not be the best forIndonesia.51YuzrilMahendra, head of the CrescentStar Party(PBB), also backtrackedand indicated supportfor strongprovinces (40 of them) rather thanthefocuson the districtas enshrinedin the newlaws.52The softening of positionsundoubtedlywas relatedto the backlashfeltamong the politiin thepoliticalpartyGolkar,who had come out strongly cal elite,particularly Rais' against position;the politicallyastuteRais and Mahendra apparently did not want to alienate Golkar-membersupportat later stages of a very fluidpoliticalprocess. Federalismhas alwaysbeen a topicofdiscussion,albeitin hushed tones. This has evenbeen trueamong governmentofficials, thoughthelatterwere in the main sold on the mythologiesof the New Order. The laydiscussion wasbecomingmoreintenseduringthemid-1990s.53 In thereformera,when the elite failed to respond to the emergingfederalismdiscussionamong thepublic,otherstakeholderstookup thechallenge,no doubtemboldened bythedrivetowarda more democraticpolity.Academicsand otherobservers began to writeabout federalism,or autonomyversusfederalism.54 A well-knownfreedom fighter,the late Romo Mangunwijaya,published a timelybook dealing at lengthwiththe need fora federalsystem. In the book and laterwritings, he drewon the symbolof Bung Hatta, indicating thatthisfounderof the republicfavoreda federalistspiritin regionalauRomo suggestedthata fedtonomy,even ifnot explicitlya federalform.55 eral model was needed to ward offcivilunrestand violence,but even he was softin his call, allowingimplementationto extend to theyear2045. Despite an early1998 pledge that"debate on the federalmodel mustbe accommodated,"56Ryaas Rasyid,the directorgeneral in Home Affairsresponsible forregional autonomy,went on the offensiveto champion the decentralizationframework his Home Affairs team had preparedforPresident Habibie. Senior officialslaunched an informationcampaign to "so-

7 September 1998, p. 1. 51See"Debat Golkar-PANSiap Digelar di Teve," Republika, 52SeeYusrilIzha Mahendra, "PerpolitkanKonsep Federal di Indonesia dan Konsekuensinya,"FederalismuntukIndonesia,eds. Adnan B. Nasution,Harun Alrasid,and Ichlasul Amal (Jakarta:Kompas, 1999), pp. 154-164. 53Theseare impressionsof the author,gained fromnine years of cooperation withthe Indonesian governmentat all levels,and throughdiscussionwithnon-governmentstakeholdersduringthistime. 54See,forexample, Soedjati Djiwandono, "Is a Federal SystemSuitable forIndonesia?"JakartaPost,23 July1998, p. 1; Cornelius Lay,"SistemPresidentiilMasih Dibutuhkan 15-20Tahun Lagi," Republika,15 August 1998 (Netscape version); and Amien Syam,"Semua Dati I Harus Diberi Otonomi Luas," Kompas, 24 August 1998, p. 8. untukIndonesia,pp. 55y.B. (Romo) Mangunwijaya,"MenyalamatkanKetunggalanNegara,"Federalism 32-43. 56See"Debat tentangNegara Federal Harus Diakomodasi," Kompas,27 August1998, p. 6.

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cialize"thecontentsofthetwokeylaws. RyaasRasyidstatedthatthe"broadest possibleautonomy"was givenin the new laws,57evokinga concept that had currencyin the 1950s. Quite aside fromthe factthatthereis no such formulationin the laws,thisslogan representeda distortionof historybecause the "broadestpossible"autonomyconcept relatedto a period when theweak centerwas forcedto yieldto keyregionaldemands thatwere primarilyprovincial(e.g., the birthof certainprovincescontiguouswithhistoricalbounds or thatapproximatedDutch "residency"borders).58 In a rebuttalof federalism,Rasyidexplained to the public thatfederalism was not possible in Indonesia because federalnations could only be formed"byindependentnationsdecidingto come togetherto forma federation."59 To indicate the new laws' generous spirit,Andi Mallarangeng, statedthatthese laws gave the realso instrumentalin the draftingeffort, "full gions sovereignty."'6 During thisexchange,as carriedout in seminarsand meetingswiththe press,thepresidentkepta lowprofile,leavinghis regionalautonomydirectorgeneral and partyfunctionariesof Golkarto quell incipientdiscussion on federalism.Golkarattackedsupportersof federalismwithvigor,chargforceslaybehind the desire to establishfederalism. ing thatdisintegrating AkbarTandjung,thepartychairman,invokedthestateideologyofPancasila to establish as thebase fora unitarystateand pledged to "oppose all efforts a federalnation."61 federalismhad begun to emergein Bytheend ofHabibie's government, the broader discourse,but could not be said to have become an acknowledged issue fordeliberationwithingovernment.

THE UNITY GOVERNMENT: USING THE "F" WORD Once the new governmentof PresidentGus Dur was in place (November 1999), some officialspressed for the immediate implementationof the Habibie laws.62However,keyfollow-upregulationsdid not exist,a factthat concerned some regions hopeful for quick action on decentralization.63

31.

untukIndonesia,pp. 17Mallarangen and RyaasRasyid,"Otonomi dan Federalism,"Federalism "57Andi

in Indonesiaas a PoliticalProblem (Ithaca: Mod58See,forexample, Gerald S. Maryanov,Decentralization ern Indonesia Project,Cornell University, 1958). 59"Otonomi Lebih Realistisdaripada Federasi,"Kompas,10 September 1998, p. 6. 6?"OtonomiDaerah Tetap Mengandung Risiko,"Kompas,21 September 1999, p. 17. 6""GolkarTolak Negara Federal," Kompas,1 September 1998, p. 6. 62Forinstance,Dewi FortunaAnwar(formerHabibie advisorand memberof the Indonesian Institute of Science) and Andi Mallarangeng (an architectof the laws and lecturerin the Home AffairsInstitute forGovernmentalStudies); see "RegionalDiscontentThreatensUnity," Post,24 October 1999,p. 1. Jakarta and districtofficialsgathered on 30 October 1999 to begin preparationsforautonomy. 63Provincial They noted the lack of regulationsand warned thatif thiswas not correctedsoon, it would lead to conflictsdown the road (reported 30 October 1999 byTelevisionRepublik Indonesia, news program). The preparationsto be takenwere not made clear,and it is hard to see whatthe regionscan do withoutbeing givena road map of some type.

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To expediteregionalautonomy,the presidentestablisheda new StateMinistryfor Regional Autonomy,and placed Ryaas Rasyidas minister. This signaled the importanceof regional autonomyto the president,and indicated continuitywiththe Habibie government'sregionalgovernmentlaw, of giventhatRasyidhad led itsdraftingas directorgeneral in the Ministry Home Affairs. The new ministerpledged to hasten the implementationof the new regional governmentand financelaws,and reassuredthepublicwiththecommentthat: "Autonomycan be theanswerto all theproblemsofseparatism. It can serveas an adhesiveforthe unitarystateof Indonesia."''64 Giventhat no districtsare currentlyseeking nationhood,"65 the minister'sattention seems misplaced; adhesion is needed largelyat the provinciallevel. The ministeris undoubtedlyaware of thisreality,but is workingwithinthe persistentlogic thatprovincescan best be kept in check by denyingthem a prominentrole. To theratheruninformedpress,thefinalizationofdecentralizationlaws sounded like good news,even elicitingthe hope that"itwillpostpone ... forthe timebeing at least ... theheated debate about federalism."66 These sentimentswereexpressedbytheJakartaPostin thesame breathas reminders of provincialclaims on resourcesand referencesto the upcoming decentralizationofpower"to theprovinces,"''67suggestingthatsome members ofthepresswerestillin thedarkabout thecontentsand implicationsofthe new laws.68 The president'sown pronouncementshave been inconsistentor difficult to decipher,and perhaps theyare meant to be opaque. He acknowledges thatfederalismmaybe needed,butis reluctanttouse theterm"federal system,"giventhe unpleasantconnotationsthishas formanyIndonesians, his vice president,MegawatiSoekarnoputri. Hence, he sees a particularly need to proceed cautiously,but apparentlynot clearly,holdingthat: "Even froma federalsystem, thoughgrantingtotalautonomyis not thatdifferent it is easier to swallow." His quandaryis aptlycaptured in his concluding

64"Government Says AutonomyLaw Ready in 2000,"JakartaPost,23 November 1999 (Netscape version). unrest or calls for independence have been rare but not unheard of in Indonesia's 65District-level history.The districtof Minahasa, in NorthSulawesi,is probablythe best example. Followingthe war of independence, the regional elite, led by the Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasan Unity)movementand the local leader Ratulangie (a nationalist)voiced theirpreferencefor"independence" withina federalIndonesian Republic; see Henley David, "Nationalismand Regionalism in Colonial Indonesia: The Case of Minahasa," Indonesia55 (April 1993): 91-112. "See editorial"Delay Not the Autonomy," JakartaPost,23 December 1999 (Netscape version). 67"RIForced into Federal State by2010,"JakartaPost,15 November 1999 (Netscape version). 6This kind of confusioncould also stemfrominappropriateEnglish translationsof the termdaerah (region) whichcould mean provinceor district,and requiresspecificationin Indonesian (unless ambiguis ity sought). The factthatthe termsremain unspecifiedmaybe an indication of how successfullythe governmenthas been able to muddle or avoid the issue of provincialautonomy.

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statementto theJapanese press,"I am tryingto do somethingthatcannot be expressedin words."69 The taboo on federalism,evidentin the election campaign where few partiesdared mentiontheterm,is crumbling,butveryslowly.The aversion to using the "f' word stillfeltby the presidentindicatesthathe does not wish to be perceived as softon the forcesof disintegration;maintaining is perhaps uppermostin the president'smind,at least territorialintegrity on par witheconomic recovery.He has givenhisvice presidentthe taskof managing regional issues,but has kept the "Aceh" portfolioforhimself, and presumablyin lightofAceh's stridentdemands forself-determination theirreligiousovertones. Gus Dur at firstappeared to agree withthe call on independence,70butthenhe explainedthatthismeant fora referendum for religiousmatters.Finally,he allowed his ministerforlegal affairs, only YusrilIhza Mahendra,to statethattherewould be no referendum.In its place, the governmentwould propose a "special autonomy"package for Aceh.71 The ad hoc "special"autonomypackagesputforthbythepresidenthave not arisen fromany policydebate. He has pledged to Aceh province75 revenues."Anotherformof "specialautonomy" percentofnatural-resource is being promised to West Papua, and recentlythe state ministerfor regional autonomyhas acknowledgedthe meritsof Bali's claim forspecial autonomy. These accommodationsappear to be unrealisticin termsof arrangements.73 addressingregionalequityand sustainablecenter-region The pressureforprovincialautonomyor federalismmounted earlyin Gus Dur's term. Provinciallegislatures,more plural and powerfulin the new politicalframework, began to rouse. The East Kalimantanlegislature to the national legislatureto lobbyforfederalismin sent representatives of the Indonesia. The East Kalimantanrequeststandsthe fear-mongering New Order on itshead: "Weasked the House to takethe concept of federalismintoconsiderationin an attemptto maintainnationalunity.. ."7 It is a significant reversalthatthe fearof disintegrationis now fuellingfederalism proposals and discussion. Provinciallegislatorsin South Sulawesiare also standingbyproposals fora federalsystem,reached as a compromise

6'Broughtto theauthor'sattentionbyBernhardMayas quoted in TheStraitsTimes,22 December1999. Post,16 November 1999 (Netscape 70"Acehto Hold Referendumin Seven Months:President,"Jakarta version). 71"DPR Diminta PrioritaskanPembahasan Otonomi Khusus Aceh," Kompas,23 December 1999 (Netscape version). 72"IndonesiansFear Domino EffectifProvinceGoes," Globeand Mail, 13 November 1999, p. A15. 73Thismessage,among others,was conveyedto the minsterforregionalautonomybythe donor comin Indonesia:ManagingtheRisks,MaximizingtheBenmunity,see AdvisoryWorkingGroup,Decentralization efits, Prepared byadvisorsfromWorldBank, UNDP, USAID, CIDA, GTZ, November 1999,Jakarta. 74"EastKalimantan LegislatorsJoin Call for Federalism,"JakartaPost,2 December 1999 (Netscape version).

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followingstudentdemonstrationsin the streetsofMakassarcallingforoutrightindependence.75 Changes are also takingplace among national politicians. The deputy chair of Golkar,Marwah Daud, afterher party'spoor showing(except in South Sulawesi and a fewother regions) statedher intentto learn more AkbarTandjung,the about and push forwardthe cause of federalism."76 hard-nosedGolkarchairmanentrustedwithdiscreditingfederalismin the Habibie period,also experiencedsome kindofconversion.As chairof the national legislature(DPR), he announced thatthe twopossible optionsto be offeredto Aceh mightbe the federaloption and the broadestpossible withinthe unitarystate." This has autonomy(otonomi yangseluas-luasnya) not been confirmedby the stateministerfor regional autonomy,but the latterdid go some waytowardacknowledgingthe dissonance betweenthe new laws and Aceh's demands by puttingforwardseveral autonomyoptions for thisprovince,one of whichwould focus on the provincerather than on the districtsand cities.7"Some senior governmentofficialshave broken rankswiththe official"unitary-autonomy" line, on one occasion openlyguessingabout the date when federalismwillcome to Indonesia.79 The regionalrepresentative of thePeople's LegislativeAssembly(MPR), a much more energeticbody than in the past,organized a forumin early December 1999 on federalismversusa unitarystate. These "national"politicianscame out withthefollowingresults:theAceh and WestPapua province representatives did not feel thatfederalismwould keep themin the union; Riau and East Kalimantanpressed for a federal form;and other waveredor opposed federalism.80 representatives Standingagainstany easing on the federalissue are formidableforces, namely,theIndonesian DemocraticPartyforStruggle(PDI-P) and themilitary.Led byMegawatiSoekarnoputri,PDI-P has strenuouslystateditsopposition to federalismor any threatto the unitarystate. It has sought to censure Amien Rais, now speaker of the People's ConsultativeAssembly In makingthecase fortheunitarystate, (MPR), foradvocatingfederalism.81 PDI-P the stated: "It was proven thatfederalismwas resecretary-general jected bythe people," alludingto the 1950 returnto the unitarystate. The enactmentof the newlawswould be "appropriatemeasuresto counterfed75"BerceraiKita Runtuh," Gatra,6 November 1998, p. 42. 76"MarwahDaud Siap Mundur,"Kompas,8 November 1999, p. 7. 77"KetuaDPR Tolak Opsi Merdeka," Kompas,4 December 1999 (Netscape version). 78"Ditawarkan Empat Alternatif-Ryaas Rasyidsoal Otonomi untukAceh," Kompas,27 November1999 (Netscape version). 79Seecommentsby Anhar Gonggong, directorof historyand traditionalvalues at the Ministryof National Education, who stated that preparationsfor a federal state should be complete by 2005, "RI Forced into Federal State by 2010,"JakartaPost,15 November 1999 (Netscape version). communicationswithLuc de Meester,GTZ advisorforthe Home Affairsbased Support for 80Private DecentralizationMeasures project,Jakarta. "8See "PDI Perjuangan Seeks to Censure Amien,"JakartaPost,30 November 1999 (Netscape version).

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eralismdemands."s2The yearningfortaboo statusfortheconceptoffederalismseems evidentin these statements.The Java/urbanemphasisof the PDI-P is also clearlyevident. It is not in touch withthe outlyingregions, nor is itverysensitiveto the issue of decentralization. A respectedtraditionalfigure,Yogyakarta GovernorHamengkuBuwono X, has been somewhatmore thoughtfulin his opposition to federalism. He warnedthe nationthat: "Manyareas willformstatesbased on ethnicity or religion ... They will demand independence and Indonesia will collapse."83

Looming in the backgroundis the military.Stilllickingitswoundssufto "threaten feredin thelastthreeyears,itis nonethelessgrowlingat efforts the unity(persatuan)and unitarynature (kesatuan)and continuityof the nation (bangsa) and state (negara)."84 A federalstateis clearlynot favored bythe military, makingit thewildcard in thisintricategame.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE of demands and protestsoverseparation,federalThe post-electionflurry ism,or regionalautonomygavewayto a steadymurmurin theearlymonths of 2000. The centralgovernmentwas unable to takefulladvantageof the relativerespite. A "humanitarianpause" was reached withthe Aceh freedom movement(GAM), but no agreementon the natureof the autonomy package ensued, and low-levelviolence continued. On the westernfront, West Papua convened a provincialforumin earlyJune 2000 that culminated in a call forrecognitionof its "independentstatus." The autonomy package thatwas to preemptsuch demands remainsundefined. The federal option continuesto be raisedin some quarters,but not bythe governhave indicated thatthe federaloption might ment. GAM representatives be an acceptable compromise.85Riau studentscontinueto presstheirofficials and the centralgovernmentto considervariousalternatives,including federalism.86 To relievethe pressure,the governmenthas primarilytriedto inculcate among officialsthe virtuesof autonomyoverfederalism.On 23 February 2000, theministerofhome affairs, SurjadiSoedirdja,opened hisworkshop forregional officialswiththe statementthat"Indonesia is an einheidsstaat [unitarystate],thusIndonesia does not have regionsthatare staats[states]. It cannot possiblyhappen thattherecan be regionsthatare stateswithin

s2"PDI Perjuangan Rules Out Option of Federal State,"JakartaPost,13 December 1999 (Netscape version). 83"Unitary vs. Federal SystemSized Up," JakartaPost,8 December 1999 (Netscape version). 84"AdaUpaya MerombakBentukNegara Kesatuan,"Kompas,2 December 1999 (Netscape version). 85See"PertemuanBondan-AbdullahTerganggu'Pemusatan' TNI GAM ingin negara federal,"Suara Kaltim,18 Maret 2000 (Netscape version). Riau Se-Indonesia TuntutDPR," Riau Pos,9 Maret 2000 (Netscape version). 86"Mahasiswa

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the unitarystate of the Republic of Indonesia.""' This truismposing for policyis vintageNew Order rhetoric. The failureto embrace the discussions takingplace outside governmentcan only isolate policymakersand lead to politicalmiscalculation.These simplisticwarningsof "federationis do a disserviceto the complexityof Indonesia's historyand disintegration" are unlikelyto withstandthe kind of scrutinythatcivilsocietyis beginning to expect and mountof itsown accord. The unofficialdebate on federalismis being continuedbynon-governmentactors,principallyinJakarta.The national and regionalpressoften returnsto the theme,seekingviewsfromofficials, intellectuals,and technical advisorsworkingin relateddonor-supportedprojects. Universitiesand foundationshold forato discusstheoption,usuallyin tandemwithregional autonomyoptions. The press also is active in conductingpanel discussions,oftentelevised."88 Foreignadvisorsare no longershyabout voicingtheirviewson the federal model. Some advisorsopenly speculate that the federal model "in principlecan be applied to Indonesia,"or thatitis workable"ifthatis what thepeople want."89Comingfromadvisorstaskedwithsupportingtheelaborationand implementation ofthecurrent"unitary" government's autonomy policies,these are significantadmissionsifnot endorsements. Explicitsupportforfederalismis foundamong seniorresearchersin the respectedIndonesian Instituteof Sciences (LIPI). It recentlycollaborated withinternationalparties (e.g., Hanns Seidel Foundation) to hold forato enlarge the discussion,90 withthe expressed intentto influencegovernment policymaking.LIPI examined the question: "Is the unitarystateto be identifiedwiththe unityof the nation, and is the federal state to be identifiedwith the nation's disintegration?"Using a scientificforumto demystify governmentclaims on decentralizationis a marked departure fromthe New Order patternof co-optedscientificeffort forthe purpose of statecontroland ideological dominance. The LIPI forumconcluded that it mightbe possible to introducea compromiseposition,one thatperhaps the presidenthimselfis strugglingto enunciate,where the unitaryformis

87Translatedfrom Indonesian by the author from the report found in "Pelaksanaan Otonomi Hendaknya tidakTimbulkanKonflik,"Suara Pembaruan,23 February2000, p. 2. public debate was held in Hotel Meridien,Jakartaon 16 February2000, titled"AntaraBentuk "88A Negara Kesuatuan dan Federasi" (Between the Unitaryand Federal Form of the State). 89See, for example, the views expressed by the members of the Gesellschaft ffirTechnische Zusammenarbeit,the executingarm of the German governmentin the latter'scooperation in the Support for Decentralization Measures project of the Government of Indonesia. These are found in "Wawancara Dr. Bernhard May-Janggan 2, 24-30Januari 2000, Menunggu Daerah Berteriak,"Integrasi, pp. 12-17, and in "Otonomi Baik, Federal tidak Perlu-Ir.Luc de Meester,Penasehat Pengembangan PemerintahLokal dan Regional Depdagri," SorotanKhusus,15Juni 1999, p. 69. "See, forexample, the proposal byLIPI to hold a seminarto compare the meritsof the unitaryversus the federalmodel forIndonesia; LIPI, "Seminar Internasional-NegaraKesatuan VersusNegara Federal: Mencari Bentuk Ideal Negara Indonesia Masa Depan," February2000.

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keptbut the stateover timeabsorbs "some elementsof a federalstatesystem."91Althoughfewstateshave approached federalismwithinthe structureof a unitarystate,92it is likelythatthisseparationof the "spirit"from the "form"of federalismcould become the new fieldof debate, echoing Elazar's focus on the principlesof federalismand Saunders' caution regardingmakingtoo much of structure.

PROSPECTS FOR FEDERALISM IN INDONESIA Federalismfitswiththe enduringvaluesand currentplightofIndonesians. The essence of federalism,"the primacyof bargainingand negotiatedcoordinationamong severalpowercenters,"93connectswellwiththeIndonesian principleof "musyawarah (consensus throughdeliberation). mufakat" The covenantconcept offederalism,concernedwithethicalcommitments and equitable materialdistribution betweensocietalgroups,resonateswith the ideologyof Pancasila. Yet,the pursuitof a federalsystemat thisjuncand grievances,undermininga comprehenturecould accentuatediversity sive shared sense of identificationand belonging.94Ethnic strifealready poses a seriouschallenge to nationalunity.The transitionto a federalsyssecessionand temcould exacerbateexistingfractures, possiblyprecipitating of of the conflict. Elazar's observations ability federalsysbloody hopeful temsto accommodateculturalcleavagesmightbe too riskyto testin Indoof new provincialand districtcreation, nesia. It maywellbe thata strategy combined withsufficient autonomyforboth, can also serve to recognize "local identities"and assuage aggrievedgroups. A unitarystatewithan appropriateformof regional autonomycould be the less convulsiveand saferroutein the immediatefuture. The emergingexplorationof "federalismwithintheunitarystate"could lead to a "made in Indonesia" solution. Some Indonesian scholarswishto remedythe ineffectualregional representationat the centerthroughthe creation of a bicameral national legislaturesimilarto the Americansystem.95Anotherelementof thesolutioncould be tailoredspecial autonomy deals with"separatist"provinces. The proposal forspecial autonomysubmittedbyAceh governmentrepresentatives(not necessarilyapproved by

91LIPI,"Resume and Recommendationof InternationalWorkshopon 'UnitaryState versusFederal State: Searchingforan Ideal Formforthe Futureof the Indonesian State',"Proceedings oftheInternational 28-30 March 2000, p. 2. Workshop, 92SouthAfricahas skated close to a federalmodel withina unitarystructure.Its new constitutionis perhaps too young to be used as an example for others. Spain and Italy have had considerable regionalization,but continuingregional discontentover theirconstitutionalarrangementspersist. oftheSocial Sciences(New York: Macmillan 93DanielJ. Elazar, "Federalism,"International Encyclopedia Co. and The Free Press,1968), 5:354. and theNew WorldOrder,ed. StephenJ. MacPherson, "The Future of Federalism,"Federalism 94James of CalgaryPress,1994), p. 12. Randall and Roger Gibbins (Calgary:University 95Thesescholarsinclude theconstitutional expertHarun Alrasidand politicalscientistRamlanSurbakti; see Idris Kyrwan,KyrwanReport, 15June 2000.

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GAM, the separatistmovement) approaches a loose confederation;only defense,foreignaffairs,and monetarypolicywould be leftto the center (along witha modest share of Aceh's revenues). WestPapua separatists mightfinda similarcompromisepalatable. To the extentthatthe center cedes such formsof "autonomy,"otherprovincesmightbe emboldened to strikea betterdeal thanthatpossibleunder thecurrentregionalautonomy laws thatforesee only "restricted"autonomyfor the provinces. A wider formof provincialautonomyforall provincesnot involvedin special deals (i.e., the "separatist"provinces) would likelyensue to stem chaotic and unstableasymmetrical autonomy. A national dialogue that examines the opportunitiesand dangers for autonomyand federaloptionswould be salutary.96It is unlikely,however, thatthe governmentwillencourage a broad dialogue. Autonomywillhave to be won bythe regions. While democracyin Indonesia is stilltakingroot, restricted formsofregionalautonomywillbe preferredbythe government. Regional autonomyin thiscontextis a flexiblevehicle to variablyappease, disarm,and undercutthe regions. It allows the basic featuresof the centralizedpatrimonialstate to remain in place. Even as the presidentand ministerforregionalautonomyclaim thepoliticalbenefitsof newlawsand regulationsforregionalautonomy,central-level departmentsare undoubtTo the extentthatthe edly readyingthemselvesto diminishtheireffect."97 presidentmaintainsa large and politicallydiversecabinet (to gain support fromthe manyparties),he willfeed centralismas the ministersor parties seek to gain controlover policyand access to resources. The immediate victimsof these central-levelmaneuverswillbe the relatively weak districts or cities. The much-touteddecentralizationdriveis likelyto be frustrated or slowed in the shortterm. As democracygathersstrength,the unitaryformof the statein thisvast and populous archipelagiccountrywilllook increasinglyout of step with the restof the largerdemocracies. It seems inevitablethatmore fundamentaland widelylegitimizedreformsthanthose offeredto date willhave to be fashionedto meet thechallengeofnationalintegrity. The newframeworkwillneed to betteraccommodate provincialinterestsand, at a minimum,be infusedwithelementsor principlesof a federalsystem.

"6The historicalrecord could be reappraised, and the mythsabout federalismcould be dispelled. The contention that an established nation cannot restructureitselfas a federationof states could be counteredwiththe case of the incrementalBelgium conversionto a federalstate. Discussionsbeing held in the United Kingdom,Sri Lanka, and Italy,all pertainingto the meritsofa federalor quasi-federalstate, indicate thatthe transformation is not deemed impossibleby these nations. 97Requestsfromcentral departmentsand agencies for amendments or exceptions to government regulation25/2000 on the distributionof functionsare alreadytricklingin to the ministerforregional autonomy. Some departmentsare takingstepsto fashiondecentralizationaccording to theirown vision.

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