Vol. XLIX, No. 2, March/April 2009

A Bimonthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs ■ University of California Press

Vol. XLIX, No. 2, March/April 2009 ■

The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization in South Korea:

State, Big Business, and Foreign Investors • Thomas Kalinowski and Hyekyung Cho

■

The Sequence and Consequences of Bank Restructur-

ing in South Korea, 1998–2006: Too Fast to Adjust • Myung-koo Kang ■

Labor Market Polarization in South Korea: The Role of Policy Fail-

ures in Growing Inequality • Ji-Whan Yun

■

“Super-Sizing” the DPRK

Threat: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea • Christopher W. Hughes

■

Political Paralysis of the Basic Law Regime and

the Politics of Institutional Reform in Hong Kong • Baohui Zhang ■

The Influence of Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process: Different

Ways and Mechanisms • Zhu Xufeng

■

Mongolia and Preventive Diplo-

macy: Haunted by History and Becoming Cosmopolitan • Li Narangoa ■

Economics, Lobbying, and U.S. Congressional Support for Taiwan:

Buying American Support, 2002–2006 • Joshua Su-Ya Wu

■

MONGOLIA AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY Haunted by History and Becoming Cosmopolitan

Li Narangoa

Abstract Since 1992, Mongolia has sought to embed itself and its neighbors, Russia and China, in regional security arrangements and international law. This strategy can be categorized as preventive diplomacy and involves seeking to create a climate in which conflict will not arise, rather than managing conflict after it has emerged. Keywords: Mongolia, Northeast Asia, preventive diplomacy, security

Mongolia is a small country in terms of population, economy, and influence on world politics. Dwarfed by two large neighbors, China and Russia, it appears insignificant even in regional politics. On closer examination, however, Mongolia presents a fascinating case of a small country making the most of its position and its weaknesses to exert greater influence than its size would suggest was possible. The key elements in Mongolia’s strategic position are its small population and large territory (about 2.9 million people inhabiting about 1.56 million square kilometers); its specialized economy (predominantly herding, with a growing mining sector); and of course its strategic location between China and Russia. This location is not only militarily significant but also gives Mongolia a key Li Narangoa is Associate Professor at the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, Canberra. She wishes to thank the anonymous readers and Robert Cribb for their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. An earlier version was presented at the Northeast Asia Workshop held at The Australian National University in July 2007. Email: . Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 2, pp. 358–379, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.2.358.

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place in the regional transport system of Northeast Asia. During the Cold War, the Mongolian People’s Republic’s foreign relations was oriented toward Soviet foreign policy, and most of its economic and cultural exchanges focused on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. Since the 1990s, newly renamed the Mongolian Republic, Mongolia has developed an active and independent foreign policy. Recent history still haunts the Mongolians: in the 1910s and 1920s, they struggled to free themselves from the new Chinese Republic but in doing so became dependent on the Soviets. The Soviets are gone, but Russia is still powerful, and China is emerging as an economic and military giant. The Chinese hegemonic idea that Mongolia was part of Greater China is still fresh in memory. How to deal with two big neighbors’ balance of power is a question directly related to Mongolia’s national integrity and security. To avert domination by its neighbors, Mongolia has been focused on bringing itself into the regional political scene and emphasizing the values of security, human rights, and international law. As a newly democratized state, Mongolia’s foremost foreign policy concern is to preserve its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security and to avoid a return to its previous status of dependence on a powerful neighbor. Mongolia’s unique location, surrounded by China and Russia without direct access to the sea, has limited its foreign policy options. But at the same time, Mongolians recognize that their state was able to survive because it played an important role as a buffer between the Soviets and the Chinese. The central issue for Mongolian policy makers is whether Mongolia can move beyond buffer status to exercise a broader role in the region and garner greater security for its newly obtained sovereignty. With this aim in mind, Mongolians have adopted a preventive diplomacy designed to avert future conflicts with and deflect pressures from its two big neighbors, which both have threatened Mongolia during the last century. The term “preventive diplomacy” was coined by U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960. Initially, the term was understood in the context of the Cold War, when U.N. efforts were undertaken to eliminate localized disputes and wars that could have provoked wider confrontations between the two superpowers. In 1992, preventive diplomacy received particular attention when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali broadened the concept and publicized it in his Agenda for Peace. According to his definition, preventive diplomacy is “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” The objective of preventive diplomacy is “to seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to

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remove the sources of danger before violence results.”1 Although preventive diplomacy sometimes fails to attract media attention, it has grown in popularity because it can be employed with relatively few resources: “Preventive Diplomacy is by definition tedious and low-key. But it is far cheaper than peacekeeping, reconstruction or War.”2 Although Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy to include “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties,” in practice it has consisted of forecasting specific undesirable events and working to prevent them from happening. Mongolia’s approach to preventive diplomacy goes one step further and aims, in the spirit of Boutros-Ghali’s original definition, to create a general situation in which disputes will not arise. Mongolia is unusual in not having any recognizable dispute with any country. Lingering uncertainty about the border with China was resolved by a boundary commission that completed its work in 1964.3 However, this does not mean that Mongolia is immune from future disputes with its neighbors or within the region. There is no regional security organization with a mandate to prevent regional disputes; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) has discussed preventive diplomacy but has not yet settled on practical measures or institutions. If there were any clash between its neighbors, Mongolia’s own sovereignty would be endangered, as it was for most of the 20th century. Mongolia’s foreign policy therefore focuses on preventing any such clash from arising, by binding its own policy as well as its neighbors to international law in order to ensure its own national security. Part of its aim is to promote peace more broadly in the region, because even if Mongolia has no problems bilaterally with its neighbors, it would be nonetheless at risk in any kind of regional conflict. In practical terms, Mongolia has taken several approaches, actively joining regional and international organizations, seeking third neighbors (i.e., other than Russia and China), and implementing policies such as non-alignment, as well as seeking a legally binding nuclear weapon free status. The literature on preventive diplomacy identifies two distinct preventive strategies. First, operational prevention is undertaken “when violence 1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 77. 2. John J. Maresca, “An Important Role for an Evolving CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe]: Preventive Diplomacy,” International Herald Tribune, August 23, 1994. 3. “China-Mongolia Boundary,” International Boundary Study, no. 173, August 14, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: The Geographer, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State), , accessed November 11, 2007.

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appears imminent.”4 This strategy involves identifying so-called early warning signs of conflict and taking steps to forestall disputes at a very early stage. The problem with this approach is that reliably identifying future disputes is difficult, and by the time they have begun to emerge they are likely to be tied to existing interests, so that effective action becomes difficult. By contrast, structural prevention looks at the sociopolitical, economic, and environmental causes of conflict and seeks to diminish them before disputes can arise.5 The Commission on Global Governance stated in its report in 1995 that “a comprehensive preventive strategy must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic and environmental causes of conflict.”6 Mongolia’s case is distinctive because it shows the importance of history in devising strategies for structural prevention. I argue that Mongolia’s proactive preventive diplomacy is rooted in the memory of its recent historical experience and awareness of its geographical location sandwiched between two big powerful neighbors. In order to analyze Mongolia’s preventive diplomacy, this paper focuses on its subtle way of becoming involved in a regional organization led by China and Russia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It also assesses Mongolia’s attempts to have itself recognized as a legally binding nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), its efforts to seek third neighbors, and its selfrepresentation to the world.

Haunting History: Escaping from Chinese Suzerainty, Becoming a Soviet Satellite Until the 17th century, the Mongols were a major regional power whose influence derived from their formidable military organization and skills. The arrival of firearms in the region, however, removed much of their military advantage, while their small numbers soon put them at a demographic disadvantage relative to both the Russians and the Chinese. From the 17th century on, Mongols were caught up in the long struggle between Russia and China for hegemony in Northeast Asia, and their main political strategy was to play off the imperial rivals against each other.

4. Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), pp. 37, 69. 5. For example, see William Zartman (ed.), Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 5–6; Bruce W. Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytic Framework,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 6. Commission on Global Governance (1995), “Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,” , accessed on February 5, 2009.

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Until 1911, most of the Mongol lands (today’s Mongolian Republic and China’s Inner Mongolia Province) were under the Manchu domination of the Qing Dynasty. When the Qing collapsed in 1911, the Mongols, as did Tibet, sought to create their own nation state, arguing that they had been subjects of the Manchus but not of the Chinese. The Jebtsundamba Khutagt, the religious leader of the Mongols, declared independence and established a government with himself as the Bogd Khan (Holy Khan), aiming at creating an independent state unifying all the Mongols. The road to the independence was, however, not smooth. The Chinese Republic President Yuan Shikai protested against the idea, and violent clashes broke out between Yuan’s troops and Mongol soldiers. The Mongol government looked for help and recognition from Russia as well as other powers. Neither Russia nor the other powers supported the idea of Mongol independence, nor recognized the new Mongol state: its only diplomatic success was a treaty with Tibet in 1913 that meant little in international affairs because Tibet itself lacked international recognition. Mongolia’s desire to escape from the new Chinese Republic was not easy to realize. In 1913, a Sino-Russian accord recognized Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia. China agreed not to send troops to Mongolia and recognized Outer Mongolia’s right to autonomy and control of its commerce and industry. This arrangement was formally established in the tripartite Treaty of Kyakhta, which was signed by China, Russia, and Mongolia in May 1915.7 China reasserted its control over the whole of Mongolia in 1919, when the Soviet revolution left Russia temporarily in turmoil with little time for Mongol-Chinese conflicts. The Mongol army was demobilized, and a ceremonial handing over of authority to the Chinese took place in Urga (today’s Ulaanbaatar) in February 1920 under humiliating conditions: Mongol officials had to kowtow to a Chinese general and the Bogd Khan had to pay personal reverence to the Chinese flag. Mongol autonomy was cancelled, and Mongolia was incorporated into the state structure of the Republic of China.8 The turn in Mongol fortunes finally came in 1921 when the Soviet Red Army helped the Mongol army fight against the Chinese army stationed in Mongolia. The Bogd Khan was restored to the throne, and the new people’s government declared its independence from China. In 1924, the Bogd Khan died, and Mongolia became the world’s second socialist country after Soviet Russia, designated the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR). 7. A previous and better known Treaty of Kyakhta was signed in 1727 between Russia and China, establishing trade accords and delineating the disputed border. 8. Charles Bawden, Modern History of Mongolia (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968).

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Soviet help for Mongol independence did not come without costs. After 1924, Soviet influence increased steadily; eventually Mongolia became dependent on the Soviets not only in economic, military, and foreign policies but also in cultural matters. The MPR government even abandoned the Mongolian written script for the Russian Cyrillic script in 1943. Having escaped from Chinese control, Mongolia found itself under the domination of the Soviets. In 1945, China agreed to recognize the independence of Mongolia within its “existing boundary” (meaning that Inner Mongolia was not included), provided that a plebiscite confirmed the Mongolian people’s desire for independence. Two months later, Mongolia announced that 100% of the electorate had voted for independence from China. In January 1946, the Chinese Nationalist government recognized Mongolian independence. When the Chinese Communist Party took over power in China in 1949, Mongolia recognized it as the legitimate government of China. Mongolia became a member of the U.N. in October 1961 and was subsequently accorded diplomatic recognition by Western European countries. Mongolia officially was now an independent country and hoped to maintain friendly and equal relationships with its “two communist brothers,” but the hope was dashed when Sino-Soviet relations increasingly cooled at the end of the 1950s, turning to open hostility from the mid-1960s. Mongolia had no choice but to stand on the side of the Soviets, closing its border to China until the 1980s. By the late 1960s, the Soviets had 60,000– 75,000 troops stationed in Mongolia, some of them equipped with intermediate range ballistic missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads.9 Because of the strong Soviet influence, Mongolia was generally classified as a satellite state of the Soviets and was sometimes even referred to as the “16th republic” of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War brought Mongolia a new opportunity. Mongolia introduced democracy, and Soviet troops fully withdrew in 1992. For the first time in its recent history, Mongolia was able to pursue its own national interests and priorities in a wider world community. Its two big neighbors’ economic, political, and military conditions still had a strong impact, but Mongolia was determined not to rely on one single country and rather to have a multi-pillar foreign policy. Its past experience of escaping from the control of the one, only to become the other’s subordinate, showed Mongolian leaders that they had to learn from the past and take preventive measures not to repeat it. President Nambaryn Enkhbayar, for example, commented: 9. J. Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Concept and Practice,” Asian Survey 40:2 (March 2000), pp. 344–45.

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Lesson from the past: Being too much dependent only on one country or a limited number of countries will make Mongolia isolated. And the isolation of the country will put at risk the independence of the country and its development, since isolation leads towards being passive, irresponsible and slow. Isolation brings the necessity to rely on the power of weapons in solving disputes and difficult issues.10

Enkhbayar added that Mongolia would carry out an active and responsible foreign policy in developing cooperation with other countries and international institutions, in common good deeds, and “to engage countries in negotiations in solving difficult issues.” A central element in an active foreign policy aimed at enabling Mongolia to avoid dependence upon its neighbors has been strengthening its presence in the international community. Mongolia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1997 and the ARF, the Asia-Pacific’s sole intergovernmental regional security organization, in 1998. Mongolia has become an Asian partner of the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)11 and in 2006 was admitted to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a forum of Asian and European nations established in 1996 to discuss inter-regional cooperation in a wide range of areas. And it has expressed interest in joining other regional forums such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The subtlety of Mongolia’s diplomacy, however, is best reflected in its relationship with the SCO. Mongolia’s attitude to this organization reflects its policy of working in a friendly way with its immediate neighbors without being limited by them.12

Ambiguity about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization The SCO is a regional forum created to forge stronger ties among states in Central Asia while promoting security in the region. It was founded in Shanghai in 2001; its members comprised the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and four of the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO originated from the Shanghai Five, a loose security group made up of current SCO members except Uzbekistan. The Shanghai Five was formed in 1996 as a 10. Nambaryn Enkhbayar, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy: Efforts Toward Regional Peace and Security,” . 11. The OSCE’s Asian Partners for Co-operation are Afghanistan, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and Thailand. See , accessed June 29, 2007. 12. Hisane Masaki,“The Great Japan-Mongolia Love Affair,” Asia Times, February 28, 2007.

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confidence-building measure in which member states could cooperate on border delineation issues. In its new capacity, the SCO aimed at cooperation among member states not only on border and regional security, counterterrorism and trade, but also on energy, transportation, environmental protection, and technological and cultural exchange. By promoting all these areas among the member states, the SCO has been attempting to develop as “the region’s authoritative voice.”13 The group has applied for U.N. recognition; the headquarters of the SCO Secretariat was set up in Beijing. The SCO is the largest regional grouping in the world (in terms of population and geographical size), although it is of course not the strongest. The SCO remains the world’s only regional security mechanism without direct U.S. participation. The U.S. has, therefore, been suspicious about the real purpose of the SCO.14 From Washington’s point of view, China and Russia are using the SCO to expand their spheres of influence in Central Asia.15 The American perception is not without basis. The founders of the SCO hoped to create an organization that would reduce military tensions and build trust among member states and thus prevent danger in the future. In this effort the SCO also limits American political and military expansion into Central Asia.16 For example, the member states issued a joint statement at a 2005 SCO summit calling for an early withdrawal of the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan.17 Mongolia applied for observer status in the SCO on the encouragement of both Moscow and Beijing. This was granted in 2004, and since then Mongolia has attended meetings and participated in activities. In early June 2007, Mongolian observers monitored anti-terrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan that were held under SCO auspices.18 Observers have the right 13. Sean L. Yom, “Power Politics in Central Asia,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 6:4 (Autumn 2002), , accessed June 20, 2007. 14. “The ‘Not an Anti-American’ Bloc,” Asia Times Online, December 8, 2006, , accessed June 7, 2007. 15. Lionel Beehner, “Asia: U.S. Military Base in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs 84:4 (July 26, 2005). 16. Mōri Kazuko, “Chūgoku no Ajia gaikō: Shanghai Kyōryoku Kikō to Higashi Ajia Anzen Hoshō Kyōdōtai o Megutte” [China’s foreign policy: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and security cooperation in Northeast Asia], in Watanabe Akio (ed.), Ajia Taiheiyō Rentai Kōzō [Asia and the Pacific alliance structure] (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2005), pp. 235– 36; Lkhamsuren Lkhagvasuren, “Evolution and Growth for Contemporary Mongolian Diplomacy: Consideration of Its Relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Kan Nihonkai Kenkyū [Japan Sea Rim Studies] 12 (Niigata, Japan) (June 2006), p. 4. 17. Masaki,“The Great Japan-Mongolia Love Affair.” 18. “Policy Recommendations on Enhancing the Role of Mongolia in Northeast Asia,” November 30, 2005, , accessed June 19, 2007; “Mongolia Observers View Anti-terror Exercises,” Mongolia Web, June 6, 2007, , accessed June 6, 2007.

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•

to attend open meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of SCO Member States and their Conferences of Heads of Ministries and/or Departments; • to participate in discussions on issues lying within the competence of the SCO institutions, without the right to vote and with advance consent of the chairperson; and to circulate through the SCO secretary-general statements written in the working languages of the SCO, on relevant issues of concern; • to deliver a speech and/or circulate written statements at meetings of the SCO institutions with 10 days’ prior notice.

However, observer status does not convey the right to participate in preparation and signing of documents of the organization. Observers do not participate in formulating decisions of SCO institutions, nor do they bear responsibility for such decisions. If an observer commits actions or makes statements targeted against the SCO, the decisions of the SCO institutions, or its principles, the status can be withdrawn.19 From the SCO members’ point of view, the advantage of including Mongolia as an observer arose out of its importance in transportation and energy as well as security. Mongolia is located between Russia and China. It has long borders with both and straddles a major line of north-south communication between them. Mongolia’s growing mining industry is the other important factor, both as a source of investment and of energy. In terms of security, Mongolia shares a border with the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China, which is considered to be a potential terrorist source by China.20 From Mongolia’s point of view, the SCO’s agenda of cooperation in security, economics, trade, and transport networks in Central Asia was very attractive to a small state that had long historical ties with Central Asia. Most important to Mongolia from the state security standpoint was the SCO principle that emphasizes “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, nonaggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas.”21 Participating in this Sino-Russian-led security organization that emphasizes the participants’ “sovereignty,” “territorial integrity,” and “no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas” was just what Mongolia wanted from its neighbors. 19. “Regulations on Observer Status at SCO,” SCO, , accessed December 5, 2007. 20. Ruslan Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective,” Sipri (August 2006), . 21. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the U.N., “Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (August 15, 2001), , accessed on February 7, 2009.

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But the downside of the SCO was that because the organization had the unspoken agenda of limiting U.S. interference in Central Asia, membership would inhibit Mongolia’s desire to build a close relationship with the U.S. as a “third neighbor” on whom it could rely if Russia and China became hostile to each other or violated Mongolia’s sovereign rights. A further risk from the Mongolian point of view was that the SCO was dominated by China, even though Chinese power was somewhat counterbalanced by Russian power. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Mongolia’s economy has been increasingly oriented toward China, which has topped the list of investors since the 1990s. Between 1994 and 2004, for example, Chinese investment made up 40% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mongolia. Chinese investors have been involved in big mining industries and the construction of roads, railways, and bridges, so extensively that an American banker commented that China has been “attacking from all fronts.”22 Mongolian total foreign trade in 2002 was US$12.14 billion; of this amount, trade with China, at $3.63 billion, made up almost one-third of the total.23 As Lkhamsuren Lkhagvasuren has pointed out, from the long-term perspective of Mongolian security and sovereignty, getting too close to China is not a desirable policy. Despite the economic attraction of a closer relationship, Mongolia’s history has made its people sensitive to the risks. Thus, even though Russia and China are encouraging Mongolia to become a full member of the SCO, Mongolia seeks rather to maintain its status as an observer.24 Observer status offers Mongolia the unique position of being inside the circle without having the burden of duty and without being restricted by the SCO political agenda.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone A second strategy adopted by Mongolian policy makers to promote national security and thus to contribute to regional and global security has been to declare Mongolia a nuclear weapon free country.25 Being located 22. Li Gangzhe, “Chūgokukasuru Mongoru Keizai to Hatten Heno Kadai” [Issues on the Sinicizing of Mongolia’s economy and development], in NIRA [National Institute for Research Advancement] Policy Research 18:2 (Tokyo) (February 2005), p. 83. 23. Chūgoku Sōran 2004 [China overview 2004] (Tokyo: Gyosei 2004), p. 201. 24. Lkhagvasuren, “Evolution and Growth,” p. 6; Iran and India, which are also observers, have been keen to gain full membership, but the existing Central Asian members have been reluctant to agree because they feel that including other regional powers would marginalize their own position and would not benefit the SCO in the long term (Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”). 25. The existing nuclear weapon free zones are the following: the Latin America and Caribbean Region NWFZ (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967); in the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985); in Southeast Asia (SEANWFZ, Treaty of Bangkok, 1996); the African NWFZ (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1997); and the Central Asia NWFZ (CANWFZ, Semipalatinsk, 2006).

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between two nuclear states, Mongolia feels uncertain about its own people’s security, because if there is a nuclear strike against one of its neighbors, Mongolia would be affected directly. Although Russia and China concluded unilateral assurances about their non-use of nuclear weapons, these assurances lack legally binding force; nor do they promise that Moscow or Beijing will not station nuclear weapons or their components on the territory of other states. The nuclear weapon free initiative is important not only for Mongolian security but also for regional security. As Ambassador Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan, then-Mongolian representative at the U.N., expressed in a paper in 2000: The initiative, if realized, would make Mongolia’s policy more predictable; this would have an impact on the diplomatic calculations and policies China and Russia undertake with respect not only to Mongolia but also more importantly to one another and to other powers around the region. Moreover, since global and regional approaches to disarmament can be complementary, a regional initiative such as Mongolia’s has the potential to serve as an important confidencebuilding measure as well as promoting non-proliferation more generally.26

From the outset of its new political reform, Mongolia has been lobbying the international community to be recognized as an NWFZ. At the 47th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1992, when the Russian troops were leaving and Mongolia was setting up its new Constitution, President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat announced that Mongolia had declared its territory to be nuclear weapon-free and would work to have that status recognized internationally. Obtaining international recognition, however, proved to be difficult. Although the nuclear powers had welcomed Mongolia’s intentions in general terms, they were uneasy in practice with the idea of giving institutional recognition to a single-state NWFZ. The problem from their point of view was the risk of creating a precedent that could lead to a multitude of fragmented NWFZs, thereby complicating their own security arrangements. Eventually, in April 1997, after several years of lobbying and a few unsuccessful draft proposals, the Mongolian U.N. delegation introduced a paper concerning a single-state NWFZ concept and guidelines on its principles to Working Group I of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. The paper proceeded from the assumption that consideration and adoption of such guidelines could be conceptually important as well as have practical implications for the one-third of the U.N. membership that is not covered by

26. Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” pp. 348–49.

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existing zones. During the 1998 session of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, more delegations extended their support for the consideration of the single-state zone concept. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on December 4, 1998, as Resolution 53/77D. The main points of Resolution 53/77D were the following: 1. acceptance by the General Assembly of Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status; 2. acceptance of the fact that Mongolia’s good-neighborly and balanced relationship with China and Russia constitutes “an important element of strengthening regional peace, security, and stability”; and 3. an invitation for member states, especially the five nuclear weapon states, to help Mongolia consolidate and strengthen its “independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its frontiers, its economic security, ecological balance, and its nuclear weapon free status as well as its independent foreign policy.”27

The resolution, however, neither mentioned the concept of single-state zones nor the notion of institutionalizing the status. It was understood that the final nature of the status would depend primarily on whatever agreement was worked out among Mongolia, its neighbors, and other nuclear weapon states.28 Accepting Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status without formally recognizing the country as an NWFZ and without any reference to institutionalization reflects an absence of agreement on the legal nature of the proposed status. Mongolia’s proposal to be recognized as an NWFZ has two unique elements. First, the existing NWFZs have been created in regions or groups of countries, whereas Mongolia’s proposal is based on a single country. This uniqueness is caused by the fact that Mongolia has common borders only with the nuclear powers Russia and China, neither of which is likely to abandon this status. Ulaanbaatar therefore has no possibility of creating a zone with its immediate neighbors. In fact, Mongolia did attempt to join an NWFZ proposal offered by Central Asian countries. Together with Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia submitted a draft resolution for the establishment of an NWFZ in the Central Asian region, at the 51st session of the General Assembly in October 1996. The draft was, however, subsequently withdrawn when it failed to gain the support of the other states in the region.29 On October 30, 2006, the General Assembly’s First Committee adopted draft

27. United Nations General Assembly, Disarmament Committee, 53rd Session, Official Records, document no. A/C1/53/L.10. Also see . 28. Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” p. 354. 29. “Kyrgystan and Mongolia: Draft Resolution Establishment of a Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone in the Central Asian Region,” General Assembly (A/C.1/51/L/29), October 19, 1996, , accessed June 11, 2007.

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resolution A/C.1/61/L.54/Rev.1 on the establishment of an NWFZ in Central Asia. The Central Asian states achieved their aim, and the member states signed the treaty in September 2006; however, Mongolia was excluded from the zone because it did not have a common border with any of the Central Asian states (although it lies only 50 kilometers from the border of Kazakhstan). The active denuclearization of Kazakhstan since the early 1990s may have helped the Central Asian states’ goal of building an NWFZ, but Mongolia’s commitment to inclusion in such a zone began about the same time. Although a 1976 U.N. Comprehensive Study on the Question of NuclearWeapon-Free Zones stated that “even individual countries”30 could comprise an NWFZ, and although Mongolia has no choice, by virtue of its geographical location, but to pursue its proposal as a single country, so far it has not been permitted to do so. A second reason for Mongolia’s difficulties is that it is not under immediate threat from nuclear weapon countries. The existing NWFZs were proposed when there was a direct nuclear threat. For example, the NWFZ in Africa was proposed when France exploded its first nuclear instrument in the Sahara Desert in 1960; the Latin American proposal for an NWFZ was prompted by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; and the NWFZ treaty in the South Pacific is tied to France’s nuclear tests in the region.31 Mongolia’s proposal to create an NWFZ arose not because Ulaanbaatar recognized an immediate threat; it is rather part of its preventive diplomacy. Russia and China signed a joint declaration in Beijing in December 1992 to define their new relations. They declared that they would resolve mutual disputes by peaceful means and would not use force or threaten to do so— in any form—against each other either directly or through the territory of neighboring countries. They also pledged that neither would participate in any military political alliance directed against the other nor conclude with third countries any treaties or agreements detrimental to the other’s state sovereignty and security interests.32 Both Russia and China, moreover, have concluded similar non-aggression treaties with Mongolia itself. However, these are bilateral treaties, not bound by international law. Mongolia’s initiative in proposing an NWFZ therefore is a proactive preventive measure for the sake of national and regional stability. In this context, it is a noble way of thinking about using international law to prevent future conflict.

30. Cited in Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” p. 352. 31. Chen Miaofeng, “Menggu Wuhequ Wenti Tanxi” [A discussion on the problem of nonuclear district in Mongolia], Dong-Ya Luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], February 2002, p. 40. 32. Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” p. 351.

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In other words, the proposal would create a legal barrier to block any future attempts to reintroduce or deploy nuclear weapons in Mongolia under any circumstances. Mongolia is determined that its nuclear weapon free status should be recognized as legally binding under international law. Mongolia carried out domestic discussions to set up legislation to define and regulate its status, and in February 2000 the Parliament passed a law in which production, obtaining, and possession of any kind of nuclear weapon in Mongolia were forbidden. At the same time, officials continued lobbying the international community to make the status legally binding. Between 1998 and 2002, Ulaanbaatar initiated bilateral and multilateral talks with the five official nuclear weapon states, the U.S., U.K., China, Russia, and France. Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status under international law is still not recognized, but the five states jointly declared in October 2000 that they provided assurance of Mongolia’s security. In September 2001, the U.N. Asia and the Pacific Regional Peace Disarmament Center organized a conference in Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan to discuss ways that would make Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status legally binding. Mongolian representatives and specialists from the five nuclear weapon countries took part. The conference concluded that the best way to make the Mongolian status legally binding was to “focus on signing treaties with China and Russia.”33 In 2002, Mongolia submitted a draft proposal for a Three Countries Treaty on Mongolian Nuclear WeaponFree Status among itself, China, and Russia. Since that time, however, desultory talks have failed to achieve any great progress on the treaty. Some Mongolian government officials have even expressed doubt over whether the treaty would give Mongolia nuclear weapon free status in international law—even if the status materialized.34 This stalemate in the trilateral negotiations led Mongolia to see potential in the SCO. The territories of the four Central Asian member states have been recognized as an NWFZ since September 2006, and the other two members, Russia and China, are Mongolia’s immediate neighbors. Thus, the support of the SCO members provides another potential framework for the Mongolian aim of becoming an internationally recognized NWFZ. Mongolia’s negotiations through the SCO were initially promising. On June 7, 2002, the Heads of the Member States of the SCO issued a declaration supporting the establishment of NWFZs and emphasizing respect and 33. NPO [non-profit organizations] Hōjin Peace Depot, Kakugunshuku to Hikaku Jichitai 2002 [Nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapon-free zone 2002] (Yokohama: Kobunkan, 2002), p. 93. 34. Lkhagvasuren, “Evolution and Growth,” p. 9.

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support for the nuclear-free status of Mongolia.35 Nonetheless, the country has been wary of becoming too closely involved with the SCO because one of Mongolia’s grounds for claiming single-state nuclear weapon free status has been that it is not a member of any regional security arrangements. Mongolia recognizes that NWFZs are not an ultimate security solution, but they provide an opportunity for small states to contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while strengthening their national security. As the official webpage of the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations states, NWFZs are “an inseparable part of the active quest for international peace and security and represent a valuable practical measure capable of contributing to the gradual reduction and, perhaps even elimination of nuclear weapons. In this the role of single-state zones should not be underestimated.”36

Seeking Third Neighbors The third main element in Mongolia’s foreign policy has been to seek what it calls “third neighbors.” Because the country shares borders only with Russia and China, this strategy involves forging special ties with more distant countries that might be willing to support Mongolia’s continued independence and security. President Enkhbayar has said that Mongolia’s multi-pillar foreign policy is the outcome of his country’s aspiration not to be isolated. He continued: “It brings about the necessity to develop ‘neighborly’ relations with such important players at the international arena as the U.S., Europe, Japan, India, the U.N. and others, thus securing” independence.37 The three countries most commonly identified by Mongolian officials in this category are the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and most recently Canada, which is the second largest foreign investor in Mongolia after China. In November 2005, then-U.S. President George W. Bush visited Mongolia. The visit aroused a wave of excitement in Mongolia and a wave of suspicion in its neighbors. The Chinese newspaper Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao [China Business Times], which covers current trade affairs, reported that the real target of Bush’s visit to Mongolia was China. The report claimed that 35. “Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Department of Information and Press, October 6, 2002, , accessed June 6, 2007. 36. The Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations States, , accessed December 5, 2007. 37. Embassy of Mongolia, Washington, D.C., “President Enkhbayar Addresses the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.,” , accessed December 6, 2007.

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in recent years, Washington had been paying a lot of attention to China’s military development and to its economic, political, and diplomatic influence in the world. As a result, the U.S. had begun to strengthen its relationship with China’s immediate neighbors such as India, Vietnam, and Mongolia.38 Bush, who became the first serving U.S. president to visit Mongolia, spent only a few hours in Ulaanbaatar but his visit highlighted U.S. interest in cultivating a relationship with Mongolia. It was recognition in particular of Mongolia’s membership in the so-called coalition of the willing in Iraq, where Mongolia stationed 173 troops.39 This contribution provided a basis for American training of Mongolian troops as peacekeeping forces. The U.S. was the third-largest direct investor there of foreign capital between 1994 and 2004 (10.1% of all foreign investment), followed by Korea and Japan, at 7.2% and 5.6%, respectively.40 Both Russia and China have been alarmed by the U.S. interest in Mongolia. From the Chinese point of view, Washington’s interest is geostrategic, that is, not in Mongolia itself but rather in Central Asia.41 U.S. officials have rejected this suspicion categorically: The U.S. does NOT have “strategic” interests in Mongolia in the military or security sense. . . . The U.S. does NOT seek a military base in Mongolia. Rather and more importantly, it seeks to consolidate a base of democracy in Mongolia.42

Nonetheless, the fears among Mongolia’s neighbors remain strong. Another “third neighbor,” Japan, has been the largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) provider to Mongolia since the 1970s, when the two countries normalized their diplomatic relationship. During the Cold War between 1971 and 1990, Japan donated ¥ 60 billion (US$5.6 billion), which included the cost of a cashmere factory built as part of war compensation. Since Mongolia introduced a market economy, between 1991 and 2003, Japan provided ¥ 688.1 billion ($6.5 billion) in aid, ¥ 233.42 billion ($2.2 billion) in technological support, and a ¥ 361.26 billion ($3.4 billion) loan. Japan also hosted eight of the 10 conferences of countries providing ODA to Mongolia between 1991 and 2003. Japanese ODA to Mongolia reached 38. Lu Hu, “Bushi Fanmeng Yizai Zhongguo” [The real goal of Bush’s visit to Mongolia is in China], Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao [Chinese Business Times], November 23, 2005, p. 4. 39. “Mongolia/U.S.: Mongolia Has Ally Beyond Its Region,” Oxford Analytica, November 18, 2005, , accessed June 2, 2007. Mongolia’s troops are dispatched to Iraq in six-monthly rotations and serve under Polish command. 40. About 46% of the foreign investment was for mining. See Li, “Chūgokukasuru Mongoru Keizai,” p. 82. 41. Lu, “Bushi Fan Meng Yizai Zhongguo,” p. 4. 42. “Remarks by Ambassador Slutz to the Mongolian Society Annual Meeting and Panels,” April 6, 2006, San Francisco, , accessed June 8, 2007.

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a cumulative total of ¥ 130 billion ($1.22 billion) in fiscal 2004. In 2006, when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited, he brought along ¥ 350 million ($3.3 million) including grant aid to Mongolia for the Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship.43 Japan also trains sumo wrestlers from Mongolia; many of today’s best wrestlers are Mongols. In Mongolia, Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been most active in many social issues such as building schools and orphan centers and renovating temples. Japan reportedly topped a media poll conducted in early 2007 asking which countries Mongolia should maintain friendly relations with. The year 2007 was a “Japan Year” in Mongolia, meaning that cultural programs about and from Japan would be promoted to strengthen ties. Although the partnership with Russia and China is often referred to as a “friendship partnership,” that with the U.S. and Japan is referred to as a “comprehensive partnership.” It means that the latter countries will be partners not only in economics and trade but also regional politics and security.44 The other “third neighbor” is South Korea. This relationship is partly romantic, partly geopolitical. Koreans and Mongols often emphasize their “sameness” and their historical links. As Chon Yong-u, South Korea’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and foreign trade, said, “The people of Mongolia and South Korea have ancient traditional relations.”45 Although the most important event in the historical relationship between the two countries was the Mongol conquest of the Korean Peninsula, occurring in the 13th century, in their modern bilateral relations this event has often been romanticized. One foreign observer even described the Mongols and Koreans as “siblings.” Their special bonds also “reflect the solidarity of two small nations living on the edge of rising China.”46 This idea is also often expressed in cyber chat and blogs: “While Koreans cannot fully trust the Chinese and Japanese, the Mongols do not trust the Chinese and the Russians, but they [i.e., the Mongols and Koreans] do trust each other.”47 43. This provides scholarships for students, who study in Japan as well as building schools in Mongolia. Hanada Marohito, “Nihon no Tai Mongoru Enjo to Seisan Saisei” [Japan’s aid to Mongolia and industrial reproduction], NIRA Policy Research 18:2 (February 2005), p. 77; “Mongolia’s Birthday,” August 10, 2006, Asahi Shimbun (English), , accessed June 5, 2007; Hisane Masaki, Asia Times, , accessed June 22, 2007. 44. “Japan to Help Mongolia Develop Mineral Wealth,” Japan Times, February 27, 2007, , accessed June 30, 2007. 45. “South Korean Officials Discuss Trade, Security,” Montsame website, July 29, 2005, , accessed June 19, 2007. 46. James Brooke, “Mongolians and Koreans: Twins with Minimal Sibling Rivalry,” New York Times, October 12, 2003. 47. Enjoy Korea, , accessed June 16, 2007.

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The diplomatic relationship with South Korea started in 1990 when Mongolia introduced its new political reform. Since then both countries have been working closely together on the issues of cultural exchange; refugees from North Korea; and legal, military,48 economic, and environmental issues. From the 1990s, Korea has been one of Mongolia’s major donors of foreign aid as well as the fourth biggest foreign capital investor between 1994 and 2004, after China, the U.S., and Canada. In 1998, Seoul and Ulaanbaatar agreed through their aviation authorities to operate three weekly flights between the two capitals, with connecting flights to Japan and China. Officials also made special temporary arrangements for labor migrants. There are many Mongols working in Korea and many Koreans do business in Mongolia. The communities have been growing fast, so there are Mongolian schools in Seoul and Korean schools in Ulaanbaatar. With the increase of two-way migration, there are also legal and criminal issues to solve. In 1999 South Korea and Mongolia signed an extradition agreement “to make it easier to round up nationals committing crimes in each other’s countries”; it took effect from January 2000. Mongolia in fact has been pursuing good relations with both Koreas. As a neutral state, it has played an important role as a transit place for North Korean refugees who wanted to move on to South Korea or the U.S. Since the late 1990s, South Korean and also American missionary groups have quietly helped hundreds of North Koreans to Mongolia via an “underground railroad,” for eventual settlement in South Korea or elsewhere. In 2002, however, Chinese police intercepted 29 refugees, and missionaries stopped running their clandestine conduit. Refugee supporters requested permission to build a transit camp in Mongolia where the refugees could stay while their papers were being processed for settlement in other countries. But both Koreas opposed the plan because North Korea did not want its citizens fleeing and South Korea did not want to “irritate” North Korea. It was a sensitive issue for Mongol relations with the two Koreas. Pyongyang became alarmed and in 2002 sent Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun, its highest-ranking envoy to Mongolia in 14 years, to renew a bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty.49 The Mongolian government neither rejected nor agreed to support the refugees but simply let the volunteers do their job. Mongolian Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar (in 48. “S. Korea and Mongolia to Increase Military Exchanges: Seoul,” Xinhua News Agency, December 8, 1999, , accessed June 14, 2007. 49. “Mongolia under Pressure to Serve as Haven for Refugees,” New York Times, November 21, 2004.

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this post 2000–04) said that “[t]hese are human beings, people who suffered in this long journey, crossed the border, risked their lives. They should be treated as human beings in a humanitarian way.” He also used the standard excuses, “We are a small country” and “Mongolia does not want to offend anyone.”50 In 2007, however, it was reported that Mongolia closed its border to the North Korean refugees. Mongolia’s diplomatic relations with North Korea were established in 1948 and since then have remained friendly despite Mongolia’s democratization. Mongolian officials see keeping good relations with both Koreas as essential to contribute to regional peace and security, and they believe that Mongolia could act as a mediator if political or nuclear crises arise. They believe that Mongolia could play a good role as a mediator in the six party talks on the Korean nuclear weapon issue.51 Having Japan and South Korea, these two economic powers of Northeast Asia, as “third neighbors” would also promote Mongolia’s participation in regional and global economic matters. Mongolia has no membership yet in key regional groupings that primarily discuss economic cooperation, such as APEC, ASEAN Plus Three, or the East Asia Summit (EAS). These powerful “third neighbors” or “comprehensive partners,” ironically all strongly influenced by the U.S., are countries that Mongolia can rely on in its efforts to balance the power of its direct neighbors. To gain the goodwill of its “third neighbors,” however, Mongolia has been paying the price: sending soldiers to the U.S.-led Iraq war; withdrawing its candidature for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council so that Japan could seek a two-year term starting in 2009; and closing the borders to North Korean refugees in 2007. Mongolia relies on these “third neighbors,” of course, because of their economic and military power, and trusts them because they are geographically distant and do not present the same risks that its immediate neighbors do.

Regional and Cosmopolitan These three strategies to secure Mongolia’s long-term independence and territorial integrity have been accompanied by a remarkably self-confident claim to “soft power” in international affairs. Mongolian officials have not only been emphasizing to the international community their country’s 50. “S. Korea Plans Transit Camp in Mongolia,” Taipei Times, September 29, 2003; “Mongolia Closes Borders to Fleeing North Koreans,” Mongolia-Web, , accessed July 1, 2007. 51. “Mongolia Urges N. Korea Envoys to Show Trust,” Straits Times (Singapore), July 22, 2007, , accessed July 24, 2007.

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support for the values of universal international law. They have also asserted that Mongolia can make a special contribution to global and regional stability, in its own right. The leaders of Mongolia are very much aware of their country’s weaknesses in economic, trade, and military respects. They are aware of the fact that Mongolia is a small state. But they have been presenting its “small” size not negatively but rather making a virtue out of it, emphasizing what a small state can contribute to the regional and global good. The president of Mongolia said that to build a general organization for Northeast Asian security, the small- and middlesized states should carry out the groundwork, rather than leaving it to the big states, in order to avoid unnecessary suspicion about each other’s interests.52 In a widely publicized paper, Mongolian Ambassador to Japan Zamba Batjargal constructed a matrix showing the political and economic partnerships among the Northeast Asian countries and their rivalry and competition in these areas. The matrix awarded Mongolia the highest points (10) for cooperation and partnership. Russia was in second place with 5.75, followed by China (5.25); North Korea and South Korea had 4.50 and 3.50, respectively, whereas Japan had the lowest score of a mere 0.50. The ambassador explained that Japan’s outcome was low because of its war history in the region and also because it had economic rivals. Mongolia received high points because it not only had “the possibility of cooperation with all the countries” but also because it acted as a “bridge” between countries that had difficulties in engaging with each other. Batjargal ignored the earlier military history of the Mongols in the region. Thus, “because Mongolia is the part of the Network which faces the least resistance [from other members], it can soften the elements of hostility which have been gathered in the Network.”53 This view is obviously a very subjective Mongolian opinion, but it reflects the general positive idea in Mongolian official circles that the country is small and therefore can make a contribution to the region that a big state cannot. There is also a tendency among Mongolian officials to claim that Mongolia had historical grounds for being a model of regional politics. This excerpt from Batjargal’s writings reflects the general idea: In 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongol Empire made the material and spiritual cultural exchange possible that linked the West and the East. And it created 52. “Nijū’Isseiki no Heiwa Kōzō” [The peace construction of the 21st century], Shakai Minshuto [Social Democratic Party], May 2, 2005, , accessed June 16, 2007. 53. Zamba Batjargal, “Hokutō Ajia Chi’iki Kyōryoku ni Okeru Mongoru no Yakuwari” [The Mongolian contribution to the Northeast Asian regional cooperation], NIRA Policy Research 18:2 (February 2005), pp. 74–75.

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what we could call today a “free trade zone” from Asia to Europe. It also established a political system that we could call the model of today’s republican states. That time, because it implemented a generous religious and national politics among the people under its control, it was able to avert conflict and collision. . . . The Mongolia experience shows that today big states and small states could be in equal and helpful collaboration and it [i.e., the experience] even can become an important model for the advancement of the Northeast Asian unification process.54

Batjargal’s text is a remarkable claim to Mongol cosmopolitanism, entirely at odds with the more common global view of the Mongols as isolated herders. It underpins a Mongolian eagerness to participate in a wide range of regional and global activities and organizations. It involves a reassertion of the Mongol Empire of the 13th century as the Pax Mongolica, a regime of security and order spanning the Eurasian continent and promoting trade and peaceful coexistence in a way comparable to that of the earlier Pax Romana.55 This reassertion is obviously in contrast with the alternative memory of the Mongol age in China, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe as a time of pillage and destruction. Even without this ambitious cosmopolitanism, Mongolia’s international profile since the end of the Cold War has been striking. The practice of preventive diplomacy shows remarkable breadth of vision, based both on Mongolia’s fragile national independence during the 20th century and on an older sense of political universalism. Whether these efforts would secure Mongolia’s integrity in the event of a breakdown in the regional or global order may be a matter of some doubt, but Mongolia’s diplomatic activity clearly has a positive contribution to make toward sustaining peace and development in Northeast Asia.

Conclusion Mongolia’s participation in regional and global affairs has been conditioned above all by its location, sandwiched between two superpowers, both of which have a history of attempting to control Mongolian affairs. The traditional Mongolian response to this situation was to attempt to play off these two powers, Russia and China, against each other. Mongol authorities would typically seek an alliance with whichever power they judged to be less dangerous, in order to stave off the menace of the other. Although this strategy delivered national survival, it came at the cost of a high degree of subordination. Early in the 20th century, Mongolia exchanged Chinese 54. Ibid., pp. 75–76. 55. Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “When Did Globalization Begin?” European Review of Economic History 6:1 (April 2002), p. 24.

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domination for Russian. At the end of the century, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Chinese economic power and regional ambition, it appeared possible that Chinese hegemony would be restored. In response to this risk, Mongolia’s strategy since 1992 represents innovation based on lessons learned from historical experience. Rather than playing the two powers off against each other and seeking the less dangerous as a protector, Mongolia has sought to embed itself and its powerful neighbors in regional security arrangements and in international law. This strategy can be categorized as preventive diplomacy, specifically as structural prevention. It involves seeking to create a climate in which conflict will not arise, rather than managing conflict after it has emerged. The key elements in this strategy have been a multi-pillar foreign policy that engages both with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional forum and with selected powerful “third neighbors,” specifically the U.S., Japan, and Korea, as well as a strategy of acquiring a legal nuclear weapon free status as a guarantee of non-belligerence. Mongolia has pursued this strategy not as an admission of weakness but rather as a remarkable assertion of cosmopolitanism that reinterprets the Mongol Empire of seven centuries ago as the forerunner of a peaceful contemporary world order. Mongolia’s experience represents an important case of the use of history both to define a problem—here, a difficult strategic situation wedged between two superpowers—and to devise a solution—the reassertion of a cosmopolitan multilateralism. In this way, Mongolia has added a new dimension to the structural approach within preventive diplomacy, potentially opening the way to a richer repertoire of strategies to forestall global security problems.