and that the Westphalian narrative perpetuates a Eurocentric bias in international relations theory. This bias maintains that Westphalia cre- ated an international ...
International Studies Review (2010) 12, 193–217
Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory Turan Kayaoglu University of Washington In the past 10–15 years, an increasing number of revisionist scholars have rejected the most significant elements of the argument about the centrality of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the evolution and structure of international society. At the same time, the prominence of this argument has grown in the English School and constructivist international relations scholarship. I deconstruct the function of the Westphalian narrative to explain its pervasiveness and persistence. I argue that it was first developed by nineteenth century imperial international jurists and that the Westphalian narrative perpetuates a Eurocentric bias in international relations theory. This bias maintains that Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a normative divergence between European international relations and the rest of the international system. This dualism is predicated on the assumption that with Westphalia European states had solved the anarchy problem either through cultural or contractual evolution. Non-European states, lacking this European culture and social contract, remained in anarchy until the European states allowed them to join the international society—upon their achievement of the ‘‘standards of civilization.’’ This Westphalian narrative distorts the emergence of the modern international system and leads to misdiagnoses of major problems of contemporary international relations. Furthermore, their commitment to the Westphalian narrative prevents international relations scholars from adequately theorizing about international interdependencies and accommodating global pluralism.
The centrality of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the evolution and structure of the international system is a familiar theme in international relations scholarship.1 Countless references to these treaties have led to the formation of a framework for understanding international history and politics that I call the Westphalian narrative.2 Among the chief elements of this narrative is the idea that the Peace of Westphalia instituted, or at least embodied, the principles of sovereignty and secularism. On sovereignty, the Peace is credited with limiting the hegemonic aims of the Holy Roman Empire, thus allowing the newly sovereign rulers to establish exclusive territorial domains. Westphalian arrangements 1 I would like to thank Katie Baird, Priya Chacko, Rob Farley, Michael Forman, Lucas Freire, Ahmet Kuru, Kate Marshall, Jon Mercer, Chuck Rowling, Jason Scheideman, Mike Struasz, and Charles Williams for their criticisms and suggestions on this essay. I would also like to express my gratitude to the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their comments. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York City, February 15–18, 2009. 2 For a classical statement of the Peace of Westphalia’s place in the development of the international system, see Gross (1948).
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are said to enable the states to monopolize the means of violence within their territories and their control of foreign policy instruments such as war and diplomacy. Moreover, the notion of respect for each other’s sovereignty (political tolerance), out of which international law has emerged, has been traced back to Westphalia. On secularism, the Peace allegedly curtailed the universalist claims of the Catholic Church and made possible the separation of the public domain of the state from that of the private domain of religion. Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention on religious issues together with a newly instituted spirit of religious tolerance led to peaceful coexistence within and among states. Taken together, these so-called Westphalian principles and institutions were idealized as engines responsible for transforming early modern Europe into a society of states. Once this ‘‘Westphalian’’ international society—shared ideas and institutions grounded in political and religious tolerance—had consolidated itself in Europe, European colonization then expanded this framework worldwide; this process is described by Bull and Watson (1984). This Westphalian narrative has its critics. In the past 10–15 years, an increasing number of scholars have rejected significant parts of this narrative; Osiander (2001), Beaulac (2004), and Teschke (2003) have even called it a myth. These critiques have argued that many norms and institutions attributed to the Peace of Westphalia emerged much later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They have identified some Westphalian anachronisms. For one, ‘‘Westphalian sovereignty’’ is a misnomer; Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel (1714–1776) was the first to develop the idea that state sovereignty requires the exclusion of external authority structures from domestic politics (Krasner 1999; Beaulac 2003, 2004). Some major nonstate political entities, including the Holy Roman Empire, survived until the early nineteenth century (dissolved in 1806) (Krasner 1993, 1995 ⁄ 96; Osiander 2001). In addition, until the late nineteenth century states continued to share the means of violence with a plethora of non state groups such as privateers, pirates, and merchant companies (Thomson 1994). European states often deviated from the norm of territorial jurisdiction and claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction in non-Western states and kept their consular courts there well into twentieth century (Kayaoglu 2007, 2010). The constituent principles of secularism—the separation of church and state and the acceptance of religious tolerance—had little to do with the Peace of Westphalia and they materialized, albeit imperfectly, in Europe in the nineteenth century (Kaplan 2007). Highlighting the anachronisms associated with the Westphalian narrative, these scholars discounted the role of the Peace of Westphalia for the origins, evolution, and structure of international system. But the Westphalian narrative has been resilient. Among many others, Wendt (1999), Jackson (2000), Philpott (2001), and Clark (2005) have presented arguments emphasizing the prominence of the Peace of Westphalia to understand international relations. So far Westphalian critiques have not explained the persistence of the Westphalian narrative in and its implications for international relations scholarship. To this end I deconstruct the Westphalian narrative to suggest that it in part substantiates a perspective of European exceptionalism. This exceptionalism idealizes the European ⁄ Western order and elevates its ideas and ideals in international relations scholarship. The Westphalian narrative allows scholars to reinvent an framework of normative hierarchy depending on where Western and non-Western societies placed in the narrative. Western states produce norms, principles, and institutions of international society and non-Western states lack these until they are socialized into the norms, principles, and institutions of international society. In this perspective, international society is a normative hierarchy assumed to reflect the natural division of labor in international relations. From its early sponsors to its present day supporters, there have been remarkable similarities in the use of the Westphalian narrative. These similarities could
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be grouped as practical, historical, and normative. The narrative is practical in that it has, albeit arguably, established a plausible freestanding account of the development of international society to which scholars could refer while tracing the origins of contemporary international norms or while providing a concise account of the international system in introductory international relations classes. It is historical in that it has allowed scholars to challenge ahistorical approaches to the study of international law and relations (the nineteenthcentury jurists used it against analytical positivist jurists, the English School used it against behavioralist scholars, and the constructivists used it against structural realist and neoliberal theorists). It is normative in that this narrative has established an understanding of liberal progress toward an international order of political and religious tolerance embedded in European history, values, and political vision. It is this third use and its consequences that I evaluate in this article. Essentially, I argue that the Westphalian narrative was first developed by German historians and usurped by international jurists in the nineteenth century. According to its earliest formulation by German historians, the Peace of Westphalia allowed European states to establish an international order based on mutual independence, political tolerance, and the balance of power. These alleged Westphalian sovereign vision stood in stark contrast to the menacing Napoleonic imperial vision. Nineteenth-century jurists added an external dimension to the Westphalian narrative: lacking a Westphalia-like arrangement, nonEuropean societies remained in political disorder and religious intolerance. When these societies ‘‘fulfilled’’ the so-called ‘‘standards of civilization,’’ the European states then ‘‘admitted’’ them into ‘‘international society.’’ English School scholars in the 1960s–1980s revived the narrative of the centrality of Westphalia. With the cultural turn in international relations scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s, constructivists brought the Westphalian narrative into the literature on international norms. But it is time for international relations scholars to do away with the Westphalian narrative for four reasons: (i) it distorts our understanding of the emergence of the modern international system, (ii) it leads to misdiagnoses of major aspects of contemporary international relations, and (iii) it prevents international relations scholars from theorizing cross-civilizational and cross-regional interdependencies and (iv) it thwarts the accommodation of pluralism in an increasingly globalized world. First, by exaggerating some, down-playing other, and ignoring some other aspects of the development of international society, the narrative has allowed the construction of an essentialized and over-generalized history. In this stylized understanding, Western societies’ achievement of religious and political tolerance originated with Westphalia and was furthered by subsequent treaties and conventions while non-Western societies’ lack of religious and political tolerance was shaped by their intolerant and despotic past. This ‘‘historical’’ vision is often invoked to justify cultural and legal arguments for guaranteeing the intellectual and political superiority of Europe in international relations scholarship. More perniciously this intellectual construct became an ideological tool to excuse the coercion used by Western states over non-Western states as a necessary evil, required in order to get them to conform to the rules of international society. For example, in the process of Europe’s colonial and imperial expansion, policymakers and scholars invoked Westphalian-grounded principles to justify acts of brutality and subjugation in the name of the privileged position of states that were deemed ‘‘civilized’’ in spreading the rule of law, tolerance, and civilization. Similar to other European-invented narratives (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Hodgson 1993; Patterson 1997; Goody 2006), the Westphalian narrative allows for the continued imagination and invention of Europe’s
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intellectual and political superiority, treating the West as a perennial source of political and religious tolerance in international society. Once different societies are placed in the Westphalian narrative, this slanted history becomes a perspective and an interpretative technique that distorts our understanding of contemporary issues. Starting with the assumption of the centrality and the normative value of the Peace of Westphalia in international society cause observations become what I call ‘‘narrative-laden’’ when analysts focus on historical practices that either largely confirm, in few cases disconfirm, the narrative. This problem of selection bias is similar to the problem of ‘‘theoryladen’’ observations when analysts focus on cases that confirm the theory rather than falsify it. While international relations scholars are arguably alert for the limitations of the theories and the methodologies they employ, they rarely pay attention to the limitations and biases of the historical narratives they employ. This omission is particularly troubling given the centrality of history to the study of international relations (Elman and Elman 2001). Moreover, the selection bias is confounded with an interpretative bias: behaviors are interpreted differently depending on a state’s place in the narrative. The Westphalian narrative produces an interpretive dualism analogous to different modes of explaining intergroup relations: an in-group’s desirable behavior is attributed to the in-group’s character while an in-group’s undesirable behavior is attributed to the external conditions. Similarly an out-group’s undesirable behavior is attributed to the out-group’s character while out-group’s desirable behavior is attributed to external conditions (Mercer 1996: chapter 2). Mercer’s insight sheds some light onto the in-Westphalian and out-Westphalian interpretative rationale the Westphalian narrative perpetuates: it creates a dualism between Western and non-Western states akin to in-group and out-group identity in a normative hierarchy. Thus, Westphalia-confirming European practices, for example, political and religious tolerance, are attributed to Europe’s inherent superiority; Westphalia-disconfirming European practices, for example, lack of political and religious tolerance, are attributed to either conditions notinherent to Europe, conditions European states could not stop, or used as evidence for the evolving practices of the Westphalian order. Conversely, Westphalia-confirming non-Western practices are attributed to conditions external to non-Western states, such as their socialization by European states; Westphalia-disconfirming non-Western practices are attributed to non-Western states’ inherent inferiority and an example of the challenge thy pose the Westphalian order. This hierarchy has been used to justify the notion that Western states should follow different norms and principles toward non-Western societies as these societies have different norms, principles, and institutions. While non-Western societies were gradually admitted into international society, international society continues to expand its normative scope, reaching higher levels of religious and political tolerance. Paradoxically, the Westphalian international society has deepened more rapidly than it has widened: the normative gap in the origins of the emergence of international society between Western and non-Western societies and the disparities of progress between them means that non-Western societies must perpetually chase the progress of Western states and the European order. The normative divergence will persist because Western societies continuously evolve faster than the non-Western states are socialized by adopting the existing norms, principles, and institutions. Perpetual progress of the Western normative order will continue to sustain a normative hierarchy in which the non-Western tortoise will never catch the European hare. Three caveats are necessary before further elaborating my argument that reducing the origins and structure of international society to the Peace of Westphalia reflects a Eurocentric bias in international relations scholarship. To
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begin with, I do not offer an alternative history of international society free from the inconsistencies that I claim the Westphalian narrative produces.3 Rather, I offer a historiography of Westphalian international society by exploring its initial invention by nineteenth-century jurists and subsequent refinement by the English School scholars and some constructivist scholars. Furthermore, while references to the Westphalian narrative also exist in other international relations theories, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, I do discuss these theories. Because the presumption of Westphalia does not occupy a central position in these theories and they emphasize other aspects of the international system—like anarchy and the distribution of power for neorealism and interdependence and rational-choice for neoliberalism. Finally, I do not dispute the existence of international society—shared ideas and institutions based on political and religious tolerance—or the importance of international society in achieving international peace, development, or human rights. Rather, I argue that international relations scholars must move away from a Westphalian-based, and thus Eurocentric, notion of international society to one that more thoroughly accommodates global diversity and plurality. This shift in narratives can bolster the legitimacy and efficiency of international society. I develop my argument regarding the Eurocentrism endemic to the Westphalian narrative in international relations scholarship in the following three sections. These sections offer a chronological view of the notion of Westphalian international society. The chronological order also allows me to illustrate how later generations of scholars inherited and re-invented the ethnocentrism of past scholars. First, I examine the origins of the Westphalian narrative: nineteenthcentury international jurists’ attempts to build a Westphalian narrative to support their claims for the existence of international law. Second, I discuss the English School’s concept of international society and its relation to the Westphalian narrative. Third, I explore the current constructivist international relations literature, tracing the durability of the Westphalian myth to the presence of Eurocentrism in current international relations theory. The Construction of the Westphalian Narrative The construction of the Westphalian narrative postdates the Peace of Westphalia (1648): it was the product of nineteenth-century intellectual and political developments. The initial sponsors of this narrative were German historians and international jurists of the nineteenth century—not the rulers of the seventeenth century. There is good reason why the Westphalian narrative did not emerge until the nineteenth century: natural law, which had been the dominant international legal discourse until the late eighteenth century, did not need to rely on a historical incident or treaty to justify the existence of international society and law. Connecting law, justice, and morality, natural law posited that the content of law is set by a transcendental source above states. Jurists of natural law pointed to numerous sources for the law: religion, human nature, nature, and finally, in the age the Enlightenment, natural reason. Since the transcendental quality of law made it valid everywhere and for everyone at all times regardless of political boundaries, any treaty, including the Peace of Westphalia, was insignificant for the legal and political order envisioned by the natural law theorists envisioned. The universalist assumptions of natural law allowed these scholars to assume the existence of an international society, preventing them from clarifying discriminatory doctrines such as sovereign recognition and sovereign territoriality, and thus making the issues central to the Westphalian narrative marginal to these scholars’ theories. 3
Hodgson (1993) provides some preliminary ideas as to what such a history might look like.
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But in the nineteenth century, this was to change. The transformation from natural law to legal positivism occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Nussbaum 1954:157–185). Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations, first published in 1758, was one of the important bridges from natural to positive law. Deviating from the earlier naturalist ‘‘law of nations,’’ Vattel made sovereignty central to his framework of international law by adding an external dimension to the domestic sovereignty developed by Hobbes and Bodin. The external dimension of sovereignty entails two qualities: the sovereign state’s privilege as the sole representative of a country’s population, and the exclusion of what the ruler considers ‘‘external’’ from domestic authority structures. With this external dimension, now known as Westphalian sovereignty, sovereign states became the sole representatives of their populations and the sole subjects of the law of nations (Krasner 1999:20–21; Beaulac 2003). Like other Enlightenment thinkers, Vattel (1916: Book 3, Chapter 3, §47) referred to the ‘‘societal’’ qualities of Europe using the term republic: Europe forms a political system, an integral body, closely connected by the relations and different interests of the nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is not, as formerly, a confused heap of detached pieces, each of which though herself very little concerned in the fate of the others, and seldom regarded things which did not immediately concern her. The continual attention of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and the perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a kind of republic, of which the members—each independent, but all linked together by the ties of common interest—unite for the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political balance, or the equilibrium of power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate, and prescribe laws to the others.
Although Beaulac (2003, 2004) implicitly and Krasner (1999:20–1) explicitly credit ‘‘Westphalian sovereignty’’ to Vattel, and as the quote suggests the parallels between the Vattel’s argument for the uniqueness of Europe’s political systems and the argument of Westphalian system are striking, surprisingly, Vattel linked neither his argument of sovereignty nor the uniqueness of European political order to the Peace of Westphalia. In The Law of Nations, he invokes Westphalia only five times on issues such as the papal rejection of treaties (Vattel 1916: Book 2, Chapter 15, §223) and the rights of German states against the Holy Roman Empire (Vattel 1916: Book 4, Chapter 6, §59). The incidental and infrequent references to Westphalia in Vattel is striking compared with the treatment Westphalia receives by one of the most prominent international jurists of the nineteenth century: Henry Wheaton. Wheaton starts his section on ‘‘The History of the Modern Law of Nations’’ in the History by stating: ‘‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648, may be chosen as the epoch from which to deduce the history of the modern science of international law. This great transaction marks an important era in the progress of law of nations’’; Wheaton then lists numerous fundamental changes he attributes to Westphalia (Wheaton 1973 [1845]:70). The Napoleonic Wars were mostly responsible for the emergence the Westphalian narrative. As Edward Keene has persuasively demonstrated, the earliest form of the Westphalian narrative was product of early nineteenth-century German historiography. The initial purpose of the Westphalian narrative was ‘‘to stigmatize the French Revolution, and especially the Napoleonic imperial system, as unlawful interims of the traditional principles of European public law and order’’ (Keene 2002:16). Elucidated by the German historians W.C. Koch and A.H.L. Hareen, this historiography developed the idea that the Peace of Westphalia established a decentralized system of mutually independent sovereign states and thus distinguished medieval Europe from modern European politics.
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The moniker attached to the modern European political order was states-system, originating from the Peace of Westphalia. The counter-revolutionary German historians had a good reason to advance the Westphalian narrative. The alleged role of Westphalia in justifying and guaranteeing the mutual independence of states allowed the historians to justify the traditional liberties of German states secured from the Hapsburg Dynasty but now under a similar threat from the Napoleonic dynasty. While legal scholars, like Vattel, also supported the idea of states’ mutual independence, German historians could not easily rely on them because these scholars, influenced by natural law, would find revolutions and foreign interventions justified ‘‘if a ruler had violated the fundamental principles of natural law’’ (Keene 2002:17). Rather than natural law, these German scholars thus turned to historical analyses of European legal systems, focusing in particular on the treaties underlining these systems. These scholars argued that the Peace of Westphalia established the foundation of the European legal order. The treaties of the Peace of Westphalia had been ‘‘constantly refreshed by all the subsequent treaties up to the French Revolution’’ and the Peace was thus ‘‘the turning-point of modern politics’’ (Koch cited in Keene 2002:20). In a manner serving German interests in the first half of the nineteenth century, the German historians Koch and Hareen argued that the significance of the system established by Westphalia was its confirmation of the German states’ territorial supremacy, rights, and privileges, and by setting German states as barriers between major European powers, the Peace of Westphalia secured both the mutual independence of European states and Europe’s balance of power (Keene 2002:21). Upon the foundation invented by German historians, international jurists of the nineteenth century built a comprehensive narrative of the development political and legal order of Europe that stressed its uniqueness. The jurists’ construction of ‘‘Westphalian’’ international society was part of the larger intellectual trend of nineteenth century, European exceptionalism. According to this perspective, European societies and political systems were superior to the European past and to the rest of the world. In the humanities and social sciences, nineteenth-century European uniqueness and superiority were taken for granted. A wide range of academic disciplines like philosophy, history, anthropology, jurisprudence, and sociology almost simultaneously and in tandem established their own episteme of European exceptionalism. In the epistemic exceptionalism, what was ‘‘law’’ to John Austin, ‘‘science’’ to Auguste Comte, ‘‘contract’’ to Sir Henry Maine, ‘‘capitalism’’ to Marx, ‘‘legal-rationality’’ and ‘‘protestant ethics’’ to Max Weber, was ‘‘Westphalian order’’ to international jurists. The claim of European normative exclusivity and supremacy was constructed in conjunction with the creation of inferiority of the Other. In this epistemic the inferiority, what was ‘‘custom’’ to John Austin, ‘‘metaphysical’’ to Auguste Comte, ‘‘status’’ to Sir Henry Maine, ‘‘Asian Mode of Production’’ to Marx, ‘‘kadi justice’’ to Max Weber, was ‘‘anarchy’’ to international jurists. In addition to this intellectual background, the creation of the Westphalian narrative with its emphasis on treaties and conventions in the making of international law was instrumental in the international jurists’ need to justify the existence of international law when legal naturalism and its transcendental basis for law, like natural reason, became untenable with the rise of legal positivism (Anghie 2005:40–52). The ascendance of positive law (formulated by utilitarian philosophers such as J. Bentham, J. Austin, and J.S. Mill) over natural law in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Anglo-American jurisprudence made natural law an unacceptable justification for international law. According to positivists, the state was the ultimate and only source of law. The reduction of law-making authority to state legislation, the reduction of law-interpretation to state adjudication, and the reduction of law–enforcing authority to state enforcement
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denied the existence of any law outside and above the state. The rise of positivist jurisprudence in international law was slow, incomplete, and contested; though not every jurist was a positivist or equally committed to its principles (Koskenniemi 2001; Slyvest 2007), every Anglo-American jurist did take the positivist critique of international law seriously. Since the late nineteenth century, all major international law texts have addressed the legal positivists’ denial of international law, usually focusing on the critique offered by John Austin (2000 [1832]). In response to the earlier positivist claims that international law is not proper ‘‘law,’’ nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurists, like Wheaton (1973 [1845]), Twiss (1884), Hall (1894), Westlake (1894), and Holland (1898), developed two lines of justification—a dualism, arguably, that still characterizes the major doctrinal and interpretative disagreements in international law (Koskenniemi 2005 [1989]). Despite the differences between these two justifications, both routinely invoked Westphalia to ground international law in European thought and practices. The first justification was a historical one that attributed the origins of international law to customary law. According to this perspective, law emerged from the spontaneous functioning of a society, in addition to the enactments of a sovereign. Much of European law was customary in that it had emerged spontaneously to regulate inter-European relations. Essentially, historical jurists reduced law, including international law, to the product of a European consciousness and culture. The second justification was an analytical argument with an emphasis on the positivist and contractual qualities of law. The analytical school justified international law based on the sovereigns’ explicit consent to it. Convinced of the necessity of sovereign will in the creation of law, these jurists argued that international law is law because the collectivity of states enacted the international law, and each states enforced it through its domestic courts. States act with their sovereignty when they agree on treaties. The treaty ratifications, marking the sovereign legislative will, elevate treaties and conventions into a form of positive law, thereby internationalizing positive law. For both the historical and analytical schools, the Westphalian narrative was indispensable. For the historical school, it represented the growth of a cultural revolution triggered by Protestant religious ideas then combined with preWestphalian legal and political ideas. Philosophers like Grotius, Bodin, and Hobbes offered robust theoretical justifications for sovereignty; theologians and philosophers, like Luther, Costello, and Locke provided strong arguments for religious tolerance, and both groups provided intellectual and cultural frameworks for customary international law. For the analytical school, the Westphalian narrative represented the establishment of a clear break from the feudal system of overlapping authority structures wherein rulers vied with the Holy Roman Emperor and Catholic Church in a system of exclusive territorial sovereignty. The narrative corresponded to a structure of contractual relationships, one between the rulers and their subjects sanctifying religious tolerance, and another among rulers for upholding political tolerance. It turned the political stalemate among the political and religious groups unleashed by the Reformation into an affirmation of political and religious live-and-let-live policies, ending the ThirtyYear Wars. Once these Westphalian constitutional principles and institutions became well-established in Europe, European rulers signed additional treaties and conventions to further develop international law. Essentially, international law of the late nineteenth century became a ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law whose historical development and sources were closely linked to the Peace of Westphalia and subsequent European treaties and conventions. The writings of nineteenth-century jurists provide many examples of the ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law. As mentioned earlier, Wheaton, possibly the most prominent jurist of the first half of the nineteenth century, was particularly influential in integrating a Westphalian narrative to explain the development of
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European legal and political order. In his commentary on Wheaton, Nicholas Onuf observes: ‘‘Wheaton adopted Vattel’s position that Europe constituted an actual international society’’ but ‘‘[h]e also took a step that neither Vattel nor, as far as I have been able to tell, anyone else before him taken[:]. . .he identified a specifically juridical basis for a distinctively European international law’’ (Onuf 2000:6). While Wheaton also noted the contribution of Europe’s Roman and Christian heritage in the development of a distinctively European international law, Westphalia was the most significant factor in European distinctiveness regarding international law. In Wheaton’s (1973 [1845]: preface) view, Westphalia, an avowed positivist, starts by citing legal positivist Austin (2000 [1832]:147–148): ‘‘It has been very justly observed that ‘international law is found only on the opinions generally received among civilized nations, and its duties are enforced only by moral sanctions; by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility and incurring its probable evils, in case they should violate maxims generally received and respected.’’’ Agreeing with the claim that international law could be seen as an international morality, Wheaton moves on to explaining European distinctiveness regarding international law. According to Wheaton (1973 [1845]:70) this uniqueness lays with the Peace of Westphalia in creating the modern international law. The scope and substance of the consequences that Wheaton (69–71) attributes to the Peace of Westphalia is remarkable. According to him, the treaty established secularism and religious tolerance, and thus ended the religious revolutions. It freed states from the religious authorities of the Church and from the secular authorities of the Holy Roman Empire. It also established a right of resistance against oppressive rulers. Wheaton furthermore claims that the peace secured Germany as a safe haven from religious and political persecution and as a place for refugees to ‘‘appeal to the public opinion of Europe’’ in case of oppression. The peace replaced European customary law with the new law of Europe. The treaties also marked the inauguration of modern diplomacy through which the European peace was maintained. With all these distinctive qualities, Westphalia thus established a European order based on public law. Wheaton’s ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law disqualified non-Western societies. In the Elements, he stats: ‘‘The Public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to civilized and Christian people or to those of European origin’’(Wheaton 1936 [1866]:15). Reducing international law to European history and culture in the form of ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law became widespread as the nineteenth century progressed. In the second part of the century, W.E. Hall, a prominent international jurist with a strong positivist orientation, justified the existence of international law based on the strength of European culture: ‘‘it is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the principle could not be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries differently civilized, such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization.’’ States ‘‘outside European civilization,’’ Hall continued, ‘‘must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries. They must do something with the acquiescence of the latter, or of some of them, which amounts in its entirety beyond all possibility of misconstruction’’ (Cited in Wight 1977:115). Sir Travers Twiss, a counsel to the British Crown and to King Leopold of Belgium (Koskenniemi 2001:33, 108; Hocshchild 1999:71), offered a more contractual understanding of Westphalia. Twiss (1884:xvii) argued that Westphalia had ‘‘laid the foundation of a new European State-System, by grouping for the first time together the States of Central Europe after the fashion of a family, the members of which were acknowledged to independent, and, although of unequal power were recognized as an equality of Right.’’ While his jurisprudence
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combined positivist and naturalist elements, he emphasized that the consent of states was necessary for international law (xli) and that Westphalia marked a turning point for international law because it unambiguously showed that state rulers consented to the creation of a positive international law, replacing natural law (155). The above arguments are but a sampling (and one can find plenty of other international jurists making similar arguments Anghie (2005:32–114) and Keal (2003:84–112), however they represented the jurisprudential consensus of the late nineteenth century asserting European exceptionalism in establishing a distinctive legal and political order promoting mutual independence and tolerance. According to the international jurists of the age of Empire, such as Wheaton, Hall, Westlake, Twiss, Lawrance, Oppenheim, Europe had formed a superior order composed of sovereign and secular states, an order significantly shaped by the Peace of Westphalia and the increasing number of treaties and conventions followed Westphalia, making international law, in essence ‘‘Westphalian.’’ With respect to the non-Western world, this argument meant that non-Western societies did not have any place in ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law, because these societies were not signatories to the treaties and conventions that made international law. But the narrative included a vision in which non-Western societies could be part of the political and legal order marked by European progress. Once in place, the order was self-perpetuating: deepening within Europe and diffusing out of Europe. Deepening has occurred as the international laws, norms, and institutions of Europe that Westphalia had inaugurated spilled over into other issue areas. This led to further cooperation in Europe and to further differentiation between Europe and the rest of the international system. Diffusion has occurred as ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law, norms, and institutions spread to non-European areas. They spread first to the civilized American states, then to the semi-civilized Asian states, and last to the then uncivilized African states (Bull and Watson 1984). Apart from a few marginalized voices opposing the discriminatory interpretation and application of international law and the removal of non-Western societies from its realm (Pitts 2007), by the end of nineteenth century most international jurists took the existence of a normative hierarchy as the natural division in the international system. Combined with other nineteenth-century hierarchical discriminations, like scientific racism, ‘‘scientific’’ international law allowed jurists to argue that the unique combination of rationality and culture that existed in Europe enabled the European political order to evolve toward more efficient outcomes, fueled by the Peace of Westphalia and bolstered by subsequent treaties and conventions. In contrast, the narrative encapsulated that the other societies were in disorder in terms of their political and legal system (Turner 1978; Hodgson 1993:86). In other words, the construction of European exceptionalism and Orientalism were codependent. While the former elevated the European ‘‘order’’ as just and progressive, the latter denigrated the Oriental system as corrupt and decaying. Jurists constructed ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law and Oriental anarchy and despotism in the same crucible. This view offered a stark image of the world; to paraphrase the seminal title of Eric Wolf’s (1982) book, this dichotomy can be understood as Westphalian Europe and people without Westphalia—that is, a non-European political space lacking the crucial dimension of international society, Westphalia, and the political and religious tolerance it generated. To justify their version of what Laura Nader (2005) labels ‘‘law and the theory of lack,’’ jurists and scholars contrasted the law-based Westphalian international order of mutual independence and tolerance with a caricaturized image of, for example, a monolithic Islamic despotism under the authority of the caliph with an ideology of constant warfare with non-Muslims. Likewise, the Chinese Middle Kingdom was portrayed as a territory ruled by a
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self-important feudal-isolationist emperor. Non-Western societies were consequently, constantly, and unfairly defined by reference to a cluster of absences of the qualities that enabled Europeans to establish an international society. More than simply an intellectual exercise, ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law had enormous political implications. As Paul Keal, in his analysis of international society and the rights of indigenous peoples, observes in the nineteenth century, ‘‘political and legal thought asserted the superiority of European culture and served to justify the dispassion of non-Europeans’’ (Keal 2003:185). In tandem with the development of ‘‘Westphalian’’ international law and the ascendance of legal positivism, international legal discourse in Europe became increasingly exclusive to European societies. Keal (87–107) observes an evolutionary trend in the deterioration of the legal status of non-European peoples in international law: while prior to the seventeenth-century jurists like Gentili, Vitoria, Las Casas, Grotius, and Pufendorff recognized sovereignty in non-European peoples, eighteenth-century jurists like Vattel, G.F. Von Martens and some nineteenth jurists like Phillimore and Bluntschili recognized limited sovereignty of non-European peoples, most of the nineteenth-century jurists like Hall, Westlake, Lawrance, Oppenheim denied sovereign rights to non-Europeans. These nineteenth-century jurists, whose jurisprudence was influenced by legal positivism and naturalism and whose political ideology was shaped by political liberalism (Koskenniemi 2001), were often united in their support as both apologists and ideologists of imperialism. In this sense, nineteenth-century international law was integral to European domination as it justified the normative discrimination of the Western states against non-Western societies. The Westphalian narrative allowed the jurists to construct a European past of Westphalian religious and political tolerance and a non-Western past of disorder and intolerance. Once this narrative was in place, nineteenth-century international problems like the Eastern Crisis, the Far Eastern Crisis, and the barbarity of Africa became easy to identify. The appropriateness and necessity of the expansion of European order to solve these problems logically followed. In a significant way, the perceived European superiority was predicated on the European ability and willingness to expand via colonialism. From the vantage point of the Westphalian narrative, Western colonial expansion was the expansion of international society, a ‘‘civilizing process’’ for which European principles of political and religious tolerance could be ignored (Keene 2002; Anghie 2005). For example, John Westlake argued in a 1914 British Military Manual where he agued that even the laws of war do not constrain ‘‘civilized states’’ in their wars with uncivilized societies (Me´gret 2006). Compatible with the civilizing mission of nineteenth-century international jurists’ vision of global order, from 1840 to 1870, Britain established its informal imperialism. The economic, financial, political, and legal systems of the Ottoman Empire, China, Thailand, and Iran were increasingly constrained by decisions made in European capitals. European-imposed tariff regimes, the favorable treatment of European companies, and the European establishment of consular courts compromised the sovereignty of non-Western states. Elsewhere I have analyzed what I call legal imperialism, the processes by which Western powers expanded their legal authority into non-Western societies (Kayaoglu 2010). This expansion came through extraterritorial courts. These courts, operated in all non-Western states for example in Japan (1856–1899), the Ottoman Empire ⁄ Turkey (1825–1923), and China (1842–1943), created as a separate legal system for Western citizens. Even though these states were not formal European colonies, these courts limiting and denying non-Western legal authority over Western foreigners turned these states into, to use Mao’s term, semi-colonies. During the mid-1880s, for example, a total of 44 Western extraterritorial courts operated in Japan’s treaty
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ports. In 1895, 32 British courts operated in the Ottoman Empire. Three decades later (circa 1926), 26 British, 18 American, and 18 French courts existed China’s ports and cities. Some of these courts like the British Her Majesty’s Supreme Court at Constantinople and the US Court for China had significant legal authority. Legal positivism, by its categorical delegitimation of non-Western law, and international jurists, by their legal tools like extraterritoriality, had a significant effect in motivating and justifying Western courts in non-Western societies. Western states imposed what is known as the standard of ‘‘civilization’’ to end their extraterritorial claims, a standard established and articulated by nineteenth-century jurists (Gong 1984; Kayaoglu 2010). While the scramble for concessions from China and the Ottoman Empire remained limited to ‘‘unequal treaties’’ of consular jurisdiction and tariff limitations, a new wave of imperial expansion from 1870 to 1914 brought all of Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, under formal European imperialism (Hobsbawm 1989; Doyle 1986; Abernethy 2000). As legal scholars Anghie (2005:65–100) and Koskenniemi (2001:110–177) argue despite the rhetoric of ‘‘the gentle civilizer of nations,’’ the involvement of European international jurists in the scramble for Africa epitomized by the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, was anything but benign. Most of the international jurists acted like ideologists of European colonialism through the doctrines like Westphalian sovereignty that dispossessed non-Western rights or through extraterritoriality policies that limited non-Western legal authority, or acted as apologists for Europe’s excessive brutality in the name of its civilizing mission and expansion of international society. In sum, international jurists were often complicit in, and frequently ardent supporters of, European colonialism. In addition, some current scholars of international society have offered insightful analyses linking the nineteenth century discourse of international society with imperialism and colonialism. For example, Keal (2003) examines what he calls the ‘‘moral backwardness of international society’’: the role of nineteenth-century legal discourse in dispossessing the rights of individual peoples and facilitating European conquest. Suzuki’s (2009) interesting analysis shows how the emergence of Japanese imperialism was rooted in Japan’s socialization into what he labels as the ‘‘dark side’’ of international society in the late nineteenth century. The English School’s Westphalian International Society No group of international relations scholars has been more active in promoting the Westphalian narrative than the English School. Since the early 1960s, members of the English School have engaged in a sustained and collective effort to articulate a historically informed and normatively progressive theory based on the concept of international society. Working within the notion of the Westphalian international society framework, English School scholars have produced studies exploring the historical foundations, expansion, and contemporary implications of international society. Essentially, these scholars trace the idea of a distinctively European civilization both to Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. The later is particularly important as under its reign a Christian community was created. Following the secularization of this community with the Peace of Westphalia, Europe institutionalized common principles and institutions; these took the form of international society. Following the admission of Russia and the Americas, European imperialism expanded international society and Europeans started to admit the non-colonized states of Asia (the Ottoman Empire, Japan, Iran, Thailand, and China) into international society upon these states’ fulfillment of the ‘‘standards of civilization.’’ According to first generation English School scholars (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Jackson
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1990), international society became truly global only after the decolonization following the Second World War. The existence of an international society is a foundational premise of the English School (Manning 1962; Wight 1977; Bull 1977); some reviewers (Suganami 2000) have even suggested that the term ‘‘English School’’ is a misleading term for a multi-national group, and thus the ‘‘international society approach’’ would be a better descriptor, since this term identifies the group’s core research agenda. Part of the reason for the English School’s intellectual coherence was methodological: English School scholars emphasized diplomacy, law, history, and philosophy in international relations theory, offering an alternative to the behavioral-positivist framework then dominant in American international relations scholarship. However, this intellectual coherence was also institutional as scholars of The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (a Rockefeller-funded committee, 1959–1984) established the core ideas and methodologies of what would later come to be called the English School (Dunne 1998). Well-known English School scholars such as Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Adam Watson, and Hedley Bull, were consecutive chairs of the British Committee. Over time, the number of scholars identifying themselves with the English School has increased and diversified, however the emergence and evolution of international society has remained the focus of their scholarship, in the words of Barry Buzan, its flagship idea (Buzan 2004:1). The concept of international society is particularly central to Hedley Bull’s works. Often referred to as the classical definition of international society, Bull’s definition has certainly been the most influential (Bull 1977; Alderson and Hurrell 2000; Bellamy 2005). The distinction between ‘‘international system’’ and ‘‘international society’’ is key for Bull. States constitute an international system when their interactions influence each other’s behavior mechanically, without the states sharing principles and institutions to regulate their interactions. States constitute an international society when ‘‘conscious of certain common interest and common values…they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’’ In Bull’s dualist perspective, the international system corresponds to Hobbesian anarchy, and the international society corresponds to a Lockean contractual society that features ‘‘order, regularity, predictability and long periods of peace’’ (Cited in Alderson and Hurrell 2000:3). On these parallel dichotomies of system ⁄ society, Hobbesian ⁄ Lockean, Bull successfully reinvents the nineteenth-century notion of the Westphalian narrative of European ⁄ non-European normative orders using a legal and historical perspective. His legalism is compatible to the English School’s Grotian approach to international relations. As elaborated by Wight (1991) the Grotian legal-rational approach offers a state-centric middle way between that of Hobbesian anarchy and Kantian cosmopolitanism. Within this broader Grotian tradition, Bull further refines his view of international society. Bull is particularly reliant upon nineteenth-century international jurists, especially Oppenheim (Bull 1966). Bull substantiates the nineteenth century legalistic notion of international society with a Eurocentric history, following the German historian A.H.L. Hareen (Keene 2002:22–29). As Alderson and Hurrell (2000:4) argue, for Bull, the European origins of international society are ‘‘a matter of historical fact.’’ Westphalia is key in this history because ‘‘[t]he idea of international society, which Grotius propounded was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia’’ (Bull 1992:75). The Peace of Westphalia marked ‘‘the emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them’’ (Bull 1992:75–76). According to Bull (1992:77–78), Westphalia removed the problem of religious conflict and
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affirmed a ‘‘general commitment to peaceful coexistence.’’ The treaties advanced ‘‘external sovereignty,’’ ‘‘internal sovereignty’’ and curtailed the hegemonic efforts of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. Moreover, ‘‘the Westphalian treaties demonstrated…that the independence of sovereignty of states was not incompatible with their subjection to law or their recognition of the common bonds of society.’’ In essence, Westphalia created the European order by providing ‘‘a kind of constitutional foundation of international society’’ (Bull 1992:77). The English School’s Westphalian international society in general and Bull’s approach in particular have been criticized for their Eurocentrism (Keal 2003; Suzuki 2009). Several scholars (Cutler 1991; Kingsbury 1997 ⁄ 1998; Bartelson 1996; and Keene 2002) note the problems with Bull’s anachronistic interpretation of Grotius as the first theorist of international society. For example, Keene (2002:35–38) argues that Bull’s state-centric and positivist notion of international society imposes a ‘‘peculiarly narrow and twisted perspective of order in modern world politics’’ onto Grotius by squeezing ‘‘Grotius’ extremely eclectic and wide ranging account of the law of nations into a small box.’’ Moreover, as critics like Suzuki (2009), Keal (2003), and, more elaborately, Keene (2002) argue, the Eurocentric conceptualization of international society allowed the English School scholars to ignore the function of international society outside of Europe. In particular, international society discourse equated European international society with political and religious tolerance and, conversely, equated non-European systems with political disorder and religious intolerance. With this dualism, the Eurocentric notion of international society was invoked to promote the ‘‘standard of civilization.’’ thereby legitimizing colonialism (Keene 2002: chapter 4), dispossessing the rights of indigenous people (Keal 2003), and even socializing Japan into an imperialist state (Suzuki 2009). While Suzuki (2009) and Keene (2002) identify problems associated with the normative divergence that the notion of international society presumes between Europe and Europe’s relations with those deemed outsiders and while these scholars provide incisive critiques of the English School’s notion of international society, they fall short in theorizing the relationship between different aspects of international society. For example, Keene largely treats dualism in the workings of the international society’s European and extra-European spheres as unrelated to each other, neglecting to examine how the construction of the European international society of tolerance may have presupposed the view of nonEuropean societies as intolerant. Similarly, Suzuki refers to imperialism as the ‘‘dark side’’ of international society without elaborating how this ‘‘dark side’’ and a presumably ‘‘good side’’ of international society have been related. The analyses of Keal (2003) and Callahan (2004), however, rightly suggest that different aspects of international society have been complementary. They argue that European self-identification depended on various European other-identifications; the assertion of the complete superiority and exceptionalism of the European political and legal order has necessitated the European willingness to spread it, even if the process of civilizing non-European societies frequently requires some evil. The political impetus that gave rise to the first generation of English School scholars was decolonization, namely the possibility of sustaining the international order that European imperialism had created in the postcolonial world. This was associated with an anxiety that a non-Western ‘‘revolt’’ could further challenge Western dominance and values (Callahan 2004). Once the notion of international society was secured within European history and values, this perspective facilitates a pessimistic scenario: any non-Western disagreement with the West is potentially also a revolt against Western values. A revolt against Western values can destroy the foundations of the international society. Bull believed
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international society and international law were in decline in part because of a non-Western revolt against Western values (Bull 1984). The second generation of English School scholars refined and elaborated the various aspects of international society (Bellamy 2005; Linklater and Suganami 2006). One issue of scholarly debate is the normative scope of international society: so-called solidarists and pluralists differ on this point. The pluralists’ emphasis on state sovereignty allows only a thin version of international society (Jackson 2000); the solidarists’ emphasis on shared norms, values, and institutions overriding state sovereignty allows a thicker version of international society (Clark 2005; Wheeler 2005). In the rest of this section, I discuss Clark’s solidarist theory of international society and Jackson’s pluralist one, both of which are rooted in the English School tradition. Although they represent different versions of international society, the Westphalian narrative remains central to both of them: each scholar identifies the most important principles of contemporary international society (legitimacy to Clark and pluralism to Jackson) and then traces these principles back to the Peace of Westphalia. With these ‘‘Westphalian’’ legitimacy and ‘‘Westphalian’’ global covenant, each to varying degrees reproducing a Eurocentric account of international history and structure. According to Ian Clark, the most important principle of international society is legitimacy. Legitimacy shapes, and in turn is shaped by, rules about membership and conduct in international society. But legitimacy is an elusive concept. Clark argues that legitimacy is a product of diverse factors that include the distribution of power as well as moral, legal, constitutional, and international processes. While the definition of legitimacy, the defining characteristic of international society, remains amorphous, its origins are clear to Clark: the Peace of Westphalia (Clark 2005:51–70). The scope of membership in international society has evolved from Westphalia’s early exclusion of papal authority to contemporary international society’s exclusion of non-democratic states. Similarly, rules about the use of power in international society have also evolved within the European ⁄ Western state system. In Clark’s account legitimacy emerges and evolves solely within a Western system. In this narrative of ‘‘Westphalian’’ legitimacy, European powers were largely responsible for the evolution and implementation of this legitimacy prior to World War II, while the United States became the engine of legitimacy after World War II (Clark 2005:131–54). In the post-Cold War era, democratic governance is required for membership in international society. Yet membership in contemporary international society also requires adherence to a new set of standards of civilization including compliance with human rights norms and the implementation of free-market economic principles (173–90). Clark (2005:33, 36) states his concerns with problems of Eurocentrism in theorizing international relations. Yet Clark reproduces it through his use of the Westphalian narrative and the normative categories associated with the narrative it. He essentially produces what can be called a narrative of ‘‘Westphalian’’ legitimacy to correspond international legitimacy. Based on almost exclusively European diplomatic history, his analysis of the origins, development, and evolution of legitimacy marginalizes non-Western societies. He does not discuss how non-Western, nonEuropean societies develop concepts of legitimacy and how these different notions may be similar to or different from Western types of legitimacy. Worse, the only time these societies are included in the narrative is to show how these non-Western societies violated the principle of legitimacy and thus are denied membership in international society and sanctioned by Western states. As the object of ‘‘Westphalian’’ legitimacy, their contribution to the development of international legitimacy is minimal and passive, serving as foil for the core Western states that are the authors of the ‘‘Westphalian’’ legitimacy. Since
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Westphalia, core Western states, possessing an unquestioned claim on legitimacy, have interpreted and applied the legitimacy principle in part in their encounters with non-Western societies; whereas non-Western states, lacking this legitimacy, have been subjected to Western interpretations and applications of the legitimacy principle. Once the dichotomous normative framework was established in Clark’s theory of legitimacy, deviations among core European and Western states were framed as instances of reinterpretation and contestation of the legitimacy principle while the deviations of non-Western states from Western-expected behaviors have been framed as non-Western violations of the legitimacy principle. In Robert Jackson’s idea of international society, the most important element is pluralism, and he traces this back to the Peace of Westphalia. For his pluralist theory of international society, he takes international legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention as givens and theorizes a thin transnational normative content from these basic principles (Jackson 2000:16–25). In his view, the narrow scope of international society reduces the possibility of value conflicts associated with the difficulty of building international consensus on issues where cultural perspectives may vary. Jackson unequivocally rejects a thick understanding of international society because it fosters paternalism, the tendency of imposing one’s preferred values onto others. For example he correctly notes that the civilizing missions of the late nineteenth century and the articulation of ‘‘standards of civilization’’ illustrate this paternalism (412–416). Also figuring prominently in Jackson’s arguments is the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and state-centrism; this emphasizes the centrality of the great powers. This centrality is not incompatible with his anti-paternalism because great power privileges are limited to the organization of international security rather than to the organization of the cultures of the lesser powers, a view that accommodates some degree of global pluralism. While Jackson supports pluralism, his narrative of the emergence, spread, and evolution of pluralism remains grounded in the Westphalian narrative (162–5, 419–26). He argues that the Peace of Westphalia has symbolized the emergence of a pluralist ethos. Initially, this pluralism was a religious one, based on a rejection of Latin Christendom’s universalist claims in order to accommodate religious pluralism. Eventually, however, this pluralism symbolized a more expansive political transformation: ‘‘as a reconstitution of European politics from that of a universitas, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, to that of a societas, based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on political independence’’ (164). In other words, Jackson equates the Westphalian narrative with the accommodation of global pluralism like a global covenant. Essentially he offers a narrative and theory of ‘‘Westphalian’’ covenant advancing global pluralism. Jackson’s commitment to the Westphalian narrative makes even a pluralist version of international society Eurocentric. Some of this ethnocentric bias surfaces when he, perhaps unwittingly, stereotypes Islam by pairing ‘‘democracy,’’ a form of political tolerance, with ‘‘jihad,’’ a form of political and religious intolerance. These are the examples in his argument against paternalism, where ‘‘democracy’’ defines and represents Western political value and ‘‘jihad’’ defines and represents Islamic political values (182, 368).4 Like other English School scholars, he recognizes the Eurocentric roots of his theory of pluralism, but does not believe its Eurocentrism invalidates his theory: ‘‘[A]lthough global covenant is historically rooted in particular civilization, that of post-medieval Europe, it is no longer associated with exclusively with Western civilization as it still laws as
4 Of course ‘‘Jihad’’ has many different meanings, and Jackson does not define which one he is using. However, the context in which he uses it suggests he defines it as ‘‘holy war,’’ and not as spiritual striving, which is how many Muslims would define it.
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recently as 1945. It now it serves as a bridge between the diverse cultures and civilizations of the contemporary world’’ (24–25). Although Jackson’s attempt to accommodate global pluralism is a step in the right direction, it falls short. International demands for cultural and civilizational recognition, accommodation, and representation cannot be solved by confining these demands within the boundaries of the state. Nor can demands for cultural and civilizational recognition be solved by accepting the Western invention of ‘‘global’’ covenant, thereby privileging Western states in the process of the interpreting and changing the ‘‘global’’ covenant. Originating in diverse moral traditions, an increasing number of global voices (manifesting themselves in various UN agendas, such as Dialogue of Civilizations, interfaith dialogues) are seeking a global dialogue and to negotiate principles of international society as equals (for more on cultural diversity and international society, see Falk 2000: chapter 8; Dallmayr and Manoochehri 2007; Sullivan and Kymlicka 2008). In sum, the Westphalian narrative seems to do a disservice to the notion of international society. Most harmed by the use of this narrative are the English School scholars whose scholarship relies extensively on European exceptionalism. By acknowledging the importance of the values, norms, and institutions that states share, and theorizing how values, norms, and institutions shape international relations, the English School has advanced our understanding of international relations and created a vision for a more stable and peaceful international system. However, the commitment of English School scholars to the Westphalian narrative prevents them both from exploring the contribution of non-Western normative and historical sources adequately, apart from passing references to these contributions (Bull and Watson 1984:6), and from theorizing about crosscultural interactions in contemporary international relations. Constructivist Westphalian Eurocentrism Like the English School, constructivism stresses the role of culture, ideas, and historical contingencies in explaining world politics (Alderson and Hurrell 2000:29–46; Reus-Smit 2002). While the roots of the English School lie within the European legal and philosophical tradition, the emergence of constructivism is related to critical international relations theory (Ashley 1989, Walker 1993). Critical theorists were united in their rejection of taking international structures and state interests as givens. Rather, they believe that international structures, state identitie and interests are constructed through the interaction of various state and nonstate actors. These interactions are largely a reflection of worldview and shared ideas among these actors and the larger ideational context making these interactions possible (Ruggie 1998, Biersteker and Weber 1996). By fixing domestic authority within states and establishing international sovereignty as a shared understanding among sovereign-territorial states, Westphalian order has a fundamental place in constituting international structure. Although constructivists differ on which ideas are the most relevant in explaining the consolidation of the Westphalian order, a broader consensus exists whereby of the consolidation of the Westphalian order and other types of system-wide normative changes are seen as two-step processes: the emergence of norms in Europe and then their subsequent diffusion to non-European entities through state socialization. Essentially, international norms like sovereignty, secularism, and human rights emerge from the norm-generating European core, and then diffuse into the norm-receiving non-European periphery. Core states use a variety of means (socialization, shaming, persuasion, coercion) to induce non-Western states to comply with Western identities, ideas, and norms. By a turn of circular logic, Western and non-Western dualism and categories are used
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to re-invent the Westphalian narrative, and then the narrative is used to justify further dualism. For example, this two-step approach—most visible in constructivist studies on human rights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999)—limits the emergence of international norms geographically (Europe) and normatively (the Enlightenment ideals) and results in several problems. First this view leads them to either ignore the non-Western ideas and norms or acknowledge them only to illustrate their incompatibility of the Western Westphalian ones that embodies political and religious tolerance, like that of Chinese suzerainty system or Ottoman Empire’s alleged ‘‘house of war’’ versus ‘‘house of peace’’ jihad-oriented Islamic worldview (Spruyt 1994:16–17, Philpott 2001:15–20). Second, the two-step approach allows scholars to ignore the systematic European practices that are incompatible with the Enlightenment ideals such as Western colonization and imperialism. Third, this two-step dualism causes the constructivist scholars to discount the role of power asymmetry in norm-construction by isolating norm-construction from the categories of normexclusion. Only after distancing themselves from the concerns of those who are excluded and disempowered, can constructivists move to emphasize shared ideas which in turn suggests that norm-construction is an empowering process leading to superior outcomes allegedly for all (Kurki-Sinclair 2010). As a result, constructivist arguments for norm-construction may inadvertently—but systematically—marginalize and stigmatize non-European norms, values, and institutions. These problems also appear in the constructivists’ interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia as pivotal in the construction of the international system. Among constructivist scholars, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Philpott are most explicit in their Eurocentrism. Unlike the English School scholars, who more or less share common theoretical assumptions, institutional affiliations, and identification as a group, constructivists are a more diverse group whose foundational assumptions are disputed. For example, Reus-Smit (2001) divides constructivists into conventional and critical categories and further sub-divides the critical category into modernist and postmodernist camps. These groups also differ regarding the nature of the international system and the centrality of the Westphalian narrative. Both Wendt and Philpott can be called conventional as they try to construct a grand theory of international relations. In addition, both of them adhere, to varying degrees, to the Westphalian narrative, Wendt both metaphorically and historically, and Philpott historically. Wendt’s social identity theory of international relations emphasizes the change and evolution of international structures. According to Wendt, shared knowledge about state identities is more important than the distribution of material capabilities enabling and constraining interstate interactions. Wendt’s theory reinvents the Westphalian narrative by creating ideal-type categories based on what he calls ‘‘cultures of anarchy,’’ a tripartite typology of international structures—Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. This typology invokes the English School’s categories and thus indirectly links Wendt to the nineteenth-century international jurists’ categories of European civilized ⁄ Asian barbarians ⁄ African savages. In Wendt’s typology, Hobbesian anarchy is a system in which states take on the role of enemy with respect to each other; this system is identified with unmitigated violence. According to Wendt, Hobbesian anarchy describes significant portions of international history, except for the post-Westphalian European ⁄ Western system. Wendt’s Hobbesian anarchy is therefore similar to Bull’s international system. What distinguishes Wendt’s theory is his argument that this state of war is constituted by shared ideas of enmity, not by the logic of anarchy or human nature (Wendt 1999:260).
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Wendt’s argument elevates the European order not only categorically but also substantially. In Wendt’s analysis of cultures of anarchy and the progress within the hierarchy of cultures of anarchy, Westphalia is crucial. In this line of thinking, Westphalia transformed a culture of anarchy in Europe from a Hobbesian (enmity) one to a Lockean (rivals) one. In particular, two features identified with Westphalia were important in this shift (279–97). First ‘‘Westphalian’’ states developed a capability of political restraint, a form of political tolerance, and started to treat other states like rivals, not enemies. Second ‘‘Westphalian’’ states accepted a set of norms (like the Just War Theory), and a also a different one (like that of the ‘‘standards of civilization’’) dealing with non-Westphalian states. After establishing Lockean anarchy as the dominant quality of post-Westphalian Europe, Wendt minimizes elements that are inconsistent with Lockean anarchy presumably has operated in Europe since the Peace of Westphalia. For example, he argues that despite the dominance of Lockean anarchy in Europe, European states occasionally fell back into Hobbesian anarchy, during the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, and the Second World War among others. In addition, he concedes that European states used the logic of Hobbesian anarchy to pursue colonization. But in Wendt’s account these are treated as isolated fallbacks that do not disqualify his conclusion of post-Westphalian Europe dominated by a logic of Lockean anarchy and its self-restraint. However, according to Wendt, it is Kantian anarchy, in which states have internalized the role of friend. Hence Kantian anarchy represents the highest stage of the ‘‘culture of anarchy;’’ this is exemplified by the post-World World II behavior of the North Atlantic states (Wendt 1999:297).5 Three aspects of Wendt’s theory are remarkably Eurocentric. First, While Wendt (242–3) accepts the possibility that Kantian international culture is ‘‘multiply realizable’’ through, for example, ‘‘Islamic states,’’ ‘‘socialist states,’’ and ‘‘Asian Way states,’’ he exclusively focuses on Western states and explains the evolution of the European international system from the Hobbesian state of nature into a Kantian peace. According to Wendt (354), values like self-restraint, that ‘‘essence of civilization,’’ is an enabling factor in the realization of other important factors (homogeneity, interdependence, common fate). According to Wendt, self-restraint, a form of political tolerance, is most likely to be found in democratic states. Second, in addition to self-restraint, Wendt identifies homogeneity, common fate, and interdependence (most likely, to be found in capitalist societies, he agues) as being necessary for states to develop what he calls ‘‘prosocial behavior’’ required for Kantian anarchy. Thus, it is difficult to see how his theory allows for a diversity of political forms. Since states identities are formed, Wendt (1999:366) claims, through imitation and social learning, and since the ‘‘Western way’’ appears to be the preeminent model of behavior in Kantian anarchy, non-Western states needed to ‘‘socialize’’ into the Western international order to realize Kantian anarchy. Third, Wendt also, in a Eurocentric blindness, ignores imperialism. His references to the mechanisms of imitation and socialization through which units develop collective identities ignore the coercive nature of the ‘‘expansion’’ of ‘‘international society.’’ Somewhat unsurprisingly, his Social Theory of International Relations does not even have an index entry for imperialism or colonialism. Compared to Wendt’s structural-cultural approach and his metaphorical use of the Westphalian narrative, Daniel Philpott offers a Weberian ideational account that reconstructs the Westphalian narrative as a historical claim. Philpott (2001) examines the role of social justice ideas in the emergence of the modern state system with a particular focus on two ‘‘revolutions’’ in international society. The 5 Chacko (2008) offers a critique of Wendt’s use of ‘‘anarchy.’’ Schmidt (1998) offers a similar critique for the concept of anarchy in international relations theory.
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first revolution began with the Protestant Reformation and culminated with the Peace of Westphalia, ending medieval Christendom and bringing about a system of sovereign states in Europe. The second revolution sprang from the postwar ideas of equality and colonial nationalism, ending the colonial empires and bringing sovereignty to the rest of international system. In both cases, revolutions in ideas about legitimate political authority profoundly altered the ‘‘constitution’’ that established basic authority in the international system. These revolutions stemmed from earlier understandings of justice and political authority. In Philpott’s theory of change, new ideas challenge the legitimacy of existing order leading to crises, and thus trigger a revolution that creates a new order. To show the autonomous influence of ideas apart from material factors in his claims of ‘‘Westphalia as origin’’ and ‘‘no Reformation, no Westphalia,’’ (8) Philpott relies on scholarship concerning social movements and international norms. In so doing, he delineates the dual role of ideas in politics (48–51). In their first role, ideas create identities when people internalize new ideas and form social movements, including interest groups, lobbies, and parties. In their second role, when a significant number of people accept the new ideas, the ideas turn into a form of social power, persuading rulers to change their policies including forming a new international constitution, supporting new international norms, values, and institutions. In the context of the Westphalian Revolution, Philpott (108) holds that the Protestant ideas ‘‘lay the prescription for the new Westphalian order.’’ In an attempt to link Protestant theology and what can be called as ‘‘Westphalian’’ freedom, he points to central Protestant tenets such as justification by faith, salvation through grace, and the complete and unique authority of scripture in creating a new understanding of political authority (104–10). On this alleged Westphalian foundation, Philpott interprets decolonization as the second revolution in the creation of the modern international order. The principle of freedom, which Westphalia symbolizes, establishes an ideational link between the Westphalian and decolonization revolutions. While the principle of ‘‘Westphalian’’ freedom did not prevent European states from denying this principle of freedom to non-European societies, according to Philpott, after about a three-century interval, Western elites conceded the colonized peoples’ rights to freedoms associated with Westphalia and thus Protestant religious principles, resulting in decolonization. Philpott’s commitment to the Westphalian narrative slants his account of decolonization. For example, the most important elements of this normative challenge to colonialism happen in the Western international system and in the domestic politics of imperial metropoles and only secondarily among colonial populations themselves (chapter 9). In Philpott’s view, even colonial demands for independence have European roots, such as the education the colonial elite received in the metropoles or the fact that the metropoles established the institutions and the principles of equality that the Church had embraced (193). Local ideas, norms, and religions do not play any significant role in Philpott’s study of decolonization. Even if some (very few) of the actors of the decolonization movement are non-Western, their ideas, inspirations, and models are markedly Western and can be traced back to ideas propagated by theologians and philosophers of the Reformation and Westphalia. In Philpott’s international history, every freedom enhancing idea and incident is traced back to the Peace of Westphalia and thus to the Protestant reformation. Conversely, the problems in chronology, the undesirable behaviors of post-Westphalian Western societies, and the contributions of non-Western ideas and events in the creation of international society are explained away, if not totally neglected. In conventional constructivist studies, the centrality of progress and civilization appear in the form of the Westphalian narrative; with this assumed truth,
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constructivist scholars like Wendt and Philpott reinvent and celebrate the triumphal image of the West based on the concept of Westphalian international society. Using the Westphalian narrative, they see the origin, development, and contemporary structure of international society in solely Eurocentric terms. This foundational narrative assumes that the rest of the world has benefited from the spread and imposition of Western values and civilization; this foundational narrative transforms itself into a constitutional argument when it posits that non-Western societies continue to benefit from the spread and imposition of Western ideas such as modernization, state-building, and human rights. This commitment to the Westphalian narrative limits the usefulness of constructivist insights about the importance of ‘‘shared’’ values in international system and prevents them constructivists acknowledging how these norms, like human rights, can be affirmed and supported by non-liberal, non-Western traditions. Conclusion International relations scholarship is shaped both by the political and the ideological affinities of international relations scholars (Oren 2003), but also, and perhaps more significantly, by arguments about the superiority of Western values and political systems. This presumption of superiority is embedded in the standard historical reference points of the discipline’s description of international relations, descriptions which are drawn almost exclusively from Europe’s internal history. This distortion influences theorizing about modern international relations because it presents European thought and practices as the engine of the international system and as the source of enlightenment, modernity, democracy, sovereignty, and human rights. Contemporary international relations theory remains caught in the notion that the West sets the standard for civilized human conduct; Western liberal democracies are constantly treated as the only entities capable of bringing any sort of order to the system. This ethnocentrism is most evident in the international relations scholars’ acceptance of the Westphalian narrative to explain the origins and development of international society. Nineteenth-century jurists and some contemporary international relations scholars follow strikingly similar strategies. They identify one element associated with political and religious tolerance, broadly corresponding to the ideas of sovereignty and secularism, and they credit the Peace of Westphalia as the origin of that particular value. This value is international law for the nineteenth-century international jurists, legitimacy to Clark, pluralism to Jackson, selfrestraint to Wendt, and freedom to Philpott. Once these scholars have attributed these values to Westphalia, they then explicitly reconstruct an international history in which European societies are assumed to inherit these values from Westphalia. Progress is then defined in terms of progressive refinement of these values. These scholars also reconstruct, explicitly or implicitly, a secondary history dealing with non-Western societies without Westphalia, societies thereby lacking these values. Finally, for European societies, behaviors consistent with these values are attributed to the European political system and culture while behaviors inconsistent with them are presented as unimportant, caused by external and situational factors. The opposite is true for non-Western societies: behaviors consistent with these values (law, legitimacy, pluralism, self-restraint, freedom) are attributed to external and European influences in these societies while their behaviors inconsistent with these values are attributed to their history, religion, and culture. This skewed understanding of international history and relations is indicative of the Eurocentrism of international relations scholarship. This Eurocentrism prevents international relations scholars from envisioning the integration of non-Western societies in a way that does not involve coercion, domination, and an assumption of Western superiority. There is a great need to broaden and
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deepen global values. The way forward is to investigate how non-Western traditions of political and religious tolerance, like those of the Ottoman millet system, the Chinese tributary systems, and Mughal Emperor Akhbar’s religious pluralism or contemporary calls for the coexistence of civilizations or interfaith dialogue, can be appreciated and incorporated into international society. Such refocus can facilitate the non-Western affirmation of international society, the promotion of its fundamental values of peace, development, tolerance, and human rights. International relations theory without Westphalia may open new research agendas for international relations scholars in three specific ways. First, moving away from the Westphalian narrative allows a critical evaluation of the emergence of sovereignty and norms in the international system. If the revisionist scholarship is correct that many of the so-called Westphalian norms are a product of the nineteenth century, the age of empire (Hobsbawm 1989), then imperialism should be integral, not incidental, to the emergence of norms in the international system. Yet the current norm and sovereignty literature emphasizes cultural and contractual evolution and ignores the role of power dynamics in norm construction. Integrating non-European areas into a reexamination of the emergence of so-called Westphalian norms, such as sovereignty, may open new avenues for examining the nexus of power and ideas. For example, a norm analysis should address not only how norms benefit the group members but also how they weaken the ones excluded, rather than treating such exclusion as given. Thinking beyond the Westphalian narrative will shift the attention from the largely functionalist and evolutionary understanding of international society which emphasizes linear, steady progress to one that better integrates power and interest and which indicates the contested and politicized nature of the concept of international society and its various incarnations. Second, imperialism has been one of the most influential forces shaping world politics. Yet, imperialism remains marginal for many English school scholars and constructivists. This neglect that comes with emphasizing the Westphalian order, misrepresents the current world order as one based on sovereign equality despite the pervasiveness of imperial influences and the legacies present in many postcolonial states. Greater recognition and awareness of international society’s imperial origins and its reproduction of the imperial world order can produce better analyses of imperialism in the twenty-first century (Jones 2006). Third, thinking beyond Westphalia offers historical picture of the development of the international system that recognizes the interdependence among different regional systems and acknowledges the need to accommodate global diversity and pluralism. The idea of international society can be indispensable for achieving the universal ideals of peace and the promotion of human rights. The Westphalian narrative inhibits the legitimacy and efficacy of the notion of international society because of its inherent dualism: it designates ‘‘the West’’ as primary creator of the ideas of international society and identifies the other states as those that must be coerced and coaxed into conforming and complying with these ideas. Rather, a truly global international society needs to appeal to and be affirmed by diverse ethical traditions, such as the Chinese, Indian, Jewish, and Islamic (Mapel and Nardin 1998; Sullivan and Kymlicka 2008). Such appeal and affirmation requires a prior understanding about what these traditions contributed to the development of international society and how they can provide their own rationales for the necessity of and value in international society. A serious consideration of these diverse traditions could take the form of what John Rawls (1996) calls an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ over the substance of international society. As it now stands, the Westphalian narrative prevents the emergence of a genuine cross-civilizational dialogue on how best to achieve political and religious tolerance in international society.
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