White Guilt and Racial Compensation: The Benefits ... - SAGE Journals

10.1177/0146167202238377 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Iyer et al. / WHITE GUILT

ARTICLE

White Guilt and Racial Compensation: The Benefits and Limits of Self-Focus Aarti Iyer Colin Wayne Leach Faye J. Crosby University of California, Santa Cruz as superior to members of other groups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; for a review, see Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). However, there is reason to believe that those who are advantaged also might feel bad when systemic inequality illegitimately favors their group and disadvantages others (for a review, see Leach et al., 2002). For example, Shelby Steele (1990) has argued that European Americans can feel guilty about the ways in which racial inequality advantages them and disadvantages African Americans. Such group-based guilt is debilitating because it may undermine internal attributions for ingroup success (Branscombe, 1998) and may threaten the ingroup’s identity as moral and good (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). The possibility that members of advantaged groups experience their position relative to disadvantaged groups in different ways underscores the importance of group-based emotion in intergroup relations (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Smith, 1993). Intergroup emotions describe the specific ways in which

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.

World history, and six decades of social psychological

Authors’ Note: The first and second authors contributed equally to this article. Our thinking about Study 2 benefited from conversations with Bertjan Doosje, Michael Irvin, Russell Spears, Lara Tiedens, and Eileen Zurbriggen. Nyla Branscombe, Sergio Queirolo, Kathryn Player, and three anonymous reviewers provided valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. We thank Kelly Orrantia for help with data collection and management. This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship to the first author. Portions of this data were presented at the 2000 convention of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, at the 2001 meeting of the Western Psychological Association, and at the 2001 convention of the American Psychological Association. Correspondence may be addressed to Aarti Iyer or Colin Wayne Leach, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064; e-mail: aiyer@ cats.ucsc.edu or [email protected].

research, suggest that social groups prefer to be at the top of societal hierarchies rather than at the bottom. For example, a great deal of work on ethnocentrism (for a review, see Brewer, 1986) and ingroup favoritism (for a review, see Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) has shown that ingroups often create and defend advantages over outgroups. Beyond this understandable preference, however, we know little about how members of advantaged groups actually experience intergroup inequality; very little research has examined how it feels to be advantaged. It is typically assumed that members of advantaged groups feel good about their social position. Indeed, there is some evidence that the advantaged can experience something akin to pride when they see themselves

PSPB, Vol. 29 No. 1, January 2003 117-129 DOI: 10.1177/0146167202238377 © 2003 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

ingroups interpret, and thus make sense of, their relationships to particular outgroups. In this way, the emotions that groups experience in relation to one another are often suggestive of how they will act toward one another (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; see also Frijda, 1986). For example, Montada and Schneider (1989) found that Germans who sympathized with asylum seekers supported easing government restrictions on asylum. Germans who felt anger toward the asylum seekers, on the other hand, did not support easing such government restrictions. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the intergroup emotion approach can illuminate the particular ways in which ingroups experience, and respond to, systemic advantages over other groups. In this article, we focus on the White guilt that European Americans can feel in response to racial inequalities. The term White guilt describes the dysphoria felt by European Americans who see their group as responsible for illegitimate advantage held over other racial groups, such as African Americans.1 Although White guilt is based in a perception of illegitimate racial inequality, it should not necessarily lead to support of general efforts to achieve racial equality. Based in research on personal guilt, we believe that the self-focused nature of White guilt leads to an overriding concern with making restitution to the disadvantaged. This limits White guilt as a basis of support for racial equality. To demonstrate the particular benefits and limits of White guilt, we contrast it to sympathy, an other-focused response to inequality that focuses on the plight of the disadvantaged. WHITE GUILT

Theory and research on guilt show it to be characterized by three interrelated properties (for a review, see Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, in press). First, those who feel guilty accept responsibility for violating a moral standard (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). When people believe that they, as individuals, have done something wrong, they may experience feelings of personal guilt (Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 1982). The intergroup emotions approach posits that people can experience emotions based in their identity as group members and their ingroup’s relation to outgroups (Smith, 1993). Thus, people may acknowledge their group’s responsibility for moral violations and thereby experience group-based guilt, which is distinct from personal guilt (Branscombe et al., 2002). For example, Doosje et al. (1998) produced group-based guilt by telling ingroup members that their group had treated outgroups unfairly in the past. Similarly, the belief that White Europeans (Montada & Schneider, 1989) and European Americans (Swim & Miller, 1999)

benefit from illegitimate racial privilege is associated with group-based guilt (see also Hoffman, 1976). A second characteristic of guilt is that it focuses attention on the self (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Those who feel guilty concentrate on what they have done wrong and the extent to which they are responsible for the harm that has been caused (Roseman et al., 1990, 1994). Thus, the experience of White guilt should focus European Americans’ attention on the (ingroup) self rather than on the (outgroup) other (see Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). This self-focus should make guilt a weaker basis for helping the harmed than feelings that are focused on the welfare of the harmed themselves (Batson, 1998; Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989). Third, people who feel guilty are very uncomfortable with the fact they—or their groups—are responsible for causing harm to others, and thus, they attempt to make restitution to the victims (Barkan, 2000; Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988). Personal guilt is associated with the desire to apologize or accept punishment (Roseman et al., 1994), as well as attempts to directly compensate those affected by one’s immorality (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Group-based guilt also has been shown to motivate restitutive efforts at apology and compensation (Iyer et al., in press). For example, Dutch students who experienced guilt when reminded of their country’s colonial exploitation of Indonesia were more likely than those who did not feel guilty to support financial compensation to the Indonesian government (Doosje et al., 1998). In addition, Swim and Miller (1999) showed White guilt to be predictive of European American support for compensatory affirmative action programs. Although the authors did not explicitly label their characterization of affirmative action as compensatory, the items they used to measure support for affirmative action framed the policy as compensation for racial inequality. A typical item in their measure read as follows: “Blacks should receive racial entitlement such as affirmative action and other forms of racial compensation due to the past injustices of White America.” Of the remaining items, one pitted “special consideration” against “merit,” and another referenced “reverse discrimination” (Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1; see the appendix for all items in the measure). Feelings of White (or other group-based) guilt should motivate support for policies that attempt to compensate the disadvantaged group(s) for the harm done (Barkan, 2000). THE LIMITS OF WHITE GUILT

European Americans who experience White guilt wish to make restitution by compensating those suffer-

Iyer et al. / WHITE GUILT ing illegitimate disadvantage. However, many programs seeking to bring about racial equality are not characterized by explicit compensation. For example, some affirmative action policies are designed to equalize opportunities and do not explicitly seek to compensate the victims of discrimination (Kravitz et al., 1997). In fact, the overwhelming majority of affirmative action plans in the United States use strategies such as monitoring for discrimination and increased recruitment of African Americans applicants (American Psychological Association, 1996; Kravitz et al., 1997). Such equal opportunity policies imply only that racial inequality exists and that it should be rectified; they do not identify European Americans as perpetrators. There is no implication of European American responsibility or guilt, and thus, there is no suggestion of the need for compensation. Because such policies do not focus on European American responsibility or compensation, feelings of White guilt should not predict support for equalopportunity versions of affirmative action. In fact, equal opportunity policies can be supported by those who simply believe that racial inequality exists, without blaming their group for causing it (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; for a review, see Kravitz et al., 1997). As a form of help to those hurt by racial inequality, noncompensatory efforts at reducing inequality also can be based in a sympathetic concern for victims. (OTHER-FOCUSED) SYMPATHY

Given the self-focused nature of guilt and its narrow attention to compensation, other emotions may provide a better basis for support for general efforts against inequality. In particular, emotions focused on the suffering of others have been shown to increase efforts to help them (for reviews, see Batson, 1998; Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989). Sympathy, for example, is associated with a wide range of efforts to help the disadvantaged (Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989). Indeed, sympathy has been suggested as a motivation for sustained prosocial activism (Hoffman, 1991). As an other-focused emotion, group-based sympathy places emphasis on the suffering of the disadvantaged (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989) rather than on the wrongdoing of the advantaged. The other-focus of sympathy motivates help that seeks to improve the situation of the other (Batson, 1998). This is in stark contrast to self-focused guilt, which motivates compensation as a way to address one’s own responsibility for the harm done (Batson, 1998; Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989). As an emotion focused on helping the disadvantaged, sympathy should provide a basis of support for a wide range of efforts to reduce group inequality. For example, European Americans’ feelings of sympathy should pre-

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dict support for both compensatory and equal opportunity affirmative action because both types of programs seek to help those disadvantaged by racial inequality. As such, other-focused sympathy should serve as a broader basis than self-focused guilt of support for racial equality efforts. It is important to say, however, that we are not arguing that sympathy is the ideal “altruistic” emotion; rather, the fact that group-based sympathy is a more other-focused emotion makes it more likely than White guilt to motivate support for general efforts to improve the situation of the disadvantaged. PRESENT RESEARCH

With the present studies, we aim to show that the selffocused nature of White guilt leads to specific benefits and limits in its relation to efforts at racial equality. In doing so, we address two questions that have not been directly considered by existing research on group-based guilt. 1. Is White guilt self-focused? We address this first question by examining the type of antecedent belief in which White guilt is based. In Study 1, we assess whether White guilt is based in a self-focused belief in White privilege or in an other-focused belief in discrimination against African Americans. In Study 2, we examine whether the self-focused belief that European Americans discriminate elicits more White guilt than does the otherfocused belief that African Americans are discriminated against. 2. Is White guilt associated only with compensation? In both studies, we examine whether White guilt is associated with support for explicitly compensatory affirmative action policy. To examine the limits of White guilt in motivating support for equal opportunity (noncompensatory) policy, we compare its ability to predict support for compensatory policy and equal opportunity policy (Study 2).

To further demonstrate the limits of White guilt, we also contrast it to the other-focused emotion of sympathy. In Study 2, we examine European Americans’ feelings of group-based sympathy, addressing two questions. 3. Is sympathy other-focused? As with guilt, we consider this question by examining the antecedent beliefs that elicit feelings of group-based sympathy. We look at whether the other-focused belief that African Americans face racial discrimination elicits more sympathy than does the self-focused belief that European Americans discriminate on the basis of race. 4. Does sympathy provide broad support for social equality? As an other-focused emotion, group-based sympathy should provide a broader basis of support for efforts against inequality. In Study 2, we examine how well sympathy predicts European Americans’ support for compensatory and equal opportunity affirmative action programs.

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STUDY 1

We had two aims in Study 1. First, we sought to provide evidence that White guilt is a self-focused emotion. We expected guilt to be based in the self-focused belief in White privilege that sees European Americans as illegitimately advantaged by their group membership. In contrast, the belief that African Americans face racial discrimination should not predict feelings of White guilt because this belief is focused on the suffering of others rather than on the (collective) self’s responsibility for causing the suffering. Second, Study 1 sought to corroborate the finding that group-based guilt leads to support for compensation (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998). Given the more general association between guilt and compensation, White guilt should predict support for compensatory affirmative action. In addition, White guilt should (at least partially) mediate the relationship between self-focused belief in White privilege and support for compensatory affirmative action (Swim & Miller, 1999). We used Structural Equation Modeling to specify and test a model with the hypothesized relationships. Method PARTICIPANTS

The study included 202 self-identified “European American/White” undergraduates who completed the questionnaire in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Of the 61 men (30%) and 141 women (70%), 124 (67%) reported their political orientation as liberal or very liberal, 53 (26%) identified as “middle of the road,” and 13 (7%) reported being conservative or very conservative. The sample was thus quite liberal overall.2 MATERIALS

Belief in racial discrimination. We used Swim and Miller’s (1999, Study 1) six-item scale to measure belief in the existence of present racial discrimination against African Americans (α = .83). All the items began with the stem, “How often do you think Blacks experience discrimination . . . ” Various domains of discrimination were then listed, for example, “in the work force” and “from teaching assistants and faculty.” Participants rated how often they thought discrimination occurred in each domain, using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 6 (very frequently). Given its assessment of discrimination against African Americans, this scale is clearly other-focused for our European American participants.3 Belief in (illegitimate) White privilege. We used Swim and Miller’s (1999, Study 1) five-item scale to measure belief in the (current) existence of European Americans’ racial privilege (α = .87). For example, one item read,

“White people have certain advantages that minorities do not have in this society.” Participants responded using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly). Given its explicit identification of Whites as advantaged, this scale is clearly selffocused for our European American participants. White guilt. Participants completed Swim and Miller’s (1999, Study 1) five-item measure of White guilt (α = .85). Consistent with other measures of group-based guilt (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998), these items are written in broad terms and are designed to assess people’s general tendency to experience feelings of White guilt. For example, one item read, “I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans (i.e., slavery, poverty).” Participants completed this measure using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly). Support for affirmative action. Participants responded to six items from Swim and Miller’s (1999, Study 1) measure of support for affirmative action (α = .84).4 These items depicted affirmative action as involving compensation, with emphasis on demographic characteristics rather than on ability or merit. For example, “Blacks should receive racial entitlements such as affirmative action and other forms of compensation due to the past injustices of White America.” Participants completed this measure using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly). All scale items are presented in the appendix. Results We used EQS to estimate a structural model with measured variables (see Figure 1). The model included the hypothesized causal paths from belief in White privilege to White guilt, from White guilt to support for compensatory affirmative action, from belief in White privilege to support for compensatory affirmative action, and from belief in racial discrimination to support for compensatory affirmative action. Because we did not expect belief in racial discrimination to predict feelings of White guilt, we did not include this causal path in the model. Finally, given the moderate correlation between belief in White privilege and belief in racial discrimination, r(202) = .50, p < .01, we allowed for an association between these two variables in the model. Our hypothesized model fit the data extremely well. The sensitive χ2 value was small and statistically not reliable: χ2(1, N = 202) = .72, p > .10. This demonstrates that the model produced a variance-covariance matrix that was not reliably different from the original variancecovariance matrix. The other fit indices also indicated excellent fit: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index

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Belief in (illegitimate) White privilege .42* .47* .51*

White guilt

.13*

Support for compensatory affirmative action

.17* Belief in racial discrimination

Figure 1

Structural model testing relationships between belief in White privilege, belief in racial discrimination, White guilt, and support for compensatory affirmative action. NOTE: Standardized parameter estimates shown. *p < .05.

(GFI) = .99, Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = .98, standardized Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = .02, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 00. Examination of the parameter estimates demonstrates that guilt is a self-focused emotion as (selffocused) belief in White privilege was a reliable predictor of White guilt (β = .47, p < .05; see Figure 1). To further demonstrate the self-focus of White guilt, we sought to show that it was not based in an other-focused belief in inequality. Thus, we tested the hypothesis that (otherfocused) belief in discrimination is not necessary to predict feelings of (self-focused) White guilt. To ascertain that the causal path from (other-focused) belief in discrimination to (self-focused) White guilt is unnecessary, we compared our hypothesized model to a model that included this specific path. In this fully saturated model (where all the causal paths were specified), belief in White privilege was a reliable predictor of White guilt (β = .44, p < .05), whereas belief in discrimination did not predict White guilt (β = .06, p > .10). In addition, including the causal path from belief in discrimination to White guilt did not reliably improve the overall fit of the model: ∆χ2(1, N = 202) = .72, p > .10. Taken together, these results provide strong support for our hypothesis that White guilt is a self-focused emotion. White guilt was a reliable predictor of support for compensatory affirmative action (β = .13, p < .05; see Figure 1), providing support for our hypothesis that guilt is associated with efforts at compensation. Indeed, White guilt partially mediated the relationship between belief

in White privilege and support for compensatory affirmative action (see Figure 1). To obtain more support for the causal ordering in our hypothesized model, we tested a model that reversed the causal order of the association between belief in White privilege and White guilt. In this alternate model, White guilt was specified as the exogenous variable and belief in White privilege was specified as the mediator of the relationship between White guilt and support for compensatory affirmative action. This alternative model fit the data very poorly, with a large, reliable chi-square value: χ2(1, N = 202) = 43.21, p < .01. The fit indices also indicated poor fit: CFI = .78, IFI =.79, GFI = .91, AGFI = .12, standardized RMR = .13, and RMSEA = .46. Although it is not possible to directly compare the fit of the original hypothesized model and this alternative one, it is apparent that the alternative model does not adequately fit the data. Thus, the causal order specified in our hypothesized model receives strong support. Discussion Study 1 provides support for the characterization of group-based guilt as a self-focused emotion (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). White guilt was based in a self-focused belief in White privilege, whereas an other-focused belief in racial discrimination did not predict feelings of guilt. Study 1 also found White guilt to be an independent predictor of support for compensatory affirmative action, as has been shown in White Dutch students’ feelings about Indonesia (Doosje et al., 1998). Overall, the results provide strong support for the

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hypothesized characteristics of White guilt, as well as the hypothesized causal direction of the relationships in the model. We conducted a second study to replicate these findings, particularly to provide stronger support for the hypothesis that White guilt is a self-focused emotion. In addition, we used the second study to examine whether the self-focused nature of White guilt limits its association with support for other, noncompensatory policies. STUDY 2

Four issues emerged in Study 1 that we addressed in Study 2. First, we wanted to provide more conclusive evidence for the self-focused nature of White guilt. Study 1 showed a self-focused belief in White privilege to predict guilt, whereas an other-focused belief in discrimination against African Americans did not, but there are two shortcomings to this approach. First, focus of attention was not directly manipulated in Study 1, making it difficult to establish self-focus as a cause of guilt. A second problem concerns the use of different aspects of inequality in examining the effects of focus of attention. Although group discrimination and privilege are distinct constructs, they can be regarded as interrelated. For example, illegitimate group privilege in the present may be seen as based on discrimination in the past. To address these concerns, in Study 2 we manipulated the focus of attention of participants’ belief in inequality. To keep the dimension of inequality constant across the focus manipulation, we concentrated only on the belief in discrimination against African Americans. We decided not to focus on belief in White privilege because it was difficult for us to construct a measure of privilege that was purely other-focused. The focus of attention of people’s belief in discrimination could be easily manipulated, however, by emphasizing either the ingroup’s responsibility for the discrimination or the disadvantages faced by the targets of discrimination. Thus, half of the participants responded to a measure assessing their other-focused belief that African Americans face discrimination, whereas the other half completed a measure assessing their self-focused belief that European Americans discriminate on the basis of race. A second issue addressed in Study 2 concerned the implications of White guilt for European Americans’ support for racial policies. Study 1 demonstrated guilt’s association with efforts at compensation, and we were interested in extending this finding by examining how well guilt would predict support for affirmative action that focused on equal opportunity rather than on compensation. Existing theory on guilt suggests that its selffocused nature should limit its associations with policy support only to compensatory policy. Guilt should not predict support for noncompensatory policies such as those focusing on equal opportunity. To test this idea in

Study 2, we included measures of support for affirmative action that framed the policy as either explicitly compensatory or in terms of equal opportunity. Third, we used Study 2 to compare White guilt to another emotional response to racial inequality. Sympathy for the disadvantaged, a response based in identification with others’ misfortune (Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989), contrasts well with White guilt. Sympathy is a more other-focused emotion than is guilt, and thus, sympathy motivates people to help those who are disadvantaged. In contrast to White guilt, group-based sympathy should motivate support for both compensatory and equal opportunity policies because both types of affirmative action seek to help those who are disadvantaged by racial inequality. A fourth issue addressed in Study 2 concerned the measurement of emotional responses to racial inequality. In Study 1, we used a measure of White guilt (taken from Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1) that assessed participants’ general tendencies to experience this emotion, rather than their specific feelings of guilt when they think about racial inequality. In Study 2, we employed a measure of immediate emotional responses to racial discrimination, modeled after the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This measure should serve as a better assessment of respondents’ actual felt emotion rather than their general tendencies to experience emotions. Using an emotion adjective scale also allows us to replicate our results from Study 1 with a different type of measure. Hypotheses Because guilt is a self-focused emotion, we hypothesized that a self-focused orientation to racial inequality would result in more feelings of group-based guilt. Based on the other-focused nature of sympathy, we also predicted that an other-focused orientation to racial inequality should lead to more group-based sympathy for the disadvantaged. In addition, we hypothesized that guilt would predict support for compensatory policy and that guilt would not be associated with support for equal opportunity. Finally, we expected sympathy to be associated with support for both compensatory and equal opportunity policies. Method PARTICIPANTS

The study included 250 self-identified “European American/White” undergraduates who completed the questionnaire as part of a course requirement. One hundred and sixty five women (66%) and 85 men (34%) ranged in age from 17 to 65 years (M = 19.7 years, SD = 4.4 years). Participants tended toward the liberal end on a

Iyer et al. / WHITE GUILT continuous scale of political orientation (1 = left, 7 = right), M = 2.96, SD = 1.25. DESIGN AND MATERIALS

Belief in (present) discrimination. Our measure included seven statements that addressed the level of discrimination African Americans face in various domains, such as employment and housing. Participants responded to each item on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We used this measure to manipulate participants’ focus of attention regarding racial inequality. The items were presented in one of two forms, focusing either on European Americans as perpetrators (self-focused) or on African Americans as targets (other-focused). The self-focused discrimination measure (α = .87) placed emphasis on European Americans’ discrimination against others on the basis of race. These items explicitly named European Americans as the agents of discrimination, making them the subject of the sentences. The items did not mention any particular targets. A typical item read as follows: “Many White employers are racially biased in their hiring and promotion practices.” In the other-focused condition (α = .89), the statements were worded to place emphasis on those who were being discriminated against on the basis of race. The items explicitly named African Americans as the victims of discrimination (making them the subject of the sentences) and did not mention any perpetrators or agents. A typical item read, “Many Black employees face racial bias when they apply for jobs or are up for a promotion.” Felt emotions. Participants were next asked to rate the extent to which they felt various emotions when thinking about racial discrimination. In the self-focused condition, the instructions stated, “When I think about racial discrimination by White people I feel . . . ” and in the otherfocused condition, the instructions read, “When I think about racial discrimination against Black people I feel . . . ”. Participants responded to 22 emotion terms using a 5point Likert-type scale from the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), which ranged from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). We conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the 22 emotion terms using Maximum likelihood extraction and Oblimin rotation. Three distinct factors emerged, two of which could be interpreted as guilt (explaining 10% of the variance) and sympathy (explaining 7% of the variance). Five items strongly loaded onto the guilt factor (loadings of .45 and higher): guilty, ashamed, regretful, responsible, and blameworthy (α = .80). Three items loaded onto the sympathy factor (loadings of .67 and higher): sympathetic, compassionate, and empathetic (α = .78).

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Support for affirmative action. Participants were asked to rate their level of support for two types of affirmative action programs. We developed a new measure of support for a compensatory affirmative action policy (seven items, α = .86) to explicitly and consistently focus on compensation and restitution. The items in our scale emphasized entitlements and preferential treatment for African Americans on the basis of race. For example, “A certain quota of Black students, even if not all are qualified, should be admitted to universities. They are owed that much.” The items in our measure of support for an equal opportunity affirmative action policy (five items, α = .78) were adapted from various affirmative action scales (Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Schmermund, Sellers, Mueller, & Crosby, 2001; Swim & Miller, 1999). These items placed emphasis on increasing opportunities for African Americans in employment and education but not on using preferential treatment as a means to determine who receives the job or the university acceptance. For example, “I think universities should try to increase the number of Black people in their applicant pool, perhaps by sending more representatives to high schools with large Black populations.” The items from the two affirmative action measures were intermixed; participants responded to them using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). To be certain that we could differentiate between the compensatory policy scale and the equal opportunity policy scale, we submitted the 13 original items to an exploratory factor analysis with Maximum likelihood extraction and Oblimin rotation. Two distinct factors emerged. Seven items loaded highly (loadings of .51 and higher) on Factor 1, which explained 42% of the variance and could be interpreted as support for compensatory policy. Five items loaded highly (loadings of at least .47) on Factor 2, which explained 12% of the variance and could be interpreted as support for equal opportunity policy. One item did not load onto either factor and was therefore not included in the measures. All scale items are presented in the appendix. Results We again used EQS to estimate a structural model with measured variables. We specified a model including all the variables of interest: belief in discrimination, guilt, sympathy, support for compensatory policy, and support for equal opportunity policy.5 We tested the causal paths from belief in discrimination to the emotions, from belief in discrimination to support for both types of affirmative action, and from the emotions to support for both types of affirmative action. Because participants’ responses to the two measures of affirmative

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action were related, r(250) = .58, p < .01, we allowed for an association between these two disturbance terms. We wanted to include the focus manipulation in the model to directly examine the impact of the manipulation on participants’ responses to the various measures. Before we could do this, however, we had to ascertain that the manipulation did not result in significantly different models in the two conditions. Therefore, we first tested the model described above using a multiplegroups approach, comparing a model in which the parameter estimates were constrained to be equal in the two focus conditions to a model that allowed them to differ across conditions. Allowing the parameter estimates to differ across conditions did not reliably improve the overall fit of the model, ∆χ2(5, N = 250) = 12.34, p > .05. In addition, examination of the parameter estimates in the two models suggested that similar conclusions could be drawn from the model in both conditions. Taken together, these results suggest that the specified model is equally valid in both focus conditions. It is then acceptable to combine the participants in the two focus conditions to form one group and test the model with the whole sample.6 This allows us to include the focus manipulation as a variable in the model to examine its effects on participants’ levels of guilt and sympathy. We included the focus manipulation as a categorical exogenous variable in the model (1 = self-focus, 2 = other-focus), with paths specified to all the other variables (see Figure 2). Although the sensitive chi-square value was statistically reliable, χ2(1, N = 250) = 27.62, p < .01, the other indices generally indicated very good fit: CFI = .91, IFI = .92, GFI = .97, AGFI = .30, standardized RMR = .06, and RMSEA = .33. Thus, we can conclude that our specified model fits the data quite well and can examine the parameter estimates to test our hypotheses. FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND THE EMOTIONS

As expected, the focus manipulation influenced participants’ emotional responses to racial discrimination (see Figure 2). Self-focus led to more feelings of guilt (β = .15, p < .05), whereas other-focus led to more feelings of sympathy (β = .23, p < .05). Thus, there is support for our hypotheses that guilt is a more self-focused emotion, whereas sympathy is a more other-focused emotion. It was also the case that other-focus led to greater expression of belief in discrimination (see Figure 2). This means that participants were more likely to perceive discrimination against African Americans when their own group was not implicated as perpetrators. THE EMOTIONS AND POLICY SUPPORT

Guilt. As expected, guilt was a reliable predictor of support for compensatory policy ( β = .18, p < .05; see

Figure 2), although it did not predict support for equal opportunity policy (β = .03, p > .10; see Figure 2). To more directly assess the difference between these two coefficients, we tested a model in which we constrained the two parameter estimates to be equal. Including this equality constraint makes the overall fit of the model reliably worse than that of the original model, ∆χ2(1, N = 250) = 6.56, p < .05, suggesting that the two parameter estimates are reliably different from each other. In fact, the LaGrange Multiplier test suggests that relaxing this equality constraint will reliably improve the fit of the model. Thus, there is clear support for our hypothesis that guilt is associated with efforts at compensation but not with more general efforts at bringing about equality. Sympathy. Our hypothesis that sympathy would be associated with support for equal opportunity policy was supported (β = .25, p < .05; see Figure 2). However, sympathy was only a marginal predictor of support for compensatory policy (β = .10, p < .10; see Figure 2). Although sympathy more strongly predicts equal opportunity policy than it does compensatory policy, there is little statistical difference between the two relationships. When these two paths are constrained to be equal, the overall fit of the model is only marginally reliably worse than the fit of the original model, ∆χ2(1, N = 250) = 3.69, p < .10. The LaGrange test also suggests that the overall fit of the model would only marginally reliably improve when this equality constraint is freed. The results of the direct comparison suggest that sympathy can be considered a strong predictor of equal opportunity policy and a fairly good predictor of compensatory policy. Discussion The results of Study 2 support our hypotheses about the characteristics of White guilt, thus corroborating and extending Study 1. White guilt again showed itself to be a self-focused emotion because a more self-focused orientation to racial inequality elicited more feelings of guilt. The self-focused nature of White guilt had implications for its ability to predict support for racial policies. White guilt was a direct predictor of support for compensatory policy, consistent with the results from Study 1 and other empirical work on group-based guilt (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998). As expected, however, guilt was not associated with support for an equal opportunity policy that did not explicitly focus on compensation. Thus, guilt was only associated with racial policy that explicitly sought to address the harm done by the ingroup. Study 2 also provided evidence for the other-focused nature of group-based sympathy because an otherfocused orientation toward racial inequality led to more feelings of sympathy. This is consistent with other work on sympathy (Salovey & Rosenhan, 1989) and should

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Support for compensatory policy -.02 .39*

-.14*

Focus manipulation

.15*

Belief in discrimination

.18*

.33* .31*

Group-based guilt .47* Group-based sympathy .25*

.23*

.10+

.03

.34* .17* Support for equal opportunity policy

Figure 2

Structural model testing relationships between focus of attention, belief in discrimination, group-based emotions, and support for affirmative action policies. NOTE: Standardized parameter estimates shown. Focus manipulation included as a categorical variable: 1 = self-focus, 2 = other-focus. †p < .10. *p < .05.

have important implications for policy support (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Those who experience group-based sympathy concentrate on the plight of the disadvantaged and seek to help them by reducing racial inequality. Indeed, sympathy strongly predicted support for equal opportunity policy and marginally predicted support for compensatory policy. Taken together, the results suggest that group-based sympathy is a more consistent predictor of support for racial policy than is White guilt. The other-focused nature of sympathy leads people to try to help those who are disadvantaged (Batson, 1998). Those who feel group-based sympathy support various types of affirmative action because all such programs seek to help victims of racial discrimination. On the other hand, White guilt is associated with a self-focused concern to address the ingroup’s responsibility for the harm done, which is more readily accomplished through some type of compensation. Thus, White guilt motivates support solely for compensatory policy and is overall a less consistent predictor of racial policy support than is group-based sympathy. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Based in theory and research on personal guilt, we argued that group-based guilt is a self-focused emotional experience of ingroup responsibility for an immoral advantage. More specifically, White guilt is a dysphoria European Americans can feel when focused on their ille-

gitimate racial advantage over African Americans. In Study 1, we showed White guilt to be predicted by a selffocused belief in White privilege, but not by an otherfocused belief in discrimination against African Americans. In Study 2, we showed that a self-focused framing of racial discrimination, as perpetrated by European Americans, produced more guilt than an other-focused framing that described African Americans as the targets of racial discrimination. There was thus good support for our conceptualization of White guilt as a self-focused emotional reaction to racial inequality. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that focus of attention was operationalized, and White guilt was measured, in different ways in each of the two studies. As with personal guilt, the self-focus of group-based guilt suggests that it should be tied to efforts at restitution. Given that group-based guilt is based in a focus on the group’s responsibility for wrongdoing, it motivates collective restitution in the form of compensation or apology. In the Netherlands, Doosje et al. (1998) showed national guilt over colonization to predict support for material compensation to a former colony. We argue that White guilt in the United States should predict support for affirmative action policy framed as compensation to African Americans as the targets of racial inequality. Both studies demonstrated White guilt as a predict or of support for compensatory affirmative action. Those who feel the most guilty about their group’s unfair advantage or discrimination were the most supportive of

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direct compensation to those who suffer as a result. Thus, White guilt over illegitimate racial advantage predicts support for the least preferred and perhaps most radical form of affirmative action policy in the United States (Kravitz et al., 1997). This is the benefit of White guilt. This strong association between guilt and compensation, however, also serves to limit the effects of guilt. Although equal opportunity forms of affirmative action are the most preferred and the least controversial (Kravitz et al., 1997), White guilt was not a reliable predictor of support for such noncompensatory policy in Study 2. Thus, group-based guilt may serve as a limited basis of support for efforts at group equality. One possible reason for guilt’s limited role in equality efforts may be its self-focused nature. Given the extremely noxious self-recrimination characteristic of guilt, it may lead people to focus on restitution as a selffocused route to ending their dysphoria (Ortony et al., 1988). Thus, efforts at material compensation may reflect a somewhat selfish desire to assuage guilt rather than a genuine concern for equality or the harm caused the other (Batson, 1998). Indeed, Shelby Steele (1990) has argued that White guilt is a disingenuous motive for affirmative action because it “makes the real problem of Black students seem secondary to the need for White redemption” (p. 99). The possibility that group-based guilt may lead to a narrow concern for restitution due to its self-focus makes more other-focused emotions, such as sympathy, important. Much like sympathy in research at the individual level (Batson, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1994), groupbased sympathy regarding racial advantage and discrimination was more focused on the plight of the disadvantaged than on the wrongdoing of the advantaged (Study 2). This greater focus of attention on the disadvantaged seemed to lead to a broader support of equality policy. Although group-based sympathy was less strongly associated with support for compensation than was guilt, group-based sympathy was predictive of support for both compensatory and equal opportunity policy. As such, group-based sympathy served as a broader basis of support for efforts at racial equality. Taken together, our results have implications for the emerging intergroup emotions approach to intergroup relations as well as for the research and politics of affirmative action. The Intergroup Emotions Approach Group-based emotions such as guilt and sympathy offer a characterization of ingroups’ relationships to outgroups that is more specific than the analysis offered by the more general ideas of prejudice or ingroup favoritism (Smith, 1993). Indeed, group-based emotions

offer a rich phenomenological description of the way an ingroup interprets its structural relationship to an outgroup (Leach et al., 2002). Our results showed that distinguishing between group-based guilt and sympathy had important implications for understanding support for quite different forms of affirmative action. To feel White guilt is to blame one’s group for an illegitimate racial advantage and to feel bad about it. This dysphoria and self-blame motivates efforts at restitution, such as material compensation. To feel group-based sympathy, on the other hand, implies no responsibility or selfrecrimination. Sympathy is based on a compassionate concern for the state of the disadvantaged. As such, it motivates a general effort to help that is more broad than guilt’s narrow concern with restitution through compensation. The differing focus of attention characteristic of group-based guilt and sympathy, as well as their differential relations to specific forms of affirmative action policy, show clearly the advantages of differentiating specific forms of intergroup emotion. Although belief in White privilege and racial discrimination both (directly) predict support for affirmative action, these beliefs about racial inequality do not differentiate those who support the least preferred compensatory policy from those who support the most preferred equal opportunity policy. It is the specific intergroup emotions of guilt and sympathy that tell us who will support which policy and also tell us, to some degree, why. This is because emotions have a strong motivational component; knowing how someone feels is highly suggestive of how they want to act (Frijda, 1986). Thus, intergroup emotions are suggestive of ingroups’ political motivations within their intergroup relations. This is akin to what Lutz and AbuLughod (1990) call the “politics of emotion.” Affirmative Action: Research and Politics Policies such as affirmative action are seldom amenable to precise definitions because they have been implemented in many different ways. Affirmative action is thus subject to different interpretations in governmental policy and practice (Stephanopoulos & Edley, 1995), court decisions (Crosby & Van de Veer, 2000), and social psychological studies (Taylor-Carter, Doverspike, & Cook, 1995). A substantial body of research has demonstrated that the way an affirmative action program is framed influences evaluations of the policy (Golden, Hinkle, & Crosby, 2001; Kravitz, 1995; for a review, see Kravitz et al., 1997). Our results propose an extension of this framing effect. Not only do levels of support for an affirmative action program change based on the way it is framed, but the psychological predictors of this support may change as well. White guilt predicts support for compensatory

Iyer et al. / WHITE GUILT affirmative action in our studies, whereas support for equal opportunity affirmative action is based primarily in sympathy. The shifting basis of support for specific forms of affirmative action has implications for both research and politics. Research on support for, or opposition to, affirmative action must take account of the fact that the definitions employed may affect the psychological basis of support. Research that defines affirmative action as compensation, for example, is more likely to show White guilt as a predictor than research that frames the policy as concerned with equal opportunity. The various bases of support for affirmative action are also relevant to political debates on the issue. To boost public support for compensatory affirmative action, policy makers would do well to induce feelings of White guilt in European Americans. To motivate broader support for social equality strategies, however, a good strategy would be to increase European Americans’ feelings of sympathy for African Americans. Focusing attention on the victims of racial discrimination and representing affirmative action as a form of prosocial behavior appears to be an important means of encouraging broad levels of support for affirmative action. The specific relationships between group-based emotions and support for different policies underscore the importance of the framing effect in interpreting research on and debates about affirmative action.

APPENDIX MEASURES USED IN STUDY 1

Belief in (present) White Privilege (Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1) 1. White people have certain advantages that minorities do not have in this society. 2. My status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today’s society. 3. I feel that White skin in the United States opens many doors for Whites during their everyday lives. 4. I do not feel that White people have any benefits or privileges due to their race. (reverse-coded) 5. My skin color is an asset to me in everyday life.

Belief in (present) Racial Discrimination (Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1) How often do you think Blacks experience discrimination: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

In the work force? From the police? From fellow White employees? From teaching assistants and faculty? In the form of racially motivated glaring from White people? 6. In the form of racial slurs?

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White Guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1) 1. Although I feel my behavior is typically nondiscriminatory, I still feel guilt due to my association with the White race. 2. I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans (i.e., slavery, poverty). 3. I do not feel guilty about social inequality between White and Black America. (reverse-coded) 4. When I learn about racism, I feel guilt due to my association with the White race. 5. I feel guilty about the benefits and privileges that I receive as a White person.

Support for (compensatory) Affirmative Action (Swim & Miller, 1999, Study 1) 1. Blacks should receive racial entitlements such as affirmative action and other forms of compensation due to the past injustices of White America. 2. Blacks have to learn that they are entitled to no special consideration, such as that provided by affirmative action programs, and must make it strictly on merit. (reverse-coded) 3. After years of discrimination, it is only fair to set up special programs to make sure that Blacks are given every chance to have equal opportunities in employment and education. 4. Once affirmative action programs for Blacks are started, the result is bound to be reverse discrimination against White men. (reverse-coded) 5. If there are no affirmative action programs helping Blacks in employment and education, then they will continue to fail to get their fair share of jobs and higher education, thereby continuing past discrimination. 6. Affirmative action programs designed to help Blacks are no longer needed. (reverse-coded) MEASURES USED IN STUDY 2

Self-Focused Belief in Discrimination 1. Although there is some racial discrimination in today’s society, most Whites do not discriminate on a regular basis. (reverse-coded) 2. It’s hard to admit, but a lot of White people treat others unfairly on the basis of race. 3. Many White employers are racially biased in their hiring and promotion practices. 4. White landlords and sellers tend to racially discriminate when renting or selling their properties. 5. White-owned businesses probably provide bad service to certain customers because of their race. 6. In many cities, White police officers use race as a basis to treat people more or less harshly. 7. Many White people use racial slurs on a regular basis.

Other-Focused Belief in Discrimination 1. Although there is some racial discrimination in today’s society, most Blacks do not face discrimination on a regular basis. (reverse-coded) 2. It’s hard to admit, but a lot of Black people are treated unfairly because of race. 3. Many Black employees face racial bias when they apply for jobs or are up for a promotion.

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4. There is a great deal of discrimination against Black people looking to buy or rent properties. 5. Black customers probably receive bad service from businesses because of their race. 6. In many cities, Black people are treated harshly by the police simply because of their race. 7. Black people have to deal with racial slurs on a regular basis.

Support for Compensatory Policy 1. A certain quota of Black students, even if not all are qualified, should be admitted to universities. They are owed that much. 2. Private businesses should create new jobs that are set aside only for Black people who apply. 3. Black people deserve reparations from the American government in the form of affirmative action. 4. Black people are not entitled to special considerations in life such as affirmative action; rather, they must make it strictly on their own merit. (reverse-coded) 5. If I were an employer, and two people, one Black and one White, applied for the same job, I would hire the Black candidate, even if s/he were less qualified. 6. American society has a responsibility to compensate Black people with jobs and education through programs such as Affirmative Action. 7. Policies such as affirmative action that give preference to Black people are not needed because society does not owe them anything. (reverse-coded)

Support for Equal Opportunity Policy 1. There is not much reason for universities to work harder to get more Black students to apply for admission. There is nothing holding them back from applying on their own. (reverse-coded) 2. It is not important for companies to make extra effort to recruit Black candidates to apply for jobs. If they are interested and qualified they should apply on their own. (reverse-coded) 3. Affirmative action programs that enhance the opportunity for Black people to succeed on their own merits are an asset to American society. 4. I think universities should try to increase the number of Black people in their applicant pool, perhaps by sending more representatives to high schools with large Black populations. 5. Corporations should work harder to advertise their job openings in places where more Blacks will see it in order to spread the word about such opportunities.

NOTES 1. Some research has considered collective guilt produced through associating oneself with fellow ingroup members who mistreated an outgroup in the past (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). We think that the implications of this guilt by association are somewhat different from group-based guilt based in belief in existing illegitimate systems of inequality (see Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, in press; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Therefore, we focus on the White guilt people feel based on their ingroup’s current mistreatment of another group. 2. In both studies, (liberal) political orientation was reliably correlated to belief in discrimination, guilt, and support for affirmative

action. These correlations ranged in magnitude from .18 to .40. Although conservatism predicted less guilt and less support for compensatory affirmative action, the variance between guilt and compensatory policy support was still associated among the more conservative participants. Thus, liberalism did not appear to play a substantive role in the association between guilt and compensation. 3. Although this measure addresses the discrimination faced by African Americans, two of the items name “Whites” as perpetrators. These items potentially add a self-focus to a generally other-focused measure (see the appendix for all scale items). Dropping these two items does not change the results of our analyses, however, which supports our contention that the measure is other-focused overall. 4. We thank Janet Swim for providing this measure. 5. We did not include ingroup identification as a moderator of White guilt in this model because we found that ingroup identification was not reliably correlated with guilt in either focus condition. This is consistent with Doosje et al. (1998), who found ingroup identification to moderate group-based guilt only when there was ambiguity about the ingroup having harmed the outgroup. They reasoned that the ambiguity of the ingroup’s culpability allowed the highly identified to protect their group image by rejecting guilt. In our study, the explicit racial discrimination presented in the measures made the harm done by the ingroup quite unambiguous. Thus, ingroup identification should not be relevant to our model. 6. One could argue that the measures we used to manipulate (belief in discrimination) and measure the effects of (guilt, sympathy) focus of attention should not be combined across conditions in the model. However, there does not appear to be much difference between the constructs in the two focus conditions. For example, all three measures had the same nonreliable associations with the impression management and self-deceptive positivity subscales of the Paulhus (1991) social desirability measure in both focus conditions. The near-zero correlations with impression management also suggest that socially desirable responding was consistently absent across cells and measures. REFERENCES American Psychological Association. (1996). Affirmative action: Who benefits? A briefing paper of the American Psychological Association. Retrieved from http://www.apa.org/ppo/aa.html Barkan, E. (2000). The guilt of nations: Restitution and negotiating historical injustices. New York: Norton. Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 282-316). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Baumeister, R. F., Reis, H. T., & Delespaul, P. A. (1995). Subjective and experiential correlates of guilt in daily life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(12), 1256-1268. Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 243-267. Bobo, L., & Kluegel, J. R. (1993). Opposition to race-targeting: Selfinterest, stratification ideology, or racial attitudes? American Sociological Review, 58, 443-464. Branscombe, N. R. (1998). Thinking about one’s gender group’s privileges or disadvantages: Consequences for well-being in women and men. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 167-184. Branscombe, N. R., Doosje, B., & McGarty, C. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of collective guilt. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups (pp. 49-66). Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L. (1994). Collective self-esteem consequences of outgroup derogation when a valued social identity is on trial. European Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 641-657. Brewer, M. B. (1986). The role of ethnocentrism in intergroup conflict. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 88-102). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Crosby, F. J., & Van de Veer, C. (Eds.). (2000). Sex, race, and merit: Debating affirmative action in education and employment. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Guilty by association: When one’s group has a negative history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(4), 872-886.

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