Who regrets more after choosing a non-status-quo ...

Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 186–196 www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

Who regrets more after choosing a non-status-quo option? Post decisional regret under need for cognitive closure Lucia Mannetti a

a,¤

, Antonio Pierro a, Arie Kruglanski

b

Dipartimento di Psicologia dei Processi di Sviluppo e Socializzazione, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”, via dei Marsi 78, Roma, Italy b Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA Received 15 December 2005; received in revised form 19 May 2006; accepted 22 May 2006 Available online 4 August 2006

Abstract Recently there has been a growing attention to the emotion of regret and the cognitive process of counterfactual thinking in economic decisions [e.g. Inman, J. J. & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). Regret in repeat purchase versus switching decisions: The attenuating role of decision justiWability. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(1), 116–128; Tsiros, M. & Mittal, V. (2000). Regret: A model of its antecedents and consequences in consumer decision making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26(4), 401–417]. The decision-making literature has consistently reported that decisions to maintain the status quo tend to be regretted less than decision to change (status quo eVect). While Inman and Zeelenberg’s (2002) studies show the existence of situational factors that moderate the experience of regret after that a non-status-quo choice has been made, in this study we assessed the moderating role of decision maker’s cognitive closure [Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). The psychology of closed-mindedness. New York: Psychology Press; Kruglanski, A. W. & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”. Psychological Review, 103, 263–283]. We hypothesized that people with high need for cognitive closure, in comparison to people with low need for cognitive closure, would perceive the non-status-quo choice as less “normative” and therefore that they would produce, in such a condition, a larger amount of counterfactual thinking and, as a consequence, that they would experience more post decisional regret. The results support the hypothesized interactive eVect of need for cognitive closure by type of alternative (“status-quo” vs. “non-status-quo”) on both regret and counterfactual thinking.

*

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Mannetti).

0167-4870/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.12.004

L. Mannetti et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 186–196

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Mediation analysis revealed further that the inXuence of the interaction of need for closure by type of alternative on the experience of regret is mediated by counterfactual thinking. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classiWcation: D81; C91 Keywords: Regret; Status quo; Need for cognitive closure

1. Introduction Recently there has been a growing number of studies about the role of the emotion of regret and the cognitive process of counterfactual thinking in economic decisions (e.g. Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Landman & Petty, 2000; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Up to now research has mainly concentrated on the conditions under which people show more regret, revealing, for example, that experienced regret depends on whether the negative outcome of a decision results from an action or an inaction, or on whether it implies switching or staying with the status quo, but also on how much responsible a person feels for a negative outcome. Another aspect, which could play an important role in the experience of regret is decision maker’s epistemic motivation. This paper examines the inXuence of need for cognitive closure on the production of counterfactual thoughts and the experience of post-decisional regret after having made either a status quo choice or a switching choice. 2. Regret and counterfactual thinking Zeelenberg (1999) deWnes regret as “negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better, had we decided diVerently” (p. 93). The process of thinking about “what might have been” is known as counterfactual thinking. Because of its relation to counterfactual thinking regret, just as disappointment and relief, has also been categorized as “counterfactual emotion” (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese & Olson, 1995). Individuals are assumed to engage spontaneously in counterfactual thinking after negative events or outcomes (Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987). Often, the type of counterfactuals they generate are upward in direction, which means that they refer to alternatives that are better than the obtained outcome. This imagination of better alternatives can cause negative emotions as regret. So regret can be seen as one of the possible emotional consequences of counterfactual thinking. This relationship between counterfactuals and regret is assumed by various researchers (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997) and has been empirically conWrmed in few studies (Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Research has revealed some important eVects that make increase regret such as action and inaction eVects (e.g. Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002) and the status quo eVect (Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). The label “status quo eVect” (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), refers to the fact that decisions to maintain the status quo tend to be regretted less than decision to change. This

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eVect has been deWned as one of the most robust phenomenon in the regret literature (e.g. Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Zeelenberg et al., 2002). The greater attractiveness of the default, or existing, option has been conceived by Langer (1994) as a type of commitment. Once a consumer is committed to an option she/he is more likely to Wxate on it even thought there are other options available. Recently, however, Inman and Zeelenberg (2002) have shown that previous consistent results conWrming the status quo eVect might have been a methodological artifact produced by the type of scenarios used in these studies. Making the scenario more similar to real life situations, these authors were able to show that the status quo eVect is attenuated or neutralized if there are reasons to justify the decision to switch to a diVerent product or service. While Inman and Zeelenberg’s (2002) studies show the existence of situational factors that moderate the experience of regret after that a non-status-quo choice has been made, in this study we intend to assess the potential moderating role of a decision maker’s epistemic motivation, and, in particular, of a decision maker’s need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) in the emotional experience that follows this type of decision. Next, we describe this epistemic motivation and discuss its relevance to the experience of regret discussed above. 3. The need for cognitive closure The need for closure was deWned as individuals’ “desire for a Wrm answer to a question, any Wrm answer as compared to confusion and/or ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 2004, p. 6). A continuum was envisaged with a strong need for closure at one end and a strong need to avoid closure at the other. A strong need for closure is experienced as a desire to have closure urgently and maintain it permanently. Hence, individuals with a strong need for closure tend to “seize” on information permitting a judgment on a topic of interest, and, to “freeze” upon such judgment, becoming relatively impermeable or “closed minded” to further relevant information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Such individuals make strong judgmental commitments and are relatively unshaken in their views. Individuals with a strong need to avoid closure, by contrast, are leery of judgmental commitments: they feel more comfortable keeping their options open, hence they eschew binding views or deWnite opinions. An individual’s standing on the need for closure continuum is determined by the perceived beneWts and costs of possessing versus lacking closure. Such costs and beneWts can be made salient by several contextual features (for example, time pressure, boredom, noise, fatigue; see for reviews, Kruglanski, 2004). Beside its various situational determinants, the need for closure may also vary stably across individuals. A 42 item scale was developed to tap persons’ dispositional need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The scale has been translated into several (12) languages, thus enabling the cross-cultural investigation of various need for closure eVects (for reviews see Kruglanski, 2004; Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002). Need for cognitive closure theory predicts several intra and interpersonal eVects induced by this motivation (see for a review, Kruglanski, 2004). Several studies have shown that high need for closure is associated with: a tendency to stop searching for alternatives and to jump to a conclusion without consulting further evidence in decision-making tasks (De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; Shiloh, Koren, & Zakay, 2001; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003; Vermeir, Van Kenhove, & Hendrickx, 2002), high


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political conservatism and authoritarianism (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sullaway, 2003a, 2003b; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), right wing political orientation (Kemmelmeier, 1997), a tendency to preserve the status quo (Golec, 2001, 2002a, 2002b), negative reaction to organizational change (Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 2004). Most relevant to the present study, the status quo preference of high need for cognitive closure individuals is supported also by results of a study concerning reactions to normative violations (Pierro, De Grada, Mannetti, Livi, & Kruglanski, 2004) which show that high need for closure scores are associated to more aggressive responses to normative violations. On the basis of the above cited studies, it seems reasonable to expect that need for cognitive closure will induce resistance to change in consumer domain too. Indeed, need for cognitive closure may aVect consumer choice and experience of post-decisional regret for several reasons. First, high need for cognitive closure persons should have a strong preference for choosing the same brand/service, since they tend to freeze on any Wrm knowledge, while choosing an alternative diVerent from the status quo implies many of the risks that typically these persons want to avoid (uncertainty, unpredictability). Therefore, choosing the “status-quo-option” provides the best Wt for the epistemic needs of these persons and is, therefore, perceived as more “normal”. Choosing the “non-status-quo option”, on the contrary, will be perceived as less “normal”, increasing the availability of counterfactual thoughts and, as a consequence, making post decisional regret more likely, when such a choice brings about negative outcome. 4. Present research The present study aims, precisely, at assessing the hypothesized role of need for cognitive closure in moderating the production of counterfactuals and the experience of regret after decision choices between status quo and non-status-quo alternatives. While the regret literature suggests that negative outcome deriving from choosing the non-status-quo option induce more regret than the same outcomes deriving from choosing the status quo option, we hypothesize that such an eVect may be restricted to, or stronger for, high need for cognitive persons. In other words, we anticipate an interactive eVect of need for cognitive closure and type of alternative (status quo vs. non-status-quo) on counterfactual thoughts and on regret. Whereas research on anticipated regret usually concentrates either on regret or on counterfactual thinking, often assuming, implicitly, that the scenarios used make people engage in counterfactual thinking and as a consequence engender regret, in this study we intend to assess explicitly that counterfactual thoughts mediate the inXuence of the interaction of need for closure by type of alternative on the experience of regret. Finally, since post decisional regret may have interesting applied implications in the consumer domain, we intend to explore one of such implications, namely the consequences in terms of intention to repeat the choice of the same brand. Ratner and Herbst (2005, study 4) have recently shown that switching behavior is less likely for individuals with high need for cognition. We anticipate that need for closure will have an opposite eVect increasing the intention to repeat the choice of the same brand, especially after a non-status-quo choice. Furthermore, following Tsiros and Mittal (2000) we anticipate such an eVect will be mediated by regret.

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5. Method 5.1. Subjects 148 students of the University of Rome (79 women and 69 men) participated in the study on a voluntary basis. Their mean age was 25 years (SD D 2.56). 5.2. Procedure and material Participants Wlled out the Italian version (Mannetti et al., 2002) of the Need for cognitive closure scale (NfCS) (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The NfCS constitutes a 42-item selfreport instrument designed to assess stable individual diVerences in the need for (or in the need to avoid) cognitive closure. Participants responses are recorded on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). A composite need for closure score was computed by summing across responses to each item (after appropriately reverse-scoring those items reXecting a tendency to avoid closure). Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the NfCS was satisfactory at .78. Then participants were presented with a scenario adopted from those used by Tsiros and Mittal (2000). Participants were requested to read carefully a description of an episode concerning a product’s purchase, and then to reply to some questions. The scenario (in the non-status-quo condition) was worded as follows: Paul presently owns a laptop computer made by Siemens, and he is quite happy with its performance. Paul for job reasons and in order to make the best use of his time has realized that he also needs a portable computer. For some of the past weeks, Paul has been looking at the diVerent options that are available on the market. He has narrowed it to two diVerent brands Siemens and Compaq. Price and speciWcations of the machines are very similar; both, for example, oVer 24 h a day, seven days a week technical assistance. Paul, after some consideration, decides to change brand choosing Compaq. George, a friend of Paul, who is in the same situation and has to buy a portable computer, on the contrary, decides to buy a Siemens machine. After three months, Paul has started to have many problems with his portable computer. Indeed any time he has to call the green number, he has to wait for a long time before the technical-support representative arrives. The portable computer locks up and he has to shut it down loosing all of his unsaved work. In addition, on several occasion he can not open any applications, and he has to shut down the system and try again. Finally, about two weeks ago, a technician was able to solve these problems. His friend George, on the contrary, had a great experience with his Siemens computer: George never had a problem with his computer and the only time he had a problem he called the green number and the technical support representative was fast and courteous in answering his questions. Actually four versions were used in which only the brand names were changed in order to create a status quo and a non-status-quo condition, and to counterbalance the brand names. After having read the scenario participants were invited to imagine to be Paul, and to write all the thoughts that would come to their mind in a situation like the described one,


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following the so-called “free-thought instruction” (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), since we were interested in how many counterfactuals participants spontaneously generate. The responses to this open-ended question were content analyzed, using the same coding scheme as Tsiros and Mittal (2000). Each response was coded into one of two categories “what-if”/counterfactual thought or not a counterfactual thought. The Wrst category included responses that “alter reality, create hypothetical scenarios, or express an opinion as to what might have been had a diVerent decision been made” (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000, p. 411). The mean number of total evoked thoughts was 2.24 (SD D 1.05); the mean number of counterfactuals produced by participants was .68 (SD D .75); the mean number of noncounterfactual thoughts was 1.55 (SD D 1.01). In the analyses the proportion of counterfactuals on total evoked thoughts was used (mean D .32, SD D .35). After having written the evoked thoughts, participants were requested to answer four questions using a rating scale ranging from 1 D not at all to 7 D extremely. These items were derived by Tsiros and Mittal (2000, Study 1). One item was intended to measure regret (“To what degree would you regret having bought the Compaq [Siemens] instead of Siemens [Compaq]?”). Two items were aimed at measuring the intention to repeat the same choice (“Should you be in the same situation again, in the future, would you buy a brand diVerent from Compaq [Siemens]?” “How likely are you to buy a brand diVerent form from Compaq [Siemens]?”). The two items were summed up to have a composite score of intention to repeat the same choice, since they were correlated (.30, p < .001). Finally one item was intend to check the status quo manipulation (“To what extent the choice made by Paul is intended to maintain the status quo?”). 6. Results 6.1. Manipulation check and control for diVerent versions A one way Anova showed an highly signiWcant eVect of the manipulation (F1,147 D 22,799, p < .001): participants exposed to the status quo scenario saw the choice as intended to maintain the status quo signiWcantly more (M D 4.46; SD D 1.63) than those exposed to the non-status-quo scenario (M D 3.07; SD D 1.90). Three one way ANOVA revealed that the order of the two brands did not have any eVects either on the number of counterfactuals produced (F D .30, n.s.), nor on the ratings of regret (F D .12, n.s.), nor on the intention to repeat the same choice (F D 2.45, n.s.). 6.2. Regret, counterfactuals, and intention to repeat the same choice as a function of need for closure and type of scenario Data were analyzed by means of three separate moderated multiple regression analyses using multiplicative approach suggest by Baron and Kenny (1986): one for each outcome variable (i.e. regret, counterfactuals, and intention to repeat the same choice). Type of scenario was coded so that non-status-quo was equal to “¡1” and status quo was equal to “1”. Need for cognitive closure, type of scenario (status quo versus non-status-quo) and their interaction were the predictor variables. When regret was the outcome variable, the main eVect of both need for closure and status quo did not reach signiWcance ( D .04, p < .63; and D ¡.14, p < .09), while the interaction eVect of status quo by need for cognitive closure ( D ¡.202, p < .01) was signiWcant.

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To analyze the two way interaction the simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) was performed. From this analysis we found that when need for cognitive closure is high there is an highly signiWcant negative relation between regret and type of scenario ( D ¡.341, p < .003), while when need for cognitive closure is low such relationship does not reach signiWcance ( D .064, p < .58). This means that the status quo eVect, in terms of regret, exists only for high need for closure participants. Also when counterfactuals were the outcome variable, the main eVect of both need for closure and status quo did not reach signiWcance ( D ¡.03, p < .70; D ¡.10, p < .24) while the interaction eVect of status quo by need for cognitive closure ( D ¡.184, p < .02) was signiWcant. Results of simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) show that, when need for cognitive closure is high, there is an highly signiWcant negative relation between number of counterfactuals and type of scenario ( D ¡.281, p < .01), while, when need for cognitive closure is low, such relationship does not reach signiWcance ( D .089, p < .44). This means that the status quo eVect, in terms of number of counterfactuals, exists only for high need for closure participants. Finally, when the intention to repeat the same brand choice was the outcome variable, both the main eVects of need for cognitive closure ( D .17, p < .05) and type of scenario ( D .29, p < .001) and the eVect of their interaction ( D .16, p < .05) were signiWcant. All these eVects were in the positive direction. Thus, consistently with need for closure theory, high (vs. low) need for closure participants are more likely to repeat the same choice, showing a kind of “option Wxation”. The eVect of type of scenario suggests that participants are more likely to manifest an intention to repeat the same choice if they have been exposed to the status quo scenario. In other words, they tend to imitate the actor’s type of choice. As far as the eVect of the interaction is concerned, from simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) we found that when need for cognitive closure is high the intention to repeat the same choice is signiWcantly higher after a “status quo” choice ( D .452, p < .001), while when need for cognitive closure is low such relationship is not signiWcant ( D .124, p < .26). These results too are perfectly consistent with need for closure theory: the status quo scenario oVers a model – or a simple solution – upon which high (vs. low) need for closure participants are more likely to “seize” and to “freeze”. 6.3. Mediation analysis Besides our main hypothesis concerning the interactive eVect of need for cognitive closure and type of scenario, we intended to assess also (a) the mediating role of counterfactuals (CF) in explaining the dependence of regret on the interaction between need for closure (NCC) and type of scenario (Status Quo, SQ); and (b) the mediating role of regret in explaining the dependence of intention to repeat the same choice on the interaction between NCC and SQ. The mediating role of counterfactuals in explaining the dependence of regret on the interaction between need for closure and type of scenario. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), for mediation to occur, four conditions need to be met. First, variation in the independent variable (in this case, the interaction term SQ by NCC) should signiWcantly account for variation in the mediator (i.e. counterfactuals, CF). Second, variation in the independent variable (SQ by NCC) should signiWcantly account for variation in the dependent variable (i.e. regret). Third, variation in the mediator should


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signiWcantly account for variation in the dependent variable, with the independent variables in the model. Fourth, the eVect of the independent variable (SQ by NCC) on the dependent variable (regret) should be substantially reduced once the mediator eVect on the dependent variable is controlled for. In summary, for testing these four conditions the following three equations need to be estimated: (1) regret D a ¤ SQ + b ¤ NCC + c ¤ SQ ¤ NCC + error (2) counterfactuals D a1 ¤ SQ + b1 ¤ NCC + c1 ¤ SQ ¤ NCC + error (3) regret D a2 ¤ SQ + b2 ¤ NCC + c2 ¤ SQ ¤ NCC + d ¤ CF + error The Wrst two equations were estimated and reported in the previous section, showing that the Wrst two conditions suggested by Baron and Kenny were satisWed. For testing the third and fourth conditions the third equation was estimated. Results of this regression indicate that the inXuence of counterfactuals on regret is signiWcant ( D .40, p < .001), thus satisfying the third condition described above, and the eVect of the interaction between type of scenario and need for closure is reduced with respect to the previous analysis and becomes not signiWcant ( D ¡.128, p < .09) once counterfactuals (mediator) is controlled for. In order to provide a signiWcance test for this reduction, the Sobel test (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001; Sobel, 1982) was applied which compares the concerning SQ by NCC in the Wrst equation (c) with the concerning SQ by NCC in the third equation (c2). The Sobel test shows that there is a signiWcant reduction from c to c2 (z D 2.08; p < .05). Therefore, results of this mediation analysis are consistent with full mediation of the interactive eVect of SQ by NCC on regret by counterfactual thinking. The mediating role of regret in explaining the dependence of intention to repeat the same choice on the interaction between NCC and SQ. In order to assess whether the eVects of the interaction of type of scenario and need for closure (SQ by NCC) on the intention to repeat the same choice was mediated by regret, the same procedure described above was followed. In this case, for testing the four conditions suggested by Baron and Kenny, the following three equations need to be estimated: (1) intention to repeat D a ¤ SQ + b ¤ NCC + c ¤ SQ ¤ NCC + error (2) regret D a1 ¤ SQ + b1 ¤ NCC + c1 ¤ SQ¤NCC + error (3) intention to repeat D a2 ¤ SQ + b2 ¤ NCC + c2 ¤ SQ ¤ NCC + d ¤ regret + error Since the Wrst two equations were estimated and reported in the previous section, showing that the Wrst two conditions suggested by Baron and Kenny were satisWed, as far as the interaction eVect is concerned, for testing the third and fourth conditions the third equation was estimated. Results of this regression indicate that regret becomes the strongest predictor ( D ¡.473, p < .001), satisfying Baron and Kenny’s third condition, followed by type of scenario ( D .222, p < .01), and need for cognitive closure ( D .195, p < .01), while the interaction between type of scenario and need for closure is not any more signiWcant ( D .068, p < .33). The Sobel test, shows that there is a signiWcant reduction for eVect of the interaction from c to c2 (z D 2.00, p < .05). Therefore, results of this mediation analysis are consistent with full mediation of the interactive eVect of SQ by NCC on intention to repeat the same choice by regret.

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7. Discussion Results of this study provide some new insight into the phenomenon of regret, broadening the understanding of when regret is most likely to occur from an inter-individual diVerence point of view. The present results, in particular, provide empirical evidence of the moderating role of need for cognitive closure in the experience of regret after economic decisions concerning “status quo” versus “non-status-quo” options. The interactive eVect was signiWcant at all the levels considered (number of counterfactuals, experience of regret and intention to repeat the same brand choice), showing that the status quo eVect is mostly an eVect that is produced by an epistemic motivation to freeze on a stable knowledge. Furthermore, this interactive eVect is mediated by counterfactuals, conWrming previous results (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 1998) and the deWnition of regret as a cognitively mediated emotion. While the present study assessed the role of need for cognitive closure in terms of a chronic individual feature, we believe that it is worth studying the impact of contextual factors that are known to induce a need for closure motivation. Many economic and consumer decisions are, in fact, made in situation of fatigue, of time pressure, of cognitive overload. According to the need for closure literature, in such conditions the choice of an option that conWrms the status quo should be more likely than the choice of a switching option. These expectation deserves, of course, an experimental assessment. At a more general level the present results show that individual diVerences do not need to studied only as main eVects, since life is better conceived as person by context interaction. Results of this study, Wnally, suggest that the approach in terms of motivated social cognition may be a promising one to study economic decisions. The present study referred to experienced or felt, i.e. post-decisional regret. There is some empirical evidence that regret is not only experienced after a bad decision outcome, but that it may also be anticipated before making a decision (e.g. Miller & Taylor, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999) and that individuals may also engage in prefactual thoughts (e.g. McConnell et al., 2000). Epistemic motivation should also inXuence the amount of prefactual thinking and anticipated regret. Analogous to the results of our study, high need for closure should induce more prefactual thinking and make individuals anticipate more regret, if they consider the possibility of choosing a switching option than if they consider the possibility of choosing the status quo option. These assumptions could be examined in subsequent research. Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank Jonathan Baron for his insightful feedback and generous assistance in reviewing earlier drafts of this article. References Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182.


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