World War II at Sea

World War II at Sea

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World War II at Sea AN ENCYCLOPEDIA Volume I: A–K Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor Dr. Eric W. Osborne Assistant Editor Vincent P. O’Hara Assistant Editor

Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II at sea : an encyclopedia / Spencer C. Tucker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-458-0 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations—Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– II. Title: World War Two at sea. D770.W66 2011 940.54'503—dc23 2011042142 ISBN: 978-1-59884-457-3 EISBN: 978-1-59884-458-0 15

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

To Malcolm “Kip” Muir Jr., scholar, gifted teacher, and friend.


Contents

About the Editor Editorial Advisory Board List of Entries Preface Overview

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Entries A–Z

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Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea Glossary of World War II Naval Terms Bibliography List of Editors and Contributors Categorical Index Index

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823 831 839 865 877 889


About the Editor

Spencer C. Tucker, PhD, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and was a Fulbright scholar in France. He was a U.S. Army captain and intelligence analyst in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War, then taught for 30 years at Texas Christian University and was chairman of the History Department for 5 years before returning to his alma mater for 6 years as the holder of the John Biggs Chair of Military History. He retired from teaching in 2003. He is now senior fellow of military history at ABC-CLIO. Tucker has written or edited 40 books and encyclopedias, including ABC-CLIO’s award-winning The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and The Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, as well as the comprehensive A Global Chronology of Conflict.

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World War II at Sea Editorial Advisory Board

Paul E. Fontenoy North Carolina Maritime Museum Curator of Maritime Research

Capt. Carl Otis Schuster U.S. Navy (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Hawaii Pacific University

Gordon E. Hogg Director, Special Collections Library University of Kentucky

Dirk Steffen Director, AEGIR Security Solutions Ltd Tohmatsu Haruo Professor Tamagawa University Japan

Malcolm Muir Jr. Director, John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis Virginia Military Institute

H. P. Willmott Independent Scholar

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List of Entries

ABDA Command

ARCHERY, Operation (Vågsøy Island Raid, December 27, 1941) Arctic Convoys Arima Masafumi (1895–1949) Ark Royal, British Aircraft Carrier Arnauld de la Perière, Lothar von (1886–1942) Aruga Kosaku (1897–1945) Athenia, SS, Sinking of (September 3, 1939) Atlantic, Battle of the Atlantis, German Armed Merchant Cruiser Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond (1899–1961) Auphan, Paul Gabriel (1894–1982) Australia, Navy Automedon, Sinking of (November 11, 1940) Auxiliary Vessels AVALANCHE, Operation (September 9, 1943) Aviation, Naval

Abe Hiroaki (1890–1949) Abe Koso (1892–1947) Abrial, Jean Marie Charles (1879–1962) Adriatic, Naval Operations in Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in Ainsworth, Walden Lee “Pug” (1886–1960) Aircraft, Naval Aircraft Carriers Air-Sea Rescue Aleutian Islands Campaign (1942–1943) ALPHABET, Operation (June 5–8, 1940) Altmark Incident (February 16, 1940) Amphibious Warfare Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 18, 1935) Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships Antishipping Campaign off Norway AntisubmarineWarfare

Bab el Mandeb Strait Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of (January 24, 1942)

Anzio, Amphibious Operation. See SHINGLE, Operation xiii

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List of Entries

Baltic Sea, Area of Operations

Brown, Wilson Jr. (1882–1957)

Bandar Shahpur, Battle of (August 25, 1941)

Bruneval Raid. See BITING, Operation

Barbey, Daniel Edward (1889–1969)

Bulgaria, Navy

Barrage Balloons

Burke, Arleigh Albert (1901–1996)

Battle Cruisers Battleships Bay of Biscay, Battle of (December 28, 1943) Bay of Biscay Offensive (February– August 1943) Bergamini, Carlo (1888–1943) Beta Convoy Battle (November 9, 1941) Bey, Eric (1898–1943) Biak, Battle of (June 8–9, 1944) Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of (May 1941) Bismarck and Tirpitz, German Battleships Bismarck Sea, Battle of (March 2–5, 1943) BITING, Operation (Bruneval Raid, February 27–28, 1942) Black Sea, Area of Operations Blandy, William Henry Purnell (1890–1954) Bletchley Park Bloch, Claude Charles (1878–1967) Blockade Running Borghese, Junio Valerio (1906–1974) British Eastern Fleet British Naval Blockade of the European Axis Powers

Calabria, Battle of (July 9, 1940) Callaghan, Daniel Judson (1890–1942) CAM (Catapult Assisted Merchantman) Ships Camouflage, Naval Campioni, Inigo (1878–1944) Canada, Navy Canaris, Wilhelm Franz (1887–1945) Cape Bon, Battle of (December 13, 1941) Cape Esperance, Battle of (October 11–12, 1942) Cape Matapan, Battle of (March 28, 1941) Cape Passero, Action off (October 12, 1940) Cape Spada, Battle of (July 19, 1940) Cape Spartivento, Battle of (November 27, 1940) Cape St. George, Battle of (November 25, 1943) Caroline Islands Campaign (February 15–November 25, 1944) Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler (1884–1960) Casablanca, Battle of (November 8, 1942) CATAPULT, Operation (July 1940)

British Pacific Fleet

Cavagnari, Domenico (1876–1966)

Brittany, Battle of (June 9, 1944)

Central Pacific Campaign

List of Entries

CERBERUS, Operation (the “Channel Dash”) Channel Dash. See CERBERUS, Operation Channel Islands Campaign (June 1944–May 1945) China, Navy Christie, Ralph Waldo (1893–1987) Ciliax, Otto (1891–1964) CLAYMORE, Operation (Lofoten Islands Raid, March 4, 1941) Cockleshell Heroes (December 6–12, 1942) Commerce Raiders, Surface, German Conolly, Richard Lansing (1892–1962) Contre-Torpilleurs Convoy PQ 13, Attack on (March 29, 1942) Convoy PQ 17 (June 27–July 7, 1943) Convoy QP 11, Attack on (May 1–2, 1942) Convoys, Allied Convoys, Axis Convoys SC.122 and HX.299, Battle of (March 14–20, 1943) Coral Sea, Battle of the (May 7–8, 1942) Corvettes and Sloops Courageous Class, British Aircraft Carriers Crace, Sir John Gregory (1887–1968) Crete, Naval Operations off (May 21–June 1, 1941) Cruisers

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Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles (1893–1986) Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne (First Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, 1883–1963) Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres (1885–1962) Cunningham, Winfield Scott (1900–1986) Dakar, Attack on. See MENACE, Operation Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François (1881–1942) Darwin, Raid on (February 19, 1942) Da Zara, Alberto (1889–1951) De Courten, Raffaele (1888–1978) Decoy Ships (Q-Ships) Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships Depth Charges Destroyer Escorts and Frigates Destroyers Destroyers-Bases Deal (September 2, 1940) DETACHMENT, Operation (Invasion of Iwo Jima, February 19, 1945) Deutschland class, German Battleships Diégo Suarez, Japanese Raid on (May 30, 1942) Dieppe Raid. See JUBILEE, Operation Dodecanese Islands Campaign (September–November 1943) Dönitz, Karl (1891–1980) Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie (1889–1942)

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List of Entries

DOWNFALL, Operation

Franklin, U.S. Aircraft Carrier

DRAGOON, Operation (August 15, 1944)

Fraser, Bruce Austin (1888–1981)

DRUMBEAT, Operation. See PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of (Operation DYNAMO, May 26–June 4, 1940) Eastern Solomons, Battle of the (August 22–25, 1942) Electronic Intelligence Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of (November 2, 1943) England, U.S. Destroyer English Channel

Friedeburg, Hans Georg von (1895–1945) Frogmen Fuchida Mitsuo (1902–1976) Fukutome Shigeru (1891–1971) Fushimi Hiroyasu (1872–1946) Gallery, Daniel Vincent Jr. (1901–1977) Genda Minoru (1904–1989) German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders Germany, Navy

Essex Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

Gervais de Lafond, Raymond (1890–1968)

Fast Attack Craft

Ghormley, Robert Lee (1883–1958)

Fechteler, William Morrow (1896–1967)

Gibbs, William Francis (1886–1967)

Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty (1891–1940)

Giffen, Robert Carlisle “Ike” (1886–1962)

Finland, Navy Fitch, Aubrey Wray (1883–1978)

Gilbert Islands Campaign (November 1943)

Fleet Train

Glide Bombs

Fletcher, Frank Jack (1885–1973)

Glowworm, British Destroyer

Fluckey, Eugene Bennett (1913–2007)

Godfrey, John Henry (1888–1971)

Forbes, Sir Charles Morton (1881–1960)

Godfroy, René Émile (1885–1981)

Gibraltar

Force H

Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988)

Force K

Great Britain, Navy

Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949)

Great Britain, Women’s Royal Navy Service

France, Navy Franco-Thai War (November 1940– January 1941)

Greece, Navy Greer, Attack on (September 4, 1941)

List of Entries

Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of (November 12–15, 1942) Guadalcanal Naval Campaign Haguro, Japanese Navy Cruiser, Sinking of (May 16, 1945) Halsey, William Frederick Jr. (1882–1959) Hart, Thomas Charles (1877–1971) Harwood, Sir Henry (1888–1950)

India, Navy Indianapolis, Sinking of (July–August 1945) Indian Ocean Campaign (March–May 1942) Ingersoll, Royal Eason (1883–1976) Ingram, Jonas Howard (1886–1952) Inland Sea, U.S. and British Carrier Operations (July 1945)

Hasegawa Kiyoshi (1883–1970)

Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi (1889–1975)

Hashimoto Mochitsura (1909–2000)

Iowa Class, U.S. Battleships

Hedgehog

IRONCLAD, Operation (Allied Invasion of Madagascar, May 5, 1942)

Hell Ships Hewitt, Henry Kent (1887–1972) Higgins, Andrew Jackson (1886–1952)

Italian Socialist Republic, Navy

Holland, Lancelot Ernest (1887–1941)

Ito¯ Seiichi (1890–1945)

Hood, British Battle Cruiser

Iwabuchi Sanji (1893–1945)

Horton, Sir Max Kennedy (1883–1951)

Iwo Jima, Invasion of. See DETACHMENT, Operation

Hosogaya Boshiro (1888–1964) Hospital Ships

Italy, Navy

Japan, Navy

Hunter-Killer Groups

Japanese East Indies Campaign (December 20, 1941–March 9, 1942)

HUSKY, Operation (Invasion of Sicily, July 9–August 22, 1943)

Java Sea, Battle of the (February 27, 1942)

I-400–Class Japanese Submarines

JUBILEE, Operation (Dieppe Raid, August 19, 1942)

Human Torpedoes

Iachino, Angelo (1889–1976) ICEBERG, Operation (Invasion of Okinawa, March 16–June 21, 1945)

Kaiser, Henry John (1882–1967)

Ichimaru Rinosuke (1891–1945)

Kamikaze

Identification, Friend or Foe

Kearny, USS, Torpedoing of (October 17, 1941)

Ijuin Matsuji (1893–1944)

Kaiten

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List of Entries

Keyes, Roger John Brownlow (1872–1945)

Lend-Lease

Kikkawa Kioyshi (1900–1943)

Les Sept Iles, Action off (October 23, 1943)

Kimmel, Husband Edward (1882–1968)

Lexington Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

Kimura Masatomi (1891–1960) King, Ernest Joseph (1878–1956)

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (October 23–26, 1944)

Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin (1888–1972)

Leyte Landings (October 20, 1944)

Kirk, Alan Goodrich (1888–1963)

Liberty Ships

Knox, William Franklin “Frank” (1874–1944)

Ligurian Sea, Battle of the (March 18, 1945)

Koga Mineichi (1885–1944)

Lockwood, Charles Andrew Jr. (1890–1967)

Kolombangara, Battle of (July 13, 1943) Komandorski Islands, Battle of the (March 26, 1943)

Lombok, Battle of (February 19–20, 1942) Lütjens, Günther (1889–1941)

Komura Keizo (1896–1978)

Lyme Bay, Battle of (April 28, 1944)

Kondo¯ Nobutake (1886–1953) Kongo Class, Japanese Battleships

MAC (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) Ships

Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm (1912–1998)

Madagascar, British Invasion of. See IRONCLAD, Operation

Kula Gulf, Battle of (July 6, 1943) Kurita Takeo (1889–1977)

Madoera Strait, Battle of (February 4, 1942)

Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke (1892–1971)

Malta

Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974)

Malta Convoy Battles (June 12–16, 1942)

Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de (1878–1977) Landing Craft Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm (1890–1939) Leahy, William Daniel (1875–1959) Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching” (1888–1945) Leigh Light

Mariana Islands Campaign (June–August 1944) Marschall, Wilhelm (1886–1976) Marshall Islands Naval Campaign (January 29–February 22, 1944) McCain, John Sidney (1884–1945) McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert (1893–1959) McMorris, Charles Horatio “Soc” (1890–1954)

List of Entries

Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in MENACE, Operation (Allied Attack on Dakar, September 23–25, 1940) Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of (July 3, 1940)

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Netherlands, Navy Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of (December 20, 1941– March 9, 1942)

Midway, Battle of (June 3–6, 1942)

NEULAND, Operation (February 1942–September 1943)

Mikawa Gunichi (1888–1981)

New Zealand, Navy

Miles, Milton Edward (1900–1961)

Nimitz, Chester William (1885–1966)

MINCEMEAT, Operation (1943)

Nishimura Shoji (1889–1944)

Mines, Sea Minesweeping and Minelaying

Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam (1880–1955)

Mine Warfare Vessels

Nomura Kichisaburo (1887–1964)

Mitscher, Marc Andrew (1887–1947)

Normandy Invasion and Campaign. See NEPTUNE, Operation

Monitors Montgomery, Alfred Eugene (1891–1961) Moreell, Ben (1892–1978)

North Cape, Battle of (December 26, 1943) Norway, Navy

Morison, Samuel Eliot (1887–1976)

Oikawa Koshiro (1883–1958)

Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas (1900–1979)

O’Kane, Richard Hetherington (1911–1994)

Mulberries

Okinawa, Invasion of. See ICEBERG, Operation

Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré (1882–1965) Nagano Osami (1880–1947) Nagumo Chu¯ichi (1886–1944) Narvik, Naval Battles of (April 10 and 13, 1940) Naval Armament Naval Gunfire, Shore Support Naval Strategy, Allied

Oktyabrsky, Filip Sergeyevich (1899–1969) Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett (1887–1974) ¯ Onishi Takijiro¯ (1891–1945) Ormoc Bay, Battle of (December 3, 1944) ¯ Ota Minoru (1891–1945) Ozawa Jisaburo (1886–1966)

Naval Strategy, Axis Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater

Panama Canal

Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater

Panay Incident (December 12, 1937)

NEPTUNE, Operation (D-Day, June 6, 1944)

PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation (January 13–July 19, 1942)

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List of Entries

Pearl Harbor, Attack on (December 7, 1941) PEDESTAL, Operation (August 3–15, 1942) Philippine Islands, Japanese Invasion of (December 1941) Philippine Islands Campaign (October 20, 1944–September 2, 1945) Philippine Sea, Battle of the (June 19–21, 1944) Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan (1888–1941) PLUTO (Pipe Line under the Ocean) Poland, Navy Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers (1877–1943) Prien, Günther (1908–1941) Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of (December 10, 1941) Princeton, U.S. Aircraft Carrier Proximity Fuse Pyke, Geoffrey Nathaniel (1894–1948) Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, Sinking of (December 19, 1941) Rabaul Radar Raeder, Erich (1876–1960) Rainbow Plans Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home (1883–1945) Rawalpindi, Loss of (November 23, 1939) Red Sea, Naval Operations in

Reeves, Joseph Mason (1872–1948) Rennell Island, Battle of (January 29–30, 1943) Reuben James, Sinking of (October 31, 1941) Riccardi, Arturo (1878–1966) Río de la Plata, Battle of (December 13, 1939) Rogge, Bernhard (1899–1982) Romania, Navy ROYAL MARINE, Operation (May 1940) Royal Navy Volunteer Services Royal Oak, HMS, Sinking of (October 14, 1939) Saalwächter, Alfred (1883–1945) Saint-Nazaire, Raid on (March 28, 1942) Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French Seizure of (December 24, 1941) Sakai Saburo (1916–2000) Sakonji Naomasa (1890–1948) Salerno, Allied Invasion of. See AVALANCHE, Operation Sansonetti, Luigi (1888–1959) Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the (October 26–27, 1942) Savo Island, Battle of (August 9, 1942) Scapa Flow Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships Schepke, Joachim (1912–1941) Seabees

List of Entries

SEA LION, Operation (Unternehmen SEELÖWE,1940)

Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick (1896–1955)

Sfax, Action off (April 16, 1941)

Sprague, Thomas Lamison (1894–1972)

Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896–1951) Sherman, Frederick Carl (1888–1957) Shimada Shigetaro (1883–1976) Shinano, Japanese Aircraft Carrier SHINGLE, Operation (Anzio Amphibious Operation, January 22– May 25, 1944)

Spruance, Raymond Ames (1886–1969) Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty” (1880–1972) STARVATION, Operation Strait of Gibraltar Strait of Sicily

Ship’s Combat Information Center

Stump, Felix Budwell (1894–1972)

Sho¯kaku Class, Japanese Aircraft Carriers

Submarines

Sho¯ Plans

Suez Canal

Sicily, Allied Invasion of. See HUSKY, Operation

Sunda Strait, Battle of (February 28– March 1, 1942)

Sidon, Engagement off (June 9, 1941)

Suzuki Kantaro¯ (1867–1948)

Signals Intelligence

Sydney, Australian Cruiser

Sirte, First Battle of (December 17, 1941)

Sydney, Japanese Raid on (May 31, 1942)

Sirte, Second Battle of (March 22, 1942)

Takagi So¯kichi (1893–1979)

Submarines, Midget

Skerki Bank, Battle near (December 2, 1942)

Takagi Takeo (1892–1944)

Snorkel

Takamatsu Nobuhito (1905–1987)

Solomon Islands Naval Campaign (August 1942–February 1943)

Tanaka Raizo (1892–1969)

Somerville, Sir James Fownes (1882–1949)

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Takahashi Ibo¯ (1888–1947)

Taranto, Attack on (November 11, 1940)

Sonar

Tassafaronga, Battle of (November 30, 1942)

Southeast Pacific Theater

Theobald, Robert Alfred (1884–1957)

Southwest Pacific Theater Soviet Union, Navy

Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie (1889–1964)

Spitsbergen

Tirpitz, Attacks on (1941–1944)

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List of Entries

Tokyo Raid (April 18, 1942)

Vian, Sir Phillip Louis (1894–1968)

Torpedoes

Victory Ship

Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at (November 27, 1942) Tovey, Sir John Cronyn (1885–1971) Towers, John Henry (1885–1955) Toyoda Soemu (1885–1957) Truk, Raid on (February 17–18, 1944) Turner, Richmond Kelly (1885–1961) Two-Ocean Navy Program Ugaki Matome (1890–1945) Ulithi United States, Navy United States Carrier Raids (February 1–April 18, 1942) United States Coast Guard United States Marine Corps United States Navy Carrier Raid against Japan (February 10–18, 1945) United States Pacific Fleet U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping (1941–1945) Vågsøy Island Raid. See ARCHERY, Operation Vella Gulf, Battle of (August 6–7, 1943) Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of (October 6–7, 1943)

Waesche, Russell Randolph (1886–1946) Wake Island, Battle for (December 8–23, 1941) Walker, Frederick John (1896–1944) Wanklyn, Malcolm (1911–1942) Warspite, British Battleship Wasp, U.S. Aircraft Carrier WESERÜBUNG, Operation (April 1940) Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, Sinking of Wilkinson, Theodore Stark “Ping” (1888–1946) Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik) Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) Yamaguchi Tamon (1892–1942) Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943) Yamato, Suicide Sortie of (April 6–7, 1945) Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships Yonai Mitsumasa (1880–1948) Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers Yoshida Zengo (1885–1966) Yugoslavia, Navy Z Plan

Preface

Navies have played an important role from early in world history. They have defended their nation’s territory from seaborne attack, made possible the movement of their nation’s armies overseas, and attacked enemy seaborne trade (the so-called guerre de course) while defending their own nation’s waterborne commerce and access to key manufactured goods and raw materials. Yet operations at sea in World War II were on an unprecedented scale—far larger and more important than in World War I. The survival of Britain, which from June 1940 to June 1941 was the only major power at war with Germany and Italy, rested largely on control of the sea lanes—especially the Atlantic Ocean but also the sea lanes to India and the Persian Gulf. The Battle of the Atlantic was, in fact, the longest campaign of the Second World War. The war also entailed amphibious operations on a far greater scale and with a far greater degree of professionalism than in any previous conflict. The defeats of both Germany and Japan were made possible in large part by these assaults. Cutting off the Netherlands East Indies starved the Japanese fleet and Japan of oil and other essential raw materials. The U.S. capture of Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific made possible the strategic bombing campaign of Japan itself. The war also saw the United States emerge as the world’s greatest practitioner of submarine warfare. By the end of the war, the Japanese fleet had been largely destroyed, and interisland transportation by water had come to a virtual standstill thanks largely to submarines, carrier aircraft, and aerial mining by the U.S. Army Air Forces. Additionally, the war saw naval aviation come into its own. The battleship was dethroned as king of the seas by the fleet aircraft carrier. Naval battles such as the Coral Sea and Midway were decided by carrier planes with the main battle fleets never coming within sight of one another. The war saw the world’s largest battleships in the Yamato and Musashi with crews of up to 2,500 men as well as small manned torpedo craft with a crew of only two men. There were numerous technical innovations: purpose-built landing craft and ships; radar; the Long Lance torpedo;

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Preface

the proximity fuse; and such antisubmarine innovations as sonar, the Leigh light, and the Hedgehog. Although the United States ended the war with a navy larger than those of all the other world naval powers combined, the British, Japanese, German, and Italian navies all factored into the outcome. National leaders and naval commanders made decisions that had far-ranging repercussions. Entries in this encyclopedia discuss all these and more. There are entries on the national navies, ranging from the United States to Bulgaria; on leaders; on battles and campaigns; on the naval aspects of amphibious operations from the German invasion of Norway to the Allied invasions of France; on naval aircraft and on ship types, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and battleships; on important individual ships; on naval weapons systems; and on technical innovations. For the header on individual German ship entries we use for Kriegsmarine Shiff, even though this was not an official designation. I am indeed fortunate in having the assistance of excellent contributors and collaborators. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. is associate editor. He has been my good right arm in many encyclopedia projects, and he and I put together the entry list, found authors, and edited all the entries. Assistant editors Vincent P. O’Hara and Eric W. Osborne are both expert in World War II naval matters. Osborne is a professor in the History Department at the Virginia Military Institute and author of a number of books on naval history, including studies of cruisers and destroyers. O’Hara is a highly respected naval historian and author of a half dozen books on World War II naval warfare. Both have read the entire manuscript and made editorial changes. I take full responsibility for any errors that might appear, however. Spencer C. Tucker

World War II at Sea Overview

Naval operations conducted on a truly global basis were critical in the outcome of World War II. Unlike fighting on land, the struggle at sea proceeded more or less according to expectations. In September 1939, Allied naval superiority was even more marked than it had been in World War I. Britain had one of the world’s two largest navies (the other belonging to the United States), and France had the world’s fourth largest fleet. Although challenged by German U-boats and later by Japanese surface warships, their strength at sea enabled the Allied powers to tap the world’s resources, transport men and supplies vast distances, and provide naval bombardment and logistics support to amphibious operations while largely denying these capabilities to the Axis powers. Both sides resorted to convoys as protection against surface raiders and submarines. Naval technology at the beginning of World War II was little changed from that of World War I. Warships of the 1920s and 1930s were larger and faster than they had been in World War I, and surface ships boasted improved gunnery control. With the exception of radar, there had been few technological breakthroughs. The aircraft carrier, which had appeared at the end of World War I, although it was regarded as an important ship type, was not yet seen as the new capital ship. In 1939, the world’s admirals still gave the battleship primary place. The Japanese hoped to secure a decisive edge in the war at sea with the powerful Yamatoclass battleships. Their doctrine called for a decisive contest at sea, and the Yamato class seemed to promise that. Built in great secrecy and displacing nearly 73,000 tons fully loaded and armed with nine 18.1-inch guns, the Yamato and Musashi (two others were projected, one was finished as an aircraft carrier, and the fourth was never completed) were the largest battleships ever built. The United States built 10 modern battleships, more than all three Axis nations combined. The four U.S. Navy Iowa-class battleships, although they displaced only 57,500 tons fully loaded and were armed with nine 16-inch guns, were faster and not that much off the Yamato class in capability. The great battleship confrontation at sea—a World War II Battle of Jutland—never occurred.

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The primacy of the battleship changed with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, especially when the Japanese sank the British battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse from the air off Malaya. Unlike the U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor or the Italian battleships attacked by British aircraft in Taranto harbor in November 1940, the two British capital ships were underway and firing antiaircraft weapons. From this point on, ships that ventured out without aircraft protection did so at their peril. The once-mighty battleships never engaged one another in decisive fleet action (apart from the Battle of Surigao Strait during the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf), but the torpedoes fired from U.S. destroyers and torpedo boats probably inflicted the greatest damage. Battleships proved their usefulness in shore bombardment as antiaircraft platforms (virtually all warships received increased numbers of antiaircraft guns) and as “armored oilers” to accompany the aircraft carriers, the new titans of the seas. Britain’s concern over operating its aircraft carriers in narrow seas such as the North Sea or Mediterranean, which would subject them to attack from land-based aircraft, led to the introduction of an armored flight deck. The four-ship Illustrious class, which entered service in 1940 and 1941, carried heavier antiaircraft protection, an armored flight deck, and an armored “box” protecting the aircraft hangar. These additions provided greater protection but also limited British carriers to fewer aircraft than their U.S. and Japanese counterparts. British naval resources were stretched thin at the start of hostilities, and although duties and scope of operations roughly corresponded to those of World War I, ships were far fewer. Thus, instead of major surface actions, the majority of the fighting at sea in the European theater centered on the destruction and protection of seaborne trade, especially in the Atlantic Ocean, which was the critical area of operations. The Royal Navy’s chief responsibility was to maintain Britain’s seaborne lines of communication, on which the very survival of the nation depended. The Royal Navy transported the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France and then to Greece, and it reinforced and supplied garrisons in North Africa, among other places. It also rendered invaluable service by extracting the BEF from France in 1940 and from Greece and Crete in 1941. Had the Royal Navy not been able to execute these operations, Britain could have been forced from the war. Many of the French ships were modern, the result of a major building program undertaken in the years immediately before the war that had drained sizable resources from the army. French naval strategy at the beginning of the war centered on cooperation with the Royal Navy. The French North Atlantic Fleet had two principal missions: to work with the British in protecting merchant shipping and escorting convoys and to use its most powerful assets, built around the battle cruisers and organized in the Force de Raid, against German surface raiders.


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For the German navy, war came a half decade early. When Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, the Kriegsmarine was basically a coastal defense force. Hitler wanted a powerful navy that might one day challenge Britain—or even Britain and the United States—for Atlantic mastery, but he assured German Navy chief Grand Admiral Erich Raeder that he had no intention of waging war with Britain. In November 1937, Hitler had stated that war would not occur before 1943 or 1945. Raeder thus set out in the Z Plan of January 1939 to construct a balanced fleet of battleships and battle cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and a force of 249 submarines. He fixed 1948 as the date for its completion, but Hitler gave him a deadline of six years (i.e., 1945). With a lead time on capital ship construction of as much as three or four years, the outbreak of the war thus caught the German navy with the wrong mix of vessels. Germany’s sole aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppelin, was never completed. Italy, neutral until 1940, had an impressive mediumsized navy, but its operations, apart from submarines, were largely confined to the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union projected by 1943 a powerful oceangoing fleet, but by the time of the German invasion in 1941, the largest surface additions were four Kirov-class cruisers. The Soviet naval minister in Moscow was subordinate to the army, and ships were under the control of front commanders. The Soviet navy played little part in World War II. When the war began, the overwhelming Allied naval superiority promptly drove German shipping into neutral or home ports. Except in the Baltic, the German flag disappeared from the seas. The British were content to institute a naval blockade of Germany with the aim of denying Germany vital imports but also preventing sorties into the Atlantic of powerful German surface ships. Such a blockade from 1914 to 1918 had been a key factor in the German defeat. However, the blockade of 1939 had little effect on Germany, given its economic arrangements with the Soviet Union and Italy. After Germany’s victories of 1940 and 1941 in Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, moreover, Germany could tap the agricultural and industrial production of most of Europe. Admiral Raeder sought to pursue a commerce-raiding strategy, and he struck back with surface raiders, land-based aviation, mines, and, above all, submarines. His goal was to disrupt Britain’s seaborne trade and starve Britain into submission. Germany had a submarine commander of genius in Karl Dönitz, who had assumed control of the U-boat program in 1935, but the paucity of U-boats made it impossible for Dönitz to wage any meaningful campaign against Allied shipping. Dönitz believed that the only way Germany could pressure Britain was through interdicting its Atlantic shipping lanes, and he estimated that 90 submarines on station would ensure success. This meant that a force of some 300 submarines was required. At the start of hostilities, though, Dönitz had only 56 U-boats, of which 46 were ready for action; only 26 were suitable for Atlantic operations. Once the war began,

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Raeder suspended the Z Plan and gave priority to submarine construction and a commerce-raiding strategy, but much valuable time had been lost. The April 1940 Norwegian campaign ended as a brilliant strategic success for Hitler, but it also ruined the German surface navy. The Kriegsmarine lost 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers—half the German total—and suffered damage to several other ships. On the plus side, the many Norwegian fjords provided additional bases for German surface raiders and submarines. The greatest gain for Germany in this regard came in the defeat of France in June 1940. The acquisition of the French Atlantic coastline immensely benefited the U-boat war in the Atlantic, and by early August 1940, German submarines were operating from Lorient on the Bay of Biscay. These bases provided easier access to the Atlantic shipping lanes, and the French repair facilities were superior to the overburdened shipyards in Germany, translating into more U-boats at sea. Following the defeat of France and the loss of its powerful navy, Britain found itself in desperate naval straits. A new naval threat now arose in the form of a belligerent Italy, opening the Mediterranean Sea as a major theater of war. The Italian fleet posed a severe strategic threat to the key British lines of communication through the Mediterranean. Italy had some excellent ships, and its navy, although far weaker in total strength than that of Britain, was concentrated, giving it what appeared to be local naval superiority. The Italian navy, however, lacked radar until 1942, and it was deficient in night-fighting equipment, antiaircraft protection, and antisubmarine capabilities. The Italians also did not have a naval air arm, which Benito Mussolini and Italian admirals had opposed, claiming that Italy was itself an aircraft carrier. There was no doctrine for the employment of land-based aviation in concert with naval units. Oil from the Persian Gulf and other resources vital to the British war effort passed through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean, then through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic and to Britain. Without this route, British shipping was forced to go all the way around the Horn of Africa, a journey of nearly 13,000 miles. Britain’s Middle Eastern army was likewise maintained at the end of this vastly long line of supply at a heavy cost in valuable shipping. In the struggle in the Mediterranean, Allied code-breaking was vital. After June 1941 intelligence from the Ultra project provided information to the British about the timing of Axis convoys. Malta also proved critical. The British were able to hold it and use it to harry Axis reinforcement and resupply of North Africa. By the end of 1941, British aircraft and submarines were sinking many ships involved in supplying Axis forces in the Mediterranean, with a profound impact on the North African campaign. Meanwhile, a grim struggle was under way in the Atlantic. The campaign here was one of the key contests of the entire war, for without victory in the Atlantic theater, Britain would have certainly been forced to sue for peace. On the outbreak


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of war, the Allies had promptly resorted to convoys. The convoy system was predicated on reducing the number of targets and on the assumption that the more targets there were, the more likely they were to be found. Large numbers of merchant ships would steam together, protected by escort vessels. The U-boats might still sink some vessels, but the percentage of losses would be significantly less. Further, the submarines themselves ran the risk of being sunk by the convoy-escorting destroyers and destroyer escorts. Meanwhile, it was 1941 before the U-boat building program really emerged. Dönitz asserted that he would have won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941 or 1942 had he possessed the 300 U-boats he deemed necessary at the beginning of the war. It is probably a false claim, because a higher rate of sinking of merchantmen would only have forced the Allies to shift assets earlier, such as long-range aircraft from Bomber Command to Coastal Command. Dönitz’s submarines lacked effective radar until near the end of the war, and they struggled—at least in the first year—with defective torpedoes, the same problem that plagued the Americans at the beginning of their submarine campaign against Japan. To compensate for Allied superiority, Dönitz developed new tactics for his submarines, the most important of which was the Rudeltaktik (pack tactics, which the Allies referred to as the “wolf pack”). Groups of 15 to 20 submarines would spread out along the Atlantic sea lanes. Merchantmen traveling alone would be immediately attacked, but in the case of a convoy, the submarine would shadow it and radio for reinforcements. The closest U-boats would then converge for a night surface attack, which would maximize confusion for the defenders and minimize the possibility of submarine detection. The submarines would then submerge and reorganize for a second attack. To enable his submarines to remain on station for longer periods, Dönitz sent out supply submarines. The Germans also had success in code-breaking. The German navy’s B-Dienst intelligence service listened to Allied radio traffic and broke the British convoy codes, enabling Dönitz to direct his boats to where he believed enemy ships would be. The Germans also used aircraft, particularly the long-range Focke Wulf Fw-200, with great effectiveness against Allied convoys in the eastern Atlantic when they came within range of German air bases. British defenses of the vital Atlantic trade routes were strengthened in May 1941 when the U.S. navy began escorting convoys between the United States and Iceland. Then, in June 1941, Canada created the Canadian Escort Force for the same purpose. The Royal Canadian Navy grew dramatically in size during the conflict and played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. By June 1941, however, the Germans had sunk some 5.7 million tons of Allied shipping. British shipyards were able to launch only 800,000 replacement tons. Large Italian submarines, several of them operating from Bordeaux, were also effective. The Germans virtually controlled the Atlantic for more than a year after the

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United States’ entry into the war. By May 1943, half of the world’s 5,600 merchant ships afloat in 1939 had been lost. May was, however, the month when the tide of battle turned and the Allies went on the offensive. A combination of factors brought the Allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The convoy system was important, but so too was technology, primarily 10-cm radar sets that could be carried aloft in long-range aircraft, sonar, improved depth charges, rockets fired from aircraft, and forward-thrown antisubmarine “hedgehogs” or “mousetraps” (small depth charges known to the British as “squids”). The high-intensity Leigh light on aircraft illuminated the sea at night. Radio detection equipment was vital, and long-range aviation helped close the so-called black hole in the Middle Atlantic. Intelligence also played a role, chiefly Ultra intercepts of U-boat communications that guided aircraft to the submarines. The creation of hunter-killer groups of escorts and escort carriers designed for 15 aircraft, each operating independently of the convoys, carried the war to the submarines. It is also true, however, that Allied and interservice cooperation was far too long in coming. For the Allies, the Battle of the Atlantic was a close run, and it claimed significant resources. German submarines sank 2,452 Allied and neutral ships, totaling 12.8 million gross register tons. During the war, the British merchant marine lost 40,248 men and the Royal Navy another 73,642. The Royal Air Force Coastal Command sustained losses of 5,866 men and 1,777 aircraft. The Royal Canadian Navy lost 1,965 men, and U.S. Navy losses in the battle were 2,443 men. The Germans also paid a high price. During the war, Germany built 1,162 submarines. Of 830 operational U-boats, 784 were lost (696 destroyed by enemy action). Of 40,900 Germans who served in submarines, 25,870 perished and more than 5,000 were taken prisoner. U-boat crew fatalities were thus 63 percent, and the overall loss rate was 76 percent, the highest for any service in the war. In the vast Pacific theater, sea power was the most important element. The fight here was largely a U.S. Navy enterprise, and it ended in perhaps the most comprehensive victory in naval history. In going to war with the United States, Japanese leaders completely miscalculated in several key areas. They assumed that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) could cripple the U.S. Navy, carry out a series of conquests to secure desired natural resources, and build a defensive ring that would hold the U.S. Navy at bay until it gave up and recognized the inevitability of a new Japanese empire. Yet the defeat of Japan was certain. The key to victory in the Pacific war lay in numbers of ships and planes—and Japan, with a vastly inferior industrial base, was bound to lose that race to the United States. Beginning in 1943, significant numbers of the new Essex-class carriers and accompanying vessels reached the fleet. Another important factor in the U.S. Navy victory over Japan was the concept of the fleet train, which enabled carrier task forces to operate for extended periods of time and at great distances from their bases. The fleet train was a vast enterprise


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that included supply ships, tankers, repair vessels, dry docks, and tenders for seaplanes, destroyers, and submarines. As a result, the U.S. Navy enjoyed unparalleled mobility; its strategic reach in the war was unmatched by any other navy. It was this capability that made possible the recapture of Pacific islands that had been taken by the Japanese, from which long-range land-based strategic bombers could attack the Japanese mainland. It also enabled the navy to establish large fleet anchorages in remote locations such as at Ulithi. An essentially defensive policy forced the IJN to disperse its assets. In the course of the war, Japan’s navy was never able to support individual isolated Japanese strongholds before the Americans overwhelmed them. Japan’s leaders also miscalculated their vulnerability in a war against merchant shipping. Obsessed with carrying out fleet actions against the U.S. Navy, the IJN gave scant consideration to the protection of Japan’s highly vulnerable merchant trade. Antisubmarine warfare was all but ignored. In December 1941, the IJN had but four purpose-built escort vessels, and it was not until the autumn of 1942 that any escorts were equipped with sonar. The United States led Japan by a wide margin in antisubmarine technology. Japan was highly dependent on imports and yet boasted only a marginal shipping capacity. Even with their early successes, the Japanese would not be able to capture, build, or salvage the necessary tonnage to replace even modest losses. As it turned out, U.S. submarines devastated the Japanese merchant marine. The United States outbuilt Japan in submarines by two to one. The U.S. Navy entered the war with 114 submarines; Japan had 64. During the war, the United States built another 206, and Japan built 116. In the entire conflict, the United States lost 52 submarines and Japan lost 128. During the Pacific war, the U.S. Navy became the most successful practitioner of the guerre de course (war against commerce) in history. One could argue that the submarine was the most important factor in the Allied victory in the Pacific. In effect, the United States succeeded where Germany failed in both world wars. The United States built long-range submarines of 2,000 tons with 10 torpedo tubes each. Although the Japanese produced some fine boats and actually built the largest submarines of the war (3,500 tons and carrying three disassembled planes) with exceedingly long range (in 1942, Japanese submarines shelled the Pacific U.S. coast), their submarine strategy was flawed. They directed their submarines against U.S. warships. Although the Japanese enjoyed some successes, operating against enemy warships took a high toll. Later, the Japanese used their large submarines chiefly to supply isolated garrisons such as the one at Rabaul. The obvious target for their submarines was U.S. cargo vessels, but the Japanese never went after the long and vulnerable U.S. supply lines. U.S. submarines, moreover, had a deep-dive capability. The standard diving depth for submarines was 300 feet, but U.S. boats could reach 400 feet without stressing the hull and could go deeper if necessary. This was one of the best-kept

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secrets of the war, and enemy depth charges usually exploded above them. But for the first two years of the war, U.S. submarines suffered because they carried inferior torpedoes. The magnetic pistol to explode the charge under the target ship often did not function correctly. The torpedoes also circled, and at least one U.S. submarine, the Tang, was sunk by one of its own. In late 1943, however, new contact pistols were installed, and by 1944 the navy had a new magnetic pistol. From the beginning of the war against Japan, the United States waged unrestricted submarine warfare. In December 1941, Japan had 5.4 million tons of merchant shipping—only a marginal capacity. The Japanese constructed or acquired another 3.29 million tons during the war, but U.S. submarines sank 6.9 million tons of merchant ships (1,113 vessels). U.S. submarines also extracted a heavy toll of Japanese warships, sinking 201 totaling 577,000 tons. The Japanese were so short of aviation fuel by 1944 that they could scarcely train pilots. In U.S. submarine successes, Operation Magic (the breaking of Japanese codes) played a major role. The June 1942 Battle of Midway marked the turning point of the war in the Pacific, but the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, finished off the Japanese fleet as an organized fighting force. Japanese courage and tenacity were overcome by U.S. determination and numbers. In February 1945, the five carrier task groups operating against the Japanese home islands included 119 warships, yet only 4 of them had been in service before December 7, 1941. By 1945, the U.S. Navy counted 23 battleships, 19 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 108 jeep carriers, 351 destroyers, and 255 submarines. The U.S. Navy was, in fact, larger than all the other navies of the world combined. Transport by sea was steadily reduced between the Japanese home island, both because of U.S. submarines and mines dropped by B-29 Superfortress bombers. This and the strategic bombing of Japanese land targets were forcing the Japanese into starvation even as the U.S. dropping of the atomic bombs led Emperor Hirohito to order his nation’s surrender. Spencer C. Tucker and Thomas J. Weiler

A ABDA Command The first attempt by the Allied powers to establish a joint command for the defense of Southeast Asia. It resulted from the Arcadia Conference (December 22, 1941– January 14, 1942). Both U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill appreciated the need for a joint effort to protect their strategic interests in the Pacific from the Japanese. A key goal was protection of the resource-rich Netherlands East Indies. In addition to the United States and Britain, the command included Australia and the Netherlands, hence the name ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command. On January 15, 1942, the ABDA Command was established when British General Sir Archibald Wavell became responsible for all Allied forces in Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, western New Guinea, and the north and northwest coasts of Australia. Admiral Thomas C. Hart commanded the naval assets, consisting of 2 heavy cruisers (the USS Houston and HMS Exeter), 4 light cruisers (the USS Marblehead, HMAS Perth, and the HMLNS De Ruyter and Java), and 19 destroyers. The ABDA naval force was wholly inadequate to defend against Japanese attacks. On January 24, 1942, four ABDA destroyers sank four Japanese transports and a patrol boat off Balikpapan in the Dutch East Indies, but this success hardly delayed Japanese operations. Subsequently, the ABDA Command suffered setbacks on sea and land. On February 4, Japanese air strikes crippled the light cruiser Marblehead, and on February 15, Singapore fell to the Japanese Army. Amid the declining fortunes of the command, both Wavell and Hart were replaced by Dutch officers in charge of all remaining land and sea assets of the command. In effect, by late February this move resulted in the ABDA Command existing more in theory than in fact, as it was entirely Dutch controlled. Subsequent efforts to stem Japanese advances resulted in the near destruction of the naval forces of the ABDA Command. On February 27, 1942, in the Battle of Java Sea, Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, commanding 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers, attempted to intercept a Japanese invasion force bound for Java escorted by 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers. The Allies lost 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers. Then on February 28–March 1, 1942, in the Battle of Sunda Strait, the cruisers USS Houston and HMAS Perth were sunk while attacking a Japanese landing force. On March 1,

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Japanese warships and aircraft sank the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and 2 destroyers off Surabaya. Ultimately, only 4 destroyers of the ABDA Command managed to reach safe harbor in Australia. Eric W. Osborne See also: Australia, Navy; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Great Britain, Navy; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Netherlands, Navy; Sunda Strait, Battle of; United States, Navy.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Spector, Ronald. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1987. Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Abe Hiroaki (1890–1949) Japanese navy admiral. Born on March 15, 1890, in Ehima Prefecture, Abe Hiroaki graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911. He held various positions and commands in the 1920s and 1930s and graduated from the Naval Staff College. Abe commanded the battleship Fuso in 1937 and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. In December 1941, Abe led Cruiser Division 8 in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later that month, his forces assisted during the attack on Wake Island. In June 1942, Abe commanded the cruiser and battleship screen in the Battle of Midway; that August, he led the Vanguard Group in the southwest Pacific. This force—consisting of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima and the cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, and Chikuma—was involved in the carrier battles off the Eastern Solomon Islands. In late October, the Vanguard Group, augmented by destroyers, fought in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, which was a tactical victory for Japan but at some cost. The Chikuma was especially hard hit. In early November, the Japanese planned a direct assault on Guadalcanal. Abe was ordered to shell the U.S. air base Henderson Field to prepare for an amphibious assault. As his ships moved southward, they met the defending Allied force commanded by U.S. Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan on the night of November 12–13, 1942. The resulting battle was one of the fiercest in naval history, and although Callaghan lost two cruisers and four destroyers and was himself killed, he forced Abe and 13,000 Japanese troop reinforcements to turn back. In the battle, Abe’s

Abe Koso

force lost two destroyers. His flagship, the Hiei, was also crippled and succumbed to subsequent U.S. air attack. Abe took the blame for the unsuccessful mission and was relieved of his command on December 20, 1942. He resigned from the navy in March 1943. Abe died in Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture, on February 6, 1949. Harold Wise See also: Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Guadalcanal Naval Battles of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Wake Island, Battle for.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949.

Abe Koso (1892–1947) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Yamagata on March 24, 1892, Abe Koso became a career naval officer. He specialized in naval gunnery and served as a naval gunnery officer on ships ranging from destroyers to battleships. Later he commanded cruisers and battleships. By the beginning of World War II, Abe was a rear admiral. During Operation MO, the planned invasion of Port Moresby, he commanded the Port Moresby Transport Force consisting of 12 transports carrying the army’s South Seas Detachment and the navy’s Kure 3rd Special Naval Landing Force to Port Moresby. Abe’s convoy left Rabaul on May 4, 1942. On May 7, during the Battle of the Coral Sea, Abe lost his close-air support when U.S. aircraft sank the light carrier Shoho. The Transport Force retired to the north while the main forces fought it out. Although the Japanese won a tactical victory in the battle, it was a strategic U.S. victory since Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi could no longer provide close-air support to Abe and ordered the invasion postponed until July 3. Later events caused the invasion to be canceled. Promoted to vice admiral, Abe took command of Japanese forces in the Marshall Islands to prepare for a U.S. invasion there. On August 17, 1942, a Marine force under Lieutenant Colonel Evans R. Carlson landed on Makin Atoll. They wiped out its small garrison and then withdrew to the two submarines that had carried them to the island. Nine raiders were captured on August 21, however, by the Japanese relief force. The U.S. prisoners were transferred to Kwajalein, where they were well treated.

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In early October 1942, Abe met with a staff officer from Truk. The officer informed Abe that a revised policy allowed him to deal with prisoners locally and not transport them to Japan. Abe ordered Captain Obara Yoshio, commander of the Kwajalein garrison, to execute the prisoners. Despite Obara’s protests, Abe insisted. The commander ordered four of his officers to perform the executions. Obara selected the day of Japan’s annual memorial to departed heroes, the Yasukuni Shrine festival, as the execution date. On October 16, 1942, in the presence of Abe, the nine Americans were led to a large grave and beheaded. The Japanese attempted to cover up the crime, but after the war, Marshall Islanders told U.S. authorities about the executions. Abe was arrested and tried on Guam for war crimes. Convicted, he was hanged there on June 24, 1947. Tim J. Watts See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Operations, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Smith, George W. Carlson’s Raid: The Daring Marine Assault on Makin. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001.

Abrial, Jean Marie Charles (1879–1962) French navy admiral. Born at Réalmont, Tarn Department, France, on December 17, 1879, Jean Abrial entered the French Naval Academy in 1896. He commanded an antisubmarine patrol boat during World War I. During the early 1920s, he commanded a squadron of torpedo boats in the Mediterranean. Abrial was promoted to captain in 1925. Abrial studied at the Naval War College, commanded a cruiser, and held various staff positions. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1931 and to vice admiral in 1936. From 1936 to 1938, he commanded the Mediterranean Squadron. On May 23, 1940, shortly after German forces invaded France, he became commander of Northern French Naval Forces. Five days later, as Allied troops retreated to the French Channel port of Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Allied Supreme Commander Maxime Weygand ordered Abrial and his deputy commander, Lieutenant General Maurice Fagalde, to organize a beachhead there. The two French officers believed Dunkerque could be held successfully

Adriatic, Naval Operations in

against German forces, but on May 20, France’s British allies, having decided that withdrawal from the Continent was inevitable, began to organize the withdrawal effort. Abrial learned of this decision when the evacuation started on May 26, and he quickly organized all available French maritime vessels into an evacuation fleet. Requisitioning all private boats in the area, Abrial began to embark both British and French troops on May 29. He also demanded equal space for beleaguered French troops aboard British vessels. Altogether, by June 4, British and French ships had taken off some 364,000 troops, including some 140,000 French. Abrial, one of the last to leave Dunkerque, moved to Cherbourg, and on June 19, he surrendered that port to German forces. Remaining in France with the Vichy government following the defeat of France, Abrial was governor-general of Algeria from July 1940 to July 1941, and from November 1942 to March 1943, he was secretary of the navy in the Vichy government. Abrial was charged with collaboration after the liberation, and in August 1946, he was sentenced to “national indignity” and 10 years of hard labor, which was later commuted to 5 years’ imprisonment. Released provisionally in December 1947 and granted amnesty in 1954, Abrial died at Dordogne in the Tarn on December 19, 1962. Priscilla Roberts See also: Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; France, Navy.

References Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Short. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Crémieux-Brilhac, Jean-Louis. Les Français de l’an 40. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1990. Gelb, Norman. Dunkirk: The Complete Story of the First Step in the Defeat of Hitler. New York: William Morrow, 1989. Paxton, Robert O. Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Adriatic, Naval Operations in The Adriatic Sea runs southeast 420 nautical miles between the Italian and Balkan peninsulas and is 90 miles at its widest point. In 1940 Italy and Yugoslavia had the only navies on this narrow body of water. The main Italian bases were Venice, Pola, Brindisi, Taranto, and Durazzo in Albania, while Yugoslavia’s main base was Kotor (Cattaro) on its south coast. Hostilities commenced in the Adriatic with Italy’s invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. The Brindisi-Valona route was critical for maintaining Rome’s

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expeditionary army, and convoys ran on a daily basis. A British cruiser-destroyer force destroyed a four-ship Brindisi convoy on November 12, 1940, as part of the far-flung movements associated with the air raid on Taranto, but nine other raids up through the end of the year, mostly by Greek destroyers, had no effect. There was little naval activity associated with the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. One destroyer, 4 small torpedo boats, and 10 motor torpedo boats (MTBs) of the Yugoslav navy deployed to assist in an attack on the Italian enclave at Zara, but Italian bombers put this force to flight. The Italians improvised several battalion-sized (and many smaller) landings in the Dalmatian islands. In the end, Italy captured nearly the entire Yugoslav navy. Only 4 ships escaped this fate; 1 destroyer was blown up in harbor, while 1 submarine and 2 MTBs escaped to join the Allies. They formed the nucleus of the Royal Yugoslavian Navy in exile. From this point the Adriatic became an Italian lake with the exception of minor activity by Tito’s partisan naval service. Nearly 2 million tons of matériel and a million men were transported across the narrow sea from June 1940 through September 1943 with 99.9 percent of the men and 99.6 percent of the matériel arriving safely. This phase ended with the Italian armistice concluded with the Allies on September 8, 1943. Germany reacted with predictable violence to news of the armistice, and Italian and German forces fought down the length of the sea for two weeks as Italian naval units reacted to the changed situation and regrouped to the south. The Regia Marina also evacuated more than 25,000 troops from the Balkans to safety in southern Italy up through the end of September. Thereafter Germany needed to secure the Adriatic Sea to guard its Balkan flank, and the Kriegsmarine established naval forces on the Adriatic using captured Italian vessels and coastal forces already present (along with a minor and ineffective Croatian naval service). The Adriatic allowed Germany to meet army supply requirements along the Italian and Balkan coasts since land transport was inadequate. While indispensable supplies went south, resources flowed north: Albanian crude and chrome and Croatian bauxite were especially invaluable to Germany’s war economy. The Kriegsmarine’s first actions, starting on November 13, 1943, were to evict partisans from the northern islands of Krk, Cherso, and Lussino, which they had occupied in the confusion following the collapse of the Italian army. The British, meanwhile, established a destroyer force at Bari and joined the partisans holding Vis Island in mid-November, basing two MTB flotillas there. Notwithstanding British interference, the Germans proceeded with landing operations on the middle archipelago, assaulting Korcula on December 23, Solta on January 12, 1944, Brac on January 13, and Hvar on January 19. Most of these landings involved battalion-sized forces delivered by Marinefährprähme (MFPs; armed landing barges), motor sailboats, and other auxiliaries.


British destroyers patrolled the middle and upper Adriatic, sinking an MTB off Hvar on January 12 and bombarding Durazzo on January 15, Korcula on January 16 and 18, Recanati and Pesaro on February 1, and Korcula again on February 4, 12, and 27. At the same time, the Kriegsmarine was commissioning torpedo boats captured in Italian yards to serve as the capital ships in its Adriatic mosquito fleet. In total the Kriegsmarine commissioned 19 torpedo boats and corvettes in the Adriatic from the Italian armistice to the end of the war. On February 29, 1944, the French 10th Light Squadron, the large destroyers Le Terrible, Le Malin, and Le Fantasque attacked a German freighter in the upper Adriatic and sank it along with a torpedo boat and a corvette from the escort and badly damaged another torpedo boat. On March 8, British destroyers shelled Korcula again. Le Terrible and Le Fantasque raided into the northern Adriatic during March 2–4 and then, on the night of March 7, they bombarded Zante in the Ionian Sea. These powerful warships attacked three Siebel ferries and an MFP on March 19. They sank two of them and crippled the other two, suffering light damage in return. Through the summer of 1944, Yugoslavian partisans gained territory and strength, while German naval forces suffered steady attrition. The Dalmatian islands were frequent battlegrounds, subject to British commando raids, such as against Hvar on July 11 and 12. In September, after Romania signed an armistice with the Soviet Union, the Germans began evacuating the southern Dalmatian archipelago. British coastal craft attacked this traffic and destroyed two small coastal convoys off Vir on the night of October 11. The torpedo boats and corvettes of the German 2nd Escort Division operated out of Fiume during this period. These warships shelled partisan positions and kept the British MTBs and partisan naval forces at bay. Partisan advances forced further evacuations. Early on October 31, barges and landing craft lifted a German regiment from Zara to Sibenik. This provoked the other major naval action that occurred in the Adriatic. Acting on signals intelligence, two British Hunt-class escort destroyers ambushed and sank two corvettes and one torpedo boat of the 2nd Escort Division off Pag Island on November 1 with no loss to themselves, although they missed the convoy. Throughout the winter and into the spring of 1945, the Kriegsmarine, assisted by units of Mussolini’s small but efficient republican navy, kept to the upper Adriatic. A shortage of fuel and a suffocating Allied air and sea superiority limited the time German ships spent at sea. However, the Axis powers continued to undertake operations to the limits of their abilities. For example, six German explosive boats attacked the British light cruiser Delhi at Split on February 12, 1945. The Allies destroyed Germany’s last operational destroyer-sized warships during the war’s final weeks. MTBs torpedoed the TA45 in the Gulf of Fiume on April 13, 1945, while the TA43 scuttled at Trieste on May 1. The final mission of

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the eight surviving German MTBs involved sailing from Pola to Ancona crammed with a hundred men who preferred to surrender to the British rather than to Yugoslavian partisans. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Taranto, Attack on; Yugoslavia, Navy.

References Frank, Hans. German S-Boats in Action in the Second World War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. O’Hara, Vincent P. The German Fleet at War 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pope, Dudley. Flag 4: The Battle of the Coastal Forces in the Mediterranean 1939–1945. London: Chatham, 1998.

Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in The Aegean is an arm of the eastern Mediterranean separating Greece and Turkey and providing access to the Black Sea and the southern Balkans. It extends more than 300 miles north from Crete and varies in width from 100 to 200 miles. In 1940 Greece controlled the archipelagos scattered across the Aegean except for the Italian Dodecanese to the southeast, which included the major islands of Rhodes, Kos, and Leros. There the Italian Regia Marina based two destroyers, four torpedo boats, and eight submarines. Naval activity in the Aegean began from the second day of the Italian entrance in the war (June 10, 1940), when French warships probed the Dodecanese. In July an Italian attempt to base two light cruisers at Leros to raid British shipping into the Bosporus ended in failure when they encountered an Allied cruiser/destroyer force and lost the cruiser Colleoni. The British occupied Crete at the beginning of November 1940 and thereafter regularly ran convoys through the Kaso Strait along the island’s eastern edge. The Italians patrolled this route, but their surface forces enjoyed only one success, when a torpedo boat torpedoed a tanker north of Crete on January 31, 1941. Their submarines had no substantive successes during this period, and supply shortages limited Italian activities. On February 25 the British landed on Castelorizzo, the most easterly of the Dodecanese, but an Italian counter-invasion two days later drove them off. The German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941 and the subsequent attack on Crete sparked a flurry of naval activity that ended with heavy British losses and the expulsion of Allied power from the Aegean. Between June 1941 and September 1943, the Axis powers completely occupied the Aegean. By the end of this period, the Germans controlled Milos, Lemnos, Chios,

Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in

Skiros, Metelino, and nearly all of Crete. The Italians occupied the balance of the Aegean islands. Allied submarines patrolled the sea, but it was a target-poor environment because much of the area’s traffic consisted of small schooners and caiques. The Italians maintained three destroyers and three torpedo boats in the Aegean, while the Germans built a brown water fleet of Unterseebootsjager or submarine hunters consisting of converted minesweepers, fishing trawlers, and yachts; they also deployed motor minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and Marinefährprähme (MFP) barges. Following the Italian armistice in September 1943, against the advice of his own navy’s leaders, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered the Aegean held for reasons of prestige and to deny the Allies access to the Black Sea. Germany quickly seized the Italian destroyers and torpedo boats in Grecian ports and commissioned five of them by the end of October. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill saw the Aegean as a prize and an opportunity, and the British tried to snatch the archipelago, despite the concurrent operations underway in Italy and a lack of U.S. support. The British deployed a scratch force of destroyers, landing craft, a few fighter and bomber squadrons, and an infantry brigade then being refitted. In the confused aftermath of the Italian armistice, the British occupied several of the larger Italian-held islands, including Kos—which had the only airfield outside of Rhodes—Leros, Kalymnos, Samos, Symi, and Stampalia. The Italians were generally cooperative but demoralized and confused. However, the Germans were quick to rally and brought to bear superior air power. They also proved remarkably adept at improvising an amphibious campaign. Although several small convoys fell afoul of British or Greek surface forces, German air superiority restricted Allied warships to night operations. The British deployed a Spitfire squadron on Kos, but the Luftwaffe overwhelmed the British fighters. On October 1, Kos fell to a German assault. The British responded to this disaster by reinforcing their Aegean naval forces with four light cruisers and three destroyers. On October 7, they destroyed another German convoy. Later that same morning, however, Luftwaffe bombers badly damaged one of the British cruisers and German troops landed on Kalymnos, just south of Leros. Back-and-forth attrition continued as each side delivered reinforcements and supplies by night and suffered air attacks by day. Although British signals intelligence provided many details of Axis operations, the Germans slowly gained the upper hand. On November 12, a German flotilla, which included ex-Italian torpedo boats, assaulted Leros in conjunction with a paratroop drop. At the critical moment, the Royal Navy failed to control the nighttime waters surrounding Leros and the Allies capitulated on November 16. This embarrassing defeat cost the Allied navies 6 destroyers, 2 submarines, and 10 smaller ships sunk; 5 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 11 other ships were seriously damaged. By winter 1943, 8 British, Dutch, and Greek submarines were active in the Aegean. Unfortunately, their greatest success came on February 8, 1944, when a British submarine sank a transport carrying 3,173 Italian prisoners of war, of whom

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2,600 drowned. In September 1944, Soviet advances into the Balkans threatened to isolate Greece, and on September 5 the Germans began withdrawing from portions of Crete and some of the Aegean islands. For this task, the Kriegsmarine deployed 52 merchant ships and more than 200 caiques and landing craft. The British retained a strong interest in the Aegean, now fearing Soviet domination of the Dardanelles and Balkans. Indeed, Churchill sought to interest the Americans in a Balkan invasion but to no avail. Even as the Germans began evacuating, the British assembled a flotilla of 7 escort carriers at Malta. It then sailed for Alexandria. Accompanied by 7 cruisers and 20 destroyers, this force rampaged through the Aegean and in a series of engagements and air attacks savaged the German warships remaining there. On October 10, Soviet troops cut the rail line between Athens and Berlin. Germany evacuated Piraeus on October 12. British paratroopers descended on Athens airport that same day. By the end of October, the Germans had evacuated more than 37,000 troops, losing only 380 men in the process. Allied forces sank 29 merchant ships, 5 torpedo boats, a minelayer, a motor minesweeper and 3 submarine hunters. The remaining German ships were scuttled when Germany evacuated Salonika on October 31, leaving behind cut-off “fortress” garrisons on Crete, Rhodes, Leros, and Kos. British and Greek destroyer flotillas remained in the Aegean harassing these isolated garrisons to the end of the war. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Black Sea, Area of Operations; Cape Spada, Battle of; Crete, Naval Operations off; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy.

References “Naval Operations in the Aegean between the 7th September 1943 and 28th November, 1943.” London Gazette Supplement, October 11, 1948. Rogers, Anthony. Churchill’s Folly: Leros and the Aegean. London: Cassell, 2003. Schenk, Peter. Kampf um die Ägäis. Hamburg: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2000. Smith, Peter, and Edwin R. Walker. War in the Aegean: The Campaign for the Eastern Mediterranean in WWII. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008.

Ainsworth, Walden Lee “Pug” (1886–1960) U.S. navy admiral. Born on November 10, 1886, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Walden Ainsworth graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1905 and from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1910. Ainsworth participated in operations against Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. During World War I, Ainsworth served on transports as a gunnery officer.

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In February 1919, Ainsworth was appointed inspector of ordnance at the Navy’s Armor and Projectile Plant, where he served for two years ashore before returning to sea as an executive officer of a transport, a light cruiser, and as captain of the destroyer Marcus. Ainsworth was then an inspector of ordnance at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and he served at the New York Navy Yard. In 1925 he was made gunnery officer for Destroyers, Asiatic Fleet and then became commander of the destroyer Paul Jones. He left this billet in 1928 to serve for three years as an instructor in navigation at the Naval Academy. Various assignments afloat and ashore followed, including a stint at the Naval War College before returning to sea as executive officer of the battleship Mississippi in 1936. He headed the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps unit at Tulane University from 1938 to 1940. Promoted to captain, Ainsworth commanded Destroyer Squadron 2 in the Atlantic in 1940 and 1941 and then was assigned to Vice Admiral William F. Halsey’s staff. In December 1941, Ainsworth took command of the battleship Mississippi. Promoted to rear admiral (July 1942), Ainsworth became commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet. He took a leading role in the Solomon Islands Campaign, commanding the bombardment of the Japanese airfield at Munda during January 4–5, 1943, long considered a textbook operation. As commander of Cruiser Division 9 (January 1943–October 1944), Ainsworth commanded three cruisers and five destroyers escorting the U.S. invasion force to New Georgia. He fought in the Battle of Kula Gulf (July 5–6, 1943), for which he was awarded the Navy Cross. He also fought in the Battle of Kolombangara (July 12–13, 1943). In these two actions, Cruiser Division 9 suffered one ship sunk and three damaged to Japanese torpedoes. Ainsworth saw action in the Marianas, Guam, Leyte Gulf, and Peleliu. Ainsworth then commanded Cruisers and Destroyers, Pacific Fleet (October 1944–July 1945). After the war, Ainsworth commanded the Fifth Naval District (August 1945– December 1948) until his retirement as a vice admiral. He died on August 7, 1960, in Bethesda, Maryland. Gary Kerley See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kolombangara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953.

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Aircraft, Naval Most naval aircraft fall into one of four main classifications: spotters, patrol aircraft, land-based attack aircraft, and carrier-based aircraft. Battleships and cruisers usually carried catapult-launched spotter aircraft to correct gunfire against enemy vessels or shore targets. Most spotter aircraft tended to be relatively slow floatplanes (e.g., Mitsubishi F1M2 [“Pete” in the Allied identification system] and Vought OS2U Kingfisher), because the design parameters were restricted by the launch and recovery mechanism. These aircraft were also very useful in search-and-rescue missions. Patrol aircraft were designed to keep track of enemy ships and (in some cases) to attack small vessels such as submarines. The major performance requirements for patrol aircraft were range and endurance; the sea covers a vast area and an enemy fleet occupied a relatively tiny part of it, so the ability to search large areas and remain on station for a long time was important. Flying boats were widely used as patrol aircraft (e.g., the Consolidated PBY Catalina, Kawanishi H8K, and Short Sunderland), but long-range land-based patrollers (e.g., Lockheed Hudson, Ventura, and Consolidated B-24 Liberator) were used toward the latter part of the war, initially to patrol colder areas such as the Aleutians and Iceland, where flying boats found operation difficult. Land-based attack aircraft were employed by most combatants and were sometimes successful, particularly if they employed specialist anti-ship attack techniques. Torpedo-bombing was probably the most effective form of attack, but results varied depending on the skill and persistence of the aircrews involved and the efficiency of the weapon. U.S. torpedoes suffered from problems and were largely ineffective until the second half of 1943, whereas the Japanese 18-inch torpedo was extremely effective. Italian, German, and British torpedoes were all moderately effective. Dive-bombing and skip-bombing were also effective, but attacks by high-level bombers were usually unsuccessful against moving ships, because the target had plenty of time to take avoiding action. Great Britain employed purpose-designed torpedo attack aircraft (the Beaufort and Beaufighter). The United States mainly used conversions of existing aircraft as torpedo carriers (the B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder), but it usually employed skip-bombing in preference to torpedoes. Medium bombers were also used as torpedo-aircraft by Japan (the GM-4 “Betty”), Germany (He-111H), Italy (SM.79), and the Soviet Union (Ilyushin DB-3T/Il-4). German and Japanese bombers were particularly effective. The following two types of specialist torpedo bombers were widely used during World War II. 1. The Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79, originally designed as a commercial transport, was adapted for use as a bomber when its excellent performance became

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known. The SM.79-I entered service in 1936 and was used with some success during the Spanish Civil War. The more powerful SM.79-II was employed throughout World War II in the Mediterranean theater as a torpedo bomber (carrying two 17.7-inch torpedoes), medium bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, close-support aircraft, and transport/training aircraft. A total of 1,330 were built between 1936 and 1944. 2. The Bristol Beaufort was the standard British land-based torpedo bomber until it was replaced by the Bristol Beaufighter TF X in 1943. Entering service late in 1939, the Beaufort was also used for bombing and minelaying operations. It was reasonably successful, although occasionally let down by malfunctioning torpedoes. A total of 1,429 were built in the United Kingdom, and 700 were built under license in Australia. Flying an aircraft off and onto an aircraft carrier places many more stresses and strains on the aircraft’s structure than comparable activities on land. As a consequence, carrier-based aircraft were generally heavier and more robust—and thus slower and less maneuverable (at least in theory)—than their land-based counterparts. Parts of their structure usually folded to allow the aircraft to be taken below to the hangar, further increasing the weight. On top of that, landing characteristics had to be superior, which required a light wing loading, large flaps, good stall behavior, and a compliant undercarriage. Combining all of these characteristics in a single aircraft was not easy; many of the aircraft that served on carrier decks during World War II had flaws. Of the major combatants, only the United States, Japan, and Great Britain operated aircraft carriers, and each had a different approach to design of carrier-based aircraft (see Tables 1, 2, and 3 for carrier-based attack aircraft, fighters, and bombers, respectively).

United States In 1941, the United States had several large carriers and well-organized carrier operational procedures; it used scout/dive-bombers (SBD Dauntless), torpedo/levelbombers (TBD-1 Devastator), and fighters (F4F Wildcat). Generally speaking, U.S. carrier aircraft were rugged and quite suitable for maritime use. The Douglas TDB-1 Devastator carrier-based torpedo bomber entered service late in 1937 and was obsolescent when the United States entered the war. Its combat career was terminated by the Battle of Midway when it proved to be vulnerable to fighter attack while unescorted. A total of 129 TBD-1s were built. The Douglas SBD Dauntless entered service with the U.S. Marine Corps in mid1940 and with the U.S. Navy later in 1940. It was the standard navy carrier-borne dive-bomber in December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was attacked. Operationally, the Dauntless was very successful and could absorb a lot of battle damage, having

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the lowest attrition rate of any U.S. carrier aircraft in the Pacific theater. It played a major part in the 1942 Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and later flew off escort carriers on antisubmarine and close-support missions. A total of 5,936 Dauntless were built. The Grumman F4F Wildcat entered service with the Royal Navy late in 1940, and it became operational with the Marine Corps and U.S. Navy at the beginning of 1941. The F4F-3 was the standard navy shipboard fighter when the United States entered the war, and it was generally inferior to the Japanese A6M2 Zero in performance and maneuverability. However, the F4F was very rugged and had good dive performance, giving a good account of itself when using the appropriate tactics. Later in the war, the Wildcat gave sterling service on escort carriers. Approximately 8,000 Wildcats were built. The Grumman TBF Avenger first flew in August 1941 and became the standard navy carrier-based torpedo bomber. It entered service in mid-1942 in time for the Battle of Midway. It could absorb substantial punishment, and, although it was not very maneuverable, it was easy to land on deck. A total of 9,836

A U.S. Navy Grumman TBF-1C Avenger torpedo bomber from Torpedo Squadron 18 (VT-18) from the aircraft carrier Intrepid (CV-11) in the Southwest Pacific. Entering service in 1942, the Avenger was probably the best torpedo bomber of the war. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)

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Avengers were built; most served with the U.S. Navy, but 958 were supplied to the British Navy. The Curtiss SB2 Helldiver was the most successful carrier-based dive-bomber in U.S. Navy service despite its handling faults and a reputation for structural weakness. Entering service early in 1943, its first major action was the Rabaul Campaign in November 1943, and it took part in almost every major naval/air action during the remainder of the war. The navy was the major user of the Helldiver, although some were flown by the Marine Corps and the British Royal Navy. A total of 7,200 Helldivers were built in the United States and Canada. The Vought F4U Corsair entered service with the Marine Corps early in 1943; it was not an easy aircraft to deck-land and was initially rejected by the U.S. Navy in favor of the Hellcat. The gull-winged F4U operated from land bases in the Pacific and flew off Royal Navy carriers from late 1943. The Corsair was a very good fighter, convincingly superior in performance to the Mitsubishi Zero and much better than the P-51B Mustang below about 20,000 ft. Eventually, the Corsair matured into a reasonable deck-landing aircraft, and it began to supplant the F6F Hellcat as the standard U.S. Navy carrier fighter by the end of the war. It saw extensive service after the war and continued in production until 1952. A total of 12,571 were built. The Grumman F6F Hellcat entered service early in 1943. It was the most successful carrier-based fighter of the war, accounting for 76 percent of the total enemy aircraft destroyed by U.S. Navy carrier pilots. It was extremely rugged and had much better speed and dive capabilities than the Mitsubishi Zero, which it could normally beat in an even fight. Many of the U.S. Navy aces flew Hellcats. The Hellcat was also employed with some success at night; approximately 1,300 of the 12,272 produced were dedicated radar-equipped night-fighter versions.

Japan The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had several carriers at the start of the war, the air groups of which were weighted toward attack aircraft rather than fighters. Its aircraft were lightly built and had very long range, but this advantage was usually purchased at the expense of vulnerability to enemy fire. The skill of Japanese aviators tended to exaggerate the effectiveness of the IJN’s aircraft, and pilot quality fell off as experienced crews were shot down during the Midway and Solomon Islands campaigns. The Nakajima B5N (“Kate” in the Allied designator system) first entered service in 1937 as a carrier-based attack bomber, with the B5N2 torpedo bomber appearing in 1940. The B5N had good handling and deck-landing characteristics and was operationally very successful in the early part of the war. The B5N remained in service throughout the war, and it was employed as a suicide aircraft toward the end of the conflict. Approximately 1,200 B5Ns were built.

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The Aichi D3A (“Val”) carrier-based dive-bomber entered service in mid-1940, and it was the standard Japanese navy dive-bomber when Japan entered the war. It was a good bomber, capable of putting up a creditable fight in the air-to-air combat role after dropping its bomb load. It participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the major Pacific campaigns, including Santa Cruz, Midway, and the Solomon Islands. Increasing losses during the second half of the war took their toll, and the D3A was used on suicide missions later in the war. Approximately 1,495 D3As were built. When it appeared in mid-1940, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero was the first carrierbased fighter capable of beating its land-based counterparts. It was well armed and had truly exceptional maneuverability below about 220 mph, and its capabilities came as an unpleasant shock to U.S. and British forces. It achieved this exceptional performance at the expense of resistance to enemy fire, with a light structure and no armor or self-sealing tanks. Its Achilles heel was the stiffness of its controls at high speed, the control response being almost nil at indicated airspeed over 300 mph. The Zero was developed throughout the war, a total of 10,449 being built.

Japanese Mitsubishi A6M5 Zero 52. When introduced in July 1940, the Zero was the top carrierbased aircraft in the world. Well armed, fast, highly maneuverable, and with long range, the Zero lacked armor protection and would be outclassed by later, more powerful U.S. fighters. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)

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The Nakajima B6N (“Jill”) carrier-based torpedo bomber entered service late in 1943 and was intended to replace the B5N, but the initial B6N1 was plagued with engine troubles. The B6N2 with a Mitsubishi engine was the major production model, appearing early in 1944. Overall, it was better than its predecessor but not particularly easy to deck-land. It participated in the Marianas Campaign and was encountered throughout the Pacific until the end of the war. A total of 1,268 were built. The Yokosuka D4Y (“Judy”) reconnaissance/dive-bomber entered service on Japanese carriers early in 1943 and was very fast for a bomber. Initially assigned to reconnaissance units, it was intended to replace the D3A, but it was insufficiently armed and protected and suffered from structural weakness in dives. In common with most other Japanese aircraft, it was used for kamikaze attacks, and a D4Y carried out the last kamikaze attack of the war on August 15, 1945. A total of 2,819 D4Ys were built.

Great Britain During the 1930s, Great Britain had a limited number of air assets with which to patrol a far-flung empire; the Admiralty was therefore obliged to buy multirole aircraft and accept the inevitable compromises in performance. The Royal Navy entered the war with low-performing aircraft, and its efforts to introduce better aircraft were compromised by conflicts in engine supply. In 1943 it was only too pleased to have the use of F4U Corsairs that were surplus to the requirements of the U.S. Navy. The Fairey Swordfish carrier-based torpedo/spotter/reconnaissance aircraft entered service late in 1936 and participated in the night raid on Taranto, the battle of Cape Matapan, and the sinking of the Bismarck. It was very slow but was astonishingly agile with excellent flying qualities. Very easy to deck-land, it was a natural choice for use on Atlantic convoy escort carriers. It remained in service until mid-1945, outlasting its replacement (the Fairey Albacore). A total of 2,391 Swordfish were built. The Blackburn Skua came on line late in 1938 as a carrier-based fighter/divebomber. It was not easy to deck-land and had poor stall characteristics, but it was an effective dive-bomber, sinking the German cruiser Königsberg in Bergen harbor during the Norwegian Campaign. A total of 190 were built. The Fairey Albacore carrier-based torpedo/dive-bomber/reconnaissance aircraft entered service as a replacement for the Swordfish early in 1940 and took part in many of the Mediterranean operations, including the Battles of Cape Matapan and El Alamein and the Allied landings at Sicily and Salerno. The Albacore had only a slightly better performance than the Swordfish, and its service with the Royal Navy ended late in 1943. A total of 800 were built.

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The two-seat Fairey Fulmar carrier fighter entered service in mid-1940 and was principally designed to combat unescorted bombers and maritime patrol aircraft. It had adequate range, but it was underpowered and its performance was insufficient to deal with contemporary fighters. Nevertheless, it filled a gap until better aircraft became available. A total of 600 were built. The Hawker Sea Hurricane was first used on catapult assisted merchantman ships during early 1941. Many were conversions of existing land-based fighters. Sea Hurricanes were operational on carriers from late 1941; they were maneuverable and well armed but usually had a lower performance than their adversaries. Approximately 800 Sea Hurricanes were built or converted. The Supermarine Seafire was an adaptation of the land-based Supermarine Spitfire VB fighter. When it appeared in mid-1942, it was the fastest operational carrier fighter in the world, but it was difficult to deck-land and was not sufficiently robust for use at sea. Later versions were very effective at low altitude, the Seafire LIIC having an outstanding climb and roll performance. Approximately 1,900 were built or converted before the end of the war. The Fairey Barracuda carrier-based dive-/torpedo bomber entered service early in 1943. It was usually used as a dive-bomber and was not popular with its crews; its performance was mediocre and its defensive armament was poor. It was, however, a reasonably good dive-bomber and was easy to deck-land. A total of 1,718 were built. Andy Blackburn See also: Aircraft Carriers; AVALANCHE, Operation; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Mariana Islands Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of; Taranto, Attack on; Torpedoes.

References Brown, Eric M. Duels in the Sky. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1989. Jarrett, Philip, ed. Aircraft of the Second World War. London: Putnam, 1997. Munson, Kenneth. Bombers, Patrol, and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45. Poole, UK: Blandford Press, 1969. Munson, Kenneth. Fighters, Attack and Training Aircraft, 1939–45. Poole, UK: Blandford Press, 1969.

Aircraft Carriers Ships capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft. Almost without exception, the aircraft carriers commissioned by combatant navies during World War II owed their origins to designs developed between the two world wars.

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Furthermore, since this warship type was so new, most of the first generation of semi-experimental vessels remained in frontline service at the outbreak of hostilities. These included the British carriers Eagle (converted from an incomplete exChilean battleship into a flush-deck carrier with an offset island), Furious (a World War I battle cruiser converted into a carrier during the course of that conflict), and Hermes (the first vessel constructed as a carrier from the keel up, also flush-decked with an island) and the similar Japanese carrier Hosho. Provisions of the 1922 Washington Treaty also had freed large U.S., British, French, and Japanese hulls for conversion into carriers. The United States and France converted two battle cruisers and a battleship, respectively, into the flushdeck carriers Lexington, Saratoga, and Béarn. British and Japanese concepts emphasizing rapid aircraft launching led both navies to develop designs incorporating multiple flight deck levels to permit several aircraft to fly off simultaneously. Britain rebuilt the Furious with a three-quarter-length flush deck and a forward flying-off deck at a lower level, and it similarly converted two near-sister ships, the Courageous and the Glorious. Japan took this idea still further and configured a battleship and a battle cruiser, the Kaga and the Akagi, as carriers with two forward flying-off decks beneath the main deck. Both navies learned through experience that efficient deck-handling procedures were more effective in increasing launch rates. Japan subsequently rebuilt its two carriers with conventional flush decks and greatly enlarged air groups, but the British ships still served unaltered in the front line at the outbreak of war. Operational experience with these large converted carriers had a profound influence on subsequent carrier doctrine and designs. Their speed allowed them to operate with the battle fleet, and their size and aircraft capacity gave commanders invaluable opportunities to appreciate the importance of efficient deck-handling procedures, rapid launch and recovery, and concentrated mass attacks. They also served as development platforms for crucial operational equipment, including effective arresting gear using transverse wires, safety crash barriers, hydraulic catapults, and fast elevators to move aircraft between the hangar and the flight deck. During the 1930s, Japan and the United States added new carriers to their fleets. Although constrained by provisions of the 1922 Washington Treaty, both navies produced effective designs that became the basis for later construction. Their first treaty vessels, the Japanese Ryujo and the U.S. Navy’s Ranger, were not entirely satisfactory but formed the basis for the two ships of the So¯ryu¯ class and the threevessel Yorktown class, respectively. They were ships that combined large flight decks, substantial air groups of 60 to 80 aircraft, strong defensive armament (for the period), high speed, and long range in vessels suitable for extended oceanic operations. Britain was a latecomer to new carrier construction in the 1930s. The Ark Royal, commissioned in 1939, incorporated internal hangars, an enclosed bow, and a flight

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deck that was also the vessel’s principal strength deck—all features that characterized subsequent British carrier designs—and embarked a similar size air group to those of its U.S. and Japanese contemporaries. The large fleet carriers commissioned by Britain, Japan, and the United States during World War II derived from their earlier 1930s designs. Japan commissioned two ships of the enlarged Sho¯kaku class in 1941 with greater offensive and defensive capabilities, followed by the Taiho, a variant incorporating an armored flight deck (although at the cost of a reduced air group). In 1942 to 1943, Japan laid down the six-ship Unryu class, which was derived directly from the So¯ryu¯, although only two of these vessels entered service. The United States standardized on the Essex class, an expansion of the Yorktown class. No fewer than 32 units were ordered, of which 24 were completed to serve as the backbone of U.S. carrier forces from 1943. They combined a powerful offensive air group of as many as 100 aircraft, substantially augmented defensive armament, long range, and high speed in hulls the size of which conferred great adaptability to changing operational requirements.

The British Navy aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the second purpose-built Royal Navy aircraft carrier. The photograph shows the carrier refueling in Rio de Janeiro on December 17, 1939. The Ark Royal was sunk by a single German torpedo on November 13, 1941, while ferrying aircraft to Malta. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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The six British wartime carriers of the Illustrious type introduced armor protection for both flight decks and hangar sides. Incorporating this feature into the basic Ark Royal design produced vessels that proved very effective in the confined waters of the Mediterranean and in the face of kamikaze attack, but it also incurred severe penalties. Air-group capacity was slashed substantially (the original design accommodated only 36 aircraft; modified to carry 54, it still fell short of the Ark Royal’s embarked 72 machines), hangars were cramped, and it proved very difficult and expensive to upgrade these ships postwar. Both the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy developed a third generation of carrier designs from their wartime experience. These emphasized the importance of large air groups, efficient layout for fast aircraft operation, and strong defensive features—both passive in the form of armor at hangar and flight-deck level and active by means of very large batteries of antiaircraft guns. None of these carriers served during World War II. The U.S. Navy commissioned the three ships of the Midway class just after the war, but the Royal Navy’s Malta class was canceled, although two vessels of the intermediate Audacious class entered service postwar as the Ark Royal and Eagle. Both Britain and the United States studied small austere carrier designs before World War II, but only the Royal Navy seriously considered vessels for trade protection (the U.S. Navy’s XCV projects envisaged second-line fleet duties). In 1935–1936, the British Naval Staff agreed on sufficiently firm requirements to earmark five specific merchant vessels for conversion should war break out. Nevertheless, no action was taken until December 1940, when work began to create Britain’s first escort carrier, the Audacity, commissioned in June 1941. U.S. Navy planning for austere mercantile conversions began in October 1940, resulting in the completion of the Long Island, its first escort carrier, also in June 1941. The Long Island was converted from a completed diesel C-3 cargo ship, the Mormacmail, but 45 subsequent conversions used partially completed hulls and steam turbines rather than the mechanically unreliable diesel plants featured in the first five U.S.-built escort carriers. More than half of these vessels went to Britain under the Lend-Lease Act, and all 50 were in service before the end of 1943. The United States also converted four fleet tankers into escort carriers. These larger twin-shaft turbine vessels were very successful, but a general shortage of tanker hulls prevented further conversions. Nevertheless, they formed the basis for the U.S. Navy’s first purpose-designed escort carriers, the 19 Commencement Bay–class ships. These were the only escort carriers to continue to operate postwar, since their size and speed suited them for the larger antisubmarine warfare aircraft then entering service. The 50 Casablanca-class ships, however, formed the bulk of the U.S. Navy escort carrier force, even though they were outside the mainstream of U.S. Navy design. All came from the Kaiser Vancouver yard and were commissioned within

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one year starting in July 1943. Their design was by Gibbs and Cox, and their construction was under the auspices of the Maritime Commission. Shortages of both turbines and diesels forced the use of reciprocating machinery, but the ships were faster and more maneuverable than the original C-3 conversions, had longer flight decks, and had larger hangars than even the Sangamon-class converted tankers. Other than the Audacity, Britain completed only five escort carriers of its own, all conversions from mercantile hulls. They were similar to contemporary U.S. C-3 conversions, although generally somewhat larger. Thirty-eight of these, transferred under the Lend-Lease Act, formed the core of the Royal Navy’s escort carrier force throughout the war. Escort carriers, initially conceived as platforms providing air cover for convoys, soon expanded their activities into a wide variety of tasks. In the U.S. Navy, escort carriers formed the core of specialized antisubmarine hunter-killer groups, provided close air support for landings, served as replenishment carriers and aircraft transports, and operated as training flight decks. In addition, during 1942 the Sangamon took on fleet carrier assignments to compensate for shortages of firstline ships. The Royal Navy employed its escort carriers in much the same way. Its own shortage of large carriers, however, and its operational responsibilities within more confined waters led it to assign escort carriers additional frontline duties. The small carriers operated in strike roles either within a larger force or as autonomous units in the East Indies, the Aegean, and off the Norwegian coast, including the attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz. Escort carriers also provided night-fighter coverage for the British Pacific Fleet. To circumvent 1922 Washington Treaty quantitative limitations, Japan designed several fast naval auxiliaries and passenger liners for quick conversion into carriers. Beginning in 1940, conversions from five auxiliaries and three liners joined the Combined Fleet as frontline light fleet carriers. Japan also completed several mercantile conversions similar in capability to the British and U.S. escort carriers. However, unlike the Allied vessels, these were designed and usually were deployed as integral components of Japan’s main carrier force. In addition, Japan converted one Yamato-class battleship hull, the Shinano, into a huge carrier that never entered operational service, and it commenced conversion of an incomplete cruiser as a light fleet carrier. The United States, too, deployed converted warships—the nine Independenceclass light fleet carriers based on Cleveland-class cruiser hulls formed an integral part of the fast carrier force from early 1943. Although conceived as first-line units, their design owed much to plans for the escort carriers, and their operational limitations made them suitable only for emergency service. Britain also appreciated the need for smaller, less sophisticated carriers that could enter service more quickly, but it chose to construct new vessels rather

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than convert existing hulls. The design was similar to that of the larger fleet carriers, but the carrier was unarmored. Britain also deliberately conformed to mercantile rather than naval standards, since the Admiralty contemplated selling these ships for conversion into passenger liners or fast cargo ships after the war—an interesting reversal of procedures. Four of this Colossus-class of light fleet carriers served with the British Pacific Fleet late in 1945, and they joined six sister ships to form the core of British carrier power into the later 1950s, since they proved very economical to operate. France’s converted carrier Béarn remained its only example throughout the war, serving mainly as an aircraft transport because of its low The Japanese aircraft carrier Jun’yo. Laid down as a passenger liner in 1940, it was purchased speed. France began building a pair and converted to an aircraft carrier in 1942. The of new carriers, the Joffre and the carrier saw extensive service and survived the Painlevé, just before war began, but war. It is shown here at Sasebo, Japan, on Oc- the fall of France in 1940 terminated tober 19, 1945. A member of the ship’s residual construction. The final design incorcrew signals an approaching tug. (Naval Historical porated a flight deck offset to port to Center) minimize superstructure intrusion, a feature that has reappeared in several designs in recent years. Before and during the war, Germany undertook some carrier construction. Its prewar design, the Graf Zeppelin, reached an advanced stage of construction by 1940, but subsequent reductions in priority, design changes, and disputes among the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe, and the Reichs Luft Ministerium (Reich Air Ministry) over provision of aircraft and aircrew combined to prevent carrier completion before the war’s end. A similar fate befell several conversion projects from merchant vessels and warships. Italy’s government and air force, subscribing to the position that geography would permit shore-based aircraft to provide entirely sufficient air cover and offensive strike potential for its fleet, opposed funding of any of the carrier designs the navy proposed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Wartime experience led to a change in this view, and the Italian navy began two conversions from mercantile

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The U.S. Navy Independence-class light aircraft carrier Princeton, shown here in 1944. Commissioned in February 1943, the Princeton was sunk by Japanese land-based planes on October 24, 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. (Naval Historical Center)

hulls to create the fleet’s first carriers. The Aquila was a sophisticated nearly total reconstruction of the liner Roma that was virtually complete when Italy surrendered in 1943. The Italians sabotaged the Aquila to prevent its use by Germany, and the ship subsequently was seriously damaged by Allied bombing and an attack using manned torpedoes at Genoa. The hulk was scrapped after the war. Conversion of the liner Augustus into the Sparviero, a more austere vessel similar to Allied escort carriers, began in 1941, but it, too, was never completed. Air power at sea came of age during World War II. The combination of unprecedented striking power (both in volume of ordnance and range of delivery), mobility, and flexibility of use transformed the aircraft carrier into the world’s major fleets’ new capital ship, a position it retains today. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aircraft, Naval; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Human Torpedoes; Hunter-Killer Groups; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; United States, Navy.

References Chesnau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present: An Illustrated Encyclopedia. 2nd ed. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992.

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Fontenoy, Paul E. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006. Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Jentschura, Hansgeorg, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1977.

Air-Sea Rescue The rescue of air crews forced to bail out or ditch their aircraft at sea as well as shipwrecked mariners. With the advent of long-range aircraft, it became apparent that some system was necessary to increase the chances of survival for pilots whose aircraft went down during long-distance flights over water. The development of air-sea rescue (ASR) programs was hampered by technological limitations and interservice rivalries, but the rewards of an air-sea rescue program were apparent, especially with mounting casualties of the air war and a shortage of aircrews. Aside from simple life-saving, rescue meant that recovered personnel could return to the flight line, saving the cost and time of training replacements. Such programs also improved the morale of flight crews. Sometimes a downed crew could send out a “mayday” (from the French m’aidez, or “help me”) radio signal with a location. The crew would either bail out of the aircraft by jumping with parachutes, or the plane would be ditched—meaning that it would crash-land on the water, and the crew would endeavor to get out before it sank. Fighters such as a P-51 Mustang sank almost immediately, but large bombers such as the Boeing B-17 could often stay on the surface for 30 minutes. After leaving their aircraft, aircrew would endeavor to stay afloat in the water using a life preserver or a rubber raft until an airplane or boat could locate them by following a radio signal, seeing a large puddle of dye in the ocean, or spotting the men in the water. Crews needed to be prepared for long waits; especially in the Pacific theater, it could take a week or more for a downed crew to be rescued. Germany was the first country to develop an ASR program. In 1936, Seenotdienst (air-sea rescue service) units were organized as part of the Luftwaffe. They employed floatplanes and flying boats for rescues in the North Sea. German aircraft on overwater missions were equipped with collapsible rubber dinghies with radio transmitters. During the 1940 Battle of Britain, Seenotdienst units operated in the English Channel. The Allies were slower to develop air-sea rescue operations. During the Battle of Britain, downed pilots had only life preservers until they were rescued. Eventually, they were provided with dinghies and dye markers. In 1942, the British introduced

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a lightweight radio transmitter for downed crewmen, nicknamed a “Gibson Girl,” which was based on a captured German model. In addition to aircraft operated by Fighter Command, rescue motor launches (RMLs) operated near the coast. German and British rescue aircraft were painted white and marked with the large insignia of the International Red Cross. The decks of the RMLs were painted yellow, another sign of neutral craft. Both sides considered their ASR vehicles immune from enemy attack and rescued all downed pilots, regardless of their side in the conflict. But since a rescued pilot would return to duty, both sides frequently shot down ASR aircraft, leading to protests from each side in turn. In January 1941, the British Air Ministry created the Directorate of Air-Sea Rescue to coordinate operations among the Royal Air Force (including Coastal Command) and the Royal Navy, and Coastal Command. In the first six months of 1941, out of 1,200 pilots who ditched, 444 were rescued. The British also assumed primary responsibility for all rescue operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters, relieving their allies from developing their own programs. The United States organized ASR operations based on the British system, even using British officers in training. Because the British had taken primary responsibilities for rescue operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters, as well as for all planes departing India, the Americans were able to concentrate on the Pacific theater. Such efforts were hampered by interservice rivalries. Each U.S. service went its own way, conducting its own operations and duplicating labor and equipment. This cumbersome arrangement was finally solved with the establishment early in 1944 of the Air-Sea Rescue Agency, which was charged with overseeing all operations. A school for training crews was established in Gulfport, Mississippi, but by the time trained crews began to graduate, the need for them was almost over. The U.S. Navy also played an important role in the rescue of B-29 crews flying from the Mariana Islands late in the war. The navy set up submarines stationed at intervals between the Marianas and Japan that acted as lifeguards for downed crewmen. Although air-sea rescue saved many lives during World War II, its practices, operations, and equipment were constantly improvised and sometimes inefficient. Lessons learned during the war, however, led to improved air-sea rescue techniques thereafter. Pamela Feltus See also: Aircraft, Naval; Aviation, Naval.

References Air Rescue Association. USAF Air Rescue. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1997. Pereira, Wilfred D. Boat in the Blue: The Wartime Story of an RAF Air Sea Rescue Crew and Their Boats. Cheltenham, UK: Line One Publishers, 1985.

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Aleutian Islands Campaign (1942–1943) Military campaign for a 1,100-mile-long chain of U.S. islands stretching west from Alaska in the Bering Sea toward northern Japan. Although the Aleutians had a negligible population, no useful resources, and extreme climatic conditions that made them unsuitable as major military staging bases, they were nonetheless the scene of bitter fighting between Japan and the United States and Canada. On June 7, 1942, elements of Japanese Vice Admiral Hosogaya Boshiro’s Northern Naval Task Force seized the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska. The Japanese aim was twofold: to support Japan’s effort to seize Midway Island by luring U.S. forces away from there and to gain bases to deter U.S. attacks on the Japanese Kurile Islands. By May 1943, the Japanese had more than 2,500 men on Attu and more than 5,400 on Kiska. This Japanese foothold on U.S. soil triggered a substantial response from the United States and Canada, which together would eventually commit more than 100,000 troops to this remote region. Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald commanded Task Force 8, an array of sea, air, and land units charged with expelling the Japanese from the Aleutians. Theobald intended to interdict Japanese lines of communication into Attu and Kiska by isolating the Aleutian waters and engaging Japanese transports and warships where possible. Initially, the Allies employed submarine attacks in the western Aleutians. When Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced Theobald in January 1943, he doubled the effort to interdict Japanese supply convoys. On March 26, 1943, a small U.S. Navy task force of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris intercepted and stood off a larger Japanese force under Vice Admiral Hosogaya Boshiro of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, four destroyers, and two converted merchant cruisers serving as transports. This action, known as the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, ended further Japanese surface resupply efforts. Along with naval interdiction, U.S. and Canadian aircraft harassed the Japanese from bases in Alaska and the eastern Aleutians. In August 1942, U.S. forces established an airfield on Adak Island, from which bombers could strike Japanese in the western Aleutians. By September, Allied aircraft bombed targets on Kiska nearly every day for three weeks. The Japanese were forced to rely on submarines as the most dependable conveyance to ferry minimal subsistence supplies. By April 1943, the Allies had succeeded in tightening an air-sea noose around the Japanese bases. Even so, U.S. commanders determined that an invasion of Attu and Kiska was necessary. One consideration focused on unpredictable weather, especially fog, which could cloak naval activity and allow the Japanese to reclaim control of the seas. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division was designated as the landing force, and it received amphibious warfare training at Fort Ord, California, until April, when it deployed north for operations. Attu was chosen as the first objective, because

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intelligence estimated Japanese troops there to be only 500 men, considerably fewer than on Kiska. Almost 11,000 men of the 7th Division landed on Attu on May 11, 1943. At first, U.S. commanders thought they had surprised the Japanese when they met no resistance at the shoreline. However, as U.S. troops traversed through mushy tundra and ascended mountains 2,000 to 3,000 ft. above sea level, they discovered more than 2,500 Japanese waiting in trenches along ridgelines, using the inhospitable terrain to their advantage. The supply-starved Japanese troops conducted a stubborn defense that exacted a heavy toll on the U.S. force. After 19 days of attrition defense, the Japanese conducted a final banzai suicide attack of some 600 men, one of the largest of the Pacific war. U.S. losses in securing Attu were 561 killed and 1,136 wounded. Only 28 Japanese were taken prisoner. Following the loss of Attu, the Japanese decided to evacuate the 5,400 troops remaining on Kiska. On the night of July 28 in foggy weather, while U.S. ships were off refueling, two Japanese cruisers and six destroyers entered Kiska harbor and in one hour evacuated their troops from the island. Not knowing about the evacuation, on August 16 the Allies conducted their planned amphibious assault on Kiska with more than 34,000 U.S. and Canadian troops. It took the Allies several days to realize the Japanese had departed, but the operation cost some 300 casualties from friendly fire and Japanese booby traps. The campaign in the Aleutians was an indecisive one that challenged both Japanese and Allied planners. In the end, the Allies removed the Japanese from the two islands, but at great cost in resources committed and for only questionable gain. Steven J. Rauch See also: Hosogaya Boshiro; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; McMorris, Charles Horatio; Midway, Battle of; Theobald, Robert Alfred.

References Chandonnet, Fern, ed. Alaska at War, 1941–1945: The Forgotten War Remembered: Papers from the Alaska at War Symposium, Anchorage, Alaska, November 11–13, 1993. Anchorage: Alaska at War Committee, 1995. Conn, Stetson, et al. Guarding the United States and Its Outposts. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1964. Garfield, Brian. The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. New York: Doubleday, 1969.

ALPHABET, Operation (June 5–8, 1940) Evacuation of Allied troops from Norway. Although the Allies had retaken Narvik on May 28, overall the Norwegian Campaign was going poorly for them, and, more

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important, the Germans had invaded the Low Countries and France on May 10 and were overrunning both. This state of affairs prompted the Allied decision on May 24 to evacuate the 25,000 men remaining in northern Norway. The evacuation force included the British aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious, the British cruisers Southampton and Coventry, 16 destroyers, and numerous other smaller warships, transports, and cargo vessels. The evacuation began on June 5 and was completed by June 8. Another British cruiser, the Devonshire, evacuated the Norwegian royal family and government, and it sailed under radio silence independently for Scapa Flow. Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes of the Glorious requested and received permission to proceed independently at greater speed, with the justification that his ship was short of fuel. Unknown to the British, however, the Germans had powerful forces at sea. Escorted by the destroyers Acasta and Ardent, the Glorious was intercepted by the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau some 280 miles west of Harstad, Norway. The carrier had on board six Swordfish aircraft available for operations, but for reasons that will never be known, D’Oyly-Hughes did not have any on patrol and was thus caught by surprise. Homing on smoke from its stack, the two German capital ships opened fire on the Glorious at a range of some 27,000 yards. Before any aircraft could be launched, a German shell hit the forward hangar, destroying the Hurricanes there. The Glorious was soon listing and went down within 20 minutes. Although the two British destroyers were also sunk, the Acasta heavily damaged the Scharnhorst with a torpedo and scored with one 4.7-inch shell. This damage caused the German commander, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, to order the two German battleships to steam for Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the Ark Royal and remainder of the British evacuation transport and store convoys later that same day, sailing without battleship protection. The eventual loss in lives from the three British warships was 1,519 men (1,207 in the Glorious, 160 in the Acosta, and 152 in the Ardent. Only 40 men survived, including one each from the Acosta and Ardent. The remaining British forces made it safely to Scapa Flow. One consequence of the evacuation was increased German pressure on both Sweden and Finland, leading to an agreement in June whereby the government in Stockholm permitted unarmed German troops to transit Sweden on its railroads, that country’s major departure from neutrality during the war. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft, Naval; Courageous Class, British Aircraft Carriers; Marschall, Wilhelm; Scapa Flow.

References Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

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Winton, John. Carrier Glorious: The Life and Death of an Aircraft Carrier. London: Cassell Military, 1999.

Altmark Incident (February 16, 1940) World War II British navy seizure of a German merchant ship within Norwegian territorial waters. The Altmark was a supply ship serving the German pocket battleship Graf Spee in the South Atlantic. The Altmark also became a prison ship, taking aboard survivors from the nine ships sunk by the Graf Spee. Since the outbreak of war, ships of the Royal Navy had been searching for the Graf Spee and its supply ships. On December 13, 1939, in the Battle of Río de la Plata, British cruisers located the Graf Spee and damaged it. Believing that the British had assembled a superior force, the Graf Spee’s captain then scuttled his ship. The Altmark, which had refueled the pocket battleship just prior to its last fight, departed the South Atlantic in late January 1940 for Hamburg. Commanded by Captain Heinrich Dau, it reached the Norwegian coast on February 12, 1940. On February 14, the Altmark entered Norwegian territorial waters at Trondheim. Although Norwegian naval vessels twice stopped the Altmark, Dau hid his ship’s guns below and claimed he had no prisoners on board. He resisted any effort to search his ship on the grounds that it was a German naval ship, immune to search. Despite misgivings and suspecting the nature of the cargo, the Norwegians allowed the Altmark to proceed. Norwegian officials did not want to create an incident that might be used to precipitate a German invasion of their neutral country. Word of events, however, reached the British Embassy at Oslo, and the naval attaché there informed the British Admiralty of the situation. On February 16, 1940, after British planes had located the Altmark, Captain Philip Vian’s destroyer flotilla cornered the Altmark near Jössing fjord within Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian gunboat Skarv hampered the British Navy’s efforts to force Altmark to sea, and the German supply ship then slipped into the fjord. In London, meanwhile, the War Cabinet met concerning the situation and the reports that the Altmark had on board some 300 British seamen, who were in fact being held below deck in difficult conditions. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill personally authorized the boarding and search of the Altmark and liberation of its prisoners. At 11:00 p.m. on February 16, Vian’s flagship, the destroyer Cossack, entered the fjord. Altmark tried to ram the destroyer, but expert British ship handling saved Cossack from damage. As the two ships brushed together, some of the boarding party leaped across to the German ship. Cossack then again closed, the remainder of the boarding party followed, and Cossack backed clear. In a brief fight, 7 Altmark crew members were killed and 299 British prisoners were freed.

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The Altmark incident was definitely an infringement of Norway’s neutrality by Britain. Neutral countries could no longer be certain of their inviolability in this war. This incident caused Hitler on February 19 to order an acceleration in his plans to invade Norway, Operation WESERÜBUNG. After they had conquered Norway, the Germans erected a commemorative marker at Jössing fjord reading (in German), “Here on February 16, 1940 the Altmark was attacked by British sea-pirates.” Martin Moll See also: Río de la Plata, Battle of; WESERÜBUNG, Operation.

References Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Salmon, Patrick, ed. Britain and Norway in the Second World War. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995. Wiggan, Richard. Hunt the Altmark. London: R. Hale, 1982.

Amphibious Warfare The projection of sea-based ground forces onto land, amphibious warfare was more widely conducted in World War II than in any previous conflict and on a greater scale than ever before or since. Involving all aspects of naval and military operations—from mine warfare to air and ground combat—amphibious operations are the most complex and risky of all military endeavors. The basic principles had been established in World War I and the postwar period, but the lessons were largely ignored by most military leaders except those in the Soviet Union, the U.S. Marine Corps, and Germany’s Landungspionieren (Landing Pioneers). The Royal Navy concluded that the British Gallipoli operation had demonstrated the great difficulty of a successful amphibious assault in modern war. Meanwhile, the Japanese navy and Japanese army developed separate procedures, forces, and equipment to conduct amphibious operations, and they had the good fortune to carry out their early assaults from 1937 against undefended beaches in China and at the beginning of the Pacific war. The German navy had no interest in amphibious operations before the war, but, ironically, Germany initiated the war’s first large-scale amphibious operation when it invaded Norway in April 1940. It was the Allies, however, who demonstrated true mastery of the amphibious art. In the end, they landed more than 4 million troops in five major amphibious assaults, dozens of tactical landings, and countless raids along German-occupied coasts of Europe. Amphibious operations provided the Western Allies with their only means

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of taking the ground war to the European Axis countries. In the Pacific theater, there could be no Allied victory without amphibious warfare. Amphibious operations come in three levels—strategic, operational, and tactical— depending on the intended objectives. The Allied landings in France, the Philippines, and Italy and the planned invasion of Japan are examples of strategic landings intended to have decisive impact on the war. The North African landings (Operation TORCH), the German assaults in the Dodecanese Islands, and most of the Allied assaults in the Pacific were operational-level landings that supported a specific campaign, each part of an overall strategic effort. Soviet landings and most Allied commando raids were tactical-level operations for limited objectives, although some had a strategic impact (capturing German codes, radars, and so on). The Dunkerque and Crete evacuations are difficult to categorize, but most observers would describe them as operational-level efforts. Amphibious operations also fall into four types: raids, assaults, evacuations, and administrative (noncombat) landings. The first of these is the most dangerous, since it generally is executed against superior enemy forces and involves elements of both an assault and an evacuation. An administrative landing is the safest, being conducted in a benign environment with no enemy ground, air, or naval forces present. Assaults and evacuations face varying levels of risk, depending on the defender’s strength and support. The German invasion of Norway is an example of an assault, although many of its forces came ashore in circumstances approaching that of an administrative landing. Britain’s Dunkerque evacuation was the war’s first major combat evacuation, while Germany’s naval evacuation of its forces from the Baltic in the war’s final months was the conflict’s largest such operation. In 1939 the German Army was the only service to recognize the need to rehearse landings and procedures for a specific landing. By 1943, every major military leader realized the necessity to practice for a specific landing. Then, as today, amphibious operations were broken down into five phases: (1) planning, (2) embarkation, (3) rehearsal, (4) movement to the objective area, and (5) the assault. Soviet doctrine added a sixth phase, the landing of the follow-on army forces. Germany did not generate a capacity to land troops against determined opposition until well into 1942. By then, Germany’s strategic situation precluded such operations, except in very limited and special circumstances, such as the landings on Kos and Leros during the Dodecanese Campaign. Ironically, despite its prewar aversion to amphibious operations, the German navy conducted the war’s largest amphibious evacuation. Conducted during the war’s final six months under desperate circumstances of Soviet air superiority and naval parity, Germany’s withdrawal of more than 2 million troops, civilians, and critical equipment stands out as one of the world’s most remarkable military achievements. Nonetheless, amphibious warfare was never more than a useful adjunct to German military operations and usually was conducted as ad hoc affairs before 1942.

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Necessarily, the Japanese military was much interested in amphibious warfare in the 1930s. The Japanese pioneered development of ramp front-end landing craft, later copied by other countries, including the United States. The Imperial Japanese Army used amphibious landings to outflank British forces in Malaya and to invade the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and other Pacific islands. In Malaya and the Philippines, the army used its own ships and land-based aircraft to support operations, receiving little or no assistance from the navy other than to have its ships attack those of enemy naval forces. The Japanese navy had its own specialized naval landing troops to execute its amphibious assaults on Wake Island and other Pacific islands. The assault on the Netherlands East Indies was the only time Japan’s two services cooperated in the execution of an amphibious invasion, and there, as in Malaya, the landing beaches were not defended. In cases where the beaches were defended, the Japanese suffered heavy losses, as at Wake. The Soviet Union had a specialized amphibious force of naval infantry at war’s start, but it lacked equipment and training. Soviet amphibious forces were expected to land on the beach using ships’ boats or other improvised transport. Soviet doctrine called for naval infantry to conduct amphibious raids and support the army’s landing by seizing and holding the beachhead while conventional forces disembarked behind them. Although this approach economized on the number of troops requiring specialized amphibious assault training, it proved costly in combat, because any delays in the follow-on landing left the naval infantry dangerously exposed to counterattack. As a result, Soviet naval infantry suffered heavy casualties in their amphibious assaults, but one can argue that they led the Allied way in these operations. On September 23, 1941, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet conducted the Allies’ first amphibious assault, when Captain Sergei Gorshkov landed a naval infantry regiment against the coastal flanks of the Romanian forces besieging Odessa. The action temporarily eliminated the Romanian threat to the city’s harbor. In fact, amphibious raids and assaults figured prominently in Soviet naval operations along Germany’s Black and Arctic Sea flanks, with the Soviets conducting more than 150 amphibious raids and assaults during the war. There was little to no cross-fertilization of ideas or lessons learned among the Allied powers regarding amphibious landings, particularly between the European and Pacific theaters. This largely was due to the respective service leaders’ antipathy and parochialism, but the primary contributing factor was the differing military challenges posed by the Japanese and European Axis countries. The Japanese army had few mechanized units, no heavy tanks, and little artillery, but it was much better at camouflage and improvised defenses than the Germans or Italians. The Germans, conversely, rapidly reinforced their beach defenders with heavily mechanized forces and heavy artillery, and they employed more extensive minefields and beach obstacles than did the Japanese. These differences shaped Allied doctrine and tactics in their respective theaters.

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Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill forced Britain to develop an amphibious warfare capability with the formation of Combined Operations Command. Beginning in June 1940, this organization conducted amphibious commando raids along the coasts of German-occupied Europe. Gradually, such amphibious raids became more effective as lessons were learned, expertise expanded, and training improved. But Britain’s assault tactics and equipment were driven primarily by lessons learned from the unsuccessful Dieppe raid in August 1942. The beach obstacles, extensive minefield belts, and overlapping antitank and artillery fire proved devastating, suggesting to the British a need for specialized vehicles and equipment. Those “funnies,” as they came to be known, were ready by the 1944 Normandy landings, but not in time for the earlier Allied landings in North Africa and Italy. The U.S. Army, present in only a limited capacity at Dieppe, saw little requirement for specialized amphibious equipment other than landing craft, but it did see a need to remove beach obstacles and isolate the beachhead from enemy reinforcement. The smaller land areas and lack of a heavily mechanized counterattack threat obviated the need to isolate Pacific assault beaches from reinforcements. Hence, airborne operations were not endemic to Pacific theater amphibious assaults, although they were planned for the invasion of Japan. Operation TORCH in North Africa in November 1942 was the Western Allies’ first amphibious assault against a defended beach in the European theater, albeit not a heavily contested one; but it provided the foundations for U.S. amphibious warfare doctrine in Europe. The TORCH landings saw the first employment of underwater demolition teams (UDTs) and the specialized amphibious landing ships that were so critical to getting forces ashore quickly. The tank landing ships were particularly important since they enabled tanks to land directly on the assault beach. Although many mistakes were made in planning and execution of TORCH, it established the basic foundations for all future Allied assaults in the West. All subsequent landings were preceded by Special Forces, such as UDT and commandos, to remove obstacles and seize key terrain and defensive features before the main assault force approached the beach. Operation TORCH also exposed the need to rehearse the actual landings well in advance of the assault to ensure a smooth and rapid disembarkation. Costly Allied naval antiaircraft fire against Allied aircraft carrying the airborne assault force during the Sicily landing (Operation HUSKY) in July 1943 demonstrated the need for reliable coordination and identification procedures. The operation involved two armies—one British and one U.S.—of two corps each. The six-week battle for Sicily opened the Italian Campaign and drove Benito Mussolini from power. However, it was a close-run affair. The Germans launched an armored counterattack on the landing’s second day, July 10, that nearly cut the beachhead in half and was stopped only by intensive naval gunfire support. The Germans’ near

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success convinced Allied planners that the early assault waves needed tanks, placing a premium on tank landing ships in naval construction. Additional lessons about air and naval support were gained there and at the September Salerno landings (Operation AVALANCHE), where naval gunfire support proved critical to stopping German armored counterattacks. More significantly, procedures and equipment were developed to accelerate the pace of force buildup ashore. That it was a successful effort can best be measured by the success of the Normandy landings (Operations NEPTUNE and OVERLORD) on June 6, 1944, that placed six divisions ashore in less than 24 hours and nearly 1 million men and their equipment in France in less than a week—a phenomenal accomplishment. The subsequent landings in southern France (Operation DRAGOON) were not as large, landing fewer than 250,000 troops, but were equally impressive and, coming only two months after the Normandy landings, highlighted the Allies’ growing amphibious capacity. The U.S. Marine Corps’ landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi marked the United States’ first offensive actions in the war. The Japanese failure to defend the beaches

U.S. soldiers come ashore on the Normandy coast of France under heavy German fire, D-Day, June 6, 1944. (National Archives)

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masked the planning and execution errors that marked early U.S. amphibious operations. Ships were loaded for an administrative landing rather than an assault. Navy–Marine Corps planners applied the lessons learned about combat loading their assault ships to their later assaults. Unfortunately, they did not learn about the importance of prelanding reconnaissance due to the absence of reefs and beach obstacles that enabled the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal to go smoothly. The Americans would learn that lesson at Tarawa, but at much greater cost. The almost disastrous Tarawa landing of November 20–24, 1943, was the pivotal experience that shaped the U.S. Navy–Marine Corps team’s amphibious warfare doctrine. The failure to chart and survey the offshore waters meant that hundreds of marines had to wade half a mile in shoulder-deep water under heavy Japanese fire. Casualties in the first wave amounted to more than 85 percent killed or wounded. Naval air and gunfire support was poorly planned and coordinated, leaving the marines to win by sheer force of will and superior combat cohesion ashore. All subsequent landings enjoyed extensive preassault UDT beach surveys. Firesupport plans were refined, and preassault advanced-force operations became more extensive and powerful. Firepower for the assaulting troops was substantially increased in terms of automatic weapons, demolitions, and flamethrowers. After Tarawa, as in Europe after Sicily, amphibious assaults in the Pacific enjoyed extensive preassault rehearsals and practice landings. In contrast to the army’s practice in Europe, the marines developed specialized amphibious vehicles and equipment to facilitate their movement ashore and to provide some armored-vehicle support to the first landing wave. Japan’s adroit use of camouflage, obstacles, booby traps, and terrain made such equipment critical to the landing’s success. At a minimum, it reduced marine casualties against a very determined and innovative opponent. The marines also developed special tactics. Squads were broken down into three 4-man fire teams centered on an automatic weapon to ensure more flexible employment and firepower in combat. Special teams incorporating flamethrowers and satchel charges were used to take out bunkers. More critically, the marines developed tactics to isolate fortified positions for later destruction so the landing’s momentum could be maintained. In the Pacific theater, the U.S. Army also developed its amphibious operations along different lines from its European theater counterparts and that of the marines. The U.S. Navy’s VII Amphibious Force applied the lessons learned from Guadalcanal throughout the Solomon Islands and New Guinea campaigns, but southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur’s preference for assaulting undefended beaches away from the main objective precluded the need for extensive advanced preparation for operations. Much of this was also due to his southwest Pacific landing on larger islands with more operational depth and landing options than those taken by the marines. Also, by the time MacArthur’s forces landed at

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Leyte in the Philippines, the Japanese had learned not to defend at the beach, where they would give away their positions and face overwhelming U.S. naval gunfire. The U.S. Marine Corps invasion of Iwo Jima (Operation DETACHMENT) saw the Japanese defenders adopt this new tactic. Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, the island’s commander, implemented a new strategy that relied on some 1,500 interlocking strong points inland, designed for a battle of attrition. The 21,000 Japanese defenders dug out thousands of yards of tunnels in the soft volcanic rock. The high cost of securing the island for the marines—6,500 dead and 20,000 wounded—is testimony to its deadly success. Operation ICEBERG, the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, marked the Western Allies’ final amphibious operation, applying the lessons learned from all the previous landings in the Pacific. More than 5,000 ships delivered two corps of more than 100,000 men onto the main island of Okinawa after a prolonged air and naval bombardment. Again, Japan chose to conduct the fight inland, making a determined stand at virtually every piece of high ground. It was the first time the army troops had faced concentrated Japanese fortifications with only limited room to maneuver around them. Additionally, Japan mounted an unprecedented suicide campaign by kamikazes against the amphibious fleet. The Battle of Okinawa claimed more than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawan military and civilian personnel dead. It was also the costliest battle of the Pacific war for the United States. The army lost 12,520 killed in action and 36,631 wounded. Marine casualties totaled 2,938 dead and 13,708 wounded, while the navy lost 4,907 men killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks. The navy was the only service in the battle in which the numbers of dead exceeded the wounded. Indeed, navy casualties for this battle were greater than those for the navy in all U.S. wars to that date. Although the U.S. Navy lost no capital ships, it did suffer 34 ships sunk and 368 damaged (of these, 43 had to be scrapped). The comparatively heavy losses of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns were the basis of the heavy casualty estimates for Operation DOWNFALL, the planned invasion for Japan that influenced the decision to employ the atomic bombs. Amphibious operations were critical to the Allied victory in the war. Lacking a land border with Axis territory after 1940, the Western Allies could never have contributed to Germany’s defeat nor beaten Japan had they not mastered amphibious operations, the most complex of all military activities. The war firmly established the amphibious operations procedures that are employed by all Western nations to this day. Carl O. Schuster See also: AVALANCHE, Operation; Crete, Naval Operations off; DETACHMENT, Operation; DOWNFALL, Operation; DRAGOON, Operation; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation

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of; HUSKY, Operation; ICEBERG, Operation; JUBILEE, Operation; Kamikaze; NEPTUNE, Operation; SHINGLE, Operation.

References Achkasov, V. I., and N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Clifford, Kenneth J. Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920– 1940. New York: Edgewood, 1983. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vols. 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 11. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1952. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea 1939–1945. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957–1961. Ruge, Friedrich. The Soviets as Naval Opponents, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 18, 1935) Important naval agreement between Britain and Germany preceding World War II. According to Article 190 of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 at the end of World War I, Germany was not permitted any naval aviation or submarines. Its navy was limited to 6 pre-dreadnought battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo boats. In November 1934, German chancellor Adolf Hitler, however, communicated to London his desire to secure a naval agreement with Britain; then in March 1935 he announced Germany’s rearmament in defiance of the 1919 Versailles Treaty. Despite the fact that the British government had in February 1935 promised that it would take no unilateral action toward Germany without first consulting with the French government, it proceeded to reach a naval arrangement with Germany. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on June 18, 1935. The British hoped this was the opening step in a series of arms limitations agreements that would contain German power, while the Germans saw in it the beginning of an alliance between Germany and Britain against France and the Soviet Union. The agreement was of great advantage to Germany, for it gave that country the right to build a surface navy up to 35 percent the size of the British Commonwealth aggregate fleets. This would mean the German navy might now be larger than the fleets of either France or Italy. The percentage would apply to each individual class of ship, except submarines, where Germany was granted parity with Britain, although it did agree not to go beyond a proportional strength of 45 percent of that possessed by members of the British Commonwealth, except in the event of a situation arising that would make a higher percentage necessary, in which case

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the German government would notify the British. Submarines, of course, had been specifically prohibited Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. Because Germany’s own fleet at the time was almost negligible, the promise was only another predated German check, and it cost Great Britain the open hostility of its principal ally, France. It also brought the collapse of the so-called Stresa front of British, French, and Italian opposition to Germany’s rearmament, and it marked the first step in the appeasement policy of Nazi Germany. British leaders believed that they had contained a threat to Britain’s security, and in the House of Lords, Admiral David Beatty declared that Britain had cause to be grateful to the Germans for agreeing to limit their naval strength. But the agreement shattered the Versailles Treaty and was merely a postdated check, which Hitler was not prepared to honor. He unilaterally repudiated the agreement on April 28, 1939. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy.

References Hildebrand, Klaus. The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich. London: Batsford, 1973. Maiolo, Joseph A. The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Raeder, Erich. Struggle for the Sea. London: William Kimber, 1959. Watt, D. C. “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement.” Journal of Modern History 28, no. 2 (June 1956), pp. 155–175. Weinberg, Gerhard L. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships Prior to World War II, most navies underestimated the threat presented by aircraft and consequently discounted the value of antiaircraft gunnery. The U.S. Navy was typical of this outlook. In 1933, the chief of naval operations admitted that ranking officers simply did not have time to study antiaircraft gunnery. In the 1934 edition of the General Tactical Instructions, only a portion of 1 page (out of 292 pages) dealt with antiaircraft fire. The navy vastly overestimated the effectiveness of its existing defenses as it relied on the 5-inch gun firing under local control and especially on the .50-caliber machine gun for close-in defense. Despite this general complacency, some storm warnings were flying. As aircraft performance improved toward the end of the decade, the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics warned that bomb hits might well be more numerous than shell hits in the next war. In 1939, Admiral Ernest J. King, then commander of a carrier unit in

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the annual fleet problem, dedicated his postexercise comments solely to the question of antiaircraft defense, with special emphasis on fire control. The outbreak of war brought the issue squarely to the fore. On April 17, 1940, the British destroyer Gurkha became the first ship ever to succumb to hostile air attack. Other losses quickly followed. The rapidly expanding capabilities of military aircraft proved especially challenging. Although some pessimists suggested that henceforth capital ships would not dare steam into range of land-based planes, navies scrambled to remedy the situation. Some services were in a better position than others in facing the threat. For instance, the design of many large ships, even the newest, made too little provision for antiaircraft defense. Modern battleships of the Axis navies carried two secondary batteries: one for defense (about 6-inch low angle) against surface craft, the other (4.1-inch for Germany; 5-inch, Japan; 90-mm, Italy) for antiaircraft work. Designers in Britain and the United States had been more far-sighted in mounting dual-purpose secondary guns (about 5-inch) useful for either role. So dangerous was the aircraft menace that two navies (the United States’ and Japan’s) experimented with shooting heavy projectiles into the sea to throw up columns of water in front of torpedo planes. Only the Japanese put these ideas into practice. They developed a special 18.1-inch shell filled with almost 10,000 bursting charges, and the battleship Yamato fired these unsuccessfully in April 1945. The basic problem was the difficulty of tracking a fast-moving plane with the ponderous turret guns. Also, the blast from these huge weapons made it impossible to man the smaller antiaircraft guns in exposed positions. Suitable gun batteries were only part of the solution. Prewar fire control systems, such as the Japanese Type 94, the German Type 1937, and the British Mk IV, encountered severe problems in compensating for the increasing speed of aircraft. The British deployed an adequate replacement in the Mk VI, and the U.S. Navy was most successful because it had under development in 1940 an advanced antiaircraft director, the Mk 37. Although this design was basically sound, it was heavy (at 16 tons), susceptible to vibration, and required a crew of seven. Nevertheless, variants of the Mk 37 were fitted to ships as small as destroyers and made to serve throughout the entire war by constant updating, with one model undergoing 92 modifications. As aircraft speeds went up, the Mk 37 director proved amenable to the addition of radar. The British considered the Mk 37 the best heavy director in the world. No matter how excellent the guns and fire control equipment, a weak link remained in the system. Standard antiaircraft shells were detonated by time fuses, which were inherently inaccurate due to variations in manufacture and to the necessity to set them manually. In 1940, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance embarked on an ambitious project to produce a fuse that would detonate automatically when the shell passed close to an airplane. The ultimate result was the proximity or VT


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(variable time) fuse, which was, in effect, a tiny radar set in the nose of a 5-inch shell. It first saw action in January 1943; from that date on, VT-fused projectiles proved four times as deadly as conventional ones. For close-in defense, navies relied on lighter weapons with their high rate of fire. Wartime experience quickly showed that machine guns, such as the .50-caliber, firing solid bullets lacked the necessary range and lethality. Much more promising were rapid-fire cannon with their explosive projectiles. The Japanese concentrated their efforts on the 25-mm Type 96, derived from the French Hotchkiss. Under local control, this weapon, with a rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute, was fitted in triple, dual, and single mountings. Similarly, the British invested in the 2-pounder, produced in a variety of mounts from single to six gun. Allied navies also came to rely heavily on guns produced under license from arms manufacturers in two neutral nations: the 20-mm Oerlikon developed in Switzerland and the Swedish 40-mm Bofors. The U.S. Navy tested the latter weapon in both twin and quadruple mounts early in 1942 and began large-scale production in the summer. The Oerlikon was fitted in both single and twin mounts, and this gun proved to be the most effective antiaircraft weapon until the fall of 1944, when the heavier 40-mm accounted for 50 percent of all kills by antiaircraft fire. Unfortunately, miniaturization had not developed to the point that the VT fuses could be fitted to 40-mm or 20-mm shells. From 1941, all navies added these lighter guns to their warships in unprecedented numbers. By end of the war, the British and Dominion navies had taken delivery of almost 55,000 20-mm Oerlikons. The largest warships carried huge antiaircraft batteries. In 1944, the German battleship Tirpitz mounted 16 37-mm and 84 20-mm guns; the Japanese Yamato, 166 25-mm. The British battleship Duke of York carried 55 20-mm, 8 40-mm guns, and 88 2-pounders. The evolution of the U.S. Navy’s last class of battleships is instructive. In 1941, the original plans of the battleship Iowa called for 24 40-mm and 40 20-mm guns. By October 1942, the number of Bofors grew to 40 guns and a month later to 16 quadruple mounts in addition to 60 20-mm guns. In June 1943, as the Iowa was fitting out, the ship’s captain asked for a considerable increase in the alreadyheavy antiaircraft battery. By this point, though, deck space was very much a limiting factor. There were antiaircraft guns crammed into every corner and even on turret tops. Ultimately, this class of ships carried up to 80 40-mm and 52 20-mm guns. To increase the flexibility of the antiaircraft armament, U.S. officers in 1942 began interconnecting the heavy and light directors so that the 5-inch/38 mounts could be employed for close-in work, and the 40-mm Bofors could fire at night using the radar equipment of the larger gun. These arrangements became so complex that the crew often rigged an electric status board to keep up to date on which mounts were controlled by which computer and which director. These samples of

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Yankee improvisation served well enough. Ordnance experts concluded after the war that the United States Navy had the best antiaircraft fire control in the world. In addition to vastly expanding the number of lighter guns on existing warships, some navies modified or constructed ships especially configured for the antiaircraft mission. The British as early as 1940 operated off Norway older cruisers that had been converted for this work, and by May 1940, the Royal Navy regarded the ships as “worth their weight in gold.” The British built 16 ships of the Dido class, the majority armed with 10 5.25-inch dual-purpose guns. During the war, the U.S. Navy took delivery of the 8 Atlanta-class cruisers equipped with up to 16 5-inch guns. By mid-war, all ships of destroyer size and smaller featured dual-purpose batteries. Typical were the Japanese Terutsuki-class destroyers with eight 100-mm, the U.S. Fletcher class with five 5-inch, and the British Hunt-class escorts armed with the 4-inch. Of course, such ships also carried close-in antiaircraft cannon. The attention lavished on antiaircraft defenses paid dividends in battles such as Santa Cruz and the Philippine Sea. Military analyst Bernard Brodie calculated that, by the end of 1943, the effectiveness of the U.S. battle fleet’s antiaircraft gunfire had increased one-hundredfold in two years. But the race between ship defenses and aircraft was constant. Aircraft improved in capability as well, with Kamikazes (essentially missiles guided by humans) and stand-off weapons like the German Hs-293 adding a new order of lethality. Following the war, navies would turn to missiles to defend their surface warships. Malcolm Muir Jr. See also: Battleships; Cruisers; Destroyers; Iowa Class, U.S. Battleships; King, Ernest Joseph; Proximity Fuse; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Friedman, Norman. US Naval Weapons: Every Gun, Missile, Mine and Torpedo Used by the U.S. Navy from 1883 to the Present Day. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983.

Antishipping Campaign off Norway Between April 1944 and May 1945, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Coastal Command conducted an intensive campaign against German merchant shipping, light warships, and submarines off the Norwegian coast. The three principal objectives were to relieve German pressure on the Allied Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union, to disrupt and destroy the important ore trade to Germany, and to interdict U-boats attempting to reach the North Atlantic.

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Aircraft conducted the bulk of the campaign. Royal Navy carrier aircraft launched more than 30 operations during this period. Fleet carriers engaged in strikes against the battleship Tirpitz in April and August 1944 (operations TUNGSTEN and GOODWOOD) as well as undertook missions against German coastal shipping. Individual fleet carriers also conducted specific antishipping operations in June, September, October, and December 1944, after which they transferred from home waters to the British Pacific Fleet. In total, aircraft from the fleet carriers sank almost 100,000 tons of shipping, damaged an equal amount, and destroyed numerous small escort vessels and flak ships. Escort carriers undertook many more antishipping operations, usually individually but occasionally as a squadron of two of three carriers. Over this period, 12 escort carriers deployed off the Norwegian coast, sufficient to ensure at least two strikes per month. Their smaller air groups militated against duplicating the success of the fleet carriers, but their aircraft still sank almost 80,000 tons of shipping, a depot ship, two U-boats, numerous smaller auxiliary warships, and more than 15,000 tons of shipping in a simultaneous mining campaign. Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s land-based antishipping squadrons cooperated closely with the carrier campaign. In late 1943, it opened a base at Banff in Scotland, and, by spring 1944, four squadrons were operational, a force that soon expanded to eight squadrons of Mosquito fighter-bombers and Beaufighter strike aircraft with the addition of an airfield at Dallachy. The Banff and Dallachy Strike Wings maintained an intensive tempo of operations against Norwegian coastal shipping, averaging more than 20 strike packages per month from September 1944 onward. The wings sank over 80,000 tons of shipping during the campaign and numerous warships, including a minesweeper and seven U-boats in April to May 1945 alone. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Arctic Convoys; Convoys, Axis; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Bird, Andrew D. A Separate Little War: The Banff Coastal Command Strike Wing Versus the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe 1944–1945. London: Grub Street, 2003. Brown, J. D., Carrier Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Goulter, Christi. A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign 1940–1945. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

Antisubmarine Warfare The effectiveness of submarine attacks made the development of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics one of the most important challenges for both sides during

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World War II. At the beginning of the war, both the Allied and Axis powers underestimated the potential impact of submarine warfare. The British were confident that ASDIC (for Allied Submarine Detection Investigating Committee), later known as sonar (sound navigation ranging), would enable them to detect submarines out to a range of several thousand yards and that they would thus be able to sink German submarines at will. Then, too, at the beginning of the war Germany had few submarines. On September 1, 1939, commander of German submarines, Kommodore Karl Dönitz, had available 57 submarines, of which 27 were oceangoing types. Nonetheless, submarines quickly emerged as potent weapons in the European theater because of the domination of the British surface navy and improvements in both weapons and tactics. During the first two months of the war, U-boats were able to sink 67 Allied naval and merchant vessels. Italian submarines also participated in this effort, in the course of the war sinking a half million tons of Allied Atlantic shipping. Allied losses continued to climb, and at the peak of the Battle of the Atlantic in March 1943, U-boats sank 96 ships in only 20 days. Meanwhile, after overcoming deficiencies in armament and strategy, U.S. Navy submarines extracted a significant toll on Japanese shipping in the Pacific theater. By the end of the war, U.S. submarines had accounted for 57 percent of all Japanese naval and merchant losses. Initially, the principal tactics and weapons used in antisubmarine efforts by both sides during the war were those that had been developed and honed during World War I. Soon after the outbreak of World War II, the British reintroduced the convoy system. This had proved successful in World War I, and it minimized losses during World War II. For instance, at the outbreak of World War II, ships traveling in convoys between North America and Great Britain suffered only 2 percent losses until the Germans developed improved tactics. The Rudeltaktik (wolf tactic, which the Allies referred to as the “wolf pack”) developed by Dönitz involved simultaneous attacks at night by many submarines. It diminished the effectiveness of the convoy system, which was in any case initially hampered by a lack of escort ships. Not until 1943 could the Allies deploy sufficient numbers of escorts to optimize the convoy system, which worked best with a ratio of at least one escort for every three merchant ships. One exception to the convoy system in the Atlantic was the use of fast liners to carry troops. Ships such as the Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary were able to steam at more than 26 knots and literally outrun U-boats. Throughout the war, the superliners sailed without escorts and ultimately without loss. Concurrently, in the Pacific, U.S. submarine success was partly attributable to Japan’s failures to pay attention to the protection of sea transport, to develop the specialized tools such as forward-thrown ASW weapons, and to construct the specialized escorts required to effectively convoy their traffic. In December 1941, the Japanese had only four


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Shimushu- or Type A–class ships, their only purpose-built escort warships, and they were not equipped with hydrophones until the autumn of 1942, when the Royal Navy had some 2,100 vessels of all types equipped with sonar. British defenses of the vital Atlantic trade routes were strengthened in May 1941, when the U.S. Navy began escorting convoys between the United States and Iceland. Then, in June 1941, Canada created the Canadian Escort Force for the same purpose. The Royal Canadian Navy played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Comprising only 6 destroyers and 5 minesweepers at the beginning of the war, the Royal Canadian Navy grew by war’s end to include 2 light carriers, 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 63 frigates, 109 corvettes, 89 minesweepers, and many other vessels. Virtually all these were committed to the Battle of the Atlantic. Antisubmarine weapons existed in two broad forms: passive and active. Passive weapons included underwater mines and impediments, such as submarine nets, designed to prevent submarines from moving into certain areas. Underwater contact mines exploded when they touched a hull; magnetic mines exploded when a ship or submarine was in their vicinity. Mines could be placed at a variety of depths to make them more effective. To protect their ships against torpedoes, the Allied powers developed several countermeasures. One of the most successful was the “noisemaker.” Towed behind a ship, it could disable advanced acoustic torpedoes. Another was the degausser, which discharged an electronic current at regular intervals through a cable around the hull of a ship. The current helped to reduce the ship’s magnetic field, reducing its vulnerability to the magnetic detonators in certain torpedoes. Active antisubmarine weapons included depth charges, torpedoes, aerial bombs, and other explosive devices designed to rupture the hull of a submarine and sink it. The depth charge was a waterproof bomb that could be set to explode at a particular depth. The charge did not have to come into contact with a submarine to be effective; at close range, its concussion could breach a submarine’s hull. Depth charges improved during the course of the war. Such weapons could be either rolled off the stern of a ship or fired from projectors. The Italians had a multirack system that could deliver 48 depth charges in a single pass. Weapons such as the hedgehog, when fired from a ship, delivered many smaller charges ahead of the escort vessel. Depth charges and torpedoes could also be delivered by aircraft. As the war progressed, the crews of Allied planes and ships became more adept at developing patterns to enhance the effectiveness of depth-charge runs. Key to the success of a surface attack on submarines was the escorting ships’ ability to use their superior speed to keep enemy submarines contained within a certain area and then to deliver successive depth-charge attacks. Submarines usually had a smaller turning ratio than escort vessels, so containment of the submarine was especially important to a successful attack.

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Antisubmarine weapons were most commonly deployed by escort ships and airplanes. The escorts were usually small, lightly armed, fast craft ranging from destroyers and corvettes to frigates and small motor launches. Some merchant ships were also equipped with depth charges or other antisubmarine weapons. Aircraft proved especially useful in antisubmarine warfare. They could spot submarines from long distances and either attack the submarines themselves or report a submarine’s presence to surface units. Aircraft could also use a variety of weapons to attack the submarine. However, because of the Battle of Britain and the subsequent concentration on strategic bombing, British and U.S. air commanders were reluctant to allocate aircraft for antisubmarine roles. Large flying boats and later the long-range Consolidated B-24 Liberator equipped with radar proved critical in closing the mid-Atlantic gap, a wide area in the central Atlantic that had lacked air protection. In 1943, the German navy began equipping U-boats with significant antiaircraft defenses made up of rapid-fire 20-mm and 37-mm cannon. These German antiaircraft defenses were subsequently overcome as the Allies began to deploy additional long-range bombers. During one week in the summer of 1943, Allied aircraft sank nine U-boats in the Bay of Biscay alone. The increased use of aircraft along the coasts of the United States and Great Britain reduced the number of submarine attacks in these regions. To improve the convoys’ chances, the British began modifying ships into escort carriers—merchant or naval ships that had the capability to launch one or more aircraft. Critical in antisubmarine warfare was the ability to locate the submarine and therefore render its stealth meaningless. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, sonar (known as ASDIC by the British) was developed. Sonar devices sent out sound pulses and then ranged underwater using the echoes. Using detection devices and direction finders, the Allies were able to detect and attack submarines before they came in range of the merchant vessels. Ships could also be fitted with hydrophones or other listening devices that detected the sounds emitted by a submarine. Although the Germans endeavored to develop rubber sheathing for their U-boats, sonar remained the most important detection device in antisubmarine warfare. Surface radar could also be used to detect submarines, since the subs had to surface periodically to recharge their electric batteries. British Coastal Command aircraft were also equipped with lightweight 10-cm radar developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology radiation laboratory; working with Royal Navy corvettes, such aircraft played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Radar enabled Allied aircraft or surface ships to locate Axis submarines and attack them, even at night. The widespread installation of radar in Allied aircraft brought increasing numbers of U-boat kills. In response, the U-boats began using their own acoustic detection devices, called Biscay crosses, to warn of approaching planes. However, the devices often did not provide the U-boat crews sufficient time to react before an attack.


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Even before the United States entered the war, the United States and Great Britain had initiated a variety of cooperative programs to protect merchant ships. German successes added urgency to these efforts, which led to establishment of the Anglo-American integrated convoy system. As a result of the Allied Convoy Conference in 1943, lines of control over convoys were split: the United States controlled the central and South Atlantic, and Canada and Great Britain controlled the northern convoy routes. In May 1943, U.S. chief of naval operations, Admiral Ernest King, created the Tenth Fleet. Although it did not have ships attached to it, the Tenth Fleet maintained the submarine tracking room (covertly classified as unit F-21), which used radar and sonar reports and cryptologic intelligence—of immense importance in this campaign—to plot the movement of Axis submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific. F-21 coordinated U.S. antisubmarine efforts with the British tracking section at the Admiralty in London and with a much smaller unit attached to the Canadian naval command. The combination of aircraft, better intelligence, increased use of radar and sonar, and improved coordination and tactics led to massive losses among the German U-boat force. In May 1943, the Germans lost 43 subs. The average monthly losses, due to all causes, were 12 for the last six months of 1942 and 19 in 1943. By the summer of 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic was being won. In 1943 and 1944, the Allies sank 453 U-boats, and Allied merchant losses were dramatically reduced. Aircraft proved vital in antisubmarine warfare; they could deflect German bomber attacks against the Allied convoys and do battle with surfaced submarines. Early in the war, in order to provide fighter protection, the British equipped several merchantmen with a forward catapult that held a modified Hurricane fighter. After launch and intercept, the fighter would try to make landfall or else would land in the water. A more satisfactory solution was to fit a flight deck to the hull of a merchant ship. The German cargo/passenger ship Hannover, taken in March 1940, was converted into the first escort carrier, the Audacity, and entered service in June 1941 carrying six fighters. Additional escort carriers soon appeared in the form of U.S.-built conversions. They entered service with the Royal Navy in the first half of 1942. Designed to carry 15 aircraft each, the escort carriers proved invaluable. Unlike their British counterparts, U.S. captains of escort carriers late in the war enjoyed complete freedom of action to mount hunt-and-kill missions. Teams composed of an escort carrier and half a dozen destroyers or new destroyer escorts sank 53 U-boats and captured 1; the teams may have been the single most important U.S. contribution to the war against the U-boats. German U-boats succeeded in shattering a special convoy designated TM I (Tanker, Trinidad-Gibraltar) that sailed from Trinidad for Gibraltar at the end of December 1942 and inflicted 77 percent losses. This led British prime minister

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Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to concentrate on the U-boat menace during their meeting at Casablanca in January 1943. Churchill urged that priority be given to the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allied leaders decided to provide for the effort additional convoy escorts, aircraft assets (including the VLR Consolidated B-24 Liberator, which was to be based at Newfoundland for the first time to close the Greenland air gap), and escort carriers. Unfortunately, nearly three months passed before these available assets were diverted to the battle. Carrier-based aircraft were essential in closing the mid-Atlantic gap, and longrange aircraft flying from Britain also were important, although the preoccupation of the Royal Air Force with strategic bombing meant that Coastal Command possessed few long-range aircraft. Only grudgingly did Bomber Command’s Air Marshal Arthur Harris make such air assets available. The U.S. Consolidated PBY Catalina and PB2Y Coronado and the British Short Sunderland flying boats proved invaluable, as did long-range B-24 Liberator and British Lancaster bombers. In August 1944, Royal Air Force Bomber Command Squadron 617 (the “Dam Busters”) mounted attacks with special “tallboy” bombs against the concretereinforced U-boat pens of the Bay of Biscay. These raids were highly effective, and in the last year of the war, 57 U-boats were destroyed by bombing, compared with only 5 destroyed by bombers in the previous five years. This shows what might have been accomplished had the bombers been directed against the submarines earlier. Indeed, after March 1943, aircraft were probably the chief factor in the defeat of the U-boats. Between March 1943 and May 1945, a total of 590 U-boats were destroyed, compared with only 194 in the previous three and a half years of war. Of the 590 destroyed, 290 were by air power, 174 by ships, and the remainder through a combination of the two or from other causes. A number of factors brought the Allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The convoy system was important, but so too was technology, primarily the 10-cm radar sets, sonar, improved depth charges, rockets fired from aircraft, and forwardthrown shipborne antisubmarine hedgehogs or “mousetraps” (small depth charges known to the British as squids). The high-intensity Leigh light on aircraft illuminated the submarines on the surface at night. Radio detection equipment was vital, and long-range aviation helped narrow the so-called black hole in the central Atlantic. Intelligence also played a role, chiefly ULTRA intercepts of U-boat communications that guided aircraft to the submarines. The hunter-killer groups operating independently of the convoys also carried the war to the submarines. It is true, however, that Allied and interservice cooperation was far too long in coming. In the Pacific Campaign, use of submarines turned out to be decisive, but this time it was the Allies—specifically U.S. submarines—that carried the war to the Japanese. Allied success came in part because the Japanese never developed effective antisubmarine techniques. The Japanese also failed to use their submarines effectively. Although they developed some fine, large, long-range types, the Japanese


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Crewmen of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Spencer observe the explosion of a depth charge that resulted in the sinking of the German submarine U-175 in the North Atlantic on April 17, 1943. (National Archives)

never really deployed their submarines against Allied merchant ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy subscribed to the doctrine that submarines were an ancillary weapon of the main battle fleet. The ineffectiveness of U.S. submarines early in the Pacific because of a faulty torpedo only reinforced the Japanese attitude that submarines were not a key weapons system. The Japanese often used their own submarines as longrange transports and supply vessels, and some Japanese submarines carried aircraft. In addition, design problems (the Japanese submarines were large and easily detectable) further minimized Japanese submarines’ effectiveness. Because they lacked radar detection and avoidance systems, Japanese submarines were especially vulnerable to antisubmarine efforts. The Japanese deployed 190 submarines during the course of the war, and the Allies sank 129 of them. For their part, Japanese submarines sank 184 merchant vessels during the entire war, and they made little effort to attack Allied transport and supply convoys from the mainland United States. The most significant danger to Allied merchant shipping in the Pacific theater actually came from the handful of German U-boats and

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raiders that were based in Sumatra and operated mainly in the Indian Ocean or from Japanese air units. In the Pacific theater, the Allies also successfully employed the antisubmarine tactics developed in the Atlantic Campaign to further minimize merchant losses. Ineffective Japanese antisubmarine warfare techniques led to the lowest percentage of losses for U.S. submarines of any of the submarine forces of the major powers during the war. Still, the U.S. Navy lost 52 subs—hardly a small number. It was not until the end of 1943 that the Japanese navy established its first escort squadron and not until 1944 that significant air units began to engage in antisubmarine patrols. It was a case of too little, too late. The first Japanese depth charges, which used a time fuse rather than a pressure-activated detonation device, were also ineffective. More significantly, the Japanese lacked antisubmarine sonar and lightweight radar sets. These considerations and the loss of so many Japanese aircraft in combat reduced the effectiveness of Japan’s antisubmarine patrols. Finally, U.S. submarines could detect Japanese radar emissions. Antisubmarine warfare came into its own in World War II. It was certainly a key factor in the war at sea, at least in the Atlantic theater. Thomas Lansford and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of; Canada, Navy; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; King, Ernest Joseph; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Radar; Sonar; Submarines; Torpedoes; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japanese Shipping; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1996, 1998. Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Hoyt, Edwin P. The Death of the U-Boats. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988. Milner, Marc. The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany’s Submarines. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Padfield, Peter. War beneath the Sea: Submarine Conflict during World War II. New York: John Wiley, 1995. Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.

ARCHERY, Operation (Vågsøy Island Raid, December 27, 1941) A British combined arms operation against German-held Vågsøy Island, Norway. It involved the cruiser Kenya; the destroyers Chiddingfold, Offa, Onslow,

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and Oribi; the troop transports Prince Charles and Prince Leopold; and the submarine Tuna. The invasion force of 570 men included No. 3 Commando, two platoons of No. 2 Commando, a medical detachment from No. 4 Commando, and a demolition unit from No. 6 Commando, along with a dozen Norwegians. The Royal Air Force provided air support. As with the earlier Operation CLAYMORE, the chief objective of the raid was Norwegian fish oil factories, the destruction of which would adversely affect German glycerine production for munitions. Following a preliminary naval bombardment, the commandos went ashore on the morning of December 27. Opposition was light, except in the town of Måløy, where a unit of German mountain troops was on leave from the Eastern Front, and bitter house-to-house fighting ensued. The raid concluded in mid-afternoon. The commandos destroyed four fish factories, a considerable quantity of fish oil, ammunition and fuel stores, and some military installations. The British naval force also destroyed 10 ships in the harbor. The commandos killed some 120 Germans and captured 98. They also brought off some Norwegian collaborators and Norwegians seeking to join their country’s armed forces in exile. The commandos also secured a copy of the German naval code. The attackers suffered 22 men killed and 57 wounded. The Royal Air Force lost eight aircraft. This raid and the earlier Operation CLAYMORE helped convince German chancellor Adolf Hitler to send an additional 30,000 German troops to Norway and to take steps to upgrade its coastal defenses. Spencer C. Tucker See also: CLAYMORE, Operation; Signals Intelligence.

References Dunford-Slater, John. Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. (Reprint of London: William Kimber, 1953) Ladd, James D. Commandos and Rangers of World War 2. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978. Messenger, Charles. Commandos 1940–1946. London: William Kimber, 1985.

Arctic Convoys Convoys transporting war matériel from the United States and Britain to the Soviet Union. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British government made the political decision to support the Soviet Union with armaments and, almost simultaneously, the United States extended the benefits of the

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Lend-Lease Act to include supplying Russia. The first convoy, seven merchant ships in Operation DERVISH, left Liverpool on August 12, 1941, and the final round-trip transit (convoys JW/RA 67) occurred May 12–30, 1945, just after the surrender of German forces in Europe. Shipping headed to or from Soviet Arctic ports faced a quadruple German threat in addition to the hazards of navigation in stormy, fog-bound, icy seas. Germany based large numbers of U-boats in Norway, and, from the spring of 1942, most of its modern heavy surface warships transferred there, too. The Luftwaffe stationed substantial forces in Norway and transferred specialist antishipping units there as the Allied convoy system became more established. Finally, Germany conducted a steady mining campaign against the ports themselves. The proximity of the convoy route to Norway and the deployment of German heavy surface units and antishipping aircraft had a profound influence on the conduct of convoy operations. Almost all Arctic convoys were more heavily escorted than regular trade convoys. In addition to the usual small escort vessels, the close escort usually included several fleet destroyers. Furthermore, the British Home Fleet often deployed heavy covering forces for the convoys, ranging in size from one or two cruisers (plus escorts) to large squadrons that also included battleships and fleet and escort carriers. Actual sorties or threats of excursions by German heavy surface warships precipitated several notable actions. Intelligence that the battleship Tirpitz had sortied led to Convoy PQ 17 being ordered to disperse on July 4, 1942. The unescorted merchantmen were easy targets for German aircraft and submarines; 23 of the 34 ships in the convoy were sunk. Other significant actions were the Battle of the Barents Sea (December 31, 1942), in which a British combined cruiser-destroyer force fought off an attack by the pocket battleship Lützow, heavy cruiser Hipper, and destroyers, allowing the entire convoy to reach the Soviet Union unscathed, and the Battle of the North Cape (December 26, 1943), in which the German battleship Scharnhorst was sunk. In addition, the presence of the Tirpitz precipitated a series of underwater and air attacks between September 1943 and its sinking on November 12, 1944. A total of 848 merchantmen sailed to Russia in 42 convoys and one major unescorted operation, of which 65 were sunk. Of 735 ships that sailed from Russia in 36 convoys and one major unescorted operation, 40 were sunk. Overall, this loss rate was slightly higher than that of North Atlantic convoys, and it was distorted by the very high casualties of PQ 17. Paul E. Fontenoy

See also: Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Electronic Intelligence; Fraser, Bruce Austin; North Cape, Battle of; Pound, Alfred Dudley; Submarines, Midget; Tirpitz, Attacks on; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn.

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References Claasen, Adam R. A. Hitler’s Northern War: The Luftwaffe’s Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940– 1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Edwards, Bernard. The Road to Russia: Arctic Convoys 1942–1945. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2002. Hague, Arnold. The Allied Convoy System 1936–1945: Its Organization, Defense and Operation. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Llewellyn-Jones, Malcolm. The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys (Naval Staff Histories). London: Routledge, 2006. Wragg, David. Sacrifice for Stalin: The Cost and Value of the Arctic Convoys Re-Assessed. London: Leo Cooper, 2005.

Arima Masafumi (1895–1944) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Kagoshima on September 25, 1895, Arima Masafumi joined the Japanese navy in 1915. During the Sino-Japanese War beginning in 1937, he commanded the Kamikawa-maru, a transport that had been converted into a seaplane tender, and took part in the operations in southern China. Between 1938 and 1941, Arima had charge of various naval air units. In October 1942, during the Battle of Santa Cruz, Captain Arima commanded the fleet aircraft carrier Sho¯kaku, flagship of Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s Third Fleet. Although the Sho¯kaku was heavily damaged by U.S. aircraft in the Battle of Santa Cruz, damage control and navigation skills saved the ship. Also in this battle, the Sho¯kaku’s aircraft fatally crippled the U.S. aircraft carrier Hornet, which was later abandoned and eventually sunk by Japanese destroyers. At the close of the battle, Arima called for continuing air attacks on the remaining U.S. ships, but Nagumo flatly rejected this suggestion. In this sense, Arima was in the same position as Yamaguchi Tamon was at the Battle of Midway. Following a short stint at the Navy Aviation Department as head of the training section, in 1943 Arima was promoted to rear admiral, and in the following year he took command of the 26th Air Flotilla based in the Philippines. During the air battle off Taiwan (Formosa) on October 15, 1944, Arima led an attack on U.S. warships. When his “Betty” bomber was hit, Arima ordered the pilot to dive the plane into the U.S. aircraft carrier Franklin, but the aircraft was shot down by the U.S. combat air patrol and missed its intended target. To that date, Arima was the highest-ranking Japanese naval officer to carry out a suicide air attack. His dramatic death preceded the first organized kamikaze operation, which took place off Leyte on October 25. Arima was posthumously promoted to vice admiral. Tohmatsu Haruo See also: Kamikaze; Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of; Ugaki Matome; Yamaguchi Tamon.

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References Inoguchi Rikihei and Nakajima Tadashi, with Roger Pineau. The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1958. Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner. The Sacred Warriors: Japan’s Suicide Legions. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982. Y’Blood, William T. Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Ark Royal, British Aircraft Carrier The Ark Royal was the Royal Navy’s first large, purpose-built aircraft carrier. Constructed by Cammell Laird, it was laid down on September 16, 1935; launched on April 12, 1937; and completed on November 16, 1938. The British designed the ship to comply with the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. The ship displaced 22,000 tons standard load and 27,720 tons deep load. The Ark Royal measured 800 ft. in overall length by 94 ft. 9 in. in beam. The design was of interest because the flight deck was an integral part of the hull structure and served as the upper strength deck. The warship had two catapults. Its hull was protected by an armor belt up to 4.5 inches thick. Its engines delivered a maximum speed of 31 knots. The Ark Royal mounted 16 4.5-inch (2 guns each in eight mounts) and 32 2-pounder pom-pom guns (4 guns each in eight mounts). The carrier’s offensive power lay in 60 aircraft stowed in two hangers. Crew complement was 1,580 men. Although shortages prevented the Ark Royal from carrying its full complement of aircraft, it nonetheless provided highly effective service in the first two years of World War II. This included service with Force H, hunting down and helping to sink the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941. The Ark Royal was hit near Gibraltar on November 13, 1941, by a single torpedo from the German submarine U-81. It blew a large opening on the starboard side of the ship, knocking out its electrical power, and rendered the crew incapable of controlling the flooding. The Ark Royal sank the next day. Eric W. Osborne See also: Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Force H; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Apps, Michael. The Four Ark Royals. London: William Kimber, 1976. Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980.

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Jameson, William. Ark Royal, 1939–1941. London: Hart-Davis, 1957. Lenton, H. T. British and Empire Warships of the Second World War. London: Greenhill Books, 1998. Rossiter, Mike. Ark Royal: The Life, Death and Rediscovery of the Legendary Second World War Aircraft Carrier. 2nd ed. London: Corgi Books, 2007.

Arnauld de la Perière, Lothar von (1886–1942) German navy admiral. Born in Posen (today Poznan, Poland) in 1886, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière entered the Imperial German Navy in 1903 and was commissioned in 1906. He became a torpedo specialist. Following sea duty, in 1913 Arnaud became adjutant to chief of the naval staff Admiral Hugo von Pohl. He then spent time in Britain acquiring language skills until the outbreak of World War I. Returning to Germany, Arnauld volunteered for the Imperial Naval Air Service (Zeppelins), but he was recalled by von Pohl. He then volunteered for U-boat service, and on completing submarine school, in October 1915 he took command of the U-35 based at Pola on the Adriatic. From November 1915 to March 1918, Arnaud completed 14 cruises with the Pola Flotilla. During one cruise alone in 1916, he sank 54 ships totaling more than 90,150 tons. In March 1918, Arnaud took command of the U-139 in the Atlantic. During his wartime total of 16 patrols, Arnauld sank 196 ships totaling 455,716 tons. This record stands unsurpassed in both world wars and indeed all history. Retained in the German navy following World War I, Arnauld filled staff billets and commanded the light cruiser Emden from 1928 to 1930. He left the navy in 1931 as a captain and subsequently taught at the Turkish Naval Academy from 1932 to 1938. Recalled to the German navy at the start of World War II, Arnauld subsequently served as naval commander in Belgium, the Netherlands, Brittany, and western France. Promoted to vice admiral and named Admiral Southeast, he died in a plane crash at Le Bourget airport in Paris on February 24, 1942, en route to take up his new command. Dana Lombary and T. P. Schweider See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Submarines.

References Grey, Edwin A. The U-Boat War, 1914–1918. London: Leo Cooper, 1972. Miller, David. U-Boats. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2001. Tarrant, V. E. The U-Boat Offensive, 1914–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

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Aruga Kosaku (1897–1945) Japanese navy officer. Born August 31, 1897, in Nagano Prefecture, Aruga Kosaku became a career naval officer. He specialized in surface warfare, especially in destroyers. In 1923, Aruga graduated from the advanced course at the torpedo school, and during the next decade he served in light cruisers. He was promoted to captain in November 1940. By the beginning of World War II, Aruga was commander of Destroyer Division 4. During the June 1942 Battle of Midway, Aruga’s destroyers screened Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s 1st Carrier Striking Force. Two months later, Aruga, still commanding Destroyer Division 4, participated in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, screening Rear Admiral Abe Hiroaki’s Vanguard Group. In March 1943, Aruga took command of the cruiser Chokai. In July 1944, he was appointed head of the torpedo school. On November 25, 1944, Aruga, now a rear admiral, assumed command of the battleship Yamato. Its war record had been undistinguished, and, as flagship of the Combined Fleet and powerful national symbol, it had often been kept far removed from action. The Yamato had been damaged by a torpedo from the U.S. submarine Skate on December 25, 1943, and its only surface action had been in the battle off Samar in October 1944 against U.S. escort carriers. On April 1, 1945, U.S. forces landed on Okinawa. Taunted by his army counterpart that the Yamato was a floating hotel for idle and inept admirals, commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Toyoda Soemu drafted orders for Operation ICHITEN. The Yamato was provided sufficient fuel for a one-way trip to Okinawa. Escorted by a light cruiser and eight destroyers, the Yamato was to draw off U.S. carrier planes, leaving the U.S. fleet vulnerable to a mass attack by kamikazes. The Yamato would then destroy the U.S. transports off Okinawa and be beached to serve as an unsinkable fortress. Its crew could also join the fighting on land. When the task force commanders learned of the orders, they protested. Although they were willing to die for Japan, they did not believe the plan would produce significant results. They wanted instead to attack U.S. lines of communication. When Second Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Ito¯ Seiichi, who took command of the operation aboard the Yamato, refused to change the orders, Aruga and the other commanders accepted their fate. Aruga was overheard to state, “What a glorious way to die!” The Yamato sortied the afternoon of April 6. Cadets and ill sailors were landed before its departure. U.S. forces located the Yamato early the next morning and pounded it with waves of carrier planes. It was hit by at least 7 bombs and 11 to 15 torpedoes. When flooding caused a serious list to port, Aruga ordered counterflooding, although many men were trapped below decks. By 2:00 p.m., Aruga realized the end was near. He ordered that Emperor Hirohito’s portrait be saved

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and had himself tied to the compass mounting to avoid surviving the sinking of his ship. At 2:23 p.m., the Yamato capsized and exploded. Aruga was not among the 269 survivors of the Yamato’s 2,767-man crew. He was posthumously promoted to vice admiral. Tim J. Watts See also: Abe Hiroaki; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Kamikaze; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Toyoda Soemu; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. O’Neill, Richard. Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II: Their Development and Their Missions. London: Salamander Books, 1981. Spurr, Russell. A Glorious Way to Die: The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato, April 1945. New York: Newmarket Press, 1981. Yoshida, Mitsuru. Requiem for Battleship Yamato. Trans. Richard Minear. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Athenia, SS, Sinking of (September 3, 1939) The passenger liner SS Athenia was the first British ship sunk by Germany in World War II. Launched at Govan, Scotland, in 1923 and owned after 1935 by the Donaldson Atlantic Line Ltd., the Athenia displaced 13,465 tons and was 536 ft. 4 in. in overall length with a beam of 66 ft. 5 in. The ship was regularly employed in the trans-Atlantic run between either Liverpool or Glasgow and Québec and Montréal. On September 1, 1939, the day that Germany invaded Poland, the Athenia sailed from Glasgow for Montréal. Commanded by Captain James Cook, it had a crew of 315 and was carrying 1,103 passengers, more than 300 of whom were Americans. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. That same afternoon, the Athenia was steaming near the Hebrides Islands off Scotland’s west coast when it was spotted and then tracked for three hours by the German submarine U-30, commanded by Oberleutnant Fritz-Julius Lemp. The attack occurred at 7:40 p.m. without warning, despite German chancellor Adolf Hitler’s instructions that U-boat commanders follow the Hague Conventions. Lemp later claimed that, because the ship was darkened and zigzagging, he assumed it was a troop transport or a disguised Q-ship or auxiliary cruiser. Two torpedoes struck the Athenia, only one of which exploded. The ship soon began to settle by the stern, although it did not sink for 14 hours, until 10:40 a.m. on September 4. Seven ships, including three British destroyers, raced to the scene and

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rescued survivors. Of 117 people who perished (98 passengers and 19 crew members) in the torpedo explosion and the subsequent evacuation, 28 were Americans. The sinking of the Athenia was widely reported in newspaper headlines throughout the English-speaking world. It certainly exacerbated anti-German sentiment in the neutral United States. Berlin claimed that the British had sunk the Athenia themselves to win U.S. sympathy. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantic, Battle of the.

References Brennecke, Jochen. The Hunters and the Hunted. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Rademaacher, Cay. Drei Tage im September–die letze Fahrt der Athenia. Hamburg, Germany: Mareverlag, 1939.

Atlantic, Battle of the The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of World War II. In it, the German navy tried to sever the Allied sea lines of communication along which supplies necessary to fight the war were sent to Great Britain. To carry out the battle, the Germans employed a few surface raiders and long-range aircraft, but principally they used U-boats. At the beginning of the war, the German navy possessed not the 300 U-boats deemed necessary by Kommodore Karl Dönitz (he was promoted to rear admiral in October 1939), but 57 boats, of which only 27 were of types that could reach the Atlantic from their home bases. Although an extensive building program was immediately begun, only in the second half of 1941 did U-boat numbers begin to rise. On the Allied side, British navy leaders were at first confident that their ASDIC (for Allied Submarine Detection Investigating Committee) location device would enable their escort vessels to defend the supply convoys against the submerged attackers, so that shipping losses might be limited until the building of new merchant ships by Britain, Canada, and the United States could settle the balance. However, Dönitz planned to concentrate groups of U-boats (called wolf packs by the Allies) against the convoys to permit attacks by multiple submarines on the surface at night. It took time, however, before the battles of the convoys really began. The Battle of the Atlantic became a running match between numbers of German U-boats and the development of their weapons against the Allied merchant ships, their sea and air escorts (with improving detection equipment), and new weapons.


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The old Royal Navy aircraft carrier Courageous was on antisubmarine patrol in the Western Approaches southwest of Ireland on September 17, 1939, when it was hit by two torpedoes from the German submarine U-29 and sank in less than 15 minutes with the loss of 519 lives. (AP/Wide World Photos)

The Battle of the Atlantic may be subdivided into eight phases. During the first of these, from September 1939 to June 1940, a small number of U-boats, seldom more than 10 at a time, made individual cruises west of the British Isles and into the Bay of Biscay to intercept Allied merchant ships. Generally, these operated independently because the convoy system, which the British Admiralty had planned before the war, was slow to take shape. Thus the U-boats found targets, attacking at first according to prize rules by identifying the ship and providing for the safety of its crew. However, when Britain armed its merchant ships, increasingly the German submarines struck without warning. Dönitz’s plan to counter the convoy with group or pack operations of U-boats—also developed and tested before the war—was put on trial in October and November 1939 and in February 1940. The results confirmed the possibility of vectoring a group of U-boats to a convoy by radio signals from whichever U-boat first sighted the convoy. However, at this time, the insufficient numbers of U-boats available and frequent torpedo failures prevented real successes.

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The German conquest of Norway and western France provided the U-boats with new bases much closer to the main operational area off the Western Approaches and brought about a second phase from July 1940 to May 1941. In this phase, the U-boats, operating in groups, were directed by radio signals from the shore against the convoys, in which were now concentrated most of the maritime traffic to and from Great Britain. Even if the number of U-boats in the operational area still did not rise to more than 10 at a time, a peak of efficiency was attained in terms of the relationship between tonnage sunk and U-boat days at sea. This was made possible partly by the weakness of the convoy escort groups because the Royal Navy held back destroyers to guard against an expected German invasion of Britain and maintained large forces in the Mediterranean to offset the loss of the French navy. In addition, British merchant shipping losses were greatly augmented during this phase by the operations of German surface warships in the North and central Atlantic; by armed merchant raiders in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans; by the attacks of German long-range bombers against the Western Approaches; and by heavy German air attacks against British harbors. The Germans were also aided by Italian submarines based at Bordeaux and sent into the Atlantic, the numbers of which in early 1941 actually surpassed the number of German U-boats. In late 1940 and spring 1941, when the danger of an invasion of the British Isles had receded, London released destroyers for antisubmarine operations and redeployed Coastal Command aircraft to support the convoys off the Western Approaches. Thus, in the third phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, from May to December 1941, the U-boats were forced to operate at greater distances from shore. Long lines of U-boats patrolled across the convoy routes in an effort to intercept supply ships. This in turn forced the British in June to begin escorting their convoys along the whole route from Newfoundland to the Western Approaches and—when the U-boats began to cruise off West Africa—the route from Freetown to Gibraltar and the United Kingdom as well. In March 1941, the Allies captured cipher materials from a German patrol vessel. Then, on May 7, 1941, the Royal Navy succeeded in capturing the German Arctic meteorological vessel München and seizing its Enigma machine intact. Settings secured from this encoding machine enabled the Royal Navy to read June U-boat radio traffic practically currently. On May 9 during a convoy battle, the British destroyer Bulldog captured the German submarine U-110 and secured the settings for the high-grade officer-only German naval signals. The capture on June 28 of a second German weather ship, the Lauenburg, enabled British decryption operations at Bletchley Park to read July German home-waters radio traffic currently. This led to interception of German supply ships in the Atlantic and cessation of German surface ship operations in the Atlantic. Beginning in August 1941, Bletchley Park operatives could decrypt signals between the commander of U-boats and his U-boats at sea. The Allies were thus able to reroute convoys and save perhaps 1.5


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million gross tons of shipping. During this third phase, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was first involved in the battle. The entry of the United States into the war ushered in the fourth phase of the battle, presenting the U-boats with a second golden opportunity from January to July 1942. Attacking unescorted individual ships off the U.S. east coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean, German U-boats sank greater tonnages than during any other period of the war. But sightings and sinkings off the U.S. east coast dropped off sharply after the introduction of the interlocking convoy system there, and Dönitz found operations by individual U-boats in such distant waters uneconomical. Thus, in July 1942, he switched the U-boats back to the North Atlantic convoy route. This began the fifth phase, which lasted until May 1943. Now came the decisive period of the conflict between the U-boat groups and the convoys with their sea and air escorts. Increasingly, the battle was influenced by technical innovations. Most important in this regard were efforts on both sides in the field of signals intelligence. On February 1, 1942, the Germans had introduced their new M-4 cipher machine, leading to a blackout in decryption that lasted until the end of December 1942. This accomplishment was of limited influence during the fourth phase, because the German U-boats operated individually according to their given orders, and there was no great signal traffic in the operational areas. And when the convoy battles began again, the Germans could at first decrypt Allied convoy signals. When Bletchley Park was able to decrypt German signals anew, rerouting of the convoys again became possible, although this was at first limited by rising numbers of German U-boats in patrol lines. In March 1943, the U-boats achieved their greatest successes against the convoys, and the entire convoy system—the backbone of the Allied strategy against “Fortress Europe”—seemed in jeopardy. But now Allied decryption allowed the dispatch of additional surface and air escorts to support threatened convoys. This development, in connection with the introduction of new weapons and high-frequency direction finding, led to the collapse of the U-boat offensive against the convoys only eight weeks later, in May 1943. This collapse came as a surprise to Dönitz. Allied success in this regard could be attributed mainly to the provision of centimetric radar equipment for the sea and air escorts and the closing of the air gap in the North Atlantic. In a sixth (intermediate) phase from June to August 1943, the U-boats were sent to distant areas where the antisubmarine forces were weak, while the Allied air forces tried to block the U-boat transit routes across the Bay of Biscay. The change to a new Allied convoy cipher in June, which the German decryption service could not break, made it more difficult for the U-boats to locate the convoys in what was the seventh phase, from September 1943 to June 1944. During this time, the German U-boat command tried to deploy new weapons (acoustic

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torpedoes and increased antiaircraft armament) and new equipment (radar warning sets) to force again a decision with the convoys, first in the North Atlantic and then on the Gibraltar routes. After short-lived success, these operations failed and tapered off as the Germans tried to pin down Allied forces until new, revolutionary U-boat types became available for operational deployment. The final, eighth, phase, from June 1944 to May 1945, began with the Allied invasion of Normandy. The U-boats, now equipped with snorkel breathing masts, endeavored to carry out attacks against individual supply ships in the shallow waters of the English Channel and in British and Canadian coastal waters. The U-boats’ mission was to pin down Allied supply traffic and antisubmarine forces to prevent the deployment of warships in offensive roles against German-occupied areas. But construction of the new U-boats (of which the Allies received information by decrypting reports sent to Tokyo by the Japanese embassy in Berlin) was delayed by the Allied bombing offensive, and the German land defenses collapsed before significant numbers of these boats were ready. The Battle of the Atlantic lasted without interruption for 69 months, during which time German U-boats sank 2,850 Allied and neutral merchant ships, 2,520 of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The U-boats also sank many warships, from aircraft carriers to destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and other antisubmarine vessels. The Germans lost in turn the battleship Bismarck, the pocket battleship Graf Spee, some armed merchant raiders, and 650 U-boats, 522 of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic resulted from the vastly superior resources on the Allied side in shipbuilding and aircraft production (the ability to replace lost ships and aircraft) and from superior antisubmarine detection equipment and weapons. Allied signals intelligence was critical to the victory. Jürgen Rohwer See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Bletchley Park; Depth Charges; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; Radar; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Torpedoes; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books, 2000. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942; Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1996, 1998. Gardner, W. J. R. Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Niestlé, Axel. German U-Boat Losses during World War II: Details of Destruction. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

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Rohwer, Jürgen. Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two: German, Italian and Japanese Submarine Successes, 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books, 1999. Rohwer, Jürgen. The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977. Runyan, Timothy J., and Jan M. Copes, eds. To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. Enigma: The Battle for the Code. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000. Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. Wynn, Kenneth. U-Boat Operations of the Second World War. Vol. 1, Career Histories, U1–U510; Vol. 2, Career Histories, U511–UIT25. London: Chatham, 1998, 1999.

Atlantis, German Armed Merchant Cruiser The 7,862-ton Atlantis was the most successful of nine armed merchant cruisers deployed by the Germans in World War II. Launched as the freighter Goldenfels on December 16, 1937, the ship was refitted in the fall of 1939 and commissioned on December 19, 1939. Commanded by Captain Bernhard Rogge, the Atlantis sank or captured 22 ships, for a total of 145,698 tons, during its 622 days at sea. The Goldenfels was transformed into an armed merchant cruiser by the addition of six 150-mm guns, one 75-mm warning gun, two 37-mm twin antiaircraft guns, and four 20-mm automatic guns, as well as torpedo tubes, mines, and two patrol aircraft. The ship sailed from Germany in March 1940, reaching its operating area in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific by the end of April. Designated as Ship 16 by the Germans and Raider C by the British, the Atlantis preyed on British shipping under a variety of names, flags, and disguises between May 1940 and November 1941. In accordance with Prize Regulations, Rogge attempted to pick up the survivors of his attacks when possible, earning him a reputation as a fair opponent. In late summer 1940, a British War Cabinet report suggested that no reinforcements would go to the Far East if a war developed there. Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies were all regarded as indefensible. Churchill decided not to tell the Australian and New Zealand governments, but he did send a copy to the British commander in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. The report went out in a weighted bag at the end of September on the steamer Automedon, which was captured on November 11, 1940, by the Atlantis. The boarding party blew the master’s safe and secured the document. Rogge then headed for Japan without delay, arriving there on December 4. The naval attaché, Vice Admiral Paul Wennecker, immediately telegraphed a four-page cipher summary to Berlin. German chancellor Adolf Hitler, calling it of the “utmost

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importance,” ordered it turned over to the Japanese. One authority has said, “By any standard, it was one of the worst intelligence disasters in history.” On November 22, 1941, the British cruiser Devonshire located and destroyed the Atlantis while the ship was transferring supplies to the submarines U-68 and U-126 in the South Atlantic. Rogge and most of his crew were picked up by the U-boats and reached Saint-Nazaire after a series of mishaps. Rogge and his adjutant, Ulrich Mohr, both survived the war to write about their experiences. Douglas Peifer See also: Commerce Raiders, Surface, German.

References Gröner, Erich. Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815–1945. Vol. 3. Coblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1985. Hoyt, Edwin P. Raider 16. New York: Would, 1970. Mohr, Ulrich, and A. V. Selwood. Atlantis: The Story of a German Surface Raider. London: Werner Laurie, 1955. Rogge, Bernhard, and Wolfgang Frank. Under Ten Flags: The Story of the German Commerce Raider Atlantis. Trans. R. O. Long. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955.

Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond (1899–1961) French navy admiral. Born in Constantinople on November 9, 1899, Philippe Auboyneau graduated from the École Navale in 1918. Between the wars, he attended the French War College and commanded a torpedo boat. He was promoted to commander in December 1939, and, when World War II began, he was in the Far East serving as French liaison officer to British forces based at Colombo, Ceylon. After Germany invaded France in May 1940, Auboyneau was reassigned to the Mediterranean as liaison officer to British Mediterranean forces under Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham. Three months later, Auboyneau chose to follow Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle and joined the Free French in London. There Auboyneau took charge of the 1st “Fighting French” Destroyer Division. Promoted to captain in November 1941, in March 1942 he became commander of all Free French naval forces, and he also headed naval representation on the Council of National Liberation. In November 1942, shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa, Auboyneau moved to Algiers with most of the Free French leaders, becoming deputy chief of the French General Staff. In January 1943, he was promoted to rear admiral. In July 1944, Auboyneau directed the 3rd Cruiser Division in Operation DRAGOON, the Allied invasion of southern France.

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Auboyneau was promoted to vice admiral in command of French naval forces in the Far East in September 1945, and he held the position for two years during the Indochina War. In August 1955, he became commander in chief of French naval forces in the Mediterranean based in Algiers. He received promotion to full admiral in December 1957 and directed French naval operations for five years during the Algerian War. Auboyneau retired in December 1960 and died in Paris on February 22, 1961. Priscilla Roberts See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; DRAGOON, Operation; France, Navy.

References Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Short. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Gillois, André. Histoire secrète des Français à Londres de 1940 à 1944. Paris: Hachette, 1973. Ordioni, Pierre. Tout commence à Alger, 1940–1945. Paris: Éditions Albatros, 1985. Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

Auphan, Paul Gabriel (1894–1982) French navy admiral. Born on November 4, 1894, at Alès, Gard, France, Paul Auphan entered the French Naval Academy in 1911. He served in the World War I Dardanelles Campaign and in a submarine. Between the wars, he commanded submarines, destroyers, a cruiser, and a naval school ship. Auphan was deputy commander of the Naval Academy at Brest and studied at the Naval War College. He was promoted to rear admiral in March 1931. As a vice admiral in 1936, he commanded the French Mediterranean Squadron (1936–1938) before becoming maritime prefect at Toulon. Known for administrative rather than seagoing skills, in September 1939, Auphan, a protégé of Admiral Jean Darlan, French navy commander in chief, became naval deputy chief of staff. The day before Franco-German armistice negotiations began in June 1940, Darlan and Auphan promised the British that they would never permit Adolf Hitler to control the French fleet, even if this meant scuttling it. In July 1940, after the armistice, Auphan became director of the French merchant marine. In September 1941, he was named chief of the general naval staff, a position to which in April 1942 he added that of secretary of the navy in the Vichy government. Auphan’s defenders later claimed he only accepted these posts to ensure the fleet’s continued freedom from German control.

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Both before and after the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa, Auphan and former French supreme commander General Maxime Weygand pressed Marshal Henri Pétain, head of the Vichy government, to support the Allies openly. After the Allied landings on November 8, 1942, Auphan and Weygand urged Pétain to accept the North African cease-fire with the Allies that Darlan, then in Algiers, had negotiated. At the insistence of collaborationist French Premier Pierre Laval, Pétain initially condemned Darlan’s negotiated cease-fire, but Auphan persuaded Pétain to reverse this stand. On November 10, 1942, Auphan sent a telegram legitimizing Darlan’s accord with U.S. Army Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. Auphan hoped to arrest Laval, but he could not obtain Pétain’s authorization and was the only minister to advocate a ceasefire agreement for all North Africa. On November 11, Auphan ordered Admiral Jean de Laborde at Toulon to destroy the French fleet should German forces threaten the port. With Pétain’s approval, on November 13, Auphan cabled Resident General Charles Noguès of Morocco to transfer to Darlan command of all North Africa. On November 18, Auphan resigned to protest Laval’s assumption of full governmental powers. On August 18, 1944, Pétain empowered Auphan to negotiate the transfer of power to the Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, a development that de Gaulle completely ignored. In September 1944, the new French government revoked Auphan’s pension, and in August 1946, the French High Court sentenced him to lifetime imprisonment and forced labor for treason, including for having commanded the Toulon fleet’s destruction. Released in January 1955, Auphan was rehabilitated in November 1956. He subsequently published extensively in naval and political history. Auphan died at Versailles (Yvelines) on April 6, 1982. Priscilla Roberts See also: Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at.

References Auphan, Paul. Les Grimaces de l’histoire suivies de l’histoire de mes trahisons. Paris: Les Iles d’Or, 1951. Auphan, Paul. Histoire élémentaire de Vichy. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1971. Auphan, Paul. L’Honneur de servir: mémoires. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1978. Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Short. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Paxton, Robert O. Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

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Australia, Navy The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) played an integral part in the Allied war effort in both the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters. At the beginning of World War II, in September 1939, the RAN had declined in strength to two heavy cruisers (the Australia and the Canberra) mounting 8-inch guns, four light cruisers (the Adelaide, the Hobart, the Perth, and the Sydney) mounting 6-inch guns, five old destroyers, and two sloops. Its primary missions were coastal defense and protection of trade. When the war began, the Australian government immediately started work to build up the country’s naval strength. In all, the RAN requisitioned 200 civilian vessels for military use, mainly for coastal defense, transport, and search-and-rescue missions. Several small vessels were also converted into minesweepers. The government also ordered construction of several warships, including 3 destroyers, 6 frigates, 56 corvettes, and 35 motor launches. By the end of the war, the RAN had 337 vessels in service (and an additional 600 in the naval auxiliary) with 39,650 personnel. At the beginning of the war, the Australian government sent its five destroyers into the Mediterranean to assist the British there. The Perth went to the East Indian station, and the Australia and the Canberra helped escort Australian troop convoys to Egypt. The RAN also converted three liners into armed merchant cruisers for Royal Navy use, two of them manned by Australian personnel. Two others were commissioned in the RAN. All were sent to the China station. After Italy entered the war, the Australian government sent the Sydney to the Mediterranean, where it sank an Italian destroyer and helped to sink an Italian cruiser. In December 1940, the Sydney was replaced in the Mediterranean by the Perth. Other naval units were also sent, and Australian ships took part in many Mediterranean battles, including the Battle of Cape Matapan. Australian ships also participated in the hunt for the German battleship Bismarck and performed Atlantic convoy duty. Later in the war, eight RAN ships supported the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The first real blow to the RAN came in November 1941, when the Sydney was sunk off Western Australia by the Kormoran, a German armed merchant cruiser. After Japan entered the war in December 1941, nearly all Australian ships were withdrawn to the Pacific theater either to Singapore or to Australia. The cruiser Perth was sunk in the Battle of Sunda Strait in February 1942. The Japanese air raid on Darwin, also in February, and the midget submarine attack in May on Sydney Harbor underscored the need for increased naval strength. By the end of 1942, the Japanese had sunk 30 ships in Australian waters through air, naval, or submarine attack. For the remainder of the war, RAN ships in the Pacific undertook several duties. They engaged in antisubmarine and convoy protection missions and were

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credited with sinking six Axis submarines and escorting some 1,100 convoys. The RAN also laid some 10,000 defensive mines around Australia and New Zealand and engaged in minesweeping operations throughout the Pacific. RAN ships also fought in many of the major battles of the theater, including the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Solomon Island Campaign (the cruiser Canberra was sunk in the Battle of Savo Island), and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. They also supported operations in Borneo and Burma and the Australian landings at Taraken, Brunei, and Balikpapan in 1945. In all, 45,800 men and 3,100 women served in the Royal Australian Navy during the war. Thomas Lansford and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Naval Operations off; Darwin, Raid on; Great Britain, Navy; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Day, David. The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939– 42. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989. Day, David. Reluctant Nation: Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan, 1942–45. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Lockwood, Douglas. Australia’s Pearl Harbour: Darwin, 1942. Melbourne, Australia: Cassell, 1966. Thompson, Robert Smith. Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia. New York: Basic Books, 2001. Winton, John. The Forgotten Fleet: The British Navy in the Pacific, 1944–1945. New York: Coward-McCann, 1969.

Automedon, Sinking of (November 11, 1940) The Automedon was a British Blue Funnel cargo ship of 7,528 tons that was sailing from Liverpool to Singapore. Intercepted by the German commerce raider Atlantis in the Indian Ocean on November 11, 1940, it was boarded, searched, and then scuttled. In the ship, the Germans discovered a copy of the British War Cabinet minutes for August 1940, which was being conveyed to Singapore. This 87-paragraph document outlined British strategy in the Far East. The most important part of the document, COS(40)592, was addressed to the British commander in chief in the Far East, Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham. It indicated that Britain would not go to war against Japan, even if the Japanese were

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to invade French Indochina. The document also stated that the British chiefs of staff regarded both Thailand and Hong Kong as indefensible against Japanese attack. Bernhard Rogge, the captain of the Atlantis, recognized the significance of these papers and sent them on by ship to Kobe, Japan. They were then delivered to the German naval attaché in Tokyo, Rear Admiral Paul Wenneker, who forwarded them to Berlin. There Adolf Hitler ordered the information passed to the Japanese, and Japanese naval attaché Captain Yokoi Tadao sent a summary of the documents to the Navy Ministry in Tokyo. On December 12, 1940, Wenneker handed the documents to Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake, the Japanese navy vice chief of staff. Wenneker also stressed the weak British military posture in Asia and conveyed to Kondo¯ Hitler’s suggestion that the Japanese attack Singapore. There is no doubt that these documents encouraged the Japanese leadership in its decision to advance into Southeast Asia in 1941. They convinced the Japanese naval minister, Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, that Britain would not wage war with Japan over French Indochina. Kotani Ken See also: Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Oikawa Koshiro; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References CAB 66/10, National Archives, Kew, UK. Chapman, J. W. M. “Japanese Intelligence 1918–1945.” In Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945, edited by C. Andrew and J. Noakes. Exeter, UK: Exeter University Press, 1987. Elphick, Peter. Far Eastern File. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997. Rusbridger, James. “The Sinking of the Automedon and the Capture of the Nankin.” Encounter 375, no. 5 (May 1985), pp. 8–14.

Auxiliary Vessels The scope of World War II required huge numbers of auxiliary vessels for combat and support duties. In addition to the construction and conversion of specialist vessels, large numbers of civilian ships were requisitioned. The greatest demand was for coastal patrol, mine warfare, and antisubmarine vessels. Less frequently demanded, although no less important, were aviation ships, hospital ships, harbor craft, floating antiaircraft batteries, and the indispensable support vessel types of the fleet train.

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Coastal Patrol Craft, Auxiliary Minesweepers, and Submarine Chasers As in World War I, fishing fleets provided a cheap and reliable source of vessels and crews for the navies. Fishing vessels were versatile, and with modification they could usually perform patrol, minesweeping, and antisubmarine escort tasks. So successful was the concept of using fishing fleets that the Royal Navy alone ordered the construction of 240 naval trawlers in addition to the nearly 1,000 that it requisitioned during the war. As the sea frontier of its occupied territories increased throughout the war, Germany too compensated for the shortfall of purpose-built craft by converting hundreds of national and captured foreign fishing vessels, pilot boats, yachts, harbor craft, and even landing craft into patrol vessels, auxiliary minesweepers, dispatch vessels, escorts, submarine chasers, artillery support ships, and the like. The German navy also built large numbers of commercial-type trawlers, which became known as KFKs (Kriegsfischkutter), specifically for military purposes. Finally, the Germans revived the concept of the mine destruction vessel (Sperrbrecher) to counter the growing mine threat against its ships and bases. Sperrbrechers were medium-sized merchant ships employed for tactical underway mine protection of high-value units. The ships were equipped with bow protection gear and strong magnetic influence gear. Any mine not so swept, such as pressure mines, would ultimately be actuated by the ship itself. To absorb the blast, the ships’ holds were lined with sandbags and filled with empty drums or timber to provide additional buoyancy.

Auxiliary Aviation Ships The increasing demand for aircraft in naval warfare outpaced the capability of many belligerents to respond with new construction of adequate aircraft carriers. Many navies thus relied on seaplane tenders as ersatz carriers. The majority of those vessels in turn had been converted from civilian vessels or requisitioned from civilian aircraft operators. The Royal Navy in particular had to improvise because of the shortage of escort aircraft carriers (which it introduced in 1941). The Battle of the Atlantic thus witnessed the development of two new types of allied auxiliary aviation vessels: the catapult assisted merchant ship and the merchant aircraft carrier. The former represented a desperate stopgap measure designed to combat the German long-range patrol aircraft, which served as spotters for groups of U-boats and as attack aircraft. Catapult assisted merchant ships (known as Catapult Aircraft Merchantmen, or CAM ships) were merchantmen fitted with a single catapult over their forecastle from which a fighter (usually a Hawker Hurricane) could be launched. At the end of the mission, the aircraft was ditched and the pilot had to

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parachute into the water to be retrieved by a rescue vessel. The concept was superseded by the merchant aircraft carriers (MACs). These, too, were regular merchantmen; however, their superstructure and masts had been razed to the weather deck to make way for a flight deck suitable for launching and receiving a small number of aircraft.

The Fleet Train The vast and highly specialized navies of World War II required an extraordinary amount of support to function and maintain their operational readiness. The fleet train catered to those needs by providing an array of ship types ranging from replenishment ships (tankers and stores ships), tenders, and repair and depot ships to crewaccommodation vessels. Lesser navies, including the German navy, expanded their small prewar core of dedicated support ships by requisitioning merchantmen and converting them into the required support roles. The Germans only used their tankers for underway replenishment of their surface raiders, if in a rather novel fashion as one-stop support ships. The repair and depot ships remained confined to a role of floating base facilities. Only the U.S. Navy disposed a sophisticated purpose-built fleet train that could deploy to distant waters with the entire fleet. Lacking such, the Royal Navy in 1945 had to rely on the U.S. fleet train. The Japanese navy, although it had a few fleet oilers, never developed a full fleet train team and advanced base force with floating docks, repair ships, and such. The U.S. Navy had designed its fleet train precisely for these operations in order to make up for the interwar limitations on base construction in the western Pacific. The 13,000-ton Vulcan-class repair ships, for instance, could cope with most emergencies except heavy battle damage. For major repairs, the U.S. Navy commissioned no fewer than 30 forward-area floating docks, including three battleship docks. Since the tankers and stores ships were expected to accompany the fleet even beyond the forward-area bases, underway replenishment capabilities became an integral part of U.S. support ship design. The demand for forward underway replenishment, often at high speeds, ultimately resulted in the development by the U.S. Navy of fast one-stop replenishment ships that could supply consumables, such as oil, aviation fuel, water, ammunition, and stores at once and under way. Dirk Steffen See also: Aircraft Carriers.

References Gardiner, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980.

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Gardiner, Robert, ed. Conway’s History of the Ship: The Eclipse of the Big Gun. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1962.

AVALANCHE, Operation (September 9, 1943) Allied invasion of southern Italy. The Allied plan for the invasion of the Italian mainland called for a three-pronged effort. In Operation BAYTOWN, General Bernard L. Montgomery’s British Eighth Army would cross the Strait of Messina and land at Calabria on September 3; then it would work its way north. The following day, in Operation SLAPSTICK, 3,600 soldiers of the British 1st Paratroop Division would land in the Italian port of Taranto. The third part of the invasion, Operation AVALANCHE, was the largest. It involved the landing of two corps, the British X and the U.S. VI, at Salerno on September 9. The goal was to secure the port of Naples 30 miles to the northwest. U.S. Navy Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt had overall command of the operation. U.S. Rear Admiral John L. Hall had charge of the mainly U.S. Southern Attack Force, while Royal Navy Commodore G. N. Oliver commanded the largely British Northern Attack Force. British Navy Rear Admiral Philip Vian commanded 1 fleet carrier and 4 escort carriers assisting with air cover. In all, 627 ships participated in the operation. Vice Admiral Sir Algernon V. Willis commanded the Force H covering force of 4 battleships, 2 fleet carriers, and escorting destroyers. Lieutenant General Mark Clark commanded the Fifth Army, the ground force for AVALANCHE. The Fifth Army consisted of the British X Corps and the U.S. VI Corps, each of two divisions. Two battalions of U.S. Rangers and two of British commandos were to secure key passes northwest of Salerno. On September 3, the Eighth Army crossed the Messina Straits from Sicily in some 300 ships and landing craft, coming ashore without opposition. Clark expected no opposition at Salerno either. On September 8, 1943, hours before the assault forces landed, Mediterranean theater commander U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower broadcast that Italy had signed an armistice with the Allies. Clark fully expected to be able to secure Naples quickly and then throw a line across Italy, trapping German units between his own army and the British Eighth Army to the south. Despite the strong objections of Admiral Hewitt, who pointed out that the Gulf of Salerno was obviously the northernmost point in Italy for an Allied invasion, Clark decided to forego a preliminary bombardment. This meant that German forces that had occupied the strong Italian defensive positions were virtually undisturbed. The invasion began at 3:10 a.m. on September 9. On the first day, the Germans mounted only sporadic, small-scale counterattacks. German theater commander Field Marshal Albert Kesselring immediately ordered his forces south of Salerno

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to withdraw from southern Italy to prevent them being cut off. The German 16th Panzer Division was to oppose the Salerno landings and prevent any Allied deep penetration there until German troops from the south became available. On the morning of September 10, General Clark visited both corps zones. Because VI Corps was making better progress, Clark assigned it four miles of the X Corps’ area. This, however, stretched the Americans thin. Meanwhile, more men and equipment came ashore, although a shortage of landing craft hampered operations. Naval gunfire strongly supported the troops ashore. During the Salerno operation, Allied warships fired more than 11,000 tons of shell to assist shore operations. Beginning on September 11, German aircraft launched glide bombs at the Allied ships. These damaged the U.S. cruisers Philadelphia and Savannah and the British cruiser Uganda. Then on September 16, two German glide bombs badly damaged the British battleship Warspite. It lost all power and had to be towed to Malta. Rear Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian’s five escort carriers provided aerial cover for the landing. Seafire fighters flew 265 sorties on the first day alone, maintaining a constant presence of 20 aircraft over the beaches but in the course of the operation also suffering heavy losses. The crisis point for the Allies came on September 13, when Germany launched its first major counterattack, overrunning a battalion of the U.S. Army’s 36th Infantry Division before encountering stiff resistance along the banks of the Calore River. Accurate naval gunfire played an important role in stopping the German thrust. With the beachhead seemingly in jeopardy, on the night of September 13, two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division were air-dropped into the 36th Infantry Division sector and quickly thrown into the line. Meanwhile, Allied reinforcements arrived, including additional airborne drops, and the British battleships Warspite and Valiant were rushed up from Malta on September 14 to lend their firepower to that of the cruisers and destroyers. On September 15, Kesselring ordered another counterattack, which failed in the teeth of the Allied reinforcements, as Clark now had more than 150,000 men ashore. Meanwhile, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was still 50 miles to the south, making very slow progress against only light German resistance. Kesselring knew he could no longer hope to defeat the Allies at Salerno, and, on September 16, the Germans began a deliberate, well-executed withdrawal northward. The Eighth and Fifth Armies finally linked up on September 19, although the Allies did not first enter Naples until October 1. The Salerno battle had been costly. The British had suffered 5,259 casualties and the Americans 1,649. German killed, wounded, and missing were 3,472. Troy D. Morgan and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Glide Bombs; Hewitt, Henry Kent; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

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References Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944. New York: Henry Holt, 2007. Hickey, Des. Operation Avalanche: The Salerno Landings. London: Heinemann, 1983. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. New York: Scribner, 1995. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio: January 1943–June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954. Morris, Eric. Salerno: A Military Fiasco. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960.

Aviation, Naval On November 14, 1910, flying a Curtiss pusher aircraft, American Eugene B. Ely made the first flight from a ship, the light cruiser Birmingham, at Hampton Roads, Virginia. On January 18, 1911, he landed the same Curtiss pusher on the armored cruiser Pennsylvania in San Francisco Bay for the first landing of a plane on a ship. Britain’s Royal Navy later conducted similar tests. The world’s major navies developed four major roles for naval aircraft: reconnaissance, spotting for naval gunnery, attacking enemy fleet and shore installations, and defending the fleet from enemy aircraft. Navies first relied on seaplanes and land-based aircraft, but during World War I, Britain began conversion of several ships into aircraft carriers. This undertaking came to include the battle cruisers Furious, Courageous, and Glorious, all of which served in World War II. The U.S. Navy commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Langley, in 1922; in the same year, Japan commissioned its first carrier, the Hosho. Following World War I, the world’s navies deployed catapult-launched seaplanes on their battleships and cruisers for reconnaissance and spotting. Many navies considered building aircraft carriers, but only Great Britain, Japan, and the United States built them in significant numbers. During the 1920s and 1930s, aviators in all three of these navies solved the many technical problems of carrier operations despite low budgets, some opposition, and the Washington and London treaties that limited the size, number, and armament of the carriers. Large new aircraft carriers joined the three navies’ fleets in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Each nation developed a force suited to its particular needs. The United States and Japan planned for operations across the vast and relatively empty stretches of the Pacific Ocean, where land air bases would be few. Both nations developed longrange seaplanes, such as the U.S. PBY Catalina, to extend their search range, although only the Japanese navy developed land-based bombers to support its carrier aircraft. Japan also sought to maximize the number of planes on its aircraft carriers.

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Limited by the size of the carriers’ internal hangars, Japan’s larger carriers generally carried between 70 and 80 planes. In U.S. carriers, planes were parked on the decks, and hangars were used only for repair and maintenance. This enabled the United States to bring as many as 100 planes into battle. The U.S. Navy also took better advantage of folded-wing airplanes to fit large complements on its carriers. Keeping planes on deck also substantially increased the pace of flight operations on the U.S. carriers, allowing planes to be launched at a much higher rate than that from the Japanese or British ships. Britain planned for war in Europe, where its fleet was likely to confront landbased air power. For that reason, the British favored heavily protected aircraft carriers with armored flight decks capable of withstanding 500-lb. bombs. Although this scale of protection reduced the British aircraft complement to half that of comparably sized U.S. aircraft carriers, it paid off repeatedly during the war, when British aircraft carriers survived damage that would likely have sunk a U.S. or Japanese carrier. On January 10, 1941, while protecting a convoy bound from Alexandria to Malta, the Illustrious survived hits by 500-lb. and 1,000-lb. bombs as well as further damage inflicted while under repair at Malta. Later in the war, several British carriers withstood hits from Japanese kamikaze aircraft with minimal damage. Unlike the case in Japan or the United States, the Royal Air Force, rather than the navy, had authority over naval aviation until 1937. This divided leadership slowed innovation, and the Royal Navy entered the war with obsolete aircraft. Typical of this was its Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bomber. Japan developed its aviators into an elite strike force, selecting only 100 new aviators each year from its rigorous training program. In 1941, they flew the best naval aircraft in the world: the Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen (“Zero”) fighter—so named because it entered service in 1940, the Japanese year 5700, and was henceforth known as the type 0 (Reisen or Zero)—the Aichi D3A “Val” dive-bomber, and the B5N “Kate” torpedo bomber. These aircraft sacrificed protection for speed and maneuverability, and they considerably outperformed and outranged U.S. naval aircraft. Japanese fleets sent their search planes out to almost 600 miles, compared with 350 miles for the U.S. Navy, and their strike aircraft had a combat radius of 300 miles, compared with 200 miles for most U.S. aircraft. The Zero established a deadly combat reputation, and Americans flying Grumman F4F Wildcats could only best it with careful tactics and teamwork. The U.S. Douglas SBD Dauntless proved an excellent dive-bomber and served through much of the war, but the obsolete TBD Devastator torpedo bomber was slow and vulnerable. The U.S. Navy replaced it as soon as it could with the more modern TBF Avenger following the great carrier battles of 1942. During the first two years of war, aircraft did little to fulfill the promises of prewar aviation advocates. German aircraft rarely hit British warships during the 1940

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Norwegian Campaign, and the German battle cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sank Britain’s aircraft carrier Glorious with gunfire. In November 1940, British carrier aircraft surprised the Italian fleet anchorage at Taranto and torpedoed three battleships there, but this proved little to critics, who argued that battleships at sea would evade bombs and torpedoes and devastate attacking aircraft with their heavy defensive armament. Critics were also unimpressed by the battering by land-based aircraft that British carriers sustained while escorting convoys through the Mediterranean. However, carrier aircraft proved critical in bringing the German battleship Bismarck to battle. On May 16, 1941, torpedoes dropped by Swordfish, which had been launched from the Ark Royal, jammed the Bismarck’s rudder. Yet it required the heavy guns of British battleships to actually sink the ship. Similarly, Japan’s brilliantly conceived and executed attack on Pearl Harbor proved only that bases and stationary ships were vulnerable to surprise air attack. Three days later, though, Japanese navy G4M land-based bombers located and sank the newest British battleship, the Prince of Wales, and the battle cruiser Repulse in an hour-long battle off the coast of Malaya. The British warships shot down only 3 of 129 attacking aircraft. Aircraft would dominate many future sea battles. Japanese and U.S. aircraft carriers engaged each other in four battles in 1942. The first of these, the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8), ended with roughly equal losses for both sides. At Midway (June 3–6), though, Japan lost four carriers and sank only one U.S. carrier, the Yorktown. There followed a series of grueling battles around Guadalcanal in which both navies suffered heavily, the Eastern Solomons (August 24–25), which cost the Japanese one light carrier and the Americans damage to the carrier Enterprise, and the Santa Cruz Islands (October 25) wherein the U.S. carrier Hornet was sunk and two Japanese carriers damaged. Aircraft carriers, loaded with fuel and ordnance, proved particularly vulnerable to even minor damage, and few survived the first year of war in the Pacific. The United States lost five of its seven carriers in these battles, and the sixth suffered heavy damage. Japan suffered similar losses to its carrier fleet; more than 400 of the 765 airmen who attacked Pearl Harbor had died in battle by the end of 1942, in part the consequence of a poor Japanese pilot replacement/training system. In an effort to replace lost aircraft carriers, the United States converted light cruisers into small aircraft carriers, such as the U.S. 33-aircraft Independence, which joined the fleet in June 1943. Japan also added partial flight decks to two battleships, allowing them to launch but not recover planes, and it converted a Yamato-class battleship to an aircraft carrier, the 64,800-ton Shinano. Yet, U.S. industry easily won the naval building race. During the war Japan completed 15 fleet, light, and escorts carriers, while the United States commissioned 139, including 17 of the large Essex class, 9 of the light Independence class, and 113 escorts carriers of the Bogue, Sangamon, Casablanca, and Commencement Bay classes,

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and 4 conversions. Of these, 37 escorts carriers served with the British navy. By mid-1944, the United States was launching a large aircraft carrier every month. U.S. carrier operations became increasingly sophisticated after the 1942 battles. Improving radar, which by early 1944 could detect even low-flying aircraft, and new control and communications systems allowed U.S. fighters to intercept attacking aircraft with great success. New ships, increasing antiaircraft armament, and the proximity fuse considerably improved fleet defense. Radar-equipped TBF Avengers proved adept at locating targets at sea and in the air, allowing the U.S. Navy to intercept attacking aircraft at night. Whereas the Japanese navy continued to rely on its prewar aircraft designs, the United States developed several new airplanes, which began joining the fleet in 1943. These included the excellent F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair, which completely outclassed Japan’s Zero in combat. U.S. aircraft also joined the British Royal Navy—first Wildcats and later Corsairs, Hellcats, and Avengers. By 1943, the United States was supplying most of

A Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat of Fighter Squadron ( VF ) 15 is launched from the hangar deck catapult on the Essex-class aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-12), which entered service in November 1943. Fast, maneuverable, and rugged, the Hellcat was one of the finest carrier aircraft of the war and more than a match for the Japanese Zero. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)

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the Royal Navy’s aircraft. U.S. industry also churned out dozens of small escort carriers for both its own navy and the British navy. Carrying two dozen aircraft, these “baby flattops” provided continuous air cover for convoys crossing the Atlantic. Other escort carriers formed the core of antisubmarine hunter-killer groups that prowled the ocean in search of German U-boats and reinforced convoys under attack. Combined with land-based air power, the escort carriers proved the answer to the threat from Germany’s U-boats and, in mid-1943, turned the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic. They also provided vital air support for numerous amphibious invasions. A series of U.S. carrier raids and air offensives further wore down Japanese air strength in the Pacific during 1943. By November, when the United States invaded Tarawa and began its drive across the Central Pacific, 11 U.S. carriers faced only 6 Japanese carriers. U.S. Navy carriers, supported by an enormous fleet train and logistical system, raided throughout the Central Pacific. They isolated Japaneseheld islands before invasion, protected amphibious landings, and provided close air support for the invading soldiers and Marines. U.S. training and combat performance continued to improve, and an excellent submarine and seaplane rescue service saved the lives of many American pilots shot down during these missions. The Japanese carrier fleet, rebuilt from the 1942 battles and supported by landbased planes, confronted a far larger U.S. fleet in June 1944 in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The result was the “great Marianas turkey shoot,” as the better-trained and better-equipped Americans shot down scores of poorly trained Japanese pilots who failed to press home their attacks and often missed their targets. Japan lost 475 planes and almost as many pilots; the United States lost 100 planes and 16 pilots. Japanese naval air power never recovered from this defeat. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Japan used one heavy aircraft carrier and three light carriers (with a total of only 116 planes on board) as a diversion to draw away the U.S. battle fleet so Japanese battleships and cruisers could attack the landing beaches. Instead of the superbly trained pilots who attacked Pearl Harbor, Japan relied on the kamikazes, whose suicidal attacks sank dozens of U.S. ships. In the Battle for Okinawa in the spring of 1945, the kamikazes inflicted more casualties on the U.S. Navy than it had sustained in all of its other wars combined. But the Japanese were unable to stem the U.S. Navy advance across the Pacific. Throughout the Pacific, from the Mariana Islands to the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, U.S. naval aircraft smashed Japanese defenses, destroyed Japanese aircraft, supported invasions, sank Japanese ships, and raided Japanese positions. By 1945, four British aircraft carriers operated in the Pacific, and these joined more than a dozen U.S. carriers in launching a series of devastating air attacks on Japanese positions in July and August. All told, 1,000 U.S. and 250 British carrier aircraft destroyed more than 3,000 Japanese aircraft in the air and on the ground, adding to the damage B-29 bombers had already inflicted on Japan’s home islands.

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New aircraft carriers continued to join the U.S. fleet, although the first of large 47,000-ton Midway-class battle carriers were not commissioned until September 1945, after the end of the war. Of Japan’s carriers, only the old, experimental Hosho survived the war. Japan’s fortunes in the Pacific war had risen and then sunk with its aircraft carriers. Stephen K. Stein See also: Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Air-Sea Rescue; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Caroline Islands Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Hunter-Killer Groups; Identification, Friend or Foe; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of; Sherman, Frederick Carl; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Taranto, Attack on; Truk, Raid on; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Hone, Thomas C., Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles. American and British Aircraft Carrier Development. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1962. Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Reynolds, Clark. The Fast Carriers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968, reprinted 1992. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961. Till, Geoffrey. Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–1945. London: Jane’s, 1979.

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B Bab el Mandeb Strait Narrow channel linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The Bab el Mandeb (Gate of Tears) Strait is approximately 20 miles across and separates Yemen (on the Arabian Peninsula) to the east from Djinbouti and Eritrea to the west. It is situated in the Horn of Africa and is a vital passageway linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea (by way of the Suez Canal). The strait is divided into two primary shipping channels by Perim, a volcanic island that for years was used as a coaling station for ships heading for the Suez Canal to the north. There is also a small cluster of islands located near Djibouti, known as the Seven Brothers. The eastern channel is about 2 miles wide, and the western channel is about 16 miles wide. Water depth ranges from 100 ft. to about 1,000 ft. Currents are not strong, but there are two opposing ones: in the east channel, the flow is inward; in the western channel, the flow is outward. The Bab el Mandeb Strait has long been considered a choke point for shipping, and it remains so today. Control of the strait means, ultimately, control of the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. The Allies went to considerable measures to retain that control during World War II. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: Suez Canal.

References Manfreta, Valeria, and David Doubilet, eds. The Red Sea. Trans. Anthony Shugaar. Vercelli, Italy: White Star, 2008. Schonfield, Hugh Joseph. The Suez Canal in Peace and War, 1869–1969. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969.

Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of (January 24, 1942) On January 21, 1942, after the capture of Tarakan in northern Borneo, a Japanese troop convoy sailed for Balikpapan, the port and important oil field two-thirds of the way down Borneo’s east coast. The day before, following a premature Dutch 81

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report of the Japanese movement, Task Force 5, the U.S. Navy cruisers Boise and Marblehead, and six destroyers sailed to intercept. However, after the Boise tore its hull on an uncharted pinnacle, Rear Admiral William A. Glassford Jr., commander of Task Force 5, ordered Destroyer Division 59 under Commander Paul H. Talbot, and consisting of the 1919-vintage destroyers John D. Ford, Pope, Parrott, and the Paul Jones, to patrol Makassar Strait’s southern exit while the Boise and Marblehead, which had burned out a turbine, retired escorted by two destroyers. When further reports of the Japanese invasion convoy arrived, Division 59 proceeded north on the morning of January 23, intending to arrive off Balikpapan and deliver a surprise attack two hours before dawn. The Japanese force under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji consisted of 15 transports escorted by the light cruiser Naka and 10 modern destroyers. There were also three large patrol boats (ex–World War I destroyers) and four minesweepers. Dutch aircraft attacked during the approach and damaged two transports, but the Japanese convoy arrived on schedule at 8:15 p.m. on January 23 and anchored off Balikpapan in two rows. The Dutch garrison had ignited the oil fields and thick, black smoke reduced visibility. At 11:45 p.m., the Dutch submarine K-XVIII torpedoed a Japanese transport, and the Japanese destroyers deployed into the channel to hunt the submarine and prevent another attack. Meanwhile, assisted by a weather front, the U.S. destroyers approached undetected until 2:45 a.m. on January 24, when four Japanese destroyers crossed ahead. In the poor visibility, they misidentified the U.S. ships as friendly vessels. Coming upon the anchored transports, the U.S. destroyers, using torpedoes only, missed with their initial salvos, but, at 3:00 a.m., the U.S. column came about and torpedoed an ammunition ship, which exploded with a tremendous blast. Admiral Nishmura did not believe that enemy destroyers could penetrate the anchorage, and the powerful Japanese force continued to operate in the channel. At 3:10 a.m., the destroyers torpedoed a second transport. As the Americans, shrouded in smoke from the burning oil installations, cut through the shallow anchorage at high speed, they next accounted for a patrol boat at 3:19 a.m. and then, six minutes later, a third transport. Circling this stricken vessel, the John D. Ford led the column north. The Pope and Parrott, out of torpedoes, engaged with gunfire. After penetrating the first line of Japanese transports, once again, at 3:40 a.m., the John D. Ford sheered out of line to starboard, believing a minefield lay ahead. This disrupted the tight line, and the Parrott and Paul Jones circled south and out of the action, followed shortly after by the Pope. The John D. Ford continued alone and torpedoed the same ship damaged by the Dutch submarine. Then gunfire from a transport slightly damaged the U.S. ship. As the John D. Ford circled this ship, its 4-inch guns inflicted 50 casualties. At 4:00 a.m.,


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the John D. Ford turned south and withdrew. Nishimura was still querying his own patrol boats whether they were mistaking friendly destroyers for enemy cruisers. Destroyer Division 59 did not stop the Japanese invasion, but it won a tactical victory in the first surface engagement fought by the U.S. Navy since the SpanishAmerican War. The Americans eluded a vastly superior force, torpedoed a quarter of the enemy convoy, and escaped unharmed. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: ABDA Command; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Lombok, Battle of; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Nishimura Shoji.

References Bernstein, Marc D. “Tin Cans Raid Balikpapan.” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute (April 2003), pp. 80–83. Morison, Samuel E. History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1953. Van Oosten, F. C. The Battle of the Java Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

Baltic Sea, Area of Operations The Baltic Sea is a shallow, enclosed body of water that separates Scandinavia from northern Europe. In 1939, the major powers bordering its shores were Germany and the Soviet Union, while Poland, Sweden, and Finland also maintained moderate to small naval forces there. The first naval actions in the Baltic were fought during a short campaign sparked by Germany’s invasion of Poland. Poland, which anticipated this aggression and realized it could not contest German power, dispatched three destroyers to Britain two days before the war began. The Kriegsmarine hunted the remainder of Poland’s navy—which included another destroyer, a large minelayer, some smaller vessels, and five submarines—and even dispatched destroyers to shell the Polish naval base at Hel on September 3, 1939. Nonetheless, Poland’s submarines operated until September 19, laying mines that sank a German minesweeper before fleeing to Britain and to Sweden. Upon the conclusion of this campaign, Germany controlled the Baltic, which provided a secure zone for training, particularly for the crews of submarines. This state of affairs lasted until June 22, 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union maintained a strong fleet in the Baltic based at Kronshtadt near Leningrad, with secondary facilities at Ust-Dvinsk near Riga, Tallinn in Estonia,

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Hankö in Finland, and Libau in Latvia. The Soviet Baltic fleet included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 23 destroyers, 7 guard ships, and 69 submarines. Its mission was to defend the gulfs of Finland and Riga, interrupt German sea communications, and support the Red Army’s maritime flank. However, the sudden eruption of war caught the Baltic Fleet unprepared, and it failed to carry out these missions successfully. The German naval command deployed light forces to the Baltic and focused on mine warfare. It did not develop plans to maximize the navy’s resources in support of army operations. However, after the Germans captured Riga on July 3 and its protective mine field barrages were swept, convoys of barges and small merchant ships used this port to supply German land forces. Soviet destroyers and light forces attacked these convoys but failed to stop the traffic, and they lost three destroyers in the process. The Baltic Fleet’s major action in 1941 was the breakout from Tallinn to Kronshtadt on August 28, when 68 Soviet merchant ships and 128 warships from torpedo cutters to cruisers ran a gauntlet of German mines, aircraft, coastal batteries, and motor torpedo boats, losing in the process 5 destroyers and 3 guard ships, 5 other warships, and 34 civilian ships. The Soviets evacuated Hangö by December 3 but also had to cross an Axis minefield at great cost. As many as 20,000 soldiers and sailors died in these two operations; they would have been considered a fiasco by most standards, but the 30,000 men and considerable supplies they delivered to Leningrad represented an important contribution to that city’s defenses. In September 1941, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered the formation of a Baltic Fleet centered on the battleship Tirpitz in case Soviets ships attempted to break out to Sweden, but this was never needed, and the season ended with the Soviet fleet bottled up in Kronshtadt with many units damaged and crews drafted to fight in ground units. Twenty-six submarines were also lost in the first summer of operations; they sank up to 13 Axis and neutral ships in return, all but one with mines. However, the guns of the large warships were instrumental in defending Leningrad. Weather heavily affected the operations that followed, because almost half of the sea, including the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, freezes from December to April. German and Finnish forces laid 10 major minefields in the Gulf of Finland before the winter freeze. In May 1942, the Soviets prepared submarines to break out into the Baltic, while the Germans refreshed their massive mine barrages to seal them in. Some submarines penetrated this barrage, but their cruises were largely unproductive, sinking or mining 25 Axis and neutral ships totaling 50,863 gross register tonnage at a cost of 12 submarines lost. In April 1943, Finnish and German forces placed two rows of antisubmarine nets from Finland to Estonia. This barrage proved impenetrable, and there was no Soviet naval activity in the Baltic that year to disturb German training activities or commerce.


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In 1944, ground advances finally allowed the Soviets to break the blockade of Kronshtadt. Although the Germans strenuously sought to maintain their mine fields in the Gulf of Finland, Soviet motor torpedo boats and aircraft forced the patrol craft maintaining these barrages to withdraw by July 1944. The Kriegsmarine’s loss of three torpedo boats in August and two large destroyers in December to their own mines likewise demonstrated the dangerous impartiality of these weapons. Finland was driven from the war and forced to sign an armistice with the Soviets in September 1944. The Soviets then mounted an amphibious invasion of the Estonian islands on September 29, 1944. These events finally unleashed the Baltic Fleet’s submarines. Between October 1944 and April 1945, they enjoyed access to the open sea and during that period accounted for 37 ships sunk, totaling 102,856 gross register tonnage. However, 40 percent of the Axis tonnage lost occurred with the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff on January 30 and the General Steuben on February 10 during the evacuation of East Prussia. Some 10,000 soldiers and civilians died in these two sinkings alone. The poor results achieved by Soviet submarines were not due to a lack of targets. Hitler assigned a high priority to maintaining German control of the Baltic because it was necessary for training the most important of his new war-winning weapons— high-speed submarines of the XXI type and the Walter turbine boats—all of which required extensive training and working up. For this reason, the half-million-strong Army Group North maintained control of the Courland Peninsula rather than bolstering the homeland’s defenses. In August 1944, 2.4 million tons of shipping plied the Baltic sea lanes between Germany and the Courland bridgehead. Even as late as December 1944, traffic consisted of 575 vessels totaling 1.1 million tons. In the war’s final months, the Kriegsmarine undertook direct support of the German army using Panzerschiffe, cruisers and destroyers; naval gunfire was a key ingredient in the German army’s stubborn defense of littoral areas. The Kriegsmarine also evacuated 2 million troops and civilians in the face of the Soviet advance, in what was certainly one of its greatest accomplishments of the entire war. Large Soviet warships remained inactive throughout this period. From the first day of the war to the last, Germany effectively controlled the Baltic Sea. Vincent O’Hara See also: Germany, Navy; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Poland, Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, Sinking of.

References Åselius, Gunnar. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1941. London: Routledge, 2005. Grief, Howard D. Hitler, Dönitz and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944– 1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

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Ruge, Friedrich. The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Bandar Shahpur, Battle of (Operation COUNTENANCE, August 25, 1941) The British attack on an Iranian port 50 miles east of Abadan at the head of the Persian Gulf and the terminus of the Iranian State Railway. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British War Cabinet became greatly concerned about German influence in Iran. British leaders feared that Berlin might intervene in Iran, as it did in Iraq in April 1941. The Allies invaded Iran on August 25 after the Iranian government, headed by Reza Shah, refused to move against German interests as demanded by the British and Soviet governments. Anticipating the need to intervene, the Royal Navy had assembled a scratch flotilla in the Persian Gulf based at Basra under Commodore Cosmo Graham. This included an armed merchant cruiser, four sloops (including one Australian and one Indian), a corvette, a gunboat, an armed yacht, a trawler, and a number of river steamers, tugs, motorboats, and dhows. The Royal Iranian navy, which had its main base at Khorramshahr, 40 miles up the Shatt-el-Arab Waterway, consisted of a pair of 1,000-ton sloops and four 330-ton patrol boats. All six of these warships were Italian built and had Italian crews. Six Axis freighters—five German and one Italian—and two Italian tankers were sheltering at Bandar Shahpur with two of the Iranian patrol boats. On August 23 Commodore Graham received order to proceed with Operation COUNTENANCE and attack Bandar Shahpur, Abadan, and Khorramshahr at dawn on August 25. The force assigned to Bandar Shahpur was anchored in the Gulf south of the Shatt-el-Arab’s mouth. The armed merchant cruiser, the Kanimbla, had on board two companies of infantry as a landing force. Supporting it were a gunboat, a sloop, a corvette, an armed trawler, two tugs, two dhows, and a pinnacle. This flotilla navigated up the Khor Musa inlet, which narrows to a width of three miles, without incident, arriving at 4:15 a.m. The German ship crews sounded the alarm and several ignited large fires in an attempt to scuttle their ships. Landing parties, however, managed to contain the damage in most instances and captured seven of the eight Axis vessels totaling 44,000 tons. The Iranian gunboats offered no resistance and the Kaimbla proceeded to land its troops. By that evening Bandar Shahpur had been secured. The force assigned to capture Khorramshahr and Abadan set out from Basra with the exception of the sloop Shoreham, which lay at Fao at the mouth of the Shattel-Arab. The sloop Yarra arrived at Khorramshahr first and lay unseen alongside a British merchantman until the sound of firing came from downstream at Abadan. The Yarra then illuminated the Iranian sloop Babr and shelled it from close range,

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preventing its surprised crew from manning its guns. The Iranian warship quickly sank at its dock. Boarding parties then captured the two patrol boats. The sloop Falmouth arrived several hours later, having grounded in transit, and its troops went ashore. There was heavy fighting but the naval base was secured that evening. The Abadan flotilla arrived at 4:10 a.m. joined by the Shoreham, which had made its way upstream. It achieved complete surprise. The Shoreham’s first salvo disabled the Iranian sloop Palang and caused a large explosion. Iranian ground forces, however, put up a stiff resistance. The Shoreham provided gunfire support to the Indian troops until they finally secured the refinery and town that afternoon. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Australia, Navy; Red Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Gill, George Hermon. Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. Playfair, I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 2, The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941). London: HMSO, 1956. Stewart, Richard A. Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet Invasion of Iran, 1941. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988.

Barbey, Daniel Edward (1889–1969) U.S. navy admiral who established the navy’s Amphibious Warfare Section and commanded the Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet. Born on December 23, 1889, at Portland, Oregon, Daniel Edward Barbey graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1912. He served on several ships during World War I and rose to the rank of lieutenant. Following the war, Barbey was stationed in Wales and Turkey before returning to sea duty in 1922. Between 1928 and 1931, he served as an administrator at the U.S. Naval Academy. Promoted to commander in 1933, Barbey held various positions before being assigned to the War Plans Section of the Bureau of Navigation in 1937. There, he worked on developing mobilization strategies. He also became fascinated with amphibious warfare, a subject that had been little studied since World War I. In February 1940, Barbey was promoted to captain and took command of the battleship New York. In January 1941, Barbey became the chief of staff to Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs of the Service Force and Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1942 while on the staff of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King. In this capacity, he founded the Amphibious Warfare

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Section of the U.S. Navy and worked to establish doctrine and tactics as well as to secure equipment better suited to amphibious operations. Under his leadership, the DUKW amphibious truck was developed, along with other new landing craft designs. In January 1943, Barbey became commander of the Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet, setting up his headquarters at Port Stevens, Australia. Working under General Douglas MacArthur from 1943 until the summer of 1945, he commanded 56 amphibious landings in support of various invasions, including those of New Guinea, the Philippines, and Borneo. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1944, Barbey was the ranking naval subordinate to MacArthur in the southwest Pacific. After the war, he held various positions, including commander of the Seventh Fleet, commander of the Atlantic Amphibious Forces, commander of the Fourth Fleet, and chairman of the Joint Military Board. From March 1947 until September 1950, he commanded U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean. Barbey retired from the navy in June 1951. He died at Bremerton, Washington, on March 11, 1969. Harold Wise See also: Amphibious Warfare; King, Ernest Joseph; Southwest Pacific Theater.

References Barbey, Daniel Edward. MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1969. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Minadanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953.

Barrage Balloons Balloons sent aloft to protect against low-level air attack. In 1938, the Royal Air Force Balloon Command was established to arrange a system of barrage balloons at strategic sites in Great Britain as antiaircraft devices to guard communities, ports, and industries. Barrage balloons flown from boats prevented aircraft from mining estuaries. Within two years, approximately 6,400 barrage balloons protected Britain, 5,000 of which were in the London area. Air Marshal Sir E. Leslie Gossage directed 52 barrage balloon squadrons, involving 33,000 personnel. Barrage balloons were designed to prevent low-altitude German air attacks against British factories and other strategic targets. Most of these large, hydrogen-filled,

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football-shaped balloons were connected to wagons by thick steel cables, which could damage any aircraft that hit them. Camouflage and clouds prevented enemy pilots from seeing the barrage balloons. Mobility was crucial in order to form barriers of barrage balloons. Balloon crews, consisting of members of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force and the Royal Air Force Balloon Command, moved barrage balloons as needed and operated winches on the wagons to lower and raise the balloons to designated heights. Some barrage balloons reached an altitude of 5,000 ft. Not only did they help prevent German pilots from flying at low altitudes, they also increased the vulnerability of enemy aircraft to antiaircraft weapons, which could be concentrated to fire above their altitudes. During the Blitz, balloon crews devoted night duty to keeping barrage balloons at effective defensive heights and positions. Some 66 German aircraft were lost to collisions with barrage balloon cables. Smaller barrage balloons were also used to protect shipping, and they floated above Allied ships approaching Normandy for the D-Day landings. In addition to countering airplanes, barrage balloons were used to protect against attacks by V-1 buzz bombs. In 1944, operators placed a circle of 1,750 barrage balloons in south London, and the balloon cables stopped an estimated 231 V-1s. The United States employed barrage balloons to help protect vulnerable sites on the U.S. West Coast and the Panama Canal. The Allies also used them in North Africa and in other locations in the Mediterranean. The Germans raised barrage balloons over strategic sites in the Reich. Italy and Japan also employed barrage balloons during the war. A number of the barrage balloons were destroyed by enemy fire or by lightning strikes, and wind and storms often caused balloon damage. Arthur Vestry, a Scottish physicist, devised ways make the balloons lightning-proof, and the Germans sought to develop methods to cut barrage cables without ruining aircraft. Elizabeth D. Schafer See also: NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Delderfield, R. F. “A Study in Passive Defence.” Royal Air Force Quarterly 16, no. 3 (December 1944–September 1945), p. 167. Gossage, Leslie. “Balloon Command.” Flying and Popular Aviation 31, no. 3 (September 1942), pp. 97–100. Robinson, G. N. Barrage Balloons. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center, 1941. Turley, R. E. “Barrage Balloons.” Coast Artillery Journal 85, no. 1 (January–February 1942), pp. 21–22.

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Battle Cruisers Large armored cruisers that incorporated the speed and generally the armor of a cruiser but with the armament of a battleship. The original concept for this ship was developed by Italian naval constructor Colonel Vittorio Cuniberti in the early 20th century. The first power to fully endorse Cuniberti’s ideas was Great Britain, through the work of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher, who viewed this ship type as capable of performing the duties of cruisers and battleships. Germany and Japan built these ships in tandem with the British in the years before and during World War I (the United States began six as a result of the 1916 naval building program but finished none). Each country pursued its own designs, the Germans placing more emphasis on armor than their British rivals. In the 1916 Battle of Jutland, poor armor protection contributed to the destruction of three British battle cruisers, whereas the Germans lost only one. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 discontinued construction of battle cruisers, and many of the surviving units were scrapped. By the beginning of World War II, two nations retained some of their World War I–era battle cruisers. The British maintained the two ships of the Renown class. As built, the Renown and Repulse measured 794 ft. in overall length and 90 ft. in beam and displaced 30,835 tons at full load. They were protected by an armor belt with a maximum thickness of 6 in. They mounted a primary armament of 6 15inch guns as well as 17 4-inch guns (following a major refit, the Renown substituted 20 4.5-inch guns for its 4-inchers). Their engines produced a maximum speed of 30 knots. The British also operated the battle cruiser Hood, completed in 1920 to a World War I design, which displaced 45,200 tons fully loaded on a hull that measured 860 ft. in length and 104 ft. in beam and was protected by armor with a maximum thickness of 12 in. It was armed with 8 15-inch guns and 12 5.5-inch weapons. Its engines could produce a speed of 31 knots. The Japanese also retained their battle cruisers from World War I. These were the four ships of the Kongo class. They measured 704 ft. in length and 92 ft. in beam and originally displaced 32,200 tons fully loaded. The ships were rebuilt between the wars to be both faster and better protected. Their hulls were protected by belt armor with a maximum thickness of 8 in. They were armed with 8 14-inch and 14 6-inch guns and could steam at a maximum speed of 27.5 knots. After reconstruction between 1927 and 1931, these four ships were reclassified as battleships. France built two battle cruisers in the interwar period—the two ships of the Dunkerque class completed in 1937 and 1938. The Dunkerque and Strasbourg displaced 35,500 tons fully loaded, measured 703 ft. 9 in. in length and 102 ft. in beam and were protected by belt armor of a maximum thickness of 9.75 in. They were armed with 8 13-inch and 16 5.1-inch guns. Their maximum speed was 29.5 knots.

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The United States ordered six battle cruisers, of the Alaska class, during World War II but completed only two, both officially classified as large cruisers. Completed in 1944, the Alaska and Guam displaced 34,253 tons fully loaded on hulls that measured 808 ft. 6 in. in length and 91 ft. 1 in. in beam and were protected by armor 9 in. in thickness. Their armament consisted of 9 12-inch and 12 5-inch guns. These ships could steam at a maximum speed of 33 knots. World War II battle cruisers were employed in a variety of duties that included surface action, shore bombardment, antiaircraft fire support to protect aircraft carriers, and occasional service as convoy escorts, in the case of the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. The majority of these ships were lost in the war. Surface action claimed the British battle cruiser Hood when design deficiencies in its armor resulted in a magazine explosion while the vessel was engaged with the German battleship Bismarck. The British battle cruiser Repulse succumbed to Japanese air attacks off Malaya. All four of the Japanese battle cruisers were sunk by air, surface, or submarine attacks. Finally, both the French battle cruisers were scuttled to prevent their capture by the Germans. Only the U.S. Alaska-class ships and the British Renown survived the war, but these ships were scrapped after the conflict—the Renown in 1948 and the Alaska and Guam in 1961. Eric W. Osborne See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Central Pacific Campaign; France, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States, Navy.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. Gibbons, Tony, ed. The Complete Encyclopedia of Battleships and Battlecruisers: A Technical Directory of All the World’s Capital Ships from 1860 to the Present Day. London: Salamander Books, 1983. Osborne, Eric W. Cruisers and Battle Cruisers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004.

Battleships Large, complex warships that had the primary mission of establishing control of the seas. Battleships were the toughest warships built. Despite yielding pride of place to the aircraft carrier as the principal sea-control and power-projection warship, battleships remained useful throughout World War II in carrying out a wide array of tasks.

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The major naval powers continued to build battleships into World War II. The construction of these capital ships was only arrested under the pressure to construct submarines, antisubmarine warships, landing craft, and aircraft carriers. Italy and Germany launched new battleships as late as 1939 and 1940. Germany’s Bismarck and Tirpitz were 41,700 tons, mounted 8 15-inch guns, and were capable of making a speed of 29 knots. Italy’s Vittorio Veneto, Italia, Roma, and Impero (the latter never finished) displaced 40,700 tons, mounted 9 15-inch guns, and were capable of 30 knots. The vulnerability of the battleship to aerial attack was finally demonstrated on November 11, 1940, when three Italian battleships were hit at anchor in Taranto harbor by aging British Swordfish torpedo bombers from the carrier Illustrious. It took only four days, December 7 to 10, 1941, for the Japanese navy to emphasize that the battleship was no longer the capital ship of the world’s navies. Building on the Taranto example, Japanese naval air power crippled the U.S. Navy’s Pacific battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Even after that destruction, there were still those who argued that a well-handled battleship, under way and with good antiaircraft protection, could beat off an aerial assault. They were proven incorrect on December 10, when the modern Royal Navy battleship Prince of Wales (36,700 tons, 10 14-inch guns, 29 knots) and the aging battle cruiser

The powerful German battleship Bismarck, photographed here shortly after its commissioning in August 1940, although rangefinders have not yet been installed. The Bismarck was sunk in the North Atlantic on May 27, 1941. (Naval Historical Center)

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Repulse (17,300 tons, 6 15-inch guns, and 32 knots), under way and defended by an array of antiaircraft guns, were sunk in short order by Japanese naval warplanes. Yet those four days in December simply confirmed a trend that was already in effect; by that time, no nation was laying down any new battleships. In November 1941, the Royal Navy had begun the Vanguard (44,500 tons, 8 15-inch guns, and 30 knots), but this battleship was not completely new, having been constructed to put to use the 15-inch guns and turrets removed from two battle cruisers that had been converted to aircraft carriers following World War I. The Vanguard, leisurely constructed, was not commissioned until 1946, but the French battleship Jean Bart, finished in 1955, was the world’s last battleship to be completed. Nonetheless, battleships were still so valued during World War II that all of the capital ships from World War I and the immediate interwar era that had escaped the scrapping frenzy of the 1920s were pressed into combat service. For example, the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth–class ships, all but one of which (the Queen Elizabeth [27,500 tons, 8 15-inch guns, 23 knots]) had fought at Jutland, saw hard service in this new war. Only the Royal Navy, however, could boast of battleships that had fired their main batteries in battleship-to-battleship clashes in both world wars. Most of the later World War I–era battleships that survived into World War II had been extensively modernized in the 1930s to protect them against air and submarine attacks, and in all cases, they were converted to oil-fired propulsion. Although the main armament remained remarkably constant, virtually all World War I–era battleships were extensively rebuilt to afford much greater elevations for the main batteries. In terms of both dollars and time, the cost entailed in rebuilding these ships usually exceeded the original cost of construction. Construction of the battleships that served in World War II had, with the exception of the Vanguard, been started before their nations had opened hostilities. (The last two units of the U.S. Navy’s last battleships of the Iowa class were indeed started six months after Pearl Harbor, but the Illinois and Kentucky [48,000 tons, 9 16-inch guns, and design speed of 32.5 knots] were never completed.) Battleship duties in World War II were not all that different from those in World War I: convoy escort and line of battle actions, although shore bombardment received far greater emphasis. There were only two line of battle fleet actions and but few battleship-to-battleship clashes. Among the latter category, the Royal Navy battle cruiser Hood (42,700 tons, 8 15-inch guns, 31 knots) and battleships Barham (same statistics as the Queen Elizabeth) and Resolution (28,000 tons, 8 15inch guns, 24 knots) attacked the stationary French Bretagne and Provence (both 22,200 tons, 10 13.4-inch guns, 20 knots), and Dunkerque and Strasbourg (both 26,500 tons, 8 13-inch guns, and 29.5 knots) at Mers-el-Kébir (Oran, Algeria) on July 8, 1940. The 15-inch shells from the British ships sank the Bretagne and heavily damaged the Provence and Dunkerque. Return fire lightly damaged the Hood. At Dakar in West Africa, the Resolution and Barham engaged in a gunnery duel

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with the 95 percent completed Richelieu in September 1940, in the course of which a French submarine severely damaged the Resolution. The Prince of Wales, King George V (same as the Prince of Wales), and Rodney (33,300 tons, 9 16-inch guns, 23 knots) participated in the sinking of the powerful German battleship Bismarck in May 1941; in November 1942, the U.S. Navy’s Washington (37,500 tons, 9 16inch guns, 28 knots) sank the Japanese battleship/battle cruiser Kirishima (32,100 tons, 8 14-inch guns, 30 knots, as rebuilt). The South Dakota suffered some moderate damage in the same action. Also in November 1942, the Massachusetts (38,000 tons, 9 16-inch guns, 27.5 knots) hit the uncompleted and stationary French Jean Bart (38,500 tons, 8 15-inch guns, 32 knots as designed but with only 4 15-inchers in this action) with seven 16-inch shells at Casablanca, and in December 1943, the Royal Navy’s new Duke of York (same characteristics as the Prince of Wales) sank the German Scharnhorst (31,900 tons, 9 11-inch guns, 32 knots) off North Cape, Norway. The only battleship fleet actions of World War II took place on July 9, 1940, off Calabria, southern Italy and on October 25, 1944, at Surigao Strait, near Leyte, Philippines. In the first, the British battleships Warspite, Malaya, both Queen

The Royal Navy Queen Elizabeth–class battleship Barham entered service in 1915 during World War I. Shown here in the mid-1930s following its 1931–1934 reconstruction, the Barham was sunk by the German submarine U-331 on November 25, 1941. (Naval Historical Center)

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Elizabeth–class vessels, and the R-class Royal Sovereign, supported by an aircraft carrier, five cruisers, and 16 destroyers encountered an Italian fleet with the rebuilt World War I vintage battleships Cavour and Cesare (25,900 tons, 10 12.6-inch guns, 28 knots as rebuilt) 14 cruisers, and 16 destroyers. The Italian fleet disengaged after the Warspite moderately damaged the Cavour with an extreme range hit. At Surigao Strait, a fleet consisting of the aging U.S. battleships West Virginia (31,800 tons, 8 16-inch guns, 21 knots), California, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania (all 32,000–32,300 tons, 12 14-inch guns, 21 knots), and Maryland (31,500 tons, 8 16-inch guns, 21 knots), with seven U.S. and one Australian cruisers and four destroyer squadrons, sank the Japanese battleships Fuso (30,600 tons, 12 14-inch guns, 22.5 knots) by destroyer torpedoes and Yamashiro by gunfire and destroyer torpedoes. The West Virginia inflicted the most damage, with its 16-inch guns directed by the Mk 8 gunfire control radar. Not surprisingly, the Japanese navy, with its fixation on the concept of the decisive battle, was also the most battleship-minded of any navy engaged in World War II. Although the Japanese built the largest battleships in history (the Yamato class), both completed units (the Yamato and Musashi [62,300 tons, 9 18.1-inch guns, 27 knots]) were sunk by U.S. naval air power. Perhaps the most impressive battleships from World War II are those of the U.S. Navy’s Iowa class. These magnificent warships have an unmatched battle history, having fought in World War II, Korea, Vietnam (the New Jersey only [48,100 tons, 9 16-inch guns, 32.5 knots]), and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. All four units easily reached 30-plus knots during their reactivation in the 1980s. Throughout World War II, the battleships performed magnificently in a shore bombardment role. They also served effectively as antiaircraft platforms for the aircraft carriers and as fast oilers for the destroyers. After the war, U.S. Iowa-class battleships rendered excellent service during the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf Wars. Eight battleships of World War II remain in existence as museum pieces, and all are American: the Texas (27,000 tons, 10 14-inch guns, 21 knots), which also served in World War I; Massachusetts; North Carolina; Alabama; Iowa; New Jersey; Missouri; and Wisconsin. Stanley Sandler See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States, Navy; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Breyer, Sigfrieg. Battleships and Battlecruisers, 1905–1970. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974. Garzke, William H. Jr., and Robert O. Dulin Jr. Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985.

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Garzke, William H. Jr., and Robert O. Dulin Jr. Battleships: Allied Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Garzke, William H. Jr., and Robert O. Dulin Jr. Battleships: United States Battleships in World War II. Rev. ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Muir, Malcolm Jr. The Iowa Class Battleships. Poole, UK: Blandford Press, 1987. Sandler, Stanley. Battleships: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004. Sturton, Ian, ed. All the World’s Battleships: 1906 to the Present. London: Brassey’s, 1996.

Bay of Biscay, Battle of (December 28, 1943) After the invasion of the Soviet Union severed German land access to strategic raw materials such as rubber and tin, blockade runners became essential to the Axis war effort, and the Kriegsmarine maintained destroyers and fleet torpedo boats on the French Biscay coast to escort blockade runners into port during the dangerous final leg of their voyage. On December 27, 1943, two German flotillas sortied to meet the blockade runner Alsterufer, not realizing that Allied aircraft had surprised and sunk it the day before. The German units were the 8th Destroyer Flotilla (Kapitän zur See Hans Erdmenger) with the Z27, Z23, Z24, Z32, Z37 and the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla (Korvettenkapitän Franz Kohlauf ) with the T23, T22, T24, T25, T26, and T27. Two British light cruisers, the Glasgow and Enterprise, which had been hunting the Alsterufer, were south of the Germans, and, learning of their mission from signals intelligence, they steered to intercept. The German flotillas united just after noon on December 28 and swept eastwardly. It was a rough day in the Bay of Biscay with a strong easterly wind. Conditions were difficult aboard the German Type 36A destroyers, which were poor sea boats, and they were worse for the torpedo boats, which had green seas breaking over their bows and spray inundating their bridges. At 1:32 p.m., the Glasgow spotted the Germans, and eight minutes later, the Z23 saw the British cruisers bearing down. At this point, the Germans were steaming south-by-southeast in three columns. Almost immediately, Erdmenger ordered a torpedo attack, which was impractical due to the range and rough seas. Meanwhile, the British closed, and at 1:46 p.m., Glasgow’s forward turret fired the first salvo from a range of 18,000 yards. Initially both forces ran south-southeast trading long-range broadsides. At 1:56 p.m., Erdmenger ordered another torpedo attack, and the Z32, Z37, and Z34 took station to port and edged toward the cruisers. At 2:05 p.m., a shell from the Z32 struck the Glasgow, killing two men. At 2:15 p.m., the Z37 fired four torpedoes from 14,000 yards. While this futile barrage churned through seven miles of stormy water, Erdmenger decided to divide his force, even though German shooting had been at least as good

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as the British. At 2:19 p.m., the T26, T22, T25, Z27, and Z23 turned north as Z32, Z37, Z24, T23, T24, and T27 continued southeast. The Z27 turned toward the British rather than away, and the flagship became the first German vessel damaged when a 6-inch shell from the Enterprise penetrated a boiler room and ignited a huge fire. As the Germans divided, the Glasgow joined Enterprise and ranged its turrets on the three torpedo boats heading north. At 2:54 p.m., the Glasgow damaged the rear warship, the T25. Then the Glasgow shifted fire to the T26 and hit its boiler room. After temporarily disengaging to clear some gun defects, the Enterprise joined the Glasgow, and the two cruisers sank the T26, the most southerly of the three damaged ships at 4:20 p.m. The Enterprise dispatched the T25 at 4:37 p.m. with a single torpedo. Finally, the Glasgow found the Z27 drifting with all guns silent. It closed and exploded the German destroyer’s magazines at 4:41 p.m. The British cruisers then made for Plymouth. The Glasgow had been hit once, while the Enterprise received minor splinter damage from numerous near misses. The rest of the German force safely made port. The Germans fired 34 torpedoes from impossibly long ranges in eight separate attacks, but in rough conditions with extended visibility the better gun platform prevailed. The German commander’s decision to divide his flotilla also proved ill-advised as afterward ranges dropped. In the engagement, the Germans lost three ships. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Blockade Running; Destroyers; Les Sept Iles, Action off.

References Koop, Gerhard, and Klaus-Peter Schmolke. German Destroyers of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003. O’Hara, Vincent P. The German Fleet at War 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

Bay of Biscay Offensive (February–August 1943) Major anti–U-boat operation conducted by the British and U.S. air forces. Beginning in January 1942, Allied maritime patrol aircraft carried out air antisubmarine transit patrols in the Bay of Biscay. The advent of the new 10-cm radar in late 1942 and new methods of operations research encouraged a fresh approach to the flagging campaign there. The revised concept foresaw a continuous barrier patrol of the U-boat transit exit routes from the Bay of Biscay into the Atlantic by a total of 260 aircraft equipped with brand-new ASV Mk. III 10-cm-band radars. Operational command would lie with the Number 19 Group of the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command. Allied projections for success were vague and excessively optimistic,

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but the planners assumed correctly that it would take the Germans at least four months to respond effectively to the new 10-cm radar. The actual offensive was preceded by three trial phases: Operations GONDOLA (February 4–16, 1943), ENCLOSE I (March 20–28, 1943), and ENCLOSE II (April 5–13, 1943). Beset by difficulties, such as the withdrawal of the U.S. Army Air Force’s B-24 Liberator bombers, slow delivery of the ASV Mk. III radar, and lack of aircraft, the operations were nonetheless a success in that they demonstrated an increased efficiency in aircraft allocation and in U-boat sightings. Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor, head of Coastal Command, decided to launch the full-scale offensive (Operation DERANGE) on April 13 with 131 aircraft. The repeated, accurate night attacks by the Vickers Wellington medium bombers of Number 172 Squadron, then the only Coastal Command aircraft equipped with new ASV Mk. III radars and Leigh lights, produced instant, although unforeseen, results. The failure of the German threat receivers to warn the U-boats of the incoming aircraft and the success of two U-boats in shooting down the attacking planes convinced the German U-boat command that the remedy was to give up the night surface transit and to order the U-boats to fight it out with aircraft while on the surface during daylight hours. Coastal Command aircraft wreaked havoc among the grossly overmatched U-boats during those daylight battles. In May alone, six U-boats were destroyed and seven so severely damaged that they had to return to their bases. In turn, the U-boats accounted for only 5 of 21 aircraft lost by the Coastal Command in the Bay of Biscay that month. The German withdrawal from the North Atlantic convoy routes following the “Black May” of 1943 allowed Slessor to step up the operation with additional air assets. The Germans took to sending the U-boats in groups in order to provide better antiaircraft defense, yet in June, four U-boats were lost and six others severely damaged. DERANGE peaked in July, when Allied aircraft claimed 16 U-boats— among them three valuable Type XIV U-tankers—compelling Grossadmiral (grand admiral) Karl Dönitz to call off a planned operation in the western Atlantic. German losses in the Bay of Biscay dropped considerably thereafter, but the air patrols remained a formidable obstacle throughout the remainder of the war by forcing the U-boats to stay submerged for most of the time during transit. Although the Battle of the Atlantic was ultimately won around the convoys, the Bay of Biscay Offensive contributed to the success by preventing many U-boats from reaching their operational areas in time to saturate convoy defenses as they had done in March 1943. Dirk Steffen See also: Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Leigh Light; Radar.

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References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1998. Gannon, Michael. Black May. New York: HarperCollins, 1998. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 10, The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943–May 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. Vols. 2 and 3. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957 and 1960.

Bergamini, Carlo (1888–1943) Italian navy admiral. Carlo Bergamini was born near Modena on October 24, 1888. He became a midshipman in 1908. Bergamini quickly demonstrated a natural talent for technical matters and ballistics, publishing before 1915 studies of an improved fire-control computer. He was considered one of the four fathers of the Regia Marina’s mechanical computer directors introduced after 1930. In 1917, although still a lieutenant, Bergamini became fire control officer of the armored cruiser Pisa, which, on October 2, 1918, sank the Austro-Hungarian steamer Stambul at Durazzo. Bergamini was promoted to captain in 1932 and to rear admiral in 1937. In August 1939, Bergamini was promoted to admiral and picked by Italian navy chief of staff Admiral Domenico Cavagnari as the chief of staff for Admiral Inigo Campioni, the fleet commander. During spring 1940, Bergamini was reassigned to fix problems associated with the 15-inch guns of Italy’s new battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto. As a consequence, Bergamini missed the action off Calabria; his role was assumed by the commander of the V Division, Admiral Bruno Brivonesi. Bergamini then supervised the salvage and recovery efforts of Italian ships damaged in the British air attack on Taranto of November 12, 1940. Bergamini was passed over for the position of commander of the Italian battle fleet in favor of Admiral Angelo Iachino when Campioni was removed from command, even though the navy’s outgoing chief of staff, Cavagnari, considered him an aggressive leader and a first-class technician and had recommended him for the position. In December 1941, Bergamini received command of the V Division of three modernized battleships: the Doria, Duilio, and Cesare. He left port immediately with the mission of escorting an important convoy to Libya at all costs. Interpreting his orders literally, he included his battleships inside the convoy as an antiaircraft screen. On February 14, 1942, Bergamini sortied with the battleship Duilio, two light cruisers, and seven destroyers to intercept a British Malta convoy. The merchant ships in the convoy were disabled by air attacks and scuttled after the British learned of Bergamini’s approach, and thus no action followed. In their return to

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base, Bergamini’s warships encountered a strong storm. Bergamini gave his commanders total freedom of maneuver, and damage was limited, with no ship losses in stark contrast to the strict centralized control exercised by Admiral Iachino after the Second Battle of Sirte in March. By December 1942, Bergamini’s star was ascending and that of Iachino was on the wane; however, Bergamini did not receive command of the battle force until April 5, 1943. Bergamini wanted to sortie on July 10, 1943, to attack British convoys off Sicily, although he recognized that, with no air support and just two battleships against six (and two carriers) for the British, his chances would be slim. However, both Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the navy chief of staff vetoed his request. On September 8, 1943, he was preparing to lead the fleet against the Allied forces off Salerno when news of the armistice arrived. Bergamini wanted to scuttle his ships, but Admiral Raffaele de Courten convinced him to sail to the Sardinian base at La Maddalena instead. German bombers attacked the fleet at 3:50 p.m. on September 9 while en route, sinking the admiral’s flagship Roma and taking his life and 1,252 of his men. Admiral Bergamini was known as a humane commander who always demonstrated interest in the welfare of his men. He received the Medaglia d’oro, Italy’s highest military award, both from King Victor Emmanuel III and Mussolini’s Republic in 1944 and is today considered a key figure in the Italian navy’s history. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cavagnari, Domenico; De Courten, Raffaele; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Sirte, Second Battle of; Taranto, Attack on.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Raimondi, Ireneo. Ammiraglio Carlo Bergamini. Modena: Banca Popolare di San Felice sul Panaro, 1986. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Beta Convoy Battle (November 9, 1941) The Royal Navy interception and destruction of a large Axis convoy carrying vital supplies to North Africa. Under pressure to more effectively interdict traffic to Africa, Vice Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, dispatched Force K under Captain W. G. Agnew consisting of the light cruisers Aurora and Penelope and the destroyers Lance and Lively to Malta on October 21, 1941.

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In response, Italian naval headquarters temporarily suspended convoys, but a planned November 21 offensive in North Africa forced the dispatch of an unusually large convoy, code-named Beta. It numbered seven ships, loaded with ammunition, fuel, and vehicles. Beta received an unusually strong escort, consisting of the 10th Destroyer Squadron (Captain Ugo Bisciani), including the Maestrale, Fulmine, Euro, Grecale, Libeccio, and Oriani, and a distant escort of the III (heavy cruiser) Division under Rear Admiral Bruto Brivonesi with the Trieste and Trento and the 13th Destroyer Squadron of the Granatiere, Fuciliere, Bersagliere, and Alpino. The Italian convoy’s route to Tripoli circled east of Malta. Experience taught that aircraft were the principal danger during the day and that a surface interception at night was nearly impossible unless enemy forces knew the convoy’s exact route and speed. If, however, a night encounter did occur, improved training and the recent introduction of a primitive radar detection and jamming device gave some confidence to the Italians that their escort could handle the situation. The Italians did not understand the evolving capability of British radar or that signals intelligence had disclosed the convoy’s itinerary. Acting on Enigma decrypts, a British aircraft discovered Beta on the afternoon of November 8. Force K weighed anchor at 5:30 p.m. It was still a near thing, however, because the aircraft that was supposed to vector Force K onto its target suffered equipment failures. Finally, at 12:39 a.m., the Aurora’s lookouts sighted the enemy. The transports were in two columns of three with the odd ship bringing up the rear. The Maestrale sailed at the convoy’s head, while the Euro and Fulmine guarded the starboard side, the Oriani and Libeccio the port side, and the Grecale the rear. The III Division and the 13th Squadron zigzagged five miles astern, the area believed most vulnerable to British attack. The Aurora maneuvered to a down-moon position on the convoy’s starboard quarter. During this evolution, lookouts on the Fulmine sighted the British ships but assumed they were Brivonesi’s cruisers. British lookouts likewise spotted the III Division looming vaguely in the darkness but Captain Agnew assumed they were more merchant ships and he decided to focus on the larger target dead ahead. In the faint moonlight, the Aurora laid its guns with radar and opened fire at 12:57 a.m. at a range of 5,700 yards, followed seconds later by the Penelope and Lance. Their initial barrage severely damaged the Grecale. The convoy leader, the Maestrale, reacted to the outburst by turning away from the British. The escort commander assumed that Brivonesi’s cruisers had the starboard quarter covered, and he was uncertain of the direction from which the sudden attack had come. The Libeccio and Oriani remained on the unengaged side. Brivonesi’s lead destroyer broadcast an enemy alert, and, in response, the admiral steered southwest and increased speed from 12 to 18 knots. At 12:59 p.m., the Aurora turned to run down the convoy’s starboard side, unknowingly pulling away from Brivonesi’s approaching cruisers. The merchant

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ships filled the air with antiaircraft fire and made no attempt to scatter or turn away. At 1:03 a.m., the Fulmine tried to make a torpedo attack, but 6-inch gunfire from the Penelope exploded on the Italian’s bridge and mortally wounded the captain. At the same time, the Trieste opened fire 7,000 yards off the Lively’s starboard quarter. No one in Force K realized that a pair of heavy cruisers was even present. Several more broadsides struck the Fulmine, and the destroyer capsized and sank within minutes. The Euro turned toward the enemy and closed to 2,000 yards. However, the escort commander on the Maestrale ordered the destroyers to concentrate around his flagship on the convoy’s other side, which caused the Euro’s captain to think the enemy must be there and that he was stalking the Trieste. Consequently, he turned away, realizing his mistake only when the Aurora and Penelope engaged. The cruisers hit Euro six times, but their shells passed through without causing crippling damage. As the Maestrale, Libeccio, Oriani, and Euro withdrew east to regroup, the convoy continued on course, engaging imaginary bombers. The British circled around the convoy’s head, and at 1:25 a.m., they began passing up the convoy’s other side, setting ablaze one ship after another. The Italian III Division and 13th Squadron were still steaming south as the British column disappeared behind the smoke of the burning steamers, and the heavy cruisers ceased fire and turned north at 1:29 a.m., when Brivonesi decided to intercept the British withdrawal. With every ship in sight burning, Force K headed home at 2:05 a.m. and, at 2:30 a.m., passed 20 miles astern of Brivonesi’s cruisers, which were still sailing north. Force K had destroyed all seven transports, sunk the Fulmine, heavily damaged the Euro and Grecale, and escaped harm except for splinter damage to the Lively. The Beta action was one of the most brilliant British naval surface victories of the war, demonstrating superior doctrine, technology, and leadership combined with luck, surprise, and inept opposition. Italian Naval Headquarters relieved both commanders. The Germans were furious at the battle’s outcome and tried to force their advisors upon the Italians. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Signals Intelligence.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Smith, Peter C., and Edwin Walker. The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

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Bey, Eric (1898–1943) German navy admiral. Born in Hamburg on March 23, 1898, Eric Bey joined the Imperial German Navy during World War I on June 13, 1916, and served in destroyers. He continued in the German navy (the Reichsmarine) after the war and, by the beginning of World War II, had risen to the rank of commander in the navy of the Third Reich (the Kriegsmarine). After engaging in minelaying off the English coast in December 1939, Bey commanded the 4th Destroyer Flotilla of three destroyers in Commodore Friedrich Bonte’s naval force transporting troops of the 3rd Mountain Division to the port of Narvik during the German invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940. In the naval battles at Narvik on April 10 and 13, 1940, Bey distinguished himself in leading his destroyers against superior British navy resources, including the battleship Warspite. Despite the annihilation of his command, his performance at Narvik earned him the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. On May 10, 1940, Bey was promoted to captain and given command of the German destroyer force, succeeding Bonte, who had been killed at Narvik on April 10. Bey commanded the destroyer screen protecting the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in Operation CERBERUS (the so-called Channel Dash in February 1942. Promoted to Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral), Bey commanded the task force consisting of the battlecruiser Scharnhorst and destroyers Z29, Z30, Z33, Z34, and Z38, which sortied from Altafjord, Norway, on December 25, 1943, in Operation OSTFRONT, intending to intercept Allied Convoy JW-55B en route to Murmansk. Bey was freed of the restraints that Chancellor Adolf Hitler had imposed on German surface warships. Bey separated his destroyers to search for the convoy to the southwest, while he proceeded north in the Scharnhorst, only to encounter a superior British force led by the battleship Duke of York that had located the German ship by radar. The ensuing battle of the North Cape on December 26 was fought in conditions of poor visibility in which the British enjoyed significant radar superiority. It was also the last classic single-ship duel between battleships. The forward radar on the Scharnhorst was destroyed early in the battle by a lucky shot from the heavy cruiser Norfolk of the British screening force. In the ensuing running battle, the Scharnhorst was hit by both shells and torpedoes (a total of 55 were fired at it) and went down. Of its crew of 1,968 men, only 36 were plucked alive from the icy waters, no officer among them. Reportedly, Bey and Scharnhorst’s captain were spotted in the water badly wounded, but they disappeared before they could be rescued. The sinking of the Scharnhorst ended German surface attacks on the Allied Murmansk convoys. Spencer C. Tucker See also: CERBERUS, Operation; Convoys, Allied; Germany, Navy; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of.

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References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. Trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974. Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969.

Biak, Battle of (June 8–9, 1944) Pacific theater naval action during June 8–9, 1944, resulting from the AustralianAmerican interception of a Japanese destroyer force attempting to reinforce Biak Island. On May 27, 1944, U.S. troops landed on Biak, a large island off western New Guinea in conjunction with General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Campaign. Hoping that a long struggle for Biak would provoke conditions conductive to a decisive battle, the Japanese navy attempted to ferry reinforcements to the island in destroyers. Six destroyers (three towing troop barges) and the cruisers Aoba and Kinu departed Sarong at midnight June 7 under the command of Rear Admiral Sakonju Naomaso. Allied aircraft spotted the Japanese, and, at 12:45 p.m., on June 8, 10 U.S. army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell twin-engine medium bombers sank one of the destroyers and three barges. After this setback, the cruisers turned back, but Sakonju pressed on with the five surviving destroyers. These included the Shikinami, Shigure, and Uranami in the support role and Shiratsuyu and Samidare in the transport role. Task Force 74/75 commanded by British navy Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley guarded Biak against a Japanese landing. TF 74/75 included the heavy cruiser Australia; the light cruisers Phoenix and Boise and 13 destroyers (Destroyer Division 42 under Commander Albert E. Jarrell, with the Fletcher, Jenkins, Radford, and the Lavallette; Destroyer Division 47 under Captain Kenmore M. McManes, with the Hutchins, Daly, Beale, and the Abner Read; Destroyer Division 48 under Commander John B. McLean, with the Ammen, Mullany, and the Trathen; and an Australian destroyer division of the Arunta and Warramunga). At 10:00 p.m. on June 8, a search plane warned Crutchley that the Japanese force was 60 miles to the northwest. Thinking that the nearly full moon made a surprise torpedo attack unlikely and that the destroyers would need gunfire support from the cruisers, Crutchley intended to assume battle formation after contact. At 11:20 p.m., the Boise reported a contact at 26,000 yards. Unfortunately for Crutchley’s plans, Sakonju sighted him at the same time, and, at 11:23 p.m., the Japanese reversed course, made smoke, and launched torpedoes while casting off the troop barges they had been towing. After the sighting, Crutchley methodically formed his cruisers into column and ordered Destroyer Division 47 to the van, Destroyer Division 48 to the rear, and

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Destroyer Division 42 to take station on the cruiser column’s port quarter. Commander Jarrell, however, noted that the range was opening. Disregarding Crutchley’s instructions, he swung north in pursuit of the enemy. Crutchley released Divisions 47 and 48 to join Division 42. It was 11 minutes after first contract and 8 minutes after the Japanese had reversed course. Meanwhile, the cruisers worked up to 25 knots while the two Australian destroyers trailed. At 11:40 p.m., a torpedo passed behind the Boise, causing the column to maneuver and lose more ground. Division 42 began seeing troop barges at the same time; the Fletcher passed one so rapidly, its machine guns could not track fast enough to fire. At 12:17 a.m. on June 9, the Fletcher opened fire with its bow mounts, hoping for a lucky hit or at least to force the enemy to maneuver. The Japanese replied in kind, hoping for a similar result. At 12:45 a.m., the cruisers dropped out and Crutchley recalled Division 48 to screen them while the Australian destroyers backtracked to hunt down the barges. Jarrell’s Division 42 and McManes’s Division 47 continued the chase. At 1:26 a.m., when it had closed the distance to 14,000 yards, Division 42 turned to port and all four ships fired broadsides hoping to drive the Japanese ships toward Division 47. This scheme provoked more torpedoes from the Japanese and brought Division 47 to within 15,000 yards, whereupon it likewise opened fire. At 2:11 a.m., lookouts reported an explosion, and in fact the Americans hit the Shigure twice, but its speed remained unaffected. Finally at 2:27 a.m., facing a deadline imposed by Admiral Crutchley, the Americans broke off contact. It had proved to be a long and frustrating chase. Ironically, most of the Japanese barges delivered their troops to Biak. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Crutchley, Victor Alexander Charles; Southwest Pacific Theater.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of (May 1941) The sinking of the Bismarck occurred at the height of German battleship operations in the Atlantic Ocean. The commander of the German navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, expected the new battleship Bismarck, which was to be available in the spring of 1941, to provide an opportunity to test the navy’s battle group strategy in

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support of a war on commerce. Repairs to the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst forced delays, and the naval command decided to send the Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to sea as soon as possible to attack shipping in the North Atlantic in Operation RHINE EXERCISE. Raeder was determined to demonstrate the value of the battleships to the war effort, and the Bismarck was rushed into action with an incomplete antiaircraft control system and equipment scavenged from other ships. Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens, the fleet commander and task force leader, opposed a piecemeal approach. He advocated delaying the mission until the other battleships were available, including the Tirpitz. His pessimism played a key role in his decisions over the course of the operation. British intelligence, including ULTRA, alerted the Royal Navy that a major German naval operation was under way, and aircraft spotted the two ships refueling at Bergen, Norway, on May 21, 1941. The British took countermeasures to patrol the Iceland-Faroes passage and the Denmark Strait to block the German breakout into the Atlantic. On May 23, the British cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk spotted the two German raiders in the Denmark Strait. The persistence of the British cruisers in shadowing the German ships led Lütjens to conclude that the British possessed new radar. Off Iceland at about 5:55 a.m. on May 24, in the Iceland Battle or the Battle of the Denmark Strait, British Rear Admiral Lancelot E. Holland’s battle cruiser Hood and battleship Prince of Wales engaged the Bismarck. The Hood was hit in its magazines by the German battleship’s fourth salvo and blew up. Only 3 of its 1,419 crewmen survived. The Prince of Wales took seven hits (four from the Bismarck) and was damaged. Although the Bismarck had received only three hits, the ship was leaking oil, and its speed was also reduced from flooding in the forward compartments. At about 4:00 p.m., Lütjens detached the Prinz Eugen in a vain effort to draw the British off while the Bismarck made for the French port of Saint-Nazaire to carry out repairs. On May 24, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers from the carrier HMS Victorious attacked the German battleship under difficult conditions and scored one hit, but damage was superficial. In the early morning of May 25, the Bismarck managed to elude its pursuers, but Lütjens was unaware of this despite reports from Naval Command Group West. When Lütjens broke radio silence, these messages were picked up by Allied high-frequency direction-finding receivers. Increased German radio traffic along the French coast suggested that the destination of the Bismarck was a French port, which was later confirmed by a British intercept of a Luftwaffe signal. The chief British ships, which had been chasing the Bismarck in the wrong direction due to a plotting error, now altered course. In the meantime, Force H with the aircraft carrier Ark Royal had departed Gibraltar to provide air reconnaissance off the French west coast.

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On May 26, Swordfish torpedo bombers from the Ark Royal and Coastal Command’s patrol bomber aircraft regained contact with the Bismarck. Late in the day, Swordfish from the Ark Royal attacked, and a lucky torpedo hit jammed the German battleship’s twin rudder system, making its unable to maneuver. With no air cover or help from the U-boats or other ships available, the fatalistic Lütjens, remembering the reaction to the scuttling of the Graf Spee and Raeder’s orders to fight to the last shell, radioed the hopelessness of the situation. At 8:45 a.m. on May 27, the British battleships King George V and Rodney opened fire. By 10:00 a.m., although hit by hundreds of shells, the Bismarck remained afloat. As the heavy cruiser Dorsetshire closed to fire torpedoes, the Germans scuttled their ship. Three torpedoes then struck, and the Bismarck went down. Reports of German submarines in the area halted British efforts to rescue German survivors. Only 110 of the crew of 2,300 survived. Lütjens was not among them. A furious Adolf Hitler regarded the sinking of the Bismarck as a major loss of prestige and ordered that no more battleship operations be undertaken without his permission. The major German ships were now relegated to the defense of Norway, leaving the brunt of Germany’s naval war to the U-boats. Keith W. Bird See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Holland, Lancelot Ernest; Lütjens, Günther; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Submarines.

References Bercuson, David J., and Holger H. Herwig. The Destruction of the Bismarck. Woodstock, NY, and New York: Overlook Press, 2001. Burkard, Baron von Müllenheim-Rechberg. Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. Winklareth, Robert J. Bismarck Chase: New Light on a Famous Engagement. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Bismarck and Tirpitz, German Battleships The two Bismarck-class battleships were the largest German warships of World War II. Although often regarded as the epitome of German battleship design, they actually represented something of a compromise, because German chancellor Adolf Hitler had concluded a naval agreement with the British and did not want to provoke the British when the ships were laid down only a year later. Indeed, Hitler had hoped that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 1935 would be the foundation for an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union.

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The two ships followed closely in design the Baden, the last German battleship built for the Imperial German Navy. Horizontal armor was somewhat thicker, vertical armor slightly thinner. Major compartments were larger to provide better working conditions for the crews. Armament was standard for the day. The ships were extremely broad in beam, making them excellent gunnery platforms even in heavy seas. So as not to alarm the British, the tonnage displacement figure was announced as 35,000. Not until after the war was it learned that the displacement was nearly 7,000 tons over the Washington treaty limit. The Bismarck was laid down on July 1, 1936, at Blohm and Voss shipyards in Hamburg. It was launched on February 14, 1939, and commissioned on August 24, 1940. Named for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), the ship was outfitted by January 1941 and underwent trials in March and April. Captain Ernst Lindemann was granted permission to refer to the ship with the pronoun “he” to honor Bismarck. The Tirpitz was named for Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), father of the German High Seas Fleet. Built at Wilhelmshaven Navy Yard, it was laid down on October 20, 1936, launched on April 1, 1939, and commissioned on February 25, 1941. The Bismarck displaced 41,700 tons and 50,900 tons at deep load. The Tirpitz displaced 42,900 tons standard and 51,600 tons deep load. The ships were 813 ft. 8 in. in overall length and 118 ft. 1 in. in beam. Their hulls were protected by an armor belt ranging in thickness from 8.5 in. to 10.5 in. The main turrets were protected by up to 14.25 in., while deck armor was up to 4.75 in. in thickness. Thee three geared turbine engines were capable of producing a top speed of 29 knots. The Bismarck-class ships were armed with 8 15-inch guns in four double turrets and 12 5.9-inch secondary guns in six double turrets. They also mounted 16 105mm guns in eight double mounts, 16 37-mm guns (eight double mounts) and 12 20-mm guns. They could carry four to six aircraft. Normal complement was 2,092 officers and men for the Bismarck and 2,608 for the Tirpitz. Both ships were sunk by the British. The Bismarck succumbed early, while on its first commerce raiding sortie. After sinking the British battle cruiser Hood and damaging the battleship Prince of Wales (the Bismarck was also damaged in the engagement and leaking oil), its rudder was jammed by torpedoes dropped by Swordfish aircraft flying from the carrier Ark Royal. This enabled the British battleships King George V and Rodney to close. Rendered largely hors de combat in the ensuing engagement, the Bismarck was struck by three torpedoes and also scuttled by its crew on May 27, 1941. Efforts by British ships to rescue survivors were cut short by reports of German submarines in the area. As a result, only 110 crew members of a complement of 2,300 survived. On June 9, 1989, undersea explorer Robert D. Ballard located the wreck of the Bismarck some 600 miles off the French coast. In the ongoing controversy over

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who actually sank the great ship, Ballard’s investigations seemed to confirm the German view that the scuttling had sent it to the bottom. The Tirpitz received additional armament in 1942 in the form of six 533-mm torpedo tubes taken from the cruiser Leipzig. Its antiaircraft armament was also steadily increased, to 40 20-mm guns in single and quadruple mounts. Stationed in Norway, the Tirpitz represented a great threat to the Allied Arctic convoys and was subjected to numerous Allied attacks, some of them by Royal Air Force Lancaster bombers, with special 12,000-lb. “tallboy” bombs. It finally succumbed to one such attack on November 12, 1944. A total of 917 of its crew died in the attack. After the war, much of the hulk was sold for scrap. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; Hood, British Battle Cruiser; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Ballard, Robert D., with Rick Archbold. The Discovery of the Bismarck. New York: Warner Books, 1990. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Dulin, Robert O., and William H. Garzke. Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Elfrath, Ulrich, and Bodo Herzog. Trans. Edward Force. The Battleship Bismarck: A Documentary in Words and Pictures. West Chester, PA: Schiffer, 1975. Gray, Edwyn. Hitler’s Battleships. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Ireland, Bernard. Jane’s Battleships of the 20th Century. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. Koop, Gerhard, and Klaus-Peter Schmolke. Battleships of the Bismarck Class: Bismarck and Tirpitz. Trans. Geoffrey Brooks. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Bismarck Sea, Battle of (March 2–5, 1943) Southwestern Pacific air-naval battle. As the troops of Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur fought to expel the Japanese from New Guinea, it fell to the U.S. Army Air Forces to interdict Japanese resupply efforts. When Major General George C. Kenney assumed command of Fifth Air Force in the Pacific in August 1942, he found many of his units operating obsolescent aircraft and using ineffective tactics. Kenney quickly devised two important new tactics. First was the development of skip-bombing, in which medium bombers— A-20 Havocs and B-25 Mitchells—attacked Japanese ships from low altitude and

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literally skipped bombs into the sides of their targets. The bombs used time-delayed fuses so that the explosions would occur either within the ships, should they penetrate the hulls, or below their waterlines, as the bombs sank after hitting the hulls. Second, crews installed additional forward-firing .50-caliber machine guns in medium bombers, designed to either sink small vessels or suppress antiaircraft fire. Also, several squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force were available to supplement the Fifth Air Force. In January 1943, Allied forces undertook a major offensive along the New Guinea coast. In response, the Japanese sent additional resources via convoys across the Bismarck Sea. On the night of February 28, 1943, a large Japanese force under Rear Admiral Kimura Masatomi, consisting of eight transports and eight destroyers departed Rabaul carrying 6,900 troops of the 51st Division, bound for Lae, New Guinea. The Japanese recognized the threat posed by Allied air power, but Lae was too important to lose. Some 100 fighters (40 navy and 60 army) provided air cover for the convoy. Kenney knew of the Japanese activity through signals intelligence and reconnaissance flights. American B-24s first sighted the Japanese formation on March 1, but eight B-17s sent to attack it failed to locate their quarry because of cloud cover. The following day, another B-24 reacquired the target, and eight B-17s attacked with 1,000-lb. demolition bombs, sinking one transport and damaging another. Two of the Japanese destroyers rescued approximately 950 men and rushed ahead to Lae, returning to the convoy early the next morning. On March 3, the largest Allied air effort yet seen in the theater assembled to attack the Japanese when the convoy came within range of the medium bombers. At 10:00 a.m., B-17s bombed the convoy to disrupt its formation. Shortly thereafter, Australian Beaufighters, followed by heavily armed B-25s and A-20s, attacked the convoy from an altitude of 500 ft. or less, while P-38s engaged Japanese escort fighters. Out of 47 bombs dropped by the attackers, 28 reportedly found their targets. Allied aircraft repeated their assault that afternoon but with less success, as the weather began to interfere. By the end of the day, all of the Japanese transports and three of the destroyers had been sunk. A fourth destroyer was heavily damaged and was sunk by Allied aircraft the next day. The remaining destroyers collected as many survivors as possible and returned to Rabaul. During the course of the next few days, aircraft and patrol torpedo boats patrolled the area, machine-gunning and bombing any remaining Japanese to prevent enemy troops from reaching land. Additionally, Allied pilots sought retribution against Japanese flyers who had reportedly machine-gunned an American crew parachuting from their stricken B-17. In the battle, the Japanese lost some 60 aircraft, 12 ships, and 3,700 men. The Allied cost was 3 fighters, 1 B-17, and 1 B-25. MacArthur described the victory as “the decisive aerial engagement” in the southwest Pacific theater. After the battle,

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Japanese transports never again approached within range of Allied airpower for the rest of the campaign. Without reinforcement, the Japanese lost Lae to Australian troops some seven months later. Rodney Madison See also: Aviation, Naval; Kimura Masatomi; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater.

References Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. McAulay, Lex. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 11, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950. Null, Gary. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Weapon of Denial—Air Power and the Battle for New Guinea. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Programs, 1995.

BITING, Operation (Bruneval Raid, February 27–28, 1942) British combined arms raid. The objective of Operation BITING was to capture parts of a German Würzburg radar array determined to be located at a farmhouse on cliffs at Bruneval near Le Havre on the English Channel. The radar was warning the Germans of British aircraft and ships approaching the coast, and the British believed it and similar radars were in large part responsible for recent heavy Royal Air Force bomber losses. It was believed that a seaborne assault would provide the Germans too much warning, so an airborne operation was planned, with the men to be extracted by sea. The raid commander was Major John Frost, who led 120 men of C Company of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Airborne Division. Flight Sergeant C. W. H. Cox, a Royal Air Force expert radio mechanic, accompanied them. RAF 51 Squadron flying Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers under Wing Commander P. Pickard had the task of inserting the raiders. Their extraction was to be by Royal Navy motorboats under Commander F. N. Cook of the Royal Australian Navy. As training proceeded, the French Resistance reported that the Bruneval position was being strengthened. While 30 German troops were at the farmhouse, some 100 others were in the immediate vicinity. The attacking forces departed on the night of February 27–28. The air drop was uneventful, and the attackers assembled at the designated assembly point for the

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movement to the radar station. The attack proceeded as planned, Cox dismantled vital parts of the radar, and Frost then led his men to the beach shortly after 2:00 a.m. on February 28. Managing to avoid detection by two German destroyers and two E-boats less than a mile from his own craft off shore, Cook sent in six landing craft to extract the men, who had come under heavy German machine gun fire from the cliffs. The raiders and their precious cargo then transferred to the motor gun boats for the return to Portsmouth. Four Royal Navy destroyers and Royal Air Force Supermarine Spitfire fighters provided protection against possible German intervention. The attackers suffered two killed, six wounded, and six captured. The Germans lost five killed, two wounded, two captured (including a radar technician), and three missing. The attack was judged a great success. Tests on the radar components helped the British in their development of countermeasures (code-named Window) to neutralize it. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Radar.

References Frost, John. A Drop Too Many. London: Cassell, 1980. Millar, George. The Bruneval Raid. New York: Doubleday, 1975.

Black Sea, Area of Operations The Black Sea is an oval-shaped inland sea stretching 600 miles west to east and ranging from 300 to 140 miles north to south. In 1941 the Soviet Union occupied a coastline along the northern shore of more than 2,200 miles (including the Sea of Azov), with the neutral state of Turkey to the south and the German allies Bulgaria and Romania to the west. The only maritime route into the Black Sea runs through the Turkish-controlled Bosporus Straits. The inability of the Soviets to construct major warships during the conflict and that of the Axis powers to send ships through the Bosporus forced both sides to fight with the large warships with which they had started the conflict. Another prominent geographic factor affecting naval operations was the Crimean peninsula, which juts into the middle of the Black Sea. Possession of the Crimea and its great port, Sevastopol, ensured domination of the entire body of water. In 1941 the Soviet Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 3 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 17 destroyers, 2 guard ships, 44 submarines, and 120 other warships from gunboats to motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Sevastopol and Novorossiysk were the fleet’s major bases. The fleet’s mission was to control the Black Sea, to prevent


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enemy naval forces from entering the region, to destroy the Romanian navy, and to support the Red Army. Romania had bases at Sulina and Constanta and its navy consisted of 4 destroyers, 3 small torpedo boats, 1 submarine, 11 smaller warships, and a flotilla of river monitors. Germany had no naval forces in the Black Sea, and Bulgaria prudently declined to fight the Soviet Union. Berlin believed that the capture of the coastline would eliminate the need for naval forces. The first major operation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was an ineffective bombardment of Constanta, Romania, by two destroyers. One was mined and sunk and the other damaged. Two Romanian destroyers contested the attack in what was the only encounter between major warships in the Black Sea during the entire war. Romania was a major supplier of oil to the Axis, and, while most of Germany’s allotment went up the Danube River, Italy’s share was shipped through the Bosporus. Soviet submarines attacked this vital traffic, but, beginning in October 1941, the Romanians fenced off the coastal route with a mine barrage. Thereafter, the Romanian navy focused on the protection of the sea lanes in the western Black Sea. Through December 1941, Soviet submarines (or submarine-laid mines) only accounted for 10 ships totaling 19,000 tons. The rapid German advance into the Ukraine during the summer of 1941 cut off large Soviet forces in the major port of Odessa. The Black Sea Fleet effectively supported Odessa until the Soviet high command decided to evacuate. This highly successful operation, conducted from October 1 to 16, extracted 86,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilians, along with most their weapons and supplies, without the Axis even being aware of the operation and just in time to meet Axis forces advancing into the Crimea. German and Romanian forces besieged Sevastopol beginning on October 30, and for the balance of the year the Black Sea Fleet supported the fortress. The most important operation was the December 26–28 landing of 42,000 men on the Crimea’s eastern finger, the Kerch Peninsula, and around Feodosiya in the largest and most complex Soviet amphibious operation of the war. This operation disrupted a German offensive to capture Sevastopol and guaranteed that the fortress would hold out another six months. Sevastopol’s resistance convinced the German command that they needed a navy and led to the shipment of MTBs, Marinefährprähme (MFP) barges, and small submarines overland and down the Danube into the Black Sea. The captured shipyards at Nikolayev began fabricating MFPs as well. Italy contributed a flotilla of MTBs and miniature submarines. During 1942, the Black Sea Fleet continued to support Sevastopol until its capture in July, bringing in supplies and reinforcements and conducting almost nightly shore bombardments. The months of May through July cost the fleet six destroyers and one light cruiser to mines and aircraft. Italian MTBs torpedoed the cruiser Molotov after a bombardment of Feodosiya on August 3, 1942.

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A fast patrol boat of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet maneuvers at high speed during an attack on a submarine, July 13, 1942. The Black Sea Fleet played an important role in the epic defense of Sevastopol. (AP/Wide World Photos)

The Germans crossed the Kerch Strait at the end of August using a flotilla of barges and small craft and captured Novorossiysk on September 6. This forced the fleet to retreat to the minor ports of Poti and Batumi near the Turkish border. In 1942 Soviet submarines accounted for as many as 17 Axis and neutral ships of 12,660 gross register tonnage. The surface fleet remained active. On December 1, a cruiser and destroyer bombarded Fidonisi, Romania, at the cost of mine damage to the cruiser. In a subsequent raid by a destroyer and four large minesweepers, the Soviets struck a convoy escorted by a Romanian torpedo boat and four German R-boats (125-ton motor-minesweepers). In a two-hour action, the Soviets demonstrated heart but a lack of training and doctrine, failing to harm their vulnerable targets. In 1943 the Soviet winter offensive forced a precipitous Axis retreat. Sea power, however, allowed the Germans to defend the Kuban Bridgehead on the Tamen Peninsula. This required up to 2,500 tons of supply per day, nearly all delivered by barges. The Black Sea Fleet retained 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 29 submarines, and more than a hundred smaller warships while the Germans had accumulated a mosquito fleet of 6 small submarines, 16 MTBs, 23 R-boats, 26 subchasers, and more than a hundred MFPs. The Romanian navy continued to escort shipping along the sea’s western shores. During the year, Soviet submarines sank 20 ships of 34,000 gross register tonnage.


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After the Soviet summer 1943 offensives threatened German land access to the Crimea, the Germans abandoned the Kuban bridgehead. Between September 15 and October 10, the Kriegsmarine pulled out a quarter million men with their supplies and equipment. The Soviet navy failed to effectively contest this evacuation. In a costly defeat, German aircraft sank three Soviet destroyers after they had engaged in a melee with German MTBs. Following this episode, Moscow ordered that large surface warships could only operate with its authorization, a restriction that kept them in port for the remainder of the war. Soviet armies cut off the Crimea by November 1943, but the German High Command decided to retain the peninsula as a fortress to control the Black Sea and protect the Romanian oil fields. The Soviets tried to hustle the Germans out of the Crimea by landing at the tip of the Kerch peninsula and at Eltigen south of Kerch on November 1, 1943. The Germans contained these landings and blockaded the more isolated beachhead at Eltigen with R-boats, MTBs, and MFPs. After an intense battle for maritime access, the Germans eradicated the Soviet position by December 11, 1943. Both sides had suffered greatly and a lull in operations ensued as the Germans concentrated on supplying and reinforcing their 200,000-man Crimean garrison. The Soviets, with a very limited ability to repair their hard-used forces, regrouped. However, their ongoing westward advance ensured that the German tenure in the Crimea would be limited no matter what the naval situation was. Nikolayev fell on March 28, 1944, and Odessa was isolated shortly thereafter, necessitating the evacuation of this port by sea, an activity completed by April 9 and one which the Soviets permitted without interference. Soviet forces then broke into the Crimea, and on May 9, Hitler finally authorized a retreat from Sevastopol. Soviet submarines, MTBs, and aircraft contested this evacuation. The Black Sea Fleet continued to hold back its major warships, although their deployment could have turned a rushed and costly evacuation into a debacle. The Germans and Romanians brought off 130,000 men by sea (more than 30,000 in the last three days), but they lost 7 transports, 11 small warships and auxiliaries, and 11 barges, mainly to air attacks. More than 8,000 Axis troops drowned. This was the last major naval operation in the Black Sea. The campaign ended with the surrender of Romania on August 23, 1944. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Baltic Sea, Area of Operations; Bulgaria, Navy; Romania, Navy; Soviet Union, Navy.

References Achkasov, V. I., and N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

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Ruge, Friedrich. The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979. Statiev, Alexander. “Romanian Naval Doctrine and Its Tests in the Second World War.” War in History 15, no. 2 (2008), pp. 191–210.

Blandy, William Henry Purnell (1890–1954) U.S. navy admiral. Born in New York City on June 28, 1890, William Henry Purnell Blandy graduated at the head of his class from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1913 and began his career on the battleship Florida. He participated in the 1914 Veracruz landing and served in convoy duty during World War I. During the interwar period, Blandy specialized in naval gunnery and ordnance. As head of the Bureau of Ordnance’s Gun Section between 1927 and 1929, he contributed to innovations in gun designs. In February 1941, he was selected over more than a hundred more senior officers to become chief of the Bureau of Ordnance as a rear admiral. In this post, Blandy was instrumental in the production of new weapons systems, such as the 40-millimeter Bofors and 20-millimeter Oerlikon guns, as well as the proximity fuse. He also had to deal with problems such as the malfunctioning Mark XIV torpedoes. In December 1943, Blandy left administrative work to assume command of Amphibious Group 1 of the Pacific Fleet, from January 1944 to July 1945. His first combat operation was the Kwajalein invasion in February 1944. Blandy then commanded Task Group (TG) 51.1, the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve, at Saipan in June 1944. For the attack on the Palau Islands in September 1944, he was in charge of TG 32.2, the Angaur Attack Group. Blandy’s expertise in gunnery and ordnance made him the choice to command Amphibious Support Task Force (TG 52), charged with all prelanding activities, including shore bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition. Blandy was responsible for the preassault operations at Iwo Jima in February 1945. His Amphibious Support Task Force then played a key role in the Okinawa operation in the spring of 1945, where it paved the way for the landings on Kerama Retto and Okinawa itself. Blandy ended the war as commander of Cruisers/Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, from July to November 1945. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1945. As the navy’s ordnance expert, Blandy commanded the joint army-navy nuclear tests (Operation CROSSROADS) at Bikini Atoll in July 1946. From February 1947 until his retirement three years later, he was commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet. Blandy died in Queens, New York, on January 12, 1954. Robert Krumel See also: Amphibious Warfare; Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships; DETACHMENT, Operation; ICEBERG, Operation; Naval Gunfire Shore Support; Torpedoes.

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References Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Rowland, Buford, and William H. Boyd. U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.

Bletchley Park Secret British decrypting center. Just prior to the beginning of World War II, the British Government Code and Cypher School purchased a Victorian mansion known as Bletchley Park (BP, also called Station X or War Station), located some 50 miles north of London in Bedfordshire. British code breakers, some of them veterans of World War I, began moving to Bletchley Park in August 1939, just before the beginning of World War II. The staff, headed by Alistair Dennison, soon numbered 150 people. Thereafter, BP grew very rapidly. By late 1942, BP personnel numbered around 3,500, a figure that would expand to 10,000 by 1945. BP’s overseas stations were the Combined Bureau, Middle East; the Wireless Experimental Centre at Delhi; and the Far East Combined Bureau. Each had its own outposts. The personnel at Bletchley Park were a mix of mathematicians, cryptographers, engineers, and eccentrics. Among them was Alan Turing, regarded as the father of the modern computer. There were also members of the various British military services as well as foreign military personnel. At BP, they continued the work begun by the Poles in reading German signals traffic and unlocking the secrets of the German Enigma encoding machine. To house the growing staff, wooden huts were built on the garden grounds. These were numbered, and different types of analysis were conducted in each. Hut 3 decrypted German army and air force codes, Hut 6 focused on German army and air force Enigma cryptanalysis, Hut 4 worked on German naval translating and processing, and Hut 8 handled German navy Enigma cryptanalysis. Others worked on Italian and Japanese codes. The intelligence produced by BP was code-named the ULTRA secret. By 1940, Bletchley Park had come up with additional devices that, given time, could sort through the possible variations of an encoded text. Careless German practices, mostly in the Luftwaffe, gave the electromechanical devices called “bombes” a head start and greatly shortened the delay between receiving and decoding messages. The changeable settings of the Enigma machine meant that most messages could not be read in real time, but the information was nonetheless invaluable. The staff at BP was ultimately able to provide an important advantage to the Allies in the war. The Axis powers never learned of the success of the Allied decrypting operations, and the activities at Bletchley Park remained unknown to the

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public until 1974, when Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham revealed them in his book entitled The Ultra Secret. A. J. L. Waskey See also: Electronic Intelligence; Signals Intelligence.

References Friedman, Maurice. Unraveling Enigma: Winning the Code War at Station X. South Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2001. Hinsley, F. H., and Alan Stripp. Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. Winterbotham, F. W. The Ultra Secret. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

Bloch, Claude Charles (1878–1967) U.S. navy admiral who served as a commander at Pearl Harbor. Born in Woodbury, Kentucky, on July 13, 1878, Claude Charles Bloch graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1895 and was a cadet at the Battle of Santiago Bay during the 1898 Spanish-American War. He participated in the international force sent to relieve the foreign legations in Beijing during the 1900 Boxer Uprising. He also participated in the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. During World War I, Bloch commanded the troop transport Plattsburg carrying members of the American Expeditionary Forces to France. He was promoted to captain in 1918. Bloch was assistant chief of the Bureau of Ordnance during 1918–1921, then its chief as a rear admiral during 1923–1927. From 1927 to 1929, he commanded the battleship California. Graduating from the Naval War College in 1929, he commanded cruisers in the Battle Force during 1932–1934, then was judge advocate general of the navy in 1934–1936. He commanded Battleship Division Two during June 1936–January 1937. A staunch advocate of preparedness and a member of the navy “Gun Club,” which emphasized a blue-seas navy based on battleships and cruisers rather than carrier aviation, Bloch supported the fortification of Guam. Promoted to full admiral in January 1937, Bloch became commander of the Battle Force in 1937. During 1938–1940, he commanded the West Coast–based U.S. Fleet. In 1940, Bloch became commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, normally an enjoyable preretirement assignment. As a warning gesture to Japan in 1940, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred the Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii. Bloch sought to strength Hawaiian defenses, but he encountered much interference and obstruction from the fleet’s new commander,

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Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel. Yet Bloch’s own opposition to the installation of antitorpedo nets contributed to the disastrous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941. Bloch was also largely responsible for placing the fleet on a rigid schedule so that its movements were entirely predictable. Although both Kimmel and General Walter Short, the army commander, were removed from their commands, Bloch served out his term until April 1942, when he retired. A congressional inquiry subsequently exonerated him from all responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle. Recalled to Washington in April 1942 to serve on the navy’s General Board, Bloch retired in August 1942 at the rank of full admiral. In retirement, he headed the Navy Board for Production Awards until the end of World War II. Bloch died in Washington, D.C., on October 4, 1967. Priscilla Roberts See also: Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Clausen, Henry C., and Bruce Lee. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment. New York: Crown, 1992. Conroy, Hilary, and Harry Wray, eds. Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. Prange, Gordon William, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.

Blockade Running In the early stage of World War II, the main lines of communication between the Axis powers were either over land via the Trans-Siberian Railway or, when Japan entered the war in December 1941, across the sea by surface blockade runners. Japan used German blockade runners to send such goods as rubber, cooking oil, lead, tin, and tea to Germany. In return, the ships carried industrial products such as locomotives and machinery and various pieces of technical equipment, scientific instruments, and chemical and pharmaceutical products to Japan. In addition, ships carried supplies and spare parts for German warships in the Far East. Some blockade runners also supplied German armed merchant cruisers operating in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA) in June 1941, the continental line was cut, and only sea routes remained. Blockade running that began in April 1941 and ended in October 1943 involved a total of 36 ships traveling from Asia to Europe. Six of them were recalled or returned after

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sustaining damage, and, of the 30 that remained, 11 were sunk by Allied forces or were scuttled by their own crews to prevent capture. Another 2 were accidentally sunk by German submarines, and 1 was seized by a U.S. cruiser. Thus, 16 ships actually completed their voyages and delivered their cargo to the port of Bordeaux in German-occupied France. In the other direction, 23 ships, including 5 fleet supply ships, were sent from Europe to the Far East between September 1941 and April 1943. Of these, 16 reached Asian ports, 5 were sunk or scuttled, and 2 were recalled or returned to port. Overall, 45.8 percent of the blockade runners on the Far East route were lost. However, annual ship losses rose dramatically over the course of the war. Between April 1941 and October 1942, only 12.1 percent were lost, whereas in 1943, losses rose to 85.7 percent. Of 104,700 tons of materials loaded on the ships, only 26,600 tons reached their destinations. In addition to raw materials and equipment, these ships also transported passengers. Some 900 passengers embarked to travel from the Far East to Europe, but fewer than half of them arrived safely. A total of 136 died when their ships were sunk, and the remainder became prisoners of war or remained in the Far East after their ships turned back. From early 1944, submarines took over the blockade runners’ mission. Between then and early March 1945, 16 German U-boats sailed to the Far East as combat cargo transporters. But only 8 actually arrived in Far Eastern ports, carrying some 930 tons of cargo. The other 8 boats were lost, most of them to hostile action. Through the end of 1944, only 3 submarines reached Europe, but none got to Germany: the U-843 arrived at Norway but was sunk in the Kattegat Straits; the U-510 and U-861 reached French ports. Under the code name AQUILA, 5 Italian submarines also participated in blockade running. Departing France, they carried some 500 tons of supplies for German/ Italian submarine bases in the Far East as well as personnel and cargo for Japan. None of them returned to Europe. The Japanese also sent five submarines to Europe to transport German military technology and to exchange personnel. Ultimately, four of them reached the Continent, but only three returned: two to Singapore and one to Japan. All these submarines had Japanese and German technicians, liaison officers, and equipment and blueprints of German’s newest weapons. Of 89 passengers aboard Axis submarines traveling from Japan, 74 arrived in France; the remainder died when their boats were sunk. A total of 96 passengers sailed in the opposite direction, 64 of them arriving safely; 22 were lost while under way, and 10 others fell into U.S. hands. Hirama Yoichi See also: Submarines.

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References Boyd, Carl, and Yoshida Akihiko. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Krug, Hans J., and Yoichi Hirama. Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Borghese, Junio Valerio (1906–1974) Italian navy officer and ardent fascist. Born on June 6, 1906, at the family estate near Rome, Junio Borghese spent three years as a student in Britain before entering the Italian Naval Academy. Graduating in 1928, he was commissioned an ensign. Lieutenant Borghese was commanding a submarine during the Spanish Civil War when, on August 31, 1937, believing it to be a warship of the Spanish Republican navy, he mistakenly attacked the British destroyer Havock while it was on neutrality patrol. In trying to locate Borghese’s submarine, the Havock employed sonar, the first time this had been done in a wartime situation. Neither the Italian submarine nor British destroyer was damaged in the exchange. Borghese was a proponent of Italy’s efforts to develop special attack units, and his 620-ton submarine Scire transported three two-man guided slow (2–4 knots) torpedoes in the daring and successful attack at Alexandria on December 19, 1941. The raid sank the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant and damaged a destroyer and an oiler. Although the battleships were refloated and repaired, these losses severely curtailed British naval operations in the Mediterranean in the first half of 1942. Promoted to commander, Borghese received command of the 10th Light Flotilla, known as the “X” MAS (Decima Mas). Borghese, now called the “Black Prince,” conducted other operations up to the September 1943 armistice that resulted in total Allied losses of almost 200,000 tons of shipping, although many of the ships were sunk in harbors and were later returned to service. As a diehard fascist, Borghese struck an independent agreement between his “X” MAS unit and the Germans after the armistice, agreeing to continue the war as an autonomous force. Borghese’s unit ultimately numbered some 25,000 men and operated primarily on land in antipartisan activities, especially in Italy’s border areas with Yugoslavia, Austria, and Switzerland in an attempt to retain those lands as Italian territory. In April 1945, Borghese and his wife, who worked in the office of the secretary of state of the Vatican, were taken prisoner by the Americans, who hoped to learn tactics that Borghese and the “X” MAS had employed against Yugoslav partisans. Held in prison for three years after the war, Borghese was put on trial in Rome in November 1948 on charges of having committed war crimes against the partisans. Acquitted, he was set free in February 1949. He then entered Italian politics

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on the far right wing. On December 7, 1970, he led an abortive coup against the Italian government. Fleeing to Spain, he died under mysterious circumstances in Cádiz on August 26, 1974. One of the most successful Italian naval officers of the war, Borghese also fancied himself a modern condottiere. Jack Greene See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Frogmen; Italy, Navy; Submarines; Submarines, Midget.

References Borghese, J. Valerio. Sea Devils. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro J. Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro J. Massignani. Valerio Borghese and the X MAS. New York: Da Capo Press, 2004. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

British Eastern Fleet Established in 1904 with its headquarters at Singapore, the British Eastern Fleet was loosely organized into three separate commands: the East Indies Squadron, the China Squadron, and the Australian Squadron. During World War II, its primary duty was securing the safety of Allied convoys east of Suez. The fleet counted ships and personnel from other navies, including the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the United States Navy. With the beginning of World War II in September 1939, the chief threat faced by the British Eastern Fleet came from German commerce raiders and submarines. These included both the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee and auxiliary cruisers (converted merchant ships, the last of which was not sunk until October 1943) as well as submarines attacking British merchant shipping. When Italy joined the war in June 1940, its Red Sea Flotilla of destroyers and submarines operating from Italian East Africa posed a great threat to British shipping and especially the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. This threat was neutralized through naval engagements in part, but primarily by the capture of Italian bases from the land in the British East Africa Campaign. The Eastern Fleet then supported British land operations in Iraq and Iran. Japan posed a much greater threat. In September 1940, following the defeat of France by Germany, Tokyo secured bases in French Indochina that placed most of Southeast Asia within range of its bombers. This brought economic pressure from


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the United States, Britain, and the Dutch, leading the Japanese to declare war. On the commencement of hostilities with Japan on December 8, 1941, the Eastern Fleet amalgamated the East Indies Squadron and the China Squadron. The Japanese ran riot. On December 10, their aircraft sank off Malaya the new British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. They went on to conquer Malaya, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies. Then in the spring of 1942, Japanese carrier forces under admirals Nagumo Chu¯ichi and Ozawa Jisaburo operated freely in the Eastern Indian Ocean, attacked Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and sank a number of merchantmen and British warships, including the small carrier Hermes (April 9, 1942), as well as disrupting sea traffic along the eastern coast of India. There was worry in London that the Japanese might force the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean entirely, with dire implications for India. Fortunately for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese soon withdrew without discovering and destroying its major assets. With the death of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips in the sinking of the Prince of Wales, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton assumed command of the Eastern Fleet. Under Japanese pressure, Layton was forced to withdraw to Java and then to Trincomalee. In March 1942, Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed command. At this time, the Eastern Fleet had 2 modern and 1 small carriers (with fewer than 100 aircraft), 5 old battleships, 2 heavy and 5 light cruisers (1 Dutch), 16 destroyers, and 7 submarines (2 Dutch). Realizing the inadequacies and lack of security of Trincomalee and Colombo, Somerville established a new secret fleet anchorage at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands, but most of the fleet relocated to Kilindini near Mombasa, Kenya. The fleet was also severely strained by the siphoning off of its ships to meet other more pressing commitments, especially in the Mediterranean. The Eastern Fleet soon found itself little more than a glorified convoy escort force. The Eastern Fleet supported the invasion of Madagascar (Operation IRONCLAD) in May 1942, brought on by British fears that Japan might secure bases there. In this operation, the fleet was forced to deal with ships of the Vichy French navy as well as Japanese submarines. Allied successes in 1943 and 1944 released British naval resources for the Indian Ocean. These included aircraft carriers and the battleships Howe, Queen Elizabeth, and the Valiant, and the battle cruiser Renown. With the increase in forces and the liberation of British Pacific possessions in the offing, and with London determined to restore British prestige in the Pacific, agreement was reached with the United States, the Allied power in command of the Pacific Ocean area, regarding British participation in that theater. Following a training exercise in late March 1944, in April and May, the Eastern Fleet, operating with U.S. Task Group 58.5, attacked Japanese installations and oil facilities in Sabang and Surabaya. On June 21, the Eastern Fleet mounted a carrier raid on the Andaman Islands, and on July 25 it struck Sabang with both air attack and naval gunfire.

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The British battle cruiser Renown operating with other capital ships of the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, May 12, 1944. (Naval Historical Center)

On August 23, 1944, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser replaced Somerville as commander of the Eastern Fleet. With the creation of the British Pacific Fleet in November 1944, the Eastern Fleet became the East Indies Fleet until the end of the war. Then it became the Far East Fleet, operating in all the Far East, including the Pacific Ocean. In August and September, the Eastern Fleet again struck oil installations in Sumatra, and in October it attacked the Nicobar Islands in an effort to divert Japanese attention from the U.S. landings on Leyte. Additional British ships arrived, including the carriers Indomitable and Indefatigable in January 1945 to carry out attacks against oil refineries in Sumatra and Java. With the reestablishment of their control in the Bay of Benghal, British submarines based at Ceylon attacked Japanese merchant shipping and also sank two German and one Japanese submarines. Subsequent operations for the East Indies Fleet included support for the recapture of Burma, to include landings near Rangoon (today Yangon). Then on May 15–16, 1945, the 26th Destroyer Flotilla (the HMS Saumarez, Venus, Verulam, Vigilant, and the Virago) used torpedoes to sink the Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro in the Malacca Straits. In late August, it landed forces at Penang, and on September 2, it did the same at Singapore.

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After the war, the fleet took part in putting down the Malayan Emergency. The Far East Fleet was disbanded in 1971. Spencer C. Tucker See also: British Pacific Fleet; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Great Britain, Navy; Indian Ocean Campaign; IRONCLAD, Operation; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes.

References Jackson, Ashley. The British Empire and the Second World War. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

British Naval Blockade of the European Axis Powers With the beginning of the Second World War, the British Royal Navy took the lead in the effort to prevent Germany, and later Italy, from securing raw materials and goods that would aid their war efforts. Given the success of the World War I Allied naval blockade of the Central Powers, British planning for possible war against Germany included as early as 1936 implementation of a naval blockade, supplemented by a bombing campaign to damage the German economy. With its declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, Britain therefore established a blockade that resembled closely that of World War I. Once again, it was a distant blockade, one that sought to intercept commerce at points away from the German coast rather than in German territorial waters. Two forces implemented the blockade of the North Sea. The primary one was the Northern Patrol, which policed a line running from Scotland to Iceland, later extended to run to the Denmark Straits. Based at Kirkwall, this force was charged with interdicting ships bound for the North Sea and ultimately European ports to check for contraband of war and, if necessary, send these ships to a British port for examination of their cargoes. As in World War I, the force consisted primarily of aging fleet cruisers at first, but over time these were replaced primarily with armed merchant cruisers and trawlers. At the outbreak of the war, the Admiralty had at its disposal 50 armed merchant cruisers, armed principally with 6-inch guns. In addition to the Northern Patrol, until it could be replaced by a minefield, a force based at Ramsgate guarded the English Channel. A further element of the naval blockade was a patrol based at Gibraltar. It had the assignment of interdicting ships entering the Mediterranean Sea with cargoes that might be bound for Germany, and then Italy when that country entered the war in June 1940.

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Wedded to the naval effort of the blockade, and equally as important to the potential success of the endeavor, were diplomatic agreements crafted with neutral European nations and the United States. The agreements with European nations resembled those of World War I and centered on making certain that supplies bound for these countries were solely for domestic consumption rather than re-export to an Axis power. Agreements with the United States centered on assuring that major U.S. industries did not ship contraband to the same neutrals for re-export to the Axis. A key element of the effort rested on the issuance of navicerts, documents that certified at the port of departure that the cargo of a ship was not contraband and consequently exempted those vessels from search by British blockaders. Axis efforts at sea to undermine the British blockade were concentrated against forces in the North Sea and were consequently German operations. These resulted in losses for the Northern Patrol, but not to such a degree as to upset operations. The best known engagement between German naval units and the British blockaders occurred on November 23, 1939, when the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi, southeast of Iceland. The majority of attacks on the Northern Patrol were carried out by German submarines, however. Nine armed merchant cruisers succumbed to these attacks, the majority of these also near Iceland. While the efforts of the Kriegsmarine did not change the strategic situation, the naval blockade of Germany, the strongest Axis power, was undermined chiefly by the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, not only allowed the German invasion of Poland to proceed, but its secret provisions provided for the partition of Poland and the Baltic states, and the Soviet Union agreed to supply Germany with essential raw materials from its own vast stocks and to act as a purchasing agent for other goods abroad. This was a tremendous boon to the Germans and a blow to any hopes that a British naval blockade might have ruinous effect on the German economy. In addition, the 1940 conquests of Norway, Denmark, and France provided both raw materials and food stocks. Germany’s access to the resources of much of Europe also undermined British efforts to deny strategic materials to Italy upon that country’s declaration of war. The blockade did cause great disruption, as Italy had few natural resources and was consequently heavily dependent on imports of raw materials, particularly oil and coal. In September 1939, Italy had oil stockpiles equivalent to only nine months of peacetime consumption. The blockade was also responsible in part for the Italian implementation of rationing for foodstuffs. Even so, the Italians were able to mitigate these problems through reliance on Germany. The greatest accomplishment of the blockade was in the reduction of German exports (by some 80 percent) and to largely end imports of such goods as copper, magnesium, nickel, and tungsten. Importation of other raw materials, most notably oil and rubber, was also greatly reduced. These achievements ultimately amounted


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to little, however, because Germany was able to make up the shortages from its continental conquests and alliances. The Germans did incur additional expense garnering goods by land transport, which was costlier than shipment by sea, and it also had to devote more manpower to the domestic production of these goods. Even so, the British operation failed to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction or severe weakening of the civilian and government sectors of Axis economies in order to cripple those nations’ capacity to wage war. Eric W. Osborne See also: Germany, Navy; Gibraltar; Great Britain, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Rawalpindi, Loss of.

References Butler, J. R. M. Grand Strategy. Vol. 2, September 1939–1941. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957. Hampshire, Arthur Cecil. The Blockaders. London: William Kimber, 1980. Medlicott, William N. The Economic Blockade. 2 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952, 1959.

British Pacific Fleet The British Pacific Fleet (BPF) was a British Commonwealth naval force that took part in operations against Japan in the last year of World War II. Formally established on November 22, 1944, it was also the most powerful conventional force in British naval history. Following their withdrawal to the western side of the Indian Ocean in 1942, British naval units did not return to the southwest Pacific until May 17, 1944, when they took part in an Anglo-American carrier task force raid on Surabaya, Java. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill was anxious that Britain’s overseas possessions be recaptured by its forces and that British influence be restored. Although U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King was opposed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately accepted the offer of British naval assistance at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. Although King had stipulated that the BPF be wholly self-sufficient, in practice the U.S. Navy provided substantial material assistance. The British Eastern Fleet was reorganized into the BPF and the British East Indies Fleet, based in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, formerly commander of the Eastern Fleet, assumed command of the British Combined Fleet, flying his flag in the British battleship Howe. Although the Royal Navy provided the majority of the ships and all of its capital ships, the BPF included ships and personnel from the British Royal Navy, the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Royal

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Australian Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal New Zealand Navy. The Royal Australian Navy’s contribution was limited because its larger ships had been integrated with U.S. Navy formations since 1942. South African Navy personnel also contributed, while the U.S. Navy provided substantial Fleet Train support, an area in which the Royal Navy had scant resources. The fleet numbered 4 battleships, 17 aircraft carriers (with 300 aircraft), 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 18 sloops, 13 frigates, 35 minesweepers, other fighting ships, and numerous support vessels. Although Fraser exercised formal command, actual command devolved to Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, with Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian in charge of air operations. The U.S. Navy, which had control of all Allied operations in the Pacific Ocean, designated the BPF as Task Force (TF) 57 when it operated with the Fifth Fleet beginning on March 15, 1945; it became TF 37 on May 27 when it passed under the U.S. Third Fleet. The Fleet Train element was designated TF 113. Major actions in which the fleet was involved included air strikes in January 1945 against oil production facilities at Belawan Deli and Palembang in Sumatra, followed by support for Operation ICEBERG, the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, by neutralizing Japanese aviation operating from the Sakishima Islands, both through air strikes and naval gunfire against airfields. In April 1945, the British 4th Submarine Flotilla transferred to the Allied submarine base at Fremantle, Western Australia, as part of BPF. On June 8, the submarines Trenchant and Stygian sank the Imperial Japanese Navy heavy cruiser Ashigara off Sumatra, and on June 31 the British midget submarine XE3 sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Takao at Singapore. Beginning on July 17, battleships and aircraft from the fleet attacked the Japanese home islands. The battleship King George V shelled naval installations near Tokyo, the last action by a British battleship. Carrier air strikes against land and sea targets disabled a Japanese escort carrier. Although the British had accepted that the BPF should become a component element of the U.S. Third Fleet, its commander, Admiral William F. Halsey, excluded it from a raid on the Japanese navy base at Kure, noting after the war that he did not intend to give the British any basis for claiming that they had helped destroy the Japanese navy. Regardless, the BPF would have played a major part in the proposed invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operation DOWNFALL, which was canceled after Japan surrendered. With the end of the war, the fleet formed the naval arm of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The performance of the British Pacific Fleet at the end of the war did help repair to some extent British prestige and influence in the Pacific area. Spencer C. Tucker See also: British Eastern Fleet; DOWNFALL, Operation; Fleet Train; Fraser, Bruce Austin; ICEBERG, Operation; King, Ernest Joseph; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

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References Ehrman, John. History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. 5, Grand Strategy. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956. Humble, Richard. Fraser of North Cape: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, 1888–1981. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Sarantakes, Nicholas E. “The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet.” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly 40 (Winter 2006), pp. 85–91.

Brittany, Battle of ( June 9, 1944) Battle fought in the English Channel between units of the German and Allied navies on June 9, 1944, three days after the initial Allied invasion of France in Operation OVERLORD. It was sparked by a German attempt to reinforce their naval forces on the western front of the Normandy invasion zone with the last large warships surviving on the Atlantic coast, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Kapitän zur See Theodor F. von Bechtolsheim, consisting of destroyers ZH1, Z32, and Z24 and the torpedo boat T24. Signals intelligence alerted the Allies to this operation and allowed them to ambush the German force with the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, a veteran unit led by Royal Navy Captain Basil Jones and consisting of eight destroyers: the British ships Tartar (flagship) and Atshanti and the Canadian ships Haida and Huron in one division and the Polish Blyskawica and Piorun and the British Eskimo and Javelin in another division. At 1:16 a.m., the Allies detected the Germans with radar at a range of 10 miles on an overcast and rainy night, where visibility was no greater than three miles despite a nearly full moon. The first division, led by the Tartar, charged the German formation in a staggered line-abreast formation heading straight for the Germans so that the forward guns of every ship could bear while presenting a minimal torpedo target. This anticipated the German tactic that had been used successfully in several naval battles in 1943 of firing torpedoes and immediately turning away. The first three German ships repeated the earlier tactic within a minute of the first star shells bursting overhead, but their torpedoes missed while the marksmanship of the gunners on the British and Canadian ships was exceptionally good. The flagship, Z32, had to sheer away to the northwest lightly damaged, the ZH1 was disabled, and the Z24 was moderately damaged as it and the T24 fled southwest. German return fire was slow and ineffective. The battle then fragmented into a confused melee. The Z32 blundered into the northern division led by the Blyskawica and lightly damaged the Eskimo before breaking contact. The Haida and Huron pursued the Z24 and T24, but they escaped the Canadian destroyers by sailing across a British minefield and eventually

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returned to Brest. The Z32 returned to the original battle area trying to find its flotilla mates and had another encounter with the Tartar and Ashanti. The Z32 severely damaged the Tartar before breaking contact. Shortly thereafter, the Tartar and Ashanti came upon the ZH1 and sank it with torpedoes. Meanwhile, the Z32 ran into the Haida and Huron returning from their futile chase. The large German destroyer was able to disengage once, but when it set course to return to Brest, the Canadians again located it and, after a running gun battle and with damage mounting, the German captain drove his ship aground to save its crew at 5:10 a.m. With the Germans operating in three groups and the Allies in as many as four, the Battle of Brittany was confused, even for a night action. It demonstrated how the evolution of night combat tactics and technology had left the Kriegsmarine’s first-line units behind, and it ended Germany’s last forlorn hope of countering the Allied invasion with the largest warships it had left in the Atlantic. Vincent O’Hara See also: Destroyers.

References: Darlington, Robert, and Fraser McKee. The Canadian Naval Chronicle, 1939–1945. St. Catharines, Canada: Vanwell, 1998. Whitby, Michael. “Masters of the Channel Night: The 10th Destroyer Flotilla’s Victory off Ile De Batz, 9 June 1944.” Canadian Military History 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–22.

Brown, Wilson Jr. (1882–1957) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on April 27, 1882, Wilson Brown Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1902. He returned to the academy as an instructor during 1907–1908. Staff assignments followed. During World War I, Brown served as an aide to Admiral William S. Sims and later commanded the destroyer Parker. Brown next commanded the destroyer Blakeley, during 1919–1920. He was naval aide to President Calvin Coolidge, 1926–1929. Promoted to captain, he commanded the battleship California during 1932–1933, then was chief of staff of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, during 1933–1934. He was naval aide to President Franklin Roosevelt, 1934–1936. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1936, he commanded the Training Squadron, Scouting Force during 1936–1938 and then was superintendent of the Naval Academy, 1938–1941. Promoted to vice admiral in February 1941, Brown assumed command of Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet. He led the aborted carrier raid on Rabaul on February 20,

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1942, and then commanded the largest task force put together by the United States in the war to date, consisting of the carriers Lexington and Yorktown, 8 heavy cruisers (7 U.S. and 1 Australian), and 14 destroyers, leading it in the highly successful March 10 attack against the Japanese landing force in the Salamaua-Lae area of northeastern Papua/New Guinea. Because chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King believed Brown was not sufficiently aggressive, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz moved him to command of amphibious forces in April until July 1942. Brown was commandant of the First Naval District during 1942–1943, then again naval aide to President Roosevelt during February 1943–December 1944, when he retired. He died at New Haven, Connecticut, on January 2, 1957. Spencer C. Tucker See also: King, Ernest Joseph; Nimitz, Chester William; United States Carrier Raids.

References Ancell, R. Manning, with Christine M. Miller. The Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers: The U.S. Armed Forces. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. Belote, James H., and William M. Belote. Titans of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001.

Bulgaria, Navy Bulgaria has never maintained a large navy, but the diminutive size of its naval force by the late 1930s was also the product of treaty restrictions stemming from the country’s defeat in World War I and the difficult economic conditions Bulgaria faced during the interwar years. The core of the navy consisted of four obsolete Drski-class torpedo boats. Launched in 1907, they displaced 98 tons, were capable of 26 knots, and mounted three 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. The remaining naval unit, the torpedo gunboat Nadiejda, was built in 1898 and displaced 715 tons. It was armed with two 3.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes and had a maximum speed of 17 knots. This force was augmented after 1937, when Bulgaria entered into a military assistance agreement with Germany, which eventually yielded five motor torpedo boats of the 1939 Lurssen design. These vessels displaced 57.6 tons at full load

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and were armed with two torpedo tubes and a 20-millimeter antiaircraft gun. Their engines could produce a maximum speed of 37.1 knots. On Bulgaria’s entry into World War II in March 1941, Germany also supplied three formerly Dutch motor torpedo boats. The Bulgarian navy saw little fighting in World War II. Its principal action came in October 1941, when it and the Romanian navy mined Bulgarian coastal waters. Up until the time Bulgaria was driven from the war and occupied by the Soviet army in September 1944, the navy’s chief duties were escorting coastal vessels in the Black Sea and patrolling the Danube River. Eric W. Osborne See also: Black Sea, Area of Operations; Romania, Navy.

References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. Tarnstrom, Ronald L. Handbooks of Armed Forces: Balkans, Part II. Lindsborg, KS: Trogen, 1984.

Burke, Arleigh Albert (1901–1996) U.S. navy officer and chief of naval operations after World War II. Born on October 19, 1901, near Boulder, Colorado, Arleigh Albert Burke came from a family of modest means. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1923. He also earned a master’s degree in engineering from the University of Michigan in 1931. For the next eight years, Burke held a series of ship assignments and served in the Bureau of Ordnance in Washington. At the time of the U.S. entry into World War II, Commander Burke was an inspector at the Naval Gun Factory. His attempts to secure a sea billet were not successful until May 1943, when he was promoted to captain and received command of the eight-ship 23rd Destroyer Squadron in the South Pacific. He then saw action in the Solomons and Marianas campaigns. Burke led 23rd Squadron, known as the “Little Beavers,” in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November 1943. In all, the 23rd Squadron fought in 22 engagements and helped to sink one Japanese cruiser, four destroyers, and one submarine. It also claimed more than 30 Japanese aircraft shot down. There are different versions of how Burke earned the nickname “31 Knot Burke,” but the most likely is that it came from a radio message he made prior to the Battle of Cape St. George stating he was making for the interception point at 31 knots. Because


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he had previously reported his best formation speed as 30 knots, Admiral Halsey addressed his next order to the captain with “Thirty-one knot Burke.” Known for his innovations as a commander, Burke became chief of staff of 1st Fast Carrier Force, under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, in January 1945. He retained that post for the remainder of the war, coordinating carrier strike operations in the Battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Between 1945 and 1947, Burke was chief of staff of the Atlantic Fleet before serving in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as director Captain Arleigh Burke achieved fame during World of the navy’s nuclear weapWar II as commander of the eight-ship 23rd Destroyer Squadron in the Southwest Pacific. Burke ons program (1947–1949). went on to become chief of naval operations during His high profile in the so1955–1961 and retired as a full admiral. (AP/Wide called Admirals’ Revolt, in World Photos) which the navy protested the priority given to the needs of the air force, led the administration of President Harry S. Truman to remove him temporarily from the list for promotion to admiral. Notwithstanding, Burke was promoted to rear admiral in July 1950. During the Korean War, he commanded Cruiser Division 5 in Korean waters, and in July 1951, he was named a negotiator for the United Nations Command in armistice talks. In 1952, he became director of the Strategic Plans Division in Washington, D.C. Two years later, he took command of Cruiser Division 6, followed by command of the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet (1954–1955). In August 1955, Burke was appointed chief of naval operations, serving an unprecedented three terms. Refusing a fourth term, he retired as a full admiral in August 1961. While chief of naval operations, he oversaw the introduction of nuclear-powered ships in the navy as well as the implementation of the Polaris Ballistic Missile Program. After his retirement, Burke was involved in various business

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enterprises. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, on January 1, 1996. The Arleigh Burke class of guided-missile destroyers is named for him. Jason R. Harr See also: Cape St. George, Battle of; DETACHMENT, Operation; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; ICEBERG, Operation; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Jones, Ken, and Hubert Kelley Jr. Admiral Arleigh (31-Knot) Burke: The Story of a Fighting Sailor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Potter, E. B. Admiral Arleigh Burke. New York: Random House, 1990.

C Calabria, Battle of (July 9, 1940) Mediterranean air and naval battle fought between the British and Italians off the Calabrian coast of Italy on July 9, 1940. It is known to the Italians and Germans as the Battle of Punta Stilo. Beginning on the evening of July 6, 1940, the Italians dispatched a large convoy from Naples to Benghazi. At the same time, the British commander in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, sent two small convoys with numerous civilians on board being evacuated from Malta to Alexandria, Egypt. On July 7, the Italians learned of the British ship movements and immediately sent naval units from several bases to sea. Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni had command, concentrating the ships in the Ionian Sea. Campioni had the modernized but small battleships Cesare and Cavour, with 12.6-inch guns; 6 heavy and 10 light cruisers; and 41 destroyers and torpedo boats. Also at sea but scattered throughout the Mediterranean were 25 Italian submarines. Cunningham planned to cover the convoys with his naval force at Alexandria, consisting of the battleships Warspite, Malaya, and the unmodernized Royal Sovereign, all armed with 15-inch guns; the aircraft carrier Eagle; 5 light cruisers; and 23 destroyers. Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville sortied from Gibraltar with Force H as a feint, which resulted in the loss of a destroyer to an Italian submarine and some minor splinter damage from high-altitude Italian bombing. Following the safe arrival of the Italian convoy at Benghazi, Campioni decided to try to intercept the British convoy and its escorts steaming from Alexandria. He hoped that by the time of the naval encounter, the Italian air force would have been able to damage the British ships as they approached the Italian coast. Indeed, more than 100 Italian aircraft conducted attacks on the British ships, but the high-level bombing did little damage: all but one bomb missed. The bomb that hit its target damaged the light cruiser Gloucester, and a near miss caused damage to the carrier Eagle, which ultimately kept it from participating in the air attack on Taranto four months later. The Italian planes also carried out several attacks in error on their own warships, again with no result. Meanwhile, Cunningham was maneuvering to position his own ships so as to be able to block the Italian fleet from returning to Taranto. The Eagle launched several air attacks. Although not hitting any Italian ships, these attacks disrupted their

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movement, and British fighters did shoot down and chase off Italian reconnaissance aircraft. As a consequence, by the morning of July 9, the Italians were not cognizant of the exact location of the British force, whereas the British had fairly reliable information on the location of the Italian ships. The battle opened on the afternoon of July 9 as the two fleets at last came into contact, and it lasted nearly two hours. The fight was initially a long-range cruiser gunnery duel, resulting in no damage to either side, although the British salvo spreads tended to be much tighter than those of the Italians. As the Italian battleships came into action, they were opposed by Cunningham’s flagship, the Warspite, fastest of the three British battleships. In the ensuing action, three British 6-inch shell hits on the Italian heavy cruiser Bolzano and one 15-inch shell hit on the Cesare slowed both and compelled the Italian main force to retire. The fact that three British battleships had outgunned the entire Italian fleet deeply affected Italian tactics. As the Italian main force pulled back, both sides ordered their destroyers forward. At long range, the Italians fired torpedoes through their smoke screens but registered no hits. The ships in the Italian fleet then retired to their home ports. The Germans later criticized the Italians for not having launched night torpedo attacks with their numerous destroyers. On July 10, the Eagle mounted an air strike on Augusta, Italy. An Italian destroyer was sunk (it was later raised and repaired) and an oiler was damaged. Meanwhile, the British Malta convoys arrived safely at Alexandria. The Battle of Calabria raised British morale, for the Royal Navy had successfully engaged a numerically superior enemy force close to its own coast. The Italians’ failure could be traced to poor coordination between their air and naval assets, although this situation steadily improved in the course of the war. The Italians also came to realize the ineffectiveness of high-altitude bombing against warships maneuvering at high speed and firing back. The Battle of Calabria demonstrated the fallacy of the decision made by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and his navy to completely embrace land-based aviation at the expense of aircraft carriers. Thereafter, Italian naval leaders were reluctant to commit major naval units beyond the range of their land-based aircraft. Jack Greene See also: Campioni, Inigo; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998.

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Mattesini, Francesco. La Battaglia di Punta Stilo. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina, 1990. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Smith, Peter C. Action Imminent. London: William Kimber, 1980.

Callaghan, Daniel Judson (1890–1942) U.S. navy admiral and task force commander in the Pacific theater. Born on July 26, 1890, in San Francisco, Daniel Callaghan graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1911. He served chiefly on destroyers, commanding one in 1916 before becoming the engineering officer of a cruiser during the last two years of World War I. Following that war, Callaghan served on battleships and cruisers as a gunnery and operations officer. Known as an excellent staff officer, he became naval aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1938, a post he feared would hamper his chances of becoming an admiral. Callaghan returned to sea duty in the spring of 1941 as the captain of the cruiser San Francisco, which was at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, but was undamaged in the Japanese attack. In April 1942, Callaghan was promoted to Rear Admiral and in June became chief of staff to the commander of the Southwest Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Ghormley. He represented Admiral Ghormley at the planning conference leading up to the Operation WATCHTOWER, the landings on Guadalcanal in August 1942. On October 30, after Vice Admiral William F. Halsey had replaced Ghormley in the Southwest Pacific, Callaghan took over Task Group 67.4, a cruiser/destroyer force, raising his flag on his old ship, the cruiser San Francisco. In early November, Callaghan’s two cruisers and eight destroyers escorted a U.S. reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal. When the transports departed to return to Noumea on November 12, Halsey ordered Callaghan, whose force was now joined by an antiaircraft cruiser and two destroyers under Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept a much more powerful Japanese bombardment force under Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki, which was also acting as cover for Japanese transports carrying a large troop reinforcement for Guadalcanal. Scott was junior to Callaghan, and the latter assumed command. Just after midnight on November 13, Callaghan’s ships intercepted Abe’s force of 2 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 14 destroyers off Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, on its way to shell Henderson Field. In a hard-fought, 38-minute action, the Americans sank 2 Japanese destroyers and crippled the battleship Hiei (which was later sunk by carrier aircraft), while losing 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers of their own. Abe’s squadron as well as the task force carrying 13,000 Japanese reinforcements to Guadalcanal, which it was designed to mask, both turned back.

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Callaghan, dubbed “the Fighting Admiral,” was killed by a shell that struck the bridge of the cruiser San Francisco during the action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. Harold Wise See also: Abe Hiroaki; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990. Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, November 13, 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal, Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942. Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Press, 1988. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Murphy, Francis. Fighting Admiral: The Story of Dan Callaghan. New York: Vantage Press, 1952.

CAM (Catapult Assisted Merchantman) Ships British merchant vessel fitted with a catapult to launch fighters to provide defensive cover for North Atlantic convoys during World War II. CAM was an acronym for catapult assisted merchantman. This was an emergency response to the acquisition by Germany of bases in France from which their submarines and aircraft could attack Allied shipping beyond the range of British shore-based aircraft and the absence of escort carriers for organic convoy defense. On completing their missions, CAM pilots would either seek the nearest land within range or abandon their aircraft close to the convoy and await rescue. The Royal Navy fitted out five auxiliaries and a merchant ship in early 1941 to carry two fighters apiece. Between May and October, their fighters launched on 10 occasions, shooting down one Focke Wulf Fw 200 Condor and driving off several others, although three of the ships themselves were lost to submarine attack. The Royal Air Force’s Merchant Ship Fighter Unit largely took over this task from the summer of 1941 until it disbanded in September 1943. It operated some 60 aircraft from 34 CAM ships, all modified merchant vessels with small air force contingents embarked to maintain and operate Hawker Hurricane fighters. CAM-ship fighters destroyed six Condors and drove off several others during 170 round-trip voyages, but the arrival of the first escort carrier, the Audacity, in late

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1941, followed by mass-produced units from U.S. shipyards the following summer, rapidly rendered the concept obsolete. CAM ships were a valuable stopgap, but their inherent operational risks made deployment of carriers, to which aircraft could return, infinitely preferable. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; MAC (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) Ships; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Brown, David K., ed. The Design and Construction of British Warships, 1939–1945. The Official Record: Major Surface Vessels. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Sturtivant, Ray. British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917–1990. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Camouflage, Naval The attempt to confuse an observer as to the speed, direction, type, or nationality of a vessel through paint schemes, false structures, or misleading flags, identification marks, or signals. In limited contexts, such as against a coastal or river background or ice shelf, it is possible to conceal a vessel with a variegated pattern or matching color, but naval camouflage, because of the highly conspicuous form a ship naturally presents at sea, is primarily concerned with disguising a vessel’s intention and operations, not hiding them. Paint schemes can reduce visibility of vessels in specific atmospheric or sea conditions, but there is not a color or combination of colors that is optimal under all conditions. In addition, radar compromised the effectiveness of paint-based camouflage, although it was still possible to disguise a vessel with structural and signal ruses. With sails difficult to conceal, the earliest camouflage was the ruse whereby a ship presented itself as something it was not: false gun ports painted along the hull or deploying a neutral flag. This camouflage strategy was carried into World War II, with Q-ships and armed raiders steaming as merchant ships; the former to lure unsuspecting submarines into compromising positions, the latter to wage war on shipping while appearing as innocent merchantmen to warships seeking their destruction. Submarines have relied on ruses to confuse an attacker, the most common being the release of oil and refuse so to suggest a fatal breach in the submarine’s hull. Once gunnery achieved success at great ranges in the last quarter of the 19th century, the world’s navies began adopting overall gray color schemes to make

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visual ranging more difficult; navies also adopted temporary schemes for propaganda purposes, such as the conspicuous white ships of the U.S. and Russian navies during the 1890s. Navies during World War I retained dull gray schemes, but the effectiveness of submarines against merchant ships led to a concentrated effort to determine whether a paint scheme could be developed that would make it more difficult for a submarine to determine the speed, direction, or type of merchant vessel. Tests on models led to a number of elaborate, colorful geometric patterns for merchant vessels. These patterns were soon applied to escort vessels as well because of their close work with merchant vessels. These dazzle schemes did work, but convoy tactics were the primary reason for the reduction of shipping losses. During World War II, dazzle schemes were once again applied, but as the war progressed, disruptive patterns were gradually retired in favor of large applications of blues, greens, grays, black, or white. Amphibious vessels operating in the South Pacific and Philippines environments retained camouflage patterns since they operated close to shore, and units operating in the far North had white schemes. Electronic means of vessel detection—radar, sonar, radiation imaging—have now made solid, less-conspicuous, color schemes the standard visual camouflage of the world’s navies, and work is now progressing on redesigned superstructures to reduce radar wave reflection. Bruce Hampton Franklin See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Decoy Ships (Q-Ships); German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders.

References Sumrall, Robert G. “Ship Camouflage (WWI): Deceptive Art.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 97, no. 7 (July 1971), pp. 57–77; and 99, no. 2 (February 1973), pp. 67–81, 89–92. Walkowiak, Thomas F., and Larry Sowinski. United States Navy Camouflage of the World War II Era, Part 1. Kresgeville, PA: Floating Drydock, 1988.

Campioni, Inigo (1878–1944) Italian admiral, executed for treason by Italy’s Fascist regime. Born in Viareggio, Italy, on November 14, 1878, Inigo Campioni attended the naval academy at Livorno (Leghorn), graduating in 1896. He fought in the 1911–1912 war with Turkey and served aboard a battleship during much of World War I. At the end of the latter conflict, he was a highly decorated destroyer commander.

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In the interwar period, Campioni led naval design programs at the La Spezia weapons laboratory, served as naval attaché in Paris, and held various Naval Supreme Command staff posts. In 1936, he was promoted to full admiral, and two years later, he became vice chief of staff of the Italian navy. In 1939, he was elected to the Italian senate. Regarded as his country’s most promising naval officer, Campioni was appointed to operational command of Italy’s battle fleet at the beginning of World War II. He led the fleet in a number of engagements against the British in the Mediterranean, notably the Battles of Calabria (Punta Stilo) on July 9, 1940, and Cape Teulada (Spartivento) on November 27, 1940. In the latter engagement, Campioni failed to intercept two converging British convoys. His superior naval force was hampered by poor Italian reconnaissance and by the failure of Italian air cover to materialize for well over an hour after the start of the battle. Campioni was subjected to intense criticism for his lack of aggressiveness, especially on those rare occasions when his fleet outgunned the opponent. On December 8, 1940, he was relieved of operational command and made deputy chief of staff of the Naval Supreme Command. In July 1941, Campioni was assigned to command Axis forces in the Dodecanese Islands. After Italy’s surrender to the Allies on September 8, 1943, he was contacted by the British and urged to resist German attempts to establish control over the Aegean region. Although Italian forces on Rhodes resisted the German takeover, they were compelled to surrender on September 11, 1943. The Germans held Campioni prisoner at Schokken (Skoki) in Poland until January 1944, when he was turned over to Benito Mussolini’s puppet Italian Social Republic in northern Italy and jailed in Verona. Tried at Parma for treason, Campioni was found guilty and executed there by fascist authorities on May 24, 1944. In November 1947, the Italian government honored Campioni by posthumously awarding him the Gold Medal for Military Valor. John P. Vanzo and Gordon E. Hogg See also: Calabria, Battle of; Italy, Navy

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Menasha, WI: George Banta, 1957. Dizionario biografico degli Italiani. Vol. 17. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1974. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignari. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Rocca, Gianni. Fucilate gli ammiragli: La tragedia della Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1990.

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Canada, Navy At the outbreak of World War II, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) consisted of only 6 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, and 2 small training ships. During the war, it underwent a rapid expansion, astonishing for a nation of only 11 million people. By 1945, the Canadian navy was the third largest Allied navy in terms of numbers of warships. Its core force consisted of 2 light carriers, 2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 60 frigates, and 118 corvettes. In all, it counted a total of 363 vessels, most of which were built in Canadian shipyards. Yards on the St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, and Atlantic and Pacific coasts produced 70 frigates, 122 corvettes, 194 minesweepers, and numerous trawlers, motor torpedo boats, motor launches, and landing craft. From a permanent force of 1,774 men and 2,083 reserves on the outbreak of war in September 1939, the RCN expanded to some 100,000 personnel (6,700 of them women) by the end of the war in 1945. Throughout the war, the Canadian navy’s primary function was convoy protection. In the gale-swept North Atlantic, RCN ships played a crucial role in the long struggle against German submarines. Having expanded so rapidly, the RCN suffered from poor training as well as a dearth of advanced equipment. Early in 1943, Canadian corvettes and frigates were sent to English bases, where they were fitted with new radar, sonar, and high-frequency direction-finding detection gear. In addition, the crews underwent intensive training in antisubmarine tactics and warfare.

The HMCS Halifax, commissioned in November 1941, was a Flower-class corvette that served in World War II. Ships like these were produced specifically for convoy protection. (Corel)

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Of particular value was the Western Approaches Tactical Unit established in Liverpool in February 1942, which trained escort captains and commanders in a common doctrine of convoy defense. Practical training was provided by exercises against Royal Navy submarines. As a result, by mid-1943, the Canadians fought much more effectively in the Atlantic arena. Still, these deficiencies led to the replacement of the chief of the naval staff, Vice Admiral Percy Nelles, with Rear Admiral (later vice admiral) George C. Jones. The Canadians organized the massive convoys that set out from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In 1943 the ocean area off Canada and Newfoundland, which had been under British and then U.S. strategic control, became a strictly Canadian theater under Rear Admiral Leonard W. Murray, commander in chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic. He now controlled all Allied ships and aircraft involved in protecting Allied convoys in the region. As radio interception and the breaking of German codes assumed major roles in the war against the submarines, the RCN Operational Intelligence Centre proved a key Canadian capability. By 1944 also, Canadian ships were providing a majority of close escort in the North Atlantic convoys. In all, the RCN provided eight midAtlantic support groups and escorted more than 25,000 merchant ship voyages with 180 million tons of cargo from North America to Great Britain. Built to a British design stressing mass production, the Flower-class corvette was the mainstay of the escort fleet. Displacing 1,245 tons at full load, this ship was armed with a 4-inch gun and 40 (later 70) depth charges. The Flower-class ships proved to be miserable seaboats, however, taking on water and rolling furiously; and, at 16.5 knots, they were too slow for offensive operations. A far more effective escort was the River-class frigate, weighing 1,920 tons at full load. The River-class ship could make 21 knots and mounted two 4-inch guns, a Hedgehog mortar, and 126 (later 150) depth charges. While protecting the Allied convoys was the chief Canadian contribution to the war effort, the RCN also made significant contributions in other area. Canadian destroyers assisted in the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation of Allied soldiers from France and then protected Allied merchant ships in British waters. Three passenger liners were converted into auxiliary cruisers to help hunt down Axis commerce raiders in the North Atlantic, Caribbean, and North Pacific. The acquisition of four large British Tribal-class destroyers (the Athabaskan, Haida, Huron, and Iroquois) gave the RCN additional capability for surface warfare operations. At full load, the Tribals displaced 2,519 tons (later 2,710 tons) and easily made 36 knots. Formidably armed for their size, they mounted six 4.7-inch cannon, two 4-inch dual-purpose guns, and four 40-mm antiaircraft weapons. They also carried four torpedo tubes. Two other Tribals (the Micmac and Nootka) were launched at Halifax in 1943 and 1944, respectively. The Canadian Tribal-class ships saw heavy action, especially in spring 1944 in the English Channel against

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German destroyers and heavy torpedo boats (900-plus tons). In the course of these battles, the Athabaskan was lost on April 29, 1944. The RCN contributed 17 corvettes to Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of northwest Africa. RCN ships also played a considerable part in the Normandy invasion. Some 10,000 officers and seamen and 109 RCN warships participated in Operation NEPTUNE, landing 45,000 troops on the beaches. The Canadian contribution included 15 destroyers, 11 frigates, 19 corvettes, 16 minesweepers, and 30 landing craft. In 1944, the Canadians acquired two British light aircraft carriers, the Magnificent and Warrior (displacing 14,000 and 13,350 tons, respectively). Both saw action overseas, with the RCN thereby acquiring valuable experience in naval aviation. Their 40 aircraft were wholly British, however. The RCN also secured two light cruisers from Britain, the Uganda (in August 1941) and the Ontario (in July 1943). The Uganda took part in the Battle of Okinawa. In the course of the war, the RCN lost 24 ships sunk and 2,024 men killed. At the same time, the Canadian navy played an important role in the Allied victory by destroying or capturing 42 Axis surface warships and helping to sink 33 submarines. Sherwood S. Cordier and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; ICEBERG, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References: German, Tony. The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy. Toronto, Canada: McClelland and Stewart, 1990. Milner, Marc. The North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Schull, Joseph. Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in World War II. Toronto, Canada: Stoddart, 1987. Worth, Richard. Fleets of World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001.

Canaris, Wilhelm Franz (1887–1945) German navy admiral and head of German military intelligence during World War II. Born in Aplerbeck, Westphalia, Germany, on January 1, 1887, Wilhelm Franz Canaris entered the German navy in 1905. Serving aboard the cruiser Dresden off the South American coast at the beginning of World War I, he established an intelligence network to track Allied movements. On March 14, 1915, the British attacked the Dresden at Valparaiso, Chile, but Canaris escaped Chilean internment and returned to Europe in October. From November 1915 until October 1916, he

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was in Spain on an intelligence mission. In April 1918, he took command of a Uboat in the Mediterranean. After the war, Canaris, an ardent conservative and nationalist, was active in covert operations to rebuild the German military, specifically working in Japan with German designers to build submarines. He then resumed his naval career, increasingly in intelligence activities. Promoted to captain in 1931, he took command of the battleship Schlesien the next year. He was named to head military intelligence— the Abwehrabteilung (Abwehr)—in January 1935 and was promoted to Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) that April. One of his first successes was to convince German Chancellor Adolf Hitler to intervene on the side of the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War in July 1936. Canaris became disillusioned after the Fritsch Affair in 1938, when untruthful allegations of homosexual activities were brought against Generaloberst (Colonel General) Werner von Fritsch because of his opposition to Hitler’s announced war policy. Shortly thereafter, the Abwehr became tied to anti-Nazi elements in Germany. Canaris opposed Hitler’s policies, predicting they would lead to war and inevitable defeat. Despite the admiral’s reticence, Hitler personally liked him, and the Abwehr did provide much useful information, all of which gave Canaris some protection as he aided a limited number of Jews and covertly undermined German attempts to involve Spain in the war. Canaris was promoted to full admiral in January 1940. Canaris resisted efforts by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) to take over the Abwehr, but his position was threatened when Heydrich uncovered evidence that Canaris had committed treason. Heydrich’s assassination in May 1942 provided a brief reprieve for the admiral, and it was not until February 1944 that Hitler removed him from his post. Shortly thereafter, he was placed on the navy’s inactive list; he lived under a loose but comfortable house arrest at Burg Lauenstein until June, when Hitler recalled him to Berlin as head of mercantile warfare. Implicated in the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler (although he did not take an active role), Canaris was arrested afterward. Initially, there was no evidence against him, but discovery of his secret diaries led to his trial and conviction. Canaris was hanged at Flossenbürg Prison on April 9, 1945. Rodney Madison See also: Germany, Navy.

References Brissaud, André. Canaris: A Biography of Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War. Trans. Ian Colvin. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1970.

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Hohne, Heinz. Canaris: Hitler’s Master Spy. Trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979.

Cape Bon, Battle of (December 13, 1941) Mediterranean Sea naval action between units of the Italian and British navies. In November and early December 1941, British surface, air, and submarine forces operating from Malta had enjoyed considerable success against Axis shipments to North Africa, sinking about two-thirds of the matériel dispatched and in the process sparking a supply crisis there. The Italian navy responded by using destroyers and light cruisers to transport gasoline to Africa. On December 12, 1941, Vice Admiral A. Toscano sailed from Palermo, Sicily, bound for Tripoli with the light cruisers Alberico Da Barbiano and Alberto Di Giussano, accompanied by the torpedo boat Cigno. Each of the cruisers carried 950 tons of aviation fuel in cans stacked on their decks and superstructure. Signals intelligence provided the British advance notice of this important sailing, and Vice Admiral Malta Wilbraham Ford planned to attack the Italian cruisers at dawn with torpedo bombers. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla under Commander G. H. Stokes, of the Sikh, Maori, Legion, and the Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers, happened to be en route from Gibraltar to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet in Alexandria. When Commander Stokes was informed of events, he increased speed in the hope of being able to intercept the Italian ships. The British destroyers hurried along the African coast, staying in French waters to avoid Axis minefields. At 3:02 a.m. on December 13, as they approached Cape Bon, lookouts spotted flashing lights that disappeared behind the promontory. The Sikh, followed by the Legion, Maori, and Isaac Sweers, rounded the cape in pursuit. Admiral Toscano, meanwhile, heard aircraft above his formation and assumed the British had found him. The volatile nature of his cargo made him cautious and he decided to abort his mission. The Italian warships executed a simultaneous turnabout, which positioned Cigno to the formation’s rear and put the Italians on a collision course with the Allied destroyers hunting them. As the two columns met, the British were inshore and hidden against the dark mass of the land, while the Italians were silhouetted against the horizon; thus, the British made the first sighting, and at 3:23 a.m., the Sikh fired four torpedoes at the Da Barbiano from 1,500 yards. Within a minute, two torpedoes slammed into its hull and the Italian flagship erupted in flames. By this time, more torpedoes were streaming toward the Italians, and the Allied warships also opened fire with all guns, shredding the gasoline cans lashed to the deck of both ships. As two more torpedoes hit the Da Barbiano, the Di Giussano had time to fire three 6-inch salvos, but the rapidly converging destroyers were difficult targets, and

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the shells exploded ashore. At 3:27 a.m., a torpedo hit the Di Giussano amidships, along with two 4.7-inch shells and a stream of machine-gun fire. There was a massive explosion, and the cruiser swerved and lost way. The Cigno launched a torpedo and opened fire as the Allied ships passed. The Italians incorrectly claimed several hits. The Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers in turn targeted the torpedo boat, straddling it and launching four torpedoes, all of which missed. The Allied destroyers continued south at high speed, leaving the Da Barbiano sinking in a sea of flames and the Di Giussano waging a losing fight against uncontrollable fires. Admiral Toscano and more than 900 of his men died. The Cigno rescued survivors and returned to Sicily. The Battle of Cape Bon was an embarrassing defeat. Tactically, Toscano could not have picked a worse time to reverse course, and he should have kept the Cigno in the lead. But the real mistake was using cruisers as gasoline transports, which left them excessively vulnerable. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Convoys, Axis; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Signals Intelligence.

References Page, Christopher, ed. Naval Staff Histories. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 2, November 1940–December 1941. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Smith, Peter C., and Edwin Walker. The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

Cape Esperance, Battle of (October 11–12, 1942) Second of five major surface actions fought off Guadalcanal. The battle occurred eight miles west-northwest of Savo Island as both U.S. and Japanese forces maneuvered to protect their own reinforcements moving toward Guadalcanal. U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Norman Scott led Task Force 64, consisting of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five destroyers. Scott’s mission was to protect transports carrying the U.S. Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment to Guadalcanal by searching for and attacking Japanese ships. Scott’s crews had just undergone three hard weeks of night training, and the admiral was fully prepared to engage in a night action, in which the Japanese had hitherto enjoyed superiority. Scott had developed simple tactics and rehearsed them, keeping his crews at station from dusk to dawn. His ships operated in a single column, with destroyers forward and aft of his cruisers.

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Japanese Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo commanded a bombardment group, Cruiser Division 6, composed of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers. It protected Rear Admiral Joshima Takagi’s two seaplane carriers and six destroyers, transporting some 700 men and artillery belonging to Lieutenant General Hyakutake Haruyashi’s Seventeenth Army to Guadalcanal. Goto planned to shell Henderson Field to neutralize the U.S. air threat while Joshima landed the reinforcements off the northwestern cape of Guadalcanal. U.S. aircraft tracked Goto’s force as he approached, although communication miscues aboard the U.S. ships nearly rendered that advantage moot. Goto and Joshima did not expect opposition, and preoccupied with navigation and preparations for the Henderson Field bombardment, they ignored indications that U.S. vessels were nearby. Lacking radar, the Japanese blundered into the Americans. Their lookouts did spot the U.S. ships and identify them as enemy, but Goto believed they were friendly and flashed recognition signals. At 11:25 p.m. on October 11, U.S. radar from the light cruiser Helena first picked up the Japanese, but Scott, on the flagship heavy cruiser San Francisco, did not learn of this before he ordered his ships to turn at 11:30 p.m. Eight minutes later, while his formation was still in some mild disorder from the turn, Scott received his first radar indication. Initially, he believed this came from his own destroyers out of formation. Fortunately for Scott and the Americans, the turn inadvertently allowed the U.S. ships to cross the T of Goto’s approaching ships. The Helena opened fire at 11:46 p.m. at 3,600 yards, quickly followed by the other cruisers. Surprise was total. Goto believed that Joshima’s ships were shooting at him. U.S. 8-inch, 6-inch, and 5-inch guns pounded the Japanese ships. Among the casualties was Goto, who was mortally wounded. Before his death, he ordered his force to withdraw, and a running gunfire duel followed. The Japanese heavy cruiser Furutaka and the destroyer Fubuki were sent to the bottom. The heavy cruiser Aoba was badly damaged and would require four months to repair. In an associated action on October 12, aircraft from Henderson Field sank the Japanese destroyers Murakumo and Natsugumo, which were searching for survivors. On the U.S. side, the destroyer Duncan was sunk, the cruiser Boise was heavily damaged, the cruiser Salt Lake City was lightly damaged, and the destroyer Farenholt was damaged. Meanwhile, Henderson Field had been spared Japanese shelling, and U.S. morale soared, especially as Scott claimed his force sank three cruisers, five destroyers, and a transport. Despite their tactical defeat, the Japanese did land their troops and supplies safely, as did the Americans on October 13. Because Japanese torpedoes had not been successfully employed in the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Americans discounted their effectiveness. U.S. Navy leaders also incorrectly concluded that using the single-column formation and gunfire was the way to fight at night. This approach slighted the destroyers’ main battery, the torpedo, and effectively tied the

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destroyers to the cruisers’ apron strings. The Americans deployed this way in another night action on November 13, much to their chagrin. John W. Whitman and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Radar; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Torpedoes.

References Cook, Charles O. The Battle of Cape Esperance: Strategic Encounter at Guadalcanal. New York: Crowell, 1968. Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990. Lacroix, Eric, and Linton Wells II. Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Poor, Henry V. The Battles of Cape Esperance, October 11, 1942, and Santa Cruz Islands, October 26, 1942. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994.

Cape Matapan, Battle of (March 28, 1941) Naval battle between British and Italian forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite its crippling fuel shortages and at the urging of its German allies, units of the Italian navy set out on March 26, 1941, to attack British convoys around Crete. Commanded by Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino, the force included the battleship Vittorio Veneto; the heavy cruisers Trieste, Trento, Bolzano, Zara, Fiume, and Pola; the light cruisers Luigi di Savoia and Garibaldi; and 17 destroyers. On March 27, Royal Navy forces under Vice Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham (Force A) alerted by key radio intercepts to the Italian movements, steamed from Alexandria to join Vice Admiral Henry D. Pridham-Wippell (Force B), already in the Aegean, in search of the Italian force, although the British were not certain of its exact composition or mission. At 6:35 a.m. on March 28, Italian aircraft spotted Pridham-Wippell’s force, which consisted of four light cruisers and four destroyers, and shortly before 8:00 a.m., Rear Admiral Luigi Sansonetti’s III Division with three heavy cruisers made contact south of Crete and proceeded to chase the British squadron until 8:55 a.m., firing over 500 rounds at long ranges but failing to obtain any hits. Fearing that Sansonetti was sailing into a trap, Iachino ordered the III Division to reverse course and concentrate on his flagship. When the Italian division turned away, PridhamWippell likewise came about and followed. Iachino then maneuvered to trap the

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British between his battleship and his cruisers. At 10:55 a.m., Vittorio Veneto came in range and opened fire from 25,000 yards. The British cruisers immediately made smoke and fled south. All this time, Cunningham’s battleships and the carrier Formidable were forging up from Alexandria. Cunningham had already launched a strike of six Albacores to help his cruisers. Iachino suspected there were more British forces about but had no firm intelligence. The Italians obtained several straddles and near misses on Pridham-Wippell’s ships but no hits. At 11:15 a.m., the Vittorio Veneto gave up the chase just as the British air strike arrived. The planes attacked through an intense antiaircraft barrage, but all their torpedoes missed astern. In steady pursuit 40 miles back, Cunningham’s task force, joined by PridhamWippell’s Force B, followed Iachino’s ships. It consisted of the Formidable and the battleships Warspite, Valiant, and Barham together with 4 cruisers and 13 destroyers, bolstered by British aircraft operating from nearby shore bases, which conducted six separate attacks. The Italian force received little useful air cover from its own air force or its German allies and suffered accordingly. Despite withering antiaircraft fire from Vittorio Veneto and escorting ships, British Albacores from Formidable, in their second attack, torpedoed the Italian battleship at 3:10 p.m. on March 28. Cunningham judged that the progress of the Italian force, now drawn in around its wounded flagship, would likely be slow, and he plotted it at about 12 knots. But despite having shipped 4,000 tons of water and making way on only two of four propellers, the Vittorio Veneto worked up to a speed of 19 knots and thus moved its formation farther along than expected on the run toward home waters. With night falling, however, Iachino received the unwelcome news that the heavy cruiser Pola had been stopped dead by an aerial torpedo attack delivered in Formidable’s third attack. Believing that the British were still far astern, he instructed the cruisers Zara and Fiume (with four destroyers) to turn back and tend to their sister ship. In fact, from a distance of less than 50 miles, Cunningham was closing as fast as his flagship, the old battleship HMS Warspite, and its sister ships Valiant and Barham could make way. By 8:30 p.m., radar sets aboard the vanguard cruisers Ajax and Orion had picked up the derelict Pola, about six miles distant; it was presumed to be the Vittorio Veneto. As the main British force drew closer and prepared to attack the Pola, an in-line formation of six more unknown ships (the Zara, Fiume, and their escorts) was suddenly detected at 10:25 p.m. at 4,000 yards, which shifted the British targeting and drew a wall of concentrated fire from the British battleships’ main and secondary batteries at nearly point-blank range. The Zara and Fiume were reduced to flaming wrecks within minutes; the Fiume, along with the destroyers Alfieri and Carducci, sank within an hour. The Zara and Pola remained afloat until early the

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following morning, finally dispatched by scuttling charges and by torpedoes from British destroyers. Some 40 miles ahead, the main body of the Italian force pressed onward, arriving in Taranto on the afternoon of March 29 after evading the renewed chase given by Cunningham. Employing radar, which the Italians still lacked, and vastly superior air cover to great advantage, Cunningham claimed that, in the Battle of Cape Matapan, the Royal Navy established primacy in the Mediterranean. The loss of five valuable warships and 2,300 lives shocked the Italian leadership, and they ordered the battle force to stay within land fighter range and to avoid night battles until the fleet had radar. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini also ordered the conversion of the liner Roma into an aircraft carrier. Gordon E. Hogg, Vincent O’Hara, and Charles R. Shrader See also: Battleships; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Radar; Sirte, First Battle of.

References Giorgerini, Giorgio. Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1989. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Pack, S. W. C. Night Action off Cape Matapan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972. Stephen, Martin. Sea Battles in Close-Up: World War 2. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Cape Passero, Action off (October 12, 1940) Mediterranean naval engagement involving the British and Italian navies. On October 8, 1940, a convoy of 4 British supply ships sailed from Alexandria for Malta escorted by 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 5 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers. The commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham, ordered such a strong escort because 4 Italian battleships had sortied against the last Malta supply operation. Assisted by heavy weather, the convoy reached Malta undetected on October 11. That same day, however, an Italian aircraft reported the presence of the British warships. Italian naval headquarters responded by dispatching the 11th Destroyer Squadron of the Geniere Aviere, Artigliere, and Camicia Nera, and the 1st Torpedo Boat Squadron of the Alcione, Airone, and Ariel to patrol east of Malta, while the 7th Destroyer Squadron and an MAS (Motoscafo Armato Silurante; Italian, Torpedo Armed Motorboat) motor torpedo-boat unit guarded the Sicilian Channel and two cruiser divisions raised steam.

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The Mediterranean Fleet’s main body remained south of Malta waiting to escort the empty transports back to Alexandria. The fleet’s light cruisers scouted to the northeast with the cruiser Ajax being the end ship on the line some 100 miles east of Malta. Meanwhile the Italian 1st and 11th squadrons swept west in an extended search line running north to south with 16,000 yards between the two squadrons. At 1:35 a.m. on October 12, the Alcione detected the Ajax in bright moonlight 12 miles ahead and altered course southwest toward it. Within minutes, the Airone and Ariel also spotted the enemy ship, and at 1:48 a.m., the squadron commander ordered a simultaneous torpedo attack. At 1:55 a.m., lookouts on the Ajax spotted ships ahead and challenged the Alcione, which fired two torpedoes from under 2,000 yards. Almost at the same time, the Airone off the British cruiser’s port bow launched two torpedoes, while the Ariel off its starboard bow launched one. However, the Ajax, not having received the correct response to its challenge of the unknown ship, had increased speed and altered course. This maneuver, along with Italian errors in calculating the British cruiser’s speed and heading, resulted in all five torpedoes missing their target. The Airone closed rapidly and launched two more torpedoes from only 1,000 yards. That torpedo boat’s 3.9-inch guns landed two shells on the Ajax’s bridge and another pieced the British ship’s hull, but the torpedoes missed astern. The Ariel and Alcione opened fire as well, but their aim was off and the Alcione lost contact. In response to the sudden Italian attack, the Ajax engaged the Ariel and the Airone with its main and secondary batteries. The first salvos crumpled the Ariel’s bridge and cracked its hull. The unarmored torpedo boat sank within minutes. The Airone tried to disengage, but a broadside of 6-inch British shells left the squadron flagship down at the stern and burning fiercely. At 1:56 a.m., the 11th Destroyer Squadron began heading north. The Aviere sighted the Ajax at 2:10 a.m. and fired its guns, but the moon silhouetted the destroyer and made for effective shooting by the Ajax. Hit twice with major flooding, the Aviere staggered to starboard after only six minutes and lost contact. Crewmen in the Geniere spotted the Ajax at 2:18 a.m., engaged it briefly, and then withdrew. The Artigliere, a few thousand yards northeast, opened fire. The Artigliere launched one torpedo before an exchange of gunfire left the Italian destroyer adrift and fiercely on fire. The Artigliere retaliated with four shells that moderately damaged the cruiser. The Camicia Nera, the southernmost Italian destroyer, came into action at 2:46 a.m., and the two opposing ships exchanged several ineffective salvos before the British cruiser reversed course and broke contact, ending the action. At 5:00 a.m., the Camicia Nere took the crippled Artigliere in tow, but at 8:40 a.m., the heavy cruiser York and the light cruisers Gloucester and Liverpool found and sank the Artigliere.

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In the Battle of Cape Passaro, the Italians lost the torpedo boats Airone and Ariel and the destroyer Artigliere, while the destroyer Aviere was severely damaged. The British cruiser Ajax suffered moderate damage that kept it out of action for two weeks. In the action, the Italian torpedo boats had achieved surprise and attacked at point-blank range, but all their torpedoes had missed. This led Italian naval headquarters to conclude that its forces were technically inferior to the British in night actions. In fact, Italian weapons and tactics contributed to the result. The Italian torpedo boat commander conducted a brilliant approach, but his ships could only put five (of a maximum potential of six) torpedoes into the water. This feeble barrage was half that of one modern Allied destroyer. Then the 11th Destroyer Squadron, which possessed greater torpedo capability, never attempted to concentrate; instead, its four ships presented themselves silhouetted in moonlight to the Ajax’s gunners one by one at close range. This proved ineffective as well as deadly. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Malta; Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

References Fioravanzo, Giuseppe. La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Vol. 4, Le Azioni Navali in Mediterraneo Dal 10 Giugno 1940 al 31 Marzo 1941. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1976. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Cape Spada, Battle of (July 19, 1940) When Italian naval headquarters received intelligence that a group of small British tankers was leaving Romania after that nation’s change of alliance and passing through the Bosporus into Greek waters, it decided to dispatch Rear Admiral Ferdinando Casardi’s II Division of the light cruisers Bande Nere and Colleoni to Leros into the Aegean Sea to attack them. Casardi departed Tripoli on July 17. By chance, British warships were operating along his route sweeping for submarines in advance of a convoy from Port Said to Greece. At 6:17 a.m. on July 19, the Italian cruisers entered the Aegean Sea northwest of Crete, where they encountered the British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under Captain H. Nicolson with Hero, Ilex, Hasty, and Hyperion headed in their direction from 10 miles away. The Australian light cruiser Sydney commanded by Captain John

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Collins and the British destroyer Havock cruised independently 40 miles to the north-northeast in the Gulf of Athens. Upon sighting the enemy cruisers Nicolson’s flotilla immediately turned northeast. Casardi pursued through rough seas and strong winds at 30 knots on a slightly diverging course. He naturally suspected the destroyers were the van of a larger force and that he had stumbled upon a dangerous situation. He opened fire at 6:27 a.m. from 19,000 yards. The destroyers replied but their salvos fell well short. Collins received Nicolson’s enemy report at 6:33 a.m. and immediately turned toward the contact, maintaining radio silence. Rolling swells limited the cruisers to 32 knots while mist and the morning sun made long-range spotting difficult. Although they chased the enemy from 6:48 to 7:30 a.m., Italian gunnery was very sparse At 7:30 a.m., the Sydney arrived 20,000 yards to the north-northeast and announced its presence with gunfire from out of a fogbank. The Italians came about and responded with their aft turrets. The Sydney, firing rapidly, hit the Bande Nere at 7:35 a.m. The two forces settled into a stern chase trading fire from roughly 18,000 yards. Conditions made gun laying difficult, but on the Sydney the Italian gunfire seemed accurate, if very slow. At 8:21 a.m., a 6-inch shell holed the Sydney’s forward funnel. The Italians passed Cape Spada and at 8:25 a.m., a 6-inch round hit the Colleoni, jamming its rudder in the central position. Then two more shells struck, knocking out two boilers. Fires erupted, and, with the other boilers starved for water, the cruiser lost way. At 8:40 a.m., the Ilex discharged a torpedo salvo and one struck, blowing off the tip of the Italian’s bow. Shortly thereafter, the Hyperion scored a hit amidships. The Bande Nere circled, and then at 8:50 a.m., turned west as the Sydney, Hero, and Hasty pursued. At 8:59 a.m., the Colleoni capsized and sank 6 miles off Cape Spada. The Sydney hit Bande Nere again but did not slow it down. Finally at 9:37 a.m., with the range slowly opening and ammunitions becoming a concern, the Sydney broke off. The Bande Nere made port at Benghazi. In the engagement, the Italian cruisers fired 500 shells, scoring no hits on the destroyers and only one on Sydney over the course of three hours. The Sydney, fighting its third surface engagement in a month, expended 1,300 shells and obtained five long-range hits in two hours. Italian naval headquarters concluded that lightly armored “expendable” warships operating in enemy-dominated waters could not expect to survive long. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in; Australia, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sydney, Australian Cruiser.

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References Gay, Franco, and Valerio Gay. The Cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Gill, G. Hermon. Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942. Adelaide, Australia: Griffin, 1957.

Cape Spartivento, Battle of (November 27, 1940) Mediterranean Sea battle between units of the British and Italian navies, known in Italy as the Battle of Cape Teulada. After crippling three Italian battleships at Taranto on November 11, 1940, the British sought to exploit their victory by launching a major operation to reinforce Malta from both the west and east and to relocate a battleship and two cruisers from Egypt to the home islands. Elements of the British Mediterranean Fleet departed Alexandria on November 23, and Force H cleared Gibraltar two days later to escort three transports to Malta. The Italian naval command learned that the British had major forces at sea, and Admiral Inigo Campioni sortied from Naples on November 26 with the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Cesare; the I Division with heavy cruisers Pola, Fiume, and Gorizia; and the 11 destroyers of the 7th, 9th, and 13th destroyer squadrons. The III Division of the heavy cruisers Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano, and the three vessels of the 12th Destroyer Squadron under Rear Admiral Luigi Sansonetti left Messina the same day. Campioni and Sansonetti rendezvoused north of Sicily and headed west to challenge Force H. Force H included the battle cruiser Renown, the carrier Ark Royal, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers. The convoy consisted of three transports escorted by two light cruisers, one destroyer, and four corvettes. Somerville planned to rendezvous with Force D of the battleship Ramillies, one heavy and two light cruisers, and five destroyers coming from Alexandria at noon on November 27 southeast of Sardinia. The combined force would then head toward the Sicilian narrows and return to Gibraltar, while the merchant ships, five destroyers, and the corvettes continued to Malta under the cover of darkness. At dawn on November 26, Campioni’s fleet loitered off Sardinia with the cruiser divisions ahead of the battleships. Campioni had difficult orders. He was to stay under Sardinia’s air cover, to avoid action unless the enemy was obviously inferior, and to be highly aggressive while remembering the difficulty of replacing warship losses. When Campioni received a report that enemy ships had transited the Sicilian Channel heading west, he assumed they sought to join Force H, and, hoping for an opportunity to fight within the constraints of his orders, he launched spotters to find them. As the Italians awaited news, Somerville sailed east likewise scouting for opposition. At 10:45 a.m., Campioni swung southeast acting on an ambiguous

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report that led him to believe he could intercept the force previously reported in the Sicilian Channel. In fact, Force D had already slipped by. Somerville, meanwhile, had finally received news that there were Italian battleships astride his route. Force H and Force D rendezvoused at 11:30 a.m., and, as the Ark Royal and the convoy with their escorts cleared the area, Somerville turned north with the battleship Ramillies and battle cruiser Renown; the heavy cruiser Berwick; the light cruisers Manchester, Southampton, Sheffield, and Newcastle; and 10 destroyers to confront Campioni. At 12:07 p.m., Campioni learned that the British force included a carrier. Considering that the odds were now tilted against him, he ordered his cruisers to discontinue their advance and concentrate on his flagship. At 12:15 p.m., the British cruisers observed smoke on the northern horizon. On the Italian side, the cruiser divisions were heading east with Campioni to the eastnortheast and closing. Despite orders to disengage, the Fiume fired a ranging salvo at the Berwick from 24,000 yards at 12:20 p.m. Within two minutes, both Italian cruiser divisions were in action, having altered course away to maintain long range, which Italian doctrine favored. Almost immediately an 8-inch shell hit the Berwick, causing moderate damage. The British cruisers returned fire, and at 12:24 p.m., the Renown briefly engaged before losing its target in the smoke. The Ramillies discharged two ranging salvos that splashed far short, and the old battleship slowly dropped behind the rest of the fleet. A brisk gunnery action ensued between 12:20 and 12:42 p.m. as the cruisers fought in a northeasterly direction at ranges up to 23,000 yards. Straddles were obtained, but smoke rendered spotting difficult. Nonetheless, at 12:35 p.m., another 8-inch shell plunged into the Berwick. The first British success came at 12:40 p.m., when a 6-inch round disabled the destroyer Lanciere. At the same time, 11 British Swordfish aircraft attacked the Vittorio Veneto. The battleship dodged every torpedo launched and then engaged the British cruisers from 32,000 yards. As giant waterspouts erupted around the Berwick and Manchester, the British squadron made smoke and fled southeast to close with the Renown. As the Italians continued steaming northeast and disappeared over the horizon, Somerville quite correctly turned to close on the convoy before dark. During the remaining hours of daylight, both sides traded ineffective air attacks. After the battle, British prime minister Winston Churchill unfairly demanded Somerville’s scalp, having questioned the admiral’s offensive spirit ever since his reluctance to attack the French at Mers-el-Kébir. However, a board of inquiry exonerated Somerville. As for Campioni, although he had a mandate to be conservative, he had lost a good opportunity to defeat the British in a fleet action, and his days of command at sea were numbered. Nonetheless, the Italian navy had demonstrated that, despite the

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Taranto raid, it retained the battleships and the will to dispute the passage of even the most heavily escorted British convoys to Malta. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Campioni, Inigo; Iachino, Angelo; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sansonetti, Luigi; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on.

References “Action between British and Italian Forces off Cape Spartivento on 27th November, 1940.” London Gazette, Supplement, May 5, 1948. Fioravanzo, Giuseppe. La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Vol. 4, Le Azioni Navali in Mediterraneo Dal 10 Giugno 1940 al 31 Marzo 1941. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1976. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Cape St. George, Battle of (November 25, 1943) Pacific theater naval battle. This final surface action in the Solomons area was brought on by the Japanese attempt to reinforce their garrison at Buka in northern Bougainville on the night of November 24–25, 1943. The Japanese transport group under Captain Kagawa Kiyoto was made up of three destroyer-transports—the Amagiri, Uzuki, and Yugiri—with the destroyers Onami and Makinami as escorts. The Allies had long been reading the Japanese naval code, however, and Captain Arleigh Burke and his 23rd Destroyer Squadron of five destroyers arrived just after midnight and took up station athwart the direct Buka-Rabaul route to intercept the Japanese on their return trip. The night was dark, with low-hanging clouds that produced occasional rainsqualls. The sea was calm. Burke’s plan was for his division—the Charles F. Ausburne (the flagship), Claxton, and Dyson—to launch a torpedo attack while Commander B. L. Austin’s division of the Converse and Spence covered with its guns; then the two squadrons would reverse roles. The action unfolded nearly as Burke had hoped. At 1:40 a.m. on November 25, the two unsuspecting Japanese escorts appeared, and Burke, closing the range quickly, launched 15 torpedoes at 1:56 a.m.; then turned hard right to avoid any Japanese torpedoes coming his way. None did. Both Japanese escorting destroyers were mortally stricken. The Onami went down quickly; the Makinami somehow managed to stay afloat until the Converse and Spence sank it with gunfire. Burke then set out in pursuit of the three transports that had turned north and were trying to make good their escape to Rabaul. In the running fight, the Japanese ships separated. Burke went after the Yugiri and, at 3:28 a.m., sank it with gunfire.

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Burke continued the chase until 4:04 a.m., and then, with only two hours of darkness remaining to shield him from the Japanese air bases at Rabaul, he turned for home. He had fought a near perfect action, sinking three enemy destroyers at no cost except for the oil and munitions expended. For the Japanese, however, the battle ran down the curtain on the costly war of attrition they had tried to wage in the Solomons. Their misfortunes continued; in mid-May, they lost the submarines I-176 and I-16 while they were attempting to supply the Buka garrison. Ronnie Day See also: Burke, Arleigh Albert; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Southwest Pacific Theater; Torpedoes.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960. Potter, E. B. Admiral Arleigh Burke. New York: Random House, 1990.

Caroline Islands Campaign (February 15–November 25, 1944) A series of air attacks, naval bombardments, and amphibious assaults during the U.S. Navy’s 1944 drive across the Central Pacific. A chain of 680 islands, islets, and atolls stretching across the Pacific between the Marianas and New Guinea, the Caroline Islands were part of the German Empire prior to World War I. In the peace settlement following the war, the victorious powers gave Japan the Marshall Islands and all of the Marianas except Guam. These acquisitions dramatically increased Japanese power in the Pacific and created a potential major problem for the United States, as the Carolines straddled the sea-lanes between Hawaii and both the Philippines and China. Indeed, Japanese control of the Carolines caused so much concern that it spurred development of the amphibious warfare doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps during the interwar period, a process that accelerated after Japan fortified Ponape, Truk, Yap, and Peleliu in the 1930s. Following the United States’ entry into World War II in 1941, Japanese units in the Solomons and Gilberts were gradually destroyed or isolated by U.S. forces pushing across the Central Pacific. Kwajalein Atoll fell on February 7, 1944, and U.S. Fifth Fleet forces under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance accelerated preparations to capture Eniwetok Atoll as part of an overall plan approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943. The plan called for the seizure of key islands


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in the Marianas as bases to support a strategic bombing campaign against Japan and for selected attacks to support the South Pacific forces of General Douglas MacArthur. To cover the Eniwetok landings, however, certain bases in the Carolines first had to be neutralized. Between February 15 and 26, 1944, B-24 Liberator bombers from Major General Willis H. Hale’s Seventh Army Air Force struck Ponape. The Eniwetok landings took place on February 17, and on that day and the next, aircraft carriers from Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 58 launched more than 30 raids on Truk, which served as the major forward Japanese fleet anchorage and base in the Central Pacific. Each of the raids included at least 150 planes, and, together, they destroyed more than 250 Japanese aircraft and some 200,000 tons of ships, including 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 2 submarine tenders, 1 aircraft ferry, 6 tankers, and 17 merchant ships. Eniwetok fell on February 22, and Mitscher’s airmen carried out more attacks on Truk on April 29–30. Those attacks, combined with significant shore bombardment by Spruance’s battleships, destroyed another 100 Japanese planes. The cumulative effect was so great that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to bypass Truk and move westward, isolating the substantial Japanese garrison there. Between June and August, U.S. forces fought the Battle of the Philippine Sea and seized Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas, then continued west to attack the Philippines. To cover the initial Philippine landings on Mindanao and Morotai, U.S. planners intended to capture both Peleliu and Yap in the Carolines for use as air bases and forward staging areas. Those plans changed, however, following the September 1944 raids on the Philippines by Mitscher’s Task Force 38 of Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet. Halsey found Japanese defenses so weak that he recommended bypassing Morotai, Mindanao, Yap, and Peleliu and moving ahead with the attack on Leyte in October. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed but decided to launch the landings on Peleliu and Morotai anyway, because the troops for those attacks were already embarked. Morotai fell on September 15, the same day that U.S. Marines of the 1st Division landed on Peleliu and began one of the most grueling and perhaps unnecessary campaigns of the war. For the first time, the Japanese chose not to defend the beaches of an island under assault. Instead, the 5,300 defenders burrowed into the coral and prepared a main line of defense well inland. They counterattacked frequently; made use of underground tunnels, bunkers, and caves; and fought a battle of attrition in heat that sometimes reached more than 120 degrees Fahrenheit. By the time the Peleliu Campaign ended on November 25, more than 1,950 U.S. troops had been killed, and a regiment of the Army’s 81st Division had been brought in as reinforcements. Whether the island needed to be taken and whether it materially aided the capture of the Philippines is extremely doubtful.

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U.S. Marines observe 8,000 lb. of tetrytol exploding off Peleliu Island, marking the conclusion of a U.S. Navy underwater demolition team (UDT) operation. UDTs cleared water and beachfront obstacles as a prelude to the amphibious landing at this island in the Palau group on September 15, 1944. (AP/Wide World Photos)

If Peleliu was a mistake, U.S. forces compensated by performing brilliantly throughout the rest of the Caroline Islands Campaign. A regimental combat team of the 81st Division took Ulithi Atoll on September 23, and, in less than two weeks, the U.S. Navy was utilizing its splendid large anchorage for attacks against Formosa. The rest of the 81st Division took Angaur (in Palau, near Peleliu) from 1,600 Japanese defenders on October 23, and, with that, the Caroline Islands Campaign came to a close. Although no decisive battles were fought during the campaign, it was a vital stepping stone toward victory in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and in the conquest of the Marianas and the Philippines. Ulithi became the major U.S. forward fleet anchorage for the duration of the war and played a critical role in the eventual defeat of Japan. Moreover, the strategy of island-hopping reached maturity in the Carolines, as did the evolution of the U.S. Navy’s fast-attack carrier groups and the concept of refueling and replenishing at sea. In these and other subtle ways, the campaign played an integral if underappreciated role in the final outcome of the

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war. One measure of the success of the U.S. strategy may be found in the experience of the British naval squadron that returned to raid Truk in June 1945. By then, that island had been so pummeled by U.S. attacks and its garrison so emaciated by isolation and lack of supplies that the British had no targets worthy of the name. Truk was little more than a prison for its defenders. Lance Janda See also: Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Theater; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Naval Gunfire Shore Support; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Spruance, Raymond Ames.

References Gailey, Harry A. Peleliu, 1944. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1983. Gayle, Gordon D. Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu. Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1996. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1955. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler (1884–1960) U.S. navy admiral. Born in New Brunswick, New Jersey, on October 14, 1884, Arthur Schuyler Carpenter graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1908 and was commissioned in the navy in 1910. He served in the battleship Minnesota during the Great White Fleet’s around-the-world cruise in 1908–1909. Carpenter also took part in the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. Lieutenant Carpenter commanded the destroyer Fanning in 1917, the first U.S. warship to sink a German submarine in World War I. Carpenter then commanded the destroyers Maddox during 1921–1922 and the McDonough in 1928. Carpenter was chief of staff to the Commander Destroyers in the Scouting Force 1936–1937. He commanded the cruiser Northampton during 1937–1939 and then was professor of naval science and tactics at Northwestern University until 1939. Promoted to rear admiral in December 1941, Carpenter was Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet until June 1942. Promoted to vice admiral, from September 1942 to November 1943, Carpenter commanded the Southwest Pacific Force, known as “MacArthur’s Navy,” which, in February 1943, became the Seventh Fleet. Carpenter worked hard to alleviate supply problems and oversaw naval

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operations during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 25, 1943) and Operation CARTWHEEL. From January 1944 to March 1946, Carpenter commanded the Ninth Naval District. He then retired and was promoted to full admiral. Carpenter died in Washington, D.C., on January 10, 1960. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Ancell, R. Manning, with Christine M. Miller. The Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers: The U.S. Armed Forces. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. Hoyt, Edwin P. MacArthur’s Navy: The Seventh Fleet and the Battle for the Philippines. New York: Orion, 1989.

Casablanca, Battle of (November 8, 1942) As a part of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, U.S. Navy forces commanded by Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt approached Casablanca, Morocco, to land army troops at Fédala and to suppress the area’s strong land and naval defenses. Vichy French forces present at Casablanca included the battleship Jean Bart (immobile, four of eight 15-inch guns operational) and the 2nd Light Squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Raymond Gervais de Lafond with the light cruiser Primauguet; the large destroyers Milan and Albatros; and the fleet destroyers Fougueux, L’Alcyon, Frondeur, Brestois, and Boulonnais. The French also had the sloops Commandant Delage, La Gracieuse, and La Grandière; 4 patrol boats; 11 submarines; and, under repair, 3 more destroyers. A powerful coastal battery just south of Casablanca called El Hank and smaller batteries around Fédala and Casablanca aided the defense. Hewitt’s force included Task Group (TG) 34.1 under Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen with the battleship Massachusetts and two heavy cruisers, Tuscaloosa and Wichita, screened by Destroyer Squadron 8, Wainwright, Mayrant, Rhind, and Jenkins. Their mission was to contain the French fleet in Casablanca, neutralize Jean Bart, and guard against a sortie by the other modern French battleship, Richelieu, which, along with three light cruisers and three large destroyers was based at Dakar, 1,350 miles south. TG 34.9, directly under Hewitt’s command, had the heavy cruiser Augusta; the light cruiser Brooklyn; Destroyer Squadron 26 with the Wilkes, Swanson, Ludlow, and Murphy; and Destroyer Squadron 13 with the Bristol, Woolsey, Edison, Tillman, Boyle, and Rowan. These ships were to provide fire


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support and protect the transports. TG 34.2 included the aircraft carrier Ranger, the escort carrier Suwannee, one light cruiser, and five destroyers. The landings at Fédala commenced without a preliminary bombardment in the hopes that the French would not resist. However, at 7:01 a.m., the El Hank battery opened fire and Giffen’s force replied while the Ranger’s Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers swooped down on the harbor. During a bombardment that lasted until 8:35 a.m., U.S. warships and aircraft hit the Jean Bart, jamming its operational turret, and they sank three submarines and eight commercial ships. They also damaged several other vessels. Fire from the shore batteries failed to hit the U.S. ships. The Massachusetts group had sailed beyond containment range when, at 8:15 a.m., Admiral Gervais de Lafond’s 2nd Light Squadron emerged from port and began to head northeast up the coast under the cover of smoke to attack the transports off Fédala. A Grumman F4F Wildcat aircraft spotted the French ships and alerted the Augusta and Brooklyn, which had been on the far side of the landing zone. While the U.S. warships rushed to respond to this unexpected and dangerous thrust, fighters strafed the French ships, killing or wounding many topside personnel, including Gervais de Lafond, who was wounded. At 8:25 a.m., the Milan engaged the U.S. destroyers Wilkes, Swanson, and Ludlow, causing them to retreat and hitting the Ludlow hard enough to force it from the action. The French destroyers also targeted the U.S. landing craft, sinking one and damaging another. This was the only occasion during the Second World War when U.S. landing craft came under fire from enemy warships at sea. At this point, the Augusta and Brooklyn intervened, and the French, who were just 7,000 yards from the nearest transports, turned back toward Casablanca in the hopes of drawing the U.S. cruisers within range of El Hank’s heavy guns. Meanwhile, the Massachusetts had returned and opened fire at 9:18 a.m., but smoke and equipment malfunctions made it difficult for the Americans to find targets, and neither side registered hits. Nonetheless, assuming that Giffen’s ships had the situation in hand, the Augusta and Brooklyn returned to their screening duties. Finally, at 9:40 a.m., a 16-inch shell disabled the Fougueux, and six minutes later an 8-inch round from the Tuscaloosa slammed through the Frondeur’s bridge. At 10:00 a.m., the guns at El Hank landed a 194-mm shell on the Massachusetts, but it did little damage. Shortly thereafter, the battleship narrowly dodged a spread of four torpedoes launched by the French submarine Méduse. Despite these distractions, the Massachusetts disabled the Milan before ceasing fire at 10:16 a.m. and heading west. The French destroyers Boulonnais and Brestois noted the battleship’s withdrawal and lunged toward the transports. This caused the Augusta, Brooklyn, and three destroyers to return to the fight. At 10:12 a.m., after dodging more submarine torpedoes, the Brooklyn’s rapid-firing 6-inch guns crippled the Boulonnais, forcing

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its crew to abandon ship. An 8-inch round from the Augusta penetrated the Brestois, and, at 10:20 a.m., three rounds struck the Primauguet. All this activity caused the Massachusetts to reverse course, and, at 10:30 a.m., the battleship lofted a salvo at the French from 30,000 yards. Over the next half hour, the two forces traded salvoes through smoky skies. The Albatros hit the Brooklyn, and the Primauguet hit the Massachusetts, but in each case little damage was done. At 11:03 a.m., the Massachusetts ceased fire to conserve ammunition in case the Richelieu appeared. The Tuscaloosa and Wichita, however, continued to press the French. The Boulonnais sank at 11:10 a.m., and 15 minutes later, an 8-inch shell disabled the Frondeur. At 11:28 a.m., a round from El Hank punched through the Wichita, but two minutes later a shell damaged the Primauguet’s boiler room. U.S. aircraft, meanwhile, continued to harass the French ships. At 11:40 a.m., they bombed the Primauguet and Albatros, and F4Fs circled, taking turns strafing the gravely damaged warships. At 11:46 a.m., a bomb burst alongside the Brestois and caused serious flooding. At 11:50 a.m., the Tuscaloosa and Wichita disappeared southwestward in pursuit of a rumored enemy cruiser. French sloops and a tug used the respite to rescue survivors. Their presence inspired another intervention by the Augusta and Brooklyn until 1:56 p.m., when aircraft reported that all the French ships were out of action. In fact, the Primauguet, Milan, and Albatros were heavily damaged; Fougueux and Boulonnais sank offshore; and Frondeur and Brestois limped back to port, where they capsized the next day. Only L’Alcyon remained operational. In this battle, U.S. aircraft greatly assisted their ships, while French shore batteries and submarines failed in their role as potential equalizers. One reason the battle lasted so long was because the U.S. admirals had too many jobs to perform any effectively, and they did not effectively coordinate their activities. On November 10, the final events in the naval battle for Casablanca occurred. At 10:10 a.m., three French sloops sortied to support troops defending the city, and the Augusta, with four destroyers, intervened. The Jean Bart had cleared the turret jammed two days before, and, at 11:46 a.m., the battleship opened fire from 17,500 yards. As the Augusta fled, making smoke, the Jean Bart fired eight more two-gun salvos to a distance of 29,000 yards, narrowly missing the cruiser. Then the Ranger’s aircraft appeared and dropped nine 1,000-lb. bombs; two struck and cratered the battleship’s deck. This knocked the Jean Bart out of action for good. Casablanca surrendered the next day. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Gervais de Lafond, Raymond; Hewitt, Henry Kent.

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References Caroff, Capitaine de Vaisseau. Les débarquements alliés en afrique du nord (Novembre 1942). Paris: Marine Nationale, Service historique de la Marine, 1960. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. Tomblin, Barbara Brooks. With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942–1945. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004.

CATAPULT, Operation (July 1940) British navy operation, beginning on July 3, 1940, to neutralize, seize, or, if necessary, destroy French navy warships, which British leaders feared would fall into German hands. In 1940, the French navy was the second most powerful in Europe and had many modern warships. With the defeat of France and the German capture of its Atlantic ports, a number of French warships ended up in British harbors; by July 3, these included the old battleships Courbet and Paris, a super destroyer leader, two destroyers, six torpedo boats (called light destroyers by the French), and numerous other small warships. Many more ships remained in French ports, however. When the French entered into armistice talks with the Germans, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and the War Cabinet became concerned over the final disposition of the French fleet. Although the commander of the French navy, Admiral Jean Darlan, had promised the British government that France would scuttle the fleet rather than see it fall into German hands, Britain’s leaders were not certain that would be the case. And with the threat of a German invasion of Britain looming, Churchill was determined to neutralize the French fleet. Such a dramatic action on the part of his nation would also demonstrate to the Americans that Britain was determined to continue in the war. The armistice terms did indeed allow the French government to retain control of the fleet, but it was to be disarmed, mostly at the French navy base of Toulon and also at colonial French ports. At that time, a majority of the French ships were in North Africa, at the ports of Mers-el-Kébir, Oran, Algiers, Bizerte, Alexandria, or elsewhere overseas. The almost completed and powerful battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart had escaped France and were at Dakar and Casablanca, respectively. At Mers-el-Kébir, there were the two fast battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg; the two older, modernized battleships Provence and Bretagne; the seaplane tender Commandant Teste; and some large destroyers and miscellaneous warships. Oran served as base to seven destroyers, and Algiers had six modern light cruisers. Over some opposition and at Churchill’s insistence, the War Cabinet approved Operation CATAPULT to carry out the “simultaneous seizure, control or effective

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disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet.” French naval commanders were offered a series of options: they could join Britain and continue the fight, they could sail their ships to a neutral port and be disarmed there, or they could scuttle their ships. If French commanders rejected these options, the British naval commanders were under orders to open fire and sink the French ships themselves. The plan, which unfolded on July 3, met with considerable success in those areas under British control. At Portsmouth, the British seized the old French battleship Courbet, along with other small vessels. At Plymouth, they secured the battleship Paris, two destroyers, a torpedo boat, and three sloops. There they also took the Surcouf, the world’s largest submarine. Three submarines and other craft were secured from the ports of Falmouth and Dundee. In their home ports, the British secured almost 200 small warships, including minesweepers, tugs, submarine chasers, and trawlers. The vessels were taken at a cost of three sailors killed—two British and one French. Later, 3,000 of the ships’ 12,000 officers and sailors joined the Free French. Also seized were French merchant ships and their crews. CATAPULT was also successful in the West Indies. Prolonged talks involving the British, French, and Americans led to the internment of the aircraft carrier Béarn and two light cruisers at Martinique. At Alexandria, Vice Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham negotiated with Vice Admiral René Émile Godfroy, who commanded a French squadron consisting of the rebuilt World War I–era battleship Lorraine; the heavy cruisers Duquesne, Tourville, and Suffren; the light cruiser Duguay-Trouin; three destroyers; and one submarine. In deft negotiations, Cunningham managed to secure an agreement that the French ships would be disarmed and their fuel emptied. Some of the sailors were also repatriated to France. The operation was not so effective farther west in the Mediterranean. At Mers-el-Kébir, the French refused to yield and fought a battle with Vice Admiral James Somerville’s newly formed Force H from Gibraltar. In the action, the French battleship Bretagne blew up and sank. The Provence was also badly damaged and beached itself; the battleship Dunkerque ran aground. In this battle, 1,297 French seamen died; another 351 were wounded. However, during the battle, the Strasbourg and four of the large destroyers broke free and escaped. There was also fighting at Dakar, where a small British squadron built around the tiny aircraft carrier Hermes damaged the battleship Richelieu on July 8. Because of CATAPULT, the Vichy French government severed diplomatic relations with Britain. The German government also lifted demobilization requirements for the French fleet and elements of its air force, and the French then mounted several largely ineffectual air strikes against Gibraltar. On July 26, London declared a blockade of metropolitan France and French North Africa, although it was never heavily enforced.

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Those who had opposed CATAPULT believed it would drive a wedge between the two former allies; they also expected France to honor its pledge to Britain to scuttle the fleet if necessary. In these beliefs, they were quite correct. Despite their sharp animosity toward Britain for launching CATAPULT—an animosity that lingers to this day—the French honored their pledge. In November 1942, following the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH), the French scuttled their ships when the Germans tried to secure them at Toulon. Operation CATAPULT was one of the most tragic aspects of the war. Jack Greene See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Dakar, Attack on; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Godfroy, René Émile; Great Britain, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes.

References Huan, Claude. Mers-El Kébir: La rupture franco-britannique. Paris: Economica, 1994. Marder, Arthur. From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1974. Tute, Warren. The Deadly Stroke. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973.

Cavagnari, Domenico (1876–1966) Italian navy admiral, chief of the naval staff, and undersecretary of the navy from 1934 until relieved of these positions by Italian leader Benito Mussolini in November 1940. Born on July 20, 1876, at Genoa, Italy, Domenico Cavagnari graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1895 and served as a destroyer captain in World War I. From 1929 to 1932, he was the commandant of the Naval Academy in Livorno. As undersecretary of the navy and naval chief of staff, Cavagnari presided over the navy’s expansion, although budget shortfalls and air force opposition defeated his plans to include small aircraft carriers in the 1934 and 1936 programs. He believed that Italy would be unable to keep pace with Great Britain in a naval war of attrition and espoused the theory of the “fleet in being” as a low-risk means for Italy to assert sea power in the face of a superior enemy. France had long been the Italian navy’s presumptive regional rival, but from March 1935, Admiral Cavagnari began to focus on Great Britain as a more likely Mediterranean threat. He proposed developing a large Italian oceanic fleet to deal with that threat, although Mussolini refused to consider the concept. The Italian navy embarked on more modest building and rebuilding projects focused on capital ships. The May 1939 Friedrichshaven summit confirming the Pact of Steel left Cavagnari skeptical of the practical benefits of a naval alliance with Germany.

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Italy’s entry into World War II in June 1940 found the country with a navy that was well positioned to disrupt British movements in the Mediterranean. Cavagnari, however, failed to deploy his forces decisively, which effectively gave an initially weaker Royal Navy opportunities to regroup and build to strength. The November 11, 1940, torpedo attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto by Royal Navy carrier aircraft clearly demonstrated the power of naval aviation; it temporarily crippled the Italian battle line and cast into doubt the credibility of the fleet in being imperative. Mussolini relieved Cavagnari of his dual command in December 1940, and the admiral retired in 1942. He died in Rome on November 2, 1966. Gordon E. Hogg See also: Italy, Navy; Taranto, Attack on.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Mallett, Robert. The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940. London: Cass, 1998.

Central Pacific Campaign The U.S. Navy’s overarching strategy for defeating the Japanese by making a thrust through the Central Pacific had its roots in a long-standing concept for a maritime war with Japan. War Plan Orange dated to 1898, and, though modified many times, the basic scheme remained consistent. Plan Orange called for marshaling the main battle fleet in the eastern Pacific, then steaming to the Philippines, where a decisive Mahanian-style battle fleet engagement would occur. Simultaneously, the navy would relieve the beleaguered Philippine army garrison. Faced with catastrophic defeat and total U.S. command of the sea, Japan would presumably surrender. The successful Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor completely disrupted Plan Orange and the Central Pacific thrust. With all Pacific Fleet battleships sunk or damaged and only five aircraft carriers available in the Pacific, the navy was in no condition to execute Plan Orange, defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy in a decisive battle for command of the sea, or even reinforce or evacuate the Philippine defenders. Consequently, for almost two years, the navy engaged in peripheral operations against the Japanese defensive perimeter, supporting the Marines and the army in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea and repelling Japanese main strike forces at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. By mid-1943, with Essex-class fleet carriers coming on line from the TwoOcean Naval Expansion Act of 1940 and fast battleships of the North Carolina and


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South Dakota classes for antiaircraft support and shore bombardment, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, stood ready to launch the Central Pacific assault against the Japanese Empire. The dual-pronged Pacific strategy that emerged in 1943 represented a compromise between the services. The ABC Conference (between Britain, Canada, and the United States in March 1941) established Pacific operational areas, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconfirmed in March 1942. The agreement gave the navy operational control over the Central and South Pacific areas; the army had responsibility for the southwest Pacific. The army area commander, General Douglas MacArthur, advocated an advance up the New Guinea coast along the New Guinea–Mindanao axis to isolate the Japanese base at Rabaul and drive to the Philippines. The navy, meanwhile, pressed for a Central Pacific thrust. In March 1943, the Joint Chiefs agreed on a compromise plan whereby both services would advance along their preferred routes while simultaneously supporting each other. The results of this dual-pronged strategy formed from compromise were devastating for Imperial Japan. To face two simultaneous threats, the Japanese, unable to concentrate against a single-threat axis, had to stretch their air, naval, and ground forces perilously thin. By adopting a leap-frogging operational mode in both the Central and southwest Pacific, U.S. forces could attack strategic points, such as islands with airfields, while simply bypassing and isolating large Japanese garrisons, such as Truk and Rabaul. These latter then withered on the vine. Another component of the Central Pacific strategy was the submarine offensive against Japanese shipping. This offensive further reduced Japan’s capability to reinforce and sustain isolated garrisons as U.S. forces advanced key island by key island, beginning with Operation GALVANIC against the Gilbert Islands in November 1943. In the interwar years, the U.S. Marine Corps had made great strides in amphibious operations, and Guadalcanal had been a useful test of amphibious doctrine. Nimitz and his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, had originally conceived of the first thrust going against the Marshall Islands; however, the Gilberts were closer to Hawaii and within range of land-based air cover. The Central Pacific thrust offered a number of advantages. The many islands and atolls provided a target-rich environment that prevented the Japanese from determining the precise route of advance and forced them to defend all points. The size of the islands and atolls discouraged the establishment of large garrisons. The long distances between islands mitigated mutual support, and U.S. carrier air power inhibited supply and reinforcement. Further, the line of communications from Pearl Harbor and the mainland United States would be shorter than that to the southwest Pacific. The Central Pacific also offered a more healthful climate than the jungles of New Guinea. And an advance through the Central Pacific would cut off and isolate Japanese forces in the South Pacific.

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There were, of course, some disadvantages to a Central Pacific thrust. These necessitated the defeat of the main Japanese battle fleet (which occurred in the Battle of Midway) and included the requirement for overwhelming naval and air superiority, which could not be achieved until late 1943. The U.S. plan would also rely on successful amphibious operations, which had not been totally proven. Operation GALVANIC commenced in late autumn 1943 with landings on Tarawa Atoll (the primary objective being Betio, with its airfield) and Makin Atoll. The joint army, navy, and marine force employed overpowering numbers, with more than 200 ships and 35,000 troops under Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of V Amphibious Force. Task Forces 52 and 53 assaulted the atolls on November 20, 1943. Six fleet carriers and five light carriers, escorted by six battleships, provided overwhelming firepower, naval gunfire support, and air cover. Additionally, several hundred army, navy, and marine aircraft participated from the base at Ellice Island. Despite Japanese air attacks from the Marshalls, the air threat proved negligible. On Tarawa, strong fortifications, bunkers, hidden obstacles, and barbed wire slowed the advance—a prelude to future Japanese defensive schemes—and with orders to fight to the last man, the garrison staunchly resisted. Very few Japanese survived, another indicator of the bitter struggle unfolding in the Central Pacific Campaign. U.S. forces suffered a 17 percent casualty rate and encountered other problems as well, including faulty beach and surf intelligence, the inability of landing craft to negotiate shallow atoll waters, inadequate landing craft, too little advance shore bombardment, and poor communications. The Gilberts experience provided many valuable lessons for the U.S. Navy and Marines on how to conduct future operations. The Marshall Islands were next. Despite a dearth of transports, Operation FLINTLOCK finally commenced on January 31, 1944. Eniwetok and Kwajalein (the world’s largest coral atoll) succumbed to overwhelming force and the pounding from Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force 58. The Americans had learned from the Gilberts experience, and casualties among the assaulting forces were much lighter. With the capture of the Marshalls by March, 10 weeks ahead of the established timetable, the navy bypassed several heavily fortified Japanese-held islands and turned its attention to the Mariana Archipelago. The assault on the Marianas, Operation FORAGER, aimed at taking Guam, Saipan, and Tinian Islands. From these bases, the Japanese home islands would be within striking distance of the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers. The assault on Saipan commenced on June 13, 1944, with landings on June 16. Determined to halt the advance by interdicting the supporting naval forces, Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo mounted an assault on the Americans in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. However, the assault, which commenced on June 19, turned into disaster as the better-trained and better-equipped U.S. Navy pilots decimated the inexperienced Japanese airmen in what came to be called the “great Marianas turkey shoot.”


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Ozawa lost 325 of 375 attacking aircraft; Japanese naval airpower disappeared in a day, never to play any significant role in the war thereafter except in desperate suicide attacks in the last months. Saipan was taken by July 13. The Marines landed on Tinian on July 24 and secured it on August 2. Guam, the last of the major islands, was struck on July 21 and was finally declared secured on August 10. With the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese defensive perimeter had been decisively breached. U.S. strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands now began in earnest and ended in the atomic bomb attacks launched from Tinian a year later. From the Marianas, the two prongs of the Pacific strategy came together again with the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944. Tenacious Japanese defenders and their fortifications did cause heavy U.S. casualties, and the difficulties inherent in staging such massive invasion efforts presented formidable challenges to U.S. operations. Nonetheless, the Central Pacific Campaign succeeded decisively. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s hitherto deadly air arm had been utterly destroyed, and the stage was set for the final Allied thrust through the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and on toward the Japanese home islands. Stanley D. M. Carpenter

The U.S. Navy light aircraft carrier Belleau Wood (CVL-24) afire astern after being hit by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft off the Philippines on October 30, 1944. As some deck crewmen fight the fire, others move Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers away from the flames. In the background, another carrier is also afire from a kamikaze hit. (U.S. Navy)

See also: Amphibious Warfare; DETACHMENT, Operation; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Ozawa Jisaburo; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rainbow Plans; Southwest Pacific Theater; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly; TwoOcean Navy Program.

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References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Harries, Meirion, and Susie Harries. Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House, 1991. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1985. Van de Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945. New York: Touchstone, 1991.

CERBERUS, Operation (the “Channel Dash”) Passage of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen through the English Channel from Brest, France, to Wilhelmshaven, Germany, in February 1942. In March 1941, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had arrived at Brest, on the French Atlantic coast, after a commerce-raiding voyage, and they were joined by the Prinz Eugen in June 1941. Though vulnerable to British bombing, the ships constituted a standing threat to Allied convoys in the Atlantic. However, by late 1941, Adolf Hitler was convinced that the British were planning to invade Norway, and, against the advice of his naval commanders, he demanded that the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen return to Germany for deployment in Norwegian waters. In early 1942, when British intelligence strongly suggested a possible German breakout and passage through the Straits of Dover, preparations for aerial and naval attacks, already underway for nearly a year, were accelerated. The British assumed that the German ships would transit the narrowest part of the channel at night, but the Germans planned Operation CERBERUS to conceal the ships’ departure from Brest and to run the straits in daylight, counting on surprise to prevent a timely British concentration of adequate resistance. Exceptional cooperation between German naval and air commands combined with failures in British technology and communications brought the Germans almost complete success. At 10:45 p.m. on February 11, the three big ships and an escort of six destroyers, with Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax commanding, cleared Brest harbor. Not until 11:09 a.m. on February 12, when the Germans were less than an hour from the straits and had been reinforced by torpedo boat squadrons from French ports, did the British identify the ships. By noon, the German ships were in the Dover narrows, and, although attacked by British coastal artillery, torpedo boats, and the Fleet Air Arm, they passed through unscathed. Later attacks along the Belgian and Dutch coasts by destroyers and by Royal Air Force fighters and

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bombers were no more successful. Although the Gneisenau struck one mine and the Scharnhorst hit two (the second one seriously slowing it and separating it from the rest of the flotilla), all the German ships were safely in the Elbe estuary by 10:30 a.m. on February 13. Amid German euphoria and British humiliation, thoughtful minds on both sides realized that this German tactical success in the channel represented a self-inflicted strategic defeat in the Atlantic. Even the sense of victory was short-lived, for the mine damage to the Scharnhorst took six months to repair, the Prinz Eugen was torpedoed on February 23 by a British submarine in the North Sea, and the Gneisenau was irreparably damaged during air raids on Kiel on February 26–27. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Kemp, Peter. The Escape of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975. Robertson, Terence. Channel Dash. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958. Van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Channel Islands Campaign (June 1944–May 1945) The Channel Islands were the only British territory occupied by Germany in World War II. Germany fortified and equipped them with powerful coastal artillery emplacements as part of the “Atlantic Wall.” After the Allies invaded Normandy, the 26,100-man German garrison—which included the 319th Infantry Division and assorted coastal artillery, air force, navy, construction and supply personnel— remained in place. The decision to hold the islands rather than evacuate led to a miniature naval war far behind the front lines that lasted nearly a year until the defeat of the Nazi regime in May 1945. In the Gulf of St. Malo, the German navy deployed the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla with seven 775-ton M-class minesweepers; the 46th Minesweeper Flotilla of converted trawlers numbered sequentially M4600 through M4628; and the 2nd Patrol Boat Flotilla of converted trawlers numbered V201 through V216. Following the Normandy landings, German convoys sailed nearly every night throughout June, rushing supplies into the islands and evacuating construction workers and concentration camp inmates.

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Allied forces patrolled across the English Channel to suppress this German traffic. On the night of June 13, the Polish destroyer Piorun and the British destroyer Ashanti attacked six German minesweepers of the 24th Flotilla along with assorted V-boats escorting a convoy from St. Malo. They sank the M343 and damaged the M412, M422, M432, M442, and M452. On June 15, the Canadian 65th Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) Flotilla intercepted a convoy of two M-class minesweepers, three trawlers, and two merchantmen and torpedoed the M133. On June 22, four boats of the Canadian 65th Flotilla, along with four MTBs of the Royal Navy’s 52nd Flotilla, conducted a sweep off Jersey. The 65th came upon a German convoy consisting of a minesweeper, a pair of armed trawlers, and the merchant ship Hydra. They sank the Hydra, but the MTB-745 was severely damaged in the exchange. On the night of June 26, the 52nd Flotilla had better luck off Jersey, sinking the M4620. The Germans won a rare victory the next night when the large Tribal-class destroyers Eskimo and Huron intercepted the M4611 and two patrol boats. The destroyers set the M4611 ablaze, but the V213, a 282-ton ex-fishing boat, put an 88-mm shell into the Eskimo’s number one boiler room and a 37-mm round pierced the main steam line. The Eskimo was reduced to steaming in circles at six knots before eventually making it back to Plymouth. On the night of July 3, the 65th Flotilla ambushed a convoy sailing from Jersey to St. Malo and torpedoed the V210, V208, and the tug Minotaure. The MTB748 was damaged. On the night of July 7, the destroyers Huron and Tartar sank the M4605 and M4601. On July 25, the Americans broke the German lines in Normandy around St. Lô and raced into Brittany. On the night of August 6, the surviving units of the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla, the M-412, M-432, M-442, and M-452, evacuated St. Malo in the face of the advancing Americans. An Allied force of two destroyers and MTBs intercepted the Germans off Jersey but could not prevent the 24th from fighting its way through to St. Hélier, Jersey. The Allies proceeded to quarantine the Channel Islands, and, after August 2, this became the responsibility of the United States Navy. The Americans teamed destroyer escorts with PT Squadrons 30 and 34 operating out of Cherbourg and began to patrol around the islands every night. On August 9, the U.S. destroyer escort Maloy with five PT boats encountered six trawlers of the 46th Flotilla. The Germans emerged from this scrap intact, while PT-509 was sunk. On August 11, the destroyer escort Borum supporting two PT boats attacked two ships of the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla off Jersey without result. On the night of August 13, the British destroyers Onslaught and Saumarez with the Borum and two U.S. and two British MTBs engaged four ships of the 24th Flotilla and a merchant vessel off St. Peter Port, Guernsey. The minesweepers inflicted slight damage and some casualties on the destroyers and suffered light damage in

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return. On August 19, Allied forces intercepted an interisland convoy escorted by the 24th Flotilla and heavily damaged a minesweeper. After this action, as the U.S. Army liberated Brittany, the 24th and 46th Flotillas kept largely to port while the U.S. Navy discontinued offensive patrols. As autumn passed into winter, supplies began to run low in the Channel Islands, and the civilian population faced starvation. The German naval commander decided to raid the mainland to obtain food and coal. By coincidence, the Allies were shipping coal to the nearby port of Granville on the Cotentin Peninsula, which had good rail connections to Paris. On the night of March 8, 1945, a small fleet consisting of the M-412, M-432, M-442, M-452, a tug, three artillery lighters, three fast launches, and a pair of armed trawlers sailed from St. Hélier. They encountered and badly damaged the U.S. submarine-chaser PC-564 outside of Granville. The Germans then stormed ashore. Everything went as planned except that the M-412 grounded on a mud bank in the outer harbor. At 3:00 a.m., the Germans retired with one collier loaded with coal. There was no time to salvage the M-412, however, and the crew blew up that ship. The German ships then returned to St. Hélier. On May 8, 1945, following the collapse of the Nazi regime, the British destroyer Bulldog approached Guernsey to demand the island’s immediate surrender. An emissary sailed out on a rusty and battered minesweeper and told the destroyer to move away. Facing 12-inch coastal guns, the British destroyer complied and did not receive the surrender until the next day. It was clear that the German defenders of the Channel Islands believed they had never been defeated. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Brittany, Battle of; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Cruickshank, Charles. The German Occupation of the Channel Islands. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. O’Hara, Vincent P. “Defiant Until the End.” World War II (May 2005), pp. 42–48.

China, Navy In the 1920s, Germany assisted the Guomindang (Nationalist) government of China in establishing a naval academy at Mamei in Fujian (Fukien) Province, and in 1927, the Nationalist leaders also set up the Chinese Naval General Headquarters. However, the vast bulk of the country’s resources went into the army and air forces. When war with Japan began in July 1937, the Nationalist navy consisted of a few old gunboats, some small coastal vessels, and river craft. The navy also maintained

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a few naval stations inland on the major rivers and a facility that manufactured mines and naval explosives. The Japanese quickly destroyed the larger Chinese naval craft during and after the August 1937 Battle of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. Nonetheless, throughout the war, elements of the Chinese navy conducted raids against Japanese ships and shore bases in China. In early 1942, the U.S. Navy sent to China a small detachment known as the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (or the “Rice Paddy Navy”) under the joint command of Nationalist General Dai Li (Tai Li) and U.S. navy Captain Milton E. Miles. Its mission was to establish and man weather stations and communications facilities, gather intelligence, and conduct sabotage and guerrilla operations in the coastal areas and along the inland rivers of China. In 1943, Miles was promoted to commodore and assigned as commander, Naval Group China. At the end of the war, there was a significant interservice battle over the type of navy China should maintain, who would control it, and how it would be equipped. Disputes slowed the effort to build a postwar Nationalist navy. In any case, however, Nationalist leaders did not see maritime forces as critical in the coming battle with the Communists. J. G. D. Babb See also: Miles, Milton Edward.

References Liu, F. F. A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956. Miles, Milton E. A Different Kind of War: The Little Known Story of the Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Tolley, Kemp. Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971.

Christie, Ralph Waldo (1893–1987) U.S. navy admiral and commander of submarines in the South Pacific. Born at Somerville, Massachusetts, on August 30, 1893, Ralph Waldo Christie graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1915. Eight years later, he obtained a master of science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). On entering the navy, Christie specialized in the submarine service and torpedoes, commanding individual submarines in 1919, 1920, 1923, and 1924 and pursuing research at MIT that contributed to the development of the trouble-prone magnetic torpedo exploder.

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From 1939 to 1940, Christie commanded Submarine Division 15, before moving to Brisbane, Australia, to take charge of Submarine Squadron 20, which he commanded from late 1940 to 1942. In November 1942, Christie was promoted to rear admiral, and in April 1943, he became commander of submarines in the South Pacific, operating out of Perth and Fremantle in Western Australia. Christie’s forces made extensive use of ULTRA and MAGIC code-breaking intelligence material, gathered from code-breaking and radio direction–finding technology used against Japanese vessels, and succeeded in interdicting Japan’s capacity to control its conquered Pacific territories and maintain an operational seagoing navy. Despite Christie’s obvious talents and achievements as a submarine commander, he clashed repeatedly with the Seventh Fleet commander, Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, over management of his force; among other things, Christie pushed for decorations for his men and had a habit of awarding them at dockside. Another problem was the number of casualties that resulted from his aggressive tactics. These difficulties caused Kinkaid to replace him in February 1945. Christie’s subsequent commands included the Puget Sound Navy Yard, between 1945 and 1948, and the U.S. naval forces based in the Philippines. He retired in August 1949 as a vice admiral. Christie died in Honolulu, Hawaii, on December 19, 1987. Priscilla Roberts See also: Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States, Navy.

References Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1975. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Wheeler, Gerald E. Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1995.

Ciliax, Otto (1891–1964) German navy admiral. Otto Ciliax was born in Gotha-Neudietendorf, Germany, on October 30, 1891. He entered the German navy in 1910 and served in submarines during World War I. After the war, he continued in the navy and held various posts. During the Spanish Civil War, he commanded the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and in 1938 also briefly filled the post of senior officer of the naval forces in Spain.

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At the outbreak of World War II, Captain Ciliax commanded the battleship Scharnhorst. Promoted to rear admiral on November 1, 1939, he was appointed chief of staff of Navy Group West at Wilhelmshaven. He then commanded the German battleships between June 1941 and June 1942, until this post was disbanded. In the high point of his World War II service, in February 1942 Vice Admiral Ciliax, flying his flag in the Scharnorst, had charge of Operation CERBERUS, more widely known as the Channel Dash. Against the advice of German navy commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered that the battleships Scharnhorst and its sister Gneisenau be returned to Germany along with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. The three capital ships departed Brest, France, on the night of February 11, and, escorted by 6 destroyers and 14 torpedo boats, made it safely through the English Channel to Wilhelmshaven and the Elbe River estuary on February 13 in what proved a great embarrassment to the British. During March 1943 to April 1945, Admiral Ciliax was commander of German naval forces in Norway. Ciliax died at Lübeck-Travemünde on December 12, 1964. Spencer C. Tucker See Also: CERBERUS, Operation; Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Doubleday, 1975. Hildebrand, Hans H., and Ernest Henriot. Deutschlands Generale und Admirale Teil 1: Deutschlands Admirale 1849–1945 Band 1. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio-Verlag, 1988. Patzwalt, Klaus D., and Veit Scherzer. Das Deutsche Kreuz 1941–1945: Geschichte und Inhaber Band II. Norderstedt, Germany: Verlag Klaus D. Patzwalt, 2001. Rohwer, Jürgen, and Gerhard Hummelchen. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945. 2 vols. London: Allen, 1972–1974. Witthöft, Hans Jürgen. Lexikon zur Deutschen Marinegeschichte. Herford, Germany: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977.

CLAYMORE, Operation (Lofoten Islands Raid, March 4, 1941) Allied raid against the Norwegian Lofoten Islands some 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The raid involved the Royal Navy troop ships Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix transporting some 1,000 men of No. 3 and No. 4 Commando, with a naval escort of five destroyers. The ships departed Scapa Flow on February 21, 1941; proceeded to the Faroe Islands for training; and left there on March 1. The primary target of the raid was the Norwegian fish oil factories, the destruction of which would adversely affect German glycerine production for munitions.

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British commandos return from a successful raid on the German-held Lofoten Islands, Norway, on March 3, 1945, leaving behind smoking oil tanks. The raid, codenamed Operation CLAYMORE, was a complete success. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Despite the ships having been spotted by a German aircraft in their approach, surprise was complete. During the March 4 raid, 11 factories, 800,000 gallons of oil, and five ships in harbor were destroyed. A total of 225 Germans and 60 Norwegian collaborators were taken prisoner, and 314 Norwegians volunteering to join their government’s forces in exile were taken to Britain. In addition, the raiders secured from a German trawler a set of spare rotors for an Enigma coding machine, which were sent to Bletchley Park to assist British code breakers. There were no British losses. The success of the raid was a fillip to British morale, which had been badly shaken by a series of military reverses. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Scapa Flow; Signals Intelligence.

References Dunford-Slater, John. Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991 [Reprint of London: William Kimber, 1953].

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Ladd, James D. Commandos and Rangers of World War 2. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978. Messenger, Charles. Commandos 1940–1946. London: William Kimber, 1985. Miles, G. The Epic of Lofoten. London: Hutchinson, 1941.

Cockleshell Heroes (December 6–12, 1942) British commandos who, on December 11–12, 1942, attacked German ships in the Gironde River at Bordeaux, France. The commandos had been organized under the cover name of Boom Patrol Detachment. Following intensive training, they set sail to execute Operation FRANKTON (popularly known as Operation COCKLESHELL). The plan had been developed at the headquarters of Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, chief of Combined Operations. It called for the launching of six two-man, collapsible canoes on a moonless night off the Gironde estuary in an effort to destroy up to 12 German merchant ships. December had been chosen because the longer nights of winter would give greater cover to the raiders. On the night of December 6, the party of 12 Royal Marines under Major Herbert G. “Blondie” Hasler arrived in the Bay of Biscay off the Gironde on board the British submarine Tuna. Their mission was to paddle the canoes, known as Cockle Mark IIs, nearly 100 miles from their launch point up the Gironde to Bordeaux and there destroy the German merchant ships with mines. The commandos were then to make their way home via Spain on foot. Bad weather delayed the commando launch until the night of December 7, and an even more serious setback occurred when one canoe was damaged in launching and had to be scrubbed. The remaining five successfully launched and then set out for the mouth of the Gironde. Then one of the boats capsized, and its two men were drowned. Now only four canoes and eight men remained. The Gironde’s tidal races caused another canoe to become separated. It was spotted by Germans ashore, and its crewmen were captured. Although the two men were in uniform, they were brutally interrogated (they revealed nothing) and were executed at Bordeaux early on December 13 by a firing squad acting under German chancellor Adolf Hitler’s infamous Commando Order. Another canoe sank after hitting an underwater obstacle as it neared Bordeaux. While making their way to Spain, the two men from this boat were betrayed to the Gestapo at La Reole. Taken to Paris, they were executed there on or about March 23, 1943. The men in the last two canoes—the first containing Hasler and Marine William Sparks and the second with Corporal A. F. Laver and Marine W. H. Mills— paddled the 91 miles to Bordeaux at night (going ashore and sleeping during the day) in cold and wet conditions. Finally reaching their target, they set timedelay limpet mines on four cargo ships and a small tanker during the night of

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December 11–12. When the mines exploded the next morning, the ships flooded and sank; a German minesweeping vessel was also badly damaged. None of the ships again saw service in the war. After setting the mines, Hasler, Sparks, Laver, and Mills paddled to the riverbank, scuttled their canoes, and split up to attempt the trip to Spain and safety. Laver and Mills made for Ruffec but were betrayed to the Germans by French police at Montieu. They were shot in Paris on or about March 23, 1943. Hasler and Sparks walked 100 miles northeast to make contact with the French Resistance at Ruffec. From there, Resistance members led them across France to the Spanish border, from whence they made their way to Gibraltar. They were the only members to survive the operation, arriving in Britain in April 1943. Hasler was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Sparks the Distinguished Service Medal. The story was commemorated in a 1955 film titled The Cockleshell Heroes. A. J. L. Waskey See also: Great Britain, Navy; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas.

References Phillips, C. E. Lucas. Cockleshell Heroes. London: Heinemann, 1956. Southby-Tailyour, Ewen. Blondie: A Life of Herbert George Hasler—Cockleshell Hero, Navigator and Inventor Extraordinary. London: Leo Cooper, 1998. Sparks, William, and Michael Munn. The Last of the Cockleshell Heroes: A World War Two Memoir. 3rd ed. London: Leo Cooper, 1995.

Commerce Raiders, Surface, German Germany entered World War II with a navy ill-equipped for waging war against a major naval power. The head of the German navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, supported by Adolf Hitler, had planned to build a powerful surface fleet of capital ships to challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. War came too early for this “Z Plan,” however. When the war began in September 1939, Raeder recognized that his navy was inadequate for the task ahead, stating that it “would be able to do little more than show that it could die courageously.” Lacking the ability to challenge the British and French in a general engagement, the German navy fell back on the experience of World War I as Raeder sought to wage a war to destroy British commerce. He recognized that surface raiders patrolling the oceans and sinking ships in an irregular manner could in no way serve as a distant blockade of Great Britain. Instead, he hoped that they would force the dispersion of Allied naval forces from more

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important theaters and wear down a large part of the Allied naval strength through the need to escort convoys and form task groups to hunt down elusive raiders. Raeder had sent the pocket battleships Deutschland and Admiral Graf Spee to sea in mid-August 1939. However, valuable time was lost, as Hitler’s reluctance to make the first hostile move against Britain meant that the ships were not authorized to begin operations until September 26. The two German capital ships initially met Raeder’s expectations, sinking numerous merchant ships and, by October, forcing the Allies to employ a force of 3 carriers, 3 battleships, and 15 cruisers in task groups to hunt for—or to provide strengthened convoy escorts against—these two German ships. The threat did not last long, however, because Germany’s strategic position prior to June 1940 precluded easy transit and resupply of the ships. In November 1939, the Deutschland returned to Germany, and the Graf Spee met its demise in the Río de la Plata in South America in December 1939. In late 1940 and early 1941, the Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper made productive raiding sorties in which they accounted for 144,000 tons of shipping, while the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had a highly successful two-month foray into the Atlantic in February and March, sinking 115,000 tons. However, the destruction of the battleship Bismarck in May 1941 near the beginning of another foray led Hitler to restrict the use of his capital ships so that, by 1943, they rarely ventured to sea. Beginning in 1940, the Germans deployed another type of ship, the armed merchant cruiser (AMC), for commerce raiding. They eventually fielded nine AMCs, known in German as Hilfskreuzers. Made to look innocuous, the AMCs were capable of rapidly changing their profile to confuse prey and hunter alike; in essence, they were stealth ships. Freighters best served this purpose, because they possessed the holds needed to store supplies for long cruises and could mount six 150-cm guns. From 1940 through early 1943, these nine armed merchant raiders operated at sea, mainly in distant waters, where many unescorted Allied merchant vessels were still to be found. The German AMCs initially proved elusive, and, by the end of 1940, they had sunk 54 Allied vessels totaling 366,644 tons; they also forced the British to devote a significant portion of their naval assets to the effort to hunt them down. However, as the war dragged on, Allied intercepts of German radio communications led to the sinking of four of the AMCs as well as some of their supply ships. The other five AMCs reached German-controlled ports but could not slip back out through the Allied blockade. The German AMCs sank 846,321 tons of shipping, a major return for what was, after all, a relatively minor investment. This figure represented about 7.5 percent of the more than 11.3 million tons of shipping sunk by Germany in the war. The impact of the AMCs cannot be quantified by this statistic alone, however. These nine ships also disrupted shipping timetables, forced longer voyages, and delayed the arrival of desperately needed Allied war matériel. The capture of the British

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cargo ship Automoden by the AMC Atlantis, with the seizure of important British government papers, dealt a serious blow to Britain’s position in the Far East. A voyage that might normally have taken only two weeks may have extended into months because of a raider’s activities. Beyond that, the secondary and tertiary effects, combined with the efforts to eliminate the AMCs, produced results well out of proportion to the time, money, and manpower that Germany put into the program. However, as in World War I, the German navy could not take advantage of their impact, and, by the spring of 1943, no more AMCs were at sea. C. J. Horn See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Z Plan.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Zebra Books, 1974. Mohr, Ulrich, and A. V. Sellwood. Sea Raider Atlantis. Los Angeles: Pinnacle Books, 1955. Muggenthaler, August Karl. German Raiders of World War II. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Conolly, Richard Lansing (1892–1962) U.S. navy admiral who commanded forces in many of the largest amphibious operations of the war. Born in Waukegan, Illinois, on April 26, 1892, Richard Lansing Conolly was commissioned in the navy on his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1914. He served in destroyers in the Atlantic, winning the Navy Cross for his part in rescuing a transport vessel damaged by a German submarine attack. Between the wars, Conolly earned a master of science degree at Columbia University, served as an instructor at the Naval Academy, and captained several destroyers. From 1939 to 1942, Conolly served in the Pacific theater, successively commanding 6th and 7th Destroyer Squadrons and providing the destroyer screen for the April 1942 raid on Tokyo. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1942, he spent several months on the staff of the chief of naval operations and commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. From March to October 1943, Conolly served with the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force and took part in the invasions of Sicily, where he earned the nickname “Close-in Conolly” for the naval fire support his ships provided the ground forces. That September, he commanded the amphibious component that landed the British 46th Division at Salerno, Italy. Again, he used his destroyers and cruisers to provide close gunfire support.

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Conolly then transferred to the Pacific, using his amphibious landing expertise in operations at Kwajalein, Wake, and Marcus Islands. In 1944 and 1945, he commanded Group 3 of the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force, leading the July 1944 landing on Guam and the January 1945 landing on Lingayen Gulf (Leyte), and Okinawa. He participated in six of the seven largest amphibious operations of World War II, missing only Normandy. Conolly was the U.S. naval representative at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. Promoted to full admiral, he subsequently commanded the Twelfth Fleet for four months and then U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleet from 1947 to 1950. He then spent three years at Newport, Rhode Island, as president of the Naval War College. Conolly retired in November 1953 to become president of Long Island University, where he remained until he and his wife died in a commercial air crash at La Guardia Airport in New York, on March 1, 1962. Priscilla Roberts See also: Amphibious Warfare; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of.

References Barbey, Daniel E. MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1969. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953.

Contre-Torpilleurs French warships, a new super-destroyer type inspired by the large destroyers built toward the end of World War I by the German, Italian, and British navies. After the war, the French saw the Italians as their principal naval rival, and, to counter the large Italian destroyers, in 1923 the French launched the first of a new class of ships, the six contre-torpilleurs of the Chacal class. These vessels were optimized for high-speed gunnery engagements in the Mediterranean, and French naval planners envisioned them acting as high-capacity scouts that could collect information about an enemy fleet while effectively screening their own battle line. Whereas most World War I destroyers were on the order of 1,000 tons displacement, the Chacal-class vessels displaced 2,400–2,500 tons normal load and 2,950–3,050 tons deep load. They were 415 ft.11 in. in overall length and 37 ft. 2 in. in beam.

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They had a main armament of five 130-mm (5.1-inch) guns and carried six 21.7inch torpedo tubes. They were capable of 35 knots. The Chacal-class ships were followed during 1928–1931 by the Guépard, Aigle, and Vauquelin classes. These three six-ship classes displaced some 2,400 tons standard load and 3,200 tons deep load and had a main armament of five 138-mm (5.5inch) guns and six to seven torpedo tubes. They were capable of 36 knots. All 18 had four funnels, a unique feature among post–World War I constructed destroyers. The six ships of the two-funnel Le Fantasque class of 1933 to 1934 were 2,569 tons standard load displacement and 3,200–3,400 tons full load. They were 434 ft. 4in. in overall length by 40 ft. 6 in. in beam. They mounted a main armament of five 5.5-inch guns and carried nine 21.7-inch torpedo tubes. These were followed by the two-ship Mogador class, launched in 1936 and 1937. They were 2,884 tons standard load displacement and 4,018 tons full load. At 45l ft. 1 in. in overall length and 41 ft. 7 in. in beam, they were capable of 39 knots. They mounted eight 5.5-inch guns in four twin turrets. This last class carried 10 torpedo tubes. All of the contre-torpilleurs also mounted antiaircraft guns, the number of which were steadily increased. The contre-torpilleurs were attractive ships, marked by fine lines. They were the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed destroyers in the world prior to World War II. During the war, the contre-torpilleurs saw more action than any other class of large French warships. They served with the Force de Raid and participated in actions against the Italians before the Armistice of June 1940. A squadron successfully fought its way out of Mers-el-Kébir during the British attack there of July 3, 1940, and a division of contre-torpilleurs defeated a British squadron in the Battle of Sidon off the coast of Syria on June 9, 1941. These ships also participated in the Battle of Dakar September 23–25, 1940, and in the Battle of Casablanca against the U.S. Navy on November 9, 1942. Four of the Le Fantasque class served with the Allies from 1943 through the end of the war. Their high speed and heavy armament made them very useful, especially for intruder missions—as on February 29, 1944, when Le Terrible and Le Malin sailed up the Adriatic Sea and destroyed a German convoy. They continued in service until the mid-1950s. Because of their size and armament, the Allies designated them as light cruisers. Only six of the contre-torpilleurs survived the war. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Cruisers; Destroyers; France, Navy.

References Carré Paul. Le Fantasque: L’odyssée de la 10e DCL. Nantes, France: Marines edition, 1994. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980.

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Jordon, John, “The contre-torpilleurs of the Le Fantasque class.” In Warship 2000–2001, edited by Antony Preston (pp. 132–145). London: Conway Maritime Press, 2000.

Convoy PQ 13, Attack on (March 29, 1942) Allied Convoy PQ 13 consisting of 19 merchantmen bound for Murmansk sailed from Reykjavik, Iceland, on March 20, 1942. On March 24, a violent gale blew up, and, by March 27, when the weather moderated, PQ 13 was completely scattered. The German Naval Group North regarded it a perfect target for surface units based in northern Norway. On March 28, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, Z26 (Kapitän zur See Gottfried Pönitz), Z24, and Z25, left Kirkenes and headed north through calm seas. At 1:43 a.m. on March 29, they sank a straggler, the Soviet freighter Bateau. However, thereafter, the weather began to deteriorate with snow showers and the wind increasing to 25 knots. Meanwhile, the escorts had collected eight merchantmen in one group and a Soviet destroyer flotilla out of Murmansk consisting of the Sokrushitelni, Gremyashchi and the British Oribi had reinforced the close escort, the destroyer Eclipse, and the trawler Paynter. The light cruiser Trinidad sailed three miles off the convoy’s starboard bow while the destroyer Fury guarded the rear approaches. At 9:46 a.m., the German flotilla unexpectedly encountered the cruiser looming out of the snow. The Trinidad’s radar had provided some forewarning; its initial salvo fell short, but the cruiser’s next broadside devastated the Z26, disabling an engine and two gun mounts and igniting a large fire. After five salvos, the Trinidad shifted target to the Z25. In reply, the German destroyers landed two shells on their adversary, causing light damage. Then they fired torpedoes and turned north. The Trinidad dodged this barrage and circled to pursue. At 9:56 a.m., radar detected the Z26. The German flagship had become separated from its flotilla and had no support as the cruiser followed the black smoke roiling from its fires. The cruiser closed to point-blank range, inflicting heavy damage in the process. At 10:22 a.m., the Trinidad launched three torpedoes to finish the job, but two failed to deploy and the third malfunctioned. The intense cold had solidified the weapon’s engine oil and it circled back and exploded against the cruiser, causing serious damage. The Z26, which could still maneuver, used the reprieve to escape, and when a destroyer appeared from the muck, it flashed its call sign, assuming the newcomer was friendly. However, it was the Eclipse. Trailing oil and faced with British radar, the Z26 was unable to break contact, and the British destroyer registered repeated hits on its crippled adversary. By 11:20 a.m., the Z26 was dead in the water and the Eclipse closed for the kill. Then the snow stopped and visibility cleared, revealing the Z24 and Z25 steaming to succor their flagship. They drove off the Eclipse, seriously damaging the

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British ship. However, it was too late for the Z26, which slowly foundered. The Z24 and Z25 returned to Kirkenes, while the Trinidad limped into Murmansk. The convoy had escaped the surface threat, but U-boats and aircraft took a toll. Of the 19 ships that left Reykjavik, 14 arrived at their destination. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Arctic Convoys; North Cape, Battle of.

References Kemp, Paul. Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. London: Arms and Armour, 1993. O’Hara, Vincent P. German Fleet at War 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

Convoy PQ 17 (June 27–July 7, 1943) Disastrous Allied Arctic convoy to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. From August 1941 through May 1945, the Western Allies sent some 4 million tons of supplies to the northern Soviet Union via the Arctic. A total of 811 ships in convoy sailed east, of which 58 were sunk. A large percentage of these losses occurred in one convoy, PQ 17. It sailed from Iceland on June 27, 1942, with 36 merchantmen protected by four corvettes, two antiaircraft ships, and four antisubmarine trawlers. At the same time, eastbound Convoy QP 13, made up of 35 merchantmen, sailed from Kola Inlet. British Rear Admiral L. H. K. Hamilton commanded a covering force to protect both convoys, consisting of two British and two U.S. heavy cruisers, plus one British and two U.S. destroyers. En route, British Commander J. E. Broome joined them with six destroyers to provide additional protection. Distant cover was provided by the Home Fleet under Admiral Sir John Tovey. He commanded a mixed British and U.S. force, consisting of 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 14 destroyers. Tovey was under strict orders to steer clear of the German airfields in northern Norway, where the Luftwaffe had massed 103 bombers, 42 torpedo bombers, 20 dive-bombers, and 89 reconnaissance aircraft to block any convoy’s passage. The Germans also had 10 U-boats on station, so their tactical reconnaissance advantage was formidable. The Allies hoped to trump this with strategic intelligence gleaned through ULTRA decrypts; however, a change in German Enigma cipher settings on July 3 led to an intelligence blackout. Political pressure from Washington and Moscow compelled leaders to insist that the convoy proceed, and it sailed blindly into a German trap. British First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound agonized over the choices of action available to him. He could not recall the convoy, and he would

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not allow the Home Fleet to close with it and risk an overwhelming German air and submarine attack. Allied intelligence also assumed that German surface units in Norway would attempt an attack. These forces consisted of the battleship Tirpitz, the pocket battleships Scheer and Lützow, the heavy cruiser Hipper, 10 fleet destroyers, and 2 oceangoing torpedo boats. Even before PQ 17 sailed, Pound informed Tovey that if he believed a German surface attack was imminent, he would order the convoy to scatter. Tovey pointed out in no uncertain terms to Pound that this was contrary to all recent British experience. In any case, at 9:00 p.m. on July 4, Pound, incorrectly assuming that the Germans’ big ships were on their way to intercept the convoy and would reach it early the next day, began sending signals ordering PQ 17 to scatter and its cruisers and fleet destroyers to withdraw toward the Home Fleet, because they were too weak to face the German squadron that he believed to be at sea. Although scattering was the logical precaution when a convoy was under surface attack, it was a suicidal move when made against aircraft and submarines. Of the 34 merchant ships still with the convoy when the order to scatter was given, only 13 reached Murmansk. The Allies had suffered one of their worst maritime defeats of the war, the tragedy of which was deepened by the fact that it need not have happened. Convoys to Murmansk were then suspended for the summer, as perpetual Arctic daylight and German strength made them untenable. James Levy See also: Arctic Convoys; Convoys, Allied; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn.

References Kemp, Peter. Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at Way, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Woodman, Richard. Arctic Convoys. London: John Murray.

Convoy QP 11, Attack on (May 1–2, 1942) Allied Convoy QP 11 with 13 ships sailed from Murmansk at the end of April 1942. Two days out of port, the U456 ambushed the convoy’s largest escort, the Edinburgh, destroying that light cruiser’s stern abaft Y turret. Within hours, Germany’s Naval Group North ordered Destroyer Group Arctic, the Z7, Z24, and Z25 under the command of Kapitän zur See Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs, to strike QP 11 and then double back to sink the cruiser, which was being towed toward Murmansk.

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On May 1, Schulze-Hinrichs found the convoy hugging the pack ice southeast of Bear Island with an escort of four old destroyers, the Bulldog, Beagle, Amazon, and Beverley; the corvettes Oxlip, Saxafrage, Campanula, and Snowflake; and the armed trawler Lord Middleton. It was very cold with intermittent visibility amid snow flurries and showers. At 2:05 p.m., the Z7 opened fire, whereupon the Amazon, Beverley, and Beagle formed up behind the Bulldog and came between the German destroyers and their target. In an exchange of gunfire from 10,000 yards, the Amazon was hit twice and severely damaged. However, fearing torpedoes, the Germans did not press this advantage. At 2:30 p.m., they tried a long-range torpedo attack that sank the Soviet freighter Tsiolkovski, while a British torpedo salvo missed. Schulze-Hinrichs probed the escort four more times, hoping to catch it out of position or to sneak up behind a snowstorm. Each time the British destroyers, feinting torpedo attacks, skillfully weaving smoke screens and maintaining an intense counterfire, drove off the larger German warships. Finally, at 5:50 p.m., Schulze-Hinrichs disengaged to go after the British cruiser. The Amazon was the only warship significantly damaged during this prolonged engagement. The Edinburgh was 250 miles east, limping toward Murmansk at two knots, escorted by the destroyers Foresight and Forester; the Soviet guard ship Rubin; and four British minesweepers, the Hussar, Harrier, Gossamer, and Niger. Rushing toward the distant enemy at 35 knots, Schulze-Hinrichs planned to attack with torpedoes from the north with the advantages of light and wind. With Edinburgh unable to maneuver, this plan seemed to guarantee success. In the Arctic, however, weather often led to strange outcomes. At 6:17 a.m. on May 2, the Z7 sighted the Edinburgh eight miles away. As the Germans approached, the cruiser cast off its towlines and, unable to maneuver, began steaming in a circle at eight knots, its best speed. At 6:34 a.m., Schulze-Hinrichs ordered his ships to turn and fire a concentrated torpedo salvo, but a snow shower descended between Z7 and the other destroyers, masking their target and leaving the German flagship to conduct the attack alone. As the Z7 aimed its tubes, the Edinburgh circled. The cruiser had no power to train its turrets, but when the destroyer crossed its line of fire, B turret opened up. Its second salvo landed two rounds that disabled the Z7’s engines. The destroyer dropped smoke floats and drifted to a stop. The Foresight and Forester then attacked the Z7, inflicting additional serious damage. The Z7 could only reply with single shots over open sights; and, although it launched four torpedoes, all missed. At 6:45 a.m., the Z24 and Z25 found their flagship and counterattacked. The Z25 disabled the Forester, hitting it five times in the space of five minutes and leaving the British ship dead in the water. The Z25 fired four torpedoes to finish the job

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as the Foresight rushed to the Forester’s aid. However, the Z25 severely damaged the Foresight as well and forced it to fall back on the Edinburgh. The Forester restored some power and slowly followed, hitting the Z25 once. Then one of the Z25’s torpedoes, which had been fired some minutes before, hit the Edinburgh and the explosion nearly broke the cruiser in two. The minesweepers had kept their distance during the action, but the flashes from their 4-inch guns gave a false impression of strength, and this caused the two operational German destroyers to disengage. At 8:15 a.m., the Z24 rescued most of the Z7’s men after they scuttled the wreck and the two surviving German warships returned to Norway. Schulze-Hinrichs had led a successful sortie, credited with sinking a cruiser (the Edinburgh was scuttled due to its damage) and a merchant ship and inflicting heavy damage on three destroyers at the cost of one of his own. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Arctic Convoys; North Cape, Battle of.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Doubleday, 1974. Pearce, Frank. Last Call for HMS Edinburgh. New York: Atheneum, 1982.

Convoys, Allied Organized groups of merchant vessels escorted by warships to defend against Axis attack. As a result of its experience in the latter stages of World War I, Britain was quick to set up the convoying of merchant vessels at the beginning of World War II. There was some initial hesitation because of the feared detrimental effect convoys could have on the efficient employment of shipping, but that changed after the liner Athena was torpedoed and sunk on September 3, 1939, indicating that Germany had commenced an unrestricted campaign of submarine warfare against merchant vessels. The first convoy—eight tankers sailing from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf via the Cape of Good Hope—actually departed on September 2 with a cruiser escort for fear of a possible Italian entry into the war. Regular east coast convoys between the Firth of Forth and the River Thames started on September 6, as did outbound transatlantic convoys from Liverpool two days later. Operational convoys were set up to cover the movement of merchant vessels chartered by the government to transport and supply the British Expeditionary Force across the English Channel. Subsequent convoys carried troops to Norway and supported operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Far East, and all the other theaters of operations.

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Lookouts on the bridge of a U.S. Navy destroyer scan the horizon for German submarines while escorting a large Atlantic convoy in 1942. (Library of Congress)

A special category of convoys included the series that carried cargo and war matériel to the Soviet Union and the smaller series that ran to resupply the island of Malta. These operations were unusual in that, in addition to the strong naval close escorts that normally covered convoys, they often also featured substantial distant cover by heavy units of the main fleet. Between August 1941 and May 1945, 42 convoys were undertaken to the northern Soviet Union, and there were 36 return convoys. A total of 835 ships sailed outbound, losing 60 of their number; 710 returned, with a loss of 37 ships. The Malta convoys included a series of major fleet operations from both the eastern and western ends of the Mediterranean to assist the passage of supplies for the island. Between November 1940 and August 1942, 82 merchant ships took part in these convoys, of which 29 were sunk, and there were substantial losses among their naval escorts as well. Trade convoys were required for regular commercial traffic on those passages most at risk of air or submarine attack. The initial series operated along the east coast, from London down the English Channel, and outbound from the west coast across the Atlantic and to Gibraltar. The east coast convoys and those to Gibraltar were escorted throughout their passage, whereas escorts accompanied those

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outbound into the Atlantic only until they were just beyond the expected operating area of German submarines. At that point, the convoy dispersed, each ship proceeding individually to its destination. Depending on their destination, some vessels might detach from an outbound convoy prior to its dispersal. Inbound convoys assembled at Halifax, Gibraltar, Freetown, and—for a short period—at Kingston, Jamaica. These convoys were escorted by cruiser or armed merchant cruisers until they reached the limit of U-boat operations, where antisubmarine escorts took over. A heavily escorted convoy series also operated between Scotland and Bergen, Norway, commencing in November 1939. The end of the so-called Phony War in May 1940, with the invasion of France and the Low Countries, brought major changes to the convoy system. The German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 abruptly ended the Norwegian convoys, and the collapse of France in June brought even more substantial changes. From French bases, German aircraft operated against shipping in the channel and far into the Atlantic, and the operational range of the U-boats increased dramatically. Convoys along the channel accommodated local traffic only, and all oceanic traffic from the east coast now sailed north around Scotland. A series of interlocking convoys provided escort for all coastal shipping. To accommodate the need for more transatlantic convoys, a second series of slower convoys originating from Sydney, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, was initiated. The increased threat of attack led to the provision of escort throughout the voyage for all convoys to and from Freetown. Finally, Italy’s entry into the war terminated all commercial traffic in the Mediterranean except for very heavily escorted operational convoys to carry supplies into Malta and local convoys in the Aegean and along coastline of the eastern Mediterranean. The dispersal point for westbound transatlantic convoys and the pickup point for escort groups meeting eastbound shipping gradually moved westward as the range of the escorts was increased. In mid-1941, the United States imposed its neutrality zone on the western Atlantic and began escorting British convoys in conjunction with Royal Canadian Navy escorts, operating from Argentina in Newfoundland. North Atlantic convoys now were escorted throughout their passage by antisubmarine vessels. The German declaration of war on the United States on December 10, 1941, brought a major westward expansion of U-boat operations against shipping. A disastrous period followed while the U.S. Navy struggled to secure the escorts and crews required to convoy the enormous volume of merchant traffic along the East Coast of the United States; it also struggled with the very concept of convoy itself. Nevertheless, by mid-1942, an elaborate and comprehensive system of interlocking convoy routes and sailings was established for the East Coast of North America and in the Caribbean. As the commander of German submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz became aware that the convoy system had been extended

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to a specific area, he shifted U-boat operations to another area where unescorted traffic still operated. Consequently, the scope of the U.S. Navy’s convoy system gradually expanded to encompass almost all traffic between Rio de Janeiro and Halifax. Landing operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean brought about some changes. Apart from the significant number of operational troop convoys, the opening of the Mediterranean introduced a series of convoy routes within that sea, and a British shortage of fuel oil also led to a series of fast tanker convoys between the Caribbean and the United Kingdom. In 1944, Allied military successes in France began to allow a gradual reduction in the scope of convoying. The reduction occurred because U-boats were forced to make more extended passages to their patrol areas as their home ports moved farther from the Atlantic and because German aircraft no longer had quick access to British coastal waters. All these trade convoys sailed at regular intervals, regardless of the number of ships waiting at the departure port. Changes in the interval or convoy cycle could be made but only after careful consideration of the impact on the efficiency of the limited escort force and on trade patterns. Efficient use of both escorts and shipping required that the employment of convoy be extended or contracted in response to perceived threat levels. Because the U-boats’ maximum surface speed was about 16 knots in ideal conditions and much less in the open ocean, ships capable of 15 knots or more sailed independently. Between November 1940 and June 1941, this minimum was lowered arbitrarily to 13 knots, and losses among vessels sailing independently almost tripled; the upper speed limit was then reinstated. For oceanic convoys, a minimum speed of 7.5 knots soon became the norm, with slower vessels obliged to proceed independently. Ships in coastal convoys, however, could be appreciably slower. To make the danger zone as a convoy passed a submarine as small as possible, the standard convoy formation, except while transiting cleared channels through minefields, was always a broad front. The most common formation had from 6 to 12 columns in the convoy, each with up to 6 ships. Some of the very large convoys that ran during the spring of 1944, when a shortage of escorts forced planners to consolidate convoys, had as many as 19 columns with 9 or 10 ships each, but this was far in excess of the normal size. Ships in each column steamed at 400-yard intervals until mid-1943, when the growing number of less experienced captains forced an increase to 600 or even 800 yards. Columns were initially spaced 600 yards apart during daylight and 1,000 yards apart at night, but scientific analysis determined that the wider spacing was preferable from a hit-statistic perspective, and later convoys standardized on the broader spacing. Early in the war, smaller convoys of no more than 35 ships were considered easier to protect, but again, analysis demonstrated that larger convoys made more efficient use of available escorts, so the convoy size increased to 60 ships or more.

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Convoys most certainly diminished the efficient use of shipping assets to some extent, and the simultaneous arrival of large numbers of vessels caused significant bottlenecks in the unloading process. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt as to the efficacy of convoys in protecting merchant vessels from attack during World War II, as the dramatic reduction of sinkings after the introduction of convoys on the East Coast of the United States demonstrated. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aircraft Carriers; Antisubmarine Warfare; Arctic Convoys; Atlantic, Battle of the; Corvettes and Sloops; Depth Charges; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Hunter-Killer Groups; Leigh Light; Liberty Ships; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sonar; United States, Navy; Walker, Frederick John; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Grove, Eric J. Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939–1945. London: Naval Records Society, 1998. Hague, Arnold. The Allied Convoy System, 1939–1945: Its Organization, Defence and Operation. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 10, The Battle of the Atlantic Won, May 1943–May 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956–1961.

Convoys, Axis When war began in September 1939, Germany essentially abandoned any attempt to maintain its oceanic trade. Those ships beyond easy reach of the homeland endeavored to reach neutral ports, where they were interned, and closer ships broke for home, with the navy providing cover for those carrying important cargoes. Norwegian and Swedish ore traffic was the most important sector in Germany’s European trade, and securing it became the principal focus of the navy’s trade protection efforts throughout the war. After the successful German invasion of Norway, the navy introduced the convoy of merchant shipping along the Norwegian coast late in 1940. Convoys generally were small—three to six ships—and escorted by a few torpedo boats, trawlers, and light craft. British submarines and aircraft were the principal threats. As the war progressed and British air attacks became more effective, Germany added defensive coastal antiaircraft batteries and antiaircraft escorts. In addition to ever increasing strikes by shore-based Royal Air Force

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Coastal Command aircraft, the Royal Navy mounted periodic carrier strikes against German coastal shipping in 1942 and 1943, culminating over the next two years with more concentrated assaults using escort carriers that came close to paralyzing this traffic. When war with the Soviet Union began, the Soviet navy’s Northern Fleet submarines initiated attacks on German shipping around northern Norway and were soon joined by British submarines operating from Kola Bay. Joint operations continued until 1944, when the British crews were sent home and the submarines were turned over to the Soviet navy. Substantial numbers of Soviet naval aircraft also joined the attack against German convoys from 1943. This assault against the northern Norwegian convoys cost the Germans some 500,000 tons of shipping, a relatively small amount considering annual traffic was well in excess of 6 million tons. War with the Soviet Union also brought the threat of attack on Swedish ore traffic, primarily by Soviet submarines at first. The Germans endeavored to keep shipping within Swedish territorial waters as far as possible, escorting vessels for the final leg of their passage behind the protection of defensive minefields and net barriers. During 1942 and 1943, Soviet submarines succeeded in sinking only about 20 ships for a total of some 40,000 tons of shipping, out of more than 1,900 vessels in convoy representing well over 5.6 million tons of shipping. During 1944, the Soviet army’s advances and the defeat of Finland meant that aircraft played a greater role in antishipping operations, but German losses remained relatively light. The collapse of German positions on the Baltic coast early in 1945 required the evacuation by sea of more than 2 million troops and others. Despite some spectacular successes (the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff and General Steuben with 1,200 survivors from the more than 9,000 passengers aboard, for example), Soviet attacks were remarkably ineffective; the Germans lost only about 20 ships with a total of some 100,000 tons of shipping. The Italian navy began convoying traffic carrying supplies to its forces in Libya almost as soon as it entered the war, for British submarines and aircraft immediately began an interdiction campaign. The navy’s responsibilities expanded as Italy undertook campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 and increased still further when Germany took on a larger role in the Balkans and North Africa. During 1941, Italy also began convoying shipping along the Libyan coast. Italian convoys generally were small—three to six merchant vessels, with two or three escorting destroyers or torpedo boats. As British surface forces operating from Malta began attacking Libya-bound shipping, the Italian navy had to deploy heavier covering forces, often including cruisers and eventually battleships, to support particularly valuable convoys. In this struggle over shipping, the British possessed two great advantages: radar, which vastly enhanced the night-attack capabilities of its aircraft and surface ships, and signals intelligence, especially ULTRA, which consistently gave them advance convoy routing information.

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Axis fortunes in this campaign fluctuated greatly. From mid-1941, Axis forces in North Africa required approximately 100,000 tons of supplies each month. But in March 1942, for example, only 47,588 tons got through, whereas in April, 150,389, tons arrived. Overall, the Italian navy succeeded in bringing about 80 percent of all convoyed shipping to North Africa through to its destination. Despite its direct experience of successful convoy operations by its destroyers in the Mediterranean during World War I, the Imperial Japanese Navy was very slow to introduce convoying of merchant shipping after the Pacific war began. The navy possessed very few suitable escort vessels at the outbreak of war, which reflected the overwhelming emphasis it placed on planning for the decisive fleet action that was the centerpiece of its operational strategy. Japan’s response to the burgeoning unrestricted submarine campaign conducted by the United States against its shipping was to increase aggressive surface and air patrols and continue to eschew defensive convoy of its traffic. Not until the later part of 1944, by which date its merchant fleet had been devastated by U.S. submarines, did the navy begin limited convoy, especially of the crucial tankers carrying fuel from the Dutch East Indies, but by then it was too late. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Signals Intelligence; Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, Sinking of.

References Goulter, Christina J. A. Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Antishipping Campaign, 1940–1945. London: Cass, 1995. Levine, Alan J. The War against Rommel’s Supply Lines, 1942–1943. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Parillo, Mark P. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993. Polmar, Norman, and Jurrien Noot. Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718– 1990. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Convoys SC.122 and HX.229, Battle of (March 14–20, 1943) Largest North Atlantic convoy battle of World War II. March 1943 was the highwater mark of the German U-boat campaign against Allied convoys in the North Atlantic. Between March 10 and 20, Allied signals intelligence suffered a temporary blackout in its operations against the German U-boat cipher Triton. At the same time, the German signals intelligence service was able to decipher the rerouting instructions for two eastbound convoys: SC.122 and HX.229.

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The German U-boat command had an unprecedented concentration of U-boats in the North Atlantic at that time, and on March 14, it set about forming three large packs from boats that had been operating against the convoys SC.121 and HX.228. Groups Raubgraf (8 boats) and Stürmer (18 boats) were to operate against SC.122, and group Dränger (11 boats) was deployed against HX.229. On March 16, the first U-boat made contact with HX.229. Both convoys were sailing close to each other, and HX.229 was closing on the slower SC.122, which had already passed the Raubgraf patrol line undetected. The Raubgraf boats, as well as 11 boats of the Stürmer group, were thus deployed against HX.229 in the mistaken belief that it was SC.122. Inadequately defended by only two destroyers and two corvettes, HX.229 suffered heavy damage during the night of March 16–17. The same night, U-boats of the Stürmer group made contact with SC.122. Realizing that the two convoys were about to merge, the German U-boat command committed the remainder of its 40 available U-boats within range to the battle. Throughout March 17, long-range B-24 Liberator bombers from Iceland and SC.122 escorts with high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) equipment succeeded in fending off the contact-keeping boats. Only one U-boat managed to close for an attack, sinking two ships out of SC.122 on that day. On March 18, air cover provided by the Liberators of the Number 120 Squadron again prevented 21 of the 30 U-boats deployed against HX.229 from reaching the scene, and again, only one U-boat succeeded in closing for a daylight attack. A reinforcement of the surface escort group prevented serious losses during the night of March 18–19, in which the U-boats claimed only two further ships before intensified air cover, now flying out of the British Isles, forced them to desist. Two Uboats were damaged and one was sunk before Grossadmiral (grand admiral) Karl Dönitz called off the operation on March 20. The tally of 21 Allied ships sunk, totaling 141,000 tons of shipping as well as one destroyer lost during this largest convoy battle of the war was impressive, yet it was also deceptive. It had been achieved primarily because the sheer numbers of U-boats had saturated the convoy defenses. Nevertheless, only 16 of the 40 Uboats deployed against both convoys had actually been able to make contact, and, owing to the diligence of the convoys’ hard-pressed air and sea escorts, only nine succeeded in torpedoing ships. Of the 39 U-boats that survived the battle, 16 subsequently required more than 40 days of maintenance due to damage sustained during the battle. Committing virtually all available North Atlantic boats to four convoys— SC.121, SC.122, HX.228, and HX.229—also meant that the other four eastbound North Atlantic convoys in March 1943 made their passage entirely unmolested. Dirk Steffen See also: Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Aviation, Naval; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Radar; Signals Intelligence; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

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References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1998. Boog, Horst, Werner Rahn, and Reinhard Stumpf. Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative. Vol. 6 in the series Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Coral Sea, Battle of the (May 7–8, 1942) World War II Pacific theater battle fought by units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Japanese carrier forces as the United States attempted to prevent a Japanese landing at Port Moresby on New Guinea. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval engagement in history in which two fleets fought without opposing surface ships making visual contact. Following their successful December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and early military triumphs, Japanese leaders were reluctant to continue with their original strategy of shifting to a defensive posture. They feared the adverse impact this might exert on their forces’ fighting spirit and believed that it would work to Japan’s disadvantage by allowing the Western powers time to regain their strength. Japanese naval leaders in particular were anxious to occupy the Hawaiian Islands and Australia, the two chief points from which U.S. forces might mount offensive operations. U.S. carriers were operating out of Pearl Harbor, still the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. If Japanese forces could take the Hawaiian Islands, it would be virtually impossible for the U.S. Navy to conduct long-range Pacific naval operations. Also, securing the islands to the north and east of Australia—the Solomons, New Caledonia, and Samoa—would enable the Japanese to establish bases to cut the Allied lifeline from the United States to Australia. Japanese longrange bombers would then be able to strike targets in Australia itself, preparatory to an invasion and occupation of that continent. The Japanese army was not enthusiastic about either proposal. Most of its assets were tied down in China fighting the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist) Army and garrisoning Manchuria. Invading Australia and occupying even the populated areas would require significant military resources that the army could not spare. The Army Ministry and General Staff in Tokyo therefore advocated holding the gains already achieved in the southern advance and shifting resources to China. The army formally vetoed the navy plan in early April 1942, but, in effect, it was dead by the end of January. Japanese navy leaders hoped, however, that a


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success either eastward toward Pearl Harbor or southwest toward Australia might overcome army opposition. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, and his staff favored taking Midway Island, 1,100 miles west of Pearl Harbor, as a preliminary step before invading Hawaii. Yamamoto expected this move would provoke a strong U.S. naval reaction, enabling him to set a trap for and destroy the U.S. aircraft carriers. The Japanese naval staff, however, preferred the southeasterly drive to isolate Australia. By the end of March, the Japanese had already advanced from Rabaul into the Solomon Islands and along the northern coast of New Guinea. The Japanese Imperial General Staff searched for a strategy to follow up their successes. Initially, the Naval General Staff favored assaulting Australia, fearing an Allied buildup there could lead to a counteroffensive against the Japanese defensive perimeter. The army rejected an Australian operation because of long distances, insufficient troops, and inadequate transportation. In January 1942, both agreed on a less demanding joint invasion of Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea; the seizure of Tulagi in the Solomons; and the capture of the Australian base of Port Moresby in Papua, New Guinea. On March 8, 1942, U.S. carriers, sent to beleaguer the Japanese base at Rabaul northeast of New Guinea, interdicted Japanese landing operations at Lae and Salamaua on the Papuan peninsula of eastern New Guinea. Two carrier task forces, one built around the carrier Lexington under Vice Admiral Wilson E. Brown and Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s task force centered on the carrier Yorktown, sailed into the Gulf of Papua on the opposite side of the peninsula. Together, on the morning of March 10, they sent 104 aircraft across the high Owen Stanley Mountains and surprised Japanese ships discharging troops and supplies at both Lae and Salamaua. The attacking U.S. aircraft sank three Japanese ships, including the armed merchant cruiser Kongo Maru at a cost of only one plane and one aviator lost. The action caught the Japanese operational commander, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, by surprise and convinced him that conquest of New Guinea would have to be postponed until he could secure fleet carriers for protection. That opportunity came only after the return of the carriers from the Japanese raids into the Indian Ocean. In early April 1942, the attention of the Imperial Naval General Staff was on southeast operations (seizure of strategic points in New Guinea, New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, and Samoa) to isolate Australia. However, the April 1942 (Doolittle) raid on Tokyo refocused their attention on the destruction of the U.S. carriers and forced an earlier date for the Tulagi and Port Moresby operations, with the New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa operations to follow after Midway. Admiral Inouye, commanding the Fourth Fleet and Operation MO, as it was designated, broke his forces into five groups: two invasion groups to land army and naval forces at Tulagi and Port Moresby; a support group to establish a seaplane

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base in the Louisiade Archipelago off New Guinea; a small covering group with the light carrier Shoho; and the main striking force of two fleet carriers, Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku, plus escorts. This strike force, commanded by Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo, was to support both landings and to protect the entire force from U.S. carriers. At Pearl Harbor, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, determined from intercepts that the Japanese would probably attack Port Moresby on May 3. On April 29, he ordered Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, commanding the Yorktown group, to operate in the vicinity of the Coral Sea beginning on May 1. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch’s Lexington group and the U.S. Southwest Pacific Command’s combined naval force of two Australian cruisers, the U.S. heavy cruiser Chicago, and two U.S. destroyers under Rear Admiral John Crace, of the Royal Navy, were also placed under Fletcher’s tactical command. The two carrier groups and Crace’s force formed Task Force 17 when they rendezvoused on May 1 some 250 miles off the New Hebrides. While the Lexington’s group refueled, Fletcher sailed the Yorktown’s group north on May 2 to reconnoiter, having received reports of approaching Japanese naval forces. On May 3, the Japanese Tulagi invasion group began landing forces without opposition. Learning of the landings, Fletcher decided to strike Tulagi the next morning without waiting for the Lexington to join him. He sent his fleet oiler and its escorts to inform Fitch and Crace of his change of plans and to order them to join him 300 miles south of Guadalcanal on May 5. The Yorktown then closed on Tulagi undetected on May 4 and launched three air strikes that met little resistance. Admiral Takagi’s carrier striking force had been delayed and was nowhere near Tulagi. Inexperienced as they were, the U.S. attackers were ineffective, only damaging a destroyer to the point that it had to beached and sinking three small minesweepers and four landing barges. The planes also shot up some grounded aircraft. However, even this small success was enough to send the remainder of the Tulagi invasion force steaming back to Rabaul. Withdrawing southward, Fletcher rejoined Fitch and Crace as scheduled on May 5. Task Force 17 then moved northwest, expecting to catch Japanese forces as they emerged from the Jomard Passage into the Coral Sea. Although sightings were made by both sides on May 6, essentially ineffective reconnaissance led to little significant action by either. Before dawn on May 7, the opposing fleet carriers passed within 70 miles of each other. At dawn, both sides sent out search planes over the Coral Sea. The Japanese sighting of what they thought were a U.S. carrier and cruiser led to the sinking of the destroyer Sims and the inflicting of fatal damage on the oiler Neosho. At about the same time, a U.S. scout aircraft reported two Japanese carriers north of


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the Louisiades. After the Lexington and Yorktown launched their aircraft, Fletcher discovered that his ships had been sighted by a Japanese scout plane. The action prompted by the U.S. sighting turned out to be a wild goose chase, but the Lexington and Yorktown pilots stumbled on the light carrier Shoho and sank it. Early the next morning, the two carrier forces found each other. The U.S. planes concentrated their attack on the fleet carrier Sho¯kaku but hit it with just three bombs, causing only modest damage. The fleet carrier Zuikaku escaped attack by hiding in a rainsquall. The Sho¯kaku’s damage was sufficient to prevent launch-and-recovery operations, however; and when the Americans withdrew, it turned north toward Japan. Meanwhile, planes from the Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku found the Lexington and Yorktown. Diving out of the sun, torpedo planes hit the Lexington twice on the port side, and dive-bombers scored two minor hits. The Yorktown was hit by only one bomb, which did no major damage. Confident they had sunk the Saratoga, the Lexington’s sister ship, and the Yorktown, the Japanese pilots withdrew. Neither ship sank, however, until gasoline vapors aboard the Lexington reignited fires that eventually became uncontrollable; as a result, it was abandoned, with Fletcher forced to order it scuttled by torpedoes from a nearby destroyer. Both sides hailed their achievements in the Coral Sea and scored themselves a win. Tactically, the Japanese came out ahead. The United States was hurt most by the loss of the Lexington, one of its largest carriers, whereas Japan lost only the light carrier Shoho and suffered moderate damage to the large carrier Sho¯kaku. Although Japan scored a tactical victory, the United States had finally blunted a Japanese offensive thrust, preventing the occupation of Port Moresby and thus winning the strategic victory. In addition, significant losses in aircraft, aircrew, and repairs to

The crew of the U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington (CV-2) abandon ship on May 8, 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Japanese aircraft also damaged the aircraft carrier Yorktown in the same battle. (U.S. Navy)

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the Sho¯kaku prevented both Japanese carriers from taking part in the critical Battle of Midway a month later. Arthur T. Frame See also: Aircraft Carriers; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Takagi Takeo; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Hoyt, Edwin P. Blue Skies and Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. New York: S. Eriksson, 1975. Lundstrom, John. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. Millet, Bernard. The Battle of the Coral Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway. New York: Penguin, 1983. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.

Corvettes and Sloops Relatively small warships designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare and patrol duties. The British navy in the years prior to World War II and during the war built several classes of both of these types, because their small size allowed for rapid construction not only by large shipyards but, in the case of corvettes, also by small, privately owned yards. Britain built a large number of both corvettes and sloops to protect its trade lanes from submarine attack. A good example of the World War II–era sloop is the British Black Swan class constructed during 1939–1940 and a modified version of the same launched throughout the war. A modified Black Swan displaced some 1,490 tons, measured 299 ft. 6 in. in overall length by 38 ft. 6 in. in beam, and was capable of 19.75 knots. The unarmored hull mounted six 4-inch guns and carried 110 depth charges on racks. During the war, upgrades to a few of these ships replaced the racks with hedgehog depth charge launchers. Crew complement was 192 officers and men. Corvettes are typified by the Castle class, built between 1943 and 1944. Smaller than the sloop, it displaced 1,060 tons, was 252 ft. in overall length by 36 ft. 8 in. in beam, and was capable of 16.5 knots. Castle-class corvettes were armed with a

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single 4-inch gun and a Squid depth charge launcher. Crew complement was 120 officers and men. While both sloops and corvettes participated in the Battle of the Atlantic, neither type proved wholly satisfactory. Corvettes gradually supplanted sloops because they could be built in greater numbers thanks to their size, which allowed for construction in smaller yards; corvettes were not ideal for antisubmarine duty because they lacked oceangoing qualities due to their small hulls. Not only were living conditions poor on these ships, but they also could not store a large amount of fuel or supplies. Larger and more capable frigates supplemented sloops and corvettes during the war. Aside from the British, the Japanese launched several classes of escorts the size of corvettes and capable of antisubmarine warfare. Other powers such as the United States, France, and Italy also constructed these ships. The United States built one class of corvette as submarine chasers, while other nations that built vessels the size of sloops or corvettes attached duties to them other than antisubmarine warfare. Germany’s corvettes were envisioned as fleet escorts, while France employed its corvettes as torpedo boats. Italy constructed 29 units of the Gabbiano class of 660 tons from 1942, and these ships proved capable in the antisubmarine role. Germany took over 4 and completed 10 more after the Italian armistice to equip its Mediterranean antisubmarine flotillas. Eric W. Osborne See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Convoys, Allied; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; United States, Navy.

References Brown, D. K. Atlantic Escorts: Ships, Weapons, and Tactics in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980.

Courageous Class, British Aircraft Carriers Two-ship class of British aircraft carriers. Originally built during World War I as 15-inch gunned large light cruisers designed for Baltic operations, the Courageous was commissioned in November 1916 and the Glorious in January 1917. On November 17, 1917, both ships and the battle cruiser Repulse engaged German forces in Heligoland Bight. Following the limitations imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, both Courageous-class ships were declared surplus tonnage and the Admiralty

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decided to convert them to aircraft carriers. The design was similar to that of the carrier Furious. Work on the Glorious began in February 1924 and was completed on March 10, 1930. Work on the Courageous commenced in June 1924 and was completed on May 28, 1928. The ships had two flight decks, the main deck and a smaller lower flying-off deck that was subsequently converted into a gun deck for antiaircraft guns. Displacing 27,400 tons at deep load, the two ships were 786 ft. 7 in. in overall length and 90 ft. 6 in. in breadth over the bilges. They were capable of 30 knots speed. They had a 3-inch armor belt and were armed with 16 120-mm and 4 2-pounder quick-firing guns and 14 .50-caliber machine guns. They carried 48 aircraft and had a crew complement of 1,216 men, including fleet air arm personnel. Two weeks after the start of World War II, on September 17, 1939, the Courageous, commanded by Captain W. T. Mackraig-Jones, was on antisubmarine patrol off the coast of Ireland. Two of its four escorting destroyers had been dispatched to assist a merchantman under attack when the Courageous came into the wind to launch aircraft, putting it in perfect position for the German submarine U-29, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Otto Schuhart. Hit by two of three torpedoes from the U-29, the carrier sank in only 15 minutes with the loss of 518 men, including its captain. The Courageous was the first British warship lost in the war. Just before the start of the war the Glorious, with Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes in command, was assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet and based primarily at Malta. Transferred to the Indian Ocean in October 1939, it joined Force I searching for the German commerce raider pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee. Returning to Malta, following the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, the Glorious was recalled to Britain and sent immediately on to Norway to support Allied operations ashore with its Blackburn Skua and Gloster Gladiator aircraft. The carrier also delivered a squadron of Hawker Hurricanes to Bardufoss, which helped cover the subsequent Allied evacuation. The Glorious also participated in Operation ALPHABET (June 5–8), the evacuation of Allied troops from Norway. During June 7–8, the Glorious took on board 10 Gladiators and 8 Hurricanes (this was the first time that high-performance monoplane fighter aircraft without arresting hooks had landed on an aircraft carrier) based in Norway to keep them from being destroyed by the Germans. The carrier was then part of an evacuation convoy that included the aircraft Ark Royal, bound for Scapa Flow. Early on June 8, however, D’Oyly-Hughes requested and received permission to proceed independently at greater speed, supposedly because of a fuel shortage. Escorted by the destroyers Acasta and Ardent, the Glorious was intercepted by the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at 4:00 p.m. on June 8, some 280 miles west of Harstad, Norway. The carrier had on board six Swordfish aircraft, but for reasons that will never be known, D’Oyly-Hughes did not have them aloft flying reconnaissance, and the carrier was caught completely by surprise. Homing

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on smoke from its stack, the two German capital ships opened fire on the Glorious at a range of some 27,000 yards. Before any aircraft could be launched, a German shell hit the forward hangar, destroying the Hurricanes and preventing passage of torpedoes stored there. The Glorious was soon listing, and it went down within 20 minutes. The two destroyers were also sunk, but the Scharnhorst was badly damaged by a torpedo from the Acasta and hit by a single 4.7-inch shell. Damage was sufficient for Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall to steam for Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the Ark Royal and remainder of the British evacuation convoy later that same day. Although German radio broadcasts of the sinking were intercepted by the British, they were not acted upon. A radio transmission from the Glorious reporting the sighting of the German battleships was intercepted by the British cruiser Devonshire, but it was transporting the Norwegian royal family and government officials and was under orders of radio silence. Thus, the loss of the three British ships went unnoticed until the next day. Although some 900 men abandoned the Glorious, those who were able to reach life rafts drifted for three days. The eventual loss in lives from the three British warships was 1,519 men (1,207 in the Glorious, 160 in the Acosta, and 152 in the Ardent). There were only 40 survivors from the three ships, including one each from the Acosta and Ardent. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; ALPHABET, Operation; Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships.

References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Gray, Randal, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Winton, John. Carrier Glorious: The Life and Death of an Aircraft Carrier. London: Cassell Military, 1999.

Crace, Sir John Gregory (1887–1968) British navy admiral who commanded a U.S.-Australian task force in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Born on February 6, 1887, at Gungahleen, New South Wales, Australia, John Crace joined the Royal Navy in 1902 as a colonial cadet at the midshipman training college at Devon, Britain. In World War I, he saw service at sea as a torpedo lieutenant.

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After the war, Crace specialized in torpedoes. Following various assignments that included sea service, he became assistant to the second sea lord in 1937. A rear admiral when World War II began, he was assigned to command the Australian Squadron, in effect becoming the commander of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The RAN was subordinate to the British Admiralty, and Crace considered asking for another more responsible position in the Royal Navy. After the United States entered the war, the U.S. Navy assumed overall Allied command of the South Pacific, and Crace took command of the mixed U.S.-Australian cruiser Task Force 44. In May 1942, the Allies became aware that the Japanese were preparing to invade Port Moresby, New Guinea. Along with two U.S. carrier task forces, Crace and his squadron set out to intercept the Japanese invasion force, which reconnaissance aircraft had reported as headed for the Jomard Passage. In the early afternoon of May 7, Japanese medium bombers and torpedo bombers attacked Crace’s ships, but skillful maneuvering averted major damage at the hands of the Japanese and also from U.S. Air Force B-17s, which mistakenly attacked the friendly force. The presence of Crace’s ships and mistaken Japanese impressions about the size of his unit led the invasion force headed for Port Moresby to turn back. Crace’s ships played no other role in the Battle of the Coral Sea. They remained in the Jomard Passage for another two days, until being notified of the overall course of the battle. They then headed south and returned to Australia. Crace received high marks from the Americans both as a seaman and as a commander of a joint force. He retired from the navy in 1942 and died in Liss, Hampshire, England, on May 11, 1968. Harold Wise See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Torpedoes.

References Hoyt, Edwin P. Blue Skies and Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. New York: S. Eriksson, 1975. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.

Crete, Naval Operations off (May 21–June 1, 1941) British naval activity first to defend and then to evacuate the island of Crete. After the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was defeated and subsequently evacuated from Greece between April 24 and 30, 1941, many of these troops were then

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relocated to the Greek island of Crete. Adolf Hitler’s decision to send forces to conquer the island to shore up his southern flank prior to invading the Soviet Union led to an epic confrontation between air power and sea power. Allied radio intercepts and ULTRA intelligence revealed the broad outlines of the German plan, which consisted of airborne assaults and a sea invasion. They did not reveal the relative strength of these two attacks, however. This, in fact, proved a negative for Major General Bernard Freyberg, the commander of the British corps on the island, who shifted precious assets to the north to defend against the anticipated naval attack when these would have been much better deployed to defend the vital airfields. Particularly serious for the British forces was the lack of air assets. By May 18, German air attacks on Crete had left the defenders with only a dozen aircraft, and Britain’s one aircraft carrier, the Formidable, began the battle with only four serviceable planes. While patrolling the seas around the north of the island to prevent a German seaborne landing, Royal Navy sailors, exhausted from their role in the evacuation from Greece, were exposed to the full weight of the Luftwaffe’s 700 combat aircraft operating from bases in Greece, as well as occasional Italian air strikes. The German assault on Crete, Operation MERKUR (MERCURY) began on May 20. German air superiority forced the Royal Navy’s warships to retire south of Crete during the day, and the defenders rarely managed to put more than a dozen planes in the air at any one time. Long-range bombing of the Luftwaffe’s bases in Greece by British aircraft based in Malta and Egypt failed to affect German air operations in any material way. On the night of May 21–22, British warships intercepted an Axis troop convoy consisting of 21 small, coastal vessels packed with 2,330 German troops and escorted by a single Italian torpedo boat. In a one-sided engagement, British cruisers and destroyers sank eight ships in this convoy. At 8:40 a.m. that morning, another cruiser force intercepted a second convoy of 30 small steamers and caiques, also escorted by only a single torpedo boat. After a short engagement, and with the convoy covered by a smoke screen and undamaged, the British commander decided to head south because he feared air attacks. The surviving ships of both convoys returned to Greece. Some 400 German soldiers were lost in this effort, and Germany thereafter relied entirely on air supply and reinforcement in its invasion. Despite the best efforts of the Royal Navy and the defenders on the ground, it became impossible to defend the island once German troops had captured Máleme Airfield. On May 26, with the situation hopeless, Freyberg ordered an evacuation. Once again, the Royal Navy rushed to rescue Commonwealth and Allied soldiers (wags said that BEF stood for back every fortnight). The long distances involved and the Luftwaffe’s complete control of the air made the evacuation particularly difficult, but the British commander in the

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Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, ordered his ships to continue the evacuation regardless of cost. Despite constant German air attack, they managed to evacuate almost 18,000 of Crete’s 32,000 defenders, but the Royal Navy suffered very high losses in the process. In the weeklong operation, German air attacks sank three cruisers, six destroyers, and several smaller ships and inflicted varying degrees of damage on the Formidable, the battleships Barham and Warspite, three cruisers, and numerous other warships. Some 2,000 British sailors died, along with a similar number of evacuated soldiers. In the course of the fight, many ships completely exhausted their antiaircraft ammunition. The Luftwaffe lost only a few dozen aircraft. Stephen K. Stein See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References MacDonald, Callum. The Lost Battle: Crete 1941. New York: Free Press, 1993. Pack, S. W. C. The Battle for Crete. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. Vol. 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954. Spector, Ronald. At War at Sea. New York: Viking, 2001. Thomas, David. Crete 1941: The Battle at Sea. London: New English Library, 1975.

Cruisers Class of warships that in the World War II era possessed moderate armor and armament and were capable of high speed. These ships were the successors of the 18th-century frigates in the age of fighting sail. Frigates were primarily employed as reconnaissance ships for the main battle fleet. They also served in commerce protection, commerce raiding, surface combat against enemy vessels of similar strength, and blockades. Technological innovations in the mid-19th century, such as steam power and iron armor, led to the development of the first modern cruiser, the U.S. Navy’s Wampanoag, commissioned in 1867. By World War I, the major naval powers of the world had produced six different types of cruisers charged with the tasks formerly assigned to frigates. They also were given a new task that resulted from technological change—protecting the capital ships of the fleet from torpedo attack. These warships were primarily armored cruisers, protected cruisers, light cruisers, and scouts. Also in production was the battle cruiser—a warship that incorporated battleship armament on a cruiser-sized hull and was capable of high speed. This vessel, however, was viewed largely as

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a capital ship rather than a cruiser. The final type was the armed merchant cruiser, a civilian-owned merchant ship or passenger liner converted to carry weapons in time of war. In the years immediately following World War I, most of the armored, protected, and scout cruisers were considered obsolete and were scrapped. The major maritime powers, primarily Great Britain, also largely discarded battle cruisers because their light armor did not adequately protect them against heavily armed enemy warships. Britain kept three (the Hood, Renown, and Repulse; the Tiger was discarded in 1930), whereas Japan had four Kongo-class ships that were modernized and reclassified as battleships. The interwar years produced many of the cruisers that participated in World War II. Military and diplomatic developments directly affected their design, although technologically they were almost the same as those of World War I. Many naval officials viewed the continued construction of cruisers as a dubious endeavor, partly because of the increasing ability of aircraft to perform reconnaissance, the primary duty of cruisers up to that time. Construction, however, did not diminish, as the major maritime powers still desired a warship that was capable of protecting trade routes and providing support for amphibious operations—a relatively new role that had surfaced in World War I. These vessels also proliferated as part of a new, worldwide naval arms race. Following World War I, the great powers attempted through international agreements to prevent an arms race in warships, which many politicians believed had been a factor in the tensions that had led to war. The resulting 1922 Washington Naval Conference produced the situation that diplomats had sought to avoid when it placed restrictions on the tonnage of cruisers but not on the numbers allowed to each naval power. The nations that signed the 1922 agreement tried to correct this problem at the 1930 London Conference, which separated cruisers into two basic types: those mounting 8-inch guns (heavy cruisers) and those with 6-inch or smaller guns (light cruisers). Building ratios between the signatory powers based on total tonnage of cruisers restricted the numbers of each type, and a clause from the Washington Treaty stating that no warship could displace more than 10,000 tons or carry guns larger than 8-inchers governed their size. Even so, cruisers continued to be the largest surface warships built, as restrictions on battleship construction that had been set out at the Washington Naval Conference remained in place. The 8-inch-gunned cruisers, known as heavy cruisers, were built primarily in the years before the 1930 London Conference, because most of the world’s major maritime powers had already built up to the tonnage limit set for these ships by the Washington agreement. Although the United States and France managed to produce some vessels that were well-balanced designs, the majority were generally unsatisfactory, as armor was sacrificed to meet the 10,000-ton restriction of the Washington Treaty. An example of this imbalance was the U.S. heavy cruiser

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Portland. This ship measured 610 ft. by 66 ft., displaced 10,258 tons, and mounted a primary armament of nine 8-inch guns. It had a maximum speed of 32.5 knots, but the ship’s armor protection consisted of a belt only 2.5 inches thick and an armored deck that was 2.5 inches deep. This armor was generally effective only against opposing destroyers armed with 5-inch guns. Larger shells could easily penetrate the protection. Japan and Italy, each of which had signed one or both of the treaties, built heavy cruisers that solved this problem of protection through subverting the terms of the agreements. Germany, which was restricted by the Treaty of Versailles, also built heavy cruisers that violated its agreement: the heavy cruisers of the Prinz Eugen class and the more powerful Deutschland class originally classified as a Panzerschiff or armored ship. The latter class of ships mounted six 11-inch guns and displaced 11,700 tons, in contravention of the 10,000-ton limit set out in the treaty. The naval powers also produced large numbers of 6-inch-gunned, light cruisers, particularly after the 1930 London Conference as each built up to the construction limit for the type. Many of these vessels also suffered from inadequate armor protection as a result of the restrictions of the naval treaties. An example was the British light cruiser Arethusa, which measured 506 ft. by 51 ft. and displaced 5,270

The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser Portland (CA-33), shown here off the Mare Island Navy Yard, California, on July 30, 1944. (Naval Historical Center)

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tons. It mounted six 6-inch guns and was protected primarily by an armored belt with a maximum thickness of 3 in. that only covered its machinery and ammunition spaces. These ships were charged with the same duties as the cruisers of the World War I era, with the notable exception of reconnaissance, as airplanes now fulfilled that role. For the cruisers, reconnaissance duty was replaced by a new task resulting from the threat posed by airplanes to surface warships. Most interwar cruisers, particularly light cruisers, were built with large batteries of antiaircraft guns to protect battleships and aircraft carriers against enemy aerial attack. Some light cruiser designs were also purpose-built for this specific role. In 1937, Great Britain built the first units of the Dido-class, which became known as antiaircraft cruisers. These ships mounted 10 5.25-inch guns in dual-purpose turrets that could either be trained on surface targets or elevated to an extreme angle for use against aircraft. By the beginning of 1940, four months after the start of World War II, interwar cruiser construction, in combination with some battle cruisers retained from World War I, had created a large world cruiser force. Great Britain maintained 3 battle cruisers, 18 heavy cruisers, and 50 light cruisers; the United States had 18 heavy cruisers and 19 light cruisers; Japan operated 18 heavy cruisers and 19 light cruisers; Italy had 7 heavy cruisers and 14 light cruisers; France maintained 7 heavy cruisers and 12 light cruisers; Germany operated 6 heavy cruisers (3 Deutschlandclass Panzershiffe, 3 Admiral Hipper-class), and 6 light cruisers; and the Soviet Union possessed 5 medium cruisers and 2 old light cruisers. These numbers were augmented by wartime construction. Cruisers in World War II fulfilled all of the roles that naval officers in the interwar years believed to be important. These ships were particularly valuable on the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939. The German navy, being much smaller than it had been in World War I, was not powerful enough to face the British Royal Navy in open combat. As a result, it was given the task of waging a commerce war on Great Britain’s overseas trade routes in an effort to deny that country war materials and supplies. British cruisers were consequently used to protect against these raiders. This situation resulted in the December 13, 1939, Battle of Río de la Plata, the first naval engagement between German and Allied warships in the conflict. The battle pitted the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee against one British heavy cruiser and two light cruisers. As a result of the encounter, the German vessel retreated to Montevideo, Uruguay, where its commander scuttled his ship rather than renew battle. British cruisers also served in the 1941 hunt for the German battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which had been dispatched into the Atlantic to prey on shipping. Although commerce warfare by surface warships declined somewhat after the sinking of the Bismarck due to the restrictions Adolf Hitler placed on their use, British cruisers continued to guard merchant convoys in the Atlantic Ocean against the occasional sortie of German warships.

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In June 1940, with Italy’s entry into the war, this duty expanded to the Mediterranean. British cruisers escorted convoys and attacked Axis shipping. Allied cruisers also performed commerce protection duties in the Arctic Ocean following Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Armed merchant cruisers on the Allied side were involved in blockade duty as well from the opening days of the war in the Atlantic. However, this effort was not very effective, because after occupying Norway and France in 1940, the Germans had access to goods beyond those from the Soviet Union. Cruisers also provided gunfire support for amphibious invasions not only in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Arctic theaters but also in the Pacific Ocean, following the United States’ entry into the war in December 1941. Germany employed cruisers in the 1940 invasion of Norway, and the Allies utilized them during the 1942 amphibious assault in North Africa and the invasions of Sicily and Italy in 1943. They were also used to bombard and to direct fire during the 1944 invasion of Normandy, France, in Operation OVERLORD. The role of cruisers in supporting amphibious invasions proved particularly important in the Pacific, where mostly U.S. cruisers bombarded Japanese island possessions in preparation for the landing of amphibious forces. Arguably the greatest use of cruisers in the Pacific theater was in their new role as antiaircraft protection for aircraft carriers. Throughout the conflict, cruisers received upgrades to their antiaircraft weaponry as a response to the extreme threat of air attack. New antiaircraft light cruisers augmented this force. Allied cruisers provided vital cover in operations across the Pacific theater: in the 1945 battle for Okinawa, for instance, cruisers formed part of the defensive screen to prevent Japanese suicide aircraft, known as kamikazes, from crashing into Allied ships. The valuable duties performed by cruisers in World War II resulted in a heavy toll of ships sunk. Japan lost 39 light and heavy cruisers. Great Britain had 27 vessels sunk, and Italy and the United States lost 13 and 12, respectively. France lost 10 cruisers, the majority scuttled to prevent their capture by the Germans following the surrender of France in 1940. The Germans lost 7 cruisers, the majority of these sunk early in the war in commerce raiding or during the invasion of Norway. Eric W. Osborne See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Battle Cruisers; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Caroline Islands Campaign; Central Pacific Campaign; Destroyers; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Indianapolis, Sinking of; Kamikaze; Leyte Landings; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of; Rawalpindi, Loss of; Río de la Plata,, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater.

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References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. George, James L. The History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Preston, Anthony. Cruisers. London: Hamlyn, 1983. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1985. Van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles (1893–1986) Royal Navy admiral whose forces participated in major actions in the Pacific, including the disastrous Battle of Savo Island. Born on November 2, 1893 in London, Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley served at sea in World War I and won the Victoria Cross for heroism during the British action at Ostend, Belgium, in May 1918. He commanded the light cruiser Diomede between 1935 and 1936 and was captain of the battleship Warspite from 1937 to 1940, seeing action during the Norwegian Campaign. On April 13, 1940, he led the Warspite and nine destroyers into Narvik harbor and sank the eight German destroyers trapped there. Crutchley then commanded the Royal Navy barracks at Devonport before being transferred to the Pacific as a rear admiral in June 1942 to take charge of a squadron of Australian and U.S. ships that had recently participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. His forces assisted with the U.S. invasion of Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. However, Crutchley’s dispositions contributed to the subsequent Japanese victory in the August 8–9 Battle of Savo Island, which saw one Australian and three U.S. cruisers sunk, with no Japanese losses. Crutchley avoided official censure for the defeat and went on to participate in further operations in the Pacific, mostly in support of various amphibious landings. Promoted to vice admiral, he was made the commander at Gibraltar in 1945 and remained in that post until his retirement two years later. Crutchley died in Nettlecombe, Dorset, England, on January 24, 1986. Harold Wise See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Savo Island, Battle of.

References Loxton, Bruce, with Chris Coulthard-Clark. The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

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Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Pitt, Barrie. Zeebrugge: St. George’s Day, 1918. London: Cassell, 1958. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945: Official History. Vol. 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954.

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne (First Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, 1883–1963) British admiral of the fleet and first sea lord from 1943 through 1945. Born in Dublin on January 7, 1883, Andrew Browne Cunningham enrolled at Stubbington House near Portsmouth to prepare for entry into the Royal Navy. Rated a midshipman in 1898, he saw action with the Naval Brigade in the 1899–1902 South African War. Although Cunningham later served in a variety of warships, he was happiest in destroyers and torpedo boats. In 1911, Cunningham took command of the destroyer Scorpion, remaining with it until early 1918 and spending most of World War I in the Mediterranean, the theater that became inseparably identified with his career. Promoted to captain in 1920, he thereafter held staff positions in the Baltic, Mediterranean, and West Indies. After being made rear admiral in 1934, he commanded the destroyer flotilla in the British Mediterranean Fleet from 1934 to 1936. He then commanded the battle cruiser squadron and was second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet in 1937 and 1938. From September 1938 until June 1939, he was deputy naval chief of staff. Promoted to vice admiral and universally called “ABC,” Cunningham became commander of the Mediterranean Fleet in June 1939. The collapse of France militarily and Italy’s entry as an Axis belligerent in June 1940 prompted his first significant actions in World War II—the peaceful neutralization of the French fleet at Alexandria and an engagement with the Italians on July 9, 1940, off Calabria; in the latter, he pursued a powerful force returning from North Africa into Italian home waters, damaging its flagship. Four months later, on November 11, 1940, with his fleet strengthened by the addition of the carrier Illustrious, Cunningham launched a night air attack on the Italian base at Taranto, sinking three battleships, two of which were later raised and repaired. On March 28, 1941, he fought the Italians off Cape Matapan, sinking three heavy cruisers and two destroyers and damaging a battleship. Soon afterward, however, British armies in Greece and Crete required evacuation, and Cunningham’s full support of them brought severe losses to his ships from German air attacks. In June 1942, Cunningham became the Admiralty’s representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Promoted to admiral of the fleet, he became Allied naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean in October 1942. Cunningham oversaw the naval aspects of Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in North

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Africa in November 1942, and the Allied assaults on Sicily in April 1943 and at Salerno five months later, followed by Italy’s surrender and internment of the Italian fleet at Malta. When First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound died in October 1943, Cunningham succeeded him, serving in the post for the rest of the war. Often at odds with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, he also faced growing U.S. naval dominance and a very different war in the Pacific. Ennobled in September 1945, he retired in June 1946, recognized as one of the last British admirals in the Nelson tradition. Cunningham died in London on June 12, 1963. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: AVALANCHE, Operation; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Crete, Naval Operations off; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater Naval Operations; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Taranto, Attack on.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1991. Cunningham, Andrew Browne. A Sailor’s Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope. New York: Dutton, 1951. Grove, Eric J. “Andrew Browne Cunningham: The Best Man of the Lot.” In The Great Admirals: Command at Sea, 1587–1945, edited by Jack Sweetman (pp. 418–441). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pack, S. W. C. Cunningham the Commander. London: Batsford, 1974. Winton, John. “Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Stephen Howarth (pp. 207–226). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres (1885–1962) British navy admiral who was commander in chief and Allied naval commander in the Mediterranean. Born on April 13, 1885, at Demerara, British Guiana, John Henry Dacres Cunningham joined the British navy in 1900 and specialized in navigation. During World War I, he served in the West Indies, in the Mediterranean, and with the Grand Fleet. In 1916, he survived the sinking of the battleship Russell, which was struck by a mine in the waters off Malta. Between the wars, Cunningham, promoted to captain in 1924, held a variety of staff and seagoing positions, acquiring an intimate knowledge of Mediterranean waters while serving there during the Abyssinian crisis. In 1938, he became fifth sea lord and chief of naval air services. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1939.

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In 1940, Cunningham’s squadron took part in the Norway Campaign and the illfated Anglo-French expedition to Dakar. In early 1941, Cunningham was appointed fourth sea lord, responsible for supplies and transport—a vital position in which he remained for two years, winning a knighthood in 1941. In June 1943, he became commander in chief of the Levant, one of the two Mediterranean commands; later that year, he was made commander in chief and Allied naval commander of both commands, directing British, U.S., French, and Greek vessels. Cunningham’s forces were responsible for amphibious assaults at Anzio (Operation ANVIL) and in the south of France (Operation DRAGOON). In May 1946, Cunningham took over as first sea lord from Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, thereby becoming the first navigation officer to attain the navy’s highest position. (The two men were not related.) As part of the British postwar economy drive, he supervised drastic cuts in the wartime fleet, including the scrapping of many serviceable vessels. In January 1948, he was promoted to admiral of the fleet, retiring in September 1948 to become chairman of the Iraq Petroleum Company, where he remained for 10 years. He died in London, on December 13, 1962. Priscilla Roberts See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Dakar, Attack on; Mediterranean Theater Naval Operations.

References Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

Cunningham, Winfield Scott (1900–1986) U.S. navy officer in command of the naval air station on Wake Island. Born in Rockfield, Wisconsin, on February 16, 1900, Winfield Scott Cunningham entered the U.S. Naval Academy in 1916. His class graduated in 1919 because of World War I, and Cunningham was commissioned an ensign. He then held a variety of sea assignments. In 1924, Cunningham was accepted for flight training. His aviation career began in scout planes and culminated with command of VF 5 (Fighting Five) Squadron aboard the carrier Yorktown. On November 28, 1941, Commander Cunningham assumed command of the naval air station under construction at Wake Island in the Pacific. His command

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consisted of 500 Marines from the 1st Defense Battalion, 12 F-4F Wildcat aircraft of Marine fighter squadron VMF 211, and various support personnel. There were also more than 1,100 civilian contractors assisting in the construction. The Japanese attacked Wake Island beginning on December 8 (December 7 in Hawaii). For 15 days, the defenders held them off, but eventually, faced with overwhelming odds and concerned over the fate of the civilians on the island, Cunningham was forced to surrender. He and his men spent the next four years in Japanese captivity. During this time, Cunningham attempted to escape twice. Freed at the end of the war, in 1946, Cunningham took command of the seaplane tender Curtiss. From June 1947 until his retirement from the navy as a rear admiral in June 1950, he commanded the Naval Technical Training Center, Memphis, Tennessee. Cunningham died on March 3, 1986, in Memphis. M. R. Pierce See also: Wake Island, Battle for.

References Cressman, Robert J. The Battle for Wake Island: A Magnificent Fight. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Cunningham, Winfield S., and Lydel Sims. Wake Island Command. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Schultz, Duane. Wake Island: The Heroic, Gallant Fight. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978.

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D Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François (1881–1942) French navy admiral. Born on August 7, 1881, in Nérac (Lot-et-Garonne), France, Jean Louis Xavier Darlan graduated from the École Navale in 1902. A specialist in naval gunnery, he served in the Far East on cruisers and then in the Mediterranean. Promoted to commander in 1912, he was then an instructor on the training cruiser Jeanne d’Arc. During World War I, Darlan commanded heavy naval artillery on land. He was promoted to commander in July 1918 and took charge of the Rhine Flotilla. Promoted to captain in August 1920, Darlan was assigned to the Far East, where he commanded cruisers. He was advanced to rear admiral in November 1929 and played an important role in the reorganization of the navy. He next commanded naval forces in Algeria and then a cruiser division in the Mediterranean. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1932, he took charge of the Atlantic Squadron during 1934–1936. He was then chief of the French naval staff. Darlan was promoted to admiral of the fleet in June 1939 and took command of the French navy. Following the June 1940 defeat of France, he joined the Vichy government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain as navy minister. In February 1941, he also became vice premier and minister of the interior, and in August 1941 he was made minister of defense. He was also Pétain’s designated successor. Darlan was an Anglophobe, especially after Operation CATAPULT and the killing of French sailors at Mers-el-Kébir. He hoped to win concessions for France through military agreements with the Germans. His May 1941 meeting with Adolf Hitler led to an agreement with German ambassador Otto Abetz. In the Paris Protocols, France granted major concessions to Germany in Africa and the Middle East, but the Germans gave little in return. By April 1942, rival Pierre Laval forced Darlan to relinquish his cabinet posts, except that of commander of the armed forces. Darlan traveled frequently to North Africa and was in Algiers when, on November 8, the Allies invaded in Operation TORCH. Darlan agreed to cooperate with the Allies and to order a cease-fire on November 10 in return for recognition of his authority. The deal was confirmed on November 11 with U.S. Major General Mark Clark and Ambassador Robert Murphy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the agreement, although some Allied leaders denounced it as an immoral act that gained little.

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Many people, including Allied leaders, wanted to see Darlan removed, and on December 24, 1942, 20-year-old French royalist Fernand Bonnier broke into Darlan’s office and shot him twice with a pistol. Darlan died two hours later. Bonnier was captured, tried, and executed two days afterward. The assassination of Darlan is shrouded in mystery and has been variously attributed to the United States, Britain, the Free French, French monarchists, and even the Germans. William P. Head and Spencer C. Tucker See also: CATAPULT, Operation; France, Navy.

References

Admiral Jean Darlan commanded the French Navy

Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt at the start of World War II. After France was deand American Foreign Policy, feated by Germany in June 1940, Darlan joined the 1932–1945. New York: Oxford collaborationist Vichy government. Commander of the French armed forces in North Africa at the University Press, 1979. Maguire, G. E. Anglo-American Pol- time of the Allied landings there in November 1942, icy Towards the Free French. New Darlan rallied to the Allies but was assassinated in December. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images) York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Melton, George E. Darlan: Admiral and Statesman of France, 1881–1942. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. Verrier, Anthony. Assassination in Algiers: Churchill, Roosevelt, De Gaulle, and the Murder of Admiral Darlan. New York: Norton, 1990.

Darwin, Raid on (February 19, 1942) First direct Japanese attack against Australia during the war. Into early 1942, Japanese forces moved inexorably down through the Philippines and Malay Peninsula and into the Netherlands East Indies. To secure Java and protect landings at Timor, the Japanese High Command decided to attack Darwin, a port city on Australia’s north coast used by the Allies to ferry aircraft, troops, and equipment to the East Indies. Commander Fuchida Mitsuo planned the raid, centered on the four aircraft

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carriers of Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s First Air Fleet and a covering force of two battleships and three heavy cruisers under Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake. It was the most powerful Japanese strike force since the attack on Pearl Harbor. On February 19, 1942, the Japanese carriers in the Timor Sea launched 188 aircraft against Darwin in two waves. Fifty-four land-based bombers joined them. A U.S. Navy PBY Catalina radioed a warning of the first wave but was then shot down. News reached Darwin just as 10 U.S. Army Air Forces P-40s of 33rd Squadron returned following an aborted attempt to reinforce Java. Five P-40s remained airborne to face the Japanese. The remaining five attempted to take off just as the Japanese planes arrived at about 10:00 a.m. Japanese Zeros claimed nine of the P-40s in the air; the survivor landed with severe damage. The second raid occurred two hours later. Overall, the Japanese sank eight ships, including the U.S. destroyer Peary, and damaged a further nine. Wharves and jetties suffered extensive damage, and 18 Allied aircraft were destroyed. The human toll was also high: some 500 to 600 people were killed or wounded. The Japanese accomplished all this at a cost of only 10 aircraft. This raid succeeded in its objective of assisting the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Japanese attacks on Darwin continued during the next several months. Rodney Madison See also: Fuchida Mitsuo; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of.

References Bergerud, Eric M. Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000. Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. Lockwood, Douglas. Australia’s Pearl Harbour. Melbourne, Australia: Cassell, 1967. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

Da Zara, Alberto (1889–1951) Italian navy admiral. Born in Padua on April 8, 1889, into a family of Jewish background, Alberto Da Zara entered the Italian Naval Academy in 1907 and was commissioned in 1911. He participated in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War and in World War I, earning promotion for his service and two silver medals for bravery as commander of motor torpedo boats.

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Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1923, Da Zara commanded a naval detachment in China from 1924 to 1925 and then served in the headquarters of the Venice Naval Command. In 1927 he was promoted to commander, and in 1930 he was appointed deputy commander of the battleship Duilio. Later he commanded other warships, including the cruiser Montecuccoli, in which in 1933 he made a long cruise in the Far East. He was promoted to captain during that cruise. He commanded the cruiser Aosta during its February 12, 1937, shelling of Republican positions at Valencia during the Spanish Civil War. Promoted to commodore in 1939, Da Zara then commanded the Albanian Naval Command. When Italy entered the war in June 1940, Da Zara commanded the Di Giussano group of the IV Division, in which he participated in the battle with the British navy off Calabria on July 9, 1940. Da Zara then received command of the Venice Arsenal, and, from August 1941 to March 1942, he headed the AntiSubmarine Inspectorate. Promoted to division admiral (rear admiral), in March 1942, Da Zara took command of the VII Division with his flag in the cruiser Eugenio di Savoia. He commanded the Italian forces in the Battle of Pantelleria on June 15, 1942, during Operation HARPOON, and for his bravery in battle he was awarded the Military Order of Savoy. He then carried out several actions with light vessels. In August 1943, Da Zara became commander of the V Division, hoisting his flag on the battleship Duilio. He held the command during the armistice with the Allies, and, upon receiving orders from the Italian naval command, which believed that German troops were threatening Taranto, he proceeded to Malta with his division. On March 10, 1944, Da Zara was promoted to vice admiral and became inspector of naval forces, with his flag in the battleship Giulio Cesare. With his notable service at sea and his recognized bravery under fire, Da Zara was arguably the most effective Italian admiral of the war. He retired in September 1946, wrote his war memoirs that year, and died in Foggia on June 4, 1951. Alessandro Massignani See also: Calabria, Battle of; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Da Zara, Alberto. Pelle d’ammiraglio. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1946. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

De Courten, Raffaele (1888–1978) Italian navy admiral. Raffaele de Courten was born in Milan on September 23, 1888. He became a midshipman in 1910 and volunteered for the naval air branch.

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During World War I on August 5, 1915, his airship, the Zeppelin Città di Jesi, was shot down over Pola, and de Courten became a prisoner of war. He was exchanged in June 1917. De Courten remained in the navy after the war, and in 1923 he was assigned to submarines, where he developed a reputation for expertise in that branch. Promoted to captain, de Courten served as naval attaché in Berlin from July 1933 until February 1936. He had a German mother and spoke the language fluently and enjoyed good relations with German chancellor Adolf Hitler. From December 1937 to May 1938, he was special naval liaison officer with the Imperial Japanese Navy in Tokyo. Promoted to rear admiral in June 1938, de Courten was appointed head of the newly created Ispettorato Armi Subacquee (Inspectorate of Underwater Weapons), tasked with increasing the efficiency of submarines, torpedoes, and mines. He was also responsible for developing the special attack craft and selecting the personnel for Italy’s naval commandos. In May 1940, he was reassigned to Supermarina, the naval headquarters, and was promoted to admiral in October 1940. In August 1941, de Courten assumed command of the VIII (light cruiser) Division where he gained a reputation for luck, not losing a single freighter under his escort. In March 1943, de Courten became deputy Sottocapo di Stato Maggiore, the number three posting in Supermarina after admirals Arturo Riccardi and Luigi Sansonetti. De Courten assumed administrative responsibilities so that Sansonetti, the number two, could concentrate on naval operations. On July 25, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III appointed de Courten naval minister. De Courten asked for and received the post of chief of staff two days later and thus assumed full charge of the navy. Although he did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the Italian armistice of September 8, 1943, he ensured that the navy followed government policy and that it remained a cohesive force, much to the disappointment of the Germans, who had considered him the most reliable member of the Italian high command. In October 1943, de Courten signed an accord with British admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham for Italian naval cooperation against Germany. In September 1946, de Courten suffered a serious car accident. He resigned from the navy on December 31, 1946, to protest the insistence of the Allied powers in claiming Italian ships as war reparations. In 1947, de Courten became president of the Navigazione Generale Italiana shipping company. He died at Frascati, near Rome, on August 23, 1978. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Human Torpedoes; Italy, Navy; Riccardi, Arturo; Sansonetti, Luigi.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957.

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De Courten, Raffaele. Le memorie dell’ammiraglio De Courten (1943–1946). Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1993. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994.

Decoy Ships (Q-Ships) Special ships deployed specifically to operate against enemy submarines. During World War I, the British employed such decoys as part of their response to German submarine warfare. The first were trawlers armed with concealed weapons that sailed with the fishing fleet, but the vast majority of the decoys were deployed in the Western Approaches and based at Queenstown, Ireland (hence the designation of Q-ships). Posing as merchant ships and assigned to areas where U-boats were known to be operating, decoy ships sought to persuade submarine captains to engage them on the surface with their deck guns, rather than having to employ expensive and scarce torpedoes. The Q-ships carried several guns concealed behind false works and so arranged that they could be deployed quickly at the right moment. Their cargoes might be light wood (balsa or cork) so that the ships could stay afloat if torpedoed. The ships also made use of false national colors until they were ready to fire, when the White Ensign (Royal Navy flag) would be hoisted. Q-ships might also use “panic parties” of supposedly fleeing crewmen to distract a U-boat crew until they were ready to strike. Although the British may have operated as many as 400 mercantile conversions and 60 purpose-built decoys during the war, their success was limited. One authority claims only 11 U-boats were sunk by Q-ships, although other authors claim up to 30 submarines. Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the United States also operated limited numbers of these ships. Because decoy ships were not cost effective in an environment of unrestricted submarine warfare, far fewer numbers of them were employed during World War II. The Royal Navy deployed 10 such ships during the war. Ranging from 510 to 5,119 tons displacement, they included the Chatsgrove, Maunder, Prunella, Lambridge, Edgehill, Brutus, Cyprus, Looe, and the Antoine. The Edgehill and Prunella were both sunk in June 1940, and the remainder were paid off in March 1941. The last British Q-ship of the war was the 2,450-ton Fidelity. Converted in September 1940, it carried an antitorpedo net, four 4-inch guns, four torpedo tubes, two OS2U Kingfisher float planes, and a motor torpedo boat. Sailing with a French crew, the Fidelity was sunk in the course of a North Atlantic convoy battle on December 30, 1942. When the Germans initiated Operation Paukenschlag (DRUMBEAT), concentrating submarines off the Atlantic U.S. coast with ensuing heavy U.S. merchant ship losses, the U.S. Navy converted five ships into decoys at Portsmouth, New

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Hampshire. These were the Eagle (subsequently the Captor), Asterion, Atik, Big Horn, and the Irene Forsyth. The Eagle, a former fishing trawler, 133 ft. in overall length, was armed with one 4-inch gun, two .50-caliber machine guns, four depth charge throwers, two .30-caliber machine guns, and a number of small arms to include hand grenades. It had a crew of 47. The Atik and Asterion were larger. These former cargo ships were of 3,209 tons displacement and 318 ft. in overall length. They carried four 4-inch guns, four .50-caliber machine guns, six depth charge throwers, and an assortment of small arms. The decoy ships were not successful. The Atik was sunk on its first patrol by U-101, and the others had uneventful patrols. All such efforts ended in 1943. Several U.S. Q-ships also operated in the Pacific, one being the Anacapa. While it did not sink any Japanese submarines, the Anacapa is believed to have damaged two U.S. submarines with depth charges. It was also withdrawn from service in 1943. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation.

References Beyer, Kenneth M. Q-Ships versus U-Boats: America’s Secret Project. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-boat War. Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1996–1998. Bridgeland, Tony. Sea Killers in Disguise. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Chatterton, E. Keble. Q-Ships and Their Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972. Lenton, Henry T., and J. J. Colledge. British and Dominion Warships of World War II. London: Greenhill Books, 1998.

Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) was the name of a British program to arm and man the armament on British merchant ships during World War II. The program was established in June 1939 with the goal of arming some 5,500 vessels. A total of 3,400 ships had been armed by the end of 1940; all were armed by 1943. At the beginning of World War II, most merchant ships equipped with guns carried obsolete weaponry left over from World War I. In time, the equipment was upgraded to include an antisubmarine gun (usually a 3-inch or 4-inch) on the stern and, in many cases, a second gun of similar caliber on the bow. Several antiaircraft guns were provided elsewhere. For example, a typical Liberty ship carried four .50-caliber machine guns on the flying bridge in addition to two on the

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fore deck and two on the after deck. DEMS and Armed Guard crews were usually service personnel, although they were frequently augmented by members of the ship’s merchant crew. Neutrality legislation prevented the arming of U.S. merchant ships until November 17, 1941. The United States began supplying Armed Guard personnel and weapons to the merchant ships of other nations on January 24, 1942. The United States followed the British practice of mounting a large gun at the stern (at first 4-inch guns removed from obsolete destroyer classes, then 5-inch guns on ships of more than 10,000 tons). Most Victory ships were armed with one 5-inch gun mounted at the stern for antisubmarine use, with antiaircraft armament of a single bow-mounted 3-inch gun and eight 20-mm cannon. These weapons were manned by U.S. Navy Armed Guard personnel. The effectiveness of DEMS and the U.S. program are difficult to assess, but they did reduce the number of German submarine attacks and added to the number of aircraft shot down. Walter W. Jaffee See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Liberty Ships.

References Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Greatest Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Depth Charges Explosive devices designed to sink a submarine by detonating in its vicinity when triggered by water pressure, by the target’s magnetic or acoustic signature, or by a variety of timers. From 1916 until 1943, well into World War II, the depth charge was the principal antisubmarine weapon of all navies, after which more sophisticated weapons with greater range came to the fore. In 1939, most navies used weapons similar to the British Type D Mark III (which entered service in 1916). The Mark III had a charge of approximately 200 lb. and a sink rate of 6 to 10 ft. per second and was triggered hydrostatically to explode at depths between 25 and 300 ft. Such charges had a lethal radius of 20 ft., and, exploding at 40 ft., they could force a submarine to surface. Antisubmarine vessels discharged depth charges from roll-off racks and mortars (throwers) that projected them some 40 yards to the side. At the beginning of the war, the normal procedure for antisubmarine attacks was to use depth charges in patterns of five—three

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dropped in a line using gravity from the roll-off racks at the stern and two fired (one to each side) by throwers to produce a diamond-shaped pattern intended to bracket the target submarine. Development during World War II concentrated on four main areas: larger charges, faster sink rates, greater fused depths, and more effective patterns. More powerful explosives such as Minol and Torpex, which were 50 percent more effective than TNT, replaced guncotton, and charges also increased in size. The U.S. and British navies introduced weapons with 600-lb. explosive charges in 1941. In 1942, the Royal Navy introduced the massive Mark X weapon with a 2,000-lb. charge. It was so large it was fired from 21-inch torpedo tubes retained on destroyers and escorts for this specific purpose. Sink rates rose to 22 to 50 ft. per second, either by adding weights to conventional charges (heavy charges) or by streamlining the cases. Modified fuses also allowed depth charges to explode deeper, doubling the maximum depth to 600 ft. (at 50-ft. intervals). The modified Mark X* sank faster because one buoyancy chamber was deleted and could be fused to explode down to 900 ft., while the Mark X** (which did not enter operational service) could be set to explode as deep as 1,200 ft. Equally important were more effective dropping patterns. Modified casings resulted in more reliable and predictable underwater trajectories, newer projectors increased surface ranges to 150 yards, and mathematical analysis generated patterns having greater kill probabilities. First, the addition of another thrower on each beam allowed use of a seven-charge pattern in the form of a hexagon, increasing the danger zone. Mixing standard and heavy charges created a new, highly effective 10-charge pattern that layered two diamond-shaped five-charge patterns, one above the other. The final development was a three-layer 14-charge pattern using four throwers on each side and six charges dropped from the stern racks. Operational experience, however, demonstrated that, although the pattern was theoretically much more lethal than the 10-charge pattern, in practice the explosion of the first charges countermined the later charges and rendered them ineffective. Therefore, the antisubmarine force reverted to the 10-charge pattern and replaced the additional throwers with stowage for extra charges. Air-dropped depth charges played an important role during and after World War II. First designs were modifications of existing surface types, which limited their efficacy, since their weight reduced the number that could be carried and they were also subject to restrictions on dropping height and speed. The purposedesigned types that followed were lighter and less subject to dropping restrictions. Scientific analysis of attack camera records contributed mightily to the effectiveness of air-dropped depth charges. Scientists learned that charges were dropped too low and with depth fuse settings that were too deep to be effective. The ultimate fuse setting for aerial depth charges of 25 ft. and new bomb sights and tactics transformed the weapons’ effectiveness.

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During 1944, newer weapons such as Hedgehog, Squid, and homing torpedoes surpassed depth charges in the sinking of submarines. Nevertheless, the depth charge was still an important antisubmarine weapon until after the war’s end. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Hunter-Killer Groups; Sonar.

References Brown, D. K. Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development, 1923–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Friedman, Norman. Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Hartman, Gregory K., with Scott C. Truver. Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Destroyer Escorts and Frigates Warships smaller than regular destroyers and designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare. Great Britain first built this type of warship to address the shortage of regular destroyers engaged in the defense of its shipping lanes against German submarines, as they were cheaper to construct and shipyards could produce them more rapidly than larger warships. After entering the war in December 1941, the United States also built both types for use in the Battle of the Atlantic. The destroyer escort, being the more capable of the two designs, first appeared in 1939 in the British Hunt class. The Hunt class escort destroyer displaced 1,175 tons and was 296 ft. in overall length with a beam of 33 ft. 4 in. Its engines were capable of producing a speed of 26 knots. Armament consisted of six 4-inch quick-firing guns, four 2-pounder pom-pom guns for antiaircraft defense, three 21-inch torpedo tubes, and up to 70 depth charges. It had a crew of 170 officers and men. By the end of the war and owing to its far greater industrial capacity, the United States had built far more of these ships than had Britain. The last American variants, built during 1943 and 1944, were the “DET” and “FMR” classes, designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare but also capable of antiaircraft defense. The DET and FMR classes displaced 1,253 tons, were 306 ft. in overall length by 36 ft. 7 in. in beam, and were capable of 20.2 knots. Armament consisted of 3 3-inch guns, 3 21inch torpedo tubes, and an antisubmarine battery of one Hedgehog, 8 depth charge throwers, and 2 depth charge racks. These classes also mounted 2 40-mm Bofors

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and between 8 and 10 20-mm Oerlikon guns for antiaircraft defense. These ships had a crew complement of 186. As with destroyer escorts, Great Britain also pioneered the design of frigates, which were ships solely for use against submarines while escorting merchantmen. The first frigates were those of the River class, launched beginning in 1942. A River-class frigate displaced 1,310 tons and was 301 ft. 4 in. in overall length and 36 ft. in beam. It was capable of a speed of 21 knots. Its armament consisted of only two 4-inch guns, but it possessed a large antisubmarine warfare battery of a Hedgehog and 126 depth charges mounted in racks. Britain subsequently built several classes of frigates based on the River class, while the United States built one class of the same design but armed with three 3-inch guns, four 40-mm, and nine 20-mm antiaircraft guns. Antisubmarine armament consisted of one Hedgehog, 8 depth charge throwers, and 2 depth charge racks. By the end of the war, the numbers of escorts, being primarily destroyer escorts and frigates, eclipsed that of conventional destroyers. Great Britain commissioned 349 of them while the United States produced 499 escorts. Eric W. Osborne See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Destroyers; Sloops and Corvettes.

References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Ireland, Bernard. The World Encyclopedia of Destroyers and Frigates: An Illustrated History of Destroyers and Frigates, from Torpedo Boat Destroyers, Corvettes and Escort Vessels through to the Modern Ships of the Missile Age. London: Lorenz, 2008. Osborne, Eric W. Destroyers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005.

Destroyers Small warships that are lightly armed and protected and capable of high speed. The destroyer originated in connection with the self-propelled torpedo, which was introduced in the late 1860s, and the consequent construction in the following decade of torpedo boats to carry the new weapon. These small, inexpensive warships offered the potential to destroy battleships, which were the most powerful and most costly vessels afloat. Most naval powers of the age, as they based their fleet strength on the battleship, endeavored to devise a defense against the torpedo boat. In 1893, Great Britain produced an answer in the Havock, the first modern torpedo-boat destroyer.

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Torpedo-boat destroyers were essentially enlarged torpedo boats that carried light guns and torpedoes. They were charged with hunting down and destroying enemy torpedo boats before the latter could launch their weapons against the capital ships of a battle fleet. Development in all maritime nations yielded vast improvements over the first torpedo-boat destroyers. By World War I, there were more of these warships (known by this time simply as destroyers) than of any other ship type in the world’s navies. The role of destroyers changed because of their increasing design capabilities in the years before World War I and from wartime experience. Destroyers became superior in all respects to the torpedo boats they were designed to destroy. As a result, naval powers in the prewar years largely discontinued the production of torpedo boats in favor of destroyers. The destroyer assumed the offensive role of torpedo boat while retaining the role of defending against torpedo attacks launched by enemy destroyers. World War I added extensively to the duties of these vessels. By the end of that conflict, destroyers had acted not only in the roles envisioned for their type, but also as surface combatants and bombardment ships in amphibious operations. More important than these uses, however, was their use by Great Britain, France, and later the United States as convoy escorts to defend against submarine attack. Destroyers were particularly effective in this capacity after the wartime introduction of depth charges and underwater listening devices such as hydrophones and sonar. World War I demonstrated the importance of destroyers, and the same basic types continued during the interwar years. Great Britain had such large numbers of the craft that fresh designs were not initiated immediately after the close of the war in 1918. However, destroyer construction in Italy led France to respond, because French politicians and naval officials viewed Italy as France’s principal naval competitor in the Mediterranean. In 1923, France built large vessels that began a trend toward superdestroyers in the world’s navies. Great Britain and Japan returned to destroyer production in the late 1920s; the United States did not initiate new construction until the early part of the next decade. Germany, although restricted by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, began building new vessels at the same time as the United States. This destroyer construction took place in an era of naval disarmament as the world’s great powers sought to limit production as a means to prevent future wars. Unlike most other warships, few restrictions were put on the design and number of destroyers during the naval disarmament talks of the period. The 1930 London Conference limited destroyers to a maximum displacement of 1,850 tons and their guns to five inches or smaller, but these stipulations meant little. Until the late 1930s, the largest and most heavily armed designs met these requirements, and the limit was increasingly ignored after 1934, when the Japanese withdrew from the Washington Treaty and declared that they would not support future arms limitations discussions.

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The U.S. Somers class is an example of destroyer design in the years immediately before the outbreak of World War II. Completed in 1937, the Somers measured 381 ft. by 36 ft. 11 in. and displaced 2,047 tons. It had exceptionally heavy armament: 8 5-inch guns, 8 1.1-inch guns, 2 half-inch weapons, and 12 21-inch torpedo tubes. The Somers had no armor protection and could steam at a maximum speed of 37 knots. The largest destroyers belonging to other naval powers loosely approximated the size, displacement, and armament of this class. France remained the exception as it continued to design destroyers that dwarfed those of other nations. The Mogador, launched in 1937, measured 451 ft. 1 in. by 41 ft. 7 in., displaced 2,884 tons, and carried no armor protection. It was armed primarily with 8 5.5-inch guns and 10 X 21.7-inch torpedo tubes and was capable of 39 knots. Despite the increase in the size and armament of destroyers, they were, in most respects, technologically the same as their World War I predecessors—although in some destroyer classes, the largest guns were mounted in gun houses rather than open mounts to provide protection for crews. Another difference from the past was the incorporation of antiaircraft guns to fend off air attack. By 1940, as during World War I, destroyers were the most numerous warships in the world’s navies. Great Britain operated 247 destroyers of varying types and ages. The United States counted 149, and Japan had 116. Italy operated 90 destroyers. The other naval powers of the world also possessed large fleets: France maintained 66; the Soviet Union had 62; and Germany, through a naval policy that had violated the Treaty of Versailles, possessed 32. World War II proved the continued importance of the roles destroyers had performed in the previous world conflict and introduced a new vital duty. In the Atlantic theater, the primary task of British and Canadian destroyers was as convoy escort to guard against attack of merchant vessels by German submarines. This effort proved so important that the destroyer formed the basis for one of the first diplomatic agreements between Great Britain and the United States during the war. The 1940 Destroyers-Bases Deal transferred 50 aging World War I–era U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for basing rights in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout the war, destroyers fought and helped to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Despite heavy losses in merchant vessels, ultimate Allied success in this effort allowed Great Britain to continue in the war. In addition, it enabled the transport of U.S. troops to the European and Mediterranean theaters after 1941. Destroyers also served as escorts for fleet units, as surface combatants, in support of amphibious operations, as troop transports, and as resupply ships. An example in the Atlantic theater of the first four of these roles is Germany’s April 1940 invasion of Norway. Destroyers escorted the German battleships and cruisers involved in the operation and not only bombarded areas earmarked for the landing of troops, but they also attempted to fend off attacks from opposing British warships, and

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they transported a portion of the German ground force. The same roles existed for destroyers in the Mediterranean, where they routinely bombarded enemy ports and troop positions, and Allied units supported all the major amphibious operations starting with Operation TORCH, the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa. British vessels also acted as resupply ships for Tobruk and Italian destroyers as fast emergency transports for North Africa. These same roles were prevalent in the Pacific theater, involving largely the forces of the United States and Japan. The Japanese used the destroyers both as surface combatants and as resupply vessels. Destroyers armed with the Long Lance torpedo were a key element of Japanese tactical operations and proved their effectiveness, especially in early night actions. The best example of a resupply effort was the famous Tokyo Express, which supplied Japanese troops during the 1942–1943 contest for Guadalcanal. Destroyers were well suited for this resupply role because they were fast enough to make the voyage to Guadalcanal and depart still under cover of darkness. Early U.S. deficiencies in night fighting were overcome, and U.S. destroyers soon matched their Japanese counterparts in surface combat. In the August 1943 Battle of Vella Gulf, U.S. destroyers sank three Japanese destroyers with no losses. The Japanese also used destroyers to protect convoys that supplied the home islands with war matériel. In addition, use of destroyers in an antiaircraft role was widespread in the Pacific theater. Both the Japanese and the United States sought ways to effectively defend their most important capital ships, the aircraft carriers. Destroyers partly filled the need for antiaircraft defense. This critical duty was reflected in the significant increase in the antiaircraft gun batteries of both Japanese and U.S. destroyers during the war. The 12 Japanese Akitsuki-class ships, launched between 1941 and 1944, mounted only four 25-mm guns in addition to their primary armament of eight 3.9-inch guns, which could be used against surface targets or elevated and used against aircraft. By the end of the war, the complement of 25-mm guns had risen to 40 to 51 each for the surviving ships of the class. U.S. destroyers showed the same shift to greater antiaircraft armament over the course of the war based on combat experience. By 1944, the 58 vessels of the Allen M. Sumner class mounted a primary armament of six 5-inch guns that could be used for surface combat or against aircraft and a smaller battery of 12 40-mm guns specifically devoted to antiaircraft defense. The large number of critical roles performed by the destroyers and their consequent frequent use led to wartime construction that yielded an additional 633 destroyers among the principal naval combatants. The vast majority of these vessels were produced in the United States and Great Britain, which completed 392 and 165 ships, respectively. An example of wartime construction is the 150-ship U.S. Navy Fletcher class. Launched between 1942 and 1944, these vessels measured 376 ft. 5 in. by 39 ft. 7 in., displaced 2,325 tons, and were protected by light side

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The U.S. Navy Benson/Gleaves class destroyer Aaron Ward. Commissioned in March 1942, it succumbed to a Japanese air attack off Guadalcanal on April 7, 1943. (U.S. Navy)

and deck armor. They were armed with five 5-inch guns, four 1.1-inch weapons, four 20-mm guns for antiaircraft defense, and 10 21-inch torpedo tubes. They could make 38 knots. The necessity for vessels to fulfill convoy escort roles also led to the production of a new type of destroyer that was cheaper and faster to build. Known as the destroyer escort, this ship was an essentially smaller, less capable destroyer with greater antisubmarine warfare capability. An example is the U.S. TE-class escort, which measured 306 ft. by 37 ft. and displaced 1,432 tons. These were armed with three 3-inch guns and an assortment of antisubmarine weaponry. During the war, the belligerent powers constructed 915 destroyer escorts. The United States and Great Britain accounted for the majority of this production with 499 and 349 ships, respectively. The design of both the destroyers and destroyer escorts of the Allies and Germany and Italy benefited from the incorporation of radar, which was retrofitted to vessels produced before the war. World War II exacted a heavy toll in terms of destroyers lost. By the end of the conflict, the belligerents had suffered a combined loss of 490 destroyers of varying types: among these, Japan lost 147; Great Britain suffered 133 sunk, largely in the

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Battle of the Atlantic; Italy lost 69 vessels; the United States counted 68 destroyers sunk; the Soviet Union lost 26; and France lost 14. Eric W. Osborne See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Central Pacific Campaign; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Convoys, Axis; Depth Charges; Destroyers-Bases Deal; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Greer, Attack on; Guadalcanal Naval Battles of; Hunter-Killer Groups; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Radar; Reuben James, Sinking of; Savo Island, Battle of; Sonar; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Torpedoes; United States, Navy; Vella Gulf, Battle of.

References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. George, James L. History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Preston, Anthony. Destroyers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977. Whitley, M. J. Destroyers of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

Destroyers-Bases Deal (September 2, 1940) An agreement between U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill in 1940 that provided Great Britain with World War I–vintage U.S. destroyers, in return giving the United States access to British bases in North America and the Caribbean. Following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Britain was virtually naked militarily, and the nation now awaited a German attack. When Churchill appealed to Roosevelt for military assistance, the U.S. reaction was immediate and extraordinary. Within days, 600 freight cars were on their way to U.S. ports filled with military equipment to be loaded aboard British merchant ships. These included half a million rifles and 900 old 75-mm field guns. On June 15, Churchill directly appealed to Roosevelt for 35 old U.S. destroyers. With Germany controlling both the English Channel ports and Norway, Britain faced the prospect of defending against German invasion with only 68 destroyers fit for service, a stark contrast to the 433 destroyers possessed by the Royal Navy in 1918. Britain’s shipping lanes were even more vulnerable to German submarines with the fall of France, and Italy’s entry into the war had made the Mediterranean an area of difficult passage. As Churchill put it to Roosevelt, “We must ask

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therefore as a matter of life or death to be reinforced with these destroyers.” During the course of the next days and weeks, as the number of these British warships continued to dwindle, Churchill’s appeal grew to 50 to 60 destroyers. Roosevelt’s insistence on proceeding with the aid went against the advice of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, who believed that Britain was doomed and that such a step would strip the United States bare militarily before new production could materialize. With U.S. public opinion strongly opposed to U.S. intervention, Roosevelt masked the transfer in a deal announced on September 3, 1940, in the form of an executive order, not subject to congressional approval. Britain received 50 World War I–vintage destroyers from the United States, in return granting the United States rights of 99-year leases to British bases in North America and the Caribbean Islands. The United States claimed that the agreement did not violate U.S. neutrality because the British were providing access to naval bases and facilities deemed essential for U.S. defense, including those in Newfoundland, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad. The Roosevelt administration maintained that the deal was an important step in ensuring national security and preventing the spread of the European war to the Americas. Actually, the United States got far more than it gave. The destroyers were in wretched condition; some barely made it across the Atlantic. But the deal gave a tremendous boost to British morale at a critical juncture, and Churchill viewed this as another step by the United States toward outright participation. Privately, German leader Adolf Hitler saw this in much the same light. Anxious to unleash Japan in Asia to occupy the United States, he ordered talks opened with Japan that culminated in the Tripartite Pact of September 27. The long war, a clash involving continents that would give advantage to nations with superior sea power, drew closer to realization. One of the destroyers, HMS Campbeltown (formerly the USS Buchanan) played a major role in the British destruction of the dry dock at SaintNazaire, France, on March 28, 1942. James T. Carroll and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty.”

References Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. Meacham, John. Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship. New York: Random House, 2003. Shogan, Robert. Hard Bargain: How FDR Twisted Churchill’s Arm, Evaded the Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency. New York: Scribner, 1995.

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DETACHMENT, Operation (Invasion of Iwo Jima, February 19, 1945) The penultimate test of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious doctrine and practice. By the end of 1944, U.S. forces had secured control of the Mariana Islands to provide air bases for B-29 strategic bombers that could strike Japan. En route to Japan, these bombers flew over Iwo Jima (Sulphur Island). Located in the Japanese Bonin Islands, halfway between the Marianas and Japan, the pork chop–shaped volcanic island of Iwo Jima is from 800 yards to 2.5 miles wide and 5 miles long, with a total area of some 8 square miles. Iwo Jima housed a radar facility that gave Tokyo advance notice of impending air attacks as well as three airstrips for fighter aircraft to harass the U.S. bombers. As a consequence, U.S. commanders formulated Operation DETACHMENT to seize Iwo Jima. Japanese leaders realized the strategic importance of Iwo Jima and began reinforcing it a year prior to the U.S. invasion. Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, the island’s commander, disregarded the traditional Japanese defensive doctrine of meeting the enemy at the shoreline and implemented a new strategy that relied on some 1,500 interlocking strong points inland, designed for a battle of attrition. His force of 21,000 men dug out thousands of yards of tunnels in the soft volcanic rock. Beginning in August 1944, U.S. Army aircraft in the Marianas subjected Iwo Jima to air strikes, and from December 8, the island came under daily attack. Three heavy cruisers bombarded Iwo Jima three times in December and twice in January. Then, for two weeks beginning in late January, Seventh Air Force bombed Iwo Jima day and night, and B-29s struck it twice. In all, U.S. forces dropped 6,800 tons of bombs. As it turned out, this only drove the Japanese defenders further underground. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, cut the naval bombardment of the island, begun on February 16, 1945, back to only three days. This was a far shorter period than the 10 days sought by V Marine Amphibious Corps commander Lieutenant General Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith. Spruance concurred with invasion commander Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner that he lacked both ships and ammunition for the longer bombardment. The bombardment force included 6 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and 16 destroyers, while the invasion force totaled 880 ships of all types. Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy had command of Amphibious Support Task Force (TG 52), charged with all prelanding activities, including shore bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition. In all, the navy fired 22,000 rounds of 5-inch to 16-inch shells prior to the invasion, the heaviest bombardment of the Pacific war. Beginning at 8:59 a.m. on February 19, 1945, 30,000 men of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine divisions stormed ashore, only to encounter Iwo Jima’s coarse, black

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volcanic sand. Heavy surf smashed the landing craft against the island’s shelf, and the deep sand immobilized many vehicles on the beach. The resulting logjam of men and equipment on the beachhead provided prime targets for Japanese fire, and the marines were forced to fight their way inland. For the next 36 days, assisted by flamethrowers, demolition charges, bazookas, tanks, and air support, the marines pushed their way through Kuribayashi’s defenses, sometimes advancing only a few feet per day. By March 26, 1945, nearly 70,000 marines had conquered most of the island, at a cost of approximately 6,500 dead and 20,000 wounded. More than 95 percent of the Japanese defenders died during the same period, and pockets of Japanese resistance continued to emerge from concealed caves throughout April and May, resulting in 1,600 additional Japanese deaths. Fewer than 300 Japanese were taken prisoner. The struggle for Iwo Jima epitomized the courage and esprit of the Marine Corps during the war. Twenty-two marines, four navy corpsmen, and one navy officer on Iwo Jima earned the Medal of Honor (almost half of them posthumously), accounting for one-third of all such medals won by marines during the entire war. With the island firmly in U.S. possession, U.S. bombers pounded the Japanese homeland unabated. In the midst of the heaviest fighting on March 4, the first of 2,500 U.S. bombers made emergency landings on the island, and some 2,000 B-29s force-landed there from March to August. Given that these planes carried 10-man crews, this represented up to 20,000 airmen. U.S. Army Air Forces long-range fighters also moved Iwo Jima and began to escort the B-29s to Japan. The bombers now mixed medium-level daytime raids with the low-level night attacks. With the fighters along, losses of Japanese planes mounted rapidly, while those of the B-29s continued to decline. Derek W. Frisby See also: Blandy, William Henry Purnell; Central Pacific Campaign; Mariana Islands Campaign; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

References Alexander, Joseph. Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1994. Bradley, James. Flags of Our Fathers. New York: Bantam Books, 2000. Wright, Derrick. The Battle for Iwo Jima, 1945. Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 1999.

Deutschland Class, German Battleships Class of German “pocket battleships” built in the early 1930s. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles restricted the composition of the Germany navy. Capital ships were limited both in number and in size and could have a maximum displacement of

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10,000 tons and gun caliber of 280-mm (11 inches). Utilizing new technologies in electric welding and diesel propulsion, Germany built the Deutschland class of the Deutschland, Admiral Graf Spee, and the Admiral Scheer. To avoid any conflict in the interpretation of the Versailles Treaty, the Deutschland-class ships were described as Panzerschiffe (armored ships). Designed as long-range merchant raiders, these capital ships were heavily armed, yet thinly protected. Conceptually, they were to be stronger than any faster vessel. Ships of the Deutschland class displaced 11,700 tons standard load and 15,900 to 16,200 tons under deep load. They were 610 ft. 3 in. in overall length and 70 ft. 10 in. in breadth. Their three propeller shafts produced a maximum speed of 28 knots. Armor varied in thickness from 1.6 in. on the main deck to 6 in. on the conning tower. Main armament on each ship numbered six 280mm (11-inch) guns. Secondary armament included eight 150-mm, six 105-mm, and eight 37-mm guns, as well as six 20-mm antiaircraft guns and eight 533-mm torpedo tubes. Each warship carried two catapult-launched aircraft. The Deutschlands were more powerful than any faster ships, save three British battle cruisers. In 1940 they were reclassified as heavy cruisers. During World War II all three successfully carried out their missions as commerce raiders. The Deutschland sank 6,962 tons of shipping, the Admiral Graf Spee 50,089 tons, and the Admiral Scheer 137,223 tons. Built at the Wilhelmshaven Navy Yard, the Admiral Graf Spee was laid down on October 1, 1932, launched on June 30, 1934, and commissioned on January 6, 1936. Following the Battle of the Río de la Plata (Battle of the River Plate) on December 13, 1939, it was scuttled four days later in the Río de la Plata estuary after the British convinced its commanding officer, Captain Hans W. Langsdorff, that a superior force was standing off Montevideo. Hitler immediately ordered the name Deutschland changed to Lützow to prevent the possible sinking of any ship bearing the symbolic name “Germany.” Constructed by Deutsche Werke of Kiel, the Lützow was laid down on February 5, 1929, launched on May 19, 1931, and commissioned on April 1, 1933. It was scuttled at Swinemünde on May 4, 1945, after heavy damage suffered from near-misses by Royal Air Force bombing. The wreck was broken up in the 1960s. The Admiral Scheer was built at the Wilhelmshaven Navy Yard. Laid down on June 25, 1932, it was launched on April 1, 1933, and commissioned on November 12, 1934. It was sunk by the RAF on April 9, 1945, at Kiel. The capsized wreck was partially scrapped and later made part of the foundation of a new quay. Walter W. Jaffee See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Battleships; Germany, Navy; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Río de la Plata, Battle of.

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References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922-1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1997. Ireland, Bernard. Jane’s Battleships of the 20th Century. New York: Harper Collins, 1996.

Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on (May 30, 1942) Japanese midget submarine attack on shipping in the harbor of Diégo-Suarez (now Antsiranana), Madagascar. At the time, the British were in control of the harbor, having seized it from the Vichy French in early March 1942 to protect shipping routes to the Middle East and India. During March 1942, the Japanese planned a two-part operation by midget submarines in Australian waters and the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean operation was to be carried out by the 8th Submarine Group, commanded by Commodore Ishizaki Noboru. Ishizaki sortied from Penang, Malaysia, on April 30 with five submarines. Two carried one reconnaissance seaplane each, while the other three each carried one Type A midget submarine. After refueling from the armed merchant cruiser Hokoku Maru on May 5, the submarines searched for shipping up and down the African coast. Following their successful invasion of Madagascar, the British fleet had dispersed. Only the battleship Ramillies, three destroyers, and two corvettes remained at Diégo-Suarez. On the night of May 29, one of the Japanese seaplanes flew over Diégo-Suarez and reported the presence of a Queen Elizabeth–class battleship in the harbor. The British spotted the plane but could not intercept it. They believed it was a Vichy French plane scouting for French submarines known to be in the area. The Ramillies was ready to get under way by 5:00 a.m. on May 30 and sailed around the bay to foil an expected attack. During daylight, Fleet Air Arm planes flew antisubmarine patrols over Diégo-Suarez. At dusk, the Ramillies again anchored. Ishizaki ordered the midget submarines, which were 10 miles out to sea, launched at dusk on May 29. Only two were launched, and only one entered the harbor. At 8:34 p.m. on May 30, Lieutenant Saburo Akeida and Petty Officer Masami Takemoto fired a single torpedo that struck the Ramillies, blowing a large hole in the battleship’s port bulge and causing it to immediately sink by the bow. An hour later, Saburo and Masami launched their remaining torpedo at the oil tanker British Loyalty, sinking it. The corvettes dropped depth charges throughout the night, damaging the midget, which ran aground. Saburo and Masami made it ashore and began walking across northern Madagascar toward a prearranged rendezvous. The British believed a French submarine had attacked them. Not until three days later, when a British patrol encountered and killed both Saburo and Masami, did the British realize who had attacked them.

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The Ramillies was the largest victim of any Japanese midget submarine attack. Temporarily repaired, it sailed for Durban on June 3, where complete repairs took nearly a year. Tim J. Watts See also: Submarines.

References Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. O’Neill, Richard. Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II: Their Development and Their Missions. London: Salamander Books, 1981. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. Vol. 2, The Period of Balance. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offices, 1956.

Dodecanese Islands Campaign (September– November 1943) The islands of the southern Aegean Sea off the southwest coast of Anatolia were known through much of their history as the eastern or southern Sporades (“scattered”). The islands include Rhodes, Karpathos, Kassos, Haliki, Kastellorizo (Castlerosso), Alimia, Tilos, Symi (Simi), Nissyros, Kos (Cos), Pserimos, Astypalea, Kalymnos, Telendhos, Leros, Lipsi, Patmos, Arki, and Agnthonissi. Early in the 20th century, the Young Turks revoked the historic privileges enjoyed by the islanders, who were part of the Ottoman Empire. Twelve islands (dhodkeka nisia) joined in a failed protest against the loss of these privileges, and the name of Dodecanese stuck as a term for all these islands, even though they exceeded 12 in number. In 1912, as a consequence of the Italo-Turkish War, the Dodecanese Islands passed to Italian control. In 1941, the Germans joined their Italian allies in garrisoning the islands, which were inhabited chiefly by Greeks. The Italians had naval and air bases on Rhodes, the strategic key to the area. There was also an airfield on Kos, a seaplane and naval base and naval batteries at Leros, and an air base on Scarpanto. When Italy signed an armistice on September 8, 1943, the Dodecanese were occupied by two poorly equipped Italian divisions; along with air force, naval and auxiliary troops, the Italian garrison totaled 37,000 men, but their morale was very low. The Germans had one division of 7,000 men, which was well equipped with tanks and artillery. The local Greek population was excited at the prospect of liberation by the Allied powers. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered that operations be conducted against the Dodecanese Islands. He believed that success there would open

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the way to the Dardanelles and the Balkans. He also sought to induce Turkey to join the war and to remove the stain of Britain’s defeat in World War I at Gallipoli. The original plan for an invasion of the Dodecanese, prepared by the Middle East Command, was known as Operation MANDIBLES, but it was subsequently renamed Operation ACCOLADE. Churchill appealed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for aid to liberate the Dodecanese. The Americans, who were preparing a landing on the Italian peninsula at Salerno, rebuffed him. Roosevelt also suspected that the British hoped to open a new front in the Balkans. Coincidentally, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Quebec ordered most of the landing ships in the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, which starved the operation of needed assets. On September 9, 1943, three British operatives led by Major Lord George Jellicoe parachuted onto Rhodes. They contacted Italian authorities there and urged them to take the Germans prisoner. However, the governor, Admiral Inigo Campioni, hesitated. The Germans, meanwhile, acted swiftly, and on September 11, the Italians on Rhodes surrendered to the Germans. The British nonetheless proceeded with some landings, and by October 1943— deploying a force of 5,000 men, six Royal Air Force squadrons, a destroyer flotilla, and six submarines—they secured several islands, among them Kos, Samos, Patmos, and Leros. They were not able, however, to either gain air superiority or take Rhodes, and as long as the Germans were secure at Rhodes, the British could not hold the Dodecanese. On October 3, 1943, the Germans went on the offensive, landing a force on Kos. Supported by heavy bombing of the island by Stuka aircraft, German troops quickly reduced the defenses, and the British and Italian forces there surrendered the same evening. Churchill refused to consider a withdrawal, instead ordering that Leros and Samos be held at all costs. Indeed, the British reinforced Leros. On November 12, the Germans attacked Leros with overwhelming force, taking it four days later. British troops remaining in the Dodecanese then withdrew. Among British units involved were the Long Range Desert Group, the Special Boat Squadron, the Raiding Forces’ Levant Schooner Flotilla, the King’s Own, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Durham Light Infantry. The Greek navy provided seven destroyers to assist the more numerous British ships. In the campaign, the British lost 4 cruisers damaged and 2 submarines, 6 destroyers, and 10 small coastal vessels and minesweepers sunk. The Royal Air Force flew 3,746 sorties and lost 113 aircraft out of 288 involved. The British army lost in all about 4,800 men, while the Italians lost 5,350. German casualties totaled some 1,184 men, 35,000 tons of shipping (between late September and late November 1943), and 15 small landing craft and ferries. The operation failed as a consequence of Campioni’s hesitation, German aggressiveness and air superiority, lack of cooperation by the Americans, and the inadequacy of British resources. Holding the islands, however, stretched

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German resources, ultimately tying down some 60,000 troops who might have been better employed elsewhere. After the war, the British governed the Dodecanese until 1947. The islands were then turned over to Greece. A. J. L. Waskey See also: Campioni, Inigo.

References Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. Vol. 5, Closing the Ring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951. Gander, Marsland L. The Long Road to Leros. London: Macdonald, 1945. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Holland, Jeffrey. The Aegean Mission: Allied Operations in the Dodecanese, 1943. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. Molony, C. J. C., et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 5, History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series, J. R. M. Butler, ed. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973. Pitt, Barrie. Special Boat Squadron. London: Century, 1983. Smith, Peter, and Edwin Walker. War in the Aegean. London: William Kimber, 1974.

Dönitz, Karl (1891–1980) German navy admiral who commanded the U-boats and later the full Kriegsmarine and then succeeded Adolf Hitler as head of the Third Reich. Born in Gruenau-bei-Berlin on September 16, 1891, Karl Dönitz joined the German navy in 1910. During World War I, he served on the cruiser Breslau, but he transferred to U-boats in 1916, commanding several submarines in the Mediterranean. In October 1918, his U-68 attacked an Allied convoy, sinking one of the ships. His submarine was forced to the surface when it developed mechanical problems, and Dönitz was taken prisoner. Released after the end of the war, Dönitz continued in the navy. He held a variety of shore and sea assignments, including command of a torpedo-boat flotilla, during which he experimented with tactics he would later develop into the Rudeltaktik (wolf pack) concept. German chancellor Adolf Hitler named Dönitz commander of the fledgling German submarine force in 1935. As Kapitän zur See und Kommodore (captain and commodore), Dönitz sought to build additional submarines to expand the fleet to 300 boats. He believed this number would be decisive in winning the next war.

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Commander of U-boats Konteradmiral Karl Dönitz congratulates the crew members of a German U-boat upon its return to port, May 1942. (Library of Congress)

Dönitz’s passionate advocacy of submarines led to friction between him and the commander of the navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who preferred to allocate scarce naval resources to a long-range program of conventional large surface ships. Their differences became moot when World War II began before either type was fully ready for decisive employment. Promoted to Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) in October 1939, Dönitz struggled to overcome the problems of insufficient numbers of U-boats and ineffective torpedoes, difficulties that nearly wrecked his operations. To combat Allied convoys, Dönitz implemented wolf pack tactics: centralized control over groups of U-boats that struck Allied convoys at night in surface attacks. In January 1943, Hitler, frustrated by the performance of his surface navy, removed Raeder and replaced him with Dönitz as head of the navy with the rank of Grossadmiral (Grand Admiral). Dönitz endeavored to continue the U-boat war, but during “Black May” in 1943, his U-boats were essentially defeated through Allied antisubmarine countermeasures, including aircraft, convoys, searchlights, radar, sonar, and the ability to read Germany’s encoded radio messages. Unlike virtually all other senior German military officers, Dönitz managed to retain Hitler’s confidence and favor. Dönitz’s final military success was the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Germans from the Baltic states by sea. As the Allied armies entered Germany on April 15, 1945, Hitler appointed Dönitz

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as commander of all forces in northern Germany. On April 30, the day that Hitler committed suicide, Dönitz was informed that Hitler had appointed him to serve as president of the Reich and supreme commander of the armed forces. Dönitz then led the crumbling Third Reich, hoping to delay Soviet advances to allow millions of German troops and civilians to flee westward to British and U.S. lines to avoid falling into Soviet hands. Dönitz surrendered Germany unconditionally to Allied representatives on May 7, 1945. The British arrested Dönitz on May 23. Tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg, Dönitz was found guilty of crimes against peace and violation of the rules of war and was sentenced on October 1, 1946, to 10 years in Spandau Prison. He was released in 1956 and later wrote several books about his career and about submarine warfare. Unrepentant about his role in the war, Dönitz died in Aumuhle, Federal Republic of Germany, on December 24, 1980. Steven J. Rauch See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Doenitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. Trans. R. H. Stevens in collaboration with David Woodward. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. Edwards, Bernard. Dönitz and the Wolf Packs. London: Cassell, 1999. Padfield, Peter. Dönitz, the Last Führer: Portrait of a Nazi War Leader. New York: Harper & Row, 1984.

Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie (1889–1942) Dutch admiral. Born on April 23, 1889, in Utrecht, the Netherlands, Karel Doorman entered the Royal Netherlands Naval College in Den Helder in 1906. Commissioned in August 1910, he then served on several ships in the Far East and at home. In 1915, he joined the air division of the navy at Soesterberg and served at the De Kooy Naval Airfield from 1918 to 1921. After attending the Higher Naval School in the Hague, Doorman became one of the first flying instructors in the Netherlands naval air service. He returned to the Far East at the end of 1923, and from 1928 to the end of 1931, he was the first officer at De Kooy. Doorman began his third tour in the Far East in 1932 and served as a commanding officer on destroyers and cruisers. He held several positions in the naval department in Batavia (now Jakarta) in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). Doorman served in the Netherlands from June 1934 to September 1937 as chief of the naval staff and then returned for his fourth tour in the Far East, where he commanded a cruiser. He then headed the Royal Netherlands Naval

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Air Service in the NEI from August 1938 to May 1940. Promoted to rear admiral in May 1940, Doorman was appointed commander of the Netherlands Squadron in the East on June 17. Because of his close connection with the naval air service, Doorman was well aware of the importance of aircraft and aerial reconnaissance. To try to stop the Japanese forces moving toward Singapore and the NEI, the Allies formed the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command in midJanuary 1942. Dutch vice admiral Conrad E. L. Helfrich took overall command of the naval elements on February 14, and Doorman held tactical command of the naval strike force. As Japanese intentions became clearer, Helfrich combined the naval elements available to him into the Combined Striking Force under Doorman. The fleet departed Surabaya on the evening of February 26 following reported sightings of Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo’s Eastern Invasion Force as it approached Java. The Combined Striking Force consisted of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers. Outgunned by Takagi’s ships, Doorman’s command faced heavy odds even before it entered battle. It had never trained together as a unified force, lacked a common doctrine and common communication system, the men were suffering from fatigue the day of the battle, and the command had nothing to match the excellent Japanese Long Lance torpedoes. More important, although Doorman had requested aerial reconnaissance, none was available. As a consequence, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft discovered Doorman’s fleet first. In the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942, the Japanese sank the light cruisers De Ruyter (the flagship) and Java and three destroyers. Three cruisers and five destroyers (four of them U.S.) survived. The Japanese lost no ships. Doorman perished aboard the De Ruyter. Although some have criticized Doorman for his tactics in the battle, no one can question his bravery or his decision to attack. In order to defend Java, his fleet had to give battle. Doorman was posthumously awarded the Militaire Willemsorde 3rd class, the highest Dutch military decoration during the war. Two Netherlands aircraft carriers were later named for him. Jon D. Berlin See also: ABDA Command Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of the; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Takagi Takeo.

References Great Britain Ministry of Defense (Navy). War with Japan. Vol. 2, Defensive Phase. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995. Kampen, Anthony C. van. Ik val aan, volgt mij! [I attack, follow me!]. Amsterdam: Voorheen C. de Boer Jr., 1947.

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Oosten, F. C. van. The Battle of the Java Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

DOWNFALL, Operation U.S. plan for the invasion of Japan. On May 25, 1945, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington provided a general outline of a plan to invade Japan but left the details to the two Pacific theater commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. MacArthur issued his plan, code-named DOWNFALL, three days later. It foresaw two operations. The first, to be initiated following “extensive air preparation,” had the code name OLYMPIC. It consisted of a landing on the southern part of the island of Kyushu by the 14 to 17 U.S. divisions already available in the Pacific theater. The second invasion, code-named CORONET, would begin with a landing on the main island of Honshu and have as its objective the capture of Tokyo and the Yokohama areas as a base for further operations. X day, the invasion of Kyushu, Operation OLYMPIC, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, and was to involve some 766,700 men lifted in 1,315 amphibious vessels. Five days before the actual invasion, the Japanese offshore islands of Tanegashima, Yakushima, and the Koshikijimas would be taken to secure nearby anchorages for ships not needed in the landing and those that had become damaged. Sixth Army would be the principal ground element. For the invasion of southern Kyushu, MacArthur envisioned four corps of three divisions each. The follow-on force would add another two divisions. Three other divisions would be the strategic reserve. Nimitz saw aircraft carriers as the principal naval strike weapon and envisioned using 16 fleet and 6 light carriers of the U.S. Navy and 6 fleet and 4 light carriers of the British Pacific Fleet, both embarking a total of some 1,914 aircraft. Once southern Kyushu was secured, MacArthur planned to turn it into a gigantic naval and air base for 40 air groups with approximately 2,800 aircraft. Both OLYMPIC and CORONET faced daunting problems. The invasion of Kyushu was predicated on the assumption that the invaders would encounter only three Japanese divisions in southern Kyushu and three more in the northern part of the island. Yet ULTRA signal intercepts by early summer 1945 revealed that the Japanese were substantially reinforcing Kyushu. MacArthur dismissed out of hand intelligence estimates based on ULTRA intercepts of a higher Japanese troop strength on Kyushu. He claimed such evidence was erroneous and suggested that the Japanese had managed to hoodwink ULTRA. Historian Edward Drea has pointed out that MacArthur routinely dismissed ULTRA evidence that “failed to accord with his own preconceived strategic vision.” The last estimate by MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Charles Willoughby, of Japanese troop strength on

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Kyushu was 195,000 men (up from an initial estimate of 137,400), whereas actual Japanese strength was 287,000. Y day, the invasion of Honshu in Operation CORONET, was scheduled for March 1, 1946. MacArthur planned to command CORONET in person. The invading force would consist of the Eighth and Tenth Armies with a total of 14 divisions, 3 of which would be Marines. The First Army of 10 divisions from Europe would be the follow-on force. MacArthur planned to hold one airborne division of his own, presumably the 11th, in strategic reserve, augmented by a corps of three divisions deployed from Europe. In all, CORONET was projected to involve 1,036,000 personnel. As the date for the projected invasions drew closer, plans changed. For example, the Tenth Army, formed for the conquest of Okinawa, was dropped from CORONET and replaced by the First Army. Estimates of casualties from the invasions, had they gone forward, vary considerably. Historian Ray Skates has concluded that Operation OLYMPIC alone would have taken two months and resulted in 75,000 to 100,000 U.S. casualties. This estimate, which approximates the figure presented by MacArthur based on casualties taken in the securing of Luzon in the Philippines, may have been low. Others then and since have postulated a much higher figure on the basis of the Battle of Okinawa, in which 130,000 Japanese defenders inflicted some 66,000 casualties on attacking U.S. forces, not counting Allied naval personnel losses to kamikazes. In addition to the much higher troop strength on Kyushu than on Okinawa, Japanese authorities were assembling thousands of kamikaze aircraft and water craft and mobilizing the civilian population for a fanatical defense. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had been reduced to an operational force of 1 battleship, 6 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and perhaps 40 submarines. But there was insufficient fuel to put the capital ships to sea, and the best the IJN could hope for was several days of operations for the destroyers and submarines. The Japanese had readied large numbers of what were essentially suicide craft: some 100 Ko¯ryu¯-class midget submarines, 250 smaller Kairyu¯-class midget submarines, 1,000 Kaiten manned torpedoes, and 800 Shin’yo¯ suicide boats. It would seem logical that the Japanese would have fought even more fiercely for their home islands than they did for Okinawa. Although heavy U.S. losses would not have affected the ultimate outcome of the war, they might have brought some modification in U.S. conditions for peace. MacArthur’s revised plan of August 15 for CORONET also would have faced problems. It called for an assaulting force of 20 divisions, including 2 armored and 3 Marine. Five divisions would be in immediate reserve, with three others in the Philippines in strategic reserve. The total troop commitment came to 1,171,646 men. But even this revised plan faced problems. The assault would be beyond the range of most land-based aircraft, and MacArthur estimated defending forces of 7 army divisions, 160,000 naval troops, and supporting units and civilian volunteers. But

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the contemporary Joint Intelligence Committee estimated actual Japanese forces at perhaps double that figure, or 560,000 men. In any case, MacArthur’s plans were never tested. Operation DOWNFALL proved unnecessary, for on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese people the decision to surrender. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Kamikaze; Nimitz, Chester William.

References Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Code-Name DOWNFALL: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Chappell, John D. I. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996. Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 1999. James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–64. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985. Skates, John Ray. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.

DRAGOON, Operation (August 15, 1944) Allied amphibious operation in southern France originally intended to support and coincide with the June 1944 invasion of northern France—Operation OVERLORD—although it could not be mounted until August 15, 1944. Operation DRAGOON had its genesis under the code name ANVIL during strategic planning in 1942 as the Allies considered operations to invade continental Europe. ANVIL was to be a diversionary attack on the Mediterranean coast of France to either draw German forces there or, at a minimum, hold those already there so they could not reinforce the defense against an attack on the English Channel coast. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, however, favored operations in the eastern Mediterranean and additional support for the Italian Campaign, which had become bogged down. So severe was the landing craft shortage that Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces General Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in favor of at least postponing ANVIL until after OVERLORD. This weakened the U.S. argument that ANVIL was necessary to divert German troops away from Normandy’s beaches, but the British argument for needing additional forces in Italy evaporated with the Allied liberation of Rome. The Americans still argued they required the major Mediterranean port of Marseille to bring resources ashore for the drive against Germany.

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On June 24, the British reluctantly agreed to give ANVIL the go-ahead. Renamed because of security problems, DRAGOON (Churchill said the name was apt because he had been dragooned into agreeing to it) began on August 15, 1944. U.S. vice admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, commander of the Eighth Fleet, had charge of the landing, and four naval task forces supported the invasion. Participating ships included 5 battleships (the Lorraine, Ramillies, Texas, Nevada, and Arkansas), 9 escort carriers, 24 cruisers, 111 destroyers, and numerous smaller ships from the British, U.S., French, and Greek navies. A total of 881 ships took part, along with 1,370 landing craft. In the skies, 4,056 Allied aircraft provided support. At dawn, contingents of three U.S. divisions—the 3rd, 45th, and 36th—and a French armor task force came ashore on beaches between Saint-Tropez and Cannes on the French Riviera, while a combined British and U.S. airborne task force landed to seize bridges and cut roads inland. U.S. Seventh Army commander Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch Jr. led the Allied force. Major General Lucian Truscott Jr., VI Corps commander, was the ground force commander. Seven Free French divisions under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny came ashore the next day and headed west to seize the ports of Toulon and Marseille. Although DRAGOON was dwarfed by the Normandy invasion two months earlier, the Allies nonetheless ultimately landed 250,000 U.S. and French ground troops. German forces in southern France amounted to no more than 210,000 troops in mostly second-rate formations. By the end of the first day, all three Allied divisions had secured their beachheads, and 86,000 men, 12,000 vehicles, and 46,000 tons of supplies had come ashore. By August 17, the Allied advance had reached 20 miles inland. Operation DRAGOON cost the Allies more than 13,000 casualties (more than half of them U.S.) but led to a 400-mile advance that liberated virtually all of southern France. It also hurried the introduction of Free French troops into combat and opened additional ports for supporting the drive across France into Germany. It also netted 79,000 German prisoners and sped the collapse of the Third Reich. Arthur T. Frame See also: Hewitt, Henry Kent; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Breur, William B. Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of the South of France. Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987. Wilt, Alan F. The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.

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Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of (Operation DYNAMO, May 26–June 4, 1940) Extraction of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and some French forces from the English Channel port of Dunkerque (Dunkirk), France. After the German invasion of France and the Low Countries and the rapid collapse of Allied forces, contingency planning was begun in Britain on May 19, 1940, under the supervision of Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, naval commander of Dover, for the possible evacuation of British forces from France. By May 25, the Germans had already taken the French port of Boulogne, leaving only Dunkerque and Calais among the channel ports from which an evacuation might be attempted. Calais fell the next day. Naval planners hoped they might be able to extract 40,000 members of the BEF, but in Operation DYNAMO they actually evacuated 364,628 troops, of whom 224,686 were British. On May 26, as the German armored thrust from the south was closing in on Dunkerque, the commander of German Army Group A, General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, ordered it halted, believing the panzers were overextended. Hitler made this into a hard-and-fast order and kept the panzers in place until May 29 to allow the German infantry to join them. Hitler’s stop order was critical, allowing the BEF to escape and Britain to continue in the war. Head of the Luftwaffe, Marshal Hermann Göring, who believed the German air force had not received sufficient credit for its role in the war to date, then secured Hitler’s permission to destroy the British forces on the ground with his dive-bombers. He even requested that the panzers be moved back several miles. As it turned out, the dive-bombing was not effective; the German bombs burrowed deep into the soft sand before exploding. Meanwhile, Operation DYNAMO began. All manner of vessels, including a number manned by civilian volunteers, participated in the evacuation. Royal Air Force fighter pilots flying from bases in southern England did what they could to protect the evacuation and disrupt the Luftwaffe, and they probably made the evacuation possible. Among the evacuation ships, British and French destroyers rescued the most men, but they were also the chief targets for Luftwaffe attacks. By the fourth day of the evacuation, 10 destroyers had been sunk or put out of action. This led the Admiralty to take the difficult decision to remove all of its modern destroyers from the operation. The same reasoning limited the number of fighter aircraft that were available. In addition, head of Fighter Command Air Marshal Hugh Dowding refused to sacrifice valuable aircraft in a battle already lost, believing the planes would soon be required for the defense of Britain, which was certain to be the next target. The Dunkerque evacuation was assisted by bad weather and fires from burning equipment on the beaches that inhibited Luftwaffe operations. The BEF lost more


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Two of the many small craft that helped bring British and French troops across the English Channel from Dunkerque, France, June 4, 1940. During the Dunkerque Evacuation of May 26–June 4, private craft of all types and sizes assisted in the evacuation to Britain of more than 364,000 Allied troops. (AP/Wide World Photos)

than 2,000 men during Operation DYNAMO. Royal Air Force Fighter Command lost 106 aircraft and 80 pilots, and Bomber Command lost an additional 76 aircraft. Of 693 British vessels of all types that took part in the operation, one-third (226) were sunk, including 6 destroyers; 19 other destroyers were put out of action. Other nations also participated; France provided the most vessels (119), and Belgium, Norway, Poland, and the Netherlands also provided assistance. The other Allies lost 17 of their 168 vessels taking part. The BEF lost 30,000 men, including prisoners, to the Germans, and it was forced to abandon virtually all of its equipment in France. The 50,000-man French First Army had played a key role, holding the advancing Germans from the beaches and allowing the British to get away. The French contested every bit of ground, and ultimately between 30,000 and 40,000 men of their troops were forced to surrender. The evacuation of Dunkerque was hardly a victory, but it did sweep away the halfheartedness that had marked the British war effort to that point. It also elevated

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the stature of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who, in a speech to Parliament on June 4 as the last British troops were being evacuated, vowed that, come what may, Britain would continue the fight. David M. Grilli and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home.

References Divine, David. The Nine Days of Dunkirk. New York: Norton 1959. Gelb, Norman. Dunkirk: The Complete Story of the First Step in the Defeat of Hitler. New York: William Morrow, 1989. Harman, Nicholas. Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980. Lord, Walter. The Miracle of Dunkirk. New York: Viking, 1982. Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man. New York: Viking, 2006.

E Eastern Solomons, Battle of the (August 22–25, 1942) Naval battle fought off Guadalcanal. Henderson Field, captured by the Marines following their surprise landing on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, was the only U.S. air base in the Solomon Island chain. The Japanese were determined to retake the field, and they subjected the U.S. Marines there to ground attacks and to frequent night bombardment from destroyers offshore. Japanese admiral Yamamoto Isoroku devised Operation KA, a plan to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal and at the same time eliminate the defending U.S. carriers. As in the Battle of Midway, however, Japanese forces failed to concentrate on a single objective. On August 19, the Japanese launched a major ground attack against Henderson Field but failed to take it. The next day, a convoy from Rabaul with 1,500 reinforcements sailed for Guadalcanal, escorted by the light cruiser Jintsu and six destroyers, all commanded by Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo. To provide air cover for the landing, Yamamoto ordered Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake to steam from Truk with a task force centered on the fleet carriers Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo. Also on August 20, the marines at Henderson Field received 31 aircraft from the escort carrier Long Island. Although Japan had changed its codes after Midway, its radio traffic indicated something was in the offing, and on August 21, Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, ordered Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher, commanding the Wasp, Saratoga, and Enterprise carrier task forces, to oppose the Japanese operation. On August 22, U.S. patrol bomber (PBY) Catalina aircraft spotted Japanese submarines, prompting an air strike from the Saratoga, which failed to locate the Japanese fleet. The following day, Nimitz received faulty intelligence indicating that the Japanese attack force remained at Truk, and Fletcher released the Wasp to refuel. On August 24, a PBY spotted the Ryujo, and Scout Bomber Douglas (SBD) divebombers from the Enterprise reported 15 Zeros and 6 Kate torpedo planes from the carrier headed toward Guadalcanal. The Saratoga then launched a strike on the Ryujo. The U.S. SBDs located the carrier and scored three hits, setting it on fire. During the attack, a PBY located the main Japanese task force, centered on the aircraft carriers Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku under Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi. Fletcher then ordered the planes attacking the Ryujo to strike instead the larger Japanese

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carriers, but this message never reached the attacking aircraft, which went on to sink the Ryujo. They also badly damaged the Japanese heavy cruiser Tone, a specially modified aircraft cruiser armed with eight 8-inch guns and carrying eight seaplanes. Meanwhile, U.S. radar revealed the incoming strike of aircraft from the Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku, heading toward the U.S. carriers. The Enterprise and Saratoga were operating independently, and the Japanese first located the Enterprise, which launched its F-4 Wildcat fighters in defense. Soon, 30 Japanese Val dive-bombers began attacks on the Enterprise. Their bombs pierced its flight deck in three places, seriously damaging it. Fires soon raged below deck, as the crew of the Enterprise fought valiantly to save their ship. The Saratoga escaped, in part thanks to highly effective antiaircraft fire provided by the battleship North Carolina. On August 25, Tanaka’s convoy bound for Guadalcanal came under attack by U.S. B-17 bombers from Espiritu Santo and aircraft from Henderson Field. U.S. divebombers scored two hits on one of the transports, which later sank. For the first time in the campaign, the B-17s also scored a hit on a Japanese escorting destroyer and sank it. The convoy, far from its objective and vulnerable, now returned to Rabaul. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was a U.S. victory, securing, for the time being, the U.S. position on Guadalcanal. Japan lost 1 light carrier, 1 destroyer, and 1 transport along with 75 aircraft, and the United States lost 25 planes. The Enterprise returned to Pearl Harbor and was repaired within a month. Fletcher was slightly wounded, and Nimitz selected Vice Admiral William Halsey to replace him. One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific war involves Yamamoto’s failure to employ the giant battleship Yamato off Guadalcanal. It was available, and its guns might have made a difference in the fight for Henderson Field, but Yamamoto was unwilling to risk such a powerful national symbol. Robert W. Serig See also: Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Southeast Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Griffith, Samuel B. The Battle for Guadalcanal. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963. Hammel, Eric. Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, August 1942. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 1999. Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal: The Carrier Battles. New York: Crown Publishers, 1987. Lundstrom, John B. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

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Electronic Intelligence The collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions that provide insight into an enemy’s technological capabilities. The broader category of signals intelligence (SIGINT) includes both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT encompasses the monitoring of radio and telephone traffic, the decryption of coded messages, and the analysis of the contents of those messages. ELINT is the collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions, such as telemetry and radar signals, with the expectation that the successful analysis of ELINT will provide information about enemy technology and lead to the development of effective countermeasures. During World War II, signals intelligence played an important role in strategic decision making. Its best-known successes were in COMINT and included breaking the Japanese and German codes in MAGIC and ULTRA. The Axis powers also had some success in breaking Allied codes, especially those regarding the Atlantic convoys. Signals intelligence activities during World War II were not limited to intercepting and reading communications, however. ELINT activities during the war included monitoring radar signals to determine the transmitting power, range, and accuracy of the air defense systems built by both the Allies and the Axis powers. In the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Great Britain and the United States used sophisticated radio receivers to approximate the positions of submarines, merchantmen, and surface warships by means of triangulation (interpreting the strength and point of origin of radio transmissions). As the war progressed, ELINT techniques became more sophisticated. Because of the role played by both COMINT and ELINT in the conflict, World War II has sometimes been referred to as the SIGINT war. Shannon A. Brown See also: Signals Intelligence.

References Budiansky, Stephen. Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet. New York: Scribner’s, 1999. Laqueur, Walter. World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1985. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy during World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.

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Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of (November 2, 1943) Naval battle between U.S. and Japanese naval forces during the Bougainville Campaign. On November 1, 1943, Major General A. H. Turnage’s 3rd Marine Division, which had been reinforced, landed at Empress Augusta Bay, about halfway up the west coast of Bougainville Island in the northern Solomon Islands. The landing was part of Operation CARTWHEEL, which was designed to neutralize the major Japanese air and naval base at Rabaul on New Britain Island to the north. In addition to air attacks from Rabaul, which were thwarted by Allied fighter aircraft, the Japanese dispatched a scratch naval task force to attack the Torokina beachhead on Bougainville. Commanded by Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro, the force consisted of the heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro, two light cruisers, six destroyers, and five destroyer transports carrying 1,000 troops who were to be landed on Bougainville. Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji commanded Destroyer Squadron 3, the left flank screen with the light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers, and Rear Admiral Osugi Morikazu had the right with Destroyer Squadron 10, the light cruiser Agano and three destroyers. The transports turned back late in the evening of November 1 after Omori concluded that the task force had been sighted by U.S. planes. Omori, however, continued to Bougainville with his other ships in the expectation that he could destroy the Allied transports and cargo vessels in a night battle. Unknown to him, the transports had been quickly unloaded and had left Empress Augusta Bay earlier that day. Learning of Omori’s task force from U.S. Army reconnaissance aircraft, Rear Admiral A. Stanton Merrill, whose Task Force 39 had been providing bombardment support for the Bougainville landing force, moved to intercept the Japanese about 20 miles north of Empress Augusta Bay. Task Force 39 was centered on Merrill’s Cruiser Division 12, consisting of the light cruisers Montpelier (the flagship), Cleveland, Columbia, and Denver. Captain Arleigh Burke’s Destroyer Division 45 made up the van, and Commander B. L. Austin’s Destroyer Division 46 comprised the rear. Merrill hoped to engage the Japanese ships at long range to avoid a torpedo attack while making use of his radar-controlled, 6-inch guns. The two task forces encountered each other at 2:27 a.m. on November 2 and fought a complicated battle that was really three engagements in one: Merrill’s cruisers against Omori’s cruisers and individual battles waged respectively by the two destroyer divisions. Although the Japanese were superior in gunfire and torpedoes and although Omori thought he had inflicted serious losses on the Americans, he broke off the battle after an hour, at 3:27 a.m. Merrill’s cruisers sank the Japanese light cruiser Sendai, and Destroyer Division 46 sank the Japanese destroyer Hatsukaze, which already had been badly damaged in a collision with the cruiser Myoko, Omori’s flagship. Task Force 39 suffered damage to six ships, most seriously to the destroyer Foote, which had its stern

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blown off by a torpedo. Merrill abandoned pursuit of the Japanese ships at dawn to await the inevitable Japanese air response from Rabaul. It came at about 8:00 a.m. in the form of 100 Japanese aircraft, which were met by a smaller number of Allied fighters. The Japanese inflicted only minor damage, with the cruiser Montpelier taking two bomb hits on its starboard catapult. Omori was subsequently relieved of command for failing to carry out his orders. The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay did not end the Japanese naval threat to the Allied lodgment on Bougainville. However, the prompt U.S. Navy reaction prevented Japanese disruption of the landing, and, along with massive air raids against Rabaul over the next days and the naval battle of Cape St. George on November 25, it helped ensure the success of the Bougainville Campaign. John Kennedy Ohl See also: Burke, Arleigh Albert; Cape St. George, Battle of; Ijuin Matsuji; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater.

References Gailey, Harry A. Bougainville: The Forgotten Campaign, 1943–1945. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.

England, U.S. Destroyer A Buckley-class destroyer escort credited with sinking six submarines, the most of any U.S. warship during World War II. The England (DE-635) was built at Bethlehem Shipbuilding, San Francisco, and commissioned on December 10, 1943. It was of flush-deck design with a high, open bridge. The England was 306 ft. in overall length with a beam of 37 ft. Its turboelectric power plant was capable of driving it at 24 knots. It was armed with three 3-inch single guns, one 1.1-inch quadruple machine cannon, eight (later 10) 20-mm guns, two 21-inch torpedo tubes, eight depth charge throwers, two depth charge racks, and a British-designed Hedgehog ASW mortar. The England arrived in the Pacific war zone in March 1944, and in May it was assigned to a hunter-killer group ordered to intercept a Japanese submarine scouting line, revealed through U.S. code breaking, north of the Admiralty Islands. During May 19–31, the England sank five submarines (the I-16, RO-106, RO-104,

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RO-116, and the RO-108) with hedgehog patterns and administered the hedgehog coup de grâce to a sixth (the RO-105), shattering Japanese attempts to reconnoiter U.S. movements in the Central Pacific. For this achievement, the England received a Presidential Unit Citation. The England returned to convoy duty throughout the balance of 1944 and into early 1945 until assigned to Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa. While patrolling off Kerama Retto on May 10, 1945, the England was struck by a kamikaze, which killed 37 men. After receiving temporary repairs, it steamed to the United States. Plans to convert it into a high-speed transport were canceled and the ship was decommissioned on October 15, 1945, and sold for scrap. Bruce Hampton Franklin See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Depth Charges; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; Hedgehog; Hunter-Killer Groups; ICEBERG, Operation; Kamikaze.

References Franklin, Bruce Hampton. The Buckley-Class Destroyer Escorts. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Ross, Al. The Destroyer Escort England. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Williamson, John A., and William D. Lanier. “The Twelve Days of the England,” Naval Institute Proceedings 106, no. 2 (February 1980), pp. 76–83.

English Channel A shallow sea, part of the Atlantic Ocean, which separates France and Great Britain and that connects the Atlantic with the North Sea. The French refer to the English Channel as La Manche (sleeve). The waterway is approximately 350 miles long. Its width varies from about 150 miles at its widest point to just 21 miles at the Strait of Dover, which separates Dover, England, from Calais, France. In all, the English Channel encompasses some 29,000 square miles. The boundary of the channel begins at Land’s End to the far west (southwestern England) and stretches to the Strait of Dover to the east. Water depth is rather shallow, averaging about 350 ft. The deepest point is an underwater trough known as Hurds Deep, about 30 miles northwest of the Island of Guernsey, where the water is approximately 600 ft. deep. There are numerous islands located within the channel, the most significant of which are the Isle of Wight and the Channel Islands. The English Channel is strategically significant because it controls ingress and egress to the North Sea and has long borders along southern England and northern France. Indeed, maritime control of the English Channel could effect a blockade of much of Western Europe.


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Tides and currents within the English Channel can be treacherous and are subject to frequent changes of direction and intensity, depending upon weather conditions. This makes the waterway a particularly challenging one to navigate. Tidal ranges between low and high tides can be extreme, as high as 42 ft. in some locations, during spring equinox. Westerly winds prevail, and gales—some of which rise suddenly and can be highly destructive—are frequent occurrences, particularly from October to January. The frequency of gales is at its low ebb during May to July, which explains in part why the Allies chose to launch the 1944 Normandy invasion in June. Some of these storms and squalls can reach the intensity of lowlevel hurricanes. The English Channel played a pivotal role in World War II. It saw numerous attacks on ports along the channel as well as German attacks on civilian shipping. German submarine activity remained high, and, for much of the conflict, the waterway proved too dangerous for surface ships. Realizing that the Allies would have to mount an invasion of France via the English Channel in order to dislodge them from French soil, the Germans erected stout defenses along France’s northern and western coasts. During most of the war, the Germans occupied the Channel Islands, the only part of the British Commonwealth to be controlled by Germany. In June 1944, the Allies launched Operation OVERLORD from Britain—the invasion of Normandy via the English Channel. Today, France and England are connected via tunnels under the channel that link Folkestone and Calais. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: JUBILEE, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Smith, Peter C. Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Unwin, Peter. The Narrow Sea: Barrier, Bridge, and Gateway to the World: The History of the English Channel. London: Headline, 2004.

Essex Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers U.S. Navy aircraft carriers forming the major carrier element of the U.S. Navy task forces in the Pacific theater during World War II and that served well into the postwar period. Part of the Two-Ocean Navy building program passed by Congress in 1940 and the first U.S. aircraft carriers to be built freed from post–World War I naval treaties restrictions, these ships were essentially improved and enlarged

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versions of the Yorktown-class carriers. They boasted improved underwater protection; enhanced antiaircraft armament; improved power plant; more powerful catapults; and a second, armored deck on the hangar-deck level to prevent enemy armor-piercing bombs from passing into the ship’s vitals below. The fourth U.S. warship to bear that name, the Essex (CV-9) was laid down at the Newport News Shipbuilding Company on April 28, 1941, launched on July 31, 1942, and commissioned on December 31, 1942. Twenty-six Essex-class ships were ordered, but only 24 were commissioned (the Reprisal [CV-35] and Iwo Jima [CV-46] were never completed). Other Essex-class carriers included the Yorktown (CV-10), Intrepid (CV-11), Hornet (CV-12), Franklin (CV-13), Ticonderoga (CV14), Randolph (CV-15), Lexington (CV-16), Bunker Hill (CV-17), Wasp (CV-18), Hancock (CV-19), Bennington (CV-20), and the Boxer (CV-21). The Essex class was the largest class of capital ships ever built, at least in modern times. The Essex displaced 27,208 tons at standard load and 34,881 tons at full load. It was 820 ft. in overall length and 93 ft. in beam (147 ft. 6 in. maximum width

The Essex-class U.S. aircraft carrier Intrepid (CV-11), shown here operating in the Philippine Sea in November 1944. Essex-class carriers played a key role in World War II in the Pacific. Twenty-four were built, making them the largest class of capital ships in modern times. (Naval Historical Center)


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on the flight deck). It had a top speed of 32.7 knots. The ship’s armor belt was two and a half to four in., and hangar deck armor was two and a half in. thick. Although armament for the class varied somewhat, the Essex had 12 5-inch guns (four more than the Yorktown-class ships), as well as 32 40-mm and 46 20-mm antiaircraft guns. It could carry 91 aircraft (later upgraded allowed it to carry 100) and a crew of 2,682. The Essex and others of its class spent most of World War II supporting the U.S. campaigns in the Pacific. For the Essex, these included Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, during which time it weathered three typhoons and numerous air attacks. In late October 1944, while covering the Leyte landings, it was struck by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft on the port edge of its flight deck and suffered extensive damage as well as 16 killed and 44 wounded. In December, following quick repairs, it rejoined the Third Fleet off Luzon. Returning to the United States in September 1945, it was deactivated on January 9, 1947. With the Korean War of 1950–1953, the Essex and some of its class were renovated, receiving new and better antiaircraft armaments, hydraulic catapults for jet aircraft, and new jet-capable arresting gear. In the upgrade, the Essex received a new deck and a streamlined island superstructure. Recommissioned in January 1951, it served effectively during the Korean War supporting United Nations Command ground forces and launching air strikes against North Korea. On October 1, 1952, the Essex was reclassified CVA-9. Undergoing a second overhaul, at Bremerton Navy Yard during July 1955 to January 1956, the Essex received a new hydraulic/steam catapult and an angled flight deck. During 1956–1957, it served with the Pacific Fleet. Transferred to the Mediterranean, it supported the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958. In March 1960, the Essex was converted into an antisubmarine support carrier. Redesignated CVS-9, it operated from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, as the flagship of Carrier Division 18 and Antisubmarine Carrier Group 3. It was decommissioned to reserve status on June 30, 1969, and designated for disposal on June 1, 1973. The last Essex-class ship stricken was the Lexington, which continued in service until the 1990s as CVT-16 at Pensacola, Florida. The Essex-class carriers Intrepid and Yorktown are today preserved as museum ships. William Head and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Kamikaze; Leyte Landings; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers.

References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

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Faltum, Andrew. The Essex Class Aircraft Carriers. Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Kilduff, Peter. U.S. Carriers at War. Second rev. ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Raven, Alan. Essex-Class Carriers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

F Fast Attack Craft Small warships armed with torpedoes (usually) and light machine guns or automatic cannons and largely powered by internal combustion engines or by diesel engines (as with most Germany models). Many navies during World War II operated fast attack craft but only the fleets of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and the United States deployed them in large numbers. Most fast attack craft designs employed planing hulls—either hydroplane forms with one or more steps—or hard chine V-bottom shapes. A significant minority used round-bottom displacement hull forms capable of planing when given sufficient power. Planing hulls required less power to achieve high speed but were appreciably less seaworthy and could not carry heavy armaments without sacrificing speed and seakeeping. Both Italy and the Soviet Union devoted considerable effort to developing fast attack craft before World War II, focusing their efforts mainly on small hydroplanes. The Soviet design derived from captured World War I–era British coastal motor boats. They had very high speed (49–56 knots) but limited seakeeping qualities. One very unusual feature of these Soviet boats was their all-aluminum construction. The Type G5 remained in production from 1934 to 1945 (more than 400 were built). It was 56 ft. in length and displaced 14–16 tons. It was armed with two 21-inch torpedoes, launched from rails over the stern, and light machine guns. The Soviets also introduced a large wooden hard chine design (Type D3) in 1941. Some 130 were built during 1941–1945. The D3 was 71 ft. in length and displaced 32 tons. It carried two 21-inch torpedoes, one or two 20-mm cannon, and up to four light machines guns. Capable of 32–39 knots, it could operate in conditions up to Force 6 on the Beaufort Scale. Until the mid-1930s, Italian production of fast attack boats (motobarca armata siluranti or motoscafo anti sommergibili [MAS]) concentrated on small hydroplanes developed from the type introduced in 1915 that had achieved some spectacular successes during World War I. These boats were 52 ft. 6 in. in length and displaced 13–15 tons. Capable of 40 knots, they carried two 450-mm torpedoes and light machine guns. A new series of hard chine stepped hull boats entered service during 1936–1941. Most were 61 ft. 4 in. in length and displaced 25–27 tons. They carried two 450-mm torpedoes and a 20-mm cannon at up to 44 knots.

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Efforts to develop larger, more capable models were advanced by exposure to captured Yugoslav Lürssen type boats. These led Italy to construct similar highspeed displacement hull motosiluranti (MS) boats from 1942. These more seaworthy craft were 91 ft. 10 in. in length, displaced 63–67 tons, and carried two 533-mm torpedo tubes, two to four 20-mm cannon, as well as light machine guns, and sometimes two additional 450-mm torpedoes (in dropping cradles) at speeds of 31–32 knots. Germany began building fast attack boats in 1930. Unlike all other navies, the Kriegsmarine considered its Schnellboote (S-boats) as significant surface warships rather than expendable craft. Built by Lürssen, the unique design was a large planing displacement hull of composite construction (aluminum framing with a wooden skin) powered by three high-speed diesel engines. By 1940 a standardized type emerged, 114 ft. 8 in. in length and displacing about 95 tons, they were capable of 40 knots. They were armed with two 533-mm torpedo tubes (with reloads) and two 20-mm cannon. Later series boats (and wartime upgrades) added armored bridges and a heavier gun armament of up to one 40-mm and three to four 20-mm cannon. Germany also built many experimental boats (including several radical hydrofoil types) but all operations were conducted by the 240 Lürssen type S-boats commissioned between 1933 and 1945. The Royal Navy’s first new fast attack craft (motor torpedo boats [MTBs]) entered service in 1936. This British Power Boat design was a planing hull of double diagonal plywood construction 60 ft. 4 in. in length, displacing 18 tons, and armed with two 18-inch torpedoes (launched from stern troughs) and four light machine guns. It was followed by a new design from Vosper (but also built by White) for a planing hull of 71 ft. 9 in. in length, displacing 37–40 tons standard load (46–53 tons deep load), and capable of 40 knots. It became the standard British “short-hull” type. Most were armed with two 21-inch torpedo tubes and light weapons—initially .50-caliber and 0.303-inch machine guns but later two or three 20-mm cannon and, on some examples, a single 6-pounder gun. The British quickly discovered that German S-boats heavily out-gunned their MTBs. In response, the British developed motor gun boats (MGBs). British Power Boat produced the standard MGB. With a planing hull 71 ft. 9 in. in length, displacing 37–46 tons, and capable of 38 knots, it was armed with one 2-pounder poweroperated gun, two 20-mm cannon, and two .303-caliber machine guns. Later in the war, these boats added up to two 20-mm cannon, two .303-caliber machine guns, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes as combined MTB/MGBs. A separate line of development was the “long-hull” type MGB. These evolved from a Fairmile design for a highly prefabricated wooden displacement hull motor launch for harbor and coastal defense. The Fairmile Type “C” was an MGB 110 ft. in overall length. It displaced 69 tons standard load (75 tons deep load) and was capable of only 27 knots. It was armed with two 2-pounder guns and two twin

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.50-caliber machine guns on power-operated mounts (the latter subsequently replaced by six 20-mm cannon) and four light machine guns. The following Fairmile Type “D” was an innovative design combining a hard chine fore body with a displacement hull after body. With a hull 115 ft. long, displacing 102 tons standard load (118 tons deep load), it was only capable of 29 knots but was very heavily armed. Initial boats were MGBs but most were completed as combined MTB/ MGBs armed with two 21-inch or four 18-inch torpedo tubes, two 6-pounder guns, and two twin .50-caliber machine guns on power operated mounts, two to three 20-mm cannon, and four light machine guns. The United States became interested in fast attack craft in the late 1930s. In 1939 the U.S. Navy held an open competition for a patrol torpedo (PT) boat prototype, which was won by a 70-ft. British Power Boat design. The type was put into production by Elco of Bayonne, New Jersey. A small group of 70-ft.-long boats was followed by a larger series of 77-ft. craft and, finally, by the definitive 80-ft. type displacing 38 tons, with a speed of 39 knots. Initially, armament was four 21-inch torpedo tubes and two twin .50-caliber machine guns. Later, lighter aircraft type torpedoes discharged from launching racks replaced the tubes, and a 37-mm and a 40-mm cannon were fitted fore and aft. Many boats added 20-mm cannon, either in addition to or in place of the machine guns, and other weapons such as rocket launchers and mortars were added as PT boats assumed anti-barge operations in the South Pacific and Mediterranean theaters. In addition to the Elco boats, Higgins of New Orleans produced a 78-ft. hard chine type for the navy. It was 78 ft. 6 in. in length, displaced 35 tons, and attained 39 knots. The armament of Higgins PT boats matched that of the Elcos. The United States also produced quantities of Vosper-type MTBs of 72 ft. 6 in., displacing 39 tons, with a speed of 38 knots, almost all of which were transferred to other navies under Lend-Lease. Fast attack craft operated extensively in European and Mediterranean waters. Most operated in night attacks on enemy merchant shipping, served as convoy escorts and naval auxiliaries (such as minelayers, minesweepers, and patrol craft), and operated against their counterparts. These operations required both sides to devote considerable resources to countermeasures and there were some notable successes (Italian MS boats sank the British cruiser Manchester, and both Allied and Axis fast attack craft sank several enemy destroyers and other small warships, while German S-boats caused havoc with one of the pre-invasion convoys prior to D-Day). Nevertheless, actual results were limited to losses of roughly 250,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece. The U.S. Navy made considerable use of PT boats in the Pacific, especially in the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns. Here their primary mission rapidly evolved from attacking surface warships to interdiction of Japanese barge traffic engaged in delivering supplies and reinforcements to their scattered garrisons.

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Fast attack craft in World War II brought together visions of stealthy attack, powerful offensive punch for limited resource investment, and rapid egress. In the event, 40 to 60 percent of each navy’s force became casualties, accomplishments were relatively limited, and the glamour of fast attack craft far outweighed the reality. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Air-Sea Rescue; Borghese, Junio Valerio; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Guadalcanal, Naval battles of; Higgins, Andrew Jackson; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Norway, Navy; Saint-Nazaire, Raid on; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Soviet Union, Navy; United States, Navy.

References Bagnasco, Ermano. I MAS e le Motosiluranti Italiane 1906-1966. Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1967. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Fock, Harald. Fast Fighting Boats, 1870–1945: Their Design, Construction, and Use. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Small Combatants, Including PT Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown-Water Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Lambert, John and Al Ross. Allied Coastal Forces of World War II. 2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Meister, Jürg. Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977.

Fechteler, William Morrow (1896–1967) U.S. navy admiral. Born in San Rafael, California, on March 6, 1896, William Morrow Fechteler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1916. Following U.S. entry into World War I, he served on the battleship Pennsylvania as an aide to the Atlantic Fleet commander. After the war, Fechteler held seagoing assignments and staff and administrative appointments in Washington and was an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. When World War II began, Fechteler was operations officer for Destroyer Command. From 1941 to 1943, he served as assistant director of the navy’s personnel bureau, and, from 1943 to 1944, he commanded the battleship Indiana in the Pacific. In January 1944, Fechteler won promotion to rear admiral and took command of Amphibious Group 8 of the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force. During the New Guinea Campaign, he directed amphibious operations in Biak (May 1944) and Sansapar (July 1944), and he had charge of the landings on Luzon and Palawan during the Philippines Campaign.

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Promoted to vice admiral after the war, Fechteler served from 1946 to 1947 as commander of battleships and cruisers in the Atlantic Fleet. He then spent three years in Washington as deputy chief of naval operations for personnel. Appointed commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet in 1950, the following year he unexpectedly became chief of naval operations (CNO) and a full admiral when the incumbent CNO, Admiral Forrest Sherman, suffered a fatal heart attack. From 1953 until he retired in July 1956, Fechteler was commander in chief of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces Southern Europe. He died at Bethesda, Maryland, on July 4, 1967. Priscilla Roberts See also: Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Sherman, Forrest Percival.

References Barbey, Daniel E. MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1969. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Kennedy, Gerald. “William Morrow Fechteler August 16, 1951–August 17, 1953.” In The Chiefs of Naval Operations, edited by Robert William Love Jr. (pp. 235–241). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1959.

Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty (1891–1940) British naval officer killed in the Battle of the Atlantic. Born at Southsea, Hampshire, on October 8, 1891, Edward Stephen Fogarty Fegen joined the Royal Navy as a cadet at Osborne in 1904. He served in World War I, commanding a torpedo boat and destroyers. Between the wars, Fegen commanded a training ship and several destroyers and cruisers, served in both British and Chinese waters, headed the Naval College at Jervis Bay in Australia, and held various staff positions. At the beginning of World War II, Fegen became an acting captain and took command of the 14,000-ton armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay, which had been converted from a passenger liner. It had a crew of 254 seamen drawn from the Royal Navy, Naval Reserve, and merchant marine. The Jervis Bay mounted seven 6-inch guns, adequate to tackle submarines and other armed merchant cruisers and perhaps to ward off destroyers.

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On October 28, 1940, the Jervis Bay was serving as escort for convoy HX84, a group of 38 merchant ships bound from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Britain. The convoy faced a 2,000-mile journey, the second half through submarine-infested waters. Mines around the British coast were an additional hazard. In addition, three German battleships were loose in the Atlantic. German naval intelligence informed Captain Theodor Krancke, commander of the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer (with six 11-inch guns), of HX84’s departure, ordering him to seek it out and attack it. Krancke hoped to surprise and destroy an entire convoy, thereby justifying German naval demands to build more battleships rather than submarines. On November 5, the Admiral Scheer made contact with the convoy. The other ships scattered, and Fegen immediately attempted to lay a smoke screen from his ship and to close to gunnery range with his powerful adversary. The Admiral Scheer concentrated its guns on the Jervis Bay, but Fegen kept his own ship on collision course toward its opponent. He maintained command even when he was wounded and had one arm blown off, but he died when the bridge took a direct hit. The battle lasted 22 minutes, giving the convoy vital time to disperse, before the Jervis Bay sank. A total of 189 of its crew died. Although the Admiral Scheer did sink six additional convoy ships, with the loss of 251 more lives, 32 ships escaped. Fegen was posthumously awarded a Victoria Cross, the highest British award for gallantry in battle. Priscilla Roberts See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied.

References Doherty, Richard, and David Truesdale. Irish Winners of the Victoria Cross. Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2000. Laffin, John. British VCs of World War II. Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2000. Roskill, Stephen. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Winton, John. The Victoria Cross at Sea. London: Joseph, 1978.

Finland, Navy In September 1939, Finland had a small military establishment. Despite the best efforts of Carl Gustav Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish armed forces, the military services were constantly underfunded, underequipped, and plagued by a government that insisted on relying on domestic sources that often did not exist. The Finnish navy was quite small, and its activities were largely limited to minelaying. At the start of the Winter War (1939–1940), Finland had 5 submarines,

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2 armored coastal vessels, 4 gunboats, and 10 motor torpedo boats. Operations in the Gulf of Finland halted in the winter when it froze. The Finnish navy cooperated with German naval units during the Continuation War to confine the Soviet Baltic Fleet to the eastern end of the gulf, and it mined the Soviet coast. Throughout the Continuation War (1941–1944), Finnish naval strategy was strictly defensive, designed to prevent the Soviets from interfering with trans-Baltic shipping or intervening in the land battles. Britton W. MacDonald See also: Baltic Sea, Area of Operations.

References Erfurth, Waldemar. The Last Finnish War. Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1979. Kirby, D. G. Finland in the Twentieth Century. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979. Mannerheim, Carl. The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. London: Cassell, 1953. Tillotson, H. M. Finland at Peace and War, 1918–1993. Wilby, UK: Michael Russell, 1993. Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1991.

Fitch, Aubrey Wray (1883–1978) U.S. navy admiral. Born at Saint Ignace, Michigan, on June 11, 1883, Aubrey Wray Fitch graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1906. Commissioned an ensign in 1908, he ended World War I as a temporary commander. During the 1920s, Fitch specialized in naval gunnery and torpedoes. He served as executive officer on a battleship, was a member of a naval mission to Brazil, and held various ship commands. Fitch became a naval aviator in 1930. Promoted to captain in 1931, he then commanded three naval air stations and also the aircraft carriers Langley and Lexington. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1938. In April 1940, Fitch took command of Patrol Wing 2 at Pearl Harbor and was promoted to rear admiral that July. In November, he assumed command of Carrier Division 1, with his flag in the carrier Saratoga. Fitch served under Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher in the aborted Wake Island relief expedition. Transferring his flag to the carrier Lexington in the Battle of the Coral Sea, Fitch exercised tactical control over U.S. carriers. He then took command of U.S. Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and in September he commanded all ground-based naval and Marine aviation in the Guadalcanal Campaign. As

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such, he played an important role in the subsequent U.S. victory in the Solomon Islands. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1943, Fitch became deputy chief of naval operations for air in August 1944. In 1945, he was the first naval aviator to serve as superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. In July 1947, Fitch retired as a full admiral. He died at Newcastle, Maine, on May 22, 1978. Nathan L. Gilbert See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Wake Island, Battle for.

References Hoyt, Edwin P. Blue Skies and Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. New York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1975. Reynolds, Clark. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. Sweetman, Jack. Great American Naval Battles. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Fleet Train One of the greatest advantages possessed by the U.S. Navy in the final years of World War II was its fleet train—the assortment of auxiliary vessels, which made possible the wide-ranging forays of the Pacific Fleet. Although the limelight never fell on the Fleet Train, these unsung forces demonstrated once again the primacy of logistics in modern warfare. On oceans, as on land, logistical considerations have always dictated the pace of operations. In the days of sail, ships could remain at sea for extended periods— sometimes as long as a year. With the introduction of steam propulsion, warships found themselves on a shorter tether. Both the Russian Baltic Fleet in 1905 and America’s Great White Fleet of 1907–1909 made their epic voyages fueled by coal and supplied with stores bought from friendly powers. Given the need to operate during World War I in European waters, the U.S. Navy experimented successfully with colliers and destroyer tenders. When the fleet moved to San Diego in 1919, the Base Force was formed to support the combatant craft. By 1925, this flotilla, numbering 75 ships, included fleet tugs, colliers, store ships, a hospital ship, and tankers. The last category became increasingly important as the navy made the transition from coal to oil. At-sea refueling, first experimental and labeled “an emergency stunt,” became routine. By 1940, the Base Force had grown in size to 120 auxiliaries. Long-distance replenishment of the fleet became increasingly important in planning as the possibility of war with Japan loomed. Following the Japanese attack

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on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the command was renamed in March 1942 the Service Force, under the command of Vice Admiral William L. Calhoun. His sailors soon developed the mobile service squadron, the first (Service Squadron 4) being based at Funafuti in the Ellice Islands. As the drive across the Central Pacific gained momentum, new Service Squadron 10 set up at Majuro in the Marshalls, but soon moved to Eniwetok, then to Ulithi, and finally, at the end of 1944, to Leyte. By this stage of the war, the Service Force consisted of 30 different types of auxiliaries, to include repair ships, submarine tenders, salvage ships, floating dry docks, ammunition ships, and seaplane tenders. The numbers of ships also rose markedly, with oilers increasing from 14 in 1940 to 62 by 1945; 19 repair ships joined the original 2, while hospital ships went from 1 to 6. In aggregate, the Service Force counted 324 ships assigned in September 1943. By March 1944, the figure was 990; in February 1945, 1,432; and by the end of the war, 2,930. The personnel manning this armada grew proportionally. By V-J Day, the crewmembers of the Service Force numbered 456,314. One out of every six sailors in the U.S. Navy served in the arm. The Service Force enabled the Pacific Fleet to advance on the Japanese home islands. Replenishment groups and escorts, remaining always out of reach of enemy air power, trailed the task forces by a few hundred miles. Every few days, the combatants would drop back to refuel and take aboard the myriad items necessary for continued operations. Then the replenishment group would return to a forward base to replenish from merchant ships while another group took its place. Thus, the Service Force conferred on Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s warships the ability to remain at sea almost indefinitely and to engage in prolonged offensives without returning to port. Additionally, repair ships could often return damaged warships to service without their visiting a yard. At Ulithi, Service Squadron 10 counted 9 destroyer tenders, 14 floating dry docks, and 13 repair ships along with many other craft. As one example, the new battleship Iowa, continuously at sea from January to December 1944, was forced by a machinery failure into Ulithi, where a floating dry dock made the necessary repairs and thereby quickly returned the battleship to its task force. In 1945, the Service Force was tasked with the additional responsibility of assisting the Royal Navy in supporting its British Pacific Fleet. Until this point in the war, British warships had usually operated within easy range of the many shore establishments maintained in Britain’s overseas empire. These had sufficed in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean, but as Britain assembled its largest naval force of World War II for the drive on Japan, its logistical shortcomings became quickly apparent. By agreement with the U.S. Navy, the British Pacific Fleet was to be selfsufficient, which meant that this force would require 158 supporting ships. However, some of the auxiliaries on hand proved unsuitable for the purpose, the tankers being ill-equipped for alongside refueling, to give one example. Fortunately, U.S.

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logisticians in the theater interpreted the requirement for British self-sufficiency with considerable latitude and rendered great assistance in the establishment of a forward British base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. In return, the British Pacific Fleet afforded substantial reinforcement to the U.S. Fleet in the closing months of the war. In contrast to these Allied efforts, the Japanese never developed a logistical arm adequate to support the excellent warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Factors contributing to this surprising oversight include the Japanese supposition that any war would be short, as well as the samurai disdain for the mundane matter of supply as not worthy of a warrior. In consequence, the Japanese conducted even their earliest offensives on a logistical shoestring. In telling contrast to the mobility of the most powerful U.S. warships, the giant battleship Yamato spent the crucial six months of the Guadalcanal Campaign anchored at Truk, in large part because of the Japanese inability to satisfy its prodigious appetite for fuel. By 1944, the Japanese were forced to base the bulk of the Combined Fleet in the East Indies to keep their major warships close to their oil supply. Malcolm Muir Jr. See also: Iowa Class, U.S. Battleships; Nimitz, Chester William; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Bartholomew, C. A. Mud, Muscle, and Miracles: Marine Salvage in the United States Navy. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department, Naval Historical Center, 1990. Carter, Worrall Reed. Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.

Fletcher, Frank Jack (1885–1973) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Marshalltown, Iowa, on April 29, 1885, the son of Rear Admiral Thomas Jack Fletcher, Frank Jack Fletcher graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1906. Commissioned an ensign in 1908, Fletcher commanded the destroyer Dale in the Asiatic Torpedo Flotilla in 1910. Fletcher saw action in the 1914 U.S. intervention at Veracruz, Mexico. For his bravery in moving more than 350 refugees to safety, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. Lieutenant Fletcher then served in the Atlantic Fleet. Following U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, he won promotion to lieutenant commander and commanded the destroyer Benham on convoy escort and patrol operations. Fletcher’s postwar commands included submarine tenders, destroyers,

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and a submarine base in the Philippines, where he helped suppress an insurrection in 1924. Fletcher attended both the U.S. Naval War College (1929–1930) and U.S. Army War College (1930–1931). From 1933 to 1936, he served as aide to the secretary of the navy. From 1936 to 1938, Fletcher commanded the battleship New Mexico and then served in the navy’s Bureau of Personnel. Following his promotion to rear admiral, Fletcher commanded Cruiser Division 3 in the Atlantic Fleet. On December 15, 1941, Fletcher took command of the Wake Island relief force centered on the carrier Saratoga, but he moved cautiously, and the island fell on December 23 before he arrived. In January 1942, Fletcher received command of Task Force 17, which was centered on the carrier Yorktown. He participated in carrier raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands and joined Task Force 11 in attacks on Japanese shipping in the Solomon Islands. Fletcher commanded U.S. forces in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea. Following his return to Pearl Harbor for hasty repairs to the Yorktown, Fletcher raced back with it to join the U.S. force near Midway, where he helped orchestrate the dramatic U.S. victory on June 3–6, 1942, in which the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers and the Americans only one, the Yorktown. Fletcher then commanded the three-carrier task force supporting 1st Marine Division assaults on Tulagi and Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER). Unwilling to risk his carriers, Fletcher took the controversial decision to withdraw them before the transports had completed unloading supplies to the marines, forcing the transports to depart as well. He then committed his forces against the Japanese counterattack toward Guadalcanal, resulting in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher was wounded when his flagship, the carrier Saratoga, was torpedoed, and he returned to the United States. Upon his recovery, Fletcher commanded the 13th Naval District and the Northwestern Sea Frontier. Fletcher’s reputation for caution led chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King in 1943 to assign him to command the North Pacific area. Following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Fletcher participated in the occupation of Japan, overseeing northern Honshu and Hokkaido. In 1945, Fletcher joined the navy’s General Board, which advised the secretary of the navy; he served as its chairman from May 1946 until May 1947, when he was promoted to full admiral and retired. Fletcher died at Bethesda, Maryland, on April 25, 1973. Stephen Patrick Ward

See also: Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Wake Island, Battle for.

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References Hammel, Erich. Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, August 1942. Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Press, 1997. Lundstrom, John B. Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948,. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4., Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Regan, Stephen. In Bitter Tempest: The Biography of Frank Jack Fletcher. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994.

Fluckey, Eugene Bennett (1913–2007) U.S. navy officer, submariner, and Medal of Honor winner. Eugene Bennett Fluckey was born in Washington, D.C., on October 5, 1913. He was commissioned an ensign upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in June 1935, then served in the battleship Nevada and destroyer McCormick before being assigned to the Submarine School at New London, Connecticut. Upon completion of the course there, he was assigned first to S-42 and then to the submarine Bonita (SS-165), in which he completed five World War II patrols. In August 1942, he returned to Annapolis, where he completed graduate instruction in naval engineering. In November 1943, Fluckey reported to the Submarine Base at New London, where he graduated from the Prospective Commanding Officer’s School. Following one war patrol as the prospective commander of the submarine Barb (SS-220), Fluckey assumed command of that submarine on April 27, 1944, and soon established himself as one of the most effective submarine commanders of all time. Fluckey revolutionized submarine tactics, including carrying out the single U.S. landing in the Japanese home islands during the war. While cruising off Otasamu on the east coast of Karafuto, Fluckey noted a railroad on the coast and sent ashore a landing party with demolition charges, who then blew up a 16-car Japanese train. He also fired what he termed “ballistic missiles”—5-inch rockets—into the towns of Shiritori and Kashiho and bombarded two other towns, destroying a lumberyard and sampans. Fluckey was awarded four Navy Crosses, one each for his 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th war patrols. On his 11th war patrol of December 19, 1944 to February 15, 1945, he attacked two convoys, sinking a large ammunition ship in the first. The second convoy, which he attacked on January 25, 1945, consisted of 30 Japanese ships anchored in Nankuan Chiang (Mamkwan) Harbor in only five fathoms of water. Despite knowing full well that his escape would entail a risky passage through

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Commander Eugene B. Fluckey, skipper of the U.S. Navy submarine Barb (SS-220). Fluckey is shown here aboard his submarine on December 6, 1944, having just been presented the Navy Cross. Note the Barb’s insignia painted on the submarine’s sail. (Naval Historical Center)

shallow, mined waters, he attacked and obtained eight direct hits on six of the merchant ships. He then cleared the area in a high-speed run and escaped two pursuing Japanese destroyers. Fluckey was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for this daring attack. Known as the “Galloping Ghost of the China Coast,” Fluckey was fourth on the list of most Japanese ships sunk (16 and one third) but first in shipping tonnage sunk, at 95,360 tons. This latter figure is more than any other U.S. warship captain obtained during the war. In August 1945, Fluckey returned to Groton, Connecticut, to oversee completion of the submarine Dogfish (SS-350) and to become its commanding officer, but on its commissioning he was ordered to the office of Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. In December 1945, Fluckey became the personal aide to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. In June 1947, Fluckey assumed command of the submarine Halfbeak (SS-352) before helping to establish the Submarine Naval Reserve Force. During 1950–1953, he was U.S. naval attaché in Portugal. In September 1953, he

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took command of the submarine tender Sperry. He commanded Submarine Flotilla 7 during 1955–1956 before becoming chairman of the Electrical Engineering Department at the Naval Academy. In July 1960, Fluckey was appointed rear admiral and then assumed command of Amphibious Group 4. During 1966–1968, he was director of Naval Intelligence before heading the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal. Fluckey retired from the navy as a rear admiral in 1972. He later ran an orphanage in Portugal for a number of years. Fluckey died in Annapolis, Maryland, on June 28, 2007. On January 24, 2008, his remains were buried in the South China Sea from the U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarine Pasadena near the site of his daring rescue on September 17, 1944, of 14 Australian and British prisoners of war who were being transported to Japan when their ship sank. Some 450 miles distant at the time of the sinking, the Barb managed to locate and rescue these survivors, despite a typhoon. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Submarines; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping.

References Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Fluckey, Eugene B. Thunder Below! The USS Barb Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Lavo, Carl. “Fitting Ceremony for Navy Legend,” Naval History 22, no. 3 (June 2008), p. 63.

Forbes, Sir Charles Morton (1881–1960) British navy admiral and commander of the Home Fleet. Born in Colombo, Ceylon, on November 22, 1880, Charles Morton Forbes joined the Royal Navy as a cadet at age 14 and graduated two years later. A gunnery specialist, he received advanced training on HMS Excellent, the Royal Navy’s gunnery school. He favorably impressed one of the officers, Sir Roger Blackhouse, a future first sea lord, who furthered his career. During World War I, Forbes was a staff officer to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who commanded the Grand Fleet at the 1916 Battle of Jutland, where, as Jellicoe’s flag commander on the Iron Duke, Forbes won the Distinguished Service Order. From 1917 to 1919, Forbes commanded the light cruiser Galatea. Following two years at the Royal Staff College at Greenwich, in 1923 Forbes became director of naval ordnance. In October 1928, he was made rear admiral, and in 1932 he was appointed third sea lord and controller, a post that gave him

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responsibility for naval warship design and construction. Two years later, he became a full admiral and commander of the 1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet. In 1938, Forbes took command of the Home Fleet. Forbes’s leadership came under severe scrutiny during the Norwegian Campaign of April 1940. He and a divided Admiralty could not decide whether the Germans were more likely to invade Norway or attempt to move their capital ships into the Atlantic. Forbes ordered the battleship Rodney and battle cruiser Repulse to sea, hoping to match the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but this move left the southern North Sea unguarded and the Home Fleet unable to check the German invasion of Norway. The entire Norwegian Campaign was plagued by indecision and inadequate forces, and his actions earned Forbes the nickname “Wrong-Way Forbes.” Although Forbes was promoted to admiral of the fleet in May 1940, he was removed from command of the Home Fleet in December in favor of Admiral John Tovey following a dispute over the transfer of fleet assets to England’s southern coast. Forbes thought an invasion unlikely and suggested that German U-boats presented a graver threat. Forbes then commanded the Portsmouth navy base, overseeing planning and assaults against German shipping along the French coast and the U-boat pens at Brest and at Saint-Nazaire. Forbes retired from the navy in August 1943. He died in London on August 28, 1960. Thomas D. Veve See also: Great Britain, Navy; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn.; WESERÜBUNG, Operation. References Clifford Caslon, “Sir Charles Morton Forbes.” In Dictionary of National Biography, 1951– 1960, edited by E. T. Williams and Helen M. Palmer (pp. 369–371). London: Oxford University Press, 1960. Levy, James. The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet in World War II. New York: Palgrave, 2004. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Force H British naval task force established at Gibraltar in late June 1940, created in an effort to offset the loss of French naval power in the Mediterranean occasioned

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by the German defeat of France and the entry of Italy into the war. For obscure reasons, it was named Force H, and it was something of an anomaly in command structure, as it reported directly to the First Sea Lord in London rather than to Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic, already at Gibraltar. Commanded by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville (July 1940–January 1942), then Rear Admiral E. N. Syfret (January 1942–Janaury 1943), followed by Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burrough (January 1943–March 1943), and then Vice Admiral A. U. Willis, Force H initially consisted of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the battleships Resolution and Valiant, the battle cruiser Hood, and a small number of cruisers and destroyers. During the next three years, it was the chief British naval force in the western Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The first principal engagement for Force H was Operation CATAPULT, the British attack on French naval units at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria. Force H also played a leading role in numerous engagements in the Mediterranean, particularly the resupply operations to Malta, during which it fought the Battle of Cape Spartivento in November 1940. Its ships also took a leading role in the operation to hunt down the German battleship Bismarck, and they bombarded Genoa in February 1941. Force H participated in the invasion of Madagascar, and it provided cover for the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH), Sicily (Operation HUSKY), and Italy (Operation AVALANCHE). For all practical purposes, Force H ceased to exist after the surrender of the bulk of the Italian fleet that September and the dispersal of its assets elsewhere. Spencer C. Tucker See also: AVALANCHE, Operation; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Harwood, Sir Henry; HUSKY, Operation; Malta Convoy Battles; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on.

References Dannreuther, Raymond. Somerville’s Force H: The Royal Navy’s Gibraltar-based Fleet, June 1940 to March 1942. London: Aurum Press, 2005. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960.

Force K British navy Mediterranean task force based at Malta. In November 1941, with events in North Africa reaching a climax and the British Eighth Army preparing to

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attack Axis forces there, London dispatched additional naval units to harass German and Italian cross-Mediterranean supply efforts. Known as Force K and commanded by Commodore W. G. Agnew, it consisted of the light cruisers Aurora and Penelope from the Home Fleet and the destroyers Lance and Lively from Gibraltar. Force K reached Malta on October 21, 1941, and, early on the morning of November 9, 1941, it scored a great success against a Brindisi-to-Benghazi convoy (the Beta or Duisburg Convoy). Force K sank one of four escorting Italian destroyers and damaged another, and it sank all seven of the merchant ships. The British submarine Upholder, which had closed during the night, sank another of the Italian destroyers. Force K registered other successes on November 24, when it sank two important supply ships, one German and one Italian. Indeed, Force K accounted for 10 of the 12 Axis resupply ships lost in November. On December 1, it sank two more Axis ships also bound for Africa, an Italian supply ship and a tanker. Meanwhile, Force K was strengthened by the addition of the cruiser Neptune. Force K provided security for British supply efforts to Malta, most notably by the fast supply ship Breconshire in mid-December. On its safe arrival, Force K immediately departed to attack another reported convoy. But on the night of December 18 off Tripoli, Force K ran into a minefield recently laid there by Italian destroyers. The cruiser Neptune hit four mines and went down; only one man of its crew was saved. The cruisers Aurora and Penelope hit one mine each. Damaged, they managed to regain Malta safely. The destroyer Kandahar also struck a mine and was badly damaged and had to be scuttled. Force K continued to operate from Malta with the Penelope and five to six destroyers, but it mostly escorted empty transports from Malta and met full ones coming in. It achieved its last success against Axis shipping on February 7, 1942, when two of its destroyers sank a pair of small Italian coasters. It also participated in the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. Finally, in April 1942, intensified air attacks on Malta forced all surface ships to withdraw from Malta. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Beta Convoy Battle; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Creswell, John. Sea Warfare, 1939–1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1839–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Sadkovitch, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

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Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949) U.S. secretary of the navy and later secretary of defense. Born in Beacon, New York, on February 15, 1892, James Forrestal entered Dartmouth College in 1911. The next year, he transferred to Princeton University, but he left school without graduating in 1914. Two years later, Forrestal secured a position with the prestigious investment-banking corporation of William A. Read and Company (later known as Dillon Read Company). When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Forrestal enlisted in the navy. Soon afterward, he transferred to the aviation branch; he trained in Canada with the Royal Flying Corps but never saw combat. At the end of the war, he left the navy as a lieutenant and returned to Dillon Read Company, becoming its vice president in 1926 and its president in 1938. In 1940, Forrestal resigned his position to join the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration as undersecretary of the navy. His primary role was in procurement, which was vital in preparing the U.S. Navy for World War II. He worked closely with his army counterpart, Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, to streamline contracting and purchasing policies. Forrestal oversaw the rapid expansion of the navy in the early years of the war, including not only number of ships but also facilities and training. On the sudden death of Secretary of the Navy William F. Knox, Forrestal succeeded to the post in May 1944 and continued in the position until 1947. In September 1947, Forrestal became the first U.S. secretary of defense. In this capacity, he is sometimes referred to as the “godfather of the nationalsecurity state.” Forrestal was a staunch proponent of efforts to halt what he saw as Soviet expanJames Forrestal was U.S. secretary of the navy from sionist policies, and he lobbied 1944 to 1947. He was subsequently the nation’s first hard for George Kennan’s Con- secretary of defense (1947–1949). (Library of Containment Doctrine and the North gress)

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Atlantic Treaty Organization. He also supported the concept of a balanced military establishment. The immense strain of his position weighed on Forrestal and led to increasingly irrational behavior. In January 1949, President Harry S. Truman informed Forrestal that he was replacing him as defense secretary with Louis Johnson. On March 1, 1949, Forrestal resigned his post. Admitted to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland, for psychiatric care, on May 22, 1949, Forrestal leaped to his death from the 16th floor of that facility. Todd M. Wynn See also: United States, Navy.

References Albion, Robert Greenhalgh, and Robert Howe Connery, with Jennie Barnes Pope. Forrestal and the Navy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Forrestal James. The Forrestal Diaries. Ed. Walter Millis, with E. S. Duffield. New York: Viking Press, 1951. Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley. Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal. New York: Knopf, 1992. Rogow, Arnold A. James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

France, Navy In 1939 France possessed a powerful battle fleet. The navy had been largely rebuilt beginning in the 1920s and was generally regarded as the world’s fourth most powerful maritime force. Georges Leygues, a National Assembly French deputy who had served as minister of marine, was a chief architect. Admiral Jean Darlan, the personification of a political admiral, commanded it. The navy was undoubtedly the most pro–United States and anti-British of the three French services during World War II. In the pre–World War II era, French naval planning was guided by the formula that the navy should be equal in strength to the combined German and Italian navies. In addition, while the bulk of the French fleet was stationed in the Mediterranean, the navy was to be capable of operating elsewhere in the world, primarily in the Atlantic. Between 1925 and 1937, the French laid down new warships at the rate of 32,426 tons a year. With the approach of war, however, this increased to 41,000 tons annually, severely straining France’s shipyard capacity. The French fleet was centered on the battleship. France’s two oldest battleships were seized by the British in July 1940 during Operation CATAPULT, but they

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were of so little worth that they would not see further naval action. Its next three older—but slow—battleships of the Bretagne-class had been reconstructed in the interwar period. The Bretagne was sunk at Mers-el-Kébir during CATAPULT, and the Provence was damaged there and later scuttled at Toulon. The Lorraine joined the Free French fleet in 1943. In the 1930s, the French built two fast battleships, the Dunkerque and the Strasbourg. Displacing 35,500 tons fully loaded, they were rated at 29 knots and were armed with eight 13-inch guns in the distinctive French quadruple turrets. Under construction the French had two of the best battleships in Europe in armor design, the Jean Bart and the Richelieu. Both were armed with eight 15-inch guns in two quadruple turrets. Both would see action as Vichy and Free French warships and would survive the war. France also had one aged aircraft carrier, the Béarn, that would remain idle in the West Indies most of the war. Two aircraft carriers were under construction but were never completed. France maintained a cruiser force centered on seven heavy ships. With the exception of the Algérie, they were probably the worst-armored heavy cruisers of any major navy. It also possessed 12 modern light cruisers, of which 6 were Gloire-class ships: fast, well armed, and well armored. France also developed a unique destroyer force. It had built 32 large destroyers of a type designated as contre-torpilleurs. Fast, long-ranged, and almost light cruisers in concept, the best known were the six ships of the Le Fantasque class. Capable of maintaining 37 knots at full load, they were for the whole of their careers the fastest flotilla craft afloat (Le Terrible made 45 knots in its trials). Displacing 2,800 tons (3,400 tons fully loaded), they were armed with five 5.5-inch guns. These superdestroyers were designed to operate in squadrons of three each. France also had 26 destroyers designed for fleet operations (torpilleurs d’escadre) and 12 light destroyers, the latter being 610-ton torpedo boats similar to the Italian Spica-class vessels. A total of 23 destroyers of all types were under construction in 1940, but none would be completed. With the exception of the legendary monster submarine Surcouf, France’s submarines consisted of three types. France had 38 first-class submarines of 900 to 1,800 tons displacement, 32 second-class submarines of approximately 600 tons displacement each, and 6 minelaying submarines. Rounding out the fleet were numerous sloops, patrol boats, and other small craft; many trawlers and similar small vessels were requisitioned during the war for coastal work. France did not have sonar until after the outbreak of the war, and during the Vichy era, there was only very limited introduction of radar. Free French naval units were dependent for advanced equipment on Great Britain and the United States, chiefly the latter. Meanwhile, the greatest gift by Vichy France to the Axis war effort may have been Darlan’s presentation to the German navy of the Metox device for detection of radar.

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The French navy had no role during the Polish Campaign that began the war, but it did participate in the Norwegian Campaign. The latter included a destroyer raid into the Skagerrak, an arm of the North Sea between Norway and Denmark. The navy also conducted convoy and antisubmarine operations as well as operations in the Atlantic against German raiders. French naval units also participated in the Dunkerque evacuation, losing several destroyers to German aircraft. With the fall of France, the majority of the ships passed to Vichy government control. After the British attack at Mers-el-Kébir, most of the now-truncated fleet was relocated at Toulon, where virtually all were lost in a mass scuttling on November 27, 1942. Seventy-seven ships went down: 3 battleships (the Strasbourg, the Dunkerque, and the old Provence), 7 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 19 other craft. A few destroyers and smaller ships were raised and towed to Italy, but the Axis powers gained little from them. Five submarines escaped; one was badly damaged by bombing and had to be scuttled, another was interned in Spain, and three arrived in Algeria. Some Vichy warships participated in actions against the Allies, primarily off Syria, Madagascar, and Dakar and during Operation TORCH. The French warships also conducted convoy operations to France. The successful Vichy defense of Dakar on September 23–24, 1940, was an important factor in Adolf Hitler’s decision to continue backing the Vichy regime in 1940–1941. Charles de Gaulle placed the few mostly smaller warships of the Free French under Vice Admiral Émile Muselier. As late as January 1943, this modest force had only 5,314 men, but it would expand as the war progressed to include several small British- and U.S.-built warships. They would operate in all oceans, participate in operations against the Vichy territories, and later take part in Operation OVERLORD and in Pacific Ocean battles with Japan. Major wartime losses for French ships were 4 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 58 destroyers and large torpedo boats. Unfortunately for France, its navy was little able to influence events at the beginning of the war, and the defeat of France in June 1940 came too soon for the navy to contribute in a meaningful way. Jack Greene See also: Dakar, Attack on; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of; Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré; Radar; Sonar; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at.

References Couhat, Jean Labayle. French Warships of World War II. London: Ian Allen, 1971. Goda, Norman J. W. Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998.

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Hood, Ronald Chalmers III. Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Jenkins, E. H. A History of the French Navy: From Its Beginnings to the Present Day. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Melton, George E. Darlan: Admiral and Statesman of France, 1881–1942. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. Meyer, Jean, and Martine Acerra. Histoire de la Marine Française des Origines à nos Jours. Rennes, France: Éditions Ouest-France, 1994. Salerno, Reynolds Mathews. Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935–1940. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Franco-Thai War (November 1940–January 1941) Undeclared war between Thailand and Vichy France. Thailand began the FrancoThai War to regain the three rich rice-growing provinces of Battambang, Siemréap, and Sisophon, which the Thais had annexed in 1862 from Cambodia but which the French had forced them to restore in 1907. Thailand also claimed territory in Laos, which the French had forced it to return in 1904. In early June 1940, Thailand concluded a nonaggression pact with France. However, after Germany defeated France, the Thais lost interest in ratifying the pact. The pro-Japanese military government of Marshal Pibul Songgram saw an opportunity to capitalize on French weakness, and in October it called up military reservists. The Thai army numbered 26,500 men, but reservists doubled it to nearly 50,000 men. The Thai air force had about 270 aircraft, of which 150 were combat types mostly of U.S. manufacture. The navy also had several dozen obsolete land-based aircraft, but in December 1940, Japan delivered 93 modern aircraft. The Thai navy had 10,000 men who manned royal yachts, a British-built World War I destroyer, two British-built small gunboats, and eight motor torpedo boats. Italy supplied nine small torpedo boats, two minesweepers, and nine minelayers. Two light cruisers under construction in Italy for Thailand were not available for the war and were indeed sequestered by Italy in 1941. Japan also delivered two armored coastal defense antiaircraft vessels, four small submarines, two escort/training ships, and three small torpedo boats. The Thai navy suffered from serious shortcomings. Its sailors were poorly trained, the older vessels were of limited value, the modern Italian torpedo boats were too flimsy for service in rough seas, and the Japanese submarines could not dive. The French army in Indochina was comparable in size to the mobilized Thai force: 50,000 men. But 38,000 of these were Indochinese troops of questionable loyalty. The heart of the French military was the 5,000-man 5th Foreign Legion Regiment. The French possessed 30 World War I–vintage tanks. Much of their

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artillery was also outdated, and they were short of artillery ammunition. The French had fewer than 100 aircraft. French naval units in Indochinese waters were old and for the most part poorly armed. They consisted of the light cruiser Lamotte-Picquet, two gunboats, two sloops, two auxiliary patrol craft, and several noncombatants. The French were in an extremely vulnerable position. France had just been defeated by Germany in Europe, and Japan was applying pressure in Indochina. In September 1940, Japanese troops invaded Tonkin, killed 800 French troops, and secured concessions and airfields. Bangkok decided to take advantage of these circumstances to reassert its claims. In mid-November 1940, the Thais sent military units across the Mekong River into Cambodia, producing immediate military skirmishes with French troops. The French military was temporarily sidetracked by the November 22 Indochina Communist Party uprising in Cochin China, which it crushed in the first week of December. French high commissioner of Indochina Admiral Jean Decoux then decided to go on the offensive. On land, a mixed French brigade attacked Thai positions at Yang Dom Koum on January 16, 1941. The assault failed because of insufficient manpower and insufficient heavy weapons. The Thais, who had planned their own offensive for the same day, then counterattacked. French Foreign Legionnaires beat back this attack, which included tanks. Both sides then withdrew from the immediate area, although Bangkok claimed victory. At the same time, the French took the offensive at sea. The French navy planned an assault on the Thai naval detachment at Koh Chang and the principal Thai navy base at Sattahib. The initial strike was to be carried out by virtually the entire French flotilla: the cruiser, two gunboats, and two sloops. On January 16, the fleet sailed for the Gulf of Siam to Koh Chang, which guarded the passage to Sattahib. Early on January 17, the French surprised the Thais. In the ensuing 90-minute action at Koh Chang, the French sank two Thai torpedo boats; they also mortally damaged a Thai coastal defense vessel. With no direct hits or losses to their own ships, the French then returned to Saigon on January 19. There was little air action during the war, although the Thais did use their Curtiss Hawk III biplanes in a dive-bombing role. The French also had a plan, which they did not implement, to fire-bomb Bangkok from the air. The indecisive land and naval actions of January 1941 did not end the war. The Japanese then applied diplomatic pressure on France, threatening to intervene on the side of Thailand. On January 31, 1941, at Saigon, French and Thai officials signed a Japanese-dictated armistice aboard the Japanese cruiser Natori. In March, the Vichy government, which was also being intimidated by Germany, accepted Japanese mediation. Under Japanese pressure, on May 9, 1941, France signed a peace treaty with Thailand in Tokyo whereby France transferred to Thai control three Cambodian and two Laotian provinces on the right bank of the Mekong River—about 42,000 square miles.

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After the end of the World War II, France forced the Thais to return this territory in September 1945 and to accept the Mekong as the boundary separating Thailand from Laos and Cambodia to the east. But border clashes along the Mekong occurred in 1946 and with Cambodia as late as the 1980s. Spencer C. Tucker See also: France, Navy.

References Decoux, Jean. A la Barre de l’Indochine. Paris: Plon, 1949. Meisler, Jurg. “Koh Chang: The Unknown Battle: Franco-Thai War of 1940–41.” World War II Investigator 2, no. 14 (1989), pp. 26–34. Mordal, Jacques. Marine Indochine. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953. Mordal, Jacques, and Gabriel A. J. P. Auphan. La Marine Française pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Paris: Hachette, 1958.

Franklin, U.S. Aircraft Carrier The USS Franklin (CV-13) was an Essex-class aircraft carrier. Laid down at Newport News, Virginia, on December 7, 1942, launched on October 14, 1943, and commissioned on January 31, 1944, “Big Ben” sailed for the Pacific that June. During the summer of 1944, the Franklin’s planes participated in numerous strikes, including those against the Bonin Islands, Guam, and Yap. While supporting the invasion of Leyte in October, the Franklin was heavily damaged by direct hits from both Japanese bombs and kamikazes. It returned to the United States for overhaul at the Puget Sound Naval Yard the next month. Returning to action in March 1945, the Franklin had maneuvered closer to Japan than had any other U.S. carrier, when, early on March 19, a Japanese aircraft on a low-level run dropped two 500-lb. bombs on it with devastating effect. Armed and fueled planes exploded after the first bomb struck the flight deck. The second bomb hit aft and tore through two decks, igniting planes on the hangar deck. The Franklin lay dead in the water, within 50 miles of Japanese territory with no radio communications, enveloped in fire, and seemingly lost. Although casualties totaled 724 killed and 265 wounded, many more would have died without the heroic effort of the survivors. Rescue operations by ships such as the light cruiser Santa Fe and repair work by the carrier’s skeleton crew permitted the mangled wreck that was now the Franklin to reach Pearl Harbor on April 3, 1945. Although unable to return to the war, the Franklin arrived at New York City on April 28 under its own power. After repair, the Franklin was decommissioned on February 17, 1947, because of a surplus of carriers. It was reclassified in reserve

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three times thereafter. Removed from the naval list on October 1, 1964, it was scrapped at Norfolk during 1966–1968. Mary Ann Kan See also: Essex-Class Aircraft Carriers.

References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Hoehling, Adolph A. The Franklin Comes Home: The Saga of the Most Decorated Ship in Naval History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Nilo, James R., and Robert E. St. Peters. USS Franklin (CV-13): The Ship that Wouldn’t Die. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1989.

Fraser, Bruce Austin (1888–1981) British navy admiral. Born into a military family (his father was an army general) on February 5, 1888, Bruce Austin Fraser was educated at Bradfield College and the fleet training school of HMS Excellent. His early service was in battleships and destroyers, and he became known as a gunnery officer, holding that post on cruiser Minerva in the Mediterranean during World War I. In the following years, Fraser served as gunnery officer for the Mediterranean Fleet. From 1929 to 1932, he commanded the cruiser Effingham and then served as director of naval ordnance, playing an important role in helping to design the King George V–class battleships. Following command of aircraft carrier Glorious in 1936 and 1937, Fraser was promoted to rear admiral in 1938 and became chief of staff of the Mediterranean Fleet. In March 1939, Fraser was appointed controller of the navy and made third sea lord. Early in World War II, Fraser was responsible for the development of a new class of corvettes. In May 1940, Fraser was promoted to vice admiral, and a year later he was knighted. Fraser was appointed second in command of the Home Fleet in June 1942, and in May 1943 he assumed its overall command. In his position, Fraser oversaw the adoption of new antisubmarine tactics against German U-boats and increased cooperation with U.S. naval forces during the height of the Battle of the Atlantic. In December 1943, Fraser personally commanded British Task Force 2, which engaged and sank the German battleship Scharnhorst during its sortie against an Allied Arctic convoy. The Allied successes in the Atlantic and the resultant reduction of the German U-boat and surface raider threat led British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill to assign Fraser to command the Pacific Fleet in late 1944. Fraser led the return of

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British naval units to the Pacific with a force built around aircraft carriers. For the remainder of the war, Fraser maintained excellent relations with U.S. commanders and led British forces in support of U.S. amphibious and naval operations. Fraser was the British representative at the formal Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. Rewarded with the title of First Baron Fraser of North Cape, in 1948 Fraser was promoted to admiral of the fleet and appointed first sea lord and chief of naval staff. He held this post until his retirement in 1951. Fraser died in London on February 12, 1981. Thomas Lansford See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Great Britain, Navy; North Cape, Battle of.

References Evans, Mark Llewellyn. Great World War II Battles in the Arctic. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Humble, Richard. Fraser of North Cape: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, 1888–1981. Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983. Roskill, Stephen W. Churchill and the Admirals. New York: William Morrow, 1978. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Friedeburg, Hans Georg von (1895–1945) German navy admiral and commander of the German navy. Born on July 15, 1895, in Strassburg (then Germany; now Strasbourg, France), Hans Georg von Friedeburg joined the German navy in 1914 and became a submariner. He participated in World War I and was promoted to lieutenant in 1917. Friedeburg continued in the navy after the war, and, from 1932 to 1934, he was a military adviser to General Kurt von Schleicher, who was German chancellor in 1932–1933. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1933, Friedeburg in June 1936 was assigned to command the light cruiser Karlsruhe. He then was attached to the German Military Ministry under minister of war General Werner von Blomberg. In 1939, Friedeburg became an assistant to commander of German submarines Kommodore Karl Dönitz. From 1939 to 1941, Friedeburg was in the Operations and Organization Department of the German submarine forces. He then took command of U-27, and in February 1943, he succeeded Dönitz as commander of all German submarine forces. In May 1945, Friedeburg was promoted to general admiral (full admiral).

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Friedeburg was appointed commander of all German naval forces on May 1, 1945. On May 7, he signed the instrument of surrender of German forces in northern Germany. Friedeburg committed suicide in Flensburg, Germany, on May 23, 1945. Kyle D. Haire See also: Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy.

References Padfield, Peter. Dönitz, The Last Führer: A Portrait of a Nazi War Leader. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. Steinert, Marlis G. 23 Days: The Final Collapse of Nazi Germany. New York: Walker, 1969. Toland, John. The Last 100 Days. New York: Random House, 1966.

Frogmen Popular term for members of underwater demolition teams (UDTs), which played an important role in World War II. Italy was at the forefront in training combat swimmers; the Italian 10th Light Flotilla was composed mostly of sailors who manned small surface and underwater craft with explosive warheads. Their mission was to sink Allied warships and merchant shipping, a role in which they enjoyed some success. The United States also devoted attention to such activity, training and deploying frogmen in demolition and commando tactics. The first unofficial U.S. frogmen were organized in September 1942 as a detachment of sailors who received a week of training in underwater demolition tactics before being sent to North Africa as part of Operation TORCH. They destroyed nets blocking the entrance to the Sebou River in Morocco, allowing U.S. assault ships to enter the river and offload rangers to assault Vichy-held Port Lyautey Field. This success led chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King to issue orders on May 6, 1943, for the formation of UDTs. The first Naval Combat Demolition Unit consisted of 13 volunteers who trained at the Naval Amphibious Unit at Solomon Island, Maryland. They were instructed in the destruction of underwater obstacles and use of explosive charges to make channels through sandbars. These newly designated frogmen took part in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. They destroyed roadblocks near the coast, used bangalore torpedoes to remove barbed wire along the beach, salvaged stranded boats, and cleared channels through sandbars. On completion of their mission, most of the frogmen were sent back to the United States to work as instructors following further training at the Naval Amphibious Training Base at Fort Pierce, Florida. In the European theater, frogmen

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also participated in the invasion of Normandy, where they were tasked with the destruction of steel girders and heavy timbers on Omaha and Utah Beaches, clearing the way for the landing craft. Frogmen also played a key role in the Pacific theater, participating in the many amphibious operations. The British also used frogmen in the war. In the United States, frogmen were the forerunners of the U.S. Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) elite special-operations commando teams. Gregory C. Wheal See also: Borghese, Junio Valerio; HUSKY, Operation; Italy, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Submarines.

References Best, Herbert. The Webfoot Warrior. New York: John Day, 1962. Fane, Francis D. The Naked Warrior. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1956. Gleeson, James. The Frogmen. London: Evans Brothers, 1950. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Black Prince and the Sea Devils. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2004. Kelly, Orr. Brave Men, Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs. New York: Pocket Books, 1993.

Fuchida Mitsuo (1902–1976) Japanese navy officer and aviator. Born at Nagao in Nara Prefecture on December 3, 1902, Fuchida Mitsuo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1924 and completed flight training in 1927. While he was posted to the Yokosuka Kokutai (Air Corps), he developed the coordinated dive-bombing techniques intended to saturate target defenses that subsequently became standard Japanese tactics. In 1939, Fuchida became the bomber group leader of 1st Carrier Division aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi. He was a major participant in planning for the Pearl Harbor attack and was selected as overall strike commander for the 330-plane force from Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s First Air Fleet that surprised the U.S. Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. Fuchida actively participated in the attacks on Rabaul and Port Darwin and the devastating raid by the First Air Fleet into the eastern Indian Ocean during the spring of 1942. Fuchida was incapacitated by appendicitis during the Midway operation. When the Akagi was attacked and sunk by U.S. Navy dive-bombers he was severely wounded, barely managing to survive. Following his recovery, Fuchida was posted to the staff of Yokosuka Kokutai and undertook a series of planning assignments before transferring to operational posts in the Mariana Islands and the Philippines. He returned to Japan with the rank

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Japanese Navy captain Fuchida Mitsuo, photographed here in 1945. Fuchida was the strike force flight commander of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. After the war, Fuchida emigrated to the United States and became a U.S. citizen. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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of captain to participate in planning for the final defense of the home islands. Fuchida stated that he escaped death at Hiroshima; he left the city the day before the atom bomb was dropped. He also claimed to have attended the surrender ceremony aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri on September 2, 1945, although some historians consider this a fabrication. After the war, Fuchida took up farming and converted to Christianity with such fervor that he became a globecircling evangelist. He emigrated to the United States in 1966 and became a citizen. Fuchida died while visiting Osaka, Japan, on May 30, 1976. Paul E. Fontenoy

See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Genda Minoru; Indian Ocean Campaign; Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ ichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Fuchida Mitsuo and Okumya Masatake. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955. Parshall, Jonathan. “Reflecting on Fuchida, or A Tale of Three Whoppers.” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 127–138. Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Stillwell, Paul, ed. Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

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Fukutome Shigeru (1891–1971) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Tottori, Japan, on February 1, 1891, Fukutome Shigeru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in July 1912 and later from the Naval War College. He became a specialist in navigation. Fukutome’s various posts included vice chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Fleet (1938) and captain of the battleship Nagato (1938–1939). He was promoted to rear admiral in November 1939, and, until March 1941, he was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. In this position, he supported Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. In April 1941, Fukutome was appointed head of the operations planning section of the navy general staff, and, until April 1943, he took part in most of the strategic planning for the war. In November 1942, Fukutome was promoted to vice admiral, and in May 1943 he again became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, this time under Admiral Koga Mineichi. In March 1944, the Combined Fleet headquarters staff left Palau for Davao in two flying boats. On March 31, 1944, they were caught in a typhoon. The first plane, with Koga on board, was lost; the second plane crashed into the sea with Fukutome, who was badly injured. Local Filipino guerrilla forces took Fukutome and some of his staff prisoner. Although Fukutome and his staff were later rescued by the local Japanese army garrison, the guerrillas had taken the codebook and operation plans of the Combined Fleet and sent them to the United States. For whatever reason, Fukutome did not report this loss to the authorities, a failure that contributed to the Japanese defeat in the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea. After recovering from his injuries, Fukutome commanded various air fleets until the end of the war. He was arrested as a war criminal in October 1947 but was later released. Fukutome died in Tokyo on February 6, 1971. Tohmatsu Haruo See also: Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Morley, James William. The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Yoshimura, Akira. Kaigan ostdu jiken [Navy case B]. Tokyo: Bungeishunju¯, 1982.

Fushimi Hiroyasu (1872–1946) Japanese imperial prince and admiral. Born in Kyoto on October 16, 1872, Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu studied in Germany from 1890 to 1895. He entered the German

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Naval Academy in 1892, and in 1895 he graduated from it and from the German Naval War College. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1903, Fushimi served in the battleship Mikasa during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and was in the flagship during the October 1905 Battle of Tsushima, when he was wounded in action. Fushimi held various line and staff duties, and he was promoted to full admiral in 1922. He occupied the post of chief of the navy general staff from 1932 to 1941. Fushimi opposed the naval tonnage ratio fixed at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. His support of the so-called Fleet Faction encouraged the hard-liners to push to increase their influence in the navy during the late 1930s. During this period, Fushimi took over many of the functions traditionally under the jurisdiction of the navy ministry. He also saw to it that many high-ranking naval officers who had supported the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 were dismissed from the service. Replaced by Nagano Osami in April 1941, Fushimi thereafter had no practical influence on affairs of state or the war. He died in Tokyo on August 16, 1946. Tohmatsu Haruo See also: Nagano Osami.

References Morley, James W. Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. Nomura, Minoru. Tenno¯, Fushiminomiya to Nippon Kaigun [Emperor Hirohito, Prince Fushimi, and the Japanese navy]. Tokyo: Bungeishunju¯, 1988. Shillony, Ben-Ami. Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981. Titus, Stephen J. Emperor Hirohito and Sho¯wa Japan: A Political Biography. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

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G Gallery, Daniel Vincent Jr. (1901–1977) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Chicago, Illinois, on July 10, 1901, Daniel Vincent Gallery Jr. graduated from the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1920. Following service on several ships, he underwent pilot training and was certified a naval aviator in 1927. Gallery was a flight instructor and then commanded a scouting squadron. From 1938 to 1941, he was chief of the aviation section of the Bureau of Ordnance. Gallery next participated in antisubmarine patrols in the North Atlantic as commander of the U.S. Fleet Air Base, Reykjavik, Iceland, from 1941 to 1943. In mid-1943, Captain Gallery took command of antisubmarine task group (TG) 22.3 operating out of Norfolk, Virginia, a hunter-killer force consisting of the escort carrier Guadalcanal (CVE-60) and five destroyer escorts. TG 22.3 sank several German U-boats while providing protection for Allied Atlantic convoys. While he was in command of TG 22.3, Gallery developed a plan for capturing a German submarine intact. That plan was executed to perfection on June 4, 1944, when the German submarine U-505 was forced to the surface and captured with valuable cryptographic materials. Following the war, the U-505 was placed at the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago, where it is still on display. When the actions of Gallery and TG 22.3 were made public at war’s end, the navy emphasized that the U-505 was the first enemy vessel captured on the high seas by the U.S. Navy since the War of 1812. In 1944, however, the navy worried that Gallery’s exploit would cause the Germans to change the radio codes, but the Germans never learned of the capture. Following the war, Gallery was chief of the navy’s Guided Missile Division. He became involved in the so-called Revolt of the Admirals in 1949 and publicly argued the navy’s case in the mass media. Retiring as a rear admiral in 1960, Gallery wrote numerous books and articles. Two of his brothers also retired from the U.S. Navy as rear admirals. Gallery died at Bethesda, Maryland, on January 16, 1977. Edward F. Finch See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied.

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References Gallery, Daniel V. Eight Bells and All’s Well. New York: Norton, 1965. Gallery, Daniel V. Twenty Million Tons under the Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Gilliland, C. Herbert, and Robert Shenk. Admiral Dan Gallery: The Life and Wit of a Navy Original. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Genda Minoru (1904–1989) Japanese navy officer and aviator. Born in Hiroshima on August 16, 1904, Genda Minoru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1924. Following sea service, he took flight training at Kasumigaura in 1928 and 1929, graduating at the head of his class. He served with the Yokosuka Kokutai (air corps) and aboard the carriers Akagi and Ryujo before becoming a fighter flight instructor at Yokosuka in 1934. There he gained national fame as leader of the Genda Circus, an aerobatics team. While at Yokosuka and subsequently at the Naval Staff College in 1937, Genda developed and expounded his concepts of massed air attacks under fighter umbrellas and the central role of naval aviation in future warfare. Following combat service in China and command of the Yokosuka Kokutai, he became assistant naval attaché in London from 1938 to 1940. When Genda returned to Japan in 1940, he joined the staff of the 1st Carrier Division. On its formation in April 1941, he became chief air officer of First Air Fleet, which concentrated all of Japan’s carriers into a single force to maximize their combat effectiveness, much as he had advocated since the mid-1930s. In February 1941, Genda drafted a very aggressive plan for an air assault on Hawaii, expanding on Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s initial tentative suggestion for a preemptive strike to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Genda played a leading role in designing the tactical plan for the Pearl Harbor attack. Although Genda’s demands for concentration of force and surprise were heeded, his emphasis on destroying the U.S. carriers and following up with an invasion to eliminate Hawaii as a U.S. forward base formed no part of Yamamoto’s eventual plan. During the Pacific war, Genda served in carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack, in the Indian Ocean, in the Battle of Midway, and in the Solomon Islands. He was on the staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet at Rabaul until his promotion to captain in late 1944, when he became senior aviation officer in the Naval General Staff. In 1945, Genda was charged with the air defense of the Japanese home islands as commander of Kokutai 343, a large formation equipped with the best navy interceptor aircraft that were flown by the most experienced available crews. He served in this capacity until Japan’s surrender. Following World War II, Genda was first in private business; he then headed the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces from 1955 to 1962, retiring as a full general.

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He was elected to the upper house of the Japanese Diet in 1962, serving there until 1982. Genda died in Tokyo on August 15, 1989. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Fuchida Mitsuo; Indian Ocean Campaign; Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Stillwell, Paul, ed. Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Willmott, H. P., with Tohmatsu Haruo and W. Spencer Johnson. Pearl Harbor. London: Cassell, 2001.

German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders At the beginning of World War II, the Germans converted selected merchantmen into armed commerce raiders. These had the missions of sinking whatever enemy ships they could find; laying mines; upsetting British merchant shipping schedules; and forcing the British navy to shift assets from more vital theaters, dissipating and wearing out machinery and ships. The first of these raiders, and the most successful, was the Atlantis. It departed Germany on March 31, 1940. Five other raiders followed by early July and one more in December. There were nine in all: the Atlantis, Orion, Wilder, Thor, Pinguin, Komet, Kormoran, Stier, and Michel. The Komet reached the Pacific through the Northeast Passage, thanks to the assistance of two Soviet icebreakers, for which service the USSR was paid some $300,000. The others all broke out through the Denmark Strait. The ships ranged in displacement from some 3,300 to 8,800 tons. Painted gray, brown, or black in order to render them less visible at night, these ships would sail under whatever flag was convenient at the moment. Their raked bows hinted at additional speed if required, but that was the only indication that they were not innocent merchantmen. Hidden behind hinged steel ports, however, were six 5.9-inch guns. These guns were the raiders’ primary weapons. They also carried torpedo tubes, both above and below water. False topside works concealed lighter guns, searchlights, range finders, and smoke generators.

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The raiders also had float aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. None of the ships had catapults, so these aircraft could only be used in calm seas. Two of the raiders carried small motor torpedo boats. Most of the raiders also carried mines, which were laid in widely scattered areas of the world, including off the Cape of Good Hope and Auckland, New Zealand. Some of the prizes taken were valuable, and a number of these were gotten safely back through the British blockade to France. The prizes also provided fuel and supplies, enabling the raiders to extend their cruising time. The raiders were hard to locate, and the Germans shifted them around and altered their appearance. Because of their heavy armament, only cruisers were sufficiently armed to deal with them. Although most of the raiders remained in the Atlantic, some reached the Indian Ocean and Pacific. The raiders had their greatest success in 1940. Gradually thereafter they were hunted down and destroyed or succumbed to mechanical problems. The Michel was the only raider left at sea at the beginning of 1943. It continued to sink Allied shipping through most of that year. On October 18, 1943, it was about 60 miles from its new base of Yokohama, Japan, when it was attacked at night by the surfaced U.S. submarine Tarpon. The Michel tried to ram the submarine but was in turn torpedoed and sunk. In all, the German raiders sank some 129 ships, totaling more than 800,000 tons, a figure equal to a year’s normal British peacetime construction. This figure does not include an unknown tally of ships sunk by mines or the indirect cost to the British war effort and the value of the prizes sent home to Germany to the German war economy. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantis, German Armed Merchant Cruiser; Germany, Navy; Sydney, Australian Cruiser.

References Duffy, James P. Hitler’s Secret Pirate Fleet: The Deadliest Ships of World War II. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. Edwards, Bernard. Beware Raiders! German Surface Raiders in the Second World War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Muggenthaler, August Karl. German Raiders of World War II. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969.

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Germany, Navy Under Adolf Hitler, Germany embarked on a program to rebuild its navy on a global scale. The German navy (Kriegsmarine) began this major effort after the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty in June 1935. The goal was creation of a balanced fleet that would serve as the core of a future blue-water navy dominated by battleships. This so-called Z Plan envisioned a powerful fleet that would one day challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. In 1938, Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy forced the navy to consider the possibility of a future naval war against Great Britain. The navy’s commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, designed a strategy to attack the British sea lanes. His proposal to build ships more suited to a commerce war, including additional U-boats, was rejected by Hitler, who was intent on building a battleship-dominated navy that would serve as an instrument of political and military force commensurate with a world power. Shortages of resources contributed to delays in naval construction, and Raeder’s blind confidence in the führer’s diplomatic successes and promises that war would not come before 1942 or 1943 found the navy unprepared for war in September 1939. At the beginning of the war, the German navy numbered 79,000 men. It possessed 2 battleships, 3 pocket battleships or Panzerschiffe (small, fast, strongly constructed armored ships later reclassified as heavy cruisers), 1 heavy cruiser, 6 light cruisers, and 32 destroyers and torpedo boats. Fewer than half of the 57 U-boats available were suitable for Atlantic operations. Despite Raeder’s initial pessimism that the navy could only “die gallantly,” thereby creating the foundations for a future fleet, he intended to carry out an aggressive naval strategy that would attack British sea communications on a global basis using his concept of diversion and concentration in operational areas of his own choosing and timing. Raeder persistently argued with Hitler that only total economic warfare against England could have a decisive impact. Hitler’s restrictions on naval operations, particularly on those of the U-boats, frustrated Raeder’s attempts to seize the initiative and achieve early successes. In late 1939, concerned that the British were planning to invade Norway, Raeder instigated planning for the successful German occupation of Norway and Denmark (Operation WESERÜBUNG). This April 1940 operation was for the navy its “feat of arms”—justifying its contribution to the war effort and future existence. Although the navy did secure important port facilities for surface raiders and U-boats in Norway as well as the shipping route for iron ore from Sweden, it also suffered substantial losses in the operation in the form of 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers. In June, with the defeat of France, the navy acquired additional ports on the Atlantic and Bay of Biscay for surface ships and submarines. But the navy also now had to

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protect an extended coastline from occupied France to Scandinavia. From 1940 to 1943, Germany also sent to sea 9 armed auxiliary cruisers. Raeder’s intent to prove the worth of the surface fleet—in particular, the battleships—led him to demand of his commanders that they take risks yet avoid unnecessary combat that could lead to losses. Two fleet commanders lost their jobs when they failed to exhibit the necessary aggressiveness. The scuttling of the pocket battleship Graf Spee in December 1939 and Hitler’s displeasure over this loss further reinforced the inherent contradictions in Raeder’s orders to strike boldly but avoid damage to the navy’s own ships. With new battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz joining the fleet, Raeder envisioned a new phase of the Atlantic surface battle, with task forces that would engage Allied convoys protected by capital ships. In an effort to prove the value of the battleships, Raeder pressed the Bismarck into service before the other battleships were available for action. Its loss in May 1941 represented the end of the surface war in the Atlantic and Hitler’s increasing interference in the use of Germany’s remaining capital ships. Unable to achieve the conditions for a cross–English Channel invasion (Operation SEA LION) in September 1940, Raeder tried to divert Hitler from his plans to attack the Soviet Union. Raeder advocated an alternative strategy in the Mediterranean to defeat Britain first, especially given the growing cooperation between that nation and the United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Raeder saw an opportunity to link up with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean and use the French African colonies and the Atlantic islands of Portugal and Spain to expand the bases for a longterm war against the AngloAmerican naval forces in the Atlantic. These plans never materialized, as the war against the Soviet Union faltered and GerGerman minesweepers, which had violated Swedish termany was forced to come to the ritorial waters in an attempt to clear a passage through aid of Italy and secure its south- mines laid there by the Swedish Navy, April 1940. (Getty Images) ern flank in the Balkans.

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Nervous about British threats to Norway and Allied support to the Soviets in the north, Hitler ordered that the two battleships in Brest—the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst—and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen be either moved to Norway or scrapped. The “Channel dash” in February 1942 was a tactical success but a strategic defeat for the navy. With the fleet relegated to Norway as a fleet-in-being, the U-boat arm, under the command of Admiral Karl Dönitz, continued its role as the navy’s primary weapon. The lack of Luftwaffe support, though, continued to seriously hamper all operations. The navy never resolved the issue of whether the U-boat war was a tonnage war or a commerce war in which U-boats attacked targets that had the greatest potential for a decisive impact. Dönitz continued to argue that all resources should go to the U-boat war and disagreed with the diversion of U-boats to other theaters such as the Mediterranean or to the defense of Norway. In late December 1942, the failure of the Hipper and Lützow to close with a weakly defended convoy in the Barents Sea (Operation RAINBOW) led an angry Hitler to attack Raeder and the surface fleet. Raeder resigned, and Dönitz succeeded him. Although Dönitz was determined to prosecute the submarine war ruthlessly, as with the surface fleet, the defeat of the U-boats in May 1943 resulted from Allied technology and successes in code breaking that reflected the shortcomings in the naval leadership and military structure of the Third Reich. As the military situation of Germany deteriorated, the navy provided support to the army, particularly in the Baltic, where it conducted a massive and highly successful evacuation effort of troops and civilians. In sharp contrast to the navy’s collapse after World War I, the German navy during World War II enforced strict discipline until the end. In April 1945, Hitler named the loyal Dönitz as his heir and successor. Keith W. Bird See also: Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in; Atlantic, Battle of the; Baltic Sea, Area of Operations; Bay of Biscay Offensive; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Black Sea, Area of Operations; CERBERUS, Operation; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Axis; Crete, Naval Operations off; Dönitz, Karl; DRUMBEAT, Operation; Friedeburg, Hans Georg von; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Lütjens, Günther; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of; Prien, Günther; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Rogge, Bernhard; SEA LION, Operation; Signals Intelligence; Tirpitz, Attacks on; WESERÜBUNG, Operation; Z Plan.

References Bird, Keith W. German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature. New York: Garland, 1985. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1996, 1998. Howarth, Stephen, and Derek Law, eds. The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

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Jackson, Robert H. The German Navy in World War II. London: Brown Books, 1999. Militärgeschtliches Forschungsamt. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg [Germany and the Second World War]. Trans. Dean S. McMurrey, Edwald Osers, and Louise Wilmott. 7 vols. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990–2001. Salewski, Michael. Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945. 3 vols. Munich, West Germany: Bernard and Graefe, 1970–1975.

Gervais de Lafond, Raymond (1890–1968) French navy admiral. Raymond Gervais de Lafond was born at Felletin in central France on October 31, 1890. He entered the French Naval Academy in October 1907 and was commissioned an ensign in October 1909. Assigned to the cruiser Iberville in the Far East Division in 1910, he took part in operations ashore in defense of French interest at Hankou, China. In 1917, following additional service in the Atlantic and as second in command of a torpedo boat, he participated in the protection of Allied convoys in the English Channel against German submarines. In March 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant. In March 1919, Gervais de Lafond was assigned to the French naval mission to Romania and was subsequently named assistant to the French naval attaché. Returning to France in 1921, he was assigned to the Intelligence Section of the French navy. In December 1923, he took command of the dispatch boat Agile in the Levant Division. He returned to the Intelligence Section in 1925. Promoted to lieutenant commander in January 1927, Gervais de Lafond commanded a squadron of torpedo craft in the Mediterranean. He again returned to the Intelligence Section in January 1931 and was promoted to commander that April. After other assignments afloat and study at the French Naval War College, in August 1936, he became French naval attaché in Rome. He was promoted to captain in April 1937. In August 1939, Gervais de Lafond took command of the 3rd Scout Division. His ships participated in the French navy bombardment of Genoa in June 1940. During the Allied June 1941 invasion of French Syria, the 3rd Scout Division, which then consisted of the large destroyers Valmy and Guépard, was based at Beirut along with three submarines and a sloop. Gervais de Lafond’s division, which faced an Allied naval force of three cruisers and eight destroyers, proved an effective nuisance, shelling Allied positions on the coast. Gervais de Lafond also fought surface engagements against heavy odds, disabling the British destroyer Janus off Sidon, Lebanon, on June 8, 1941. Promoted to rear admiral in August 1941, Gervais de Lafond commanded the Vichy France 2nd Light Squadron of one cruiser and seven destroyers at Casablanca. He took part in the defense of Casablanca against vastly superior U.S. invasion forces on November 8–9, 1942, leading his squadron in a desperate attack

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against the U.S. landing site at Fédala, in what has been described by one historian as “the last sally of the French navy against ships at sea.” Gervais de Lafond was among the wounded and only the destroyer L’Alcyon remained operational after a seven-hour battle against a battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and 14 destroyers. Named commander of French naval forces at Algiers in May 1943, Gervais de Lafond was furloughed in October 1945 and retired from the navy altogether in March 1946. He died in the priory at Remeneuil-par-Usseau on March 11, 1968. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Casablanca, Battle of; France, Navy; Sidon, Engagement off.

References Jenkins, E. H. A History of the French Navy from Its Beginnings to the Present Day. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973. O’Hara, Vincent. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Taillemite, Étienne. Dictionnaire des marins français. Paris: Tallandier, 2002.

Ghormley, Robert Lee (1883–1958) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Portland, Oregon, on October 15, 1883, Robert Lee Ghormley graduated from the University of Idaho in 1902 and from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1906. Ghormley’s first assignments were in cruisers. During World War I, he served as aide to the commander of the Battleship Force, Atlantic Fleet. He was then assistant director of the Overseas Division, Naval Overseas Transportation Service. Between the wars, Ghormley held a variety of staff positions. In 1935 and 1936, Captain Ghormley commanded the battleship Nevada. He then directed the War Plans Office and, in 1939, became assistant to the chief of naval operations. In August 1940, now a rear admiral, Ghormley was sent to London as a naval observer and to recommend possible U.S. naval aid to Britain. In June 1942, newly promoted to vice admiral, Ghormley was named commander to the South Pacific Area and Force. He assumed his new command as plans for the invasion of the U.S. Guadalcanal were in progress. Believing his forces to be unready, he requested a postponement in the operation, which was denied. He then seems to have distanced himself from the operation, while tensions between his subordinate commanders were left unresolved. After the Allied defeat in the Battle of Savo Island, Ghormley feared that the entire Guadalcanal operation would fail. As a result, he continued to maintain strong garrisons on other islands in the event

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of future Japanese advances rather than using those forces to assist in winning the protracted struggle on Guadalcanal. Ghormley suffered from a severely abscessed tooth at the time, which may have interfered with his decision making. In October 1942, following the Battle of Cape Esperance, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, replaced Ghormley with Vice Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., who infused an offensive spirit into the campaign that Ghormley seemed incapable of maintaining. In 1943, Ghormley commanded the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and in 1944 he took charge of the 14th Naval District, Hawaii. At the end of the war, Ghormley assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces in Germany (Task Force 124), which was charged, among other things, with demobilizing the German navy. Ghormley retired from the navy as a vice admiral in August 1946, and he died at Bethesda, Maryland, on June 21, 1958. Edward F. Finch See also: Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990. Miller, Eric. Guadalcanal: The Carrier Battles. New York: Crown, 1987. Miller, Eric. Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea. New York: Crown, 1988. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949.

Gibbs, William Francis (1886–1967) U.S. naval architect. Born in Philadelphia on August 24, 1886, William Gibbs grew up fascinated with ship design and marine engineering, but at his father’s insistence he studied economics and law at Harvard and Columbia Universities. During two years of unsatisfying legal practice, he joined his younger brother, Frederic Herbert Gibbs, in speculative plans for a fast, 1,000-ft. transatlantic liner. In 1915 Gibbs abandoned the law to pursue this project, winning financial backing from financier John Pierpont Morgan Jr. U.S. involvement in World War I prevented the ship’s construction, but the proposal and Morgan’s support attracted attention from both military and civilian shipping authorities, leading to Gibbs’s service as a shipping expert in the War Department and an adviser to the United States Shipping Board. In 1922, Gibbs and his brother organized a company to recondition the 54,300ton Leviathan, formerly the German liner Vaterland. Success in this difficult

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undertaking made the firm’s reputation, and in 1929 the brothers joined another naval architect, Daniel H. Cox, to form Gibbs and Cox. The new company became noted for its yachts and passenger ships, but it also profoundly influenced naval design through development of high-pressure, high-temperature propulsion systems, which were first used in 16 Mahan-class destroyers ordered by the U.S. Navy in 1933. World War II prompted Gibbs and his company to phenomenal productivity; 63 percent of oceangoing merchant ships and 74 percent of naval vessels constructed in the United States during the war were built to Gibbs and Cox specifications. Resuming government work, Gibbs served as controller of shipbuilding for the War Production Board in 1942 and 1943 and subsequently as chairman of the Combined Shipbuilding Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He simplified and standardized shipbuilding through economies of scale and a relentless emphasis on time saving and efficiency. From 1943, he also represented the Office of War Mobilization on the U.S. Navy’s Procurement Review Board. His most striking single accomplishment was his dominant role in designing the Liberty ship, a basic cargo vessel derived from British precedents, of which more than 2,700 examples were built under his direction. Following the war, Gibbs returned to his early vision of an U.S. superliner, finally realized in the construction of the SS United States in 1952. Gibbs died in New York City on September 6, 1967. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Liberty Ships.

References Braynard, Frank O. The Big Ship: The Story of the S.S. United States. Newport News, VA: Mariners’ Museum, 1981. Elphick, Peter. Liberty: The Ships That Won the War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Lane, Frederic C. Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951.

Gibraltar Key British naval base that guarded the strait between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Gibraltar, a 2.5-square-mile promontory attached to the southern coast of Spain, has as its most distinctive geographic feature a formation of limestone 1,396 ft. high known as The Rock. The British seized the area from Spain in the early 18th century, and its possession was formally recognized

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as British in the 1714 Treaty of Utrecht ending the War of the Spanish Succession. The British subsequently began construction of fortifications on The Rock and also harbor facilities, but the latter were of poor quality in comparison to the Mediterranean base of Malta. In the early 20th century, the British installed breakwaters to improve the harbor as well as three dry docks. Shortly after the beginning of World War II, the British also built an airstrip and further fortified The Rock through the inclusion of miles of tunnels along with barracks and offices within the limestone structure. Gibraltar was vastly important during the war, mostly because of its strategic position. Because it guarded the entrance to the Mediterranean, the British were able to control naval traffic entering and leaving the sea. The base was consequently essential as a staging point for convoys to supply and maintain Malta—an island base that suffered frequent air attacks from Axis forces. Gibraltar became the base for Force H, initially commanded by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, which escorted convoys to Malta and also was responsible for operations in the Atlantic, such as the search for and destruction of the German battleship Bismarck. Gibraltar also served as a command post for General Dwight D. Eisenhower during Operation TORCH, the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa. The Axis powers were fully aware of the importance of Gibraltar to the Allied war effort. In late 1940, German planners formulated a plan code-named Operation FELIX that called for two German Army corps to move through Spain and seize Gibraltar. Opposition from Spanish dictator Francisco Franco led to the plan being dropped. Attacks to disrupt operations there did take place, among the first of these an air raid by Vichy French aircraft following the British attack on ships of the French navy in Operation CATAPULT. In 1942, Italian air force planes also bombed Gibraltar with limited effect, and between 1940 and 1943, the Italians maintained a commando unit in the Spanish port of Algeciras that sank or damaged 14 ships in Gibraltar’s harbor over a two-year period. Following the completion of the North African Campaign and the invasion of Italy, Gibraltar’s importance diminished, although it continued to be a major base for Mediterranean operations. Eric W. Osborne See also: Force H; Frogmen; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Somerville, Sir James Fownes.

References Harvey, Maurice. Gibraltar: A History. London: Spellmount, 2000. Lavery, Brian. Churchill’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1939–1945. London: Conway Maritime, 2006.

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Giffen, Robert Carlisle “Ike” (1886–1962) U.S. navy admiral. Born on June 29, 1886, in West Chester, Pennsylvania, Robert Carlisle “Ike” Giffen graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1907. During World War I, he commanded a destroyer on antisubmarine patrols in the North Atlantic. Between the wars, Giffen interspersed seagoing commands with shore assignments. In 1940 and 1941, he served on the staff of the chief of naval operations. Appointed commander of Cruiser Destroyer Division 7 in March 1941 and promoted to rear admiral in October, Giffen escorted supply convoys between Britain and the Soviet Union. He then commanded a naval task force in Operation TORCH, the November 1942 invasion of North Africa. Giffen was transferred to the Pacific; he and his ships completed the lengthy voyage in time to join the battle for Rennell Island and then took part in the Aleutian and Marshall Islands campaigns. Giffen’s command provided fire support in the invasions of Makin Island in 1943 and Kwajalein in January and February 1944. He was promoted to vice admiral in March 1944. From February to August 1944, he commanded Cruiser Division 6 during the bombardments of Truk, Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. He took command of the Caribbean Sea Frontier in autumn 1944 and of the Atlantic Fleet Service Force in 1945, retiring in September 1946. Giffen died at Annapolis, Maryland, on December 10, 1962. Priscilla Roberts See also: Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William.

References Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953.

Gilbert Islands Campaign (November 1943) U.S. amphibious campaign in the Central Pacific and an important advance toward the Japanese home islands. The 16 atolls that constitute the Gilbert Islands lie astride the equator. The United States invaded the Gilbert Islands in late November 1943; approximately 200 ships and more than 30,000 troops seized the atolls of

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Makin, Tarawa, and Abemama in Operation GALVANIC. Fifth Fleet commander Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had overall command of the operation, and Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall commanded Task Force 50. Following preparatory air strikes against Rabaul, the 11 fleet carriers in Task Force 50, which were divided into four carrier groups, neutralized Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands and pounded Makin and Tarawa in preparation for landings there. At the latter two atolls, seven battleships and accompanying cruisers bombarded the shore for more than an hour the morning of the invasion. On November 20, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner’s Task Force 54 landed elements of the army’s 27th Division on Butaritari Island; 2nd Marine Division troops landed on Betio Island. Butaritari was secured in three days. Resistance was heavier on Betio; it was not secured until November 28. Although the Japanese surface navy did not intervene, Japan’s air and submarine units did strike the U.S. invasion force. At dusk on November 20, 16 twin-engine “Betty” bombers attacked a carrier group off Tarawa

A Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat flown by Commander Joseph C. Clifton prepares to launch from the carrier Saratoga (CV-3) for a strike against Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands, 1943. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)

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and torpedoed the light carrier Independence. The explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 43, and it forced the carrier to retire for repairs. At least three similar raids followed over the next week, although none scored hits because U.S. air cover—including the first use of night-combat air patrols—broke up the attacks. More deadly were Japanese submarines, one of which torpedoed and sank the escort carrier Liscombe Bay on November 24, killing 642 sailors. Overall, the Gilbert landings cost the lives of roughly 1,800 Americans and 5,000 Japanese, including the crews of four lost Japanese navy submarines. The Gilbert Islands Campaign provided important lessons in amphibious operations, and it paved the way for the next U.S. amphibious operation, which was conducted against the Marshall Islands in January and February 1944. Timothy L. Francis See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Rabaul; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

References Crawford, Danny J. The 2nd Marine Division and Its Regiments. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2001. Cressman, Robert J. The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.

Glide Bombs Precursor to today’s cruise missiles. First developed by the Germans, glide bombs were used primarily against Allied warships. The Germans developed two types of weapons systems, the first of which was the free-fall FX-1400 bomb. Designed by Max Kramer of the Ruhrstahl AG, it weighed 3,460 lb. with a warhead of 771 lb. The FX-1400 had small 5 ft. 3 in. wings to enable it to glide, and it was radio controlled by means of an electrical tail unit. Glide bombs were carried by such German aircraft as the Dornier Do-217, Heinkel He-117, and Junkers Ju-88 and Ju-290. On September 9, 1943, after Italy had announced an armistice with the Allies, the Germans used FX-1400 glide bombs to sink the Italian battleship Roma; 1,252 members of its crew were lost. Another bomb exploded off the bow of the battleship Italia, causing minor flooding. The FX-1400 could be dropped from an altitude of 18,500 to 22,700 ft. and a distance of up to three miles from the target. The second glide bomb was the Hs-293, designed by Herbert Wagner of the Henschel Company. The Hs-293 was a rocket-assisted, guided winged bomb

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initially designed for use against ships. It was fitted with a Walter 109–507B rocket motor of 1,323 lb. thrust, giving it a speed of about 360 mph. The Hs-293 was 13 ft. 4 in. long with a wingspan of 10 ft. 7 in. It weighed about 2,140 lb., of which about 165 lb. were in the rocket and 1,124 lb. were in the warhead—a substantial ratio of warhead to delivery system. The Hs-293 employed a Dortmund/Duisburg wireguided system for control, and it had a useful range of almost 10 nautical miles. Modifications to the Hs-293 included the Hs-294 (16 ft. 5 in. long with a wingspan of 14 ft. 2 in.), Hs-295, Hs-296, Hs-297, Hs-298, and Hs-344. The Hs-298, a smaller version of the Hs-293, was designed to be launched from night fighters against Allied bombers. It had a two-stage rocket motor and could operate at heights up to 20,000 ft. Its warhead weighed about 150 lb. The Hs-344 was another lightweight version designed for use by fighters against other aircraft. These versions were largely just tested. The Germans first used the Hs-293 on August 24, 1943, in the Bay of Biscay. During Allied Operation PERCUSSION, an antisubmarine air and surface attack on German U-boats, the Canadian 5th Support Group came under air attack from 14 Dornier Do-217 bombers of the 2nd Squadron of Kampfgeschwader 100 and 7 Junkers Ju-88Cs of another unit. The attackers employed Hs-293s to damage the sloop Landguard in four near hits and the sloop Bideford in one near hit. On August 28, 18 Do-217s attacked the relieving 1st Support Group and sank the British sloop Egret and heavily damaged the Canadian destroyer Athabaskan. Kapfgeschwader 100 mounted further attacks with the Hs-293 in the Mediterranean in September 1943. During the U.S. landing at Salerno on September 11, Kapfgeschwader 100’s Do-17s attacked and heavily damaged the cruiser Savannah and narrowly missed the cruiser Philadelphia. On September 13, the British cruiser Uganda was hit and heavily damaged. The Philadelphia and British destroyers Loyal and Nubian were both damaged. The hospital ship Newfoundland was sunk, probably by an Hs-293. On September 16, the British battleship Warspite sustained heavy damage from two Hs-293 hits. Among other Allied warships that were struck and sunk were the British destroyer Intrepid and the Greek destroyer Vasillissa Olga on September 26, the Italian destroyer Euro on October 1, and the British destroyer escort Dulverton on November 13, 1943. During the landing at Anzio, Do-217s and Ju-88s again attacked Allied ships with Hs-293 glide bombs. On January 23, 1944, these glide bombs sank the British destroyer Janus and damaged the destroyer Jervis. On January 29, Hs-293s sank the British cruiser Spartan, and on February 25 they sent to the bottom the British destroyer Inglefield. The glide bomb was well conceived and well tested. Some 2,300 were used in combat, but production was limited by the many other demands on the German armaments industry at the time. The Germans claimed that the glide bombs sank or damaged 400,000 tons of Allied shipping, but this was an exaggeration. The


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Germans also sent plans for their rocket motors by submarine to the Japanese, who used them to develop their Oka manned rocket bomb. Late in the war, the United States tested several types of air-to-surface missiles, including the Fletcher XBG-1, Fletcher XBG-2, Cornelius XBG-3, Pratt-Reed LBE, Piper LBP, and Taylorcraft LBT. The term glomb was used as shorthand for glide bomb. The Eighth Air Force used the GB-1 series of glide bombs beginning on March 28, 1944. Some 1,000 were launched, but they lacked accuracy. Later versions incorporated television guidance, but only one version (Project Batty, a GB-4) was used in combat. Instead, bombs without wings but with a guidance system were used. One was the Azon (for “azimuth only”); another was the Razon (azimuth and range guidance). Azons were used successfully in combat. A later version, the Tarzon, was used effectively during the 1950–1953 Korean War. The most advanced winged missile of World War II was the Bat, a glide bomb with a 1,000-lb. bomb and semiactive radar homing. Employing PBY-42s Privateer aircraft, the U.S. Navy used the Bat with great success against Japanese shipping. The Bat had a 10-ft. wingspan, was a little longer than 11 ft., weighed 1,880 lb., and achieved 300 mph in the glide. Range depended on the release height; a Bat sank a Japanese destroyer at 20 miles distance from the drop aircraft. David Westwood, Walter Boyne, Jürgen Rohwer, and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Bay of Biscay Offensive.

References Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War II. London: Jane’s, 1946. Kens, Karlkeinz, and Heinz J. Nowarra. Die deutschen Flugzeuge 1933–1945. Munich, Germany: J. Flehmanns Verlag, 1968. Rohwer, Jürgen, and G. Hummelchen. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945. London: Greenhill, 1992.

Glowworm, British Destroyer HMS Glowworm was one of 24 G-, H-, and I-class British destroyers built in the mid-1930s. Constructed by John I. Thornycroft and Company at Woolston, Hampshire, the Glowworm was laid down on August 15, 1934; launched on July 22, 1935; and commissioned on January 22, 1936. It displaced 1,335 tons standard load and 1,854 tons full load. It was 323 ft. in overall length and 33 ft. in beam. It was armed with four 4.7-inch (119-mm) quick-firing guns in single mounts and eight .50-caliber machine guns in quad mounts, as well as 10 21-inch torpedo tubes. Capable of 36 knots speed, it had a complement of 145 men.

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On commissioning, the Glowworm served with the Mediterranean Fleet into the beginning of World War II. Transferred to the Western Approaches Command in October 1939, the Glowworm was assigned to convoy work and antisubmarine patrols until November, when it was transferred to North Sea patrol and escort duties out of Harwich. On February 22, 1940, while at anchor, the Glowworm was hit in fog by the Swedish ship Rex off Outer Dowsing and badly damaged. Repaired by late March, it was assigned to the 1st Destroyer Flotilla of the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow. On April 5, the Glowworm and three other destroyers escorted the battleship Renown as part of Operation WILFRED, the British plan to lay mines off the Norwegian coast. At 7:15 a.m. on April 8, the Glowworm was attempting to rejoin the other ships, after having been detached the day before to search for a member of its crew who had fallen overboard, when, in near gale conditions, it suddenly encountered a German destroyer. The German warship was part of a contingent consisting of four destroyers and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper transporting 1,700 German troops to Trondheim as a part of Operation WESERÜBUNG, the German invasion of Norway. The German ship vanished in the murk, but shortly after another destroyer appeared and a running fight developed. The German captain called for assistance from the Admiral Hipper. When the German cruiser came into view, the Glowworm, not aware that German heavy units were at sea, signaled requesting the ship’s identification. In reply, the Admiral Hipper opened fire. Although hit several times by shells from the cruiser, the Glowworm fired one salvo of torpedoes. These missed, and, in an effort to close range and finish off its adversary before it could launch more torpedoes, the Admiral Hipper plunged through the destroyer’s smoke screen. When it emerged on the other side, however, its crew saw that the Glowworm was on a collision course. The Glowworm’s only surviving officer stated that the destroyer was not under helm at the time, so it is not certain whether the resulting collision was a desperate effort to damage its adversary or an accident. In any case, the Glowworm rammed the bow of the Admiral Hipper and scrapped along the cruiser’s side before falling away aft with a heavy list. On fire, the Glowworm soon sank. A total of 111 of its crew were killed and 39 were taken prisoner. The Admiral Hipper was moderately damaged but able to continue on to Trondheim. The Glowworm’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Gerard Broadmead Roope, who was killed in the battle, was posthumously honored with Victoria Cross, the first recipient of the war. This was in part because of the recommendation of Captain Hellmuth Heye of the Admiral Hipper, who praised Roope for his valor to the British authorities through the International Red Cross. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Destroyers; WESERÜBUNG, Operation.

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References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Haarr, Geirr H. The German Invasion of Norway: April 1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Page, Christopher, ed. Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway April–June 1940. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Godfrey, John Henry (1888–1971) British navy admiral. Born in Handsworth, Birmingham, on July 10, 1888, John Henry Godfrey entered the Royal Navy in 1903. During World War I, he served with distinction in the Mediterranean. Between the wars, seagoing duty—including cruiser commands on the China Station and in the Mediterranean—alternated with appointments at the Staff College, Greenwich, and in the naval plans division. Promoted to rear admiral, Godfrey was named director of naval intelligence in February 1939. He energetically set about remedying two decades of neglect. He expanded the division tenfold, enrolling numerous talented civilians. He also integrated intelligence with the conduct of the war at sea; took full advantage of the ULTRA cryptographic breakthrough and established the decoding center at Bletchley Park; introduced procedures to facilitate intelligence analysis, evaluation, and distribution; and established the Joint Intelligence Committee. Unfortunately, Godfrey’s inflexibility caused frequent confrontations with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and other colleagues, and, in December 1942, he was relieved of his post. Godfrey then took command of the Indian navy (vastly expanded since 1939), improving its training, recruitment, infrastructure, and staff and enabling the force to contribute substantially to the war in Asia. When World War II ended in August 1945, mutiny broke out in the Indian navy and other military forces, which Godfrey, with Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, suppressed within a few days. Neither the British Labour government nor Indian nationalists applauded his achievement. Godfrey retired in September 1946 and for 15 years chaired a group of London hospitals. He died at Eastbourne on August 29, 1971. Priscilla Roberts See also: Great Britain, Navy; Signals Intelligence.

References Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J. H. Godfrey, CB. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980.

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Godfrey, J. H. The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J. H. Godfrey. 7 vols. Hailsham, UK: Privately printed, 1964–1966. McLachlan, Donald. Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence. New York: Atheneum, 1968. Montagu, Ewen. Beyond Top Secret Ultra. London: P. Davies, 1977.

Godfroy, René Émile (1885–1981) French navy admiral. Born in Paris on January 6, 1885, René Émile Godfroy attended the École Navale and was commissioned an ensign in 1904. He held various ship assignments and participated in a scientific expedition to the South Pole from 1908 to 1910. During World War I, he served first as a gunnery officer aboard cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1920, he commanded a dispatch boat. Promoted to commander in 1921, Godfroy developed an interest in naval aviation and secured his observer’s license in 1923. He then commanded the Naval Aviation Center at Saint-Raphaël and headed a commission to study the practical application of aviation. Promoted to captain in 1931, Godfroy commanded cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1936, he headed French naval aviation, and he was promoted to rear admiral that February. Godfroy took command of the 4th Cruiser Division in the Far East in 1937. In January 1940, he was named naval commander at Marseille and charged with the defense of the Mediterranean coast of France. In April, he took command of Force X in the eastern Mediterranean to cooperate with British forces. In June, he was promoted to vice admiral. When France and Germany signed an armistice on June 22, 1940, British Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill was determined to prevent French naval vessels from falling into German hands and thereby augmenting the enemy’s ability to harass the British navy. He therefore insisted that British naval commanders offer their French counterparts the choice of continuing the fight against Germany, taking their vessels to a neutral port they would not be permitted to leave, or having their ships sunk. At the time the Royal Navy launched this plan, code-named Operation CATAPULT, Godfroy was with Force X at Alexandria, Egypt, along with British ships commanded by Admiral Andrew Cunningham. Cunningham had no wish to preside over bloodshed and loss of life resembling that which had occurred the same day at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria. He therefore exercised exceptional tact in presenting Churchill’s ultimatum to Godfroy. On reflection, Godfroy agreed to permit British forces to demobilize and demilitarize his ships and leave them in Alexandria harbor. After the November 1942 Allied liberation of North Africa, Godfroy joined the Free French Forces, but he was not trusted by them. In December 1943, he was

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removed from command and retired. He was not rehabilitated until April 1955. Godfroy died at Fréjus in southern France on January 16, 1981. Priscilla Roberts and Spencer C. Tucker See also: CATAPULT, Operation; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of.

References Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Short. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Crémieux-Brilhac, Jean-Louis. Les Français de l’an 40. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1990. Paxton, Robert O. Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. Tute, Warren. The Deadly Stroke. New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1973.

Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988) Soviet navy admiral. Born in Kemenets-Podolsky, Ukraine, on February 16, 1910, Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov entered the Russian navy in 1927 and graduated from the Frunze Naval Academy in 1931. His early service was with the Black Sea Fleet. In 1939, Gorshkov took command of a cruiser squadron in the Pacific Fleet. Gorshkov undoubtedly benefitted in his rise in the service from the purges of the Soviet military in 1937 and 1938. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Gorshkov, only 31 years old, was a rear admiral in command of the Sea of Azov Flotilla. He then became deputy commander of the Novorosiisk Defense Area, where he was placed in the unusual circumstance of commanding the Forty-Seventh Army in defense of the Caucasus. Gorshkov then resumed command of naval forces in the Sea of Azov, assisting in the liberation of the Taman peninsula and Crimea. Gorshkov next commanded the Danube Flotilla and played an active role in the liberation of Ukraine and the Soviet invasion of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. Gorshkov ended World War II in command of the Black Sea Fleet. Following the war, Gorshkov became chief of staff and then commander of the Black Sea Fleet until 1955, when he was appointed deputy commander of the Soviet navy. Gorshkov was a close associate of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who appointed him commander in chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, a post he held until his death. Khrushchev initially charged Gorshkov with carrying out reductions in defense expenditures, but this policy ended in the intensification of the Cold War following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. One of the great lessons of the missile crisis for the Soviet leadership was the inadequacy of Soviet naval power. Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev,

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embarked on a considerable increase in defense expenditures, especially in the naval sphere, allowing Gorshkov to transform the Soviet navy from essentially a coast-defense and submarine-centered force into one capable of projecting naval power around the globe in support of Soviet foreign-policy objectives. Gorshkov was promoted to admiral of the fleet in 1967. Gorshkov oversaw construction of the Soviet navy’s first aircraft carriers and of new nuclear submarines and battle cruisers comparable to Western designs. His theories of naval tactics and strategy were embodied in his major book, The Sea Power of the State, in 1976. Gorshkov died in Moscow on May 13, 1988. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Soviet Union, Navy.

References Achkasov, V., and N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Fairhall, David. Russian Sea Power: An Account of Its Present Strength and Strategy. Boston: Gambit, 1971. Golovko, Arsenii. With the Red Fleet: The War Memoirs of the Late Admiral Arsenii G. Golovko. London: Putnam, 1965. Gorshkov, Sergei. Red Star Rising at Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974. Gorshkov, Sergei. Sea Power of the State. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Great Britain, Navy The somewhat disappointing performance of the Royal Navy during World War I led to considerable improvements in many tactical and operational areas by 1939. In that year, despite the treaty limitations of the interwar years, the Royal Navy was widely regarded as the world’s dominant naval force. Significant improvements in tactical and operational doctrine occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, especially in surface action and night-fighting techniques. In contrast to the lack of offensive-mindedness with a reluctance to risk assets that characterized the Royal Navy in World War I, the Royal Navy of 1939 was imbued with a reinvigorated offensive spirit. Weaknesses did hamper operations, notably the poor state of naval aviation, particularly when compared with naval aviation in the United States and Japan. Of the seven aircraft carriers in service at the start of 1939, only the Ark Royal (laid down in 1935) could be considered a modern carrier. Four of the other six had been modified earlier from battleship or battle cruiser hulls. The five new fleet carriers under construction would not begin operational service until well into 1940.

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Despite the lessons of antisubmarine warfare learned by 1918 and the need to protect merchant shipping and convoys, the Royal Navy had relatively poor commerce protection capabilities in 1939. Warship design had primarily emphasized coastal protection and submarine hunting, resulting in the short-range corvette ship type, which first came into service in 1939, and small escort destroyers. Although these ships had long-endurance capabilities, they proved unsuitable for open-ocean convoy escort primarily because of their size. Open-ocean convoy protection had been neglected, especially in training programs, and larger destroyers capable of trans-Atlantic convoy protection were in short supply. Despite the drawbacks, Britain managed to improve antisubmarine warfare capability and assets fairly quickly in response to the German U-boat threat. Although the smaller corvettes proved minimally effective for long-range mid-ocean operations, their successor—the larger, more seaworthy frigate, particularly the River class dating from the 1940 building program—proved especially effective for convoy escort after 1942. The initial German threat came from a three-part German offensive against commerce (Handelskreig) based on submarines, mines, and surface raiders. The Royal Navy quickly and effectively addressed each threat, although significant casualties did occur. Germany began the war with not many more submarines than it had at the start of World War I—just 51 operational U-boats, about half of them coastal vessels. The organization of British convoys in the Western Approaches, combined with the Straits of Dover mine barrage, resulted in nine U-boats sunk by the end of 1939. Although some vessels were lost to German mines, the navy reduced this menace with new technology, including degaussing against magnetic mines. Surface raiders threatened British commerce, particularly in the remote waters of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic. Although Germans raiders such as the Atlantis and pocket battleship Graf Spee provided some tense moments early in the war, by late 1941 most surface raiders had been hunted down and sunk. In April 1940, Germany attacked Norway, primarily to secure its northern flank and the vital iron ore trade with Sweden. The British navy opposed the German landings, but a daring run of 10 German destroyers into Narvik subdued the Norwegian defenses. The combination of the entire German surface fleet with German land-based air power quickly resulted in the occupation of Norway. Reacting to the German moves, a Royal Navy force of destroyers attacked the Germans at Narvik, but it suffered heavy losses. A follow-on attack three days later by a large force based around the battleship Warspite devastated the Germans, which severely hampered future enemy surface operations. Ultimately, though, the Royal Navy could not prevent German victory, especially in the face of effective enemy airpower. Additionally, the German fast battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the fleet carrier Glorious. The fall of France in 1940 and loss of French ports heralded a realignment of Royal Navy forces, because prior to World War I, Britain had relied on France

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for the bulk of Mediterranean sea power. With the appearance of a hostile Vichy government, though, the navy established Force H based at Gibraltar under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville and charged him with controlling the western Mediterranean. Force H carried out a distasteful duty in the bombardment of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. Force H also played a central role in the destruction of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941, as well as in hunting down and destroying Atlantic commerce raiders. But the defeat of France and German occupation of much of that country allowed Germany to base long-range U-boats in Bay of Biscay ports such as Brest and Lorient. The toll on British and Imperial shipping dramatically increased by autumn 1940 as Adolf Hitler declared (on August 17, 1940) a total blockade of the British Isles. By autumn 1941, the tide in the commerce war had turned in favor of Britain. Escort ships provided by the United States (50 World War I–era destroyers) and the increasing number of Royal Canadian Navy escorts; improved detection equipment, including radar, high-frequency direction-finding sets and Allied Detection Investigation Committee (ASDIC or sonar); implementation of a cohesive and effective enemy submarine tracking system based on radio intercepts and code breaking; and better cooperation with Royal Air Force Coastal Command all contributed to the reduction of the German submarine threat and effectiveness. Additionally, Germany’s loss of the Bismarck and the relatively ineffective German effort to use heavy surface units to interdict the convoys to the northern Soviet Union across the Arctic above Norway all helped to lessen the threat to British maritime commerce by the middle of 1943. The Soviet convoys began receiving more robust escort following the destruction of the ill-fated PQ 17 convoy in summer 1942. This enhanced escort included greater destroyer strength and escort carriers. The destruction of the battleship Scharnhorst off the Norwegian North Cape in December 1943 by a British battleship and cruiser force essentially ended the German surface threat to British and Allied maritime shipping. Finally, despite a high number of U-boats operating in the Atlantic by March 1943 (up to 70 at any given time), the increasing skill of Allied submarine hunters and the closing of the “black hole” area south of Greenland, where air cover had not been previously available, meant a diminishing submarine threat and higher losses in U-boats. Escort carriers provided air cover, while long-range maritime patrol aircraft (primarily modified B-24 Liberator bombers) made U-boat operations less effective. Additionally, hunter-killer escort groups attached to vulnerable convoys mauled the Germans. In the Mediterranean, Italy’s entry into the war in May 1940 required reinforcement of the theater naval forces under Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. With some modernized older battleships and the new carrier Illustrious, Cunningham defeated the Italians in fleet engagements at Calabria in July 1940 and Cape Matapan in March 1941 and raided the Italian anchorage at Taranto in November 1941

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with naval aircraft. Cunningham stressed the improvement of antiaircraft protection, which paid off as the naval war in the Mediterranean increasingly devolved into attacks on shipping and naval vessels by Axis aircraft. Faced with substantial damage to their supply convoys by British destroyers and submarines, the Germans dispatched U-boats to the Mediterranean in October 1941, resulting in the sinking of the battleship Barham and the carrier Ark Royal. At the fleet anchorage in Alexandria, the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were sunk at their moorings by Italian Maiale human torpedoes. Faced with the loss of capital ships and the threat of enemy aircraft and submarine attack, British resources in the Mediterranean were stretched dangerously thin. Malta, the linchpin of Britain’s efforts to hold the Mediterranean, came under horrendous air attack. Convoys to resupply and reinforce the island suffered substantial casualties, among them the aircraft carrier Eagle. The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 had a profound impact on the Mediterranean theater. Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, resulted in the eventual destruction of Axis forces in North Africa. Reinforced and reconstituted, the Mediterranean Fleet conducted an

Two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, two battleships, and a destroyer, December 17, 1942, part of the covering force for the Allied invasion of North Africa. The ships were ready to engage the Italian Navy should it attempt to interfere. Note the Supermarine Seafire aircraft (the naval counterpart of the Spitfire) aboard the carrier in the foreground. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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ambitious and destructive assault on Italian shipping throughout 1942 and 1943 that crippled enemy resupply efforts. Cunningham admonished his sailors and airmen to “sink, burn and destroy: let nothing pass.” By the end of 1942, Britain had again established maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean, despite substantial losses. In the Pacific theater, Japan entered the war against Britain concurrent with the assault on the United States. Quickly overrunning Hong Kong, the Japanese army forced the capitulation of Singapore, Britain’s “Gibraltar of the Pacific.” Faced with the loss of basing facilities, the Royal Navy withdrew from Southeast Asian waters, particularly after the loss of the battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse to air attack in December 1941 (Force Z under Admiral Sir Tom Phillips). The admiral’s disregard of the air threat coupled with woefully inadequate antiaircraft protection greatly aided the land-based Japanese aviators, who easily sank both capital ships. Following the crippling of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japan’s main striking force—Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s First Air Fleet—wreaked havoc on the remnants of British sea power in the Indian Ocean in spring 1942. In carrier-based air attacks against British surface units, the veteran Japanese naval aviators sank detached portions of Admiral Sir James Somerville’s forces based in Ceylon, including two cruisers and the carrier Hermes. However, Somerville avoided a general action and preserved his force as the Japanese withdrew to support their thrust into New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Naval action in the Pacific theater after May 1942 involved mainly U.S. and Australian naval units, but, with the defeat of Germany in May 1945, the Royal Navy again engaged Japan with substantial forces. Under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, the Pacific Fleet of four carriers (later joined by two additional carriers) and two battleships with substantial escort destroyers and cruisers arrived in the Pacific in March 1945, where they joined the Americans in the assault on the Japanese home islands and Okinawa. Equipped with the U.S. F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters, Royal Naval aviators did great destruction to the Japanese. U.S. aircraft proved greatly superior to earlier British Seafire (modified from the Spitfire), Martlet, Fulmar, and Sea Hurricane models. The heavily armored British carrier decks proved worthwhile as a defense against Japanese suicide kamikaze aircraft (the lightly armored U.S. carriers suffered more extensive damage). From strategic and operational viewpoints, the Royal Navy performed exceptionally well in the war. Although losses were heavy (1,525 warships of all types, including 224 major surface units of which 5 were battleships or battle cruisers and 5 were fleet carriers; and some 50,000 personnel dead), the aggressiveness and risk-taking nature of senior and individual ship commanding officers overcame the tenacious and highly competent Axis opponents.

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In the Atlantic, the Axis commerce warfare offensive failed to starve the country into submission or impede the arrival of overwhelming U.S. forces and personnel. In the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy kept British and Imperial ground and air forces supplied and reinforced while simultaneously attacking the Axis supply lines to North Africa. In the Pacific, despite initial defeats by the Japanese, British sea power returned late in the conflict and helped the U.S. Navy carry the fight to the Japanese home islands. As it had not done in the previous war, the navy at all levels showed exceptional ability to adapt rapidly to technological and methodical innovations and advances in doctrine, organization, and training. To man the new ships of more than 900 major combatants and the supporting shore establishment (training, research, logistics, support, and administration), by war’s end Royal Naval personnel had increased from the prewar 129,000 to 863,500, which included 72,000 women in the Women’s Royal Naval Service. In short, the navy vindicated itself following the disappointments of World War I. British sea power both kept Britain in the fight until the United States arrived in force and subsequently provided the domination needed to attack the Axis powers at all vulnerable points with little interference. Stanley D. M. Carpenter See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Aviation, Naval; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Naval Operations off; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Depth Charges; Destroyers-Bases Deal; Dönitz, Karl; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Hunter-Killer Groups; Indian Ocean Campaign; Kamikaze; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of; Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Royal Oak, Sinking of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Sonar; Southwest Pacific Theater; Taranto, Attack on; Two-Ocean Navy Program; WESERÜBUNG, Operation.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Gray, Edwyn. Operation Pacific: The Royal Navy’s War against Japan, 1941–1945. London: Cooper, 1990. Jackson, Robert. The Royal Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. 4 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

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Titterton, G. A. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 1. London: Whitehall History in association with Frank Cass, 2002.

Great Britain, Women’s Royal Naval Service Women’s arm of the British navy, reconstituted in 1939. The Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) was first created in 1917, during World War I. Before the organization was disbanded on October 1, 1919, 6,000 British women had undertaken naval support duties, during the course of which 23 died. In 1938, on the approach of another war, planning began to reestablish the WRNS. The organization was reconstituted in April 1939 under the direction of Vera Laughton Mathews. Enlistment was initially voluntary, but under the April 1941 Registration of Employment Order, all single and childless British women aged between 19 and 30 and not yet engaged in work “essential to the war effort” became subject to conscription and were offered the choice of factory work, service in one of the auxiliary service units, or enrollment in the Women’s Land Army. As with the other women’s auxiliary services, especially the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, the WRNS (its members were called Wrens) constituted something of a prestigious and elite service. In the course of the war, 74,620 women enlisted in the WRNS, of whom 102 were killed and 22 wounded. Government regulations prevented women civilian volunteers and military personnel to serve without their consent in hazardous circumstances in which they were liable to come under physical attack—manning antiaircraft guns, for example—nor could they be compelled to operate weapons. Even in the auxiliary armed forces, women were restricted to noncombat roles, and the primary function of WRNS members was perceived as releasing men naval personnel from shore jobs. As the war progressed, however, the WRNS and other women’s auxiliary military units undertook an increasingly wide range of duties—more than 200 jobs by 1944. Many served in clerical positions or as wireless telegraphists, electricians, fitters, radio mechanics, photographers, technicians, cooks, stewards, gardeners, dispatch riders, or stokers; others helped to plan and organize naval operations. Thousands served overseas, often in hazardous conditions. A small minority qualified as naval pilots, although, as with those in the quasi-civilian Air Transport Service, they were normally barred from combat duties and restricted to ferrying planes. Thousands of women also enlisted in associated naval units, including the Fleet Air Arm, Coastal Forces, Combined Operations, and the Royal Marines. In all, 303 British women died during World War II while on active duty in the various naval services. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand established similar women’s naval auxiliary services. British women’s naval contributions were highly

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respected, and the WRNS became a permanent service arm in February 1949. In 1993, the WRNS disappeared as a separate unit when it became fully integrated into the British navy. Priscilla Roberts See also: Great Britain, Navy.

References Fletcher, M. H. The WRNS: A History of the Women’s Royal Naval Service. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Mathews, Dame Vera Laughton. Blue Tapestry: An Account of the Women’s Royal Naval Service. London: Hollis and Carter, 1948. Pushman, Muriel Gane. We All Wore Blue. London: Robson, 1989. Thomas, Lesley, and Chris Howard Bailey. WRNS in Camera: The Women’s Royal Naval Service in the Second World War. Sutton, UK: Stroud, 2002. Wilson, Rosemary Curtis. C/o GPO London: With the Women’s Royal Naval Service Overseas. London: Hutchinson, 1949.

Greece, Navy In late 1939, the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was a relatively small force of mostly obsolescent warships, some of which dated to before World War I. The navy consisted of the armored cruiser Giorgios Averoff (built in Italy in 1910), 10 destroyers (six modern and four old), six modern submarines, one old cruiser/minelayer, 10 old torpedo boats, and an assortment of auxiliary vessels. No warships were under construction, although the RHN planned to take delivery of two additional (British-built) destroyers. In addition to generally obsolete equipment, the RHN suffered from the national political schism of the 1930s that brought purges of the officer corps. In mid-1940, Italy began a period of harassment that included air attacks on Greek ships at sea and the sinking on August 15, 1940, by the Italian submarine Delfino of the anchored cruiser/minelayer Helle. Once Italy declared war on Greece on October 28, 1940, the RHN was active in supporting the army and in conducting destroyer sweeps in the Ionian Sea. The RHN experienced severe losses from air attacks following the April 1941 German invasion of Greece. The surviving Greek ships, their bases seized by German troops, withdrew first to Crete and then to Egypt, where they were integrated into the British Royal Navy. The Royal Navy had operational control of the Greek ships, and the RHN was responsible for their administration. The Greek ships were in need of refit and modernization, and they received from the British navy modern

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fire-control systems and antiaircraft and antisubmarine armaments. The British also transferred to the RHN a variety of destroyers, corvettes, submarines, and smaller craft, including minesweepers. RHN ships then served throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Beginning in 1942, the RHN experienced nearly continual political unrest concerning the composition of the Greek government in exile. This culminated in the April 1944 mutiny of virtually the entire RHN at Alexandria and Port Said. Although the mutiny was crushed, the Greek ships were out of action for about four months while units were purged of mutineers. Following the German retreat from the Balkans, in October 1944 the RHN returned to Greek waters. It spent the remainder of the war reestablishing itself in its home territory, opening ports, engaging communist groups that resisted the return of the government from Egypt, and containing German garrisons on the larger islands of the Aegean Sea. Mark C. Jones See also: Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Jones, Mark C. “Misunderstood and Forgotten: The Greek Naval Mutiny of April 1944.” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 20, no. 2 (2001), pp. 367–397. Païzis-Paradellis, Constantin. Hellenic Warships, 1829–2001. Athens: Society for the Study of Greek History, 2002. Papastratis, Procopis. “A Fighting Navy in Exile: The Greek Fleet in the Mediterranean and Beyond.” In New Interpretations in Naval History: Tenth Naval History Symposium, edited by Jack Sweetman (pp. 363–373). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Greer, Attack on (September 4, 1941) The attack by German submarine U-652 on the U.S. Navy destroyer Greer in the North Atlantic on September 4, 1941, marked the beginning of a de facto naval war between the United States and Germany. The Greer (DD 145) was built in 1918 in Philadelphia, one of a class of 21 flush-deck, four-funnel destroyers displacing 1,165 tons, 314 ft. long, and armed with four 4-inch guns, one 3-inch gun, and 12 torpedo tubes. It was rated at 35 knots and carried a crew of 133. After initial service in the Atlantic, the Greer sailed in November 1919 for the Pacific, where it remained until June 1936. In reserve at Philadelphia after January 1937, it was recommissioned in October 1939 and assigned in February 1940 to the Neutrality Patrol to protect U.S. shipping.

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At 8:47 a.m. on September 4, 1941, while proceeding independently from Argentina to Reykjavik, Iceland, the Greer, captained by Lieutenant Commander L. H. Frost, was about 175 miles from Reykjavik when it was signaled by a British plane that a German submarine was 10 miles ahead in the Greer’s path. This was the U-652. The Greer made sound contact at 9:20 a.m. At 10:32 a.m., having been informed by Frost that the Greer did not intend to attack, the British aircraft dropped four depth charges in the vicinity of the submarine and then departed to refuel. The Greer maintained contact, possibly for practice or possibly to mark the U-boat’s location pending arrival of other British forces. At 12:48 p.m., probably identifying the Greer as one of the 50 similar destroyers recently transferred by the United States to Britain, the submarine fired a torpedo, prompting the Greer to drop eight depth charges. At 1:00 p.m., the Greer evaded a second torpedo. The Americans lost sound contact and, although a British destroyer appeared, the Greer continued searching. It regained contact at 3:07 p.m. and dropped 11 more depth charges before finally disengaging at 6:40 p.m. On September 11, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made this encounter the subject of a “fireside chat” on U.S. radio, calling the German action “piracy” and issuing a shoot-on-sight order for U.S. ships on North Atlantic convoy duties as far as Iceland against German submarines. The Greer incident thus brought the United States and Germany substantially closer to war. In October 1941, the Greer escorted the U.S. destroyer Kearny to Iceland after it had been torpedoed by U-568 and suffered the war’s first U.S. casualties at German hands. The Greer continued convoy and patrol duties in the Atlantic and Caribbean until February 1944 and provided training and plane guard service in home waters until June 1945. The ship was decommissioned in July 1945 and sold for scrap the following November. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Kearny, Torpedoing of; Reuben James, Sinking of; United States, Navy.

References Abbazia, Patrick. Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939– 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1953. Williams, Andrew. The Battle of the Atlantic: Hitler’s Gray Wolves of the Sea and the Allies’ Desperate Struggle to Defeat Them. New York: Basic Books, 2003.

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Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of (November 12–15, 1942) After the failure of their October 1942 attempt to drive U.S. forces from Guadalcanal, the Japanese immediately began reinforcing the island. Between October 23 and November 11, Japanese destroyers and barges delivered there some 8,000 men of the 38th Division. This number fell far short of requirements, so the navy scheduled a large convoy to bring the remainder of the division during the night of November 14–15. To ensure there would be no aerial interference, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku scheduled a battleship bombardment of the airfield similar to that which had devastated Henderson Field in October. Meanwhile a U.S. convoy arrived at Guadalcanal on November 11, and another anchored off Lunga Point the next day. Acting on intelligence of the Japanese plans, U.S. Navy area commander Vice Admiral William Halsey ordered the convoy escorts to counter the enemy offensive. These consisted of the light cruiser Atlanta and four destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott and Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s support group consisting of the heavy cruisers San Francisco and Portland¸ light cruisers Helena and Juneau, and four destroyers. With 15 days seniority over Scott, Callaghan commanded the joint force. Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki commanded the Japanese bombardment and screening group, consisting of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima and Destroyer Squadron 10 of the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers. At 11:50 p.m. on November 12, Abe’s force approached Savo Island, but poor visibility made a bombardment impossible, and at 12:05 a.m. on November 13, the Japanese admiral ordered a 180-degree turn to clear a thunderstorm that had followed his fleet south and then another turn at 12:38 upon hearing that the weather had cleared. By this time the four destroyers that were supposed to be scouting 9,000 yards ahead of the main body were behind the battleships. The rest of Abe’s ships were out of formation, although not so drastically. The admiral swept past Savo Island at 23 knots in three columns, with destroyers flanking the Nagara and the two battleships. Visibility was good with a slight haze at sea level. As the Japanese approached, the Americans waited in a long line-ahead formation with four destroyers leading the five cruisers and four destroyers at the rear. The Helena, the eighth ship in line had SG radar and picked up the enemy at 1:24 a.m. from 27,000 yards. On the San Francisco, which mounted the inferior SC radar, Callaghan struggled to visualize the situation. At 1:28 a.m., he headed northwest, closing the Japanese at 1,350 yards per minute. He planned to turn and cross in front of the Japanese formation but waited too long. At 1:37 a.m., Callaghan directed the lead ship, the Cushing, to make the turn and expected the rest of the line to follow, but at 1:41 a.m., the Cushing suddenly saw the Yudachi crossing its bow 3,000 yards ahead. The U.S. destroyer swerved while the Japanese captain was “flabbergasted” to have an enemy destroyer suddenly appear on a collision course.


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The ships following the Cushing steered one after the other to avoid collisions as they adjusted to the destroyer’s unexpected maneuver. Callaghan told his captains to stand by and reiterated that he wanted the fleet to head due north. At 1:48 a.m., the Hiei’s searchlight swept the U.S. line and settled on the leading U.S. cruiser, the Atlanta. The cruiser opened fire, and, at this point, Callaghan finally ordered, “odd ships fire to starboard, even to port.” The Japanese, meanwhile, were already picking targets and engaging. The action rapidly degenerated into a confused melee of individual engagements and surprise encounters as the two fleets became intermingled. The Atlanta was battered by as many as 32 shells and was then crippled by a torpedo. Gunfire from at least five U.S. ships rapidly disabled the Akatsuki, the lead ship in the Japanese starboard column. The Laffey launched two torpedoes that bounced off the Hiei’s hull and then squeezed under the battleship’s bow with just yards to spare. In the confusion, both sides suffered from friendly fire. The Atlanta drifted into the San Francisco’s line of fire and was blasted by more than 20 U.S. shells. Admiral Scott died at some point during this barrage. The San Francisco had just switched targets when Callaghan realized the horrible mistake. He went on the ship-to-ship radio and ordered, “Cease fire own ships” at 1:53 a.m. Then, as the U.S. and Japanese flagships passed on opposite courses only 500 yards distant, Callaghan ordered, “Give ’em hell” and “We want the big ones! Get the big ones first!” The San Francisco engaged, and the Japanese battleship responded with bombardment rounds. The Nagara and Kirishima targeted the San Francisco as well. Callaghan was killed, and, as damage mounted, the U.S. cruiser veered south, heavily on fire. More than 100 U.S. shells struck the Hiei in turn. The most critical blow came when an 8-inch dud struck beneath the waterline and led to flooding in the steering room, causing an eventual loss of steering control. Abe was wounded and ordered his force to retire. At 1:55 a.m., the Yudachi launched eight torpedoes and then sliced through the U.S. line. One of these torpedoes hit the Portland and damaged its steering so the ship could only sail in circles. At 1:59 a.m., two torpedoes struck the Barton and broke the ship in half. At 2:04 a.m., the Murasame torpedoed the Juneau. The explosion lifted the U.S. light cruiser out of the water. At 2:20 a.m., the Cushing’s crew abandoned ship. The Asagumo torpedoed the Laffey, which then exploded with heavy casualties, and the Monssen’s crew abandoned ship after being hit 37 times in a close-range engagement with the Nagara, Yukikaze, and Teruzuki. On the Japanese side, the destroyers Amatsukaze, Ikazuchi, and Yudachi were heavily damaged. The Hiei limped up the strait west of Savo attended by Nagara. The Kirishima, steaming at high speed, had already escaped into the Slot (New Georgia Sound, the body of water through which the Japanese ships passed to supply their troops on Guadalcanal). By 2:26 a.m., the Helena led the San Francisco, Juneau, O’Bannon, Fletcher, and Sterett south. The Fletcher was the only U.S. ship to escape undamaged. Five

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U.S. and two Japanese ships remained on the scene. The Aaron Ward had no power, and the Portland continued to circle, while the Atlanta’s crew fought fires and flooding. The Cushing, Monssen, and Yudachi all burned. At 6:30 a.m., the Portland sank Yudachi from a range of 12,500 yards. The Portland and Aaron Ward finally made Tulagi, but the others all foundered. Progressive flooding doomed the Hiei as a jammed rudder left the battleship sailing in a wide circle north of Savo. U.S. bombers conducted 70 sorties and scored three bomb hits and at least four torpedo hits. Abe ordered the Hiei abandoned, and the battleship foundered unseen during the night of November 13–14. A Japanese submarine sank the Juneau as the Americans withdrew. This action was one of the most costly and confused naval battles of the war. Admiral Callaghan’s direction of the battle to his death has been criticized, but he saved Henderson Field from a potentially devastating bombardment. After this night battle, the Japanese still had to get their large convoy safely to the island. The Hiei’s fate confirmed the need to neutralize Henderson Field. A Japanese cruiser force arrived off the field on the night of November 13–14 and fired nearly a thousand 8-inch shells in the vicinity of the airfield but failed to knock it out. The Japanese convoy sailed confident that U.S. air power had been eliminated, while the cruisers hustled north worrying it had not been. With daylight, Henderson Field erupted into activity. Air strikes first severely damaged two of the cruisers and then sank 6 of the 11 transports in the convoy and forced 1 to return to base. Even though the damage had already been done, the Japanese decided that a battleship bombardment of the airfield was necessary and dispatched Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake with the battleship Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, Destroyer Squadron 3 with light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers, and Destroyer Squadron 10 with the Nagara and six destroyers. The destroyer squadrons were to deal with any enemy warships encountered, leaving the Kirishima and the heavy cruisers free to pound the airfield. At this critical juncture, Halsey took a great risk. Unlike Combined Fleet, which withheld its heaviest units, including the super battleship Yamato, he ordered Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee to lead the South Pacific’s last significant surface assets into the narrow waters off Guadalcanal to oppose the Japanese thrust. This included the new, nonexpendable battleships Washington and South Dakota and four destroyers rounded up from separate formations on the basis of which ships had the most fuel. At 12:01 a.m. on November 15, Lee’s task force had just come to a course of due west after circling Guadalcanal and Savo islands from the north. He was steering back toward the channel between the two islands with his four destroyers preceding the battleships when radar picked up a contact 18,000 yards to the north-northwest. This was Kondo¯’s “sweeping unit,” Destroyer Squadron 3, passing east of Savo Island. The Japanese had spotted the U.S. formation at 11:13 p.m. and were following in its wake. At 12:17 a.m., the U.S. battleships opened fire at the Sendai.


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Squadron 3 prudently reversed course without sustaining any damage. However, the destroyer Ayanami from the same unit had been dispatched to investigate the passage west of Savo, and U.S. radar picked it up as the Sendai group faded from contact. Destroyer Squadron 10 led by the light cruiser Nagara followed 10,000 yards behind the Ayanami. The U.S. destroyers and the Washington engaged Ayanami and quickly crippled the Japanese ship. Then Squadron 10 entered the action, and their gunfire overwhelmed the Preston and damaged the Gwin, the third and fourth ships in the U.S. line. The shock of the South Dakota’s guns tripped a circuit breaker and the ship lost power, forcing it to sail blind. At 12:35 a.m., Squadron 10 fired a massive torpedo volley and turned away. Torpedoes struck the two leading U.S. destroyers, Walke and Benham. As the Washington passed its devastated screen to port, radar picked up a large contact to the northwest. This was Kondo¯’s bombardment unit following Squadron 10. Admiral Lee ordered his surviving destroyers to retire as he proceeded westnorthwest past Cape Esperance. His radar was tracking the Kirishima, but he was unsure of the South Dakota’s location and so held fire. The South Dakota, in a blind spot off the Washington’s starboard quarter, continued to have radar difficulties and, citing poor visibility and gun flashes as the reason, had failed to follow the Washington. Admiral Kondo¯, collating the optimistic reports of his destroyer squadrons, decided the enemy had been defeated and the bombardment could proceed. At 12:54. a.m., he turned toward Lunga Point, but almost immediately lookouts spotted the South Dakota. The Atago illuminated the battleship. At 1:00 a.m., the Japanese bombardment force opened fire from only 6,000 yards and began hitting immediately. The searchlights and pyrotechnics eliminated Admiral Lee’s doubts as to who was who, and within seconds the Washington’s main battery engaged Kirishima from only 8,400 yards. In the ensuing exchange, the South Dakota absorbed 27 shells, mostly 8-inch shells from the heavy cruisers. The barrage did not threaten the armored ship’s buoyancy, but they did render it impotent through the destruction of radar, radio, and fire control, and its captain decided to retire. He did not know where the Washington was and had no radar to query or advise Admiral Lee of his intentions. Although the Japanese fired 12 torpedoes at the South Dakota from short range and noted five explosions, none hit. The Type 93 had sensitive detonators, and it is possible the battleship’s massive wake set some off prematurely. The Kirishima, meanwhile, was pummeled by as many as 20 one-ton 16-inch shells and within five minutes had turned away, heavily on fire and suffering uncontrolled flooding. The Washington ceased fire, once again uncertain of the South Dakota’s location, and proceeded by itself north of Guadalcanal. Kondo¯’s force cautiously paralleled the battleship. The Japanese admiral ordered the four surviving transports to turn away, and at 1:13 a.m., the Atago and Takao fired eight

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torpedoes each at the Washington from 4,000 yards. Once again, explosions were observed and the Japanese incorrectly claimed hits. The Washington noted firing on the starboard quarter, which may have signified torpedoes exploding in its wake. Admiral Lee, not wishing to expose his ship with the flash of his guns, withheld fire throughout this period, despite the pleas of his staff. He was mainly interested in finding, or at least delaying, the transports. The Japanese launched five more unsuccessful torpedo attacks between 1:20 and 1:45 a.m. Meanwhile, Kondo¯ canceled the bombardment. Lee turned southwest at 1:32 a.m., deciding the convoy had been delayed long enough. The Japanese broke contact at 2:40 a.m. The four surviving transports of the convoy, delayed by the surface action, finally beached to unload their cargo. With the dawn, the U.S. destroyer Meade and aircraft from Henderson Field wrecked the beached transports, ensuring that few of supplies survived. The Kirishima sank west of Savo Island at 4:25 a.m. In the action, the United States suffered three destroyers sunk and heavy damage to one battleship and one destroyer. The Japanese lost a battleship and a destroyer. However, the Japanese never again dominated the nighttime waters off Guadalcanal, nor did they again threaten Henderson Field. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Abe Hiroaki; Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Japan, Navy; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Lee, Willis Augustus Jr.; United States, Navy; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, November 13, 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Hara, Tameichi. Japanese Destroyer Captain. With Fred Saito and Roger Pineau. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign Significant and prolonged South Pacific sea-land-air campaign. The campaign for Guadalcanal comprised several naval engagements and several vicious land battles fought from August 1942 to February 1943. On Guadalcanal (an area 90 miles by


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25 miles) in the Solomon Islands, U.S. Marines and army troops attacked Japanese land forces, while the U.S. Navy battled the Japanese navy offshore. Before the battle, U.S. planners were able to build up Pacific theater resources more quickly than anticipated and take the offensive against the Japanese. This campaign, Operation WATCHTOWER, was the brainchild of U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King. It had as its objective the seizure of the islands of Tulagi and Gavatu as a preliminary step in securing the Solomons and then the recapture of the Philippines and the eventual defeat of Japan. These plans soon changed when intelligence revealed that the Japanese were building an airstrip on the nearby island of Guadalcanal. Once operational, such a base would pose a serious threat to Allied operations in the South Pacific. Therefore, its seizure became the primary objective of the campaign. Although hamstrung by a lack of adequate resources because of sealift required for Operation TORCH, the British and U.S. invasion of North Africa, Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley pieced together forces from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the invasion. Resources were so meager that some of his officers nicknamed the plan Operation Shoestring. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift commanded the 1st Marine Division landing force, and Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher had charge of the naval support element. The U.S. Navy’s tasks were to sustain forces ashore and to provide naval and air protection for the marines defending the airfield, which was captured shortly after the landing and renamed Henderson Field. The lack of a harbor compounded supply problems. The Japanese operated aircraft from Rabaul and later from other closer island airfields, but Allied coast watchers on islands provided early warning of many Japanese air and naval movements. The marines went ashore beginning on August 7, but the sealift was so limited that they were without much of their heavier equipment and heavy artillery. The first naval engagement with the Japanese occurred on the night of August 8–9, 1942, in the Battle of Savo Island. A Japanese cruiser squadron overwhelmed an Allied force of equal size, sinking one Australian and three U.S. cruisers and damaging several destroyers, losing none of its own ships. The battle clearly showed the superiority of Japanese night-fighting techniques. The battle was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a fair fight, but it was only a tactical success, because the Japanese failed to go after the vulnerable U.S. troop transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Nonetheless, the Battle of Savo Island and Japanese air attacks led Fletcher and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner to withdraw supporting naval forces from Guadalcanal, leaving the marines ashore isolated, bereft of naval support, and short of critical supplies. Long-range aircraft and destroyers did bring in some resources. The Japanese made a critical mistake in not capitalizing on the U.S. vulnerability to commit their main fleet assets. For the most part, they sent only smaller units

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in driblets, chiefly in the form of fast destroyers. The so-called Slot (New Georgia Sound, the water supply route to Guadalcanal), was controlled by the United States during the day but the Japanese owned it at night. The next major confrontation at sea off Guadalcanal came on the night of August 24–25 in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher’s carrier-based aircraft intercepted and attacked the covering group for a Japanese convoy of destroyers and transports carrying 1,500 troops to Guadalcanal. The Americans sank the Japanese light carrier Ryujo and damaged another ship, but the U.S. fleet carrier Enterprise was located and attacked by Japanese aircraft and badly damaged. The Japanese destroyers and transports delivered the reinforcements and the destroyers and then shelled Henderson Field, although a U.S. Army B-17 sank one of the Japanese ships. On August 31, the U.S. carrier Saratoga was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine and put out of action for three months. That left only the carrier Wasp available for operations in the South Pacific. On September 15, the Wasp was in turn torpedoed and sunk while it was accompanying transports lifting the 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo. A Japanese torpedo also damaged the battleship

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Wasp (CV-7) afire and sinking south of San Cristobal Island after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-19, September 15, 1942. (U.S. Navy)


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North Carolina, which, however, held its place in the formation. Admiral Turner continued to Guadalcanal, delivering the 7th Marine Regiment safely three days later. Heavy fighting, meanwhile, was occurring on Guadalcanal; the Japanese were mounting unsuccessful attacks to recapture Henderson Field. The next big naval encounter off Guadalcanal was the Battle of Cape Esperance during the night of October 11–12. The Japanese sent in their supply ships at night (the so-called Tokyo Express). U.S. ships equipped with radar detected a Japanese convoy off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. In the ensuing fight, the Japanese lost a cruiser and a destroyer, and another cruiser was heavily damaged. The Americans lost a destroyer and had two cruisers damaged. The first Allied success against the Japanese in a night engagement, the Battle of Cape Esperance, was a great boost to U.S. morale. A few days later, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz replaced the methodical Ghormley with the offensive-minded Vice Admiral William “Bull” Halsey. A major engagement occurred on October 26–27 in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and his Task Force 16 centered on the carrier Enterprise followed Admiral Halsey’s instructions to engage Japanese forces under Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake. Each side conducted carrier strikes against the other. U.S. aircraft inflicted severe damage on the heavy carrier Sho¯kaku, putting it out of action for nine months, and damaged the light carrier Zuiho. On the U.S. side, the heavy carrier Hornet was badly damaged and had to be abandoned while under tow; it was soon sunk by Japanese destroyers. Kondo¯ then withdrew. He had won a major victory over the Americans, but had he continued to pursue the withdrawing U.S. ships, he might have destroyed the Enterprise. In the battle, Kondo¯ had also lost 100 aircraft and experienced pilots, half again as many as the Americans. During November 12–15, a series of intense sea fights occurred in what became known as the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. It took place near the entrance to Ironbottom Sound (so named for being the resting place of many Allied and Japanese ships) off Savo Island between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. In the first, U.S. ships and aircraft fought to block reinforcement of the island by 13,000 Japanese troops in 11 transports, escorted by destroyers, all commanded by Admiral Tanaka Raizo. At the same time, a powerful squadron under Abe Hiroaki arrived to shell Henderson Field. In a confused engagement, both sides suffered heavily. The Japanese lost the battleship Hiei and two destroyers sunk; four other Japanese destroyers were damaged. The Americans lost two cruisers and four destroyers. A cruiser and a destroyer were close to sinking, and all other ships, except one, were damaged. Among those killed were Rear Admirals Daniel Callaghan and Norman Scott. Tanaka was obliged to retire, and the planned Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field did not occur. On November 13–14, the Japanese returned, and their heavy cruisers shelled Henderson Field. But the Americans sank seven Japanese transports and damaged two cruisers. During the third phase on November 14–15, U.S. warships under Rear

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Admiral Willis A. Lee met and defeated yet another Japanese force under Kondo¯ when the two sides met near Savo Island. The Americans lost two destroyers, but Kondo¯ lost the battleship Kirishima and a destroyer. The net effect of the three-day battle was that Tanaka landed some 4,000 troops (he rescued another 5,000 on his return to Rabaul), whereas the Americans regained control of the waters around the island. The last major naval battle for Guadalcanal occurred on November 30 at Tassafaronga Point. The Japanese again attempted to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal and were surprised by a larger U.S. Navy task force. However, the Japanese once more demonstrated their superior night-fighting ability. In the exchange, Japan lost a destroyer, and the United States lost a cruiser and had three more cruisers severely damaged. Japanese leaders now came to the conclusion that they could no longer absorb such losses in trying to hold on in Guadalcanal. The final battle of the campaign was a skirmish off Rennell Island on January 30, 1943. In early February 1943, the Japanese evacuated their remaining ground forces from Guadalcanal. The United States won the naval campaign for Guadalcanal thanks largely to its superior supply capability and Japan’s failure to throw enough resources into the battle. The Tokyo Express down the Slot was haphazard and inadequate; often drums full of supplies were simply pushed off ships to drift to shore. The campaign for Guadalcanal proved to be as much a turning point for the United States as Midway. The Japanese advance had been halted, opening the way for the long islandhopping advance toward Japan. In combatants, the Japanese lost 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers, and 8 submarines. Particularly serious from the Japanese point of view was the loss of 2,076 aircraft (1,094 to combat) and many trained pilots. U.S. Navy losses were 2 heavy carriers, 6 heavy cruisers (including the Royal Australian Navy Canberra), 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers, but new U.S. naval construction more than offset the U.S. losses. The campaign also destroyed the myth of Japanese naval superiority. U.S. control of the air had rendered the Japanese ships vulnerable to attack. It also allowed Allied forces to determine the timing and location of offensive operations without Japanese foreknowledge. William P. McEvoy and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Abe Hiroaki; Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching”; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Rennell Island, Battle of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of; Tanaka Raizo; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly; United States, Navy.


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References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, November 13, 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Hamel, Eric M. Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942. New York: Crown, 1988. Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. Jersey, Stanley Coleman. Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. Lundstrom, John B. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

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H Haguro, Japanese Navy Cruiser, Sinking of (May 16, 1945) The Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser Haguro was the fourth and last of the Myo¯ko¯ class of heavy cruisers. Constructed at the Mitsubishi Shipyard in Nagasaki, the Haguro was laid down in March 1925 and commissioned on April 25, 1929. All four ships of the class were extensively refitted during 1934–1936. They were 661 ft. 9 in. in length and had a beam of 68 ft. and draft of 20 ft. 9 in. They displaced 13,300 tons and were fast, at 36 knots. They were armed with 10 8-inch guns (five double turrets), 6 4.7-inch guns, and 12 24-inch torpedo tubes and carried two float planes. They had a crew complement of 773 officers and men. During World War II, the Haguro took part in the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942) and was involved in the sinking of the HMS Exeter and HNLMS De Ruyter and Encounter off South Borneo on March 1. The Haguro participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7, 1942) and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (August 22–25, 1942) as well as the evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal in January 1943. It was slightly damaged in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (November 2, 1943). The Haguro also took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19, 1944) and in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–25, 1944), when it again sustained damage. Commanded by Captain (promoted to rear admiral on May 1, 1945) Sugiura Kaju from December 1, 1943, the Haguro was on its way from Singapore to evacuate the Japanese garrison in the Andaman Islands in the company of the destroyer Kamikaze, when it was spotted in the Malacca Strait on May 16, 1945, and attacked by a Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber from the escort carrier Shah, without effect. In Operation DUKEDOM, British vice admiral Harold T. C. Walker dispatched Captain Manley L. Power and his 16th Destroyer Flotilla to ambush the Japanese ships. The Haguro and its escort were located and attacked just after midnight on May 16 by the British destroyers Saumarez (the flagship), Venus, Verulam, Vigilant, and Virago. Power sought to offset the speed and superior hitting power of the Haguro by attacking the Japanese ship from different directions simultaneously. Although the Kamikaze was only lightly damaged in the engagement, the Haguro was hit both by gunfire and three torpedoes. The Haguro began to go down about 2:32 a.m. The Kamikaze picked up 320 members of its crew, but some 900 men perished, including Admiral Sugiura and

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Vice Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro¯. Sugiura was honored with a posthumous promotion to vice admiral. The sinking of the Haguro is significant in naval history as the last naval surface action of the war. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Java Sea, Battle of the; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Lacroix, Eric. Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Winton, John. Sink the Haguro! The Last Destroyer Action of the Second World War. London: Seeley, Service, 1978.

Halsey, William Frederick Jr. (1882–1959) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on October 30, 1882, William Frederick Halsey Jr. was a naval officer’s son. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1904 and was commissioned an ensign in 1906. Halsey served in the Great White Fleet that circumnavigated the globe from 1907 to 1909 and was then assigned to torpedo boats. When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Halsey was a lieutenant commander and captain of a destroyer. He then commanded destroyers operating from Queenstown, Ireland. Following World War I, Halsey’s service was mostly in destroyers, although he also held an assignment in naval intelligence and was a naval attaché in Berlin. Promoted to captain in 1927, he commanded the Reina Mercedes, the Naval Academy training ship, and became fascinated by naval aviation. Halsey attended both the Naval War College and Army War College, and, in 1935, despite his age, he completed naval flight training and took command of the aircraft carrier Saratoga. Promoted to rear admiral in 1937, Halsey assumed command of Carrier Division 2 of the Enterprise and Yorktown. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1940. Halsey was at sea on December 7, 1941, when Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor. In early 1942, Halsey’s carriers raided Japanese Central Pacific installations and launched Colonel James Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo in April. Acute skin disorders requiring hospitalization removed him from the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

Halsey, William Frederick Jr.

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In October 1942, Halsey replaced Admiral Robert Ghormley as commander of the South Pacific and began the most successful phase of his career. He was promoted to admiral in November. Despite severe tactical losses, Halsey retained strategic control of the waters around Guadalcanal in late 1942, and during 1943, he supported operations in the Solomon Islands and into the Bismarck Archipelago. Halsey came to be known as “Bull” for his pugnacious nature. In March 1943, Halsey took administrative command of the Third Fleet, although he continued his command in the South Pacific until June 1944. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese battle plan and the flawed U.S. command system combined with Halsey’s aggressiveness A staunch proponent of naval aviation, Admiral to shape one of the more controverWilliam Halsey epitomized the aggressive spirit of the U.S. Navy. He commanded Third Fleet in the sial episodes of the war. On October Pacific during World War II but was also widely 24–25, a Japanese force under Admicriticized for several important decisions late in ral Ozawa Jisaburo centered on four the war for which he eschewed responsibility. fleet aircraft carriers that were largely (Naval Historical Center) bereft of aircraft decoyed Halsey and his entire Task Force 38 away from the U.S. landing sites, leaving the sites vulnerable to a powerful Japanese surface force under Kurita Takeo. Although Halsey destroyed most of Osawa’s force in the Battle of Cape Engaño, disaster for the support ships off Leyte was only narrowly averted when Kurita, affected by fatigue and poor intelligence, prematurely withdrew his strike force. Widely criticized for not coordinating his movements with Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, who had charge of the invasion force of Seventh Fleet, Halsey never admitted responsibility. He instead blamed the system of divided command. Halsey endured further condemnation when he took the Third Fleet into damaging typhoons in December 1944 and June 1945. Still, his flagship, the Missouri, hosted the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in December 1945, Halsey retired in April 1947. He then served on the

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boards of several large corporations. Halsey died at Fisher’s Island, New York, on August 16, 1959. John A. Hutcheson Jr. and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Central Pacific Campaign; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kolombangara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; McCain, John Sidney; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Ozawa Jisaburo; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of; United States, Navy.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle for Leyte Gulf, 23–October 26, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Halsey, William Frederick Jr. Admiral Halsey’s Story. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947. Potter, E. B. Bull Halsey. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. New York: McGrawHill, 1968. Reynolds, Clark G. “William F. Halsey, Jr.: The Bull.” In The Great Admirals: Command at Sea, 1587–1945, edited by Jack Sweetman (pp. 482–505). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Hart, Thomas Charles (1877–1971) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Davison, Michigan, on June 12, 1877, Thomas Charles Hart graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1897 and was commissioned an ensign in 1899. He served in Cuban waters on the battleship Massachusetts during the 1898 Spanish-American War and commanded a submarine force of seven boats based in Ireland during World War I. Between the world wars, Hart commanded submarine and cruiser forces and the battleship Mississippi. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1923 and the Army War College in 1924. In 1929, Hart was promoted to rear admiral and took command of submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets from 1929 to 1931. He was superintendent of the Naval Academy from 1931 to 1934. He commanded a cruiser division of the Scouting Force from 1934 to 1936 and served as a member of the navy’s General Board from 1936 to 1939. In June 1939, Hart was promoted to full admiral and given command of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet. During the next years, he accelerated fleet training and drills and made plans to defend the Philippine Islands and to cooperate with the British and

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Dutch in the event of war with Japan. Lacking the resources to counter the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 and denied air support from the U.S. Army’s Far East Air Force, Hart sent his surface units to the Netherlands East Indies at the end of the month and moved his headquarters to Java. In January 1942, Hart was appointed commander of the naval forces of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA), which was charged with defending the Netherlands East Indies. Hart had no chance of success, because his resources were limited and he had no prospect of reinforcements. Moreover, the British and Dutch disagreed with his plans for using his ships. At the end of January, Hart sent his cruisers and destroyers against Japanese forces in the Battle of Makassar Strait, but the Dutch wished to concentrate ABDA’s ships for the defense of Java. As a result, in February 1942, Hart relinquished his command to Vice Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich of the Netherlands navy and returned to the United States. Later that month, most of ABDACOM’s ships were lost in the Battle of the Java Sea. Hart served with the General Board until his retirement in February 1945, when he was appointed a U.S. senator from Connecticut, a post he held until 1947. Hart died in Sharon, Connecticut, on July 4, 1971. John Kennedy Ohl See also: ABDA Command; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Java Sea, Battle of the; Madoera Strait, Battle of.

References Leutze, James. A Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Thomas C. Hart. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Navy Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Morton, Louis. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953.

Harwood, Sir Henry (1888–1950) British navy admiral. Born in London on January 19, 1888, Henry Harwood joined the British Navy in 1903. He quickly distinguished himself academically. A torpedo specialist, between the wars he held numerous staff posts, studied at various service schools, and was fleet torpedo officer in the Mediterranean. In 1936 Harwood, who was promoted to captain in 1928, became commodore in chief of the South American division of the fleet’s America and West Indies station. When World War II began in 1939, the Admiralty sent Harwood additional ships and ordered him to seek out the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee,

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which was raiding British merchant shipping in the South Atlantic. On December 13, 1939, Harwood located the German raider off the Uruguay coast in the Río de la Plata estuary, and his ships, heavy cruiser Exeter, and light cruisers Ajax (the flagship) and Achilles closed in from different directions. Although theoretically outclassed, in 20 minutes the British attackers scored more than 20 hits on the Admiral Graf Spee, causing more than 100 casualties, including 37 dead. Harwood’s ships sustained major damage, particularly the Exeter; the British lost 71 men. German Captain Hans Langsdorff then took the Admiral Graf Spee into the neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo to effect repairs. Bluffed into believing that a larger British force awaited him, a few days later Langsdorff scuttled his ship and committed suicide. Harwood was promoted to rear admiral on December 13, 1939, and knighted for this action. A year later, he returned to Britain as assistant chief of naval staff, impressing British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who, in April 1942, appointed him—above his rank—to commander in chief of Mediterranean naval forces. Harwood provided aggressive flank cover and logistical support to the British Eighth Army in North Africa in its campaigns against German field marshal Erwin Rommel’s forces, on occasion entering and occupying ports abandoned by German troops even before the arrival of Allied land forces. Harwood was promoted to vice admiral in February 1943. By that time, his health was fragile, and the Admiralty transferred him to the less-demanding Orkney Islands and Shetland command. Invalided from the navy in 1945 with the rank of admiral, Harwood died at Goring-on-Thames on June 9, 1950. Priscilla Roberts See also: Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Río de la Plata, Battle of.

References Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pope, Dudley. The Battle of the River Plate. London: William Kimber, 1956. Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

Hasegawa Kiyoshi (1883–1970) Japanese navy admiral. Born on May 7, 1883, in Fukui Prefecture on Honshu, Kiyoshi Hasegawa entered the Japanese Naval Academy in 1900. During the

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Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, he served in the flagship, the battleship Mikasa, and took part in the Battle of Tsushima. Hasegawa graduated from the Naval War College in 1914 and was appointed captain of the destroyer Mikazuki. He was then a staff officer of the Second Fleet, a member of the Personnel Section in the Naval Ministry, adjutant to the minister of the navy, and a secretary to Prime Minister Kato¯ Tomosaburo¯. From 1917 to 1920 and from 1923 to 1925, Hasegawa was a naval attaché in the Japanese Embassy in Washington. After serving as captain of first the cruiser Nisshin and then the battleship Nagato, he became chief of staff of the Yokosuka Naval District in 1927. In 1937, Hasegawa assumed command of the Third Fleet. When in July the Sino-Japanese War began, he held the dual command of the Third Fleet and China Area Fleet. His forces took a leading role in the Battle of Shanghai. In 1938 he was assigned as commander of the Yokosuka Naval District. He was promoted to full admiral in 1939. From 1940 to 1944, Hasegawa served as governor-general of Formosa (now Taiwan). In this post, he promoted Kominka-Kyoiku (Japanization) in an effort to assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese culture. In 1944 he became a member of the Gunji Sangikan (the Supreme War Council advising the emperor) and inspector of the navy. In this position in February 1945, Hasegawa undertook a detailed study of navy morale and resources. His bleak report, presented to Emperor Hirohito that June, is believed to have greatly influenced the latter’s decision to surrender. After the end of the war, Hasegawa was arrested. Initially charged as a Class A war criminal, he was soon released. Hasegawa died in Tokyo on September 2, 1970. Hasegawa Rei See also: Japan, Navy.

References Denki Kanko Kai. Denki Kanko Kai Hasegawa Kiyoshi Den [The Life of Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa]. Tokyo: Hasegawa Kiyoshi Denki Kanko Kai, 1972. Drea, Edward. In Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Frank, Richard B. Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire. New York: Random House, 1999.

Hashimoto Mochitsura (1909–2000) Japanese naval officer. Born at Kyoto, Japan, on October 14, 1909, Hashimoto Mochitsura graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1931. His first assignment

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to submarine duty came in 1934, followed by tours in destroyers and escort vessels. Hashimoto attended torpedo school in 1938 and submarine school in 1939. He served as torpedo officer in the I-24, one of Japan’s newest ocean-cruising submarines. The I-24’s armament included a midget submarine. On November 18, 1941, the I-24 sailed under secret orders. By December 6, it arrived off Hawaii. The submarine launched its midget submarine early on December 7 as part of the Pearl Harbor attack force. The crew of the I-24 spent the following days looking unsuccessfully for targets and then returned to Japan. Hashimoto next attended advanced courses at the Submarine School. On his graduation in July 1942, he took command of the RO-31, a coastal defense submarine. He spent the next two years in training and other noncombat duties. In May 1944, Hashimoto was given command of the I-58, a new boat. It was modified in the fall of 1944 to carry six kaitens (manned torpedoes). Commissioned on September 13, 1944, the I-58 then commenced sea trials. Hashimoto’s first war patrol was in January 1945. Along with other Japanese submarines, the I-58 attacked U.S. shipping off Guam on January 11, 1945. Following the launch of four kaitens, Hashimoto claimed a tanker sunk, although the attack had in fact failed. Hashimoto’s next patrol was off Okinawa. His submarine was unable to attack U.S. shipping because of the many U.S. planes, but the I-58 was the only Japanese submarine to return from Okinawa. The I-58’s final patrol began on July 16. With six kaitens, Hashimoto was ordered to harass U.S. communications. He patrolled along the Guam-Leyte shipping routes, and on July 30 he spotted the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, commanded by Captain Charles McVay III. The Indianapolis was sailing unescorted after delivering parts of atomic bombs and was not zigzagging. Hashimoto launched six torpedoes and scored three hits. The Indianapolis sank quickly. Of 1,200 men in her crew, more than 900 survived the sinking; they were not discovered by rescuers for four days, however, by which time 600 more had died, largely due to shark attacks. Hashimoto later testified at McVay’s court-martial that he would have been able to sink the Indianapolis even if it had been taking evasive action. Hashimoto retired from the navy at the end of the war and became a Shinto priest. He died at Kyoto on October 25, 2000. Tim J. Watts See also: ICEBERG, Operation; Indianapolis, Sinking of; Submarines.

References Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Kurzman, Dan. Fatal Voyage: The Sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. New York: Atheneum, 1990. Newcomb, Richard F. Abandon Ship! Death of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.

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Hedgehog Antisubmarine weapon. The hedgehog was an important British development in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II between the Allies and German U-boats. Instead of depth charges being dropped astern of a warship at the point where sonar contact with the U-boat was lost, the hedgehog was installed ahead of the bridge. Much thought had been given to the possibility of a forward-throwing depth-charge launcher, and the Department of Miscellaneous Weapons Development eventually came up with a multiple mortar, consisting of 24 bombs, each with a 31-lb. high explosive charge. The projectiles were fired electrically from a platform on the ship’s deck from inclined spigots; it was the appearance of the 24 spigots that gave the weapon its nickname. When fired, the bombs spread out in a circular arc about 130 ft. in diameter over the bows of the launching ship and fell into the water some 215 yards ahead. The bombs were fitted with contact fuses, so that only a submarine hit would produce an explosion. The remaining bombs sank to the bottom of the sea.

Crew members of the frigate Moberly (PF-3) watch the hedgehog pattern ahead of the ship during attacks that led to the sinking of U-853 off Block Island, Rhode Island, on May 6, 1945. Hedgehog, the name for the projector that launched 24 depth charges ahead of the ship, overcame the problem of “blindness” in tracking an enemy submarine when it was too close to be spotted by sonar. (U.S. Navy)

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Conceived by British navy commander Charles Goodeve, hedgehog was pushed by a group of young British naval officers and scientists. Neither the director of naval ordnance nor the director of naval construction were enthusiastic about the new weapon. The hedgehog finally went to sea operationally in January 1942. For security reasons, it was first known as “anti-dive-bombing equipment.” Early hedgehogs had problems. The charges of one exploded prematurely, heavily damaging a British ship. On occasion, a projectile would not fire, presenting a potential danger for crewmen trying to remove it. For sailors used to the explosion of depth charges, the new weapon was a disappointment since even depth charges that missed shook the morale of U-boat crews and bolstered that of merchant seamen and naval personnel. Escort captains were so reluctant to use hedgehog in early 1943 that the Royal Navy was forced to issue an order instructing captains to report why they did not use the weapon on an underwater contact. Based on British 1943–1945 experience in the Atlantic, a single hedgehog salvo had a 20 percent chance of sinking a U-boat. Hedgehogs claimed 50 submarine kills by 1945. In the Pacific theater, the U.S. destroyer escort England sank six Japanese submarines with 12 hedgehog salvoes. Colin F. Baxter See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; England, U.S. Destroyer.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Johnson, Brian. The Secret War. New York: Methuen, 1978. Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996. Terraine, John. The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1989.

Hell Ships Japanese ships used to transport U.S. and other Allied prisoners of war at the end of World War II. Although the Japanese had previously transferred prisoners by ship, in the fall of 1944, U.S. forces led by General Douglas MacArthur invaded the Philippine Islands, and the Japanese dispatched ships to remove the Allied prisoners of war (POWs) from the islands to concentration camps in Japan, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea. These prison ships, referred to later by the Americans as hell ships, were examples of the inhumane conditions in which the Japanese kept Allied POWs during the war.

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In violation of the rules of war, Japanese troop and weapons-carrying ships often were marked with a red cross to shield them from attack. The hell ships, which should have been so marked, carried no designation that they were transporting prisoners of war, and consequently several of them fell victim to Allied submarine and aircraft attack. Conditions on these ships were indeed hellish. In many instances, the Japanese packed as many as 1,000 prisoners into a ship that should have carried perhaps 250. The holds were so crowded that it was impossible to lie down, and there was insufficient fresh air, food, or water. The heat in the holds was often unbearable, and the small number of buckets allotted for human waste quickly overflowed, causing hundreds of cases of dysentery. In these circumstances, many prisoners suffocated or went insane. The Japanese often refused to allow the prisoners to bury their dead at sea. Casualties on the hell ships were often horrendous, because the unmarked ships fell prey to Allied aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Only 8 men out of 1,782 survived the October 24, 1944, torpedo attack on the Arisan Maru. Prisoners attempting to swim away from the sinking ship were shot by their Japanese captors from above decks. On September 18, 1944, only 200 prisoners of 750 survived a British submarine torpedo attack on the Shinyo Maru. In the autumn of 1944, more than 4,000 Allied prisoners were killed or drowned aboard hell ships sunk by Allied submarines. John Noonan See also: Japan, Navy.

References Giles, Donald T. Captive of the Rising Sun: The POW Memoirs of Rear Admiral Donald T. Giles, USN. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Hubbard, Preston. Apocalypse Undone: My Survival of Japanese Imprisonment during World War II. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990. Kerr, Bartlett E. Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American POWs in the Pacific. New York: William Morrow, 1985. Wright, John M. Captured on Corregidor: Diary of an American P.O.W. in World War II. London: McFarland, 1988.

Hewitt, Henry Kent (1887–1972) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Hackensack, New Jersey, on February 11, 1887, Henry Kent Hewitt graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1906. He then joined the global cruise of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet. During World

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War I, Hewitt commanded destroyers in European waters. Between the wars, he alternated shore duty as an instructor at the Naval Academy, battleship tours, staff assignments, and study at the Naval War College (1929). In 1933, Hewitt took command of Destroyer Division 12. He was promoted to captain the next year. Hewitt then commanded the cruiser Indianapolis. In December 1939, he took over Cruiser Division 8. He was promoted to rear admiral in December 1940 and commanded task groups on neutrality patrols in the Atlantic. Following U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, in April 1942, Hewitt assumed command of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. As such, he was responsible for U.S. amphibious forces in the Atlantic and Europe. Hewitt was the U.S. naval officer most involved in the development of amphibious doctrine in the Mediterranean and European theaters during the war. He had charge of every major Allied amphibious operation in the Mediterranean theater during the war. Hewitt was promoted to vice admiral in November 1942, and in March 1943, he assumed command of the U.S. Navy Eighth Fleet. Working within an Allied command structure in which he was subordinate to the British admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, and forced to coordinate military and naval operations and deal with such forceful characters as Major General George S. Patton, Hewitt demonstrated considerable diplomatic ability. Hewitt’s mathematical and logistical skills were equally fully exercised in planning and directing complicated large-scale landing operations, reinforced by naval gunfire support, in North Africa (November 1942), Sicily (July 1943), Salerno (September 1943), and southern France (1944). His most difficult decision was whether to go forward with Operation TORCH, the North African landings, despite adverse weather conditions. He elected to proceed, a difficult choice that led to military success. Promoted to full admiral in April 1945, shortly afterward Hewitt assumed command of the Twelfth Fleet, U.S. naval forces in European waters. He returned to the United States in October 1946 and took a special assignment at the Naval War College in Rhode Island before becoming naval representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. Hewitt retired in March 1949 and died at Middlebury, Vermont, on September 15, 1972. Priscilla Roberts See also: Amphibious Warfare; AVALANCHE, Operation; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; DRAGOON, Operation.

References Belot, Raymond de. The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951. Hewitt, H. Kent. The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. Edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2002.

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Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters (October 1942–June 1943). Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio (January 1943–June 1944). Boston: Little, Brown, 1954. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 11, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1957.

Higgins, Andrew Jackson (1886–1952) U.S. businessman and naval constructor. Born on August 28, 1886, in Columbus, Nebraska, Andrew Higgins moved to Alabama in 1906. He worked in the timber industry, becoming familiar with shallow-draft boats. In 1923, he started Higgins Lumber and Export Company in New Orleans. By 1926, Higgins had moved away from timber and was focused on manufacturing boats. During the 1930s, Higgins Industries built a variety of shallow-water boats. Higgins sold vessels to the Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers, and in 1939 he received contracts to build a boat for amphibious operations and to manufacture fast patrol torpedo boats. Higgins Industries designed and manufactured for the U.S. armed forces in World War II the LCP (landing craft personnel), LCPL (landing craft personnel large), LCVP (landing craft vehicle personnel), and LCM (landing craft mechanized). Higgins also oversaw the construction of materials, such as an airborne droppable lifeboat and secretly manufactured items required by the MANHATTAN Project. During the war, Higgins Industries expanded to eight plants around New Orleans. The firm built more than 20,000 boats for the Allies. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said of Higgins, “He is the man who won the war for us.” Following the war, Higgins’s company experienced financial difficulties, but during the 1950–1953 Korean War, it again thrived. Andrew Higgins died in New Orleans on August 1, 1952. R. Kyle Schlafer See also: Air-Sea Rescue; Amphibious Warfare; Landing Craft.

References Lorelli, John A. To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Strahan, Jerry E. Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats That Won World War II. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994.

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Holland, Lancelot Ernest (1887–1941) British navy admiral. Born on September 13, 1887, Lancelot Ernest Holland entered the British navy and trained as a gunnery specialist. He won promotion to captain in 1926 and to rear admiral in January 1938. From 1930 to 1931, Holland headed the British naval mission to Greece. During 1937 and 1938, he served as assistant chief of the naval staff, in which position he was responsible for naval doctrine and strategy. In 1939 and 1940, he was Admiralty representative to the Air Ministry and commanded the Home Fleet’s 2nd Battle Squadron from January through August 1939. In November 1940, Holland commanded cruisers attached to Force H during Operation COLLAR, and he participated in the Battle of Cape Spartivento. In May 1941, Holland was appointed commander of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and second in command of the Home Fleet. His force comprised his flagship and the navy’s largest capital ship, the battle cruiser Hood; the new battleship Prince of Wales; and six destroyers. Holland’s squadron was deployed in the North Atlantic, where British convoys between Britain and North America faced German U-boats, mines, and surface vessels. On May 24, 1941, Holland’s force engaged the German battleship Bismarck in the northeast Atlantic. A 15-inch shell from the Bismarck hit and ignited a magazine and blew up the inadequately armored Hood, killing Holland and all but three of the Hood’s crew, an enormous blow to British morale. The Bismarck temporarily drove off the Prince of Wales and eluded pursuing British ships, but three days later additional units of Admiral Sir John Tovey’s Home Fleet battered it into a wreck. Priscilla Roberts See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn.

References Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Hoyt, Edwin P. Sunk by the Bismarck: The Life and Death of the Battleship HMS Hood. New York: Military Heritage Press, 1977. Roskill, Stephen. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1919–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Hood, British Battle Cruiser The last British battle cruiser, the Hood was the fastest capital ship of the early 20th century. The Royal Navy laid down four ships of this type (the Hood, Rodney, Howe, and Anson) in 1916 and 1917, but work on three of them was suspended in 1917 and canceled altogether in 1918; only the Hood was completed.

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Laid down on May 31, 1916; launched on August 22, 1918; and commissioned in May 1920, the Hood was 860 ft. in overall length and 104 ft. in beam. It displaced 42,670 tons. A 12-in. armor belt protected the hull. The Hood mounted eight 15-inch guns in four turrets, two each fore and aft. Secondary armament consisted originally of 12 5.5-inch guns and 4 4-inch quick-firing antiaircraft guns and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. Its engines could propel the ship at 31 knots. Complement was 1,477 officers and men. The Hood became the symbol of Royal Navy power and was known throughout the service and to the British people as the “Mighty Hood.” The ship was built largely to pre–Battle of Jutland specifications, however, and by 1939 it was badly in need of a major refit, particularly to strengthen deck armor protection against plunging shell fire. The outbreak of World War II, however, rendered this work impossible. On May 24, 1941, the Hood engaged the German battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in the Battle of the Denmark Straits and was destroyed by a salvo that detonated its aft magazines. The Hood went down with the loss of all but 3 of its 1,500-man crew. The ship’s loss was attributed to its poor material condition, but deck armor protection was clearly inadequate. The British people saw the loss of the Hood as a national disaster, although they were somewhat mollified by the sinking of the Bismarck three days later. Eric W. Osborne See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Bismarck and Tirpitz, German Battleships; Great Britain, Navy.

References Kemp, Paul. Bismarck and Hood: Great Naval Adversaries. London: Arms and Armour, 1991. Lenton, Henry T. British and Empire Warships of the Second World War. London: Greenhill Books, 1998. Norman, Andrew. HMS Hood: Pride of the Royal Navy. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. Raven, Alan, and John Roberts. British Battleships of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Taylor, Theodore. H.M.S. Hood vs. Bismarck: The Battleship Battle. New York: Avon Books, 1982.

Horton, Sir Max Kennedy (1883–1951) British navy admiral. Born in Anglesey, Wales, on November 29, 1883, Max Kennedy Horton entered the Royal Navy in 1898. He joined the fledgling submarine

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service in 1904, acquiring a reputation for both technical expertise and independence of mind. Horton’s first command was the submarine A-1, in 1907. Horton played a considerable role in developing British submarine doctrine before World War I. On September 13, 1914, he became the first British submarine commander to sink an enemy ship when the E-9 torpedoed the German cruiser Hela near Heligoland. In October, he and Lieutenant Commander Noel F. Laurence took their submarines into the Baltic, where they operated successfully from Russian bases against ships carrying iron ore from Sweden to Germany. After his return in December 1915, Horton commanded submarines in the North Sea before taking over a submarine flotilla in 1919. Promoted to captain in 1920, Horton acquired a reputation for ruthless efficiency as he took up increasingly senior posts. In 1932 he won promotion to rear admiral; in 1936 he was a vice admiral and took command of the Mediterranean Fleet’s 1st Cruiser Squadron during the Spanish Civil War. In 1938, Horton led the Northern Patrol, which was charged after the start of World War II with sealing the northern exit from the North Sea as part of Great Britain’s economic blockade of the European Axis powers. He was then flag officer, submarines from January 1940 until November 1942. Horton directed submarine operations during the Norwegian Campaign and deployed his forces in the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean and North Sea to assist the blockade of Germany. After Italy joined the war, he provided maximum possible support to British Mediterranean submarine forces in their assault on Italian and German supply lines to North Africa, operations that played a crucial role in the ultimate defeat of Axis forces there. In November 1942, Horton became commander of the Western Approaches, leading the fight against German submarines that resulted in their defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic. Horton benefitted greatly from the valuable work of his precursor, Sir Percy Noble. He efficiently integrated and deployed his growing forces of welltrained convoy escorts, roaming support groups, and hunter-killer groups centered on escort carriers, all supported by shore-based very-long-range aircraft. Technological advances in radar, high-frequency direction finding, and antisubmarine weaponry increased his forces’ effectiveness, while ULTRA intelligence from Enigma decryptions greatly aided both offensive and defensive strategic deployments. Admiral Horton voluntarily retired in August 1945. He died in London on July 30, 1951. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Great Britain, Navy; HunterKiller Groups; Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam; Walker, Frederick John.

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1996, 1998.

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Chalmers, W. S. Max Horton and the Western Approaches. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957.

Hosogaya Boshiro (1888–1964) Japanese navy admiral. Born at Nagano on June 24, 1888, Hosogaya (Hosokaya) Boshiro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908. After World War I, he held a variety of commands in cruisers and battleships. In 1934, Hosogaya was the captain of the battleship Mutsu, and the following year he was promoted to rear admiral. He then commanded first the Naval Communications School and then the Torpedo School. In 1939, Hosogaya was promoted to vice admiral and took charge of the Port Arthur naval base in China. He commanded Japan’s Central China Fleet beginning in November 1940. During the June 1942 Battle of Midway, Hosogaya commanded the diversionary force that attacked the Aleutian Islands. His assaults, beginning on June 3, the day before the strike on Midway, were successful, and Japanese troops occupied Attu and Kiska islands. This occupation of U.S. territory had little more than propaganda value, however. In July 1942, Hosogaya’s command became the Fifth Fleet with responsibility for protecting the northern Pacific. The Japanese increased their garrisons on Attu and Kiska to more than 8,000 men, and Hosogaya was responsible for their resupply. During the winter of 1942–1943, U.S. forces began making offensive moves toward these Japanese bases. At the end of March 1943, Fifth Fleet undertook the escort of an important convoy to Kiska. On March 26, Hosogaya’s force, consisting of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and four destroyers, was escorting two transports near the Komandorski Islands when they were intercepted by a U.S. Navy task force commanded by Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris that consisted of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. At dawn, the two sides spotted one another, and the Battle of the Komandorski Islands began. This four-hour action was one of the last daytime surface battles without interference from naval aviation. In his efforts to protect his vulnerable transports, however, Hosogaya failed to press his advantage in numbers. The U.S. heavy cruiser Salt Lake City was hit several times, but the Japanese cruiser Nachi was hit twice, and Hosogaya ordered his transports to return home and broke off the action. The next month, Hosogaya was relieved of duty for lack of aggressiveness. Hosogaya was later recalled from retirement to serve as governor of the South Seas Agency at Truk. Hosogaya died at Atami-city in Kanagawa Prefecture on February 8, 1964. Tim J. Watts See also: Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of.

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References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Garfield, Brian. The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969. Lacroix, Eric. Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Lorelli, John A. The Battle of the Komandorski Islands, March 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

Hospital Ships The world’s major navies had used ships to house and transport wounded for a century and a half prior to World War II, but there were still relatively few of them in commission in 1939. Geographic differences between the European and Pacific theaters dictated quite different roles for hospital ships in the two areas. Transports were used to move wounded soldiers from France to England in May 1940 and were again employed in North Africa, Italy, and after the D-Day landings. The situation in the Pacific was different. The fact that battles were fought in areas with no resident medical facilities and the long distances between those areas and fixed base hospitals created immense difficulties in transport and often necessitated treatment on the spot. Medical ships had to be able to serve both as ambulances and as hospitals. The United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Japan, and the United States all deployed hospital ships. Germany commissioned eight Lazaretteshiffe during World War II. All were converted merchant ships designated alphabetically from A to H. All were deployed in the Baltic. The first of these was the converted passenger liner Berlin commissioned as Lazaretteshiffe A in 1939 and stationed off Norway. It had a crew of 165 and carried 400 beds. It remained in commission until January 31, 1945, when it struck a mine while transferring patients from the eastern Baltic back to Germany. While under tow to Kiel, it struck another mine and was abandoned. Salvaged by the Soviet navy in 1949, it returned to passenger service and was used as a troop transport during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The renamed Admiral Nakhimov sank after a collision at sea in 1986 in which 423 passengers and crew were lost. Two of the greatest marine disasters of the war involved former German hospital ships and occurred within days of each other. The Wilhelm Gustloff and the General von Steuben both had been converted to hospital ships early in the war and then reconverted to personnel transports later. In 1945, they were being used to move personnel from East Prussia to Germany in Operation HANNIBAL, when both were torpedoed by the Soviet submarine S-13. The Wilhelm Gustloff was sunk

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on January 30 and the General von Steuben on February 10. The combined number of lives lost in the two sinkings may have been as high as 10,000. Italy deployed 12 hospital ships during the war. These included the Aquileia, Gradisca, Arno, Città di Trapani, California, Po, Principessa Giovanna, Sicilia, Tevere, Virgilio, and Toscana in the Mediterranean and Ramb IV in the Red Sea. All were attacked at least once. Torpedo bombers sank Po and California in port at night when the ships had their lights switched off. Città di Trapani was mined, while the sinking of Sicilia occurred during a high-altitude attack against Naples by U.S. Army Air Forces bombers. The Arno, however, was sunk and the Principessa Giovanna, Virgilio, and Toscana were damaged in daylight air attacks conducted in good weather off Tunisia during April and May 1943. Italy protested these attacks, which the British and Americans denied, each blaming the other. The British navy deployed a number of ships dedicated primarily to transport of wounded, although they were staffed by naval physicians and nurses from Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service. They transported wounded from France and then moved wounded from Tobruk to Alexandria. They were again used to treat and move wounded at Anzio and transported wounded from Normandy after D-Day. The Oxfordshire not only served in the Mediterranean but was also loaned to the U.S. Navy and cared for wounded during the Battle of Okinawa. Despite the fact that they carried clear markings (white hulls with a circumferential green stripe and red crosses that were illuminated at night), the Royal Navy lost 10 hospital ships to mines, torpedoes, and Luftwaffe bombs during the war. Australia operated three of its own hospital ships and also had five Dutch hospital ships under its authority. The Manunda was converted in 1940 and served in the Middle East and New Guinea. It was damaged in the February 1942 Japanese attack on Darwin. The ship lost 13 crew Wounded British soldiers from the fighting in North members in that attack but was Africa arrive at a British port aboard the hospital ship repaired and returned to duty. Vasna, September 5, 1943. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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It reverted to passenger service in 1946. The Wanganella was converted from passenger service in 1941 and transported 13,385 wounded personnel before returning to civilian service in 1946. The Centaur was converted in 1943 but was torpedoed and sunk on its second voyage after only two months of service. The sinking of the obviously marked hospital ship and the resulting loss of 268 medical personnel caused outrage, especially in Australia. Attempts to prosecute those involved for a war crime were rendered moot when the I-177 that sank the Centaur was, itself, sunk before the war ended. Five Royal Netherlands Navy hospital ships operated under Australian command, although with Dutch and Javanese crews. The Dutch government-in-exile placed the Oranje in the Netherlands East Indies under Australian control in February 1942. It operated in the South Pacific through the end of the war. The Maetsuyker also joined the Australians, although the ship continued to fly the Dutch flag. The Tasman was, like the Maetsuyker, the property of KPM Lines before its conversion as a hospital ship. The Tasman escaped from Singapore and was converted at U.S. expense. Although the ship served with the Australian navy, it carried United States Army nurses in its complement and was crewed by Dutch and Javanese. As with the other Dutch ships, it served in the South Pacific. Two other KPM ships, the Ophir and the Melchoir-Treub, were also turned into hospital ships and served primarily in the Indian Ocean. Although they had deployed two very sophisticated hospital ships in the 1904– 1905 war with Russia, the Imperial Japanese Navy never built dedicated hospital ships. Instead, it relied on 19 converted merchant ships and the Op Ten Noort, a Dutch ship captured in the Battle of the Java Sea in 1942 and refitted as the hospital ship Teno Maru. An artificial second smokestack was added to disguise the ship in 1944, and its name was changed to Hikawa Maru No.2. Late in the war, the ship was used to transport mines, in violation of the Hague Convention protecting hospital ships. It was scuttled in 1945. The Japanese government paid the Dutch 100 million yen in damages after losing a lawsuit over the ship’s ownership in 1977. The Asaki Maru, a former Italian passenger liner, was converted to hospital duty in 1937 and served until 1944, when it was irreparably damaged in a collision with an oiler. The Tachibana Maru was converted in 1938 and served throughout the war. The Hikawa Maru served through the war and is currently a floating restaurant in Yokohama. The Takasago Maru served in Rabaul, Truk, and other parts of the South Pacific and was stopped and boarded several times by the United States Navy but always released under terms of the Hague Convention. Once, the Takasago Maru was attacked by a U.S. submarine; a torpedo struck the ship but failed to explode. The Muru Maru was not as fortunate. It was sunk in Manila harbor in November 1944 by U.S. aircraft. The United States Navy had operated hospital ships since the Civil War but entered World War II with only the Relief (AH 1) and the Solace (AH 2) in

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commission. The Relief, launched in 1919, was the first U.S. vessel specifically designed as a hospital ship and was intended to be as much a floating hospital as a floating ambulance. Both ships were deployed in the Pacific throughout the war. In all, nine dedicated hospital ships were built during the war: the Comfort, Hope, and the Mercy (the Comfort class, AH-6 to AH-8); and the Repose, Consolation, Tranquility, Benevolence, Sanctuary, and the Haven (Haven class, AH-12 to AH17). This class carried between 750 and 802 beds, complete surgical and X-ray facilities, and was air conditioned. Construction of the new ships was delayed; they entered service during 1944–1945. Initially, they operated primarily as hospitals, but by the time of the Iwo Jima invasion, the volume of casualties overwhelmed their capacity and they were again forced to move wounded to base hospitals for treatment. At the end of the war, they were employed as transports for repatriated prisoners of war. In addition to the Solace, the Rescue (AH-18), Refuge (AH-11), Samaritan (AH-10), and Bountiful (AH-9) were converted from either commercial or troop transport service to hospital ships. Following the Allied invasion of France in June 1944, ships were employed as cross–English Channel transport rather than to provide on-site treatment of the wounded. The U.S. Navy converted a class of large LSTs (landing ship tanks) and redesignated them as LST(H). Each was staffed with 4 surgeons and 27 corpsmen and could carry up to 350 wounded. Jack McCallum See also: Landing Craft; Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, Sinking of.

References Herman, Jan. Battle Station Sick Bay. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Human Torpedoes Torpedoes that were ridden by humans to their targets. In the 1890s, U.S. submarine pioneer John P. Holland envisioned midget submarines, but the first to submit plans for human torpedoes were the Italian naval engineers Teseo Tesei and Elios Toschi in October 1935. The Italians were the first to develop them, but human torpedoes were also used by the British, Germans, and Japanese. The Italian 22-ft. human torpedo was known as the Maiale (pig) because of its unruly behavior and the difficulty steering it. The torpedo was taken to the vicinity of the target by specially equipped submarines. Its two-man crew, wearing rubber suits and using oxygen breathing equipment, sat astride the torpedo. After directing the torpedo to its target vessel, they detached the torpedo’s explosive nose, secured it to the target, and set a timing device to cause the nose to explode after

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their departure. On December 19, 1941, Italian Maiales crippled the British battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria, putting them out of action for many months. The Italians also used Maiales to attack Allied shipping at Algiers, Gibraltar, and Malta. The British 25-ft. Chariot was modeled on a Maiale captured at Gibraltar, although it was not until after the Italian attack at Alexandria that the British undertook serious study of it. It had a 700-lb. detachable warhead and was developed specifically to attack the German battleship Tirpitz at Norway. This operation in October 1942 failed. The two Chariots, carried across the North Sea on the Shetland fishing boat Arthur, broke free in a sudden storm while under tow just as their crews were preparing to board them. The British did have some success, however, in subsequent attacks with Chariots against Palermo and Sicily and elsewhere, sinking two Italian cruisers and damaging a third. An operation employing Chariots against the German battleship Tirpitz failed when the two Chariots, slung under a fishing boat, broke free on the way to the target and sank. The Germans also developed a 25-ft. human torpedo. Known as Mohr (moor), it consisted of two electrically propelled torpedoes fastened together vertically. The top torpedo had a small Plexiglas cockpit instead of a warhead. Released close to its target, the Mohr was used with little success against the 1944 Allied landings at Anzio and Normandy. Japanese human torpedoes, known as kaiten (divine faith), were modified Type 93 24-inch Long Lance torpedoes fitted with a cockpit. Some 300 Type I Kaitens were produced. Launched from special submarines, they were used for the first time on November 20, 1944, against U.S. Navy ships at Ulithi Atoll, and one hit the fleet tanker Mississinewa, detonating its cargo of aviation gasoline. Wild claims of its success led the Japanese to mount eight other such operations, but only one other ship was sunk by kaiten, the U.S. Navy destroyer escort Underhill. They were also employed later with little success at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The unmanned torpedo fired from a submarine at periscope depth was a more effective and inexpensive weapon. It could be released from distances of more than 10,000 yards and did not involve risking a human crew. M. Taylor Emery and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Borghese, Junio Valerio; DETACHMENT, Operation; HUSKY, Operation; ICEBERG, Operation; Kaiten; NEPTUNE, Operation; Submarines; Torpedoes.

References Boyd, Carol, and Akihiko Yoshido. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

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Compton-Hall, Richard. Submarine Boats: The Beginning of Underwater Warfare. New York: Arco, 1983. O’Neill, Richard. Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II: Their Development and Their Missions. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981. Peillard, Leonce. Sinking the Tirpitz. Trans. Robert Laffont. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968.

Hunter-Killer Groups Specialized antisubmarine units formed to hunt and destroy submarines before they could attack and to provide roving support for convoy escort groups. In late 1942, as production and delivery of antisubmarine vessels increased, the British began forming support groups—permanently established formations charged with reinforcing hard-pressed convoy escorts. Unlike escort groups, these units trained and exercised intensively to develop and master techniques for hunting and destroying enemy submarines. Their existence and the imminent arrival of large numbers of escort carriers from U.S. shipyards spurred the deployment of specialized hunterkiller units in the navies of the British Commonwealth and the United States. The Atlantic Convoy Conference of March 1–12, 1943, mandated the formation that year of 10 hunter-killer groups, each centered on an escort carrier. Five British and Canadian groups would support operations in the North Atlantic, and five U.S. groups were to attend to the needs of the Middle Atlantic. Although convoy support was a significant role, the most important mission of these groups was to locate, intercept, and destroy U-boats before they could attack the slow merchantmen. Central to implementation of this mission were significant advances in three areas: code breaking, high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF, or “huff-duff”), and radar. By mid-1943, even though significant changes had occurred in the German naval cipher, Allied decoders were able to read 80 percent or more of the U-boat arm’s traffic. Furthermore, the British and U.S. submarine tracking rooms were able to predict submarine movements with a fair degree of accuracy on the basis of types of traffic, even if the message itself was unreadable. High-frequency direction finding also was important in tracking and locating submarines. Shore-based installations became sufficiently sophisticated to give close fixes, whereas advances in miniaturization produced sets suitable for installation aboard ships. From late 1942, half of all U.S. destroyer and escort production was fitted with HF/DF. The British followed suit in the spring of 1943. Code breaking, direction finding, and tracking ashore provided the hunter-killer groups with close approximations of the positions of U-boats at sea. Shipborne huffduff, the new centimetric radar sets, and improved sonar equipment and procedures, together with the groups’ organic aircraft, substantially enhanced their location

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rates. Better depth charges, ahead-throwing weapons, and aircraft-launched rockets or homing torpedoes eased the task of sinking the target. Hunter-killer groups trained together thoroughly, developed new coordinated tactics, and, above all, focused on locating and destroying U-boats rather than protecting convoys. From the time of their deployment, Allied hunter-killer groups played a major role in the destruction of Germany’s U-boats. For example, between May and December 1943, the group formed around the U.S. escort carrier Bogue sank 10 Uboats in the Atlantic; between June 1943 and January 1944, the Royal Navy’s 2nd Support Group destroyed 14 submarines. The attack on U-358 illustrates the significance of persistent attack made possible by adherence to a single mission: the British 1st Support Group maintained continuous contact for 38 hours and expended 530 depth charges before forcing the submarine to the surface and carrying out its destruction. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Horton, Sir Max Kennedy; Radar; Sonar; Submarines; Walker, Frederick John.

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1998. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 10, The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943–May 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1953. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. Vol. 3. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960. Y’Blood, William T. Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

HUSKY, Operation (Invasion of Sicily, July 9–August 22, 1943) Allied invasion of Sicily, to that point the largest amphibious landing in history. At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and their staffs discussed the next military objective to follow the final defeat of Axis forces in North Africa. Great Britain favored a strike against the Axis southern flank that would avoid the strong German defenses in northern France, whereas the United States advocated a cross–English Channel invasion of France as the shorter road to victory. Ultimately,

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Roosevelt agreed with the British view that a southern advance would secure Allied Mediterranean shipping lanes, provide bombers bases from which to strike Axis southern Europe, and perhaps drive Italy from the war. Thus the next big offensive of the Western Allies was the invasion of Sicily, code-named HUSKY. U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower had overall command of Allied forces in the Mediterranean. His ground commander for HUSKY was British general Sir Harold Alexander, commander of Fifteenth Army Group. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder commanded the supporting Allied air forces. British admiral Andrew B. Cunningham commanded the naval forces. The invasion force of British and U.S. troops totaled some 170,000 men. The Eastern Task Force, commanded by Admiral Bertram Ramsay, would put ashore General Bernard Montgomery’s British Eighth Army in southeastern Sicily from just south of Syracuse to the end of the southeastern peninsula. The Eighth Army was then to advance along the coast, its final objective the port of Messina on the northeastern tip of the island. The Western Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, would land Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s U.S. Seventh Army in southeastern Sicily between Licata and Scoglitti. On securing the beachhead, Patton was to move inland to conduct supporting attacks and protect Montgomery’s left flank. The newly formed Seventh Army had the supporting role, because Alexander believed that Montgomery’s veteran troops were better suited for the chief offensive role. The Allies enjoyed air superiority; they had some 3,700 aircraft as opposed to 1,600 for the Axis forces. British Force H under Vice Admiral Sir Algernon V. Willis, consisting of 6 battleships, 2 fleet aircraft carriers, 6 cruisers, and 18 destroyers was charged with preventing interference in the operation by the Italian fleet. Sicily was defended by Italian General Alfredo Guzzoni’s Sixth Army (consisting of seven static coastal divisions and four maneuver divisions) and German Lieutenant General Hans Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps of two divisions. On July 10, the Germans reinforced with two other divisions. Axis strength totaled between 300,000 and 365,000 men. The Allied invasion was preceded by an elaborate British deception, Operation MINCEMEAT. This was designed to convince the Germans that the Allies planned to invade Sardinia and islands in the eastern Mediterranean. The deception worked, causing Adolf Hitler to shift some resources to those locations. The invasion of Sicily, preceded by naval and air bombardment, began with airborne landings on July 9, 1943, the first large use by the Allies of such troops in the war. Few of the 144 gliders landed on their targets, and many crashed into the sea. The paratroopers were also widely dispersed. Worse, the invasion fleet fired on the second wave of transport aircraft in the mistaken belief they were German aircraft and shot down 23 C-47s. Nonetheless, the widely dispersed airborne soldiers created confusion among the Axis defenders, disrupted communications, and,

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despite their light weapons, prevented some German armor units from reaching the invasion beaches. The seaborne invasion began early on July 10, in bad weather. Losses en route were minimal; only four ships were sunk by U-boats. The second-largest landing undertaken by the Allies in the European theater after OVERLORD, it involved in all some 2,590 warships and landing craft. Operation HUSKY was also the first Allied invasion of the war in which the specially designed amphibious DUKW truck was employed, and the first time that large landing craft to include the LST (landing ship, tank), LCT (landing craft, tank), and LCI (landing craft, infantry) were available in large numbers. Notable among the many Allied warships providing gunfire support was the British monitor Abercrombie with its 15-inch guns. Resistance from the Italian coastal defenses was weak, and by nightfall the Allies had secured the beachheads. At Gela, the Hermann Göring Division attacked the U.S. 1st Infantry Division but was driven off by naval gunfire. Inland, the rugged terrain and Axis resistance slowed the Allied advance, although Patton’s forces reached the capital of Palermo on July 22 and, several days later, cut the island in two. The British occupied Syracuse with little resistance. British and U.S. forces were soon in competition to see which would be first to Messina, and a major controversy erupted when Montgomery expropriated an inland road that had been assigned to the Americans. This shift delayed the advance for two days and prolonged the campaign. Meanwhile, on July 25, Benito Mussolini fell from power in Italy as that government moved toward leaving the war. In Sicily, Axis forces continued a tenacious defense. Allied forces pressed forward, aided by a series of small, skillfully executed amphibious operations on the north coast east of San Stefano. On August 11, German field marshal Albert Kesselring ordered the evacuation of Axis forces, the Italians having already begun their exodus across the narrow Straits of Messina to Italy. The Italians brought out 62,000 personnel and 227 vehicles; the Germans evacuated 39,569 troops and 9,605 vehicles. It was thus something of a hollow victory when, on August 17, Patton’s forces reached Messina just hours after the last Germans had evacuated to Italy. Later that day, elements of the British Eighth Army also entered the city. The conquest of Sicily claimed 11,843 British and 8,781 Americans killed, wounded, missing, or captured. The Germans suffered some 29,000 casualties, including 4,325 killed, 6,663 captured, and an estimated 18,000 wounded. Italian losses are estimated at 2,000 killed and 137,000 captured. The Axis side also lost up to 1,850 aircraft against only 375 for the Allies. Operation HUSKY was one of the most important Anglo-American campaigns of the war. It was the first assault by the Western Allies on Fortress Europe and another important experience in coalition planning. As such, it set important precedents.

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It also achieved its goal of driving Italy from the war. On September 3, a new Italian government signed a secret armistice with the Allied powers. Anthony L. Franklin and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Force H; Hewitt, Henry Kent; Landing Craft; MINCEMEAT, Operation; Monitors.

References Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944. New York: Henry Holt, 2007. D’Este, Carlo. Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. New York: Scribner, 1995. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943–June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

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I I-400–Class Japanese Submarines Japan’s largest submarines, produced between 1944 and 1945. The I-class submarines were 296 ft. 6 in. in length and displaced about 5,223 tons. They were the world’s largest submarines until the U.S. Navy’s Triton nuclear submarine of 1959. Designed in 1942, the I-400–class submarine was to carry three to four light Aichi Type 17 Special Fighter aircraft (M6A1) to strike the U.S. mainland. The idea of a submersible aircraft carrier was unique to the Japanese navy of World War II. The I-400–class submarines were powered with four diesel engines, generating 7,700 hp. Their maximum speed was 18.7 knots on the surface and 6.5 knots submerged, with a cruising radius of 42,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. A ship of the I-400 class was thus capable of steaming around the world without refueling. The I-400s carried a standard armament of one 144-mm gun and three 25-mm machine guns. It took 30 minutes to catapult an airplane from the submarine. Each aircraft could carry two 550-lb. bombs or one 1,760-lb. bomb. This type of submarine and the Japanese balloon bombs were the only real means available for Japan’s military to attack the mainland United States during the Pacific war. The development concept behind the I-400 was similar to that of the superbattleship Yamato, in which the Japanese navy pursued the goal of having the largest guns and ships rather than the greatest number of vessels. However, the I-400 could not be mass produced. In 1942, the Japanese navy planned to build 18 I-400s, but only three were completed during the war. Nor could the Japanese navy use them effectively, given Allied control of the Pacific. In 1945, the navy developed a plan to utilize the I-400s in an attack on the Panama Canal. The attack was scheduled for August 25, 1945, but was canceled with Japan’s surrender. After the war, two I-400 submarines were handed over to the U.S. Navy. The remaining I-400 was broken up for scrap by the Japanese in 1946. Kotani Ken See also: Aircraft, Naval; Japan, Navy; Panama Canal; Submarines; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

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References Boyd, Carl, and Yoshida Akihiko. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Fukui Shizuo. Nihon Sensuikan Monogatari (The Story of Japanese Submarines). Tokyo: Koujinsha, 1994. Walts, Anthony, and Brian Gordon. The Imperial Japanese Navy. London: Macdonald, 1971.

Iachino, Angelo (1889–1976) Italian navy admiral and battle fleet commander between late 1940 and early 1943. Born on April 24, 1889, in San Remo, Italy, Angelo Iachino graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1908. A specialist in naval gunnery, he commanded a torpedo boat in the Adriatic during World War I. He was naval attaché to Britain from 1931 to 1934. In 1936, he commanded Italian naval forces in Spain. In June 1940, when Italy entered World War II, Iachino commanded the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. A month after the British raid on Taranto on November 11, 1940, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini made the fleet commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, deputy chief of staff and named Iachino to replace Campioni. Iachino, who in 1938 had supported Mussolini’s “Italy as aircraft carrier” arguments against the proponents of Italian naval aviation, backed such development in later years, particularly after his country’s grievous losses (three cruisers and two destroyers sunk and 2,300 dead) during the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941. The near total lack of an Italian air force support and of Luftwaffe air cover transformed an offensive Italian naval venture against the British into a defensive retreat that, because of miscalculations on Iachino’s part, precipitated a confused, one-sided night battle. The Matapan disaster haunted Iachino. Despite his superb theoretical grasp of naval strategy and tactics, he had proved irresolute in this and other encounters with the Royal Navy, notably the two Battles of Sirte Gulf on December 17, 1941, and March 22, 1942. Relieved of fleet command in April 1943 and opting for the Allies after the armistice, Iachino served without further command until retiring as a full admiral in 1954. He died in Rome on December 3, 1976. Gordon E. Hogg See also: Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cavagnari, Domenico; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Taranto, Attack on.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957.

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Giorgerini, Giorgio. Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1989. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Iachino, Angelo. Le due Sirti. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1953. Iachino, Angelo. Il punto su Matapan. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 1969.

ICEBERG, Operation (Invasion of Okinawa, March 16–June 21, 1945) The U.S. invasion of the island of Okinawa was the last major battle of World War II in the Pacific and the largest and most complicated amphibious operation in the theater. Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands and only 350 miles from the Japanese home island of Kyushu, had long been regarded as the last steppingstone and staging area for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The capture of Okinawa would also sever Japanese communications with their forces in south China. Okinawa is 60 miles in length and at most 18 miles wide. Japan had secured

The beachhead on the island of Okinawa during Operation ICEBERG, April 13, 1945. (National Archives)

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the island in 1875. Japanese leaders considered the defense of Okinawa as their last chance to hold off an invasion of the homeland, and their forces were prepared to battle to the death. Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, had overall charge of the invasion, code-named ICEBERG. Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher commanded the covering force of Task Force (TF) 58 (the Fast Carrier Force). It numbered 88 ships, including 11 fleet carriers and 6 light carriers with nearly 1,400 aircraft, 7 battleships and 18 cruisers, as well as destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, and logistics support ships. The British Pacific Fleet, designated TF 57, and commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, included 1 battleship, 4 fleet carriers, 5 cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the lifting force, Joint Expeditionary Force, TF 51. This was a self-contained task force made up of five separate task forces and three smaller task groups, capable of sustaining itself for up to 30 days and able to conduct sea, air, and land operations. It included 18 escort carriers, 9 battleships, and 10 cruisers as well as large numbers of destroyers, minesweepers, transports, landing ships and landing craft, and logistics support ships. In all, some 1,300 ships took part in Operation ICEBERG, the largest number of ships involved in a single operation during the entire Pacific war. The land assault force consisted of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner’s Tenth Army of some 180,000 men. Tenth Army included Major General Roy S. Geiger’s III Marine Amphibious Corps of three divisions and Army Major General John R. Hodge’s XXIV Army Corps of four divisions. Defending the Ryukyus, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru commanded some 130,000 men of the Thirty-Second Army (Ryukyus) of four divisions and additional units including the 20,000-man Okinawan Home Guard. The defenders constructed a formidable defensive system, particularly on the southern part of the island. The invasion was originally scheduled for March 1, 1945, but delays in the Philippines Campaign and at Iwo Jima caused ICEBERG to be put off for several weeks. The operation began with the occupation of the Kerama Islets, 15 miles west of Okinawa, on March 16, 1945. The next day, TF 58 struck airfields on Kyushu and shipping in the Inland Sea, claiming 500 Japanese planes destroyed. During these attacks, four carriers sustained damage, with the Franklin nearly lost. On March 21, the Americans landed in the Ryukyus on Keise-Jima, from which point artillery fire could be brought to bear on Okinawa itself. Then on April 1, Easter Sunday, the landing began with a feint toward the southeastern shore of the island. The real assault was made by 60,000 U.S. troops landing on the central stretch of Okinawa’s west coast. They quickly seized two nearby airfields and advanced east to cut the island’s narrow waist. Marines and army troops attained most of their initial objectives within four days. Ushijima had concentrated the bulk of his defenders out of range of Allied naval guns off the beaches and behind the strong Shuri line at the southern end of the

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island. There, the Japanese planned to inflict as much damage as possible on the invaders, supported by the last units of the Imperial Fleet and kamikaze raids. Fierce fighting continued on Okinawa until most Japanese resistance had been eliminated by June 21. During the battle, both commanders died within five days of each other; General Buckner died of shrapnel wounds inflicted by Japanese artillery at a forward observation post on June 18, and General Ushijima committed suicide on June 23. While the battle had raged ashore, fighting in the waters around the island was just as intense. Japanese kamikaze attacks reached their highest level of the war as the suicide pilots flung themselves against the Allied fleet. Several thousand pilots immolated themselves against U.S. and British ships, sinking 36 and damaging another 368, costing the Japanese some 1,465 kamikaze aircraft. Tokyo sent the giant battleship Yamato to Okinawa, where it was to inflict such damage as it could to Allied ships, then be beached as a stationary battery to support land operations. Discovered and attacked by U.S. carrier aircraft en route, it was sunk on April 7. Okinawa was officially declared secure on July 2. Both sides had suffered horrendous casualties. More than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawan military and civilian personnel died. On the U.S. side, the army lost 12,520 dead and 36,631 wounded. The Marines suffered 2,938 dead and 13,708 wounded. The navy lost 4,907 men killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks. The navy was the only service in the battle in which the dead exceeded the wounded. This figure was greater than the navy’s casualties in all U.S. wars to that date. The Battle of Okinawa was the costliest battle for the United States of the Pacific war. In Washington, the high cost of taking Okinawa was used to support the case for bringing the war to an end other than invasion by employing the atomic bomb. James H. Willbanks and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Franklin, U.S. Aircraft Carrier; Kamikaze; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Appleman, Roy E., James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 1948. Belote, James H., and William M. Belote. Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Gow, Ian. Okinawa, 1945: Gateway to Japan. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. New York: Scribner, 1995. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.

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Ichimaru Rinosuke (1891–1945) Japanese navy admiral. Born on September 20, 1891, in Saga Prefecture on the island of Kyushu, Ichimaru Rinosuke entered the Japanese Naval Academy in 1910. In 1919, he joined a naval aviation unit and underwent pilot training. In 1926, when he was testing an experimental aircraft as commander of the unit, the plane crashed and he sustained serious injuries, leaving him with a limp and forcing his resignation from the navy. He then became president of the Yokaren, a naval aviation academy for high school students established in 1930 in Oppama. Ichimaru proved a capable administrator, and the Yokaren produced well-trained pilots who established an enviable reputation during the Sino-Japanese War and World War II in the Pacific. Returning to active service, Ichimaru commanded a succession of naval aviation training units. In 1939, Ichimaru had charge of the bombing of Wuhan in China. During the Pacific war, he saw action in the South Pacific, particularly in the Solomon Islands and the bombing of U.S. positions on Guadalcanal. In 1943, Ichimaru returned to Japan and, now a rear admiral, took command of the 13th Aviation Wing. In August 1944, Ichimaru was assigned to the island of Iwo Jima as the commander of some 2,000 naval personnel, but his men of the 27th Naval Aviation Wing had no aircraft. Although he believed he would die on Iwo Jima, Ichimaru gladly accepted the assignment. During the subsequent Battle of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945), Ichimaru’s men fought alongside the Japanese army troops on the ground. Ichimaru was killed, presumably by U.S. machine gun fire, while leading a charge of his men, on March 17, 1945. Before his death, Ichimaru wrote a letter to U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was discovered on March 26 and published by the New York Herald Tribune on July 11, 1945. In it, Ichimaru sought to explain the Japanese point of view on the causes of the Pacific war. He claimed that the Japanese drive for the Daitoa Kyoeiken (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) did not threaten the United States and that Japan did not want war but was forced into it by the economic sanctions imposed by the United States. This letter is now at the U.S. Naval Academy. Hasegawa Rei See also: Aviation, Naval; DETACHMENT, Operation.

References Sukehiro Hirakawa. Beikoku Daitoryo eno tegami. Ichimaru Rinosuke Den (A letter to the U.S president. The life of Admiral Rinosuke Ichimaru). Saga, Japan: Shutsumondo, 2006.


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Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945. New York: Modern Library, 2003. Wright, Derrick. The Battle for Iwo Jima, 1945. Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 1999.

Identification, Friend or Foe As radars moved from prototype to production, designers immediately began to consider ways to give the new sensor the ability to identify the targets it detected. The British adopted the term Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) to define the system incorporated in aircraft to enable radar operators to separate enemy from friendly aircraft. “Fratricide”—also known as “amicide” and most recently as friendly fire— has been a recurrent problem since the beginning of organized military conflict, and the increasingly accelerated pace of aerial operations made it especially critical for air defense personnel to identify incoming aircraft rapidly. The same applied to naval operations where the first to open fire enjoyed a tactical advantage but a friend-on-friend engagement could be costly and give the advantage to the enemy. Thus, during World War II, German and Allied navies and air forces dedicated extensive training and technical research to ensuring their personnel could identify enemy aircraft and ships before their opponents. The radar-deficient Japanese and Italians focused on visual identification training. To this end, military trainers employed models, printed silhouettes, and even playing cards (with vehicle profiles printed on the faces) as training aids. Special focus was often placed on distinguishing Allied and Axis craft with similar visual characteristics, such as the early models of the Grumman F-6 Hellcat and the Japanese A6M2 Zero. During the North African and Sicilian campaigns, there were a large number of fratricides. This occurred especially in surface-to-air situations, as in the Allied invasion of Sicily, when nervous antiaircraft gunners in the invasion fleet, having earlier suffered a German air attack, shot down 23 C-47 transport aircraft carrying the second wave of Allied paratroopers. To ensure that nervous friendly airdefense gunners on the ground or in ships would not shoot at Allied planes during the cross–English Channel invasion of France in June 1944, Allied planners decided to forgo some elements of camouflage. The so-called invasion stripes were a series of broad bands of alternating black and white paint applied to the wings and fuselages of U.S. and British fighters, tactical bombers, and transport aircraft operating in support of the invasion. IFF was also a device fitted to aircraft and ships to prevent attacks on other friendly units and to let radar stations identify them as friendly. The British initially employed a shaped dipole mounted in the aircraft to enhance the radar return, but this passive system proved unreliable so they resorted to a repeater that retransmitted the radar pulse. The resulting stronger echo made friendly aircraft appear larger on the scope than enemy aircraft. Introduced into service in November 1939, the

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Mark I IFF proved quite successful during the Battle of Britain, although its limited range and other shortcomings often caused problems. The more flexible Mark II IFF, which was designed to respond to naval and mobile radars, was introduced in May 1940. It utilized a separate transceiver that operated on its own frequency separate from that of the individual radar. Therefore, the Mark III could be mounted on any Allied air or naval platform, while its related interrogation system could be added to any radar system as a kit. It was installed on all Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command aircraft by that October and was shared with the United States. Production of its successor, the Mark III, began in March 1941; it quickly became the standard Allied IFF system employed in the war. It was installed on all Allied aircraft, ships, and submarines beginning in late 1941. The Germans developed IFF systems that were unique to each radar, resulting in a plethora of IFF systems that would identify the aircraft only if it was detected by a specific radar system. More importantly, German airborne radars never acquired IFF equipment and therefore were not capable of aircraft-to-aircraft IFF interrogation. Nor were German ships and submarines equipped with IFF. The Allies’ standardization in IFF equipment and cross-service identification training did not eliminate friend-on-friend engagements in the war at sea, particularly at night, but it did give their navies and air forces an advantage over their Axis counterparts in most naval theaters of war by reducing their detection to identification times of any contacts they encountered. Japanese and Italian air force and naval personnel were trained only to recognize their own service’s equipment. This and the refusal of their military services to share operational information or coordinate activities led either to confusion or attacks on their own forces during key points in battles in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters. Thus, Japanese ground defenses on Iwo Jima could not identify their own aircraft by their signals. Similarly, German naval forces also suffered losses as a result of their country’s shortcomings in identification procedures. Their ships and submarines lacked onboard IFF systems, and the Luftwaffe’s ship identification training was limited and inadequate. As the pace of naval warfare accelerated and battles came to be fought under all-weather and limited visibility conditions, crews came increasingly to rely on electronic IFF systems. Superior IFF equipment, training, and employment were major contributors to the Allied success in the war at sea. The basic procedures and technological principles developed during the war dominated postwar IFF developments until the 20th century’s final decade. Robert Bateman, Carl Otis Schuster, and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Radar.

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References Brown, Louis. A Radar History of World War II. Philadelphia, PA: Institute of Physics Publishing, 2000. Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II. 7 vols. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. Hinchliffe, Peter. The Other Battle: Luftwaffe Night Aces versus Bomber Command. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001. Neillands, Robin. The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany. New York: Overlook Press, 2001. Price, Albert. Instrument of Darkness. London: Janes Information Group, 1982.

Ijuin Matsuji (1893–1944) Japanese navy admiral who engaged U.S. Navy forces in Empress Augusta Bay. Born in Tokyo on April 21, 1893, Ijuin Matsuji was the son of a future commander of the Combined Fleet. He joined the navy in December 1915 and served on a number of destroyers before commanding a destroyer flotilla in the years preceding World War II. In 1932, Ijuin was an aide-de-camp to the puppet emperor of Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo), Aixinjueluo Puyi (Henry Pu-yi). During the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942, he was captain of the heavy cruiser Atago. In October 1943, Ijuin was promoted to rear admiral and assumed command of 3rd Destroyer Squadron at Rabaul. His early skirmishing with U.S. Navy forces while supplying isolated Japanese garrisons proved inconclusive. On October 6, 1943, Ijuin led nine destroyers to evacuate Vella Lavella. Intercepted by an inferior U.S. naval force, he completed his mission. Each side lost one destroyer, and two U.S. destroyers were damaged. On November 1, 1943, U.S. Marines landed at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. A Japanese force sortied from Rabaul, with Ijuin commanding the left flank of the screen made up of the light cruiser Sendai (the flagship) and three destroyers. Altogether, the Japanese had two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers. A slightly larger U.S. Navy force defended the U.S. transports. In the early morning of November 2, the two sides collided near Empress Augusta Bay. In the ensuing engagement, the Sendai was sunk. Ijuin was rescued by a submarine and returned to Rabaul. He was not criticized for his role in the battle. He was then assigned to Singapore, where he died in an accident on May 24, 1944. Tim J. Watts See also: Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Japan, Navy; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of.

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References d’Albas, Andrieu, and Emmanuel Marie Auguste. Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Trans. Anthony Rippon. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964.

India, Navy The Royal Indian Marine became the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) in 1934, and its ships were identified with the prefix of HMIS, for His Majesty’s Indian Ship. The RIN grew rapidly in the course of the war, from 1,708 men manning 8 small coastal sloops in September 1939 to 30,478 men with 7 sloops, 5 frigates, 2 corvettes, 16 minesweepers, and numerous small warships to include 41 landing craft in July 1945. From 1939, the navy took responsibility for Indian coast defense, and during World War II, it was involved in convoy duty as far as the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Two Indian sloops, the Sutlej and Jumna, took part in Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Although the Indian navy was the most neglected of the armed forces following independence in 1947, because the military threats to the new nation were land-based from Pakistan and China, it is today the world’s fifth largest naval establishment. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Convoys, Allied; HUSKY, Operation.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. London: Bracken Books, 1989.

Indianapolis, Sinking of (July–August 1945) The sinking of the U.S. heavy cruiser Indianapolis by a Japanese submarine in the Philippine Sea two weeks before the end of the war remains controversial to this day. Built in Camden, New Jersey, and commissioned in 1932 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the Indianapolis (CA-35) displaced 9,800 tons and was 610 ft. in length. The engines provided a maximum speed of 32.5 knots, and the ship mounted

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nine 8-inch and eight 5-inch guns. It had carried President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a passenger during three cruises in the 1930s, and it served with distinction in the Pacific theater throughout the war. While shelling Okinawa prior to the invasion of the island, the Indianapolis was severely damaged by a Japanese bomber in late March 1945, necessitating a voyage to Mare Island, California, for repairs. After the work was completed, the ship, under the command of Captain Charles B. McVay III, was ordered to carry to the island of Tinian the internal components of the two atomic bombs to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Indianapolis subsequently departed on a highspeed voyage from San Francisco, arriving at Tinian 10 days later, on July 26. It next stopped at the island of Guam and departed on July 28 with orders to proceed to Leyte. While traveling without escort—under radio silence at 17 knots in moderate seas with good visibility—the Indianapolis was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-58, under Lieutenant Commander Hashimoto Mochitsura, in the early morning hours of July 30; it sank in only 12 minutes. Survivors were spotted by a U.S. Navy aircraft on August 2. Of some 800 members of the 1,199-man crew that initially survived the sinking, only 316 were eventually rescued. The vast majority of those who died fell victim to sharks and exposure. The incident remains the worst case of shark attack in history. Following a court of inquiry into the loss of the Indianapolis, Admiral Chester Nimitz proposed reprimanding McVay. Instead, however, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal followed the advice of the chief of naval operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, and ordered McVay to stand trial by court-martial. Hashimoto testified at McVay’s court-martial that he would have been able to sink the Indianapolis even if it had been taking evasive action. Despite this, McVay was subsequently found guilty of an error of professional judgment in unreasonably placing the Indianapolis at risk by failing to steer a zigzag course; he was acquitted of inefficiency in ordering his crew to abandon ship. The court unanimously recommended clemency, and Forrestal remitted the sentence of the court-martial. McVay retired as a rear admiral in 1949; he committed suicide in 1968. In recent years, crew members of the Indianapolis have endeavored to clear McVay’s name. They have pointed out the poor visibility at the time the ship was sunk, the ship’s engine problems, and the fact that McVay had not been informed of Japanese submarine activity. Also, McVay’s request for escorts had been refused, even though the Indianapolis lacked antisubmarine detection devices. In 2001, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution exonerating McVay of any wrongdoing. Glenn E. Helm See also: Cruisers; Forrestal, James Vincent; Hashimoto Mochitsura; King, Ernest Joseph; Nimitz, Chester William; Submarines.

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References Boyd, Carl. “Attacking the Indianapolis.” Warship International 13, no. 2 (1976): 15–25. Kurzman, Dan. Fatal Voyage: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis. New York: Atheneum, 1990. Lech, Raymond B. All the Drowned Sailors. New York: Stein and Day, 1982. Newcomb, Richard F. Abandon Ship: The Saga of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, the Navy’s Greatest Sea Disaster. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.

Indian Ocean Campaign (March–May 1942) By late March 1942, the Japanese placed primary importance on the elimination of British naval forces in the Indian Ocean that might threaten the oil-rich East Indies. Imperial Headquarters therefore decided to attack Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon (Sri Lanka), off India. The Japanese hoped this move would force the British westward; spread panic in India and cause the British to divert resources there from Burma; and open the way to the conquest of Madagascar, which would enable them to cut Allied supply lines to the Pacific, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. British vice admiral James Somerville commanded the Eastern Fleet, with 29 ships. He split his ships into Force A and Force B. The main body, Force A, consisted of his fastest ships: 2 fleet aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers. Force B consisted of 1 light carrier, 4 old R-class battleships, and a hodgepodge of 11 old cruisers and destroyers. Somerville faced a superior Japanese force under Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi. His First Air Fleet consisted of 5 large aircraft carriers (the Kaga remained in Japan), 4 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 11 destroyers. En route to Ceylon, the Japanese attacked Port Darwin in Australia and, on February 27, sank the U.S. seaplane tender Langley, bound for Java with aircraft. On March 23, the Japanese took the Andaman Islands, securing the sea route to Rangoon from Singapore. Two days later, Nagumo’s ships entered the Indian Ocean. Earlier, on March 7, the battleships Haruna and Kongo had shelled Christmas Island, located 190 miles southwest of Java and considered important for its phosphate resources. A Japanese task force, commanded by Rear Admiral Kyuji Kubo and consisting of three cruisers, two destroyers, and transports, then arrived, and Japanese troops forced the island’s surrender on March 31. The U.S. submarine Seawolf scored a hit on Kubo’s flagship, the light cruiser Naka, which had to be towed to Singapore for repairs. Several months later, Japan withdrew from Christmas Island because it was unsuitable for any military facilities. The attack on Ceylon, code-named Operation C, consisted of a strike against Colombo on April 5 and another on Trincomalee on April 9. The British believed the


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Japanese planned to attack Ceylon beginning on April 1, and Somerville stationed his ships south of Ceylon on March 31. Late on April 2, however, Somerville, who feared a Japanese submarine attack and a daylight air attack on his ships, split his fleet. He sent the majority to Addu Atoll, a small refueling base in the Maldives some 600 miles southwest of Ceylon. He also dispatched the cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall to Colombo and the light carrier Hermes and the destroyer Vampire to Trincomalee. Immediately after the British ships reached Addu Atoll on April 4, the Japanese were sighted 360 miles south of Ceylon. The main British force was now too far away to attack the Japanese, but bases on Ceylon were put on high alert. Somerville realized that he had blundered and recalled the two cruisers to Addu Atoll. The Hermes and Vampire were to rendezvous once they were finished fueling. At 8:00 a.m. on Easter, April 5, Japanese aircraft struck Colombo. Forty-two British fighters met the attackers, which were protected by escorting fighters. The Japanese planes destroyed shipping and paid particular attention to shore installations: railroad yards, repair shops, and the airfield. High-altitude Japanese bombers sank an immobilized armed merchant cruiser and a destroyer, and they severely damaged a submarine tender. The raid, completed by 8:35 a.m., cost the Japanese 7 aircraft, whereas the British lost 25. Once the Japanese had recovered their planes, a floatplane spotted the Dorsetshire and Cornwall at sea, and Nagumo launched 88 aircraft against them. The Japanese sank both British heavy cruisers in short order. Somerville had set out from Addu Atoll to engage the Japanese but failed to locate them. When Force B joined him the next day, he regarded it as a liability and promptly dispatched it to Kenya. Nagumo, meanwhile, moved his ships toward Trincomalee. Believing the Japanese were next going to attack Addu Atoll, Somerville positioned his ships off the atoll, 1,000 miles from the Japanese fleet. With the threat to India’s coast and the sinking of merchant ships, the British decided to cede the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese and sent Force A to the western coast of India. The Hermes and Vampire were ordered to hug the coast and join Force A. The Japanese raid on Trincomalee, beginning at 7:25 a.m. on April 9 and conducted by 91 bombers and 38 fighters, was met by 23 British aircraft. The Japanese planes found no warships in the harbor, but they did sink a merchant ship there. They concentrated on the shore installations and airfield and shot down nine British Hurricane fighters, as well as five Blenheim bombers sent against the Japanese carrier Akagi as it retired (the British bombers scored no hits). That afternoon, Japanese aircraft spotted the Hermes and Vampire at sea. Nagumo sent 90 aircraft against them, and the Hermes, with no planes aboard, and its escorting destroyer were promptly sent to the bottom. As part of this same operation, the Japanese convoyed their 18th Infantry Division to Rangoon without incident. It arrived there on April 7. Also, a Japanese

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raiding force attacked the sea lanes off India’s east coast. This Malaya Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, consisted of the light carrier Ryujo, 5 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 4 destroyers. Between April 5 and 6, it sank 19 merchant ships (92,000 tons) and damaged 3 others. Air strikes by Japanese aircraft flying from Burma brought this total up to some 185,000 tons of shipping sunk, and Japanese submarines operating off India’s west coast sank an additional 32,000 tons. By April 10, the Japanese had pushed the British navy out of most of the Indian Ocean, created a buffer against British naval raids on the East Indies and other Crewmen of the British Navy heavy cruiser DorsetJapanese possessions, and de- shire are rescued. Their ship was sunk by Japanese stroyed significant British mili- aircraft in the Indian Ocean on April 5, 1942. Although tary assets. Nagumo concluded 234 men of the Dorsetshire’s crew died in the attack, that he had achieved his objec- more than 500 survived in the water and were picked tives and ordered the First Air up by British ships the next day. (Time & Life Pictures/ Getty Images) Fleet to return to Japan. His fleet had been at sea for many months, and its ships badly needed refitting. Ultimately, their Indian Ocean victory fueled a belief in their own invincibility among the Japanese and led to the overexpansion of their empire. The extended Japanese Indian Ocean operation also meant that many of the ships were unavailable for the next big sea fight, the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. Benjamin E. Nehrke See also: Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Ozawa Jisaburo; Somerville, Sir James Fownes.

References d’Albas, Andrieu, and Emmanuel Marie Auguste. Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Trans. Anthony Rippon. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957.

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Dull, Paul S. The Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. Vol. 2, The Period of Balance. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956. Thomas, David A. Japan’s War at Sea: Pearl Harbor to the Coral Sea. London: A. Deutsch, 1978. Wilson, Michael. A Submariners’ War: The Indian Ocean, 1939–1945. Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus, 2000.

Ingersoll, Royal Eason (1883–1976) U.S. navy admiral whose logistical skills contributed to the success of the 1944 Normandy invasion. Born in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1883, Royal Eason Ingersoll was the son of a distinguished admiral. Graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1905, he participated in the final portion of the Great White Fleet’s voyage around the world. Quietly intellectual, unobtrusive, a superb administrator and skilled seaman, Ingersoll filled assorted staff, teaching, and seagoing assignments. Heading the Navy Department Communications Office during World War I, he ably directed its enormous wartime expansion and subsequently directed U.S. communications at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Following tours as the executive officer of two battleships, Ingersoll headed the branch of naval intelligence responsible for code-breaking efforts against the Japanese. In 1927, he graduated from the Naval War College and was promoted to captain. He then held staff assignments and commanded cruisers. For three years, from 1935 to 1938, Ingersoll headed the War Plans Division, where he helped revise Plan Orange against Japan. In 1937, he launched informal discussions with Great Britain on potential Anglo-American cooperation in any future conflict with Japan. Promoted to rear admiral in 1938, Ingersoll commanded Cruiser Division 6. He was recalled from sea duty in 1940 and became assistant to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark. Ingersoll played a crucial role in helping prepare the U.S. Navy for war. In January 1942, as a vice admiral, he took command of the Atlantic Fleet, based at Norfolk, Virginia; his mission was to counter the German U-boat campaign, thereby safeguarding Atlantic lines of communication and protecting convoys bound for Europe, and to secure the Western Hemisphere. In June 1942, his only son and namesake, a naval lieutenant, died in action at the Battle of Midway. Ingersoll was promoted to full admiral the following month. That November, he organized the movements of the ships that transported the U.S. Western Task Force to Morocco in Operation TORCH. From May 1943, Ingersoll worked closely with the new Tenth Fleet, established under the direct command of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King. Ingersoll’s logistical and managerial skills proved particularly valuable in deploying

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U.S. forces to maximum effect, and, by substantially neutralizing German submarine forces, greatly facilitated the June 1944 Normandy landings. In November 1944, Ingersoll became commander, Western Sea Frontier, to implement the complex transfer of U.S. naval forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific for the projected invasion of Japan, a task effectively obviated by the sudden end of the war in August 1945. He retired one year later. Ingersoll died in Washington, DC, on May 20, 1976. Priscilla Roberts See also: Convoys, Allied; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; NEPTUNE, Operation; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty.”

References Hughes, Terry, and John Costello. The Battle of the Atlantic. New York: Dial, 1977. Macintyre, Donald. The Naval War against Hitler. New York: Scribner’s, 1961. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.

Ingram, Jonas Howard (1886–1952) U.S. navy admiral who was given command of the Atlantic Fleet in 1944. Born in Jeffersonville, Indiana, on October 15, 1886, Jonas Howard Ingram graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy. A gunnery specialist, he served at sea in the Atlantic during World War I on Admiral Hugh Rodman’s staff. Between the wars, Ingram held seagoing commands, taught football and athletics at the Naval Academy, directed naval public relations in Washington, learned to fly as a naval aviator, and took staff courses. In 1940, Rear Admiral Ingram assumed command of Cruiser Division 2, subsequently rechristened Task Force 23 and then the Fourth Fleet, stationed in Brazilian waters to secure the South Atlantic against Axis ships and submarines. Promoted to vice admiral in 1942, he worked closely with Brazilian officials, winning their consent to the construction of U.S. air, naval, and military facilities on Brazilian territory, while helping to upgrade Brazilian naval and air capabilities. Under Ingram’s supervision, Ascension Island, 1,000 miles from Brazil’s coast, became one of the largest air bases in existence, supporting naval operations and enabling the launch of aerial attacks on German U-boats. In late 1943, Ingram declared the Atlantic secure from Brazil to West Africa. In November 1944, he was promoted to full admiral and took command of the Atlantic Fleet, protecting shipping routes between North America and the European theater—and especially troop convoys—against the final German submarine sorties.

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Ingram retired from the navy in 1947 to become commissioner of the All-American Football Conference and a vice president of Reynolds Metal Company. He died in San Diego, California, on September 10, 1952. Priscilla Roberts See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied.

References Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild. The Western Hemisphere: The Framework of Hemispheric Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960. Hughes, Terry, and John Costello. The Battle of the Atlantic. New York: Dial, 1977. Macintyre, Donald. The Naval War against Hitler. New York: Scribner’s, 1961. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978.

Inland Sea, U.S. and British Carrier Operations (July 1945) In July 1945, Admiral William F. Halsey Jr.’s Third Fleet, supported by Admiral Bruce A. Fraser’s British Pacific Fleet, carried out attacks on the Japanese home islands. On July 1, Task Force (TF) 38, commanded by Vice Admiral John H. Towers and organized into three task groups of four fast carriers each, sortied from Leyte. After refueling east of Iwo Jima on July 8, Halsey launched the first strikes against Tokyo on July 10. Although there was heavy antiaircraft fire, U.S. aviators were surprised to find no opposition from Japanese aircraft over the capital. The Japanese leadership had concluded that it could not destroy the fast carriers and that it should husband its remaining available aircraft for an anticipated October Allied invasion of Japan. Although most aircraft had been widely dispersed from the Tokyo area, Allied aviators claimed to have caught and destroyed 100 Japanese planes on the ground. Moving north, TF 38 carried out attacks in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, although bad weather prevented strikes until July 15. Again, there was no aerial opposition, but the planes sank more than 50,000 tons of coastal shipping and small warships. At the same time, battleships and cruisers shelled the Kamaishi and Muroran iron factories. After refueling on July 16, Third Fleet was joined by the British Pacific Fleet TG-37 under Vice Admiral Sir H. H. Rawlings, with two task groups of four carriers each, which had sailed from Sydney on June 28. Although the British lacked the logistical support of the U.S. Navy and Halsey expected them to be able to launch only two strikes for every three by the United States, the British matched the Americans strike for strike.

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On July 24, 25, and 28, Halsey mounted the last carrier air strikes of the war against the Imperial Japanese Navy’s remaining large warships located at Kure Naval Arsenal, where the Japanese Mobile Fleet was in fact immobilized from lack of fuel and functioning as a stationary antiaircraft platform. The last strike, on July 28, was accompanied by 79 B-24 Liberator bombers flying from Okinawa. Although Admiral John S. McCain Sr., commander of the Far East Carrier Task Force, opposed the strike at Kure as unnecessary, Halsey was determined to proceed. In his memoirs, Halsey claimed it would be a boost to U.S. morale and payback for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; that it would ensure that the Japanese fleet would not interfere with a planned U.S. invasion; that it would prevent the Japanese from using its remaining capital ships as bargaining chips to secure better peace terms; and that Pacific Fleet commander Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had ordered it. Halsey was also determined that this final destruction of the Japanese fleet would be accomplished by the Americans alone, and so he directed that British aircraft attack airfields and the port of Osaka, while the Americans moved against Kure alone. The U.S. Navy attacks on Kure, which were among the largest of the war, resulted in the sinking of the aircraft carrier Amagi; the battleships Ise, Hyuga, and the Haruna; five cruisers (including the heavy cruisers Tone and Aoba); and several smaller warships. Damage was also inflicted on three uncompleted Japanese carriers. The British, meanwhile, damaged the escort carrier Kaiyo and sank three frigates and several smaller ships. The carrier strikes in effect removed the remaining Japanese capital ships. They also enabled the Soviet Pacific Fleet to operate with far greater freedom in the Sea of Japan when the USSR entered the war. Heavy Japanese antiaircraft fire and Japanese fighter aircraft that rose to defend Kure nonetheless inflicted heavy U.S. aircraft losses. Two B-24s were shot down and 14 others were damaged. Although no Japanese aircraft reached the Allied ships, the attacks of late July claimed 133 Allied carrier aircraft (102 aircrew lost) from combat and accidents. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; British Pacific Fleet; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; McCain, John Sidney; Nimitz, Chester William; Towers, John Henry; United States Pacific Fleet.

References Craven, Wesley, and James Cate. The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki: The Army Air Forces in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Halsey, William F., and J. Bryan, III. Admiral Halsey’s Story. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947.

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Morison, Samuel Eliot. Victory in the Pacific, 1945. Vol. 14, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1960. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968, 1992. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi (1889–1975) Japanese navy admiral who advocated a negotiated end to the war. Born in Miyagi Prefecture, Japan, on December 9, 1889, Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1909. His early career included both sea duty and staff assignments. Inouye attained flag rank in 1935. Two years later, he was appointed chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Inouye shared Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa’s belief that radical elements in the officer corps posed a threat to Japan’s future. In 1939, Inouye was promoted to vice admiral and appointed chief of staff of the China Area Fleet. Convinced that naval aviation would play a vital role in any future conflict, he successfully lobbied for appointment as chief of the Naval Aeronautics Bureau in 1940 to gain practical experience. In that position, he drafted a memorandum entitled “Modern Weapons Procurement Planning,” in which he attacked the construction of battleships and called for greater emphasis on aircraft carriers and naval aircraft. Inouye’s views caused him to fall from favor. In August 1941, he was transferred to command the Fourth Fleet on Truk, a backwater assignment. When World War II began, he led the forces that captured Guam and Wake Islands from the United States. As other islands fell to the advancing Japanese, Inouye’s area of responsibility expanded to include Rabaul and the Gilbert Islands. In April 1942, Inouye was charged with planning and executing the invasion of Port Moresby. He remained in Rabaul while in early May seven naval task forces, as well as land-based naval aircraft, moved against Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Port Moresby. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea was a Japanese tactical victory, but the unavailability of close-air support due to the loss of an aircraft carrier in the battle led Inouye, on May 8, to postpone the landing at Port Moresby. The commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, was furious at this decision but unable to reverse Inouye’s orders. Inouye’s Fourth Fleet was then largely relegated to logistical duties, and operations in the South Pacific were turned over to the Eighth Fleet. Inouye was relieved in October 1942 and took command of the Japanese Naval Academy. He was recognized as an advocate of peace, and, when Admiral Yonai was recalled as navy minister after To¯jo¯ Hideki’s fall in August 1944, Inouye became vice minister. In

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May 1945, he was promoted to full admiral and became a member of the Supreme War Council. He spent the next months working for an end to the war. Inouye died in Miyagi on December 15, 1975. Tim J. Watts See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Japan, Navy; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yonai Mitsumasa.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Thomas, David Arthur. Japan’s War at Sea: Pearl Harbor to the Coral Sea. London: A. Deutsch, 1978. Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: World War II—The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Iowa Class, U.S. Battleships Last class of U.S. Navy battleships to be commissioned. Since construction of the five 60,000-ton Montana-class battleships was canceled in July 1943, the four Iowa-class vessels remain the largest battleships in U.S. history. Six were originally scheduled: the Iowa (BB-61), New Jersey (BB-62), Missouri (BB-63), Wisconsin (BB-64), Illinois (BB-65), and Kentucky (BB-66). The Iowa-class battleships were the finest U.S. battleships ever built. Their design was similar to the South Dakota class except that the hull was lengthened 200 ft. to improve hydrodynamics and provide more space for machinery to gain higher speeds. They were designed to confront the fast Japanese Kongo-class battleships. Their main armament was 9 16-inch .50-caliber guns in three triple-gunned turrets. They also had 20 5-inch guns in dual turrets. The Iowa-class ships provided highly effective service with the Fast Carrier Task Force in the Pacific theater in the last years of the war. With their excellent communications capabilities, modern radars, and spacious command facilities, they frequently served as flagships. Their powerful antiaircraft armament provided close-in support for aircraft carriers, and with their large oil bunkers, the battleships kept destroyers topped off in contested waters. Although smaller than the Yamoto-class Japanese battleships (57,540 tons versus 69,990 tons full load), the Iowa-class ships were faster (33 knots to 27 knots) and fully a match for these larger Japanese ships. The keel for the battleship Iowa, the third U.S. warship of that name, was laid at the New York Navy Yard on June 27, 1940. It was launched on August 27, 1942, and commissioned on February 22, 1943. With minor variations, all four Iowa-class ships


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The Iowa-class battleships Missouri (BB-63) and Iowa (BB-61) operate off Japan on August 20, 1945. The Iowa-class ships were the largest and most powerful battleships in the history of the U.S. Navy. (Naval Historical Center)

had a 45,000-ton design standard but displaced about 48,000 tons standard and 57,540 tons fully loaded. They measured 887 ft. 3 in. (overall length) by 108 ft. in beam by 38 ft. in draft and had a top speed of 33 knots and crews of 1,900 to 2,900 men. In the fall of 1943, the Iowa carried President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Casablanca Conference and then on the first leg of his journey to the Teheran Conference. The Iowa joined the fighting in the Pacific on January 2, 1944, as the flagship of Battleship Division 7. As with other U.S. battleships, it participated in all campaigns from the Marshall Islands to the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. During the September 2, 1945, surrender ceremony, it served as the flagship of Admiral William F. Halsey. The Iowa returned to Seattle in October, only to return to Japan in January 1946 as flagship of the Fifth Fleet. It returned to the United States in March and was decommissioned in March 1949. It was reinstated in August 1951 to support U.S. operations in Korea. The Iowa spent April through October 1952 in Korean waters, returning to Norfolk for an overhaul. From July 1953 until its decommissioning in February 1958, it served in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and in cadet training.

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In the early 1980s, all four Iowas were modernized with antiship and shoreattack cruise missiles and new electronics and support systems. The Iowa was back in service in April 1984. High operating costs eventually sent them back into reserve. The Iowa sustained a serious turret accident on April 19, 1989, in which 47 crewmen were killed. It was placed in reserve in October 1990 and stricken for disposal in January 1995 but retained for parts. In January 1999, it was reinstated and returned to reserve status at Newport, Rhode Island. In 2001, the Iowa was relocating to San Francisco. It is expected to become a museum ship. The New Jersey was laid down on September 16, 1940. It was launched on December 7, 1942, and commissioned on May 23, 1943. It spent World War II in the Pacific. It was decommissioned in June 1948 and reinstated for the Korean War in November 1950. The New Jersey deployed to Korea twice. It was decommissioned in August 1957 but overhauled and recommissioned in April 1968 for a tour in Vietnam, which ended with its decommissioning in December 1969. Modernized at Long Beach, it returned to service in December 1982 and conducted operations off Lebanon in 1983–1984. The New Jersey returned to reserve status in September 1991. Donated for preservation in January 1997, the New Jersey was towed to Camden, New Jersey, later that year and in early 2000 became a museum ship. The Missouri was laid down at the New York Navy Yard on January 6, 1941. Launched on January 29, 1944, it was commissioned on June 11. The formal Japanese surrender was signed aboard the Missouri on September 2, 1945. In a muchpublicized event and considerable embarrassment for the navy, the Missouri ran aground near Hampton Roads, Virginia, in 1950. It participated in the Korean War, playing a diversionary role during the September 15, 1950, Inchon Landing. Decommissioned in February 1955, it was modernized at Long Beach in the 1980s and recommissioned in May 1986. It served during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and participated in the Pearl Harbor 50th anniversary ceremonies. Stricken for disposal in January 1995, it was donated as a museum ship to Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, in May 1999. The Wisconsin was laid down on January 25, 1941, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It was launched on December 7, 1943, and commissioned on April 16, 1944. It, too, spent the remainder of World War II in the Pacific. Decommissioned in July 1948, it returned to service during the Korean War in March 1951. Following a collision in May 1956, it was repaired using the bow of its sister ship, the unfinished Kentucky. Decommissioned in March 1958, it was modernized and returned to duty in October 1988, joining the Missouri in the Persian Gulf War. It was decommissioned again in September 1991, scheduled for disposal in January 1995, but returned to reserve status in February 1998. It is berthed at Norfolk, Virginia, as a museum ship. The two remaining ships of the class were never completed. The Illinois was laid down on December 6, 1942, at Philadelphia but was canceled on August 11,

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1945, and scrapped. The Kentucky was laid at the Norfolk Navy Yard on June 12, 1942, but work was soon suspended until December 1944. With the ship 72 percent complete, work was again halted in February 1947. Work resumed in August 1948, and the hull was launched in January 1950 to make room for repair work on the Missouri. Although thought was given to turning the Kentucky into a missile ship, in May 1956 its bow was removed to repair the Wisconsin. The Kentucky was canceled in June 1958, sold in September 1958, and scrapped in February 1959. William Head See also: Battleships.

References Dullin, Robert O., and William H. Garzke. Battleships: United States Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Muir, Malcolm Jr. The Iowa Class Battleships: Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin. Poole, Dorset, UK: Blandford Press, 1987. Sumrall, Robert F. Iowa Class Battleships: Their Design, Weapons, and Equipment. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

IRONCLAD, Operation (Allied Invasion of Madagascar, May 5, 1942) Following the British attack on Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940, the French colony of Madagascar declared for Vichy France. With Japanese submarines operating freely in the Indian Ocean and Japanese carriers raiding into the Indian Ocean, the British Eastern Fleet was driven from its bases on Ceylon and forced to relocate to a new base at Kilindini (Mombasa), Kenya. The Japanese carrier foray into the Indian Ocean also raised alarm bells in London that Tokyo might mount an operation to seize Madagascar and use bases there for attacks against Britain’s vital Middle Eastern supply route from the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt. In any case, if the British could secure Madagascar themselves, it would enable them to base ships there and provide better protection for their convoys. Major General Robert Sturges of the Royal Marines commanded the expeditionary force of British, British East African, and South African troops. Rear Admiral Edward Neville Syfret had charge of the naval forces. Some 8,000 Vichy troops, 27 aircraft, 2 armed merchant cruisers, 2 sloops, 5 submarines, and 8 coastal batteries defended the island The invasion force and its equipment departed England in March for Durban, South Africa. Covering warships were drawn largely from Force H at Gibraltar, along with some ships from England and others from the Eastern Fleet. Syfret

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was appointed combined commander of all naval forces. These consisted of the battleship Ramillies, the aircraft carriers Illustrious and Indomitable, the cruisers Hermione and Devonshire, 13 destroyers (2 of them Australian), as well as frigates, corvettes, and transports. Everything was in place at the end of April, but the British cabinet did not give final approval for the assault until May 1, when the expeditionary forces had already sailed from Durban for their objective. The chief British objective was the northern port city and naval base of DiégoSuarez (now Antsiranana). The British decided to approach it from the rear by landing on the west coast of the island. The invasion, the first major British amphibious assault of the war, began before dawn on May 5, 1942. Although the invasion achieved surprise, the French resisted. Fleet Air Arm aircraft flying from the carriers Indomitable and Illustrious attacked and neutralized French airfields and warships, and the expeditionary forces went ashore. DiégoSuarez was secured on May 7, but fighting to secure the entire island continued for some months. On May 30, a Japanese midget submarine attack sank a tanker and badly damaged the battleship Ramillies, putting it out of action for nearly a year. On September 10, another British landing took place at Majunga. An armistice was arranged with Vichy French authorities on November 5. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on; Force H; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of.

References Brown, Mervyn. Madagascar Rediscovered: A History from Early Times to Independence. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979. Jennings, Eric T. Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution—Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Italian Social Republic, Navy The Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic or RSI) was proclaimed on September 23, 1943 with Benito Mussolini as head of state. Its territory corresponded to German occupied Italy, with the exception of several provinces such as Trento and Trieste, which the Germans administered or annexed outright. The new government had little independence and served chiefly as an instrument of German occupation. The formal capital was Venice, but the little spa town of Saló on Lake Garda, between Milan and Venice, was the actual seat of most of the ministries. The RSI’s naval service, called the Marina Repubblicana (Republican Navy) was officially founded on October 27, 1943, but active from September 10, 1943.

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Its first secretary and chief of staff was Admiral Antonio Legnani, the Regia Marina’s former commander of submarine forces. Most of the Regia Marina obeyed the orders of the royal government and honored the terms of the armistice reached between Italy and the Allies on September 3, 1943, by seeking refuge in Allied ports and joining the fight against the Germans, but some Italian naval units, particularly in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, followed locally negotiated agreements to cooperate with the Germans. The principal arrangement for Italo-German cooperation was reached by Commander Julio Valerio Borghese, leader of Italy’s naval special forces, the Decima MAS. He brought his force largely intact into the German camp as volunteers and proceeded to recruit thousands of additional men (and women) in the months following the armistice. After the Germans postponed early plans to commission a destroyer and three torpedo boats in the Marina Repubblicana, these volunteers mostly served in land units that fought at first at Anzio and, after July 1944, mostly in an antipartisan role. Although the Decima MAS was not under the direct command of Mussolini’s navy because Commander Borghese’s special relationship with the Germans allowed him to act as an independent warlord, it formed that service’s principal strength. On February 15 1944, the navy was reorganized and Borghese become the deputy chief of staff and effectively the navy’s head as the nominal chief of staff, with Admiral Giuseppe Sparzani limiting himself to administrative matters. The Germans assigned units to the Marina Repubblicana at their whim, and Germany’s needs always took priority. Decima MAS started off with three MAS boats (a 28-ton motor torpedo boat [MTB] smaller and faster than those operated by the Allies and Germans) and later received another six MTBs (two large and four small) on November 8, 1943. Between December 1943 and May 1945, the Decima MAS commissioned dozens of new MTSMs (Motoscafo turismo silurante modificati) and MTSMAs (Motoscafo turismo silurante modificato allargato), small eight-ton truck-transportable, two-man torpedo boats armed with a single torpedo, and MTM (Motoscafo turismo modificato) explosive boats; a dozen 30-ton midget submarines were added in 1944–1945, all except one in the Adriatic Sea. In the Adriatic, the Marina Repubblicana operated old torpedo boats, MAS boats, minesweepers, armed freighters, and minor vessels. Through December 1943, these played a decisive role in the Axis recovery of most of the Dalmatian islands seized by Yugoslavian partisans. The first major area of operation for the Decima MAS (and consequently the Marina Repubblicana) was the Tyrrhenian Sea. Here it manned from late December 1943 the only Axis fast coastal forces in the western Mediterranean. The Marina Repubblicana could claim a number of successes. On February 20, 1944, Decima MAS MTSMs sank the British LST-305 and damaged a U.S. minesweeper; on August 19, 1944, an Italian MTSM damaged the large French destroyer Le Fantasque, and on April 15, 1945, an explosive motorboat crippled the French

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destroyer Trombe. Overall, Decima MAS undertook 111 patrols and republican naval units engaged Allied forces 38 times. Although the Marina Repubblicana fought until May 1945, no more than 10,000 sailors ever served under Italian colors. Excluding auxiliary escorts, it never operated surface warships larger than MTBs; although some conventional submarines were assigned to the Marina Repubblica to ferry attack craft and frogmen, they were sunk in bombing raids shortly before entering service. Nonetheless, the Marina Repubblica played a significant role within the context of Germany’s Mediterranean Campaign. It supplemented the Reich’s overstretched naval forces, engaging in mundane but necessary tasks such as minesweeping, coastal escort work and training, manning batteries and auxiliary vessels, and handling many logistical and service tasks. Italian naval personnel also supplemented German crews aboard the ex-Italian torpedo boats and corvettes that Germany completed or repaired after the armistice and placed in service. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Contre-Torpilleurs; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Cernuschi, Enrico. “La Marina Repubblicana 1943–1945.” Storia Militare 188 and 189 (May and June 2009). Nesi, Sergio. Junio Valerio Borghese: un Principle un Commandante un Italiano. Bologna, Italy: Editrice lo Scarabeo, 2004.

Italy, Navy In the interwar period, the Royal Italian Navy (Regia Marina) had been designed to fight the French Navy in surface naval battles reminiscent of the 1916 Battle of Jutland. On the eve of World War II, the navy began transforming itself, albeit unsuccessfully, into an “oceanic” navy that would not be confined by the Britishcontrolled Mediterranean choke points of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. In the unlikely event that funding and resources were made available, the Italian navy by 1942 would include 9 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 36 cruisers (including 12 small Capitani Romani–class, of which 3 were completed before the armistice), and 84 oceangoing submarines. The navy had 5.4 officers for every 100 sailors (France had 7.5 and Britain 9.2 officers per 100 sailors), and many of the sailors were volunteers. On the eve of Italy’s June 10, 1940, entry into the war, the navy’s percentage of the annual budget had dropped to 12 percent, well behind the army’s 74 percent and the air force’s 14 percent. The core of the navy was built around the new, massive, 30-knot Littorio-class battleships armed with nine 15-inch guns. Two were being

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completed when war was declared, and a third was added during the war. Italy also had two small, older, and completely rebuilt and speedy World War I–era battleships ready for sea and two others that were almost ready. Although they were the weakest Axis battleships of the war, they were more powerful than any cruiser. Italy also had 7 heavy cruisers, 12 modern and 2 old light cruisers (adding 3 during the war), 59 destroyers (adding 12), 67 large torpedo boats (adding 17), and 115 submarines (adding 32). Various escorts, raiders, MAS motor torpedo boats, and successful war-built corvettes—the 700-ton Gabbiano class, of which 28 were completed before the armistice—rounded out the major fleet units. Although it was a substantial force on paper, the Italian navy suffered from fundamental problems. Italy lagged in several key areas of naval technology. One area was sonar, which was just beginning to be introduced at the start of the war. Also, in the disastrous March 1941 Battle of Matapan, the Italians discovered to their dismay that the Allies had deployed radar on their warships. The Italians did not deploy their first warship radar until a year later, in March 1942. Ironically, Italy’s scientific community had been working on radar in the mid-1930s, but the Italian government did not fully support its efforts. Of ULTRA intercepts, the Italians knew nothing, although they assumed the Germans were letting the Allies know about Italian operations, and the Germans assumed the Italians were doing the same. Italian ship armor plate was inferior as judged by Allied standards. Italian heavy ships relied on long-range gunnery, but guns in cruiser and destroyer turrets were mounted too close to each other, thus interfering in the flight of shells. Also, in an attempt to outrange the ships of their potential opponents, the Italians initially sought high muzzle velocities. These factors resulted in high salvo spreads, compared to the much tighter British salvos. The Italians sought to avoid night fighting by their heavy ships, and the navy lacked flashless night charges for ships with 8-inch or larger guns, an error not rectified until 1942. The navy dropped night-fighting training for large ships in the 1930s, precisely when the British navy was adopting such tactics for its heavy ships, including battleships. Italian losses in night surface actions during the war would be heavy and almost completely one-sided. Italy also experienced problems with its submarines. There were three classes of subs. The large oceangoing submarines were part of the new oceanic navy. Many were based out of Bordeaux, France. In 189 patrols, they sank over 500,000 tons of Allied ships, with another 200,000 tons damaged. They also conducted mostly ineffective runs to Japan for key war supplies, and they operated in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. Medium and small submarines hunted closer to home. In the Mediterranean Sea, these classes conducted 1,553 patrols with dismal results when contrasted to the successes tallied by far fewer German submarines dispatched to that theater. This outcome was, in part, due to the Italian doctrine that called for

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submarines to submerge during daytime and wait for a target to come within range. The Italians eschewed attacks on the surface in wolf packs at night. Their torpedoes were reliable but had smaller warheads than those of most other nations, thus causing less damage. Despite its long coastline and its colonies, Italy had only 25,000 mines in 1939, and most of these dated from World War I. In the 1920s, the Italians experimented with the snorkel, a tube to the surface that allowed submarines to secure air while submerged, but they ultimately dropped its development as a dead end. Their submarines also suffered from slow submerging speeds—they were two or three times slower than German boats. Italy also had to rebuild many of its submarines during the war because their large sails (the superstructure where the surface bridge and periscope were located) were easily picked up by radar. Italian periscopes were too short, and the Mediterranean itself was a much clearer sea then the Atlantic, which made it easier for Allied pilots to locate submerged submarines. Italy failed to develop the aircraft carrier. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the navy high command believed that the country’s long coastline and the many Italian islands and bases in the central Mediterranean rendered aircraft carriers unnecessary. But the slow communication and response between the Italian navy and air force, fueled by interservice rivalries, meant that too few planes arrived too late too often: early in the war, Italian aircraft actually attacked Italian ships several times. High-level bombing of warships under way also proved to be ineffective. Mussolini changed his mind about the aircraft carrier, and during the war, he twice intervened personally to secure the conversion of two passenger ships to carriers, although neither was completed before the end of the war. Italy also failed to develop torpedo bombers before the war, in large part because of interservice jealousy. The air force, with only limited funds, opposed development of torpedo bombers, preferring to use the money for high-altitude bombers. So although the Italian navy developed a torpedo for air launch, it was not until several months into the war that the air force carried out its first torpedo attack. In the course of the war, the Italians achieved several successes with these airplanes. The most innovative naval arm was the Decima MAS. This unit was made up of (1) midget submarines; (2) underwater swimmers trained in sabotage; (3) surface speedboats filled with explosives and piloted by crewmen who jumped off shortly before the vessels hit their targets; and (4) the slow-moving torpedo, or SLC, which was ridden by two men under water into enemy harbors. The most successful of these weapons was the SLC, directly developed from a World War I weapon that was employed against Austria-Hungary with good results; it was usually launched from a submarine. The most spectacular success for the SLCs occurred on December 18, 1941, when three of them entered Alexandria harbor and crippled the British battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant. With the exception of the midget submarines, the naval High Command ignored these weapons until 1935 and then only

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grudgingly supported junior officers involved in innovative development. A more forceful development program begun after World War I might well have made an important difference in World War II. Despite these limitations, the fuel-strapped Italian navy fought bravely during the war and transported to Africa 85 percent of the supplies and 92 percent of the troops that left port. In numerous battles above, on, and below the seas, the navy sank many Allied warships and forced the British to maintain a powerful naval force at both ends of the Mediterranean. In September 1943, when Italy switched sides in the war, the bulk of the Italian fleet joined the Allies. Italian naval losses before the armistice consisted of 1 battleship, 11 cruisers, 44 destroyers, 41 large torpedo boats, 33 MAS boats, 86 submarines, and 178 other vessels. After the armistice, Italy lost 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, 5 large torpedo boats, 25 MAS boats, 3 submarines, and 23 other vessels. Germany, which took over or competed many Italian warships after the armistice, also assigned some ships to the navy of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic, organized in northern Italy—the largest being the damaged heavy cruiser Bolzano. Most of these were subsequently sunk. Total wartime personnel losses for the Italian navy came to 28,837, with 4,177 of this number occurring after the armistice. Up to the armistice, Italy also lost 2,018,616 tons of merchant shipping. Jack Greene See also: Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in; Battleships; Beta Convoy Battle; Bergamini, Carlo; Borghese, Junio Valerio; Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Bon, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cape Passero, Action off; Cape Spada, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; Cavagnari, Domenico; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; de Courten, Raffaele; Great Britain, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italian Socialist Republic, Navy; Mediterranean, Operations in; Radar; Red Sea, Naval Operations in; Sansonetti, Luigi; Skerki Bank, Battle near; Signals Intelligence; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Sonar; Submarines; Submarines, Midget; Torpedoes; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

References Bagnasco, Erminino, and Enrico Cernuschi. Le navi da guerra italiane, 1940–1945. Parma, Italy: Ermanno Albertelli Editore, 2003. Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Giorgerini, Giorgio. La guerra italiana sul mare: La marina tra vittoria e sconfitta, 1940– 1943. Milan, Italy: Mondadori, 2001. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998.

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Knox, MacGregor. Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Ito¯ Seiichi (1890–1945) Japanese navy admiral who ordered the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and later commanded Japan’s Second Fleet. Born in Fukuoka, Japan, on July 26, 1890, Ito¯ Seiichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911 and the Naval War College in 1923. He studied at Yale University in the United States in 1928 and was promoted to captain in 1930. Ito¯ held cruiser commands before assuming command of the battleship Haruna in 1936. Promoted to rear admiral in 1937, he became chief of staff of Second Fleet. Ito¯ then served in the Navy Ministry between 1938 and 1940. In November 1940, he took command of Cruiser Division 8. In April 1941, Ito¯ became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, and in September he was appointed vice chief of the navy general staff under Admiral Nagano Osami. Ito¯ was promoted to vice admiral that October and played a key role in the development of Japanese naval strategy in the Pacific war. Reluctant to see Japan go to war against the United States, he opposed the Pearl Harbor attack, but Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, urged Nagano to authorize the plan. On December 1, 1941, with the fleet already at sea, Ito¯ ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor to proceed. He held his staff post for more than three years but desired a naval command. In December 1944, Ito¯ was appointed to command the Second Fleet. The Japanese navy had already been crushed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf the previous October, and Ito¯’s fleet was the only operative Japanese navy force. On April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-GO, whereby Second Fleet would join the battle for Okinawa, which had recently been invaded by U.S. forces. This operation was so reckless that Ito¯ refused the order. His fleet lacked both aircraft carriers and aircraft, which were essential to protect its ships from air attack. Moreover, the fleet would be provided only enough fuel for a one-way trip from Kyushu to Okinawa. It was obvious to Ito¯ and others that Toyoda intended to send the 7,000 men of the fleet on a suicide mission. Ultimately, Vice Admiral Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke prevailed on Ito¯ to obey the order, and on April 6, Ito¯ set out with the battleship Yamato and eight destroyers. The plan called for the Yamato to fight its way to the U.S. invasion site, destroy as many U.S. ships as possible, and then beach itself to act as a stationary battery. On April 7, 1945, the Second Fleet ships were attacked by U.S. vice admiral Marc A.

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Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force 58 in the East China Sea, and the Yamato was sunk, along with Ito¯ and 3,700 of its crew. Kotani Ken See also: ICEBERG, Operation; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nagano Osami; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific, 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Yoshida Mitsuru. Requiem for Battleship Yamato. Trans. Richard Minear. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985. Yoshida Mitsuru. Teitoku Ito¯ Seiichi no Syogai (The life of Admiral Ito¯ Seiichi). Tokyo: Bungeishunjyu, 1986.

Iwabuchi Sanji (1893–1945) Japanese navy admiral who vigorously defended Manila in the waning months of the war. Born in Niigata Prefecture, Japan, on March 2, 1893, Iwabuchi Sanji graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1915. Trained as a pilot, he then become a gunnery specialist and entered gunnery school in 1923. Between 1930 and 1933, he served as a gunnery officer on cruisers and battleships. Promoted to captain in 1937, Iwabuchi was assigned to command the training cruiser Kashii in 1941, then the battleship Kirishima in April 1942. His battleship took part in the Battle of Midway and the campaign for the Solomon Islands during 1942. On November 15, 1942, in the naval battle of Guadalcanal, the Kirishima was fatally damaged by gunfire from the U.S. battleship Washington and had to be scuttled. Promoted to rear admiral in May 1943, Iwabuchi was appointed commander of the 31st Naval Special Base Force in Manila. In November 1944, he was also assigned 4,000 army personnel and named commander of the Manila Naval Defense Force. General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, ordered Iwabuchi’s forces to evacuate Manila and conduct a protracted struggle in the mountainous regions of northern and central Luzon as well as east of Manila, but Iwabuchi refused to carry out the order. Commanding 15,000 navy and 4,000 army personnel, he was determined to defend Manila to the last. During three weeks in February 1945, there was fierce house-to-house fighting in Manila, and most Japanese forces chose to fight to the death rather than surrender. Iwabuchi

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died near the end of the battle on February 26 at Intramuros; he received a brevet promotion to vice admiral after his death. Iwabuchi’s decision to defend Manila to the last resulted in the deaths of some 16,000 Japanese troops, 1,000 U.S. forces, and perhaps 100,000 civilians. Some of the latter were deliberately massacred by Japanese troops, but most were killed by U.S. artillery fire. Iwabuchi’s actions also resulted in the trial and execution of General Yamashita, who was convicted of being a war criminal for the actions of his subordinate Iwabuchi. Kita Yoshito See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Midway, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Connaughton, Richard, John Pimlott, and Duncan Anderson. The Battle for Manila. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002. Lear, Elmer Norton. The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Leyte, 1941–1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1961. Smith, Robert Ross. The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific— Triumph in the Philippines. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

J Japan, Navy By the 1920s, the Nippon Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy, or IJN), which dated only from the late 1860s, ranked as the third-largest navy in the world. By then, it had fought three wars, and at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, it won one of the most comprehensive and annihilating victories ever recorded in naval warfare. The IJN was to fight two more wars, one in the western Pacific, directed against China, and the other throughout the Pacific, eastern and southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The latter resulted in utter and total national defeat and the destruction of the Kaigun as a service. From 1907 onward, IJN leaders identified the United States as the enemy against which preparations had to be made. Yet the Kaigun faced a basic and insoluble problem, namely, Japan’s acceptance of the limitation of its navy to three-fifths those of the United States and Great Britain, as agreed at the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference. This stance resulted from the conviction of minister of the navy Admiral Kato Tomosaburo that the only thing worse for Japan than an unrestricted naval construction race with the United States would be war against that country. Kato believed an unrestricted naval race could only bring the remorseless and irreversible erosion of Japan’s position relative to the United States, and Japan therefore had to seek security through peaceful cooperation and diplomatic arrangements rather than through international rivalry and conquest. Kato and others viewed the navy as a deterrent and, in the event of war, a defense; however, they also believed Japan’s best interests would be served not by confrontation and conflict with the United States but by arrangements that limited U.S. naval construction relative to Japan and so provided the basis of future U.S. recognition and acceptance of Japan’s regional position. The problem was that events unfolded in a manner that forced the IJN into planning for a war that, by its own calculations, it was certain to lose. The basis of this position was twofold. First, the Kaigun found itself obliged to fight not one but two wars. It would have to confront a U.S. enemy that would seek battle and undertake major amphibious undertakings across the western Pacific to bring the war to Japanese home waters. It would also be obliged to fight a maritime war to defend Japanese shipping and seaborne trade. Losing either would result in Japan’s full-scale defeat, no matter whether its navy lost a naval war that left the merchant fleet intact and undiminished or Japan was defeated in a maritime war

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Light cruisers of the Japanese Navy’s home fleet, December 17, 1941. (AP/Wide World Photos)

that left its fleet’s naval forces unreduced. In the event, Japan and the Kaigun suffered a double defeat, both naval and mercantile. In a very obvious sense, the maritime defeat was one that could have been predicted. Four Shimushu- or Type A–class escort warships were ordered under the 1937 naval estimates, but none was begun before November 1938, to be completed between June 1940 and March 1941. In December 1941, these four ships were the only purpose-built escorts in service with the IJN, and they all lacked underwater detection gear (sonar). Quite simply, Japanese industry did not have the capacity to build and service both warships and merchantmen, nor to build both fleet units and escorts (see Table 1). Japan’s limited industrial capacity forced it to choose between warships and merchantmen, between building and refitting. Moreover, the Kaigun had no real understanding of trade defense and the principles of convoy. Not until November 1943 did the navy institute general convoy, and, lacking sufficient escorts and integrated air defense, this practice merely concentrated targets rather than protected shipping. Herein, too, lay the basis of Japan’s naval defeat in the Pacific. In order to fight and defeat the U.S. attempt to carry the war across the Pacific, the Kaigun developed the zengen sakusen (all-out battle strategy), a concept that envisaged the conduct of the decisive battle in five phases. Submarines gathered off the Hawaiian Islands would provide timely reports of U.S. fleet movements, and with top

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surface speeds of 24 knots, they were to inflict a series of nighttime attacks on U.S. formations. It was anticipated they would suffer accumulated losses of one-tenth of strength in this phase and the same in the next, when Japanese shore-based aircraft, especially built for superior range and strike capability, would engage U.S.

TABLE 1 Wartime Commissioning and Completion of Major Units by the Japanese and U.S. Navies Esc/ DE CD/PF

CV

CVL

CVE

BB

CB

CA

CL

DD

SS

Imperial Japanese Navy

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

U.S. Navy

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

0

2


2

2

2

2

0

0

1

10

0

0

20

U.S. Navy

1

0

11

4

0

0

8

84

0

0

34


0

1

2

0

0

0

3

12

18

0

36

U.S. Navy

6

9

24

2

0

4

7

126

234

65

56


5

1

0

0

0

0

3

7

20

72

35

U.S. Navy

7

0

33

2

2

1

11

78

181

8

80

December 1941

1942

1943

1944

January to September 1945 Imperial Japanese Navy

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

20

39

20

U.S. Navy

4

0

9

0

0

8

6

61

5

0

31

7

4

4

2

0

0

7

32

58

111

116

18

9

77

8

2

13

33

349

420

73

203

Wartime totals Imperial Japanese Navy U.S. Navy

Note: The drawing of direct comparisons between different types of warships, specifically escorts, is somewhat difficult. Counted under the heading Esc in the Japanese listings are named escorts and patrol boats; under the heading CD are the kaiboken, or coastal defense ships. These types were not the direct equivalents of U.S. destroyer escorts and frigates, respectively, but diversity precludes these types of U.S. and Japanese ships being compared with anything but one another. U.S. figures exclude Lend-Lease vessels. Note: Dashes = zero; CL = light cruiser; CV = fleet carrier; DD = destroyer; CVL = light carrier; Esc = escort; CVE = escort carrier; DE = destroyer escort; BB = battleship; CD = coastal defense ship; CB = battle cruiser; PF = frigate; CA = heavy cruiser; and SS = submarine.

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formations. The enemy would then be subjected to night attack by massed destroyer formations, Japanese battle cruisers, and cruisers being used to blast aside escorts: the Japanese anticipated massed scissors attacks using as many as 120 Long Lance torpedoes in a single effort. Thereafter, with U.S. formations losing their cohesion and organization, Japanese carriers would join the battle, employed in separate divisions rather than concentrated, in order to neutralize their opposite numbers. Finally, Japanese battleships would engage the U.S. battle line, in what Japanese planners expected to be the decisive battle. In the 1930s, when these ideas were formulated, the Japanese expected the main battle would take place around the Marianas. The Kaigun organized its formations and building and refitting programs accordingly. Destroyers featured torpedo armaments, and battleships and cruisers emphasized armament, speed, and armor rather than range. The Yamato-class battleships, at their full displacement of 71,659 tons, carried a main armament of nine 18.1-inch guns, an armored belt of 16 inches, and turrets with a maximum of 25.6 inches of armor; they had a top speed of 27.7 knots and a range of 8,600 nautical miles at 19 knots or 4,100 nautical miles at 27 knots. These ships were deliberately conceived as bigger and more formidably armed and protected than any U.S. battleship able to use the Panama Canal. The Japanese quest for qualitative superiority extended through the other classes of warships. As part of this process, the Kaigun developed the famous Long Lance torpedo; land-based and carrier-based aircraft such as the A6M Zero-sen and long-range Betty bomber; and long-range submarines, one type equipped with seaplanes to extend scouting range. Individually and collectively, these were unequaled in 1941 and 1942, and in terms of night-fighting capability in 1941, the Kaigun undoubtedly had no peer. Despite these apparent advantages, the Japanese naval battle plan represented an inversion of the reality of what was required. By December 1941, the Kaigun had basically secured parity in the Pacific with the United States, with warships, carrier air groups and aircraft, and a pool of trained manpower that were probably the best in the world. The problem, however, was that Japan and its armed services lacked the means to fortify the islands of the central and western Pacific. The perimeter along which the Japanese planned to fight the Americans to a standstill largely consisted of gaps. Japan had neither the shipping nor the base organizations needed to transform the island groups into the air bases that were essential to the fleet. The latter, moreover, could not be guaranteed to be permanently ready to meet any U.S. move, which would, by definition, be made in a strength and at a time that all but ensured U.S. victory. Individual Japanese bases or even several bases within a group or neighboring groups could be overwhelmed by an enemy free to take the initiative and choose when to mount offensive operations, a second flaw within the zengen sakusen concept. By 1942, the Kaigun was only prepared to fight the battle

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it intended to win, and it could only win the battle it intended to fight. Instead, of course, the battle it was called on to fight was not the one for which it had prepared. The IJN, moreover, faced not one enemy but two. It opened hostilities with a total strength of 10 battleships; 6 fleet and 3 light fleet carriers and 1 escort carrier; 18 heavy and 20 light cruisers; 111 destroyers; and 71 submarines. A token of its future problems lay in the fact that only 1 fleet unit, a destroyer, was not in service on December 6, 1941. But even when it went to war, the Kaigun faced a prewar U.S. Navy that, between May 1942 and November 1943, fought it to a standstill. After that date, the Kaigun faced a wartime U.S. Navy, virtually every ship of which had entered service after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese shipbuilding effort from 1942 to 1944, though substantial, was simply overwhelmed by a truly remarkable U.S. industrial achievement: 18 U.S. fleet carriers to 7 for Japan, 9 light fleet carriers to 4, 77 escort carriers to 4, 8 battleships to 2, 13 heavy and 33 light cruisers to 4 light cruisers, 349 destroyers and 420 destroyer escorts to 90, and 203 submarines to 116. U.S. superiority was not simply numerical; radio, radar, and diversity of weaponry were all areas in which the Kaigun could not match its U.S. enemy but was systematically outclassed as the war entered its second and third years. During 1943 and 1944, the United States acquired such overwhelming numerical superiority that the Kaigun was denied not merely any chance of victory but even any means of effective response. Between December 26, 1943, and October 24, 1944, Japanese warships and aircraft destroyed no U.S. fleet units, if U.S. submarines are excluded. The simple truth was not just that the Japanese were prepared to die in order to fight but also that the only way the Japanese could fight was to die. Events in 1945 conspired to demonstrate the singular ineffectiveness of such a course of action, as Japanese losses between July 1944 and August 1945 reflected both this dilemma and the wider national defeat. In the war overall, the Kaigun lost 1,028 warships of 2,310,704 tons, of which 631 warships of 1,348,492 tons were destroyed in the last 13 months of the war (see Table 2). The wartime losses incurred by the merchant fleet—not the service auxiliaries—told the same story, totaling 1,181.5 merchantmen (there were navy, army, and civilian ships and, occasionally, shared ships, which are here calculated as one half a ship) of 3,389,202 tons, of which 811 vessels of 2,077,249 tons were lost in this same final period, after the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Losses of this order were both the cause and the result of defeat, in practice reducing the Kaigun to no more than an ever-less-effective coastal defense force. By August 1945, Japan had been pushed to the edge of final, total, and comprehensive defeat, losing all semblance of strategic mobility. Its industry was in end-run production; its people would have died by the millions from disease and starvation had the war lasted into spring 1946. To all intents and purposes, the Kaigun had by then ceased to exist, as U.S. carrier air groups flew combat air patrol

401

TABLE 2 The State of Japanese Shipping, 1941–1945 (in Tons)

Year

1942

1943

1944

1945

Built

266,000

769,000

1,699,000

559,000

Captured and Salvaged

566,000

109,000

36,000

6,000

Total Acquisitions

832,000

878,000

1,735,000

565,000

Lost

1,065,000

1,821,000

3,892,000

1,782,000

Net Loss in Year

–233,000

–943,000

–2,157,000

–1,217,000

Shipping Available on

Tonnage Afloat

Laid up

Percent Laid up

5,375,000

775,000

12.61

4,833,000

900,000

15.70

3,527,000

825,000

18.96

March 31, 1942

6,150,000

December 31, 1942

5,942,000

March 31, 1943

5,733,000

December 31, 1943

4,999,000

March 31, 1944

4,352,000

December 31, 1944

2,842,000

March 31, 1945

2,465,000

1,659,000

806,000

32.70

August 15, 1945

1,625,000

948,000

677,000

41.66

Note: The figures presented in this table are based on my own calculations. These, however, are not complete and differ in virtually every detail from figures generally given in Western histories, the sources of which are normally U.S. and date from the period immediately after the end of the war. The figures here have been taken from such a source. I would advise that a certain caution be exercised with respect to the detail of these figures and calculations and would note that Japanese merchant-shipping losses in this table include ships of unknown ownership and one Thai ship but not foreign ships under charter. These caveats noted, I vouch for the general accuracy of the figures and the conclusions that have been drawn from them.

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over Japanese airfields. A remarkable U.S. achievement, unparalleled in 400 years, had reduced the Kaigun to impotent irrelevance. States, especially great powers, are rarely defeated by naval power, but in this case, the Kaigun had been entirely powerless to prevent such an outcome. H. P. Willmott See also: Aviation, Naval; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Destroyers; I-400-Class Japanese Submarines; Naval Armament; Submarines; Torpedoes; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Ike Nobutaka, ed. and trans. Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967. Kurono Taeru. Nihon wo horoboshita kokubohoshin [The Imperial Defense Policy that Ruined Japan]. Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2002. Nomura Minoru. Tenno, Fushiminomiya to Nihonkaigun [Emperor Hirohito, Prince Fushimi and the Imperial Japanese Navy]. Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1988. Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Pelz, Stephen E. Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Japanese East Indies Campaign (December 20, 1941–March 9, 1942) After attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces moved into Southeast Asia, invading Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. They also moved against the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia). Indeed, the desire of Japanese leaders to secure the vast oil and mineral resources of the Netherlands East Indies was one of the principal reasons behind the decision to go to war against the United States. The Netherlands East Indies is a collection of some 17,000 islands rich in natural resources—including oil, tin, bauxite, and coal—and lying astride the equator and major shipping lanes. The Japanese planned a three-pronged semisimultaneous operation to secure the archipelago as quickly as possible. In the east, their forces would move from forward bases in the southern Philippines on the islands of Ambon and Timor to sever communications and reinforcements from Australia. In the center, forces

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from the Philippines would push southward through Borneo and Celebes. In the west, Japan forces would move against Sumatra as soon as Singapore was conquered. Finally, when all initial objectives were secured, the three forces would combine for an assault on Java, the center of Allied naval operations in southeastern Asia and headquarters of the joint Allied military command, ABDA (AmericanBritish-Dutch-Australian) formed in January 1942 under British Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. The disparity in naval strength is striking. Facing the attacking Japanese naval forces, ABDA had a conglomerate of ships, including the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, and some British and Australian surface ships and Dutch units from the East Indies. Major ABDA warships included 2 heavy cruisers (the USS Houston and HMS Exeter); 2 seaplane tenders (the USS Langley and Childs); 7 light cruisers, the HNLMS De Ruyter, Java, and Tromp, the USS Marblehead and Boise, and the HMAS Hobart and Perth; 22 destroyers; and some 25 U.S. and 16 Dutch submarines. Area Japanese naval forces were under Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake, commander of the Second Fleet. Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army, had charge of the land forces in the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. Kondo¯ had available for deployment if required 4 fleet aircraft carriers (the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu¯, and the So¯ryu¯), 2 light carriers, 1 seaplane carrier, 2 seaplane tenders, 2 battleships (the Kongo¯ and Haruna), 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and many minesweepers and auxiliaries in addition to transports. The Japanese offensive opened with heavy cruisers and destroyers escorting transports carrying elements of the Sixteenth Army to the northern Netherlands East Indies. Beginning on December 20, 1941, Japanese troops came ashore on oilrich Dutch Borneo as well as on Celebes and the Moluccas. Japanese land-based aircraft and Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi’s First Air Fleet supported the operation. The poorly equipped members of the 85,000-man Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, mostly indigenous forces of dubious fighting ability and in any case widely scattered over the islands, resisted as best they could. With the few ABDA air assets soon destroyed, all the Allies could hope to do is delay the Japanese advance. In a series of naval engagements, Japanese surface ships easily swept aside the outgunned ABDA naval units. These battles included Makassar Strait (January 24, 1942), Madoera Strait (February 4), Lombok Strait (Badung Strait, February 19–20), the decisive engagement of the Java Sea (February 27), and Sunda Strait and the Second Battle of the Java Sea (February 28–March 1, 1942). Of the ABDA surface naval forces, four U.S. destroyers managed to escape to Australia, while an Australian and two British light cruisers and two British destroyers withdrew to Ceylon. Meanwhile, on February 28, Japanese forces came ashore near Batavia, the capital of Java. On March 9, the Dutch surrendered on Java. Japan now had control of

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virtually the entire Netherlands East Indies, adding another 70 million people and vast natural resources to its empire. Although a number of Indonesians initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators, the occupiers were far more ruthless and exploitive than the Dutch. Although the Japanese would ultimately be driven out, their defeat of the Dutch was a major factor in the end of their colonial rule. Spencer C. Tucker See also: ABDA Command; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of the; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Lombok, Battle of; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Collier, Basil. The War in the Far East 1941–1945: A Military History. New York: William Morrow, 1969. Kirby, Woodburn. The War against Japan. Vol. 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1959. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Zainu’ddin, Ailsa. A Short History of Indonesia. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Java Sea, Battle of the (February 27, 1942) Naval battle marking the end of organized Allied resistance at sea in the Netherlands East Indies. By January 1942, the Allied defense of the southwest Pacific was collectively organized in the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. On February 24, two Japanese invasion forces set sail for Java. A Dutch patrol plane discovered the eastern force some 50 miles north of Surabaya on February 27. Rear Admiral Takagi Takeo commanded a force of 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers covering 41 transports. Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman commanded the ABDA striking force of 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers, representing all four ABDA nations. In the ensuing engagement, the lack of coordination was a major factor limiting Allied effectiveness. There was no plan of attack, and each nationality used different radio frequencies, signals, and tactics. Furthermore, the Allied crews were exhausted, and many ships were in need of either maintenance or repair. At 4:16 p.m., the Japanese opened the battle. Soon thereafter, the heavy cruisers USS Houston—its aft turret inoperable from earlier battle damage—and HMS Exeter returned fire. The Japanese scored the first hit when a dud shell struck Doorman’s flagship, the Dutch cruiser De Ruyter. At 4:35 p.m., the Japanese launched a

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mass torpedo attack, without success. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Japanese ships made another torpedo attack, this time sinking the Netherlands destroyer Kortenaer. Concurrently, a Japanese shell knocked out most of Exeter’s boilers, which disrupted Doorman’s formation. Further adding to the disarray, HMAS Perth made smoke to protect the disabled British cruiser. The Allied force was now in confusion. Two British destroyers covering Exeter’s withdrawal engaged the Japanese ships, and during this engagement, shells from HMS Electra hit the Japanese light cruiser Jintsu, flagship of Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo’s destroyer squadron. Several Japanese destroyers pounded Electra in return until it sank at 6:00 p.m. U.S. destroyers made a torpedo and gun attack shortly thereafter, holing but not sinking the Japanese destroyer Asagumo. Under cover of darkness, Doorman futilely attempted to reach the Japanese transports. He tried a run along the Java coast, during which HMS Jupiter struck a Dutch mine and eventually sank. HMS Encounter lingered to pick up survivors. Being low on fuel and having no remaining torpedoes, the U.S. destroyers also withdrew. That left Doorman with only four cruisers, which the Japanese detected just after 11:00 p.m. A Japanese torpedo struck De Ruyter aft, and the ship sank. Doorman perished with his flagship. A torpedo hit also doomed Java. Before losing contact, Doorman had ordered Houston and Perth to withdraw to Batavia. In the battle of the Java Sea, the Allies lost two light cruisers and three destroyers. Three cruisers and six destroyers (four U.S.) survived. The Japanese lost no ships, although one destroyer suffered moderate damage and other units light damage. The battle was the last major naval engagement preceding the Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies. Rodney Madison See also: ABDA Command; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Southwest Pacific Theater; Sunda Strait, Battle of; Takagi Takeo; Tanaka Raizo.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Hornfischer, James D. Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR’s Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. New York: Bantam, 2006. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Schultz, Duane P. The Last Battle Station: The Story of the U.S.S. Houston. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Van Oosten, F. C. The Battle of the Java Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

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JUBILEE, Operation (Dieppe Raid, August 19, 1942) Abortive World War II Allied raid against the northern French port of Dieppe. From a British perspective, there were good reasons for such a raid. In early 1942, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was under heavy political pressure as a result of a series of major military reverses. Churchill hoped such a raid might provide a convincing military success and also blunt Soviet and U.S. criticism of the failure to open a second front in Europe. Earlier Soviet leader Josef Stalin had dropped not-so-subtle hints that his country might leave the war, and German chancellor Adolf Hitler was certain that Churchill would try to bolster Stalin’s resolve by attempting a raid against the northern coast of France. The range of British fighter aircraft determined the likely point of attack. Dieppe was strongly defended. German colonel general Kurt Hesse had overall command. Dieppe was held essentially by the 57th Infantry Regiment. While this was not a top unit, its defensive dispositions nonetheless took full advantage of the terrain. In planning the operation, Chief of Combined Operations Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten modified it without formal approval from Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. Later, Mountbatten was able to mask his personal responsibility in the disaster. Minesweepers cleared a path across the English Channel for the sizable naval force committed to the operation. Commanded by Captain J. HughesHallett, it consisted of 237 vessels of all types, 179 of them landing craft. These transported some 6,100 Allied troops (4,963 Canadians, about 1,075 British army commandoes, and 50 U.S. Army Rangers). Some 730 aircraft, the majority of them Spitfire fighters, provided air cover and ground support. Just before dawn on August 19, 1942, the troops came ashore. Codenamed JUBILEE, the operation may have been both the largest raid and air battle in history; more fighters participated than in the Battle of Britain. The initial landing began at 4:50 a.m., and the attackers withdrew by 2:00 p.m. Some German coastal guns were destroyed, but at prohibitive cost. The Allies suffered 3,367 casualties, including 1,946 captured and 907 killed. German losses were 314 killed and 294 wounded. The Canadians suffered the worst. Their high casualty rate led to much bitterness afterward. Overall, casualties were the highest in the war for any major offensive involving all three services. In addition to vehicles and tanks destroyed, the Allies also lost 98 aircraft; Luftwaffe losses totaled 48. The Royal Navy also lost 34 vessels: 33 landing craft and the destroyer Berkeley, which was scuttled to prevent it from being taken by the Germans. The Dieppe raid led to bitter recriminations between Britain and Canada and further strained relations with the United States and Soviet Union. It also produced its share of historical controversies and myths, including the belief, since disproved, that the Germans were aware of it in advance.

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One of the chief mysteries surrounding Dieppe is why the raid was even attempted. The evidence that it had virtually no hope of success was subsequently concealed under the patent lie that it provided vital future lessons. The raid did serve to convince even diehards among the Americans that the Western Allies were not ready to assault Festung Europa (Fortress Europe) in 1942, and it demonstrated the need for strong naval and air preliminary bombardment along with thorough training of assault forces. It also demonstrated the difficulty of attacking ports and led to the decision to develop artificial harbors (Mulberries) for the eventual crosschannel invasion (Operation NEPTUNE). Even today, the Dieppe raid remains a useful lesson on how not to conduct military planning. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Mulberries.

References Atkin, Ronald. Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster. London: Macmillan, 1980. Ford, Ken. Dieppe 1942: Prelude to D-Day. London: Osprey, 2003. Robertson, Terence. Dieppe: The Shame and the Glory. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962. Villa, Brian Loring. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Whitehead, William. Dieppe, 1942: Echoes of Disaster. Toronto, Canada: Personal Library, 1979.

K Kaiser, Henry John (1882–1967) U.S. industrialist whose shipbuilding activities were vital to the U.S. war effort. Born in Sprout Brook, New York, on May 9, 1882, Henry John Kaiser left school at age 13 and worked at various jobs, including in the photography business. He then turned to wholesale hardware and construction. He established his own construction company in 1914 and built roads in the United States and abroad. Kaiser was also involved in the construction of the Hoover, Shasta, Bonneville, and Grand Coulee Dams as well as levees along the Mississippi River. His factories produced steel, cement, and aluminum. With the great demand for merchant ships in World War II, Kaiser turned to shipbuilding, beginning with a British contract for 30 merchant ships. During the war, he came to own seven shipyards in California and Oregon that constructed both cargo vessels and warships. He helped to revolutionize shipbuilding by introducing assembly-line practices that drastically cut construction time; his Richmond, California, shipyard set a record by building and launching the Liberty ship Robert E. Peary in only 111.5 hours. During World War II, Kaiser’s shipyards produced 1,490 vessels, including 50 small (escort) aircraft carriers, and they also turned out almost one-third of all the merchant ships built in the United States through the war years. Kaiser’s other wartime construction projects included aircraft, vehicle, and munitions manufacture. Kaiser also established the Permanente Foundation, which provided hospital and health facilities to all workers in his industrial empire. This was considered revolutionary for an industrial employer. By 1967, the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan was the largest health-maintenance organization in the United States. Following the war, Kaiser remained in shipbuilding and repair but also expanded into housing and automobiles. His auto manufacturing included Kaiser-Frazer automobiles, which in 1953 became Kaiser Motors. That same year, he purchased the legendary Willys-Overland brand, which manufactured jeeps. Kaiser’s cars were known for their advanced safety features, but they were eventually unable to compete with the Big Three automakers in Detroit (Chrysler, Ford, and General

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Motors). Kaiser died on August 24, 1967, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Many of his companies and business practices survive today. Nicholas W. Barcheski See also: Liberty Ships.

References Foster, Mark S. Henry J. Kaiser: Builder in the Modern American West. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Jaffee, Walter W. The Last Liberty: The Biography of the SS Jeremiah O’Brien. Palo Alto, CA: Glencannon Press, 1993. Lavery, Brian. Ship: The Epic Story of Maritime Adventure. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2004. Sawyer, L. A., and W. W. Mitchell. The Liberty Ships. London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1985.

Kaiten Japanese suicide submarines. By late 1944, the situation for Japan in the Pacific had deteriorated to the point that its leaders turned to extraordinary measures in an attempt to stem the tide of Allied victories. Already employing kamikaze suicide pilots, the Japanese also focused on developing and building the kaiten (“turning the heavens”) suicide submarine, which was really nothing more than a Type 93 Japanese torpedo with a small compartment for a pilot. The individual kaiten torpedo was to be lashed to the deck of a submarine and transported under water to the approximate location of a U.S. ship or naval anchorage. Following the appropriate ceremony, the pilot would leave the submarine and enter the kaiten while it was submerged. The kaiten would then be released and propelled at high speed by its oxygen-fueled engine to smash into the enemy ship. Capable of sustaining a speed of 40 knots for one hour, the kaiten could outrun any U.S. warship. There was no provision for the kaiten to be recovered by the launching submarine. Although the Japanese Naval General Staff had insisted that a means be provided for the pilot to be ejected from the kaiten about 150 ft. from impact, no pilot is known to have attempted to escape from his speeding torpedo as it approached the target. The first group of kaiten pilots began training in August 1944, and several submarines were modified to carry the submersibles. All kaiten pilots were volunteers. The first kaiten mission occurred in November 1944, when three submarines, each carrying four kaiten, departed Japan to attack U.S. fleet anchorages in the Caroline Islands. The kaiten were launched on the morning of November 20. Although

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three could not get under way because of mechanical difficulties, five others set off for anchored U.S. warships in Ulithi Lagoon. Explosions followed, with the Japanese later claiming three aircraft carriers and two battleships sunk. In reality, one U.S. tanker, the Mississinewa, was sunk. One submarine, still carrying its four kaiten, was detected by U.S. warships and sunk in turn. More kaiten missions followed. A kaiten unit composed of three submarines sailed for Iwo Jima on February 22, 1945. One was sunk by the U.S. destroyer escort Finnegan, which was escorting a convoy from Iwo Jima to Saipan when it happened on the Japanese submarine. The surviving submarines inflicted no damage on the U.S. anchorage at Iwo Jima. The last kaiten operation saw six submarines sortie between July 14 and August 8, 1945, each carrying five or six kaiten. Again, mechanical problems plagued the operation, and three submarines had to turn back to Japan. The kaiten from the others attacked U.S. ships off Okinawa in the most successful of the suicide missions. On July 24, a kaiten from I-53 sank the destroyer escort Underhill, with a loss of 114 officers and men. The kaiten effort had failed. Only two U.S. ships had been sunk, one each on the first and the last kaiten missions, but eight of the carrying submarines were sunk, with almost 900 crewmen lost. The kaiten, as with the kamikaze pilots, were an indication that the Japanese had run out of alternatives to counter the rapidly advancing Allied forces on their march toward Japan. James H. Willbanks See also: ICEBERG, Operation; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Submarines.

References Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Jentschura, Hansgeorg, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Kemp, Paul. Underwater Warriors. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Kamikaze Japanese suicide pilot. The special corps of suicide aviators was organized by Rear Admiral Arima Masafumi in 1944 to compensate for the critical shortage of skilled Japanese pilots and the increasingly desperate situation of the Japanese forces after the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The term kamikaze means “divine wind” and derives from two legendary Japanese victories over invading Mongol forces in the 13th century when a typhoon or kamikaze wind destroyed the Mongol fleet as it

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lay off Japan in preparation for invasion. The Japanese had long believed that this kamikaze wind was a divine intervention, and over many centuries, they had come to accept the proposition that Japan was shielded from calamity by a supernatural force much greater than any man might assemble. Japanese leaders hoped that the kamikaze pilots, like the wind that had saved their land from Mongol conquest seven centuries earlier, would spare Japan an Allied victory and occupation in the 20th century. Admiral Arima had little trouble in recruiting pilots for his suicide missions. Thousands of young Japanese volunteered. A last-ditch defensive measure, the kamikaze missions succeeded in wreaking havoc on Allied warships without sapping Japan’s other resources. The first kamikaze missions were flown during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 when 24 volunteer pilots of the Japanese navy’s 201st Air Group on Leyte attacked a force of U.S. escort carriers. During this action, one escort carrier, the St. Lô, was sunk, and two others were heavily damaged. The kamikaze plane operated as a kind of guided missile with human control. Kamikaze pilots tried to crash their planes into enemy ships. Most kamikaze aircraft were ordinary fighters or light bombers, often loaded with bombs and extra gasoline tanks. Many of the aircraft were old (some were biplanes with nonretractable gear),

A Japanese kamikaze pilot tries to crash his plane onto the deck of a U.S. Pacific Fleet warship, January 1, 1945. (Getty Images)

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but later, the Japanese also used a new aircraft, which was a piloted rocket. Specifically developed for suicide missions, this aircraft, called “Baka” by the Allies for the Japanese word for fool, was carried to the target area by a medium bomber. Dropped from an altitude of over 25,000 ft., the rocket would glide to about three miles from its target before the pilot turned on the three rocket engines, accelerating the craft to more than 600 mph in its final dive. After Leyte was nearly secured, the Allies prepared to land on Luzon (Philippines). With the loss of Leyte, there was little the Japanese could do to stop the U.S. advance, but they decided to make the Luzon Campaign a costly one for their adversaries. Having lost the bulk of their fleet in the various encounters with Allied forces in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese had to turn in force to kamikazes to combat the Allied fleet. During the landing of U.S. forces on Luzon, kamikaze pilots constantly harassed the U.S. ships. One estimate holds that 1 out of every 4 kamikazes hit its target and that 1 out of every 33 sank a ship. During the Battle of Iwo Jima, the kamikaze threat was lessened because of the distance between the island and the nearest Japanese air bases. However, there were still kamikaze attacks. On February 21, 1945, kamikazes sank the escort carrier Bismarck Sea and damaged the fleet carrier Saratoga (with the loss of some four dozen of its aircraft), as well as the escort carrier Lunga Point, a cargo ship, and two LSTs (landing ships, tank). The kamikaze effort reached its zenith during the battle for Okinawa, when the Allied task force was repeatedly attacked by waves of suicide planes. This tactic was new. Previously, kamikazes had operated in separate and individual attacks. During this battle, however, the fleet was subjected to massed kamikaze raids. These kikusui (floating chrysanthemum) raids, as the Japanese called them, were far more devastating than single kamikaze attacks and took a heavy toll of Allied ships. In several of the raids, more than 350 planes were sent against the fleet. Often, these suicide missions were supported by conventional air attacks conducted simultaneously. By the end of the Okinawa Campaign, at least 1,450 kamikaze pilots had given their lives for their emperor. In the process, they sank or damaged 263 Allied ships, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 men. These were the greatest losses ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a single battle. The effect of the kamikaze attacks, particularly during the Okinawa Campaign, had a major impact on Allied strategic planners as they contemplated an invasion of the Japanese home islands. If several thousand of these suicide pilots could wreak havoc on Allied forces in Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, what might one expect when Japan was invaded? This consideration played a role in the decision to employ the atomic bomb. James H. Willbanks See also: DETACHMENT, Operation; ICEBERG, Operation; Kaiten; Leyte Gulf, Battle of.

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References Axell, Albert. The Eternal Kamikaze: Japanese Suicide Gods. New York: Longman, 2002. Belote, James H., and William M. Belote. Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Gow, Ian. Okinawa: Gateway to Japan. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985. Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. The Kamikazes. New York: Arbor House, 1983. Inoguchi Rikihei and Nakajima Tadashi, with Roger Pineau. The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II. New York: Bantam Books, 1978.

Kearny, USS, Torpedoing of (October 17, 1941) The destroyer Kearny was the first U.S. warship to be torpedoed in World War II, bringing the United States, which was not a combatant at the time, one step closer to joining the conflict. Under its captain, Commander A. L. Danis, the Kearny was one of a number of destroyers on Atlantic convoy duty as part of the Northeastern Escort Force assigned to escort convoys as far east as Iceland and as far west as the United States. A new Benson-class destroyer, the Kearny had been completed only in 1940; with a displacement of 1,630 tons and a main armament of four 5-inch guns, along with four 40-mm Bofors and seven 20-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns, it was capable of 36.5 knots. The Kearny was at Reykjavik, Iceland, with a destroyer division that had just made the run from the United States when news arrived of attacks by German U-boats on convoy SC.48, consisting of 50 merchantmen, about 400 miles west of Iceland. On October 15, a German wolf pack had sunk three of the merchantmen. The Kearny was one of a half dozen escorts dispatched to SC.48’s assistance. The Kearny and four other destroyers from Iceland joined up with the convoy about 350 miles southwest of Iceland early on October 16 and immediately took up station screening it. Unfortunately, they were only 1,000 to 1,500 yards from the convoy, and the German submarines were able to take up longer-range firing positions undetected. That night, in three separate waves of attacks, the German wolf pack struck again, sinking seven more merchant ships. In the last of these attacks, around 2:00 a.m. on October 17, the Kearny was searching for U-boats on the surface when it came under attack by U-569, which fired three torpedoes against it. One of the torpedoes struck home, hitting the Kearny on its starboard side amidships. Through valiant effort, the crew managed to save their ship, although 11 sailors were killed and 24 wounded. Miraculously, given the extensive damage and the hole in her side, the Kearny made it to Iceland under its own power, escorted by the destroyer Greer. Eventually, the ship rejoined the fleet. The attack on the Kearny came in the middle of debate over the repeal of the Neutrality Act in the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt took to the airwaves, telling the American people, “We have wished to avoid shooting. But

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the shooting has started. And history will record who fired the first shot.” A few days later, a German submarine torpedoed and sank the destroyer Reuben James, also on convoy duty in the Atlantic. By then, it seemed as if U.S. entry into the war had become only a matter of time, although Americans were shocked to see the final provocation come from another quarter—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, halfway around the globe. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Destroyers; Lend-Lease; Submarines; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1941. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1953.

Keyes, Roger John Brownlow (1872–1945) British navy admiral and director of combined operations in 1940 and 1941. Born in Tundiani, India, on October 4, 1872, Roger Keyes joined the Royal Navy in 1887. He took part in anti–slave trade campaigns and distinguished himself during the 1900 Boxer Uprising in China. By 1905, he was a captain and regarded as one of the most promising Royal Navy officers. In 1912, Keyes was appointed as commodore in charge of the submarine service. In this capacity, Keyes took part in the August 1914 Battle of Heligoland Bight, the first naval action versus Germany of World War I. Three years later, he was chief of staff to Admiral Sackville Carden, commander of the Dardanelles Campaign. In October 1917, Keyes became director of plans for the Admiralty and organized an operation to attack the German submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Promoted to vice admiral and made the commander of the Dover Patrol in January 1918, he carried out this operation in April and May but with mixed results. Rewarded with a baronetcy and promotion to admiral of the fleet, he became the Conservative member of Parliament for North Portsmouth in 1934 and retired from the navy in 1935. A vigorous 67 when World War II began, Keyes staunchly supported First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill’s ill-considered efforts in Norway in 1940. His parliamentary speech of May 7, 1940, criticizing the government’s record, helped cause the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Churchill. Three days later, Keyes became British liaison officer to

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King Leopold III of Belgium, until the latter signed an armistice with Germany on May 27, 1940. In July 1940, Churchill appointed Keyes director of combined operations. As such, he was responsible for the early planning of British efforts to return to continental Europe, including organizing a special force of commandos intended to mount unconventional secret raids against enemy targets. He expanded this organization substantially and won it considerable independence from supervision by the army, navy, marines, and air force. In autumn 1941, however, Churchill’s decree that Keyes should not direct commando operations but simply organize and train the units and advise as to their use led the infuriated admiral to resign, and Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced him. In late November, Keyes’s son Geoffrey died in an unsuccessful commando raid intended to assassinate German general Erwin Rommel, winning the Victoria Cross. Although Keyes criticized the government’s handling of the war in Parliament, he was made a peer, Baron Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover, in January 1943. He undertook minor government assignments thereafter and lectured in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in the summer of 1944; he subsequently observed the Leyte landings in the Philippines. Keyes died in Buckingham, England, on December 26, 1945. Priscilla Roberts See also: Great Britain, Navy; Leyte Landings; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas.

References Aspinall-Oglander, C. F. Roger Keyes. London: Hogarth Press, 1951. Fergusson, Bernard. The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations. London: Collins, 1961. Keyes, Roger. Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1943. Keyes, Roger. The Keyes Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of Zeebrugge. 2 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972–1980. Roskill, Stephen. Churchill and the Admirals. New York: William Morrow, 1978.

Kikkawa Kioyshi (1900–1943) Japanese navy admiral. Born on November 3, 1900, in Hiroshima Prefecture on Honshu, Kikkawa Kioyshi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1922 and from gunnery school in 1924. From that time to 1939, he captained a succession of destroyers. In 1940, he was promoted to commander and assigned as

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captain of the destroyer Oshio in the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of the Second Torpedo Fleet. During the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies, Kikkawa particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Lombok (Badeong Strait) on the night of February 19–20, 1942, when he sank the Dutch destroyer Piet Hein by gunfire and torpedoes. Assigned to command the destroyer Yudachi in May, on the night of September 4–5, he successfully carried out a resupply mission to Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, during which his ships shelled Henderson Field and sank the U.S. destroyers-transports Little and Gregory. Kikkawa was active through the Guadalcanal Campaign and especially the fighting on November 12–15, during which the Yudachi was sunk. Kikkawa was wounded but rescued. Returning to Yokosuka to recover, he was offered the position of instructor at the Japanese Naval Academy but refused the assignment and insisted that he be returned to battle as a destroyer captain. In 1943 he took command of the newly constructed destroyer Onami. Kikkawa was eager for battle, and his destroyer was one of five returning from a supply run to Buka Island north of Bougainville, when the Japanese force was intercepted by five U.S. destroyers commanded by Captain Arleigh Burke on the night of November 24, 1943. In the Battle of Cape St. George that followed, the Onami was hit by U.S. torpedoes, the first of three of the Japanese destroyers sunk in the battle for no U.S. losses. Kikkawa was among the more than 640 Japanese to die in the battle. His superiors were unstinting in their praise of him, and he was posthumously advanced to vice admiral, skipping a grade. Hasegawa Rei See also: Burke, Arleigh Albert; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Lombok, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Ishiwatari Koji. Taiheiyousensou no Teitokutachi [Admirals of the Pacific War]. Tokyo: Japan Chuo Koronsha, 1997. National Institute for Defense Studies. Senshi Sosho. Vols. 49, 83, and 96. Nanto Homen Kaigun sakusen [Military History Series of the Pacific War: Naval Operations in the Southeast Area]. Tokyo: Asakumo Shinbunsha, 1971–1976. Sato Kazumasa. Rengogun ga osoreta gonin no Teitoku [The five admirals feared by the Allies]. Tokyo: Japan Kojinsha, 2001.

Kimmel, Husband Edward (1882–1968) U.S. navy admiral and commander of the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Born in Henderson, Kentucky, on February 26, 1882, Husband Edward Kimmel graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis,

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in 1904 and was commissioned an ensign in 1906. Over the next years, Kimmel served on battleships; participated in the 1914 intervention at Veracruz, Mexico; served as a naval aide to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt; and was staff gunnery officer for the U.S. battleship squadron attached to the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet during World War I. Kimmel, a highly regarded gunnery expert, rose to the rank of rear admiral in 1937 and served at the Naval Gun Factory; he also commanded a destroyer squadron, attended the Naval War College, commanded the battleship New York, and served as chief of staff of the battleships in the Battle Force. From 1937 to 1939, he was budget officer of the navy, and, following command of a cruiser division and of cruisers in the Battle Force, Pacific Fleet, he was named commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in February 1941 as a full admiral. During the next months, Kimmel put the Pacific Fleet through a vigorous training program in preparation for a possible war with Japan and refined plans for offensive operations in the western Pacific if war came. Following the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which put all of the Pacific Fleet’s battleships out of commission, he was relieved of his command. Kimmel has been the subject of considerable controversy for his actions preceding the Japanese attack. Several investigations and historians determined that he was too lax in his command and not sufficiently prepared for the possibility of war. His defenders—and Kimmel himself—believed he was made a scapegoat for the failures of Washington officials, arguing that he was denied both crucial intelligence about deteriorating Japanese-U.S. relations and adequate numbers of longrange reconnaissance aircraft. On March 1, 1942, Kimmel retired in disgrace from the navy. Thereafter, he was employed by an engineering consulting firm until 1947. He died in Groton, Connecticut, on May 14, 1968. John Kennedy Ohl See also: Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Theobald, Robert Alfred.

References Gannon, Michael. Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. Kimmel, Husband E. Admiral Kimmel’s Story. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Kimura Masatomi (1891–1960) Japanese navy admiral who commanded destroyer squadrons in the South and North Pacific. Born in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, on December 6, 1891, Kimura

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Masatomi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He spent virtually his entire naval career in smaller surface vessels. He specialized in mine warfare between 1923 and 1925, then went on to command destroyers. Kimura commanded several cruisers in the late 1930s and was promoted to rear admiral in November 1942. The navy recognized Kimura’s outstanding leadership qualities when he received command of 3rd Destroyer Squadron in the South Pacific on February 14, 1943. At the end of that month, his eight destroyers escorted eight Japanese transports carrying reinforcements to Lae, New Guinea. Allied aircraft discovered the Japanese convoy soon after it left Rabaul on February 28. On March 3, Allied bombers attacked and sank two of the transports. Kimura then detached two destroyers to pick up survivors and rush them to Lae. He and the remaining six destroyers continued doggedly on course at the best speed the transports could make. On March 4, U.S. and Australian aircraft again attacked, this time at low level, strafing and skip-bombing and sinking the six remaining transports and four of the destroyers. Over 3,000 Japanese died in what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Kimura himself was among the many wounded. Kimura’s failure was not held against him. When he recovered from his injuries, he assumed command of 1st Destroyer Squadron. His command formed part of the Japanese Fifth Fleet, protecting the northern Pacific. His major task was to evacuate Kiska Island in the Aleutians. Skillfully utilizing a bad-weather advantage, he took two cruisers and six destroyers into Kiska harbor on July 28 at 5:40 p.m. In only 55 minutes, they embarked 5,183 troops and departed. He did not lose a man or a ship in the operation. Kimura’s last surface action came in December 1944. The Battle of Leyte Gulf in October had destroyed the Japanese fleet as a fighting force, and Kimura led two cruisers and six destroyers from Camranh Bay in Indochina against the U.S. beachhead at San Jose on Mindoro. The ships sortied on December 24 and were not discovered until they were within 200 miles of their destination. Despite Allied air attacks against his ships, Kimura shelled the U.S. positions ashore for a half hour. In the operation, he lost one destroyer, but the other ships returned to Camranh Bay. In the final months of the war, Kimura held several senior staff positions. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1945 and retired that month. He died in Tokyo on February 14, 1960. Tim J. Watts See also: Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

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Garfield, Brian. The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969. McAulay, Lex. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

King, Ernest Joseph (1878–1956) U.S. navy fleet admiral and chief of naval operations. Born in Lorain, Ohio, on November 23, 1878, Ernest Joseph King graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1901. He subsequently held a variety of appointments on cruisers, battleships, and at the Naval Academy, where he was an instructor of ordnance and gunnery from 1906 to 1908. King commanded a destroyer in 1914. Between 1916 and 1919, he served on the staff of the commander of the Atlantic Fleet. In 1919, King, now a captain, headed the Naval Academy’s postgraduate school. During the next seven years, the ambitious, hard-driving, and forceful King specialized in submarines. In 1926, he took command of an aircraft tender and was senior aide to the commander of Air Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet. In 1927, King underwent flight training, and the next year, he became assistant chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In 1929, he commanded the Norfolk Naval Air Station, and from 1930 to 1932, he commanded the aircraft carrier Lexington. King then graduated from the Naval War College and, promoted to rear admiral, served as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1933 to 1936. He spent the next five years in senior naval aviation assignments, including a tour as commander of the Aircraft Base Force. In 1938, he was promoted to vice admiral. Appointed to the Navy General Board in 1939, King criticized the lack of Gruff and outspoken, U.S. admiral Ernest J. King was war preparations, recommending chief of naval operations and one of the architects that, should the United States go of American military strategy during World War II. He to war with Japan, it had to fol- was advanced to admiral of the fleet in 1944. (Library low an offensive Pacific naval of Congress)

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strategy. He also proposed measures for the better integration of aircraft, submarines, and small fast ships with battleships and aircraft carriers. In February 1941, King won promotion to admiral and was appointed commander of the Atlantic Fleet. On December 30, 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he became commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet. The following March, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed King as chief of naval operations, making him the only U.S. Navy officer ever to hold both positions concurrently. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, King was a major architect of wartime strategy. He vigorously prosecuted a two-front war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, but consistently gave higher priority to operations utilizing naval forces. He was therefore more committed to extensive Pacific operations, which relied heavily on naval power, than was his colleague General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, who generally followed a Europe-first strategy. King forcefully implemented a strategy of aggressive advance against Japan through the Central Pacific, later modified to include a second, southwestern offensive by way of the Philippines and Taiwan. Despite feuds over authority with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and his successor, James Vincent Forrestal, King successfully built up U.S. naval forces, introduced tactical and technological innovations, and contributed heavily to the Allied victory in the Pacific. In October 1945, King abolished the position of commander in chief of naval forces, and in December, he retired, succeeded as chief of naval operations by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Over the next decade, he served as a special adviser to the secretary of the navy and also headed the Naval Historical Foundation. King died in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on June 25, 1956. Priscilla Roberts and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Forrestal, James Vincent; Knox, William Franklin “Frank”; Nimitz, Chester William; United States, Navy

References Buell, Thomas. Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. Hayes, Grace Person. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War against Japan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982. Love, Robert William Jr. “Ernest Joseph King, March 26, 1942–December 15, 1947.” In The Chiefs of Naval Operations, edited by Robert William Love Jr. (137–179). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Love, Robert William Jr. “Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Stephen Howarth (75–107). London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992. Stoler, Mark A. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

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Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin (1888–1972) U.S. navy admiral whose forces were involved in many of the key engagements in the Pacific theater. Born in Hanover, New Hampshire, on April 3, 1888, the son of U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Thomas W. Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin Kinkaid graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1908, then served in the Great White Fleet in its circumnavigation of the globe. Kinkaid began his naval career in ordnance and aboard battleships. During World War I, he was assigned as a naval envoy at the British Admiralty. From 1929 to 1930, he attended the Naval War College. Promoted to captain in 1937, he commanded a cruiser, and two years later, he was assigned as naval attaché to Italy and Yugoslavia. In late 1941, Kinkaid was promoted to rear admiral and took command of Cruiser Division 6. In March 1942, he led his ships in raids on Rabaul and New Guinea, then participated in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea and the June Battle of Midway. In August 1942, Kinkaid assumed command of Task Force 16, centered on the carrier Enterprise, and took part in the invasion of Guadalcanal and the Battles of the Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz Islands. In January 1943, Kinkaid took command of the North Pacific Force in Alaskan waters, his ships participating in the recapture from the Japanese of the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska. Promoted to vice admiral, Kinkaid was put in charge of the Seventh Fleet, “Mac Arthur’s Navy,” in November 1943, with the mission of providing amphibious lift and protection to General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area forces on their approach to the Philippines. Seventh Fleet then participated in the defense of landings at Leyte by destroying attacking Japanese forces in Surigao Strait. In January 1945, Kinkaid led the Seventh Fleet in the invasion of Luzon at Lingayen Gulf. Promoted to admiral in April, he took the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in September 1945. Following World War II, Kinkaid briefly commanded the Eastern Sea Frontier and then the Sixteenth (Reserve) Fleet. He retired in May 1950 and died in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 17, 1972. Landon Winkelvoss See also: Aviation, Naval; Central Pacific Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States, Navy.

References Belote, James H., and William M. Belote. Titans of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

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Wheeler, Gerald. “Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Stephen Howarth (331–348). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Wheeler, Gerald. Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, U.S. Navy, 1995.

Kirk, Alan Goodrich (1888–1963) U.S. navy admiral in charge of the U.S. naval forces involved in the Normandy invasion. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 30, 1888, Alan Goodrich Kirk graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1909. He specialized in gunnery and served in the Asiatic Fleet. During the period of U.S. involvement in World War I, Kirk was stationed at the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia. In the 1920s, Kirk was executive officer of the presidential yacht and served as presidential naval aide. He next served as the gunnery officer on the battleship Maryland. Kirk graduated from the Naval War College in 1929 and then was an instructor there for two years. In 1931, he received his first command, a destroyer, and from 1933 to 1936, he was in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He was the executive officer of the battleship West Virginia before taking command of the light cruiser Milwaukee and serving as operations officer to the commander of the U.S. Fleet. In 1939, Kirk became the U.S. naval attaché in London, where he familiarized himself thoroughly with Royal Navy practices—practices he strongly admired, even though British condescension occasionally irked him. His forceful advocacy of greater Anglo-American cooperation and his urgent warnings in 1940 of the extreme danger Britain faced helped persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration to assist Britain with measures potentially liable to precipitate conflict with Germany. In March 1941, Kirk became director of naval intelligence, but partially because of fierce bureaucratic infighting with the War Plans Division, his office failed to produce any specific warnings of Japan’s intentions vis-à-vis the United States, despite clues that an attack on U.S. forces was being planned. In October 1941, he returned to sea duty as commander of a division of destroyer escorts in the Atlantic Fleet, fortuitously escaping responsibility for the failure to predict the December 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Promoted to rear admiral in November 1941, Kirk became chief of staff to Admiral Harold Stark, commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, in March 1942. In London, he contributed substantially to Allied strategic planning. In February 1943, Kirk took command of Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and that July, he led an amphibious naval task force in the Sicily landings. His outstanding success in the face of unexpectedly difficult conditions brought him command of all U.S. naval forces for the June 1944 Normandy landings. Later that year, he commanded all U.S. naval forces in France. He was promoted to vice admiral in May 1945.

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Kirk retired with the rank of admiral in March 1946. He then served as ambassador to Belgium and minister to Luxembourg until 1949 and spent two years as ambassador to the Soviet Union (April 1949 to October 1951) and the Republic of China (May 1962 to April 1963). Kirk died in New York City on October 15, 1963. Priscilla Roberts See also: Amphibious Warfare; HUSKY, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty.”

References Dorwart, Jeffery. Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Leutze, James R. Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937– 1941. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio: January 1943–June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 11, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1957. Tomblin, Barbara Brooks. With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942–1945. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Knox, William Franklin “Frank” (1874–1944) U.S. secretary of the navy during the war years. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 1, 1874, William Franklin “Frank” Knox followed his political idol and role model, Theodore Roosevelt, and joined the 1st Volunteer U.S. Cavalry (the Rough Riders) in 1898 to fight in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. After mustering out, he became a highly successful newspaper editor and publisher, acquiring papers in Michigan and New Hampshire. A strong supporter of U.S. intervention in World War I, Knox served in the artillery in France in 1917 and 1918, rising from private to major. Between the wars, he returned to the newspaper business and was active in Republican politics, running unsuccessfully as the Republican vice presidential candidate in 1936. In the late 1930s, Knox firmly believed that the United States could not remain aloof from the increasingly critical situation in Europe. Consequently, although he was unsympathetic toward President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s domestic policies, he strongly endorsed the president’s interventionist and pro-Allied international outlook. In July 1940, Roosevelt persuaded Knox, together with former Republican Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, to join his cabinet, with Knox serving

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as secretary of the navy—a step designed to win support from nonisolationist Republicans. Knox quickly recruited as assistants various able young businessmen and lawyers, such as James V. Forrestal (whom he appointed undersecretary), Ferdinand Eberstadt, and Adlai E. Stevenson. Knox utilized their industrial and organizational skills to implement expeditiously a massive naval expansion, as the U.S. Navy prepared for war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. He also introduced modern business and management methods to the Navy Department’s administration. Republican William Franklin Knox joined President Franklin Knox helped to devise Roosevelt’s cabinet as U.S. secretary of the navy in July and lobby for the Destroyers- 1940. A staunch proponent of Roosevelt’s interventionist Bases Deal of 1940, whereby policies, he died in office on April 28, 1944. (Naval HistoriBritain acquired U.S. war- cal Center) ships in exchange for leases to Caribbean naval bases, and the 1941 Lend-Lease program to aid the Allies. Like other Roosevelt administration officials, he did not predict the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941. He ascribed responsibility for this U.S. defeat almost solely to the unpreparedness of the base’s naval and military commanders. Knox, who had previously found Roosevelt’s pro-Allied policies insufficiently bold, welcomed U.S. intervention in World War II. During its course, he traveled extensively to the various theaters of war. As a former newspaperman, he strongly emphasized the importance of good public relations, holding frequent press conferences. He stalwartly supported the abortive National Service Act of 1944, which would have imposed the obligation of national service on all Americans, military and civilian alike. Knox died suddenly of heart failure in Washington, D.C., on April 28, 1944. Priscilla Roberts See also: Destroyers-Bases Deal; Forrestal, James Vincent; Lend-Lease; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States, Navy.

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References Albion, Robert. Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Furer, Julius Augustus. Administration of the Navy Department in World War II. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959. Lobdell, George H. Jr. “A Biography of Frank Knox.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1954. Lobdell, George H. Jr. “Frank Knox, 11 July 1940–28 April 1944.” In American Secretaries of the Navy. Vol. 2, edited by Paolo E. Coletta (pp. 677–727). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Koga Mineichi (1885–1944) Japanese navy admiral and commander of the Combined Fleet. Born in Saga Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan, on April 25, 1885, Koga Mineichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1906. A specialist in naval gunnery, he also graduated from the Naval War College four years later. He served on the staff of the Second Fleet and took part in the Japanese capture of Qingdao (Tsingtao) at the beginning of World War I. From 1916 to 1922, Koga held a number of administrative assignments ashore, including that of resident officer in France. Promoted to commander in 1922 and to captain in 1926, he was naval attaché to France between 1926 and 1928 and attended the 1927 Geneva Arms Limitation Conference. Returning to Japan in 1928, he was then secretary to the minister of the navy and a member of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. From 1930 to 1932, he commanded first the heavy cruiser Aoba and then the battleship Ise. Promoted to rear admiral in 1932, Koga next held a number of staff positions, including head of the Intelligence Division (1933) and vice chief of the Naval General Staff (1937). He was promoted to vice admiral in 1936. Koga commanded the Second Fleet from 1939 to 1941. He strongly opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. In 1941, he assumed command of the China Area Fleet, supporting naval operations against Hong Kong at the beginning of the Pacific war. Promoted to full admiral in May 1942, Koga then commanded the Yokosuka Naval Station (1942–1943). In May 1943, Koga succeeded Yamamoto Isoroku as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet following the latter’s death in the Solomon Islands on April 18, 1943. By mid-1943, Japan had lost Guadalcanal as well as Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians to Allied counteroffensives. Koga worked to rebuild Japanese naval air strength and at the same time sought to retrieve the situation before it became irreversible by a decisive naval action employing the Combined Fleet. In October 1943, Koga ordered Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo to launch the RO-GO¯ Operation

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to attack U.S. naval forces in the Solomons, but Ozawa suffered a major reversal in the operation, losing 120 of 170 aircraft in November. ¯ Operation to smash U.S. naval forces in the MarKoga then planned the O-GO shall Islands in February 1944. In the process of relocating his headquarters from Palau to Davao in the southern Philippines for this operation, Koga’s plane was lost in a heavy storm on March 31, 1944. He was posthumously promoted to admiral of the fleet. Admiral Toyoda Soemu succeeded Koga as commander of the Combined Fleet. Kotani Ken See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Japan, Navy; Ozawa Jisaburo; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1936–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Howarth, Stephen. Morning Glory: The Story of the Imperial Japanese Navy. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983.

Kolombangara, Battle of (July 13, 1943) Naval engagement between Allied and Japanese forces off the coast of Kolombangara, a small island north of New Georgia in the Solomon Islands. U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Walden Ainsworth commanded a force of three cruisers, reinforced by five destroyers under Captain Francis McInerney and another five under Captain Thomas Ryan. Rear Admiral Izaki Shunji led the Japanese squadron of one cruiser and five destroyers. Izaki’s squadron was protecting transports carrying 1,200 Japanese soldiers to Vila. At 12:35 a.m. on July 13, a “Black Cat” PBY reconnaissance aircraft spotted Izaki’s ships heading southeast toward Kolombangara. Ainsworth ordered his squadron into a single column and headed west on a closing course with McInerney’s squadron pushed out ahead. At 1:01 a.m., the U.S. destroyer Nicholas made radar contact, followed by visual contact two minutes later. Ainsworth assumed he would achieve complete surprise because the Japanese ships lacked radar. However, the Japanese had received some minutes earlier a radioed warning from one of their seaplanes of an enemy force and were expecting contact. At 1:08 a.m., Izaki’s squadron came within 10,000 yards of Ainsworth’s forces and launched torpedoes. The U.S. destroyer vans launched their own torpedoes two minutes later. Izaki then turned his column directly north, and the Japanese cruiser Jintsu turned its searchlights on the destroyer Nicholas. While the Jintsu

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fired both guns and torpedoes, Ainsworth waited until all three of his cruisers had closed the range before opening up fire. By 1:17 a.m., the Jintsu was dead in the water. Ainsworth then ordered his whole squadron to turn away, but some ships did not receive the order and the formation became disordered. Then the New Zealand cruiser Leander was struck by a torpedo. Severely damaged, it was nonetheless able to retire. Black Cat aircraft then reported that two Japanese ships were escaping to the north, leaving the impression that four ships had been crippled. In reality, only the Jintsu had been damaged; the rest of Izaki’s squadron had retired north to reload their torpedo tubes. In just 18 minutes, they reversed course again to reengage. Meanwhile, Ainsworth headed northeast to chase what he thought were fleeing Japanese ships. As he pursued, he was unable to locate his destroyers by radio and ordered his two cruisers to illuminate unidentified targets on radar with star shells to see if they were McInerney’s destroyers. Rather than U.S. destroyers, the unidentified ships turned out to be Japanese warships that had just fired 31 reloaded torpedoes. At 2:08 a.m., Ainsworth ordered fire opened, but before this order could be followed, the cruisers St. Louis and Honolulu took torpedoes in their bows and the destroyer Gwin was hit amidships. The Gwin was scuttled the next morning. The Allies thus had three cruisers badly damaged in exchange for the Jintsu, which went down with its entire crew. Personnel losses numbered 482 Japanese, 61 Americans, and 28 New Zealanders. Because the Japanese were able to land all 1,200 reinforcements at Vila, the Battle of Kolombangara was a clear Japanese victory. Landon Winkelvoss See also: Ainsworth, Walden Lee “Pug”; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater.

References Kilpatrick, C. W. The Naval Night Battles in the Solomons. Pompano Beach, FL: Exposition Press, 1987. McGee, William L. The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville—Pacific War Turning Point. Vol. 2. San Francisco: BMC Publications, 2002. Morison, Samuel E. United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Komandorski Islands, Battle of the (March 26, 1943) Concluding naval battle of the Aleutian Campaign in the northern Pacific and the last major daylight naval action in which aircraft played no role. The Aleutian

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Campaign began in June 1942 with the Japanese occupation of the islands of Attu and Kiska. To protect their northern flank, the Japanese held these islands into 1943, while U.S. bombers and submarines from Dutch Harbor, enduring terrible weather conditions, slowly cut off Japanese supplies. To break this tightening noose and reinforce Attu, Japanese vice admiral Hosogaya Boshiro led a task force of the heavy cruisers Nachi and Maya, the light cruisers Tama and Abukuma, and four destroyers escorting the armed, 7,000-ton converted merchant cruisers Asaka Maru and Sakito Maru, which were acting as transports. Acting upon intelligence that the Japanese might be sending a convoy, the theater commander dispatched Rear Admiral Charles McMorris to intercept them. The Americans underestimated the size of the Japanese fleet, and McMorris had a much smaller force consisting of the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City, the light cruiser Richmond (the flagship), and four destroyers. The Americans encountered the Japanese force near the Komandorski Islands. Before dawn on March 26, 1943, U.S. radar picked up the approaching Japanese ships. McMorris, expecting only lightly escorted supply ships, made for the Japanese and closed to gun range, only to discover that he was both outnumbered and outgunned. He then attempted to maneuver, hoping to draw the Japanese eastward toward U.S. air support and perhaps slip past their warships to attack the supply vessels. The two task forces engaged in a running duel for four hours. With more ships, more guns, and superior torpedoes, Hosogaya could have closed on the Americans and won a decisive victory. But his ships lacked effective radar, and he hesitated to press his advantage. Late in the battle, the Salt Lake City was struck by shells fired by either the Maya or Nachi and lost steam. McMorris then ordered his destroyers to carry out a torpedo attack while he moved the Richmond in to cover the stricken Salt Lake City. Although the U.S. destroyers scored no hits and the destroyer Bailey was damaged by Japanese return fire, the attack gave the Salt Lake City time to again get under way. At that point, Hosogaya broke off the action and withdrew without delivering the vital supplies to Attu. He later explained his decision on the grounds that he was low on ammunition and fuel and worried about U.S. air attacks. His superiors were not impressed by this explanation, and Hosogaya was subsequently relieved of his command. Although several of his ships had sustained damage, McMorris had lost none of them, and he had won a strategic victory. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division landed on Attu in May, securing that island after a hard fight against the isolated Japanese defenders. The Japanese evacuated Kiska a month later, ending the Aleutian Campaign. Terry Shoptaugh See also: Aleutian Islands Campaign; Hosogaya Boshiro; McMorris, Charles Horatio.

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References Garfield, Brian. The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence. The Aleutians Campaign, June 1942–August 1943. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1993 (reprint of 1945 original).

Komura Keizo (1896–1978) Japanese navy admiral who took part in numerous key battles in the Pacific theater. Born in Nagano, Japan, on July 20, 1896, Komura Keizo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1917. Promoted to lieutenant in 1923, he graduated from the Naval College in 1929. Promoted to lieutenant commander, he commanded the destroyer Kuretake that year and was appointed assistant naval attaché to Britain in 1933. Promoted to captain in 1936, Komura participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway as the captain of the seaplane heavy cruiser Chikuma. In June 1942, he took command of the new battleship Musashi. Promoted to rear admiral and appointed chief of staff of Third Fleet in December 1943, Komura assisted Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 and the Battle of Leyte Gulf that October. In the latter engagement, Ozawa and Komura drew Admiral William Halsey’s U.S. Third Fleet away from Leyte and completed their mission as a decoy, although at considerable cost in Japanese ship losses. On April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-ICHI (HEAVEN NUMBER ONE) in which the Second Fleet—consisting of the flagship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi, and eight destroyers—were to steam to Okinawa in an attempt to destroy U.S. support ships off the landing sites. The ships only had fuel sufficient for a one-way voyage, for the plan called for Yamato to inflict as much damage as possible and then be beached as a stationary battery. The operation was a suicide mission, but Komura joined it aboard the Yahagi. In the East China Sea on the early morning of April 7, the Yahagi was attacked and sunk by planes of U.S. vice admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s fast carrier Task Force 58, but Komura survived. The Yamato was also sunk the same day. That evening, Admiral Toyoda ordered the remaining destroyers of the task force to return to Japan. In May 1945, Komura was appointed commander of the Yokosuka Naval Station. After the war, in 1948, Komura was hired by the U.S. occupation forces at Yokosuka to manage 27 patrol vessels at the naval station. He also helped establish the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Force on the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

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He did not join that force but worked with the U.S. Navy for 11 years. Komura died in Tokyo on February 7, 1974. Kotani Ken See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Ozawa Jisaburo; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific, 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Yoshida Mitsuru. Requiem for the Battleship Yamato. Trans. Richard Minear. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Kondo¯ Nobutake (1886–1953) Japanese navy admiral who commanded the China Sea Fleet. Born in Osaka Prefecture, Japan, on September 25, 1886, Kondo–Nobutake graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1907 and became a gunnery officer. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1919 and was promoted to lieutenant commander. A resident officer in Russia in 1919 and 1920 and in Germany from 1921 to 1923, he was appointed aide to the Imperial prince in 1924. Kondo¯ was then assigned as a staff officer in the Grand Fleet. Promoted to captain in 1927, he was an instructor at the Naval War College. He next commanded the cruiser Kako and then the battle cruiser Kongo. Promoted to rear admiral in 1933, Kondo¯ became vice president of the Naval War College, and in 1935, he was chief of staff of the Grand Fleet. One year after being promoted to vice admiral in 1937, he took command of the Fifth Fleet. In 1939, he became vice chief of the Naval General Staff. In September 1941, Kondo¯ took command of the Second Fleet, and at the outbreak of the Pacific war, he provided support for the Japanese force invading Malaya. On December 10, 1941, Kondo¯’s aircraft sank the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. His fleet then provided cover for Japanese forces occupying the Philippines and Java in the Netherlands East Indies. At the Battle of Midway, Kondo¯ commanded the Midway Invasion Force comprised of 12 transports carrying 5,000 troops with four cruisers in support. His force did not see action. He then took a leading role in the long-running naval struggle for control of the island of Guadalcanal. He was unsuccessful in luring the U.S. naval forces into a trap in the Eastern Solomons in late August 1942, and in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 16 to 27, his units provided

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gunfire support for the Japanese land effort to retake Henderson Field. This action also led to the crippling and eventual loss of the U.S. carrier Hornet. In naval actions off Guadalcanal from November 12 to 15, Kondo¯’s forces were defeated, losing the battleship Kirishima. Their withdrawal sealed the fate of Guadalcanal. Kondo¯ then supervised the successful evacuation from the island of Japanese ground-force survivors. In April 1943, Kondo¯ was promoted to admiral, and he was appointed commander in chief of the China Sea Fleet the following December. In May 1945, he became military adviser to Emperor Hirohito. Kondo¯ died in Tokyo on February 19, 1953. Kita Yoshito See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the.

References Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal: The Carrier Battles—The Pivotal Aircraft Carrier Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. New York: Crown Publishers, 1987. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1941–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

Kongo Class, Japanese Battleships Japanese battle cruisers/battleships built during the navy’s transition between foreign and Japanese shipyards. This four-ship class of the Kongo, Hiei, Haruna, and Kirishima were all named after mountains. To give Japanese constructors experience in the latest designs, Japan placed an order for one battle cruiser to be built in a British yard. Designed by British naval architect Sir George Thurston, the Kongo was constructed by Vickers-Barrow. Laid down on January 17, 1911, it was launched on May 18, 1912, and completed on August 16, 1913. The other three ships of the class followed the Kongo during the next several years, but all were all built in Japanese yards: The Hiei was completed on August 4, 1914, at the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Yokosuka Yard, utilizing a fair amount of imported material; the Haruna was completed on April 19, 1915, by Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company at Kobe; and the Kirishima was built by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company at Nagasaki and also completed on April 19, 1915. The last two ships were made almost entirely of Japanese materials. Although the design of the four Kongo-class ships was basically modeled after the most powerful British battle cruisers, the Japanese improved on it by adding

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armor and stronger boilers to increase strength and speed. The ships were 704 ft. in overall length by 92 ft. in beam. Standard displacement was 27,500 tons, and full load displacement was 32,200 tons. Initial speed was 27.5 knots; after reconstruction in the 1930s, their gearedturbine engines drove the ships at a maximum speed of 30.5 knots. Armament consisted of a main battery of 8 14-inch guns in four twin turrets (two forward, a third amidships abaft the third funnel, and a fourth astern). Initially they had a secondary battery of 16 6-inch guns to repel destroyer attacks. This was reduced to 14 in 1937, when 8 5-inch antiaircraft guns were added, and to 8 in 1944, to make room for 88 additional 25-mm antiaircraft guns. World War II maximum antiaircraft armament consisted of the 5-inch guns, as well as 3 80-mm, 100 25-mm, and 8 13-mm guns. The Kongo-class ships were also equipped with 8 21-inch submerged torpedo tubes, the heaviest torpedo armament of any capital ship at the time. Ultimately each ship also carried three floatplanes. Crew complement numbered 1,221 men (Kongo, 1,211). None of these ships saw combat during World War I. They were so highly valued, however, that the British tried to secure the four on loan. Reclassified as battleships following extensive reconstruction in the 1920s, all the Kongo-class ships saw extensive service in the Pacific during World War II. The Kongo was, when completed, the most formidable capital ship in the world. Reconstructed several times in the 1920s and 1930s, it fought in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). It was sunk off Taiwan (Formosa) on November 21, 1944, from three torpedo hits from the U.S. submarine Sealion. The Hiei also underwent refits between the wars. It was part of the Japanese task force in the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Severely damaged by shellfire off Guadalcanal on November 13, 1942, it was further damaged by aircraft from the U.S. carrier Enterprise, which led to its scuttling that same day. The Haruna was reconstructed as a battleship in the winter of 1927–1928. It was badly damaged in an attack by U.S. aircraft at Kure Harbor on July 19, 1945. A week later, it suffered additional bomb damage and sank at its moorings on July 28. It was scrapped after the war. The Kirishima underwent extensive refitting and reconstruction during the 1920s and 1930s. It also took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. On November 15, 1942, while in action off the Solomon Islands, it was sunk by the U.S. battleship Washington. James Birdseye and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the

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References Chesnau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Gray, Randal, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985.

Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm (1912–1998) German submarine commander, the most successful of World War II. Born at Heidau, Liegnitz, Germany, on May 1, 1912, Otto Kretschmer joined the German navy in April 1930 and entered the officer training program. He subsequently served on the light cruisers Emden and Köln. In January 1936, he volunteered for submarine service and took up his first command, the U-35, in July 1937, in which he conducted a patrol in Spanish waters during the Spanish Civil War. In September 1937, Kretschmer assumed command of the U-23, a Type II coastal U-boat. During the first eight months of World War II, Kretschmer conducted eight patrols in U-23 in the North Sea near the coast of Great Britain but achieved little success due to the limited capabilities of the submarine. His most notable achievements were sinking a tanker in January 1940 and the destroyer HMS Daring in February 1940. In April 1940, Kretschmer took command of U-99, a much larger and more capable Type VII submarine. After two months of intensive training with his crew, he began the first of eight patrols into the Atlantic in June 1940. During these patrols, Kretschmer refined his tactics of slipping into the middle of convoys at night and torpedoing ships from the surface, often at very close range. The success of these attacks spawned his motto “One torpedo, one ship.” He also earned recognition for sinking three British armed merchant cruisers in November 1940, including two on the night of November 3–4 in a running surface engagement in which he utilized his 88-mm deck gun. This action helped to convince the British Admiralty to discontinue the use of such ships. Kretschmer was the first German submarine commander to sink 250,000 tons of Allied shipping. The most successful U-boat commander of the war, Kretschmer was known as “the tonnage king” because of his exploits. From September 1939 to March 1941, he sank 47 merchant ships totaling 273,503 tons and earned Germany’s highest award for bravery, the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords to the Iron Cross. Kretschmer, however, eschewed efforts to propagandize his accomplishments, earning another nickname, “Silent Otto.”

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On March 17, 1941, Kretschmer successfully attacked the 10-ship HX.112 convoy south of Iceland. After expending his torpedoes, he was returning to base in France when two British destroyers attacked and sank his boat. He and 40 of his 43-man crew were rescued and taken prisoner. Kretschmer spent the remainder of the war as a prisoner of war in Canada, returning to Germany in December 1947. In 1955, he joined the postwar navy of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundesmarine, and in 1965 he became chief of staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Baltic Command, a position he held for four years. He retired in 1970 with the rank of Flotillenadmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral). Kretschmer died at Straubing, Germany, on August 5, 1998. C. J. Horn See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Submarines.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Zebra Books, 1974. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Doenitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. Trans. R. H. Stevens. New York: Da Capo Press, 1997. Robertson, Terence. The Golden Horseshoe: The Wartime Career of Otto Kretschmer, U-Boat Ace. London: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhaal, 2006.

Kula Gulf, Battle of (July 6, 1943) Pacific theater naval battle, the first of two night surface actions fought for control of the major deepwater entrance to New Georgia Island. Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth, with a light cruiser task group, had been in the gulf on the night of July 5, 1943, on a bombardment mission and was southeast of Guadalcanal when he received orders to return and intercept a Japanese transport group believed to be making for Vila. Joined by two destroyers from Tulagi, Ainsworth headed back, arriving off the entrance an hour after midnight. The sky was overcast, there were passing showers, and visibility was 2,000 yards or less. Radar contact was made at 1:36 a.m. on July 6 with three warships some 22,000 yards distant, standing out of the gulf 5,000 yards off the Kolombangara shore. Ainsworth immediately assumed battle formation: two destroyers in column ahead; the light cruisers Honolulu, Helena, and St. Louis behind them; and two destroyers astern. At the same time, Ainsworth turned to port to close with the Japanese, and then, at 1:49 a.m., he came back right to unmask all guns. Radar then picked up a second Japanese group astern the first, and Ainsworth delayed opening fire as he pondered this new situation.

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The Japanese were, in fact, in three groups. The first, with which Ainsworth had made contact, was Rear Admiral Akiyama Teruo’s covering force of the destroyers Niizuki (the flagship), Suzukaze, and Tanikaze. The second group was made up of four destroyer-transports that Akiyama had first ordered to make for Vila; when contact was made with Ainsworth, Akiyama directed them to reverse course and join in the battle. The third group of three destroyer-transports was already unloading at Vila. Ainsworth opened fire on Akiyama’s group at 1:57 a.m., and the rapid-firing, radar-directed 6-inch guns in which the Americans put their faith quickly hammered the Niizuki into a wreck. But the gunfire lit up the U.S. battle line, and almost immediately, the Suzukaze and Tanikaze launched 16 torpedoes and escaped to the northwest. Believing that he had accounted for all three ships of Akiyama’s group, Ainsworth countermarched at 2:03 a.m. to deal with the transport group. Seconds later, three Japanese Long Lance torpedoes struck the Helena. It sank about 2:25 a.m. At 2:18 a.m., Ainsworth took the transport group under fire, scoring some hits, but the four destroyers scattered and headed for Vila, the only casualty resulting when the Nagatsuki ran hard aground on Kolombangara. Finding no targets to the west and convinced that he had accounted for many more Japanese ships than the Niizuki, Ainsworth, whose own ships were low on both fuel and ammunition, ordered his force to head for Tulagi, leaving the Nicholas and Radford to pick up the Helena’s survivors. Three times during the early morning hours, the two destroyers interrupted their work to engage Japanese ships. Although gunfire and torpedoes were exchanged, there was no major damage to either side, and by daylight, Kula Gulf was clear of the Japanese. Ronnie Day See also: Ainsworth, Walden Lee “Pug”; Kolombangara, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of.

References Crenshaw, Russell Sydnor. South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo Island to Vella Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.

Kurita Takeo (1889–1977) Japanese navy admiral involved in the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf. Born in Ibaragi, Japan, on April 28, 1889, Kurita Takeo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy

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in 1910. In the 1920s, he held a number of destroyer commands. Promoted to commander, Kurita was an instructor at the Torpedo School between 1928 and 1934 and again between 1935 and 1937. He was promoted to captain in 1932. He commanded the cruiser Abukuma in 1934 and 1935 and then the battleship Kongo in 1937 and 1938. Promoted to rear admiral in 1938, he commanded destroyer squadrons over the next two years. Promoted to vice admiral in May 1942, Kurita commanded the Close Support Group in the Battle of Midway. Then, in August 1943, he took command of Second Fleet. In the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, Kurita commanded the 1st Strike Force (the central force) in executing Operation SHO-GO (VICTORY ONE). Kurita’s force was the most powerful of those that were to converge on the U.S. landing site on Leyte Gulf; it was to proceed through San Bernardino Strait and then join up with the 3rd Force under Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji, which would pass through Surigao Strait to the south. Kurita’s force had five battleships, including the Yamato and Musashi. The two forces were to come together at the U.S. landing site and destroy the support ships there, while the U.S. covering force was drawn off by a decoy Japanese carrier force under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo. As it worked out, Nishimura’s force was destroyed, Kurita’s ships were discovered and attacked by U.S. aircraft, and the Musashi was sunk. Kurita then reversed course, but, unknown to the Americans, he turned around again. Meanwhile, Admiral William F. Halsey took his entire covering Third Fleet to engage Ozawa’s decoy force, as Kurita’s force issued from San Bernardino Strait to engage Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet in Leyte Gulf. In the early morning of October 25, Kurita’s ships Japanese vice admiral Kurita Takeo commanded the 1st approached the unprotected Strike Force (central force) in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in U.S. transports and their weak October 1944. Reaching the U.S. landing site off Leyte, support force off Leyte. Ku- he was about to effect considerable damage when he rita was on the verge of being broke off the attack prematurely. (Naval Historical Center)

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able to annihilate them when he decided to withdraw. He never explained his decision publicly, but apparently, he mistakenly believed that the aircraft attacking his ships were from Halsey’s force. Several days of near incessant air attacks on his ships may also have impacted the exhausted Kurita, but the reasons for his decision are still debated. Not censured for the “mysterious u-turn,” as his action is known in Japan, Kurita subsequently returned to Japan. He commanded the Japanese Naval Academy from January 1945 until the end of the war. Kurita died in Hyogo, Japan, on December 19, 1977. Kotani Ken See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Nishimura Shoji; Ozawa Jisaburo; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Cutler, Thomas. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. Wooldridge, E. T., ed. Carrier Warfare in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993.

Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke (1892–1971) Japanese navy admiral who helped plan the raid on U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor. Born in Tokyo on September 25, 1892, Kusaka Ryu–nosuke graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He was one of the early specialists in naval aviation in the Japanese navy and served as an instructor at the Kasumigaura Naval Air Station and the Naval War College in 1924. In August 1929, Kusaka traveled on the German airship Graf Zeppelin across the Pacific Ocean. He served on the Navy General Staff in 1929 and was promoted to commander in 1930. Made captain in 1934, he then commanded the aircraft carriers Hosho in 1936 and Akagi in 1939. Promoted to rear admiral in 1940, Kusaka served as chief of staff of the First Air Fleet and helped to plan the attack on Pearl Harbor. He also assisted the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, plan the attack on Midway. He participated in this operation as chief of staff of the First Air Fleet. Kusaka fought in the October 1942 Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands during the Guadalcanal Campaign as chief of staff of the Third Fleet. In 1944, he became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Toyoda Soemu, participating in the

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Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. At the very end of the war, in August 1945, he was appointed commander of the Fifth Air Fleet. Kusaka died at Hyogo, Japan, on November 23, 1971. Kotani Ken See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1889–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Kusaka, Ryu¯nosuke. Ichi Kaigunshikan no Hanseiki [Life of a Naval Officer]. Tokyo: Kowado, 1973.

Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974) Soviet navy admiral, minister of the navy, deputy minister of Soviet armed forces, and commander of Soviet naval forces. Born in the Arkhangelsk Oblast of northern Russia on July 24, 1904, Nikolai Kuznetsov joined the Red Navy in 1919. After service in the Russian Civil War, he graduated from Leningrad Naval College in 1926 and from the Voroshilov Naval Academy in 1932. In 1936 and 1937, he served as the Soviet adviser to the Republican navy during the Spanish Civil War. The Great Purges orchestrated by Soviet leader Josef Stalin exacted a frightful toll on the Soviet navy leadership, and as a consequence, Kuznetsov was named people’s commissar of the navy (minister of the navy) in 1939 at just 37 years of age. In August 1939, Kuznetsov submitted an ambitious naval construction plan designed to produce 2 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 48 cruisers, 198 flotilla leaders and destroyers, and 433 submarines. However, the demands and costs of overseeing widely dispersed Soviet naval actions during World War II prevented any meaningful result from this initiative. Promoted to admiral in 1940 and admiral of the fleet in May 1944, Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet Pacific Fleet that supported the Red Army’s operations against the Japanese at the end of the war. Kuznetsov’s postwar shipbuilding plan was far beyond the means of the Soviet Union’s warravaged industries and did not reflect Stalin’s expectations. Kuznetsov was named deputy minister of the Soviet Union’s armed forces and commander in chief of naval forces in 1946, minister of the navy in 1951, and first deputy minister of defense of the Soviet Union and commander in chief of naval forces in 1953. Stripped of these titles in December 1955, Kuznetsov was demoted to vice admiral in February 1956 and forcibly retired, apparently because of the October 1955 explosion and sinking of the battleship Novorossiisk (formerly the

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Italian Giulio Cesare) while it was moored at Sevastopol. His immediate subordinate, the more progressive Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, assumed his post and led the Soviet navy to unprecedented prominence over the next three decades. Kuznetsov was posthumously restored to his rank of admiral of the fleet by the Supreme Soviet in 1988, nearly 14 years after his death in Moscow on December 6, 1974. Gordon E. Hogg See also: Soviet Union, Navy.

References Bialer, Seweryn. Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II. New York: Pegasus, 1969. Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich. Memoirs of a Wartime Minister of the Navy. Moscow: Progress, 1990. Kuznetsova, R. V., A. A. Kilichenkov, and L. A. Neretina. Admiral Kuznetsov: Moskva v Zhizni i Sudbe Flotovodtsa. Moscow: Izd-vo Mosgoarkhiv, 2000.

World War II at Sea


World War II at Sea AN ENCYCLOPEDIA Volume II: L–Z Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor Dr. Eric W. Osborne Assistant Editor Vincent P. O’Hara Assistant Editor

Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II at sea : an encyclopedia / Spencer C. Tucker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-458-0 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations—Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– II. Title: World War Two at sea. D770.W66 2011 940.54'503—dc23 2011042142 ISBN: 978-1-59884-457-3 EISBN: 978-1-59884-458-0 15

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

To Malcolm “Kip” Muir Jr., scholar, gifted teacher, and friend.


Contents

About the Editor Editorial Advisory Board

ix xi

Entries A–Z

1

Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea Glossary of World War II Naval Terms Bibliography List of Editors and Contributors Categorical Index Index

vii

823 831 839 865 877 889


About the Editor

Spencer C. Tucker, PhD, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and was a Fulbright scholar in France. He was a U.S. Army captain and intelligence analyst in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War, then taught for 30 years at Texas Christian University and was chairman of the History Department for 5 years before returning to his alma mater for 6 years as the holder of the John Biggs Chair of Military History. He retired from teaching in 2003. He is now senior fellow of military history at ABC-CLIO. Tucker has written or edited 40 books and encyclopedias, including ABC-CLIO’s award-winning The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and The Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, as well as the comprehensive A Global Chronology of Conflict.

ix


World War II at Sea Editorial Advisory Board

Paul E. Fontenoy North Carolina Maritime Museum Curator of Maritime Research

Capt. Carl Otis Schuster U.S. Navy (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Hawaii Pacific University

Gordon E. Hogg Director, Special Collections Library University of Kentucky

Dirk Steffen Director, AEGIR Security Solutions Ltd Tohmatsu Haruo Professor Tamagawa University Japan

Malcolm Muir Jr. Director, John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis Virginia Military Institute

H. P. Willmott Independent Scholar

xi


L Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de (1878–1977) French navy admiral and one of the architects of naval aviation in France. Born on November 29, 1878, at Chantilly, Oise, France, Jean Laborde graduated from the École Navale in 1895. He first served on a cruiser in the Mediterranean before beginning a long period aboard cruisers in the Far East, which lasted until 1901. He then served in torpedo boats and cruisers in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Assigned to the Far East again, he became interested in aviation and learned to fly while in Saigon. He served on a cruiser in the Atlantic in 1912 and earned his pilot’s license in April 1914. During World War I, he commanded bomber squadrons and was charged with creating the French naval aviation center at Dunkerque. He was promoted to commander in January 1917. Following the war, Laborde commanded the naval aviation center at SaintRaphaël in 1919 and presided over a commission charged with developing French carrier aviation. In 1922, he took charge of the aerial defense of southern France. He was promoted to captain in January 1923. Named head of French naval aviation in November 1924, Laborde oversaw construction of France’s first aircraft carrier, the Béarn, completed in 1926, which he then commanded. He went on to develop French navy air doctrine and strategy. Although Laborde lacked a certain political suppleness, he was clearly destined for high rank. He was promoted to rear admiral in August 1928 and commanded 2nd Squadron in 1930. He became a vice admiral in October 1932 and was appointed maritime prefect of Bizerte. Made a full admiral in 1938, he took command of the French fleet in the Atlantic in April 1939. An admitted Anglophile, he conducted joint maneuvers with the British navy and was well respected by British naval officers. At the beginning of World War II, Laborde oversaw the French navy’s antisubmarine efforts against German U-boats and planned French naval efforts in the Norwegian Campaign. When France and Germany signed an armistice in June 1940, he initially ordered his ships to take refuge in British ports, until Premier Henri Philippe Pétain and French navy commander Admiral Jean Darlan prevailed on him to honor the naval paragraphs of the armistice agreement. In September, Laborde was named commander of the Vichy French high seas fleet at Toulon.

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After U.S. and British forces invaded French North Africa in November 1942 (reaching an accommodation with the Vichyite Darlan) and after the Germans occupied southern France, both sides sought to win the Toulon fleet. Darlan invited Laborde to bring the ships to North Africa to join the Allies, but Laborde detested Darlan, and he flatly refused, stating that he would defend his Toulon base against all threats. Incredibly naive, he believed that Adolf Hitler would honor his pledge not to take the French fleet; thus, he did nothing to prepare Toulon’s land defenses, which enabled the Germans to launch a successful surprise attack on the morning of November 27, 1942. Laborde had, however, made plans for scuttling the fleet, and he now ordered them carried out. The operation was abetted by German incompetence, and the French successfully sent to the bottom 77 ships, including 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 32 destroyers. Although Laborde’s critics argued that he should have braved German retribution and fought his way out, German air assaults would have wreaked havoc on his ships. When the war ended, Laborde was first denied his pension and then, in 1947, condemned to death, a sentence later reduced to 15 years of imprisonment. Freed in 1951, he was pardoned 8 years later. He died in Castillon-la-Bataille, Gironde, France, on July 30, 1977. Priscilla Roberts and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at.

References Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Short. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. de Gaulle, Charles. War Memoirs: Unity, 1942–1944. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959. Paxton, Robert O. Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. Raphaël-Leygues, Jacques Jean Georges, and François Flohic. Darlan, Laborde: L’inimitié de deux amiraux. Brest, France: Éditions de la Cité, 1990. Verrier, Anthony. Assassination in Algiers. New York: Norton, 1990.

Landing Craft Both the Axis and Allied powers utilized amphibious warfare during World War II, but especially the Allies (see Table 3). Landing craft were widely employed in the Mediterranean, European, and Pacific theaters. The Italians used amphibious

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warfare in the Adriatic and the Aegean and in Africa, and the Germans used it in Norway and Denmark and in the Greek islands and the Adriatic. Early landing craft were usually improvised from conventional vessels such as barges and ferries, but World War II saw the development of craft purpose-built to land troops and equipment on a hostile shore. Such specialized craft allowed an attacker to land a larger number of men and their equipment and to do so faster and in a smaller area than would otherwise be possible. Modified craft continued to be used during the war, however; for example, in 1940, the Germans assembled vessels for Operation SEA LION, their planned cross–English Channel invasion of Britain, and between 1942 and 1944, General Douglas MacArthur’s forces used modified craft in the southwestern Pacific. During the years before the war, the U.S. Marine Corps embraced amphibious warfare as its raison d’être. This doctrine was spelled out in its Tentative Landing Operation Manual (1935). The marines also developed a prototype for the landing vehicle, tracked (LVT). However, it took the practical demands of World War II to force mass production of landing craft and amphibious tractors. Only the United States built large numbers of amphibious wheeled and tracked vehicles that allowed the transport of men and equipment from ship to shore and then inland. Landing craft came in a wide variety of forms. They were armored and unarmored and designed to transport both personnel and vehicles. Some had bow ramps, and others had a fixed-bow configuration. Most landing craft, however, had a blunt bow; were powered by diesel engines acting on twin screws; were anchored at the stern; and had a shallow draft forward, a flat bottom, and a bow ramp. This ramp allowed the rapid unloading of men or cargo. German Wasser-Pionieren (water engineers) developed small landing craft before the war, but the senior German leadership had little interest in these. Landing craft only became a priority in 1940, with the planning for Operation SEA LION. During the war, the Germans built slightly more than 1,000 landing craft of all types; the largest of these had a displacement of 280 tons. The Germans utilized their landing craft chiefly to resupply their Mediterranean island garrisons and for operations in the Aegean, Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas. At the end of the war, these vessels were utilized to evacuate forces pressed by the Soviet advance. Italy built approximately 100 landing craft based on German models. The first 65 of these were roughly 154 ft. long and could carry up to 65 tons of cargo at a speed of 11 knots for some 800 miles. Known as the mule de mare (mule of the sea), this landing craft was armed with a 76-mm antiaircraft gun and two machine guns and had a crew of 13. The standard Japanese landing craft was known to the navy as the Daihatsu (the army designation was LB-D). It had a length of 47 ft. 11 in., a beam of 11 in., and a draft of 2 ft. 6 in. Displacing in excess of 20 tons and capable of carrying 10 tons of cargo, it had a crew of 12 men and was armed with two 7.7-mm machine guns

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(two or three 25-mm antiaircraft guns in later versions). It had a speed of 7.5 to 8.5 knots. The Japanese built 3,229 of them between 1935 and 1945. In addition, they built small numbers of landing craft that were roughly 33 ft., 43 ft., and 56 ft. long. Beginning in 1944, they also built 1,140 49-ft. Moku Daihatsu landing craft of wood. Japanese amphibious doctrine developed during the war with China that started in 1937. The Western Allies and especially the United States built by far the largest number of landing craft during the war to meet needs in both the European and Pacific theaters. Allied troops had to invade and secure areas in the Mediterranean and then invade northwest Europe, and in the Pacific, they had to recapture the various islands held by the Japanese. Many Allied landing craft were quite large and carried

TABLE 3 German, British, and U.S. Landing Craft Type

Year First Built

Number Built

Displacement (light) (in tons)

Maximum Speed Dimensions (in knots) (overall)

Germany SF

1940

> 50

143

MFP 1-626

1942

> 200

200

10

7.5

163ⴕ × 22ⴕ

MFP 627-2000

1942

> 150

280

8

163ⴕ × 22ⴕ

MNL

1942

< 100

154

10

131ⴕ × 27ⴕ

106ⴕ × 48ⴕ

Britain and the United States LSD

1943

27

4,032

15.6

457ⴕ9ⴖ × 72ⴕ2ⴖ

LSV

1944

6

5,875

20.3

455ⴕ6ⴖ × 60ⴕ3ⴖ

LST

1942

1,040

1,625

12

328ⴕ × 50ⴕ

LSM

1944

539

520

12

203ⴕ6ⴖ × 34ⴕ

LCI(L)

1942

920

246

15

158ⴕ6ⴖ × 23ⴕ8ⴖ

LCS(L)

1944

130

380

15

158ⴕ × 23ⴕ8ⴖ

LCT

1942

1,465

283

8

119ⴕ1ⴖ × 32ⴕ8ⴖ

LCM

1941

11,350

23.3

8

50ⴕ × 14ⴕ1ⴖ

LCVP

1941

23,358

8

8

36ⴕ × 10ⴕ6ⴖ

Sources: Data from A. D. Baker III, Allied Landing Craft of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983); Ermino Bagnasco and Enrico Cernuschi, Le navi da guerra italiane, 1940–1945 (Parma, Italy: Ermanno Albertelli Editore, 2003); Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1968); Roger Chesneau, ed., Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922– 1946 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980); Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War (New York: Galahad Books, 1963); and David Zabecki, ed., World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland). Note: LSV = Landing Ship, Vehicle; LSD = Landing Ship, Dock; LST = Landing Ship, Tank; LSM = Landing Ship, Medium; LCI(L) = Landing Craft, Infantry (Large); LCS(L) = Landing Craft, Support (Large); LCT = Landing Craft, Tank; LCM = Landing Craft, Mechanized; and LCVP = Landing Craft, Vehicle or Personnel.

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smaller landing craft on their decks. The craft were identified not by name but by numbers appended to the general designation. The most common types of landing craft are listed in Table 3. In 1941, the British pioneered development of the LST (landing ship, tank) and the LCT (landing craft, tank). Both were intended to be seagoing craft to deliver vehicles and bulk supplies directly to the shore. The United States altered the original British design and produced them for both nations. The British later modified some of the designs for their own use. The LST was undoubtedly the most widely known larger landing vessel of the war, a staple of later landings in the Pacific theater. The most common version of the LST was 328 ft. in overall length, with a beam of 50 ft. and a displacement of 4,080 tons, fully loaded. LSTs were unarmored or only lightly armed (with 8 40-mm and 12 20-mm antiaircraft guns). The bow of the ship opened, allowing the front ramp to drop and the crew to land cargo directly on a shore. The LST could carry smaller LCTs and was configured with davits to lower personnel landing craft (LCVPs) over the sides. Some LSTs carried only two LCVPs in this fashion; others carried six. The LST crew complement was 111 officers and men. The LCS(L) (landing craft, support [large]) was developed to provide support to amphibious landings. With a crew of 71, it was armed with one 3-inch .50-caliber gun, four 40-mm guns (two by two), four 20-mm guns, and 10 rocket launchers. The smaller LCT carried trucks, tanks, or cargo directly to an invasion beach. The LCVP, developed by New Orleans entrepreneur Andrew J. Higgins and popularly known as the Higgins boat, was made of wood. With a crew of three men, it was designed to land 36 troops (or one 6,000-lb. vehicle or 8,100 lb. of cargo) directly on the beach. The vessel was developed for ease of mass production, and more than 23,000 had been manufactured by the end of the war. The Allies also developed true amphibians capable of transporting men and equipment from ship to shore and then inland. Of these, the best known is undoubtedly the DUKW (an administrative code for a 1942 model amphibious four-wheeldrive truck). The DUKW had both a propeller and wheels that moved it at 5.5 knots in the water and up to 50 mph on land. It carried 25 troops or 5,000 lb. of cargo and was particularly useful for transporting litters of wounded. A number of the popular DUKWs remain in service today as tourist attractions. Landing craft were immensely important to the Allies in the war, so much so that U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall stated in 1943, “Prior to the present war I never heard of landing craft except as a rubber boat. Now I think of nothing else.” The availability of landing craft dictated timetables for Allied amphibious actions, and the shortage of them precluded simultaneous landings in northern France (in Operation OVERLORD) and south France (in Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON). Some historians have argued that the U.S. chief of naval operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, placed too many landing craft in the Pacific, thus hindering Allied efforts

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in Europe. Current scholarship has concluded that the major problem was overcommitment within the European theater itself. Far less glamorous than combatant vessels, landing craft were nonetheless an essential element in the Allied victory in World War II, just as they continue to be an integral part of naval operations today. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Higgins, Andrew Jackson; King, Ernest Joseph; SEA LION, Operation.

References Bagnasco, Ermino, and Enrico Cernuschi. Le navi da guerra italiane, 1940–1945. Parma, Italy: Ermanno Albertelli Editore, 2003. Baker, A.D. III. Allied Landing Craft of World War Two. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Bartlett, Merrill L., ed. Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. Coakley, Robert W., and Richard M. Leighton. Global Logistics and Strategy. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1968. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War. New York: Galahad Books, 1963.

Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm (1890–1939) German naval officer involved in the Battle of Río de la Plata. Born March 20, 1890, in Bergen, Germany, Hans Wilhelm Langsdorff joined the Imperial Navy in 1912 and experienced his first action in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. Through the remainder of World War I, he commanded minesweepers. During the years of the Weimar Republic, Langsdorff commanded a half flotilla (four vessels) of torpedo boats. From 1931 to 1935, he was an adjutant in the Ministry of Defense, and he then became a staff officer. Promoted to captain in January 1937, Langsdorff assumed command of the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee in November 1938. On the outbreak of World War II, Langsdorff and his ship were already at sea. With German leader Adolf Hitler having decided on an invasion of Poland, the Graf Spee and its sister ship, the Deutschland, were ordered to sea in advance of hostilities. The Graf Spee departed German waters on August 21. Langsdorff’s orders were to operate against Allied commerce in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans, and his ship sank 10 merchant vessels for a total of 50,000 tons by December. The British dispatched a number of ships to intercept the

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Admiral Graf Spee off South America, including Commander Henry Harwood’s Force G of four cruisers. The Battle of Río de la Plata on December 13, 1939, between the Admiral Graf Spee and the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and light cruisers HMS Ajax and HMNZS Achilles resulted in damage to all but the last of these vessels. Langsdorff took refuge in the port city of Montevideo, Uruguay, going ashore there to bury crewmen killed in the battle. Because Uruguay was a neutral country, combatant ships from belligerent nations could only remain in port for 72 hours. The British bluffed Langsdorff into believing they had gathered a superior force off Montevideo, centered on the battle cruiser Renown, and on December 17, he ordered his ship out of port and scuttled it at the mouth of the Río de la Plata. Langsdorff then took a hotel room ashore. On December 20, 1939, he wrote a letter explaining his actions, wrapped himself in his ship’s ensign, and shot himself. Nicholas W. Barcheski See also: Battleships; Cruisers; German Navy; Río de la Plata, Battle of.

References Bennett, Geoffrey. The Battle of the River Plate. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972. Gilbey, Joseph. Langsdorff of the Graf Spee. Hillsburgh, Canada: J. Gilbey, 1999. Grove, Eric J. The Price of Disobedience: The Battle of the River Plate Reconsidered. Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2000. Pope, Dudley. Graf Spee: The Life and Death of a Raider. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1956. Raeder, Erich. My Life. Trans. Henry W. Drexel. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Leahy, William Daniel (1875–1959) U.S. navy admiral of the fleet who was an adviser to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. Born in Hampton, Iowa, on May 6, 1875, William Leahy graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1897. He first served aboard the battleship Oregon, taking part in the Spanish-American War and the Boxer Rebellion. From 1899 to 1907, Ensign Leahy served in the Pacific, including the Philippines, and in Panama. During World War I, he formed a friendship with Roosevelt, who was assistant secretary of the navy at the time. In 1918, Leahy won promotion to captain. Leahy served at sea and also held important posts ashore. Promoted to rear admiral in 1927, he headed the Bureau of Ordnance (1927–1931) and then the Bureau of Navigation (1933–1935). He was made a vice admiral in 1935. In January

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William Daniel Leahy was chief of staff to President Franklin Roosevelt and the informal chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II. At the end of the war, Leahy opposed employing the atomic bomb against Japan. (Library of Congress)

1937, Leahy was promoted to admiral and appointed by President Roosevelt as chief of naval operations (CNO). As CNO, he argued for naval expansion. After retiring from the navy in August 1939, he served as governor of Puerto Rico (September 1939–November 1940). Roosevelt next named him U.S. ambassador to Vichy France. In May 1942, Roosevelt recalled Leahy to active duty and made him his chief of staff and unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Leahy also presided over the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings when the United States was the host. Throughout the war years, he was an adviser and confidant to Roosevelt, especially during meetings with Allied heads of state at places such as Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta. A strong nationalist, Leahy did not put much credence in Roosevelt’s cherished United Nations. In December 1944, he won promotion to fleet admiral, becoming the first naval officer to be so promoted.

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When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, Leahy became one of President Truman’s closest advisers, playing an important role at the Potsdam Conference of July and August 1945. He opposed dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, urging Truman to continue conventional bombing and to tighten the naval blockade in the belief that Japan was ready to sue for peace. He also feared that the atomic bomb might not work. After the war, Leahy played a major part in the formation of the National Security Act of 1947. His advice helped lead to the subsequent establishment of the National Military Establishment, later known as the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Group, later known as the Central Intelligence Agency. He continued to play vital roles in the formation and expansion of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Leahy was an ardent anticommunist who shared Truman’s abiding distrust of the Soviet Union. He retired from government service in March 1949 but continued to act as a key adviser to the secretary of the navy. He also helped establish the Naval Historical Foundation and served as its first president. In 1950, Leahy published his autobiography, I Was There. He died on July 20, 1959, in Bethesda, Maryland. William Head See also: United States, Navy.

References Adams, Henry H. Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Larrabee, Eric. Commander-in-Chief: Franklin D. Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. Leahy, William D. I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.

Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching” (1888–1945) U.S. navy admiral who played a pivotal role in readying U.S. forces to fight a war spanning two oceans. Born on May 11, 1888, in Natlee, Kentucky, Willis Augustus Lee graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1908. An early gunboat billet with the Asiatic Fleet and a fondness for China earned him the sobriquet “Ching.” An expert marksman, he won five Olympic Gold Medals in 1920 as a member of the U.S. rifle team. Lee advanced steadily through the various grades before World War II and served in numerous capacities, both at sea and ashore, including four tours with the Division of Fleet Training. He returned to that organization as its director in 1941 and 1942.

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Promoted to rear admiral in January 1942, Lee subsequently took command of the Pacific Fleet’s Battleship Division 6, composed of the recently commissioned fast battleships Washington and South Dakota. At Guadalcanal, he repulsed a superior Japanese force on the night of November 14–15, 1942. Despite losing his destroyer screen, Lee engaged the Japanese. Through the judicious use of radar, he identified and targeted the battleship Kirishima, which fell victim to devastatingly accurate gunfire from the Washington’s 16-inch batteries. With Kirishima mortally damaged, the Japanese ships withdrew. Lee’s victory, in essence, effectively ended Japan’s efforts to dislodge U.S. forces from Guadalcanal and was thus a turning point in the Pacific theater fighting. Although promoted to commander of the Pacific Fleet’s battleships in 1943, Lee never again engaged the Japanese in a decisive surface battle. Eclipsed by naval air power, his battlewagons were reduced to providing antiaircraft screens for the fast carrier task forces, for which he nevertheless earned recognition. Selected to develop kamikaze countermeasures in July 1945, Lee, who had been made a vice admiral in March, had just formed his task group when the war ended. He died shortly thereafter, on August 25, 1945, of a sudden heart attack, while in his launch returning to his flagship, the former battleship now auxiliary ship Wyoming (AG17), off the coast of Maine. Although Lee was a hero of the fighting at sea, his efforts at the Division of Fleet Training remain his greatest contribution to victory. Improving the equipment of combat ships and spearheading the drive to outfit vessels with radar, Lee prepared the U.S. Navy for a two-ocean war. David R. Snyder See also: Battleships; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Kamikaze.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. Stillwell, Paul. “Lee, Willis Augustus, Jr.” In American National Biography, edited by John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (Vol. 13, pp. 411–412). New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Leigh Light Powerful airborne searchlight installed on Britain’s Royal Air Force Coastal Command aircraft to illuminate German U-boats at night. The Leigh Light operated in conjunction with the aircraft’s air-to-surface search radar, which actually located

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the target, to illuminate the submarine only immediately prior to an attack, thus preserving surprise and maximizing the chances of success. The minimum range of early airborne search radars was too long to allow their use to guide a night attack; the ASV (air-to-surface vessel) Mk. II set was only effective between 1 and 36 miles. Dropping flares gave a submarine sufficient warning to escape before the aircraft could attack. Squadron Leader Humphrey de Verde Leigh, together with the firm of Savage & Parsons, developed a 24-inch, 22-million-candlepower searchlight that could be switched on just before losing the target on radar, giving the submarine only 15 to 20 seconds to evade attack. Initial testing began in March 1941, but operational aircraft equipped with Leigh Lights did not enter service until mid-1942 because the Air Ministry initially preferred the Turbinlite, an existing but less powerful (and less effective) airborne searchlight. Leigh Light–equipped aircraft over the Bay of Biscay greatly increased their contact rate but sank only two submarines during 1942, largely because the U-boats began carrying radar-warning receptors. Nevertheless, the ease with which the Leigh Light–equipped aircraft intercepted submarines led Admiral Karl Dönitz to order U-boats in transit to remain submerged even at night, greatly reducing their operational effectiveness. Moreover, the combination of Leigh Lights and centimetric radars, which entered service in 1943, subsequently proved deadly to Germany’s U-boats, most notably during the Biscay Offensive that summer. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Depth Charges; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; Radar; Sonar.

References Franks, Norman L. R. Conflict over the Bay. London: William Kimber, 1986. Franks, Norman L. R., and Eric Zimmerman. U-Boat versus Aircraft. London: Grub Street, 1999. King, H. F. Armament of British Aircraft. London: G. P. Putnam, 1971.

Lend-Lease U.S. military aid program begun during World War II. Designed originally as a means for the United States to assist Great Britain without becoming a belligerent itself or violating the Neutrality Acts, the Lend-Lease program provided more than $50 billion in aid to 38 nations between March 1941 and June 1947. The British Empire received the most aid under the program ($31.4 billion), followed by the Soviet Union ($11 billion).

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The immediate impetus for Lend-Lease was the fall of France in 1940, which left Great Britain fighting the Axis alone. Strapped for cash, Britain could no longer afford to purchase supplies from the United States. Britain’s economic crisis notwithstanding, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that the United States had to find ways to maintain the resolve of the British, thereby allowing them to continue in the war. British problems were not the only barrier to be overcome. U.S. firms were hampered from trading with Britain because of restrictions included in the Neutrality Acts that were passed in the late 1930s. These measures required that trade be conducted on a cash-and-carry basis, meaning that U.S. firms could neither extend credit nor transport materials across the U-boat–infested Atlantic Ocean. With Britain nearly out of hard currency, trade under the cash-and-carry provisions became virtually impossible. The original Lend-Lease authorizations specified that the funds were to be given only to democracies that agreed to pay the loans back in full at the earliest possible opportunity. From the start, however, Roosevelt envisioned that Lend-Lease would operate much like his domestic New Deal did. It would be a practical and flexible program that was able to meet changing demands. It would also be centrally controlled from the executive branch, leaving Roosevelt the options of deciding which nations would receive aid and what forms that aid would take. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the program was more realistic than ideological. Yet Lend-Lease was not an entirely idealistic endeavor. Roosevelt also promoted it as being in the direct strategic interests not only of Great Britain but also of the United States. He compared Lend-Lease to lending a neighbor a fire hose when his house was in flames. This act would help save the lender’s house from destruction as well, and once the fire was out, the hose would be returned. To answer the charge of critics who believed that the impoverished British government would never repay Lend-Lease obligations, Roosevelt said that he expected Britain to honor a gentleman’s agreement to eventually repay the United States in kind. He linked Great Britain’s war to the United States in compelling rhetoric that helped to overcome abiding strains of U.S. isolationism. Roosevelt reinforced these points in a series of fireside chats that led to widespread public acceptance of the program. On January 6, 1941, supporters introduced the Lend-Lease bill, which they patriotically numbered H.R. 1776, in Congress. In a speech delivered soon afterward, Roosevelt connected Lend-Lease to the famous Four Freedoms that defined the United States’ global goals: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Lend-Lease, Roosevelt argued, promised to further those aims without putting U.S. lives at risk. After adding an amendment stipulating that the U.S. Navy would not convoy supplies to Britain directly, the bill passed both houses of Congress by large majorities on March 8, 1941. It authorized the president to “sell, transfer to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of”

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property to any nation whose defense the president deemed “vital to the defense of the United States.” As the program’s success became more manifest, public opposition to Lend-Lease, always in the minority, became even less vocal. The emergency faced by the Soviet Union after the German invasion of June 1941 required a reconsideration of the specific provision that Lend-Lease applied only to democracies. In August, Roosevelt had declared that Lend-Lease did not apply to the Soviets, but he was even then accepting a 29-page list of Soviet requests. Despite serious misgivings from anticommunist members of Congress, where the extension was debated over a four-month span, the United States finally added the Soviet Union to the program in November 1941. Roosevelt agreed with British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill that, whatever the ideological conflict, the Soviets had to be supplied if they were to remain in the war against Germany. Sensitive to the tensions involved in extending Lend-Lease aid to a communist nation, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, his most trusted adviser, to Moscow to coordinate Lend-Lease assistance there. The U.S. Office of Lend-Lease Administration worked to overcome myriad complex problems of logistics. Until the Allies gained the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, supplying Britain proved difficult, and supplying the Soviet Union necessitated air routes over Africa, sea routes along the Arctic Ocean, and land routes across Persia. Complications with flying supplies over “the Hump”—as the Himalaya Mountains were known—limited U.S. aid to China, though that country still received almost $2 billion in assistance. Because of the immense logistical difficulties, the vast majority of Lend-Lease aid to China comprised light weapons systems that could be flown in. Lend-Lease worked in reverse, as well. Thus, Britain shared with the United States radar technology, in which it then led the world. The British also provided technology on jet engines and rocketry. Reverse Lend-Lease of all types amounted to some $7.8 billion during the war. Lend-Lease provided a wide range of arms, equipment, food, and raw materials to nations fighting the Axis powers. In the end, munitions formed almost half of the total aid package. Although the British Empire received more than 60 percent of the aid distributed under the program, Lend-Lease assistance proved to be critical to the Soviet Union. The Americans provided the Soviet Union with 34 million sets of uniforms, 15 million pairs of boots, 350,000 tons of explosives, 3 million tons of gasoline, sufficient food to provide a half lb. of food per Soviet soldier a day, 12,000 railroad cars, 375,000 trucks, and 50,000 jeeps. U.S. vehicles and petroleum supplies allowed the Red Army to develop a deep-offensive doctrine in 1943 that enabled Soviet units to go greater distances. The Soviet Union could also concentrate on the production of tanks and artillery because of the steady supply of trucks and jeeps arriving from the United States.

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Roosevelt and his closest advisers sought to employ Lend-Lease to open the Soviet system to U.S. ideas. In a similar vein, they insisted that any nation receiving Lend-Lease assistance had to agree to open its markets to U.S. products. Thus, Washington finally forced Great Britain to abandon the Imperial Preference System that had provided more favorable trade terms to members of the British Empire. Lend-Lease paid important dividends on the strategic level as well. U.S. aid helped to fend off Soviet demands for a second front in Western Europe. It also helped the Americans to convince Chinese generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) that he must at least appear to accept the counsel of his U.S. advisers—most notably, the reform-minded Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell. The United States later extended Lend-Lease aid to many Latin American nations, prominently Mexico and Brazil. The program brought these nations closer to the Allies and ensured that the Axis powers would not be able to establish important connections there. Lend-Lease thus served many key roles during the war. Most critically, it unquestionably shortened the conflict and relieved the suffering of millions. As Allied armies advanced across Western Europe, Lend-Lease funds paid for food and livestock shipments to France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The United States’ allies certainly appreciated its value. Churchill called Lend-Lease the most unsordid act in history. Although Soviet historians later discounted its value, Joseph Stalin himself said that the Soviet Union could not have won the war without Lend-Lease. Michael S. Neiberg See also: Radar.

References Dobson, A. P. US Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946. London: Croom Helm, 1986. Herring, George. Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Kimball, Warren. The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969. Weeks, Albert L. Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.

Les Sept Iles, Action off (October 23, 1943) The English Channel’s importance as a transit route for British and German shipping made it one of the war’s most bitterly contested bodies of water. When the

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blockade runner Münsterland and its escort of six minesweepers and two patrol boats departed Brest on October 22, 1943, the Royal Navy’s Plymouth Command ordered the antiaircraft light cruiser Charybdis (senior officer, Captain G. A. W. Voelcker); the fleet destroyers Grenville and Rocket; and the escort destroyers Limbourne, Wensleydale, Talybont, and Stevenstone to intercept the German convoy. Because Plymouth was a transit point, it often tried to maximize resources by using ships that were passing through, such as the Charybdis, but this practice had its dangers, as became clear in execution. The British warships arrived off the Breton coast shortly after midnight on October 23 and, with the cruiser in the lead, began sweeping west. Meanwhile, the German 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, T23 (Korvettenkapitän Franz Kohlauf ), T26, T27, T22, and T25 reinforced the escort. Based on past operations, the Germans had a good idea when and how the British would come. When T25’s hydrophone detected ships to the northeast, the 4th Flotilla turned toward the contact. At 1:30 a.m., the Charybdis’s radar detected the Germans 14,000 yards ahead. As the columns rapidly converged, Captain Voelcker ordered his column to come to starboard and increase speed, but there was confusion and only the rear ship received his signal. A minute later at 1:43 a.m., the German commander saw the cruiser’s large silhouette illuminated against the lighter northern horizon only 2,200 yards distant. He ordered an emergency turn to starboard. As they came about, the T23 and then T26 emptied their torpedo tubes toward the enemy. British radar was registering contacts and the British were intercepting German radio traffic. The Charybdis fired star shell, but the rockets burst above the clouds and only brightened the overcast sky. The Limbourne, which had lost touch with the flagship, plotted a contact off its port bow and, unsure whether it was hostile, likewise fired rockets. The fleet destroyers came to port and crossed ahead of Limbourne. Then lookouts aboard the Charybdis reported the tracks of torpedoes. The cruiser came hard to port, but at 1:47 a.m., a torpedo struck it on the port side. As this happened, the German column was still turning and both the T27 and T22 fired full torpedo salvos as they came about. Only the T25 failed to launch. At 1:51 a.m., the German column withdrew on an easterly heading. Another torpedo struck the Charybdis, and within five minutes its deck was under water. A minute later, a torpedo slammed into the Limbourne and detonated the small destroyer’s forward magazine. The Grenville and Wensleydale barely avoided the massive explosion. The Charybdis sank at 2:30 a.m. Attempts to tow the Limbourne failed and it was scuttled. The British force was an improvised one following a scripted plan and had blundered into a massed, close-range torpedo salvo. The British were fortunate in that they only lost two ships. Admiralty staff studied the action off Les Sept Iles

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intensely and drew many of the right conclusions. Not coincidentally, it was the last clear victory German surface forces would win during the war. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Bay of Biscay, Battle of; Blockade Running; Convoys, Axis; Destroyers.

References Smith, Peter C. Hold the Narrow Sea, Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939–1945. Ashbourne, UK: Moorland, 1984. Whitley, M. J. German Destroyers of World War Two. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Lexington Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers The Lexington (CV-2) and its sister ship Saratoga (CV-3) were originally laid down as battle cruisers. The Lexington was laid down at Fore River Shipbuilding Company, Quincy, Massachusetts, on January 8, 1921. Restrictions imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty halted its construction, and in July 1922 the navy decided to complete the ship as a carrier. Launched on October 3, 1925, the Lexington was commissioned on December 13, 1927. The Saratoga was laid down by New York Shipbuilding Corporation on September 15, 1920; launched on April 7, 1925; and commissioned on November 16, 1927. The Lexington-class ships displaced 37,681 tons standard load and 43,055 tons full load. They were 888 ft. in overall length by 105 ft. 6 in. in beam. Capable of a maximum speed of 33.25 knots, they had a crew of up to 2,327 men. Armament consisted of 8 8-inch and 12 5-inch guns, and 48 .50-caliber machine guns. Their 1936 aircraft complement was 63 aircraft, but they carried as many as 80 during the war. Much of U.S. Navy carrier doctrine was developed in the 1930s with these two ships. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Lexington was delivering Marine aircraft to Midway. Its first action was in support of the aborted effort to reinforce Wake Island. In February 1942, it attacked the Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. It also participated with the Yorktown in attacks on Japanese forces on New Guinea and in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea. During the battle, however, the Lexington was struck by two torpedoes and three bombs. With fires blazing out of control and the ship abandoned, the destroyer Phelps scuttled the Lexington with torpedoes. Both carriers had their 8-inch guns removed to make way for additional 5-inch and lighter antiaircraft guns. The Lexington was sunk without its 8-inch guns but also without the 5-inch guns that were to have replaced them being installed. The refit of the Saratoga was completed and the ship was also bulged for improved

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buoyancy with the additional weight. The Saratoga’s most important action of the war was the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942, when its aircraft sank the Japanese carrier Ryu¯jo¯. The Saratoga was then overshadowed by the new Essex-class carriers, which, although smaller, could carry more aircraft through their more efficient design. The Saratoga survived the war only to be sunk in the atomic bomb tests at Bikini atoll on July 25, 1946. William Head and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul; United States Carrier Raids; Wake Island, Battle for.

References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Power, Hugh. Carrier Lexington. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. Stern, Robert C. The Lexington Class Carriers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993.

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (October 23–26, 1944) Pacific war naval battle and history’s largest naval engagement in terms of the amount of ships, personnel, and area involved. The battle engaged 284 ships (216 U.S., 4 Australian, and 64 Japanese) and nearly 200,000 men, and it took place over an area of more than 100,000 square miles. It saw all aspects of naval warfare— air, surface, submarine, and amphibious—as well as the employment of the largest guns ever at sea, the last clash of battleships, and the introduction by the Japanese of kamikaze aircraft. The engagement also involved excellent planning and leadership, deception, failed intelligence, and great controversies. The battle resulted from U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to follow the conquest of the Mariana Islands with the recapture of the Philippines. This idea was proposed by the commander of Southwest Pacific Forces, General Douglas MacArthur; the chief of naval operations, Ernest J. King, wanted to land on Formosa instead. The latter move made sound military sense, the former political sense. On October 20, the U.S. Sixth Army began an invasion of Leyte, with more than 132,000 men going ashore the first day. Warned by the preliminary bombardment, the Japanese put into effect their overly complicated contingency plan. As early as July 21, 1944, the Naval General Staff in Tokyo had issued a directive for an operation in which the Combined Fleet would seize the initiative “to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces.” On July 26, the General Staff informed the Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, that the “urgent operations” would be

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known by the code name SHO (VICTORY). The Japanese had four of these operations to combat the next U.S. offensive; SHO ICHI-GO (Operation VICTORY ONE) covered defense of the Philippine archipelago, to which the Japanese decided to commit the entire Combined Fleet. Toyoda knew it was a gamble but believed the chance had to be taken. Should the United States retake the Philippines, it would be in a position to cut Japanese access to oil from the Netherlands East Indies. Prior to the battle, Japanese naval air strength had been severely reduced in the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea (“the great Marianas turkey shoot”), and between October 12 and 14, U.S. carrier planes and army B-29 bombers struck Japanese airfields on Formosa, Okinawa, and the Philippines. These strikes denied the Japanese navy badly needed land-based air support and alone doomed the Japanese plan. The Japanese did add extra antiaircraft guns to their ships in an attempt to offset the lack of aircraft, but offensively, they had to rely on naval gunnery and some 335 land-based planes in the Luzon area. The Japanese plan was to destroy sufficient U.S. shipping to break up the Leyte amphibious landing. There were four prongs in the Japanese attack. A decoy force would draw U.S. naval covering forces north, while two elements struck from the west on either side of Leyte, to converge simultaneously on the landing area in Leyte Gulf and destroy Allied shipping there. At the same time, shore-based aircraft were to attack U.S. naval forces offshore. On October 17, on receiving information that U.S. warships were off Suhuan Island, Admiral Toyoda alerted his forces. The next day, he initiated SHO ICHIGO. The original target date for the fleet engagement was October 22, but logistical difficulties delayed it to October 25. Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo’s decoy Northern Force (Third Fleet) consisted of the heavy carrier Zuikaku, three light carriers, two hybrid battleship-carriers, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. Ozawa had only 116 aircraft, flown by poorly trained pilots. His force sortied from Japan on October 20, and on the evening of October 22, it turned south toward Luzon. At the same time, Japanese submarines off Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the Philippine archipelago, and shortly before October 23, what remained of the Japanese Second Air Fleet began to arrive on the island of Luzon. The strongest element of the Japanese attack was the 1st Diversion Attack Force, which reached Brunei Bay in northwest Borneo on October 20, refueled, split into two parts, and resumed its movement two days later. The Center Force under Admiral Kurita Takeo had the bulk of the Japanese attack strength, including the giant battleships Musashi and Yamato with their 18.1-inch guns; Kurita also had 3 older battleships, 12 cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Center Force sailed northeastward, up the west coast of Palawan Island, and then turned eastward through the waters of the central Philippines to San Bernardino Strait. Meanwhile, the Southern Force (C Force) of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji, struck eastward through the Sulu Sea in an effort


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to force its way through Surigao Strait between the islands of Mindanao and Leyte. The Southern Force was trailed by Vice Admiral Shima Kiyohide’s 2nd Diversion Attack Force. Shima had two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. Shima’s warships left the Pescadores on October 21, steamed south past western Luzon, and refueled in the Calamian Islands. Late in joining Nishimura’s ships, Shima’s force followed them into Surigao Strait. Opposing the Japanese were two U.S. Navy fleets: Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet, operating under General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command, and Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet, under the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at Pearl Harbor. Leyte was the first landing to involve two entire U.S. fleets and also the first without a unified command, which would have unfortunate consequences. Seventh Fleet was divided into three task groups. The first consisted of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf’s 6 old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts. The other two elements were amphibious task groups carrying out the actual invasion. Seventh Fleet had escorted the invasion force to Leyte and now provided broad protection for the entire landing area. Because most of Halsey’s amphibious assets had been loaned to Kinkaid, Third Fleet consisted almost entirely of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Task Force (TF) 38 of 14 fast carriers, with more than 1,000 aircraft, organized into four task groups containing 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, and 57 destroyers. Third Fleet had the job of securing air superiority over the Philippines and protecting the landings. If the opportunity to destroy a major part of the Japanese fleet presented itself or could be created, that was to be Third Fleet’s primary task. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was actually a series of battles, the first of which was the October 23–24 Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Early on October 23, the U.S. submarines Darter and Dace discovered Kurita’s Center Force entering Palawan Passage from the South China Sea, and they alerted Admiral Halsey, whose Third Fleet guarded San Bernardino Strait. The submarines sank two Japanese heavy cruisers, the Atago (Kurita’s flagship) and the Maya, and damaged a third. Kurita transferred his flag to the Yamato, and his force continued east into the Sibuyan Sea, where, beginning in the morning of October 24, TF 38 launched five air strikes against it. The first wave of carrier planes concentrated on the Musashi, which absorbed 19 torpedoes and nearly as many bombs before sinking, taking down half of its 2,200man crew. Several other Japanese ships were also damaged. In mid-afternoon on October 25, U.S. pilots reported that Kurita had reversed course and was heading west; Halsey incorrectly assumed that this part of the battle was over. He did issue a preliminary order detailing a battle line of battleships known as TF 34 to be commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Admiral Kinkaid was aware of that signal and assumed TF 34 had been established.

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Meanwhile, Japanese land-based planes from the Second Air Fleet attacked a portion of TF 38. Most were shot down, but they did sink the light carrier Princeton and badly damaged the cruiser Birmingham. Also, unknown to Halsey, Kurita’s force changed course after nightfall and resumed heading for San Bernardino Strait. Warned of the approach of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Kinkaid placed Oldendorf’s six old Seventh Fleet fire-support battleships (all but one a veteran of Pearl Harbor), flanked by eight cruisers, across the mouth of Surigao Strait to intercept it. He also lined the strait with 39 patrol torpedo (PT) boats and 28 destroyers. In terms of naval warfare, the October 24–25 Battle of Surigao Strait was a classic case of crossing the T. The PT boats discovered the Japanese moving in line-ahead formation, but Nishimura’s force easily beat them back. Although the battleships often get the credit for the Surigao Strait victory, it was U.S. destroyers that inflicted most of the damage. Their converging torpedo attacks sank the battleship Fuso and three destroyers. The Japanese then ran into the line of Oldendorf’s battleships, which sank all the Japanese warships except the destroyer Shigure. Nishimura went down with his flagship, the battleship Yamashiro. Shima’s force, bringing up the rear, then came under attack by the PT boats, which crippled a light cruiser. Shima’s flagship collided with one of Nishimura’s damaged vessels. Oldendorf’s ships pursued the retreating Japanese. Another Japanese cruiser succumbed to attacks by land-based planes and those of Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s escort carriers. The rest of Shima’s force escaped when Oldendorf, knowing his ships might be needed later, turned back. The battle was over by 4:30 a.m. on October 25. Meanwhile, during the night of October 24–25, Kurita’s force moved through San Bernardino Strait, issued from it unopposed, and turned south. In the most controversial aspect of the battle, Halsey left San Bernardino Strait unprotected near midnight to rush with all available units of Third Fleet after Ozawa’s decoy fleet, which had been sighted far to the north. Several of Halsey’s subordinates registered reservations about his decision, but he would not be deterred. Compounding the error, Halsey failed to inform Admiral Kinkaid, who, in any case, assumed that TF 34 was protecting the strait. Halsey’s decision left the landing beaches guarded only by Seventh Fleet’s Taffy 3 escort carrier group, commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague. It was one of three such support groups operating off Samar. Sprague had six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. Fighting off Samar erupted about 6:30 a.m. on October 24, as Taffy 3 found itself opposing Kurita’s 4 battleships (including the Yamato), 6 heavy cruisers, and 10 destroyers. The aircraft from all three of the Taffy groups now attacked the Japanese. Unfortunately, the planes carried fragmentation bombs for use against land targets, but they put up a strong fight, harassing the powerful Japanese warships. Sprague’s destroyers and destroyer escorts also joined the fight. Their crews courageously attacked the much more powerful Japanese warships, launching torpedoes and laying


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smoke to try to obscure the escort carriers. These combined attacks forced several Japanese cruisers to drop out of the battle. Kurita now made a poor decision. By 9:10 a.m., his warships sank the Gambier Bay, the only U.S. carrier ever lost to gunfire, as well as the destroyers Hoel and Johnston and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. But Kurita believed he was under attack by aircraft from TF 38 and that he had inflicted more damage than was the case. At 9:11 a.m., just at the point when he might have won a crushing victory, he ordered his forces to break off the attack, his decision strengthened by news that the southern attacking force had been destroyed. Kurita then exited through San Bernardino Strait. The four ships lost by Taffy 3 Sailors cling to rope ladders as they reach out to pull to safety survivors from ships sunk off were the only U.S. warships sunk by Samar on October 24, 1944, during the Battle Japanese surface ships in the entire of Leyte Gulf. Some 1,200 survivors of USS battle. Gambier Bay (CVE-73), USS Hoel (DD-533), At 9:40 p.m., Kurita’s ships reenUSS Johnston (DD-557) and USS Samuel B. tered San Bernardino Strait. As the Roberts (DE-413) were rescued during the days Japanese withdrew, they came under following the action. (U.S. Navy) attack by aircraft from Vice Admiral John S. McCain’s task force from Halsey’s fleet, losing a destroyer. Meanwhile, Sprague’s escort carriers and Oldendorf’s force returning from the Battle of Surigao Strait came under attack from land-based kamikaze aircraft, the first such attacks of the war. These attacks sank the escort carrier St. Lô and damaged several other ships. At about 2:20 a.m. on October 25, Mitscher’s search planes, from Halsey’s force, located Ozawa’s northern decoy force. At dawn, the first of three strikes was launched, in what became known as the Battle of Cape Engaño. Ozawa had sent most of his planes ashore to operate from bases there and thus had only antiaircraft fire with which to oppose the attack. While engaged against Ozawa, Halsey learned of the action off Samar when a signal came in from Kinkaid at 8:22 a.m., followed by an urgent request eight minutes later for fast battleships. Finally, at 8:48 a.m., Halsey ordered McCain’s TG 38.1 to make “best possible speed” to

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engage Kurita’s Center Force. The task group was en route from the Ulithi to rejoin the other elements of TF 38. Since it had more carriers and planes than any of the three other task groups in Halsey’s force, it made good sense to detach this unit. Several minutes later, Halsey was infuriated by a query from Nimitz at Pearl Harbor: “WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS.” (The last three words were simply what was known as “padding,” drawn from the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade,” but Halsey took them to be an integral part of the message and felt they were a reproach delivered in an insulting manner.) At 10:55 a.m., Halsey ordered all six fast battleships and TG 38.2 to turn south and steam at flank speed, but they missed the battle. After the war, Kurita admitted his error in judgment; Halsey never did. In fact, Halsey said his decision to send the battleships south to Samar was “the greatest error I committed during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.” By nightfall, U.S. aircraft, a submarine, and surface ships had sunk all four Japanese carriers of Ozawa’s force, as well as five other ships. In effect, this blow ended Japanese carrier aviation. But the battle of annihilation that would have been possible with the fast battleships had eluded Halsey. Still, of Ozawa’s force, only two battleships, two light cruisers, and a destroyer escaped. Including retiring vessels sunk on October 26 and 27, Japanese losses in the Battle of Leyte Gulf came to 29 warships (4 carriers, 3 battleships, 6 heavy and 4 light cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 1 submarine) and more than 500 aircraft; in addition, some 10,500 seamen and aviators were killed. The U.S. Navy lost only six ships (one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort) and more than 200 aircraft. About 2,800 Americans were killed and another 1,000 were wounded. The Battle of Leyte Gulf ended the Japanese fleet as an organized fighting force. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kamikaze; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kurita Takeo; Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching”; McCain, John Sidney; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Nishimura Shoji; Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett; Ozawa Jisaburo; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick; Sprague, Thomas Lamison; Toyoda Soemu.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Field, James A. Jr. The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho¯ Operation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947.

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Friedman, Kenneth. Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975. Potter, E. B. Bull Halsey. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Vego, Milan N. Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Leyte Landings (October 20, 1944) In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt met with his Pacific theater commanders General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz to determine the next U.S. military objective. MacArthur argued for a return to the Philippines, whereas Nimitz and the navy wanted to bypass these islands entirely in favor of securing Formosa. Ultimately, because sufficient resources were available, Roosevelt decided on both the Philippines and Okinawa in the Ryukyus. The U.S. Philippine invasion had three main phases: first, the capture of Leyte Island, between the big island of Luzon to the north and Mindanao to the south; then, the capture of Luzon; and, finally, the clearing of other Japanese-held islands to the south. A precondition to such an undertaking was the neutralization of Japanese air power. In wide-ranging preinvasion operations between October 7 and 16, Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet and Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’s Far East Air Force struck all Japanese bases within range, while XX Bomber Command Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers attacked Formosa from bases in China, decimating the rebuilt Japanese naval air arm and destroying some 700 Japanese planes and 40 ships. Japanese leaders knew that they would have to hold the Philippines to prevent the severing of the supply route between Japan and the vital oil and other resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Tokyo was thus prepared, once U.S. forces committed themselves, to gamble what remained of the Japanese fleet on a vast and complex naval operation. This action would culminate in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Japanese commander in the Philippines General Yamashita Tomoyuki had some 350,000 troops to defend the islands. But Yamashita believed that the U.S. effort would be against the big island of Luzon, where he placed his Fourteenth Area Army and prepared defensive positions. Meanwhile, U.S. invasion forces headed for Leyte. U.S. planners assembled a vast amphibious force. The 700 vessels of Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet transported Lieutenant General Walter Krueger’s 194,000-man U.S. Sixth Army, consisting of Major General Franklin C. Sibert’s X Corps and Major General John Hodge’s XXIV Corps. Rear Admiral

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Thomas L. Sprague’s air-support escort carrier group consisted of 16 escort carriers, 9 destroyers, and 11 destroyer escorts. Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey commanded a close covering group of four cruisers (two of them Australian) and seven destroyers (two Australian). Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet was to provide covering protection and to engage the Japanese fleet should it decide to do battle. On October 20, following a heavy naval bombardment, four divisions went ashore on Leyte’s east coast on a 10-mile-wide front. By nightfall, some 132,400 men were ashore, along with 200,000 tons of supply and equipment. Immediately on learning of the landings, the Japanese navy initiated the SHOGO plan, and during October 23–26, the U.S. Navy won a decisive victory, defeating the Japanese effort to attack the landing site from the sea. The naval Battle of Leyte Gulf ended the days of the Japanese navy as a major fighting force. Meanwhile, U.S. land forces continued their advance as Kenney’s and Halsey’s aircraft choked off the stream of Japanese reinforcements. On November 11, attacks by Third Fleet aircraft decimated a Japanese convoy with 10,000 troop reinforcements. Although the unexpected Japanese reinforcements and heavy rains had delayed the conquest of Leyte, the outcome was never in doubt. In the battle for the island, the Japanese lost some 70,000 men, most of them dead. U.S. losses were about 3,500 killed and 12,000 wounded. Meanwhile, in late October, U.S. forces landed on the adjoining Samar Island, and in mid-December, they seized Mindoro in the northern Visayas, just south of Luzon, as an air base for the coming assault on Luzon. Claude R. Sasso and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Sprague, Thomas Lamison.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–August 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Spector, Ronald H. The American War with Japan: Eagle against the Sun. New York: Free Press, 1985.

Liberty Ships The U.S. Maritime Commission’s mass-produced emergency cargo vessels, whose construction comprised the largest single shipbuilding program of World War II. Eighteen shipyards, using assembly-line methods, completed 2,710 Liberty ships, beginning with the Patrick Henry, launched on September 27, 1941 (only eight months after the groundbreaking at the new Bethlehem-Fairfield yard), and ending with the Albert M. Boe, which was launched in October 1945 by New England Shipbuilding.

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The British ship Dorington Court of 1939 was the basis for the Liberty ship design, adapted for welded construction and with improved crew accommodation. Liberties were 441 ft. 6 in. in overall length and 57 ft. in beam, and they registered 7,176 tons gross and 10,865 tons deadweight. Two oil-fired boilers provided steam for a three-cylinder, triple-expansion engine of 2,500 indicated hp that propelled the ship at 11 knots. The commission was criticized for specifying such old-fashioned machinery. However, as it worked out, there was a critical shortage of more modern turbine machinery because of the demands of other wartime expansion programs; moreover, the engines were thoroughly reliable, and there was a substantial force of engine-room crewmen who were very familiar with this type of plant. Speedy construction and delivery was central to the Liberties’ contribution to the war effort. An overwhelming majority of the yards in which they were constructed were newly created facilities purpose-built by either the Maritime Commission or the contractors. Initially, the vessels required around 250 days for completion, but within a year, this was reduced to fewer than 50 days. The Richmond Shipbuilding Corporation, a subsidiary of Henry J. Kaiser’s Permanente Metals Corporation located in Richmond, California, broke all records by assembling the Robert E. Peary in just over four days between November 8 and 12, 1942, and delivering the ship three days later. More important, U.S. shipyards delivered 93 new ships in September 1942, totaling more than 1 million deadweight tons, of which 67 were Liberties. Liberty ships proved to be very adaptable. Although intended to operate as freighters, they were modified for service as troop transports, tankers, aircraft transports, depot ships, and an array of naval auxiliaries. Liberty ships were tough, even though they were classified as expendable war materials. Some problems were encountered with unexpected stress fatigue, but the ships often survived considerable combat damage and served successfully throughout the world in all types of weather. Many continued in postwar commercial service for 25 years or more. Two are preserved as tributes to the type’s crucial contribution to the Allied victory: the John W. Brown at Baltimore, Maryland, and the Jeremiah O’Brien at San Francisco. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Kaiser, Henry John.

References Bunker, John. Heroes in Dungarees: The Story of the American Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Bunker, John. Liberty Ships: The Ugly Ducklings of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972. Cooper, Sherod. Liberty Ship: The Voyages of the John W. Brown, 1942–1946. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

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Lavery, Brian. Ship: The Epic Story of Maritime Adventure. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2004. Sawyer, L. A., and W. H. Mitchell. The Liberty Ships: The History of the Emergency Type Cargo Ships Constructed in the United States during World War II. Newton Abbot, UK: David and Charles, 1970.

Ligurian Sea, Battle of the (March 18, 1945) Destroyer action between British and German forces and the last naval surface battle fought in the Mediterranean Sea. Even after the Allies landed in southern France in Operation DRAGOON in August 1944, Germany retained a portion of the Mediterranean coast stretching from the Franco-Italian border to a point south of La Spezia. Captured Italian and French warships that Germany had refurbished or finished constructing formed the backbone of a small but active fleet that fought small-craft, special-forces, and surface actions against the vastly superior Allied navies. By the beginning of 1945, the Kriegsmarine still possessed 3 torpedo boats, 2 minelayers, 9 submarine chasers, 10 motor minesweepers, and 35 armed barges in the Ligurian Sea. They were supported by 6 MAS motor torpedo boats of the fascist Italian republic navy. On the night of March 17, 1945, the last three operational ships of the German 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, the destroyer TA32 and the torpedo boats TA24 and TA29, conducted an offensive mining operation northwest of Corsica. After dropping 132 mines, the flotilla united for the return to Genoa with the TA24 and TA29 preceding the TA32. They were 20 miles north of Cape Corse when Allied shore radar at Livorno detected their presence. Four Allied destroyers were patrolling in the vicinity: the French Basque and Tempete and the British Meteor and Lookout. Captain A. Morazzani, the Tempete’s captain and the senior officer, ordered the British ships to intercept the intruders while he led the slower French ships southeast to cover a convoy nearing Cape Corse. The Lookout made radar contact at 3:01 a.m. The German column was steaming north at 20 knots. The British destroyer approached at high speed and surprised the enemy force, opening fire at 3:10 a.m. from 5,000 yards. Two minutes later, it swung around and launched torpedoes. The Lookout’s radar-directed gunfire slammed into the TA24 and TA29. The TA29 dropped out of the line while the other two ships fled north. The Lookout let them go and circled the TA29, firing continuously from 2,000 yards. The TA29 fought back, but the only damage the German warship inflicted occurred when a burst of 20-mm shells hit some smoke-floats and ignited a small fire on the British ship. The TA29 sank at 4:20 a.m., riddled by more than 40 shells. The Meteor, meanwhile, found the other German ships at 3:52 a.m. and engaged at 8,000 yards, hitting the TA24 almost immediately, which was highly effective

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shooting for such a long range, especially at night. The Meteor followed up its gunnery attack with a torpedo salvo that scored one hit on the TA24. The German torpedo boat exploded and sank at 4:05 a.m. The TA32, although damaged, escaped after firing a few broadsides and an ineffective torpedo barrage. The British destroyers achieved decisive results against a German unit that had effectively harassed the Allies for more than a year, and their victory effectively ended the Kriegsmarine’s ability to undertake deep water offensive operations in the Ligurian Sea. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: DRAGOON, Operation; Germany, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Operation in.

References Hervieux, Pierre. “German TA Torpedo Boats at War.” In Warship 1997–1998 (pp. 133– 148). London: Conway Maritime Press, 1997. O’Hara, Vincent P. The German Fleet at War 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

Lockwood, Charles Andrew Jr. (1890–1967) U.S. navy admiral who served as commander of the Pacific Fleet’s submarines from 1943. Born on May 6, 1890 in Midland, Virginia, Charles Andrew Lockwood Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1912. He commanded submarines during World War I and then evaluated captured German U-boats after the war. Lockwood spent most of the interwar years in the submarine service. He taught at the Naval Academy from 1933 to 1935, before becoming chief of staff to the U.S. Fleet submarine commander between 1939 and 1941. When the United States entered World War II, Lockwood was serving as U.S. naval attaché to Great Britain, a post he retained until March 1942, when he was promoted to rear admiral and became commander of U.S. submarines in the southwest Pacific. Lockwood assumed command during a difficult time. The navy had recently reorganized his command and relocated it to Australia. In addition, U.S. submarine commanders were experiencing serious problems with unreliable torpedoes. Lockwood led the way in ordering tests to determine the cause of torpedo failure. These experiments eventually resulted in securing properly functioning weaponry for the submarines. In February 1943, Lockwood became commander of submarines in the Pacific Fleet, and that October, he was promoted to vice admiral. Under his direction, the U.S. Pacific submarines became the most effective submarine force in history, utilizing radar, signals intelligence, improved torpedoes, and more aggressive tactics

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to sink two-thirds (5.3 million tons) of Japanese merchant ships and a third of Japanese warships, at a cost of 52 U.S. submarines sunk. Lockwood also played an important role in developing procedures to rescue aircraft personnel. In 1943, he adopted a plan that posted submarines in various locations to retrieve downed pilots. This program, dubbed the Lifeguard League, led to the safe return of more than 500 Americans shot down over the Pacific. After the war, Lockwood went on to serve as navy inspector general in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He stayed in this capacity until his retirement in September 1947. Over the next two decades, he wrote several books about his experiences. Lockwood died in Monte Serena, California, on June 6, 1967. R. Kyle Schlafer See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Convoys, Axis; Radar; Signals Intelligence; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States, Navy; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping.

References Blair, Clay. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Lockwood, Charles. Down to the Sea in Subs. New York: Norton, 1967. Lockwood, Charles. Sink ’Em All: Submarine Warfare in the Pacific. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951.

Lombok, Battle of (February 19–20, 1942) Pacific naval battle, also known as the Battle of Badeong Strait, fought between Japanese and Allied forces on the night of February 19–20, 1942. The encounter followed the Japanese effort to isolate the important Netherlands East Indies island of Java by an amphibious assault on Bali on the morning of February 19. As soon as he received word of the Japanese landing on Bali, Dutch rear admiral Karel Doorman, commander of the American-British-Dutch-Australia (ABDA) surface force, ordered a naval attack into Lombok Strait in hopes of destroying the Japanese invasion force. U.S. submarine attacks had earlier failed, largely because of faulty torpedoes, although Allied air strikes had damaged one Japanese transport that was escorted by two Japanese destroyers of Captain Abe Toshio’s Destroyer Division 8. Three waves of Allied warships attacked the two Japanese destroyers. Doorman led the first wave, consisting of the Dutch light cruisers De Ruyter and Java and three destroyers (one Dutch and two U.S.) in a lengthy line-ahead formation at

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approximately 11:00 p.m. on February 19. The two Japanese destroyers returned fire, disabling by gunfire the Dutch destroyer Piet Hein and then sinking it with torpedoes. After the first Allied attack had passed through the strait, the Japanese destroyers exchanged fire with one another, although without damage. The second Allied attack wave arrived at about 1:30 a.m. on February 20. It consisted of four U.S. destroyers followed by the small Dutch light cruiser Tromp. An exchange of gunfire and torpedoes at ranges as close as 2,000 yards resulted in damage to several Allied ships, including the Tromp, and both Japanese destroyers. The remaining two destroyers of Abe’s Division 8 now arrived in Lombok Strait to reinforce. Abe steamed in the opposite direction among three of the Allied destroyers and the Tromp. The Japanese destroyer Michishio was heavily damaged in the exchange of fire, with 96 killed and wounded. Both sides then disengaged. The third attacking Allied wave arrived in the strait about 5:30 a.m. It consisted of seven Dutch motor torpedo boats, but these failed to locate the Japanese. The Battle of Lombok forced the Tromp to steam for Australia and repairs, and the two Japanese destroyers returned to Japan for the same purpose. The damaged U.S. destroyer Stewart would enter dry dock at Surabaya in the Netherlands East Indies, where it was captured by the Japanese and recommissioned in their navy as a patrol ship. The mix of Allied ships manned by exhausted crews was insufficient to deter the Japanese from their advance on Java. A lack of Allied training, faulty tactics that did not allow for a coordinated attack, and poor luck accounted for this Allied defeat. Jack Greene See also: ABDA Command; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Greene, Jack. The Midway Campaign, December 7, 1941–June 6, 1942. Rev. ed. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1995. Kirby, S. Woodburn. The War against Japan. Vol. 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957. Womack, Tom. “Naval Duel off Bali.” World War II 10, no. 6 (February 1996), pp. 50–56.

Lütjens, Günther (1889–1941) German navy admiral and commander of the ill-fated operation that ended with the sinking of the battleship Bismarck. Born in Wiesbaden, Germany, on May 25, 1889, Günther Lütjens joined the navy in 1907 and served on torpedo boats during

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World War I. In 1937, he commanded the torpedo boat arm of the Kriegsmarine (German navy). With the beginning of World War II, in October 1939, Lütjens was appointed commander of Scouting Forces. In June 1940, he was named fleet commander after Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had sacked the first two fleet commanders for not taking aggressive action. On June 20, Raeder ordered Lütjens to take out the battleship Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper in a foray, but a British submarine torpedoed and badly damaged the Gneisenau, forcing a postponement in battleship operations. Raeder was determined to send the battleships into the North Atlantic to demonstrate their value before Germany had won the war, which led him to take the gamble of deploying the new battleship Bismarck in May 1941 when only the new heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was available as a consort. Lütjens had command of the force. Lütjens objected to Raeder’s piecemeal approach to battleship operations and urged postponing Operation RHINE EXERCISE until the other battleships were ready for action. He loyally supported Raeder’s decision, however, and defended the mission when questioned by Adolf Hitler. Both Raeder and Lütjens were aware that the Bismarck departed Bergen, Norway, after refueling, on May 22, 1941, with weapons and equipment cannibalized from other ships and an incomplete antiaircraft-fire-control system. Lütjens’s halfhearted leadership and pessimism, along with his rigid adherence to his orders to avoid risks, hindered his ability to analyze objectively either his options or his opportunities. He declined to exploit his victory over the British battle cruiser Hood and finish off the battleship Prince of Wales. Influenced by his belief that the British were employing new radar, he gave his position away by radioing for instructions from Berlin and failed to recognize that he had actually eluded his pursuers. His decision to steam directly for Saint-Nazaire, instead of withdrawing to a more remote area or even returning to Norway, exposed the Bismarck to the British Force H from Gibraltar and the carrier Ark Royal. Following damage by a lucky torpedo that jammed the Bismarck’s twin rudders, he resigned himself to carrying out Raeder’s instructions to fight “to the last shell” and was lost when the Bismarck went down on May 27, 1941. Keith W. Bird See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Germany, Navy; Radar; Raeder, Erich.

References Bercuson, David J., and Holger H. Herwig. The Destruction of the Bismarck. Woodstock, NY, and New York: Overlook Press, 2001. Burkard, Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg. Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.

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Salewski, Michael. Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935–1945. Vol. 1, 1935–1941. Frankfurt, Germany: Bernard and Graefe, 1970.

Lyme Bay, Battle of (April 28, 1944) In preparation for their invasion of Normandy, some 30,000 U.S. troops were to participate in Exercise TIGER, consisting of practice landings at Slapton Beach on the coast of Devon in southeastern England. The area had been selected for its resemblance to the designated invasion site of Utah Beach on France’s Normandy coast. Exercise TIGER was to last from April 22 to April 30, 1944. The first practice assault, on April 27, 1944, proceeded smoothly but the next, on the morning of April 28, became a nightmare for those involved. The troops were embarked on nine LSTs (tank landing ships), which were to have been protected by a Royal Navy force of one destroyer, the Scimitar, a Flower-class corvette, the Azalea, three motor torpedo boats, and two motor gun boats patrolling the entrance to Lyme Bay, where the exercise was to occur. In addition, other motor torpedo boats were to have under surveillance the French port of Cherbourg, where German motor torpedo boats (S-boats) were based. However, the Scimitar had been rammed the previous day and was at Portsmouth for repairs, and its replacement did not sail because of a mix-up in the shore command. The U.S. commander learned of this only after the operation was underway. On the morning of April 28, nine German S-boats of the 9th Flotilla (S-100, S-130, S-136, S-138, S-140, S-142, S-143, S-145, and S-150) that had departed on patrol from Cherbourg crossed the channel. They were engaged by British destroyers and Azalea’s commander received an enemy alert shortly after midnight. However, he continued to lead the LSTs in a straight line formation, making them an easy target, and did not attempt to warn the U.S. vessels. The German S-boats spotted the convoy of LSTs in Lyme Bay and, after tracking it for a half hour, attacked it with torpedoes, hitting LST-507 at 2:03 a.m. A large fire broke out and quickly spread amid the stored vehicles and ammunition, forcing the embarked soldiers and crew to abandon ship. Many soldiers panicked, put on their lifebelts incorrectly, and were drowned in the frigid 42-degree water. More than 260 of the vessel’s crew and passengers perished. At 2:17 a.m., LST-531, in the middle of the U.S. column, exploded under the impact of two torpedoes. It sank within six minutes, with the loss of 467 men. A torpedo also hit LST-289, but it remained afloat and lost only 13 men in the explosion. Friendly fire damaged LST-511. The escort HMS Azalea returned up the column after the first explosion, but its crew could not determine the source of the attack. The corvette’s crew was unable to seek information because, due to a typographical error in their orders, the U.S. and British were using different radio frequencies and could not communicate.

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After the Germans had expended their torpedoes, several LSTs returned and rescued survivors. They were joined by HMS Saladin, the relief escort for the Scimitar. Eyewitnesses reported that sections of the sea were literally covered with corpses. Although figures vary, deaths caused by the German attack probably totaled 198 sailors and 551 soldiers. Another 200 personnel were wounded. The German S-boats returned to Cherbourg unscathed. Official embarrassment and concern that disclosure might compromise the Normandy landings led to the order that the events of April 28 be kept secret. Indeed, 10 officers killed in the action had detailed knowledge of the forthcoming invasion that they could have revealed had they been captured, and the invasion was on hold until their bodies were located and identified. Exercise TIGER did not become public until after the end of the war. Even today, there is little documentation available about events on April 28. The events of that day did lead to better coordination of more extensive training in lifebelt use and the inclusion of more small craft in the actual Normandy landings in order to pick up men in the water. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Landing Craft; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Garn, Kenneth H. The Secret D-Day. Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1994. Lewis, Nigel. Exercise Tiger: The Dramatic True Story of a Hidden Tragedy of World War. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990. Small, Ken, and Mark Rogerson. The Forgotten Dead: Why 946 American Servicemen Died off the Coast of Devon in 1944—and the Man Who Discovered Their True Story. London: Bloomsbury, 1988. Tent, James Foster. E-Boat Alert: Defending the Normandy Invasion Fleet. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

M MAC (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) Ships British ships that superseded the earlier CAM (catapult assisted merchant ships) ships in providing emergency air cover for World War II convoys in the North Atlantic Gap, the area then beyond the range of shore-based aircraft. Unlike escort carriers, the merchant aircraft carrier (MAC) ships retained most of their cargocarrying capacity and operated as normal merchant vessels with merchant service commanders and crews. Only the aircrews and necessary aviation maintenance staff were naval personnel. The initial MAC ship design added a flight deck above a grain carrier hull, since its cargo handling gear was unaffected by the change. There was a small hangar aft with an elevator. Each ship carried three to four obsolescent Fairey Swordfish biplanes, the performance of which allowed safe operation from a deck just more than 400 ft. long. Tankers also were suitable for conversion but could not incorporate a hangar without interfering with cargo discharge pipework, so these ships parked their aircraft on a flight deck extended by 100 ft. The Burntisland Shipbuilding Company received two contracts in June 1942, and the first MAC-ship entered service in April 1943. By May 1944, 19 ships (6 grain ships and 13 tankers) were operational out of some 30 originally envisioned, but by then the ready availability of far superior escort carriers terminated the program. MAC ships used their aircraft primarily to prevent U-boat attacks on convoys. Their Swordfish carried out 12 direct attacks in all but sank no enemy submarines. The true measure of their effectiveness is that not one U-boat successfully attacked a convoy that included a MAC ship. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; CAM (Catapult Assisted Merchantman) Ships; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Brown, David K., ed. The Design and Construction of British Warships, 1939–1945. The Official Record: Major Surface Vessels. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

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Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Sturtivant, Ray. British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917–1990. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Madoera Strait, Battle of (February 4, 1942) Naval battle in the Netherlands East Indies. On January 10, 1942, responding to the deteriorating situation in the Far East, the Allies established the joint AmericanBritish-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. The next day, the Japanese began their conquest of the Netherlands East Indies by invading Tarakan in Borneo and Menado in the Celebes. This move was followed by the Japanese capture of Balikpapan in Borneo and Kendari in the Celebes on January 24 and Ambon in the Moluccas on January 27. The ABDA Command retaliated with its aircraft and an inconclusive naval strike against Balikpapan. On February 2, ABDA naval commander U.S. Admiral Thomas Hart formed the Combined Striking Force to concentrate his naval resources to meet the next Japanese move. When a Japanese convoy was spotted assembling at Balikpapan, he ordered a sortie. Hart wanted his warships to strike the Japanese as the convoy approached either Makassar in the Celebes or Bandjermasin in Borneo. Already assembled at Madoera Island, near Java’s naval base of Soerabaja, were the ABDA cruisers USS Houston and Marblehead and HMNS Tromp, supported by seven destroyers: the USS Barker, Bulmer, John D. Edwards, and Stewart and the HMNS Banckert, Piet Hein, and Van Ghent. When their air reconnaissance sighted these vessels on February 3, the Japanese gathered 36 Mitsubishi G4M (known as “Betty” in the Allied recognition system) and 24 Mitsubishi G3M (“Nell”) bombers, along with 7 Mitsubishi CSM2 (“Babs”) reconnaissance aircraft to seek out and destroy this threat. On the morning of February 4, Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman led the Combined Striking Force north. No ABDA air cover was available except for the Houston’s three floatplanes. Doorman’s concern that his force would be spotted by Japanese aircraft was confirmed at 9:49 a.m., when nine Japanese bombers found his ships passing through the Madoera Strait. For the next two hours, the Japanese concentrated their air attacks on the U.S. cruisers. The Japanese had only one plane shot down and two damaged. Although the Japanese failed to sink any of the ABDA ships, they did inflict serious damage. The Houston’s after-turret was knocked out, and the Marblehead was so badly damaged that it was forced to steam to the United States for repairs. Doorman was obliged to withdraw his force to Tjilatjap on Java’s southern coast. U.S. casualties in the battle totaled 63 dead and 84 wounded. Hollywood treated the story of the

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wounded sailors in the 1944 propaganda film The Story of Dr. Wassell, starring Gary Cooper. Jonathan “Jack” Ford See also: ABDA Command; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Banten Bay, Battle of; Darwin, Raid on; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of the; Lombok, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Shores, Christopher, Brian Cull, and Yasuho Izawa. Bloody Shambles. Vol. 2, The Defence of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma. London: Grub Street, 1996. Winslow, Walter G. The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Malta British-held island in the central Mediterranean, located about 60 miles from Sicily. This archipelago of 122 square miles, with a civilian population of 270,000, played a crucial role in the World War II struggle to control the Mediterranean. Just as Malta had been a key location for forces traveling to the Near East in support of the Crusades and during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, so it proved a vital link in the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa during World War II. Formally a British possession since 1814, Malta had the only British port facilities between Alexandria, Egypt, and Gibraltar, but because it was 1,000 miles from the nearest British base, it was difficult both to defend and to resupply. The governor of the island—Lieutenant General William Dobbie and, from May 1942, General Lord John Gort—also acted as its military commander. The British used Malta as an air and naval base to interdict Axis supply lines between Italy and Libya. In November 1941, British ships and planes operating mainly from Malta sank two-thirds of the Axis supplies sent to Libya. Both sides recognized the importance of Malta to operations in the Mediterranean theater. When Italy declared war on the Allies in June 1940, it immediately began air attacks on the island, and initially the British had only a handful of Sea Gladiator biplanes to meet these. The Germans increased the pressure on the island by sending Fliegerkorps X to Sicily to neutralize Malta so that Axis supplies and men might reach North Africa. Beginning in January 1941, Fliegerkorps X struck

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both the island and the British supply convoys in what became a furious, two-year aerial campaign. Sustaining Malta became a top priority for the Allies in the Mediterranean theater. From August 1940 until January 1943, the British pushed 27 convoys through to Malta, 11 of which sustained losses to Axis naval and air attacks. Critical to Malta’s survival was the resupply of fighter aircraft sent to the island via aircraft carrier. The situation became so desperate and British naval forces were stretched so thin that the United States employed the fleet carrier Wasp to fly in Spitfire aircraft during April and May 1942. This was at a time when the U.S. Pacific Fleet desperately needed every available carrier in the Pacific to stem the Japanese advance there. Despite Allied efforts, the situation in Malta remained precarious for much of 1942. The largest effort to resupply the island came in Operation PEDESTAL in August 1942, when the British sent 4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 24 destroyers to escort a convoy of 14 merchantmen to the island. After numerous air and U-boat attacks, the convoy limped into Malta’s harbor on August 12 with just five merchant ships, three of which were damaged. The Royal Navy lost one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and one destroyer, with another carrier and two cruisers damaged. However, PEDESTAL was sufficient to allow operations from Malta to continue. In the spring of 1942, Axis leaders discussed employing Italian and German paratroopers, supported by a sea invasion, to seize the island, but the Italians’ lack of preparation, the desire to move German air units to the Eastern Front, General Erwin Rommel’s recent success in Libya, and the memory of the costly Crete operation all led Adolf Hitler to cancel the operation. By the time the siege of Malta had been lifted in December 1942, more than 1,500 Maltese had died from Axis air attacks. In recognition of British ships on fire off Malta following an attack by Italian their stoutness and to improve Cant Z.1007bis bombers, 1942. (Getty Images)

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their morale during the bleakest of times, Britain’s King George VI bestowed on the entire population of Malta the George Cross for valor. C. J. Horn See also: Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; PEDESTAL, Operation.

References Ansel, Walter. Hitler and the Middle Sea. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972. Bradford, Ernle. Siege: Malta, 1940–1943. New York: William Morrow, 1986. Smith, Peter C., and Edwin Walker. The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces. Shepperton, UK: Ian Allan, 1974. Vella, Philip. Malta: Blitzed but Not Beaten. Valletta, Malta: Progress Press, 1989.

Malta Convoy Battles (June 12–16, 1942) A series of aero-naval actions fought in the Mediterranean in June 1942 resulting from a British effort to run convoys to Malta from both Egypt and Gibraltar. During the spring of 1942, British warships withdrew from Malta because of the pressure of Axis air attacks and the failure of a convoy in March 1942 to deliver a meaningful amount of supplies and fuel. By June, Malta’s civilians were reduced to a daily diet of 1,500 calories and the governor warned that starvation could force the island’s surrender by August. In response, the British Admiralty planned a massive double convoy operation to relieve Malta and restore its ability to function as a base. The convoy from the east, code-named Operation VIGOROUS, was commanded by Rear Admiral Philip Vian and included 11 transports escorted by 8 light cruisers, 26 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 2 minesweepers, and an old dreadnought disguised as a modern battleship. The western convoy, code-named Operation HARPOON, consisted of five transports and one tanker. Force X, commanded by Captain Cecil Campbell Hardy, provided the close escort, with one antiaircraft cruiser, five fleet destroyers, four Hunt-class destroyer escorts, and four fleet minesweepers. The distant escort, Force W, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Alban T. B. Curteis, consisted of a battleship, two aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers. Both convoys got underway on June 12, 1942. VIGOROUS lost two transports in the first two days, one to bomb damage and the other to straggling. On June 14, Italo-German air strikes sank another transport; then, at 2:30 p.m. that day, Italian Admiral Angelo Iachino sailed from Taranto with 2 modern battleships, 2 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 12 destroyers, planning to intercept the convoy the next morning.

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The Mediterranean Fleet’s new commander, Admiral Henry Harwood, ordered Admiral Vian to reverse course at 2:00 a.m. on April 15, and during this evolution German motor torpedo boats attacked, sinking one destroyer and damaging a cruiser. At 5:25 a.m., Harwood ordered Vian to return to his original course, hoping that air attacks and a submarine picket line would take care of the Italian fleet. British and U.S. pilots delivered four separate attacks and claimed more than a dozen hits on the Italian battleships. In fact, they torpedoed the heavy cruiser Trento, while a bomb bounced off one of the Littorio’s turrets. Harwood instructed Vian to reverse course again from west to east at 8:28 a.m., and, then, based on the overoptimistic reports from the airmen, from east to west at 11:51 a.m. However, Vian knew the Italian battleships were pressing forward, and he held steady for Alexandria despite his orders. Meanwhile, further Axis air strikes sank two destroyers and damaged one cruiser, and a German submarine accounted for another cruiser. In the return to base, a British submarine finished off the Trento, and a torpedo bomber hit the Littorio, putting it into dock for repairs for three months. Nonetheless, Operation VIGOROUS was a major Italian victory because no British ships made it to Malta. Operation HARPOON, which also got underway on June 12, was spotted by Axis aircraft the next day. It suffered its first air attack on June 14, when Italian bombers sank one freighter and severely damaged a light cruiser. Subsequent air strikes failed to score, and at 8:15 p.m., the distant escort, Force W, turned back, while the convoy, four freighters and one tanker, and Captain Hardy’s close escort of the antiaircraft cruiser Cairo; the 11th Destroyer Flotilla with Bedouin, Partridge, Marne, Matchless and Ithuriel; the 12th Destroyer Flotilla with the Hunt-class destroyer escorts Blankney, Badsworth, Middleton and the Polish vessel Kujawiak; and four fleet minesweepers began the dash through the Sicilian narrows. That same evening, the Italian navy’s 7th Division commanded by Rear Admiral Alberto Da Zara and consisting of the light cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli set sail from Palermo intending to intercept the British force at dawn on June 15. Da Zara was accompanied by the 10th Destroyer Squadron with the Ascari, Oriani, and the Premuda, and the 14th Destroyer Squadron with the Vivaldi and Malocello. The Italian squadron intercepted the British convoy on June 15 at 5:30 a.m., 25 miles southwest of the island of Pantelleria. The 12th Flotilla made smoke, while the 11th Flotilla interposed itself between the Italian cruisers and the convoy. The Bedouin and Partridge sustained heavy damage from cruiser gunfire. Because their speed was slower, the Italian 14th Squadron attacked independently and engaged the 12th Flotilla. In this action, the Vivaldi received a disabling hit. While the British ships kept the enemy cruisers away from the convoy, German Ju 88-bombers struck at 6:15 a.m., taking the opportunity presented by the lack of


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opposition to sink one freighter and damage the tanker. The warships continued to spar from long ranges for two and a half hours until the presence of a minefield caused the Italian admiral to break off action and seek a better location to renew the battle. During this time, the Italian cruisers were each hit by shells, while the Cairo was moderately damaged and Ithuriel lightly damaged. At 10:20 a.m., another Axis air attack damaged a transport. The British force already had two ships under tow, and Captain Hardy decided to cut his losses and make a run for Malta with his undamaged ships. He ordered the damaged transport and tanker scuttled, but the 4-inch weapons of the two warships assigned to accomplish this task proved insufficient and only ignited fires that cast huge plumes of smoke. These unintentional beacons attracted Admiral Da Zara, who had lost the British location. By 12:15 p.m., the Italian squadron was back in action, damaging a minesweeper that had stayed behind to sink the stragglers. They also finished off the cripples and chased off the Partridge, which had been towing the Bedouin. At 1:25 p.m., an Italian bomber torpedoed the Bedouin, which exploded and sank. At 2:40 p.m., Admiral Da Zara broke off his chase of the Partridge and headed for home after an effective intervention that saw, in cooperation with aerial units, one destroyer, two transports, and a tanker sunk; and two destroyers, one cruiser, and a minesweeper damaged. The Italians suffered one destroyer heavily damaged and two cruisers lightly damaged. As the British convoy approached Malta, it ran into a minefield laid the month before by Italian destroyers. The Polish destroyer Kujawiak was sunk, while one of the transports, two destroyers, and a minesweeper were heavily damaged. Of the 17 transports and tankers involved in the twin operations, only two arrived. Overall British losses consisted of six transports, one tanker, one light cruiser, and five destroyers; also four cruisers, four destroyers, and a minesweeper had been significantly damaged. The Italians lost one heavy cruiser and had significant damage to one battleship and one destroyer. Rome rightfully celebrated the mid-June convoy operations as a major victory, while the British immediately began planning another operation to relieve Malta. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Convoys, Allied; Harwood, Sir Henry; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sirte, Second Battle of; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

References Fioravanzo, Giuseppe. La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Vol. 5, Le Azioni Navali in Mediterraneo dal 1 Aprile 1941 al’8 Settembre 1943. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1970. The National Archives, Kew, England. ADM 234/353. Battle Summaries, No. 32, Malta Convoys 1942.

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Playfair, I. S. O. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 3, British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb [September 1941 to September 1942]. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2004. Santoni, Alberto, and Francesco Mattesini. La partecipazione aeronavale tedesca alla Guerra nel Mediterraneo. Rome: Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1980. Vian, Philip. Action This Day. London: Frederick Muller, 1960.

Mariana Islands Campaign ( June–August 1944) Military campaign in the Central Pacific. After securing the Marshall Islands in early 1944, U.S. military planners decided that the next step would be to bypass the Japanese-held Caroline Islands (including the stronghold of Truk) in order to seize the Mariana Islands. Located equidistant from the Marshalls and the Japanese home islands, the 15 islands of the Marianas are spread over 400 miles, with the largest, Guam, located at the southern end of the chain. Two other large islands, Tinian and Saipan, are 100 miles north. In U.S. hands, the Marianas would offer a base for a subsequent assault on the Philippine Islands to the west and a strike at the Bonin Islands to the north (only 700 miles from the Japanese home islands), as well as a location for air bases from which B-29 strategic bombers might raid the Japanese home islands. The Japanese military knew that holding on to these islands was essential to their control of the shipping routes to Southeast Asia, their retention of the Philippines, and the defense of Japan itself. In consequence, the Marshalls would prove much more difficult to seize than were the Gilberts and Marshalls. For the U.S. commander of Central Pacific forces, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the primary objective in Operation FORAGER was to secure Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance’s Fifth Fleet would conduct FORAGER. The main naval component was Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Task Force 58 of four fast carrier battle groups. Also under Spruance was Vice Admiral Kelly Turner’s V Amphibious Force. Its task was to put ashore the ground force of nearly six Marine and army divisions under Lieutenant General Holland Smith. The forces involved in FORAGER deployed from as far away as Hawaii, 5,000 miles from the Marianas. Beginning on February 23, 1944, Mitscher’s carrier aircraft repeatedly attacked Japanese air bases in the Marianas, virtually wiping out Japanese air power. On June 15, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions went ashore on Saipan. Despite intense naval bombardment that pounded the island for two days in advance of the invasion, the Japanese defenders held fast. The marines did not consolidate their beachhead until late that night, and with army reinforcements, they pushed inland over the next two weeks. The Japanese had anticipated the U.S. invasion, and on its execution, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, ordered the 1st

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¯ , an effort to destroy the Fifth Fleet. The Mobile Fleet to launch Operation A-GO heavily outnumbered Japanese naval forces were supported by land-based aircraft from the Marianas and nearby islands. To meet this Japanese attack, Spruance delayed the amphibious assault on Guam scheduled for June 18. From June 19 to 21, U.S. and Japanese naval forces met in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, essentially a contest of naval airpower and one of the largest and most decisive battles of the war. Superior numbers and pilot proficiency, as well as radar, carried the day for the Americans. The three-day Battle of the Philippine Sea cost the Japanese 3 large carriers and more than 480 aircraft, in what came to be known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.” U.S. losses came to 130 aircraft, with light damage to the battleship South Dakota. Spruance then ordered Task Force 58 to fall back on the Marianas to protect the U.S. shipping there. Spruance was criticized at the time and since for his failure to pursue the Japanese fully, but his primary mission was to cover the assault in the Marianas. Meanwhile, the struggle for Saipan raged. The Japanese commanders on the island, Lieutenant General Saito¯ Yoshitsugu and Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ ichi, both committed suicide on July 6 as the remaining Japanese defenders launched wave after wave of suicide charges, the largest of the war; this accelerated the U.S. victory. Because of Japan’s effective anti-American propaganda, more than 8,000 civilians committed suicide, many by throwing themselves off cliffs on the northernmost end of the island. Bombardment of Tinian began before Saipan fell on July 13. The landings on Tinian occurred on July 24. Marines stormed Tinian’s northern coast and encountered little opposition. The situation soon changed, however, when the Japanese defenders regrouped and attacked the marines in fanatical but futile suicide charges. Tinian was secured by August 2. Guam, the most important of the Marianas, had been a U.S. possession for 40 years prior to the war. Actual fighting for Guam began on July 21, when three U.S. divisions executed near perfect amphibious landings following two weeks of preinvasion bombardment. The ground troops, commanded by Marine Major General Roy Geiger, faced difficult terrain that favored the fanatical Japanese resistance. The Americans secured Guam by August 10, although mopping-up operations continued in some areas until the end of the war. The capture of the Marianas accomplished five key objectives of the Pacific Campaign. The great Marianas turkey shoot ended the threat from Japanese carrier-based aviation. Additionally, Guam became one of three major western bases for the Pacific Fleet, and the United States established several air bases on these islands from which to launch massive raids against Japan. U.S. forces were now in position to strike at the Philippines and cut off Japan’s oil supply from the East Indies. The U.S. victory in the Marianas also prevented any further Japanese resistance to Allied operations in New Guinea. Finally, the loss of Saipan led to the

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collapse of To¯ jo¯ Hideki’s government and his replacement as premier by Koiso Kuniaki. William P. McEvoy and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nagumo Chu¯ ichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Toyoda Soemu; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

References Crowl, Philip A. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific—Campaign in the Marianas. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Rottman, Gordon. Saipan and Tinian 1944: Piercing the Japanese Empire. London: Osprey, 2004. Smith, Douglas V. Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Marschall, Wilhelm (1886–1976) German admiral. Born in Augsburg, Germany, on September 30, 1886, Wilhelm Marschall entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet in 1906. He was a submarine commander during World War I. Continuing in the German navy after the war, in 1934, Marschall took command of the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer. Promoted to Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) in 1936, he headed the operations division of the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine. Between 1937 and 1938, Marschall commanded German naval forces off Spain during the Spanish Civil War. He then was chief of the navy’s operations staff just before the start of World War II, with responsibility for wartime planning. Appointed fleet commander in October 1939, Vice Admiral Marschall sortied with the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau that November. On June 8, 1940, Marschall and the two battle cruisers encountered the British aircraft carrier Glorious and destroyers Acasta and Ardent some 280 miles west of Harstad, Norway. The three British ships were taking part in the evacuation of Allied forces from Norway and were headed for Scapa Flow. In the ensuing two-hour engagement, all three British ships were sunk, but a torpedo from the Acasta badly damaged the Scharnhorst, and both German ships received a number of hits from 4.7-inch shells fired by the destroyers. The damage was sufficient to cause the Germans to retire to Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the evacuation convoy through the area later that same day. While escorting the damaged Scharnhorst, the Gneisenau

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was in turn badly damaged by a torpedo from the British submarine Clyde. Both German capital ships required extensive repair. Commander of the navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder relieved Marschall from his post for not strictly following the operational plan, which had called on him to avoid such action. Marschall believed that a commander at sea had to have freedom of action. Admiral Günther Lütjens then replaced Marschall as fleet commander. Given charge of Navy Group West in the summer of 1942, which he considered vindication of his earlier ideas, Marschall was promoted to Generaladmiral (equivalent to U.S. full admiral) in February 1943. Raeder’s successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz, preferred others in command positions, and Marschall then held posts ashore. He was held as a prisoner of war during 1945–1947. Marschall died in Mölln, Federal Republic of Germany, on March 20, 1976. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Lutjens, Günther; Raeder, Erich.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974. Humble, Richard. Hitler’s High Seas Fleet. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Crowell, 1969.

Marshall Islands Naval Campaign (January 29–February 22, 1944) U.S. amphibious assault on Japanese-held territory in the Central Pacific in the drive toward the Japanese home islands. This campaign came after the U.S. seizure of Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. The Marshall Islands are two parallel coral atoll chains, located within a 400,000-square-mile area. They are about 4 degrees above the equator and 2,000 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. At the beginning of 1944, the Marshall Islands formed the outermost Japanese defensive barrier in the Central Pacific. The Japanese had received the islands from Germany as a consequence of World War I and thus had ample opportunity to fortify them. Initially, U.S. planners intended to capture the Marshalls and bypass the Gilbert Islands immediately to the south, but in mid-1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to secure the Gilberts first and then use them as a base to attack the Marshalls. In developing the attack plan, which was completed in early December 1943, the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, overrode his own staff by insisting on bypassing the more heavily fortified outer islands of the atoll.

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Aerial photography revealed an airstrip under construction on Kwajalein Island, the hub of Japanese operations in the Marshalls; because that airstrip would be capable of handling bombers, it became the priority. The adjacent islands of Roi and Namur were also to be taken. The final objective was Eniwetok Atoll. Kwajalein is in the center of the Marshalls, just south of Roi and Namur, whereas Eniwetok is located at the northern end of the islands and 300 miles closer to Tokyo. The first step, however, would be to secure Majuro, an undefended atoll. Its lagoon would provide anchorage for support vessels. Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of Fifth Fleet (and Central Pacific Force), had overall charge of the operation. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner was in charge of the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51) of transports and landing craft, and Marine Major General Holland M. Smith would command the assault once troops were ashore. The attacking forces were arranged in three groups: Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly commanded the Northern Attack Force, charged with taking Roi and Namur in Kwajalein Atoll; Admiral Turner retained command of the Southern Task Force, with the objective of Kwajalein Island; and Captain D. W. Loomis commanded a reserve force that would stand by during the capture of Kwajalein. Later, this force secured Eniwetok. The assault force, not counting the fast carrier task groups of submarines, numbered 197 ships, lifting a total of 54,000 assault troops, double the number in the Gilberts operation; on Kwajalein, there would be 41,000 U.S. troops versus 8,000 Japanese. Learning from the experience at Tarawa, U.S. planners provided for a much heavier air and naval bombardment. On January 29, U.S. carrier aircraft began hitting Japanese positions. Roi was the center of Japanese air power in the Marshalls, with almost 100 aircraft based there. Its aircraft were obliterated in the sky and on the ground, ending any Japanese air threat that same day. U.S. aircraft and ships pounded Mili, Kwajalein, Roi, Maloelap, Taroa, Jaluit, and Wotje simultaneously with bombs and naval gunfire. Majuro Atoll, composed of 56 islands, was secured between January 31 and February 8 and perfectly served the needs of the mobile supply system. The primary target was Kwajalein Atoll (Operation FLINTLOCK). On January 31, troops of the 4th Marine Division landed on Roi and Namur. Unlike operations in the Gilberts, FLINTLOCK had a sufficient number of tracked amphibious landing vehicles (amphtracs, or LVTs) available for the forces, and it also saw the first large-scale use of DUKW amphibian trucks. The prolonged preinvasion bombardment was also effective. Once ashore, the marines progressed rapidly across the small islands. Japanese resistance ceased by the end of February 2. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army’s 7th Infantry Division landed on Kwajalein Island. Turner decided first to subject the island to an extensive bombardment from battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carrier aviation. The preliminary bombardment lasted from January 30 to February 1. The troops went ashore early on February


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1 in near perfect textbook fashion, and Kwajalein was taken on February 5. After seizing a few smaller islands, Kwajalein Atoll was declared secure two days later, at a cost of 372 Americans killed and 1,582 wounded. The Japanese suffered 7,870 killed and 265 taken prisoner. At the far western edge of the Marshalls lay Eniwetok Atoll, only 1,000 miles from the Marianas. Eniwetok, whose name translates as “Land between West and East,” came to serve as the staging point for U.S. military operations against the Mariana Islands. Nimitz had not planned to take it until May, but the surprisingly easy victory at Kwajalein emboldened his commanders to move the attack up to February, fearful that a delay would allow the Japanese time to reinforce. However, Eniwetok lay within striking distance of the massive Japanese base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. This bastion had to be eliminated before operations against Eniwetok could commence. Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher led Task Force 58 to neutralize Truk. His carrier aircraft destroyed more than 200 Japanese aircraft, sank 8 warships and 24 merchant vessels, and damaged an aircraft carrier. Mitscher’s raids effectively ended Truk’s value as a major Japanese base.

Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat fighters land on the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise (CV-6) following strikes on the Japanese base at Truk, February 1944. Flight deck crewmen fold the planes’ wings and guide them forward to the parking area. (Naval Historical Center)

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Code-named CATCHPOLE, the operation against Eniwetok was carried out by the 22nd Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and the 106th Infantry Regiment. The invasion of Eniwetok Atoll began on February 17 with an assault on Engebi Island at the northern end of the atoll. This tiny island was secured by early the next day, but the Japanese defenders who were well dug in on the southern islands of Parry and Eniwetok offered stiffer opposition. Eniwetok Island was secured on February 21, and Parry Island was declared secure on February 22. Operations against Eniwetok Atoll claimed 195 American dead and nearly 2,700 Japanese. Only 64 Japanese were taken prisoner. The fighting ashore had not been easy, but no U.S. ships were sunk and only a few were damaged, although several grounded in the channels between islands. Imperial Japanese Navy surface ships did not contest the landings, but submarines were present, four of which were sunk. A number of Japanese supply ships, auxiliaries, and patrol ships were also sunk by U.S. forces during the operation. U.S. successes neutralized Japanese bases on other islands in the Marshalls group, which remained isolated for the remainder of the war. The Marshalls operation saw the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps perfect their amphibious assault techniques. More important, the operation enabled U.S. forces to bypass Truk and the other Caroline Islands and leap 1,000 miles forward to the Mariana Islands, from which U.S. bombers would be able to strike Japan. William P. McEvoy and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Conolly, Richard Lansing; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

References Crowl, Philip A., and Edmund G. Love. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls. Reprint. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005. Heinl, Robert D. Jr., and John A. Crown. The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954. Meyers, Bruce F. Swift, Silent, and Deadly: Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance in the Pacific, 1942–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.

McCain, John Sidney (1884–1945) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Teoc in Carroll County, Mississippi, on August 19, 1884, John Sidney “Slew” McCain attended the University of Mississippi and the

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U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, where he graduated in 1906. Commissioned an ensign, McCain embarked on a successful career as a surface warfare officer, during which he commanded two ships and rose to the rank of captain. In 1936, McCain qualified as a naval aviator. His audacious decision to become a pilot led to his command of two naval air stations (Coco Solo and San Diego) and the aircraft carrier Ranger (May 1937 to July 1939). Promoted to rear admiral in February 1941, McCain received command of the Aircraft Scouting Force, Atlantic. In May 1942, he took command of all land-based naval aircraft in the South Pacific in the Guadalcanal Campaign. That October, he was assigned to Washington as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. McCain was promoted to vice admiral and advanced to deputy chief of naval operation for air in August 1943. In August 1944, McCain returned to the Pacific theater to command a carrier task group under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, and he participated in the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. In October, he took command of Carrier Task Force 38 from Mitscher, who in turn relieved him in January 1945. McCain returned to the same command in May 1945. He coordinated the highly effective air campaigns at Peleliu and Okinawa, and several carrier raids into Japanese home waters, and he also developed tactics to deal with Japanese kamikaze attacks. In only one month, his planes sank 49 Japanese ships and destroyed over 3,000 aircraft on the ground. Although in failing health and hurt by the finding of a court of inquiry into his actions during a typhoon in December 1944, McCain remained aboard the battleship Missouri to witness the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, before returning home to Coronado, California. He died on September 6, 1945, of a heart attack. Congress promoted him to full admiral posthumously. McCain was the father of four-star admiral John S. McCain Jr. and the grandfather of John S. McCain III, a navy pilot who spent six years as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War and who later became a U.S. senator and unsuccessful Republican presidential nominee. Bradford Wineman See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; ICEBERG, Operation; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Philippine Sea, Battle of the.

References Gilbert, Alton. A Leader Born: The Life of Admiral John Sidney McCain, Pacific Carrier Commander. Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2006. McCain, John S. III. Faith of My Fathers. New York: Random House, 1999. Van de Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: World War II—the U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

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McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert (1893–1959) British navy admiral who helped introduce various naval innovations, among them radar. Born in York, England, on April 12, 1893, Rhoderick Robert McGrigor attended the Royal Naval College, Osborne, as a cadet. He graduated from the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, at the top of his class in 1909 and was assigned to a cruiser. During World War I, he served in the Dardanelles Campaign and at the Battle of Jutland. Between the wars, he became a torpedo specialist. Following a number of routine assignments, McGrigor was promoted to captain in December 1933. When World War II began, he was chief of staff to Sir Percy Noble on the China station. But he returned to Britain in late 1940 to command the battle cruiser Renown, part of Force H, protecting convoys to Malta and joining in the bombardment of Genoa and the 1941 pursuit of the German battleship Bismarck. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1941, McGrigor was assistant chief of naval staff for weapons for 18 months, a position in which his technical ability helped him bring into service many naval innovations, such as radar. In 1943, he became a force commander in the Mediterranean, training crews in the new landing craft and taking part in the assaults on Pantelleria and Sicily. After some months as naval commander in southern Italy, McGrigor returned to Britain, leading the Home Fleet’s 1st Cruiser Squadron in numerous successful attacks on German vessels in the North Sea and in escorting several Allied convoys to the northern Soviet Union. Promoted to vice admiral in April 1945, McGrigor was vice chief of the naval staff from 1945 to 1948. After becoming a full admiral in September 1948, he served as commander in chief of the Home Fleet from 1948 to 1951. As first sea lord from 1951 to 1955, McGrigor tried to mitigate the worst of the postwar budgetary defense cuts. He insisted on maintaining high training standards, and in the 1950s he fought hard and successfully to retain aircraft carriers. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in April 1953, McGrigor retired to Scotland in April 1955. He died in Aberdeen on December 3, 1959. Priscilla Roberts See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; Great Britain, Navy; HUSKY, Operation; Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam; Radar.

References Belot, Raymond de. The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951. Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Jones, Matthew. Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942–1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

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Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

McMorris, Charles Horatio “Soc” (1890–1954) U.S. navy admiral who helped to plan offensives in the Central Pacific. Born on August 31, 1890, in Wetumpka, Alabama, Charles Horatio McMorris graduated fifth in his class from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1912. Nicknamed “Soc” or “Socrates” for his intelligence, he took part in the 1914 U.S. navy landing at Veracruz, Mexico, and served on destroyers in the North Atlantic during World War I. McMorris then held a variety of assignments, including instructor in seamanship and history at the Naval Academy (1925–1927, 1930–1933). In the interval, he commanded destroyers. From 1933 to 1935, he was a navigator on the battleship California. McMorris graduated from the Naval War College in 1938, served as operations officer for the Scouting Force (1938–1939), and then served in the same capacity with the Hawaiian Department (1939–1941). In January 1941, promoted to captain, McMorris became war plans officer on the staff of Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. In April 1942, he took command of the heavy cruiser San Francisco. Promoted to rear admiral, he assumed command of Task Force 8 that December and provided gunfire support for the 7th Infantry Division as it retook Attu Island in the Aleutians. On March 26, 1943, some 200 miles west of Attu and without air support, he fought the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, repelling a stronger Japanese naval force under Vice Admiral Hosogaya Boshiro. In June 1943, McMorris became chief of staff to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area. He helped plan the Central Pacific offensives of the war’s final two years and remained in his post until February 1946. Promoted to temporary vice admiral in September 1944, he took command of the Fourth Fleet in 1946. He served on the General Board from 1947 to 1948. In June 1948, he became a permanent vice admiral, commanding the 14th Naval District and Hawaiian Sea Frontier until he retired in September 1952. McMorris died in Honolulu, Hawaii, on February 11, 1954. Priscilla Roberts See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Hosogaya Boshiro; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; Nimitz, Chester William; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970.

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Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.

Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in The Mediterranean Sea extends 2,000 nautical miles from the Levant to Gibraltar, and varies in width from 700 miles to 80 miles. In 1939, seven states or empires possessed a Mediterranean coastline. Measuring the mainland only, Italy occupied 3,500 miles of coast, followed by France with 2,300, Greece with 2,150, Turkey with 1,850, British-governed territory with 1,050, Spain with 900, and Yugoslavia with 730. Italy, Greece, France, Spain, and Great Britain also held one or more of the inland sea’s major islands. All of these nations or empires absolutely depended upon maritime traffic through the Mediterranean to sustain their economy. Italy received 86 percent of its prewar imports by sea, and 75 of that total came through Gibraltar or Suez. For Great Britain, the Suez Canal cut 4,500 nautical miles from the journey between Bombay and London, and before the war, nearly 200 British merchant ships sailed the Mediterranean on any given day. France’s economy and its imperial connections likewise depended on the Mediterranean. Upon Italy’s declaration of war in June 1940, the following forces were in the Mediterranean: Italy had 2 battleships, 7 heavy and 14 light cruisers, 52 destroyers, 69 torpedo boats, and 105 submarines; France had 5 battleships, 7 heavy and 7 light cruisers, 38 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, and 40 submarines; Great Britain had 4 battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 2 aircraft carriers, 13 light cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 12 submarines; Spain had 6 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, and 5 submarines; Greece had 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 13 small torpedo boats, and 6 submarines; Turkey had 1 old battle cruiser, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 4 small torpedo boats, and 8 submarines; Yugoslavia had 1 old cruiser, 4 destroyers, 6 small torpedo boats, and 4 submarines. In the war’s first two weeks, the major operation was an ineffectual bombardment near Genoa by French naval forces. After France signed an armistice with the Axis powers, the disposition of its fleet became a critical concern for the British— one which the Royal Navy attempted to resolve by attacking the French squadron demobilizing at Mers-el-Kébir. This sparked a semiwar between the French—who maintained a credible fleet in being—and British forces that complicated operations in the western Mediterranean. Contrary to prewar plans, Italian leader Benito Mussolini decided to reinforce Africa shortly before war started, which presented the Regia Marina with the unanticipated mission of escorting convoys. For offensive operations, Italy planned to use light forces and bombers force to wage a low-risk, high-return campaign. However, poor tactics, unsuitable submarines, and the air forces’ reliance on inefficient, high-attitude bombing led to low returns and the rapid loss of 10 submarines. Great Britain, meanwhile, decided to hold Malta as an outpost, and most of


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the early operations revolved around British convoys to Malta or Italian convoys to Africa. London also expected to win its first significant victories of the war against Italy. The opportunity for such a victory coincided with Italy’s first large convoy to Africa. The result was an inconclusive engagement off Calabria on July 9, 1940. The Battle of Calabria set the naval status quo, which consisted of an Italian blockade of the Sicilian narrows by mines and light forces backed up by the battle fleet. With the Mediterranean’s central basin closed to all but occasional and heavily protected convoys, Britain was forced to maintain its Middle Eastern position from around Africa and up the Red Sea, a four-month voyage for a slow convoy. This required the withdrawal of shipping from the North Atlantic and contributed to a 35 percent decline in British imports between June and December 1940. In August, Italy commissioned two modern battleships, the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, giving its battle line superiority to that of Great Britain. In September, Italian forces invaded Egypt from Italy. Italy also invaded Greece on October 28, over the objections of the naval leaders, who were rightfully concerned that this action would complicate the naval war and provide the British with strategic bases. In November, during the course of a Malta supply operation, the British navy launched an air strike on the Italian navy’s base at Taranto and there damaged three battleships—the Littorio, Duilio, and Conte di Cavour, the latter being knocked out of the war permanently. As a result, the Regia Marina temporarily pulled back from Taranto and the Ionian Sea, but the Taranto attack did not eliminate Italy’s ability to dispute the through passage of the Mediterranean, as indicated by the Battle of Cape Spartivento, an indecisive battleship action fought two weeks later. In December 1940, British and British Empire forces routed Italy’s North African army and, by the beginning of February 1941, had advanced all the way to the borders of Tripolitania. This, along with the occupation of Crete, improved the Allied position in the eastern Mediterranean. During the war’s first seven months, the Italians ran 331 transports to Africa, losing 0.6 percent of the men and 2.2 percent of the matériel en route. The British brought 7 convoys with 27 merchant ships into Malta; yet only one British merchant ship successfully made the passage from Gibraltar to Egypt. Germany deployed air units in Sicily in December 1940. This was done in accordance with plans developed as early as July 1940 and to advance the Reich’s own war aims, rather than an effort to prop up Italy. German dive-bombers proved more effective than Italian high-level bombers in action against British ships off Pantelleria on January 10 and 11, when they sank a light cruiser and severely damaged the carrier Illustrious during a Malta operation. In early 1941, Britain decided to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece in accordance with its treaty with that nation. This led to London’s questionable decision to strip North Africa of its best forces. The Regia Marina, under heavy German pressure, attempted to raid convoys bringing troops to Greece with surface

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forces, but the British, who received hints of an operation from decrypts of German Enigma air force communications, dispatched the Mediterranean Fleet to intercept the sortie. The result was a nighttime ambush by the fleet’s battleship division and the loss of an Italian cruiser division in the Battle of Matapan. Events on land rather than the sea shaped the course of naval operations during the next several months. In Africa, Axis forces rolled the British back to Egypt and invaded Greece, expelling the Allies from the mainland and forcing a massive naval evacuation. The decision to hold Crete proved costly for the Royal Navy. Convinced that the island could only be taken by sea, it sent cruiser/destroyer task forces north, and, although one convoy was turned back and another largely destroyed, German paratroopers took the island anyway. Another evacuation followed, and the Royal Navy suffered grievous losses in the process. Combined with an Axis advance into Egypt, the pendulum in the eastern Mediterranean now swung against Great Britain, and its convoys had to face a longer passage through waters dominated by Axis air forces. In spring 1941, Malta also experienced intensified air attacks, and the British squadron based at Gibraltar focused on bringing aircraft to reinforce the island. During May and June 1941, 60 Axis transports and freighters arrived in Africa and just one was lost en route. However, the Regia Marina had depleted much of its fuel reserves by this point, and the naval command had to be very selective in its use of large warships. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Royal Navy devoted a destroyer squadron to keeping the besieged port of Torbuk supplied, and, after British and other Allied forces invaded Syria in June, the Royal Navy committed cruisers and destroyers to counter a pesky Vichy French flotilla that inflicted a sharp defeat on British destroyers off the Lebanese coast on June 9. During the second half of 1941, the convoy war intensified. The Germans transferred their air corps from Sicily, and on June 23, the British broke the cypher used by the Italian navy for administrative purposes. This intelligence coup gave the British advance notice of most convoys to Africa. As Malta-based submarines and bombers inflicted greater losses on Axis convoys, the British successfully brought a large convoy to Malta from the west in July. Italy’s special forces attempted to attack the convoy after it had docked but suffered a stinging defeat. On the occasion of another major convoy from the west in September, Italy decided to spend much of its remaining oil reserves to seek a strategic victory employing its fleet in conjunction with strong air attacks. The plan failed due in large part to the Italian commander Angelo Iachino’s mistaken belief that the British had stronger forces and were trying lure him into a trap. German submarines entered the Mediterranean in September, following complaints by German commander in North Africa General Erwin Rommel that the


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Italians were not doing enough to protect convoys. The U-boats sank the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the battleship Barham before the end of the year. With Malta’s supply position improving, the Royal Navy based a cruiser/destroyer force there, and this, along with submarines, aircraft, and the advantage of ULTRA intelligence, allowed several impressive sea denial victories, the most notable being against the seven-ship Beta convoy on November 9. This was followed by other British victories against small Italian one- and two-ship convoys and against two light cruisers in the Battle of Cape Bon on December 13. In November, only 38 percent of the Axis supplies shipped by sea reached Africa (for the six months ending in December, only 73 percent arrived). Just two days after the Battle of Cape Bon, the Italo-German armies in North Africa were in retreat and facing a supply crisis. The Italian navy made strenuous efforts to restore the situation, and it won three important victories in mid-December. The First Battle of Sirte on December 17 allowed a major convoy to reach North Africa. On December 19, a British cruiser/ destroyer force blundered into a minefield off Tripoli and lost one cruiser and one destroyer sunk and had two cruisers damaged. The same day, Italian commandos attacked the Mediterranean fleet’s main base at Alexandria and disabled two battleships, the Queen Elizabeth and Valiant. Meanwhile, the Germans redeployed air units to Sicily and began, once again, to hammer Malta. In the first half of 1942, the Allied position steadily deteriorated. In the short term, Japan’s entry into the war offset the advantages Britain gained by U.S. participation. Small convoys from the east proved insufficient to maintain Malta’s position, and, as food stocks there fell, the Mediterranean Fleet mounted a major operation to succor the island. This led to the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. The convoy did not deliver sufficient supplies to relieve the situation, however, and, following the intensification of the Axis air campaign against Malta, the British attempted a larger resupply operation from both the east and the west. This led to the convoy battles of mid-June and a defeat for the Royal Navy as only 2 of 17 merchant ships got through at great cost. The Axis leaders canceled plans to conquer Malta using paratroopers and an amphibious landing in the belief their siege of the island had neutralized it. On June 21, the Axis armies took Tobruk and drove into Egypt before being halted 60 miles short of Alexandria. This caused the Mediterranean Fleet to withdraw into the Red Sea and Palestine. Two months later, the Royal Navy mounted another Malta operation, this time only from the west, sending 14 freighters and tankers supported by 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 32 destroyers. Five ships from the convoy eventually reached their destination. In contrast, 94 percent of the matériel shipped by Italy to North Africa from January through June arrived safely. In the latter half of 1942, the British reverted to a blockade-running strategy to keep Malta alive. They made great efforts to chip away at the Axis North African

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seaborne traffic with some success, as only 74 percent of Axis shipments arrived. The major naval event was Operation TORCH on November 8. The Allied invasion and subsequent conquest of Morocco and Algeria and the partial occupation of Tunisia finally relieved the siege of Malta and also saw the end of French naval power with the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon, which greatly simplified matters for the Allies. Operation TORCH also introduced massive U.S. strength into the Mediterranean, and this, and not the British victory at El Alemein, marked the beginning of the end of Axis power in the region. The Axis fought to maintain a bridgehead in Africa centered on Tunis, and the focus of the naval war now shifted to the Sicilian Channel. Once again, small Italian convoys ran through heavily mined waters in the face of Allied air, submarine, and surface naval power, and losses were heavy. Tunis finally fell on May 8, 1943, and, in the face of Allied naval strength, the Axis made no effort to evacuate their African army by sea. Another consequence of this victory was the arrival in Egypt that month of the first through convoy from Gibraltar since early 1941. The breaking of the Italian blockage of the Sicilian narrows freed an estimated million tons of shipping. The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in Operation HUSKY—which followed on July 10—faced minimal and ineffective interference from Axis submarines and motor torpedo boats. On July 25, Italy had a change in government. Mussolini was arrested, and on September 8, the new government signed an armistice with the Allies. This armistice caught the Italian navy by surprise—in fact, the fleet was sortieing to attack the Allied beachheads at Salerno—and it was swept up in a campaign against the Germans that cost it a battleship and several destroyers while en route to the port of La Maddalena in Sardinia. After German forces captured La Maddalena and threatened Taranto, the naval command ordered the battle fleet to concentrate at Malta, but to not lower their flag or surrender control to the Allies. At the time of the Armistice, the Regia Marina had operational 6 battleships, 9 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 33 torpedo boats, 17 corvettes, and 42 submarines. The navy had 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 10 torpedo boats, 6 corvettes, and 17 submarines under repair. Following the Italian armistice, Germany proceeded to collect a surface fleet that deployed at one time or another 63 warships displacing more than 500 tons, mostly from captured Italian or French ships that were repaired or completed by the Germans. Germany fought several distinct naval campaigns. The Reich held the Aegean to keep Turkey neutral and deny the Allies access to the Black Sea. Germany had to protect the Balkans, and it needed the Adriatic Sea as a supply corridor to import raw materials and support its Balkan and Italian armies. In the western Mediterranean, German flotillas of torpedo boats and motor torpedo boats, supported by a new Italian fascist navy, fought in the Tyrrhenian Sea to protect the seaward flanks of their armies, transport supplies, and maintain imports from


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Spain. The Allies tried to break the stalemated land campaign on the Italian peninsula with Operation SHINGLE, an amphibious assault at Anzio on January 22, 1944. This operation, however, only resulted in an isolated beachhead that required support from the sea. Giant U.S. convoys now traversed the Mediterranean. Between the Italian armistice and December 1944, 50 Allied convoys averaging 69 ships each entered the Middle Sea. German submarines were foiled by the strength of their escorts, and their last submarine success occurred on May 18, 1944. In Operation DRAGOON on August 15, 1944, the Americans and French landed in the south of France. An Allied armada of 9 escort carriers, 5 battleships, 24 cruisers, and 111 destroyers supported this massive operation. However, even the conquest of southern France did not end naval operations in the Mediterranean as fighting continued in the Adriatic and Ligurian Seas up to the end of the war. In fact, the last surface action fought in European waters pitted British destroyers against German torpedo boats in the Ligurian Sea on March 18, 1945.

A shell explodes in the water as the Germans try to prevent Allied landing craft from resupplying the beachhead at Anzio, Italy, in January 1944. The landing was a failed Allied attempt to outflank the German defensive line to the south and secure Rome. (Getty Images/Hulton Archive)

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Overall, operations in the Mediterranean proved long and bitter. More surface actions were fought there than anywhere else in the war. Submarine operations were costly for both sides. There were five Allied major, multidivisional landings and dozens of smaller ones by the Allies and Axis both. For the first three years, Italy largely realized its naval objectives and not until the capture of Tunisia did the Allies gain control of the Mediterranean. Germany’s final campaigns in the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Ligurian Seas were instrumental in preventing the Reich from ever being threatened from the south. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in; Bergamini, Carlo; Beta Convoy Battle; Black Sea, Area of Operations; Borghese, Junio Valerio; Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Bon, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Naval Operations off; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; Da Zara, Alberto; de Courten, Raffaele; Dodecanese Islands Campaign; France, Navy; Gibraltar; Great Britain, Navy; Greece, Navy; Human Torpedoes; HUSKY, Operation; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Ligurian Sea, Battle of the; Malta; MENACE, Operation; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of; PEDESTAL, Operation; Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, Sinking of; Red Sea, Naval Operations in; Riccardi, Arturo; Sansonetti, Luigi; SHINGLE, Operation; Sidon, Engagement off; Signals Intelligence; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Skerki Bank, Battle near; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Suez Canal; Taranto, Attack on; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at; Vian, Sir Phillip Louis; Yugoslavia, Navy.

References Bagnasco, Erminio, and Enrico Cernuschi. Le Navi da Guerra Italiane 1940–1945. Parma, Italy: Ermanno Albertelli, 2003. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Simpson, Michael, ed. The Cunningham Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, O.M, K.T. G.C.B., D.S.O. and Two Bars. Vol. 1, The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939–1942. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999.

MENACE, Operation (Allied Attack on Dakar, September 23–25, 1940) Allied effort to capture the Vichy-held West African port of Dakar. Following the defeat of France by the Germans in June 1940, the French government, now based in the central spa town of Vichy, retained control of the French colonial

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empire. On August 26, however, the governor of French Equatorial Africa, Félix Eboué, declared for General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French, base in London. Shortly thereafter, Free French agents secured the Middle Congo. Encouraged by these events, de Gaulle convinced British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill that he could occupy Dakar, the capital of French West Africa, with little or no bloodshed. Strategically located in the most westerly part of Africa, Dakar boasted an excellent deep-water port and was equidistant from Europe and Brazil. The British feared that the Germans might pressure the Vichy French to allow them to use Dakar as a base from which to attack British shipping. De Gaulle pushed for an attack, eager to expand his power base in Africa, to show himself a key Allied figure, and to encourage other French African territories to rally to his cause. The resulting joint British–Free French plan was named Operation MENACE. Previously, on July 8, British aircraft flying from the carrier Hermes had attacked and immobilized the modern French battleship Richelieu at Dakar. This operation followed the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria on July 3–4 and caused great bitterness, particularly within the French navy. Despite these aggressive actions, both Churchill and de Gaulle believed the French authorities at Dakar were sympathetic to their cause. Operation MENACE involved 24 warships, including the battleships Barham and Resolution, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 5 sloops, 3 of which were Free French. These warships escorted 11 transports carrying 7,900 troops, 3,600 of whom were Free French. If the authorities at Dakar failed to rally to the Free French, the Free French troops would go ashore; the British forces were to be employed only in an emergency. Operation MENACE was plagued with problems from the beginning. The Allies lacked a clear picture of the strength of the Dakar defenses, which included the battleship Richelieu, two light cruisers, three large destroyers, one fleet destroyer, six sloops, and three submarines. The cruisers and large destroyers had sailed from Toulon to put down the rebellion in French Equatorial Africa and arrived at Dakar just in advance of the Allied force. On September 23, the French administrator at Dakar, Pierre Boisson, refused to talk to the Free French negotiators, and the French coastal batteries at Dakar opened fire on the British ships when they came into view. The British ships returned fire. In this first day of fighting, the shore batteries inflicted heavy damage on one cruiser and light damage on a cruiser and two destroyers. The heavy cruiser Australia disabled the large destroyer L’Audacieux, and destroyers sank the French submarine Persée. The defenders repulsed a halfhearted landing attempt by Free French troops. The British resumed their bombardment on the second day, September 24, but despite the heavy shelling, the Richelieu took only one light hit; in return, shore batteries landed four shells on the Resolution. The French submarine Ajax was sunk.

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In the battle’s third day, the French submarine Beveziers torpedoed and severely damaged the battleship Resolution. After the Australia and Barham suffered hits, the British commander called off the attack. Demonstrating that there was a danger of all-out war against Vichy, French bombers raided Gibraltar on September 24 and again the next day—dropping 105 tons of bombs but causing little damage. The failure of Operation MENACE was a blow to British and Free French prestige and demonstrated British inexperience in combined operations. It also revealed that the French did not feel that the British cause was their own and severely damaged the relationship between de Gaulle and Churchill. The Vichy French government regarded Dakar as a great victory. As a result of MENACE, Adolf Hitler saw some utility in Vichy France’s assistance. It also convinced him that Vichy would defend French Africa against the Allies and Free French. C. J. Horn See also: Darlan, Jean Louise Xavier François; France, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of.

References Churchill, Winston L. S. The Second World War. Vol. 2, Their Finest Hour. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949. de Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle. Vol. 1, The Call to Honor, 1940–1942. Trans. Jonathan Griffin. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968. Heckstall-Smith, Anthony. The Fleet That Faced Both Ways. London: A. Blond, 1963. Kersaudy, François. De Gaulle and Churchill. New York: Atheneum, 1981. Marder, Arthur. Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. Paxton, Robert O. Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of (July 3, 1940) Naval engagement fought between British and Vichy French warships. This battle, which took place on July 3, 1940, at the naval harbor outside Oran in French Algeria, was the most dramatic part of Operation CATAPAULT, the British effort to secure the French navy or at least keep it from falling into German hands. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered Vice Admiral James Somerville’s newly formed Force H to steam to Oran and deliver an ultimatum to Vice Admiral Marcel Bruno Gensoul. The French commander was offered the choice of joining his ships with the British and continuing the fight against the Germans and Italians; sailing them with reduced crews to a British port, with the crews to be promptly repatriated; sailing them with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies;


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or scuttling them. If Gensoul refused all these options, Somerville would open fire and sink the French ships. Somerville had the battle cruiser Hood, the battleships Resolution and Valiant (all three with a main armament of eight 15-inch guns each), the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Gensoul commanded the modern fast battle cruisers Strasbourg and Dunkerque, two older modernized battleships, six super-destroyers, and a seaplane tender, along with some small craft. Additional French warships were at nearby Oran. Somerville arrived at Mers-el-Kébir early on July 3. Gensoul tried to stall negotiations as he signaled for help from nearby French naval forces, while the Ark Royal’s aircraft dropped five magnetic mines in the harbor entrance. The mining occurred at about 1:30 p.m. After the French signal was intercepted by the British and decoded, London insisted that Somerville act quickly. At 5:54 p.m., the Hood led the Resolution and then the Valiant in a battle line and opened fire, utilizing spotting aircraft. The French ships were covered in smoke as they attempted to raise steam and leave the harbor. The range fell to about 15,300 yards. As both sides had been observing each other for hours and taking the range and with the French ships initially stationary, British fire was quite accurate. The confined waters, the process of getting under way, and the location of the Mersel-Kébir fort on a ridge overlooking the harbor between the opposing ships all conspired to make it difficult for the French ships to return fire accurately. The French managed to straddle the Hood with shells once or twice, and some shell fragments hit it and wounded two men, but no other damage was inflicted on the British ships. The British fired 36 salvos of 15-inch shells. The Dunkerque, hit four times and forced to beach, nonetheless managed to fire 40 13-inch rounds. These rounds and the increasing accuracy of the 9.4-inch and 7.6-inch guns of the French coastal batteries forced the British battle line to the west, away from the harbor entrance. On July 6, British torpedo planes attacked the Dunkerque, further damaging it and taking it out of the war for two years. The Bretagne sustained the worst damage. The second British salvo of several shells hit and penetrated its thin deck armor, causing a massive magazine explosion and capsizing it, resulting in the death of its captain and 976 men out of a crew of 1,012. The battleship Provence was hit several times and damaged. The vessel later steamed to Toulon for extensive repairs. The French destroyers, meanwhile, proceeded independently to sea; all escaped save the Mogador. That ship was hit on the stern and disabled. The others joined the Strasbourg, which fled the harbor and, although chased by the Hood, made it to Toulon. The Ark Royal lost three planes during the battle, and two of its men were dead. The French had 1,297 men killed and another 351 wounded. Cheering French sailors met the Strasbourg at Toulon, although it had lost five men because of an engineering accident during her voyage. Two light destroyers from Oran also steamed

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to Toulon, and the seaplane tender Commandant Teste (undamaged in the action) and six Gloire-class light cruisers from Algiers made Toulon on July 5. The light destroyers and small craft from Mers-el-Kébir had withdrawn to Algiers, and one sloop, the Rigault de Genouilly, was sunk by a British submarine. The battle was so one-sided because the French were surprised and their ships were at anchor without having their steam up. The fight at Mers-el-Kébir ruptured Anglo–Vichy France relations and almost brought a Vichy declaration of war against Britain. However, despite this episode, which to this day still rankles the French, the French navy honored its pledge not to surrender its ships to the Germans. In November 1942, it scuttled its ships at Toulon rather than see them fall into German hands. Jack Greene See also: CATAPULT, Operation; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at.

References Huan, Claude. Mers-El Kebir. Paris: Economica, 1994. Marder, Arthur. From the Dardanelles to Oran. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1974. Page, Christopher, ed. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 1, September 1939–October 1940. London: Whitehall History, 2002. Tute, Warren. The Deadly Stroke. New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1973.

Midway, Battle of (June 3–6, 1942) The Battle of Midway was the decisive World War II naval engagement between the United States and Japan. With their amazing run of successes in the first months of the Pacific war, the Japanese were understandably reluctant to go on the defensive. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commanding the Combined Fleet, and his staff wanted to secure Midway Island 1,100 miles west of Pearl Harbor. The half-dozen U.S. carrier raids from February to May 1942—especially the April 18 raid on Tokyo—helped silence Yamamoto’s critics and produce approval for his Midway plan. Under the revised plan, the Japanese first move would be to advance deeper into the Solomons and take Port Moresby, on the south coast of New Guinea. Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet would then occupy Midway Island, which Yamamoto saw as a stepping-stone toward a possible Japanese invasion of Hawaii. In any case, Midway could be used for surveillance purposes. After the Midway operation and the anticipated destruction of the U.S. fleet, the Japanese would resume their southeastern advance to cut off Australia.


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In the May 8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea, however, U.S. carriers caused the Japanese to call off the invasion of Port Moresby. In that battle, the Japanese lost the light carrier Sho¯ho¯ and the fleet carriers Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku were damaged. The Americans lost the fleet carrier Lexington and the Yorktown was damaged. It was a plus for the United States strategically, however. Both Japanese carriers in the battle failed to participate in the subsequent fight at Midway (one from damage and the other for lack of aircraft), while superior U.S. repair facilities and superhuman efforts made it possible for the heavily damaged Yorktown to join that fight. Meanwhile, planning for the Midway attack went forward. Yamamoto’s plan was both comprehensive and complex. For the Midway invasion, Yamamoto deployed an advanced submarine force to savage U.S. ships on their way to Midway; an invasion force under Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake of 12 transports with 5,000 troops supported by four heavy cruisers and a more distant covering force of two battleships, a light carrier, and four heavy cruisers; Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ ichi’s First Carrier Force of the fleet carriers Hiryu¯, Su¯ryu¯ , Kaga, and Akagi, with two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and a destroyer screen; and the main battle fleet under Yamamoto of three battleships (including the giant Yamato, his flagship), a destroyer screen, and a light carrier. The total was 8 carriers, 11 battleships, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, 21 submarines, and more than 600 aircraft—some 200 ships, constituting almost the entire Japanese navy. For the Aleutians, Yamamoto allotted an invasion force of three escorted transports carrying 2,400 troops, with a support group of two heavy cruisers, two light carriers, and a covering force of four older battleships. Apart from its tie-in with Midway, this force was to enable the Japanese to occupy Attu and Kiska, thus blocking a supposed U.S. invasion route to Japan. The battle would begin in the Aleutians, with air strikes on June 3, followed by landings on June 6. On June 4, Nagumo’s carrier planes would attack the airfield at Midway. On the June 6, cruisers would bombard Midway and troops would be landed, covered by the battleships. The Japanese expected there would be no U.S. ships in the Midway area until after the landings, and their hope was that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would hurry north to the Aleutians, enabling the Japanese to trap it between their two carrier forces. Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific Admiral Chester W. Nimitz could only deploy 76 ships; he had no battleships and only two carriers, the Enterprise and Hornet, fit for action. By an astonishing effort, the Yorktown, heavily damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, was readied in 2 days instead of the estimated 90 and sent to join the other two carriers. Nimitz did have the advantage of an accurate picture of the Japanese order of battle, and, thanks to code-breaking, he was reasonably certain that Midway was the Japanese objective. By contrast, the Japanese had virtually no information on the Americans, but at this point in the war the Japanese tended to dismiss the Americans and exaggerate their own abilities.

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The U.S. aircraft carrier Yorktown (CV-5), shown here shortly after it was struck by three Japanese bombs on June 4, 1942, during the Battle of Midway. It looked as if the ship could be saved, but it was sunk by torpedoes from the Japanese submarine I-168. (Naval Historical Center)

Nimitz packed Midway with B-26 and B-17 bombers. He positioned the three U.S. carriers, with 233 planes, some 300 miles to the northeast. He hoped the carriers would remain hidden from Japanese reconnaissance planes while counting on information on Japanese movements from Catalina aircraft based on Midway. He hoped to catch the Japanese by surprise, their carriers with planes on their decks. Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance had tactical command of U.S. naval forces in the battle. The Japanese deployed 86 ships against 27 U.S. and had 325 planes against 348 (including 115 land-based aircraft) for the United States. Carrier strength was five for Japan and three for the United States. On June 3, the day after the U.S. carriers were in position, U.S. air reconnaissance detected the Japanese transports some 600 miles west of Midway. A gap in the search pattern flown by Japanese aircraft allowed the U.S. carriers to remain undetected. In any case, the Japanese did not expect the U.S. Pacific Fleet to be at sea yet. Early on June 4, Nagumo launched 108 aircraft against Midway, while a second wave of similar size was prepared to attack any warships sighted. The first wave


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did severe damage to Midway at little cost to itself, but the pilots reported the need for a second attack. Since his own carriers were being bombed by planes from Midway, Nagumo ordered the second wave of planes to change from torpedoes to bombs and to focus on the airfields. Shortly thereafter, a group of U.S. ships was spotted about 200 miles away, but the Japanese at first thought it was only cruisers and destroyers. Then at 8:20 a.m. came a report identifying a carrier. Most of the Japanese torpedo bombers were now equipped with bombs, and most fighters were on patrol. Nagumo also had to recover the first wave of aircraft from the strike at Midway. Nagumo accordingly ordered a change of course to the northeast. This helped him avoid the first wave of U.S. dive-bombers. When three waves of U.S. torpedo bombers attacked the Japanese carriers between 9:00 and 10:24 a.m., 47 of 51 were shot down by Japanese fighters or antiaircraft guns. The Japanese now believed they had won the battle. Two minutes later, however, 37 U.S. dive-bombers from the Enterprise swept down to attack the Japanese carriers, while the Japanese fighters that had been dealing with the torpedo bombers were close to sea level. Soon the Akagi and Kaga were flaming wrecks, with the torpedoes and fuel on their decks feeding the fires. The So–ryu– took three hits from the Yorktown’s dive-bombers that also arrived on the scene, and soon it too was abandoned. The Hiryu–, the only Japanese fleet carrier still intact, then sent its planes against the limping Yorktown, forcing the Americans to abandon it. Then 24 U.S. divebombers, including 10 from the Yorktown, caught the Hiryu–. It went down the next day. Yamamoto now suspended the attack on Midway, hoping to trap the Americans by drawing them westward. Spruance, however, refused to take the bait. The Battle of Midway was a crushing defeat for Japan. The Americans lost the carrier Yorktown and about 150 aircraft, while the Imperial Navy lost four fleet carriers and some 330 aircraft, most of which went down with the carriers, and a heavy cruiser. The loss of the carriers and their well-trained aircrews and support personnel was particularly devastating. The subsequent Japanese defeat in the important land battle of Guadalcanal was principally due to a lack of naval air power. The Battle of Midway also provided the Americans a respite until, at the end of 1942, the new Essex-class fleet carriers began to come on line. In Nimitz’s words: “Midway was the most crucial battle of the Pacific War, the engagement that made everything else possible.” Spencer C. Tucker See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Japan, Navy; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Spruance, Raymond Ames; United States, Navy; Yamamoto Isoroku.

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References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Fuchida Mitsuo, and Okumiya Masatake. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan—The Japanese Navy’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955. Kernan, Alvin. The Unknown Battle of Midway. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. Lord, Walter. Incredible Victory. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Parshall, Johnathan, and Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005. Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982. Smith, Peter C. Midway, Dauntless Victory: Fresh Perspectives on America’s Seminal Naval Victory of 1942. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2007.

Mikawa Gunichi (1888–1981) Japanese navy admiral involved in numerous key Pacific theater battles. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan, on August 29, 1888, Mikawa Gunichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1910 and the Naval War College in 1924. He was a specialist in navigation and served on several ships as a navigation officer. Commander Mikawa also served as a member of diplomatic missions to Paris and Geneva between 1928 and 1930. Promoted to captain in 1930, he was then naval attaché in France (1930–1931). Returning to Japan in 1931, Mikawa taught briefly at the Naval Academy before he took command from 1931 to 1936 of the cruiser Aoba, then the cruiser Cho–ka, and finally the battleship Kirishima. Promoted to rear admiral in 1936, Mikawa was appointed chief of staff of the Second Fleet. In 1937, he became chief of the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and in 1940, he took command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron. Promoted to vice admiral in November 1940, Mikawa assumed command of the Battleship Division 3 in September 1941 and had charge of the Support Force of the Battleship Division 3 and Cruiser Division 8 for the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In July 1942, Mikawa received command of the newly formed Eighth Fleet and Outer South Seas Force at Rabaul. He thus was in charge of Japanese naval forces during the prolonged naval struggle off Guadalcanal, and in the course of this campaign, he administered the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a stand-up fight in the August 9, 1942, Battle of Savo Island. Mikawa sank four Allied heavy

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cruisers and one destroyer, with no ships of his own lost in the battle (a U.S. submarine torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser Kako on the return to Rabaul), but he also withdrew without attacking the vulnerable Allied transports in the sound, for which he was later criticized by naval historians. Mikawa commanded the covering force for Japanese carriers in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 22–25, 1942. In June 1944, he took command of the Southwest Area Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Fleet at Manila. Concurrently commander of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (from August to November 1944), he was attached to the Naval General Staff before he was transferred to the reserves in May 1945. Mikawa died in Kamagawa Prefecture, Japan, on February 25, 1981. Hirama Yoichi See also: Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea—The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942. Novato, CA: Pacifica Press, 1988. Loxton, Bruce, with Chris Coulthard-Clark. The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Miles, Milton Edward (1900–1961) U.S. navy officer. Born in Jerome, Oklahoma, on April 6, 1900, Milton Edward Miles joined the U.S. Navy during World War I as an apprentice seaman in 1917. Securing an appointment as a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1918, he was commissioned an ensign on his graduation in 1922. Miles was promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) in 1927. Assigned to the U.S. Naval Academy, in 1928 he was promoted to lieutenant and in 1929 he earned a master of science degree at Columbia University. During 1929–1932, he was assigned to the carrier Saratoga and in 1932–1934 was a member of the Navy Department’s Bureau of Engineering. From 1934 to 1939, he served on destroyers with the U.S. Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, and in 1937, he was promoted to lieutenant commander. From 1939 to 1942, Miles was a member of the Interior Control Board of the Navy Department. In 1942, he received promotion to commander and to captain. In 1942, Miles was assigned as a U.S. naval observer at Chongqing (then Chungking), China and as chief of the Office of Strategic Services for the Far East.

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Promoted to commodore in 1943, from 1943 to 1945, he was deputy director, Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), and from 1944–1945, he commanded the U.S. Navy Group, China. SACO consisted of 3,000 U.S. Navy personnel and some 100,000 Chinese guerrillas that operated behind Japanese lands from the Gobi Desert to Indochina to relay vital weather data and other intelligence to U.S. Navy and Chinese forces. They also conducted sabotage operations against Japanese forces in the coastal areas and along the rivers of China. In 1946, Miles took command of the heavy cruiser Columbus, and the next year he was in a staff assignment with the Atlantic Fleet. Promoted to rear admiral in 1948, that same year he commanded Cruiser Division 1, and the next year he had charge of first Cruiser Division 6 and then Cruiser Division 4. During 1950–1954, Miles was director for American Affairs and U.S. Naval Missions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, and he served as the Senior Naval Delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board. During 1954–1955, he was commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District in the Panama Canal Zone and in the latter year commanded Operation FRIENDSHIP, a flood relief program following a devastating hurricane that hit Tampico, Mexico. During 1956–1958, he commanded the Third Naval District, with headquarters in New York, and in 1956 he was the senior officer of the board that investigated the grounding of the battleship Missouri in Chesapeake Bay. In 1958, Miles was promoted to vice admiral on his retirement from the navy. Miles died in Bethesda, Maryland, on March 25, 1961. His reminiscences of his China experiences in World War II were published posthumously in 1967. Spencer C. Tucker See also: China, Navy.

References Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California. Miles, Milton E. A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in China by the U.S. Navy and Chinese during World War II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. “Milton Miles, 60, Admiral Is Dead,” New York Times (March 26, 1961). Wakeman, Frederic E. Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

MINCEMEAT, Operation (1943) Major British deception preceding Operation HUSKY, the Allied assault on Sicily. Even as Allied forces cleared Tunisia of Axis troops, their leaders were debating their next target in the Mediterranean. Although British prime minister Winston

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L. S. Churchill wanted a thrust into the Balkans, the Allies settled on Sicily, to be followed by an assault on southern Italy. Operation MINCEMEAT was a British deception to convince the Germans and their Axis partners, the Italians, that the invasion would instead occur in the Greek Isles and Sardinia. Intelligence officer Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, of the British navy, conceived the idea of using the corpse of a man who had died of pneumonia, a disease that has all the physical characteristics of a drowning. He would be given a false military identity to convey papers that would reach the Germans. On April 18, 1943, at Greenock, Scotland, the British submarine Seraph took on board a specially constructed steel container weighing about 400 lb. and marked “Handle with Care—Optical Instruments.” Eleven days later, early on April 30, the Seraph surfaced off the southern coast of Andalucia, Spain. Officers sworn to secrecy then opened the container and removed a soggy corpse dressed in the uniform of an officer of the Royal Marines. The body, which had been preserved in ice, had a briefcase affixed with the royal seal chained to one wrist. The officers then inflated the “Mae West” life jacket worn by the corpse, offered a few prayers, and pushed “Major Martin” overboard to drift inland with the tide. Later, a half mile to the south, the same officers turned an inflated rubber life raft upside down and pushed it and a paddle off the submarine. A Spanish fisherman recovered the body off Huelva and turned it over to the authorities. The British had chosen this location because a German intelligence officer was known to be in the area. The Spanish identified the corpse from its papers as that of Major William Martin of the Royal Marines. It appeared from the condition of the body that it had been in the water for several days, and the Spanish concluded that the death resulted from an airplane crash at sea. They then allowed German intelligence to examine the body and the attaché case. To keep up the ruse, the British demanded that the case be returned without delay. The Spanish finally turned it over on May 13, and subsequent tests in London revealed that it had indeed been tampered with, its contents in all probability passed on to the Germans. The briefcase contained presumably sensitive papers and private letters from British leaders in London to theater commanders in North Africa. The Germans could only conclude from the contents that operations against Sicily were only a feint and that the Allies would next invade the Greek islands (Operation BARCLAY) with 11 British divisions. A few days later, a large U.S. force was to invade Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. The deception confirmed what the Germans already believed, but there is no evidence that the Italians were deceived. Adolf Hitler, however, sent reinforcements, including the 1st Panzer Division from southern France, to Greece. This unit might

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have been decisive had it been dispatched to Sicily. Clearly, the invading forces of Operation HUSKY benefited immensely from the MINCEMEAT deception. Spencer C. Tucker See also: HUSKY, Operation; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Bennett, Ralph Francis. Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939– 1945. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994. Latimer, Jon. Deception in War. London: John Murray, 2001. Macintyre, Ben. Operation Mincemeat: The True Spy Story that Changed the Course of World War II. London: Bloomsbury, 2010. Montagu, Ewen. The Man Who Never Was. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954. Smyth, Denis. Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat. New York: Oxford, 2010.

Mines, Sea As a result of the experiences of World War I, combatants were much better prepared for mine warfare in 1939 than they had been in 1914. All belligerents expected to be committed to a mining campaign. Major advances in mine warfare before and during World War II included the widespread use of influence (i.e., acoustic, magnetic, and pressure-actuated) mines and large-scale aerial mining and the broad application of antisweeping devices. In moored mines, the trend, except in Germany, was to replace the acid-filled Herz horns with electric switch horns. Despite prewar financial limitations and errors in judgment, Great Britain entered the war with an adequate stock of mines—both technically and quantitatively. These included some 1917 H.II Herz horn type moored contact mines, but the standard moored contact mine was the switch horn type Mark XVII. It could be configured to take a charge of 320 or 500 lb. and could be laid with a depth setting of up to 303 ft. In 1939, Great Britain had both moored (M Mark I) and air-laid ground magnetic mines (A Mark I) available for deployment. Both were based on the magnetic induction principle (the horizontal magnetic field of a ship induced an electric current in a coiled rod) and proved so satisfactory that they remained in service throughout the war. The airborne ground mine was subsequently modified to conserve scarce materials (A Mark II, III, and IV), to improve compatibility with bomb gears (A Mark V, 1940), and to include acoustic actuation (A Mark VI, 1944). The majority of the mines laid by Great Britain were dropped by aircraft; hence, the British effort for a ship-laid ground mine was confined to the magnetic M Mark III, a cylindrical device that was introduced in April 1941. The charge weight was

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increased from 1,500 lb. to 1,600 lb. of amatol (or 1,750 lb. of minol) in 1942, and in 1943, acoustic mechanisms were added. An upgraded model with improved sensitivity and a pressure firing unit was canceled in 1944. Owing to the wartime shortages of TNT and RD (cyclonite), most British mines had 50/50 ammonium nitrate/ TNT (amatol) explosive charges. This low-quality explosive was later improved by the addition of around 20 percent aluminum powder (minol). Of all belligerents, Germany displayed the greatest creativity and activity in the field of mine technology. It developed a large number of sophisticated mines before and during World War II, with a focus on influence mines. The intense interservice rivalry between the German navy and the air force severely hampered the development of airborne mines, although, ultimately, the project was successful. For moored contact mines, the German navy relied on the eminently successful EM designs of World War I, the most common being the EMA (331-lb. charge), the EMB (497-lb. charge), and the EMC (661-lb. charge). The Germans also perfected the art of sweep obstruction. Many of the EM-type mines were fitted with chains (to resist wirecutters) and Kontaktauslösung (KA) gear, comprising a 98-ft. Tombac tube over the upper part of the mooring wire, which, when subjected to the upward drag in sweeping, closed a switch and fired the mine. The best-known German influence mine was probably the LMA airborne parachute magnetic ground mine; when one was retrieved on November 22, 1939, the British were alerted to the fact that the Germans, too, had a capability in noncontact mines. Unlike the British magnetic mines, the German mines were actuated by a change in the vertical component of the magnetic field (the dip needle principle). The LMA had a 661-lb. charge and a practical depth limit of 130 ft. It was superseded by the larger (1,554-lb. charge) LMB with magnetic (1939), acoustic (1940), combined magnetic/acoustic and magnetic/pressure (1944) firing. The development of the BM 1000 (1,500-lb. charge) greatly improved the efficacy of German aerial mining. That mine was dropped without parachute from altitudes of up to 19,700 ft. in water depths up to 115 ft., and it was regularly equipped with a variety of antisweeping and antilifting devices. For minelaying from torpedo tubes of submarines and E-boats, the Germans produced the TMA (moored magnetic) and TMB (ground magnetic and acoustic) mines. Both weapons suffered from serious construction defects that limited their endurance on the seabed to 6 to 12 months. The construction of the Atlantic Wall, Germany’s seaward defense against the Allied invasion, inspired the KMA anti-invasion mine. This was a shallow-water ground mine with a 165-lb. charge set in a rectangular concrete block anchor and surmounted by a steel tripod frame with a single Herz horn on top. The total height of the mine was 8 ft. 10 in., and it could be fitted with a snagline for depths of 16 to 33 ft. German charge weights in general were conspicuously heavy by international standards to compensate for the generally poor quality of the explosive fillings, usually made up of a mixture of ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate,

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potassium nitrate, cyclonite, ethyline diamine dinitrate, and aluminum—TNT being an exception. Many of the mines employed by Italy during the war were left over from World War I, some of them from the Austro-Hungarian Empire service. Some Italian mines were specifically built for deployment in warm-water conditions, such as off Libya. The P200 appeared in 1936. It weighed about 2,244 lb. and had an explosive charge of 441 lb. The Soviet navy relied mainly on material developed before 1917, such as the M06, M08, and M12. Conditions in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1941 had stifled mine development, yet the Soviet navy put to use a handful of mines developed in the interwar period. Notably, Italy and the United States distinguished themselves as substantial mine producers, the latter with an emphasis on submarine and air-laid mines such as the Mk 12/3 and the Mk 12/4 (1,200-lb. Torpex charges). Japan, as during World War I, neglected mine development and relied solely on a handful of obsolescent moored contact mines. Dirk Steffen See also: Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Mine Warfare Vessels; Soviet Union, Navy; United States, Navy.

References Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985. Cowie, J. S. Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. Ledebur, Gerhard Freiherr von. Die Seemine. Munich, Germany: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977. Lott, Arnold S. Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959.

Minesweeping and Minelaying The mine war at sea between 1939 and 1945 was a vast enterprise in terms of men and matériel that dwarfed the already quite considerable efforts made in during World War I. The aim of mining was either tactical, by sinking specific enemy ships, or strategic, by assisting in dislocating enemy war efforts in general and contributing to the security of friendly sea lines of communications through the destruction or threat of destruction of enemy forces. The aim of mine countermeasures, in turn, was to permit warships and merchant vessels to use the seas and enter


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and leave ports as necessary for the furtherance of the war effort and the support of the population, without unacceptable damage or losses from mines. A grand total of 636,000 mines and sweep obstructers were laid in European waters between 1939 and 1945. Some 95,400 more were laid in the western Pacific between 1941 and 1945. On balance, both sides laid roughly the same number of mines. The Allies lost a total of 1,406,037 tons of merchant shipping to mines— almost exclusively in European waters—representing 6.5 percent of their entire merchant ship losses. The Axis powers lost 660,533 tons of merchant shipping in the European theater and 397,412 tons in the Pacific. Strategically, the Allies were more effective than the Axis powers in disrupting and obstructing the enemy’s seaborne traffic. This was particularly true in the Pacific theater of operations, where Japanese minelaying operations had virtually no impact on Allied naval operations. By contrast, a well-conceived U.S. aerial mining operation, in which 15,800 mines were laid in Japanese and Korean waters between December 1944 and July 1945, all but paralyzed Japanese coastal traffic and hastened the collapse of the Japanese Empire’s tottering economy. Several factors impacted minelaying and minesweeping in World War II. First, mines were increasingly of the influence type; second, aircraft emerged as an effective means of delivery; and, third, the use of sweep obstructers and evaders and antilifting devices became commonplace, to the point where mine forces deliberately targeted enemy countermeasure forces and aimed to tie down valuable resources. Again, the Allies had comparatively better success in this respect: throughout the war, the German navy employed about twice as many minesweepers and about one and a half times as many personnel in the war against sea mines in European waters than did its adversaries. Minelaying distinguished between the two fundamental principles of offensive and defensive mining. Both sides expended a considerable part of their stock for the latter purpose. Great Britain alone laid 185,000 mines in defensive minefields in all theaters of war. Defensive minefields were usually laid by surface craft. Their purpose was to augment coastal defenses by providing operational depth seaward against maritime incursions and invasions. Frequently, a channel between the coast and the minefields was kept open for coastal traffic, thus offering a certain degree of protection to shipping while freeing flotilla craft from tedious coastal escort and patrol duties. Offensive minefields were ideally laid covertly, inviting the use of aircraft and submarines. The former offered an additional advantage because they could penetrate deep into enemy-controlled sea spaces in great numbers and even attack inland waterways. Famous aerial mining operations included those by the Royal Air Force (RAF) against the Kiel Canal on May 12–13, 1944 (11 mines) and against the German oil shipments on the Danube between May and October 1944 (1,200 mines). Both operations caused significant economic disruptions of the German

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war machine. Of the 76,000 mines laid offensively by Great Britain in European waters, 55,000 were laid by aircraft, mostly by the RAF’s Bomber Command. A variant of both the defensive and the offensive minefield was the tactical minefield. This minefield was usually laid on the basis of tactical intelligence reports or educated guessing in what was assumed would be the probable path of a very specific target. During their advance through the Baltic states in August 1941, for instance, the Germans laid a tactical minefield off Jumida, Estonia, knowing that a heavily escorted Soviet troop convoy from Tallinn had to take that route. On August 28–29, 25 Soviet troop transports out of 29 within the targeted convoy foundered on the minefield. Additionally, because the Germans had deliberately also targeted escorts and minesweepers with shallow-depth mines, the Soviets lost two destroyers, nine minesweepers, and several small patrol craft. This outcome was the largest single tactical success in the history of mine warfare. The minesweeping effort on all sides necessarily rose to the enormous challenge posed by the extensive minelaying campaigns—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Great Britain had built only 21 fleet minesweepers between 1933 and 1939. During the war years, these were augmented by a further 283 minesweepers. To this substantial minesweeping fleet came hundreds of motor minesweepers and auxiliary minesweepers. By May 1944, the Royal Navy had over 650 trawlers on sweeping duties alone. The Germans entered the war with a number of World War I–vintage sweepers as well as a dozen of very sophisticated, 784-ton M-35–type minesweepers under construction and dozens of cheap but capable Räumboote (motor minesweepers), the numbers of which would total 300 at the end of the war. Despite the eventual mass production of over 400 simplified M-type sweepers, the German navy, too, had to expand its capabilities further, and it requisitioned hundreds of civilian ships for minesweeping duties. As with Great Britain, Germany also built commercial trawlers for minesweeping duties. In 1939, most minesweeping forces were geared for operations against moored contact mines. To that end, the minesweepers carried an Oropesa gear, or A-sweep, consisting of a steel wire (up to .5 in. in diameter and 1,500 ft. long), which was streamed behind the minesweeper. The end of the sweep wire was fitted with wirecutters and supported by a float known as an Otter. The sweep was held at a predetermined depth by a horizontal kite near the stern of the towing vessels, and the angle to the ship’s course was maintained by a vertical kite beneath the Otter. The A-sweep could be streamed on one or both sides of the ship. Minesweepers so equipped steamed in a diagonal formation on overlapping tracks. Small A-sweeps streamed from the stem post provided bow protection. Mine cases that rose to the surface after the mooring wires had been cut were usually destroyed by gunfire. To protect fields of moored mines from sweepers, minefield planners frequently resorted to sweep obstructers such as chains on mooring wires, fuse settings that exploded the mines when swept, and other gear that would destroy or foul the


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The British minesweepers (left to right) Blackpool, Bridlington, and Bude. (Library of Congress)

sweeps or endanger the minesweepers. The Germans earned a particular reputation for indulging in this type of warfare, and they deployed minefields that contained up to 30 percent sweep obstructers. Sweep evaders, such as sprocket wheels that would let the sweep wire pass through the mine’s mooring wire, and delayed-rise or multiple-rise mines additionally thwarted sweeping efforts. The advent of ground-influence mines required different sweeping techniques. For sweeping magnetic mines, navies developed a towed current-bearing cable, called the L-sweep. This equipment consisted of two cables streamed behind the minesweeper that generated a pulsating electric current, which, when passed through the cables and the seawater, produced a magnet tow. To overcome dependence on the seawater’s conductivity and improve the individual ship’s sweep efficiency, the Royal Navy and later the German navy introduced the closed-loop system. The loop shape of the current-bearing cable was maintained by attaching it to A-sweep wires. Acoustic influence mines required the use of noisemakers. The Allied Pipe Noise Maker (“Foxer”), originally developed as a decoy for the German T-5 homing torpedo, was eminently well suited to that task. Noisemakers were usually streamed in conjunction with the magnetic sweep. The improvement in sweeping techniques quite naturally called for responses by minefield planners and mine designers. An easy way to delay any sweeping attempt was to increase the sweep effort necessary to clear a given sea space by laying combined fields of moored contact and ground-influence mines. Ship counters

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that ignored a certain amount of passes were an even better way to achieve the same effect. This concept was perfected by the British MX organization, which specialized in the modification of standard mines. The MX-modified mine was only actuated when first influenced by a strong magnetic field (i.e., a sweeper) and then by a weaker one within a certain time span. The Germans countered by preceding their U-boats with two minesweepers or Sperrbrechers (literally, barrage breakers), to which the MX organization in turn responded by setting the counters to allow the pass of two strong minefields before it detonated the mine under a third, weaker, magnetic field. The Germans ultimately adopted the rather wasteful measure of employing three mine-countermeasures vessels. The ultimate hurdle for mine countermeasures during the war, the pressure mine, was never mastered satisfactorily. For this reason, both sides hesitated to employ it for fear that it would be captured and used by the enemy. The Germans waited until June 1944 before desperation drove them to lay that type of mine. When the Allies responded with like devices, the Germans used their Sperrbrechers as expendable decoy ships against the pressure mines. Short of crawling through a minefield at speeds of less than 4 knots, this was the only viable method of countering pressure mines. Dirk Steffen See also: Auxiliary Vessels; Mines, Sea; Mine Warfare Vessels

References Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985. Cowie, J. S. Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. Ledebur, Gerhard Freiherr von. Die Seemine. Munich, Germany: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977. Lott, Arnold S. Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959.

Mine Warfare Vessels At the start of World War II in 1939, mine warfare vessels were not substantially different in design from those of 1918. Indeed, many countries, such as Germany and the United States, still operated large numbers of World War I minesweepers. New commissions of minesweepers were few and unspectacular. The most significant prewar designs were the German Minensuchboote (minesweeper) laid down in 1936 and 1937 and the French Elan class. The German ships displaced about 600


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tons, were armed with two 10.5-cm (4.1-inch) and two 37-mm guns, and could be driven by their powerful turbines at 17 knots. The Elan-class ships were similar in performance, if slightly larger. They were armed with two 3.5-inch, one 40-mm, and six 20-mm antiaircraft guns. As with other Allied designs, they doubled as escorts. The Soviets, well versed in mine warfare, opted for a somewhat smaller design with a shallow draught. The 490-ton Tral class was optimized for the confined waters of the eastern Baltic. Italian minesweepers were built before the war and displaced between 240 and 255 tons. They were armed with two 20-mm antiaircraft guns. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had devoted significant resources to mine warfare. The Royal Navy had adhered to the fleet sweeper design and hastily commissioned the somewhat inadequate Bangor-class minesweepers in 1940 to replace the unsuitable Halycon-class fleet sweepers. The new challenges posed by mine warfare soon required design changes. The German prewar designs proved inadequate and too complicated for mass production. Like the Bangor-class ships, they soon turned out to be too cramped to accommodate the extra sweep gear for use against influence mines. New minesweeper designs also required more powerful auxiliary engines that could produce the necessary current for the magneticinfluence sweeping gear. The Germans responded by building the 1940- and 1943-type minesweepers. Although similar in appearance to the 1935 type, those vessels were simplified to the point where their sections could be largely prefabricated by specialized yards and assembled by others. The turbines were substituted by coal-fired, triple-expansion engines for cost reasons and to conserve the navy’s oil fuel stocks. Otherwise, except for the improved sweeping facilities, added antiaircraft armament, and minor details, the layout of the German minesweepers remained essentially unchanged. The British substituted for their Bangor-class ships the larger, 1,200-ton, Algerine-class vessels, of which nearly 100 were built. The concept was a return to the fleet sweeper, and with their armament of one 4-inch gun, four 40-mm guns, and 92 depth charges, the Algerines easily outclassed the smaller Flower-class corvettes in their escort role. The United States responded late to the Japanese mine threat, which turned out to be a minor irritant at most. Many U.S. minesweepers subsequently saw heavy action in the Normandy landings and in the preparation for them. Apart from the 1918-vintage Bird-class minesweeper, the U.S. Navy commissioned nearly 200 minesweepers. Most were of three main types: the big Raven and Auk classes; two-funneled diesel vessels of 810 and 890 tons, respectively, with a speed of 18 knots and one or two 3-inch guns; and the diesel-powered Admirable-class of 650 tons and 15 knots. For economic reasons and for inshore sweeping, all navies took to building motor minesweepers as a cheap alternative to the fully fledged minesweepers. These

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boats, produced by the hundreds, ranged from the British 80-ft. motor launches and the German 120-ft. Räumboote (minesweepers) to the somewhat understated U.S. yard minesweepers that, at 136 ft. in length, displaced 215 tons. Nearly all of the motor minesweepers, except the very smallest, eventually assumed duties beyond inshore or harbor sweeping. The explosive growth of the minesweeping forces in World War II contrasted with that of the dedicated minelaying forces. As in the years from 1914 to 1918, most navies were content to rely on converted civilian vessels or regular combatants, such as destroyers, submarines, and patrol boats, for the bulk of their minelaying activities. Very few purpose-designed minelayers, such as the British Abdiel class, were built before and during the war. At 37 knots, these 4,000-ton vessels were exceptionally fast. The advent of large-scale aerial offensive mining, however, rendered them largely obsolete. The Abdiels eventually ended up as fast blockade-runners to Malta and elsewhere. Dirk Steffen See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Auxiliary Vessels; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Submarines.

References Gardiner, Robert, ed. Conway’s History of the Ship: The Eclipse of the Big Gun. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992. Gröner, Erich, ed. Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 1815–1945. Vols. 3 and 4. Koblenz, Germany: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1985–1986. Lott, Arnold S. Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959.

Mitscher, Marc Andrew (1887–1947) U.S. navy admiral and commander of a fast carrier task force in the Pacific. Born on January 26, 1887, in Hillsboro, Wisconsin, Marc Andrew Mitscher grew up in Washington, D.C., and entered the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1906. On his graduation in 1910, he served with the fleet until 1915, when he seized an opportunity to enter naval aviation, becoming naval aviator number 33. Mitscher spent much of World War I conducting catapult experiments. In 1919, he participated in the U.S. Navy’s first attempted transatlantic flight, although his particular aircraft only reached the Azores. Between the wars, Mitscher remained in aviation through a variety of administrative and operational postings, including assignments aboard the carriers Langley (1929–1930) and Saratoga (1934–1935), as well as with the Bureau of Aeronautics (1930–1933 and 1935–1937).

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In 1938, Mitscher was promoted to captain. Three years later, he was the first commanding officer of the carrier Hornet, and his ship launched Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo in April 1942. Promoted to rear admiral, Mitscher commanded all air operations in the Solomon Islands in 1943. In 1944, he assumed command of Fast Carrier Task Force 58/38 (38 if William Halsey commanded, 58 for Raymond Spruance). In March 1944, Mitscher was promoted to vice admiral. Excluding a brief rest period from October 1944 to January 1945, he remained with Task Force 58/38 for many of the greatest Pacific battles, including the Marshalls, the Marianas, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and raids on the Japanese home islands. In July 1945, Mitscher became deputy chief of naval operations for air. In March 1946, he commanded Eighth Fleet, then assumed the post of commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet in September. Mitscher died of heart failure in Norfolk, Virginia, on February 3, 1947. Rodney Madison See also: Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; DETACHMENT, Operation; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; ICEBERG, Operation; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Spruance, Raymond Ames; United States, Navy.

References Coletta, Paola E. Admiral Marc Mitscher and U.S. Naval Aviation: Bald Eagle. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1997. Reynolds, Clark G. “Admiral Marc A. Mitscher.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Steven Howarth (pp. 242–262). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Taylor, Theodore. The Magnificent Mitscher. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Monitors Monitors were specialized shore bombardment warships. Heavily armed for their size and armored, the ship type evolved from John Ericsson’s iron turreted Monitor of the U.S. Civil War. Monitors generally mounted their main guns in a turret amidships and, because of their large guns and armor, were quite slow. Of broad beam and shallow draft, they were designed to operate in coastal waters and rivers and were not intended for sea service. The U.S. Navy especially, but also the British navy, built a number of these ships. Monitors saw service in World War I in a shore bombardment role. The British had 35 monitors in service by 1916, mounting main batteries of 12-, 14-, or 15-inch guns. Three of them mounted single 18-inch guns. The monitors saw action in the

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North Sea, the Mediterranean, Aegean, and English Channel and were used to destroy enemy forts and provide support for troops ashore. A few monitors remained to see service in World War II. The British monitor Terror defended Malta against possible attack by the Italian navy and also provided shore bombardment to support operations in North Africa. HMS Erebus and Terror (both launched in 1916) mounted a main armament of two 15-inch guns and displaced 8,450 tons at deep load. Both ships received additional armor and antiaircraft gun protection during World War II, increasing their deep load displacement to some 9,400 tons in the Terror and 9,800 tons in the Erebus, although they were capable of 12 knots speed. Based at Singapore when the war began, the Terror was dispatched to the Mediterranean, where it played an important role in Operation COMPASS, conducting numerous fire missions in support of British and British Empire troops ashore. The Terror was slightly damaged by a mine on February 22, 1941, and heavily damaged by near misses from German bombs in an air attack on February 23. It went down off Derna, Libya, on February 24. The entire crew got off without loss. The Erebus helped protect Britain from German invasion in 1940 and then was moved north to defend the German base at Scapa Flow. In 1942 it acted as a guard ship for the port of Trincomalee, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), where it was damaged in a Japanese air attack that April. Repaired in India, it took part in the invasion of Madagascar and then in the invasions of Sicily and Normandy. It survived the war and was broken up in 1947. The last of the British monitors were the Roberts (commissioned in 1941) and Abercrombie (commissioned in 1943). Mounting two 15-inch guns, they had a deep load displacement of 9,500 to 9,900 tons. The Roberts was badly damaged when it was hit by two 1,100-lb. German bombs, while the Abercrombie was badly damaged by a mine on September 9, 1943, during the Allied invasion of Italy and spent considerable time in dry dock at Taranto. Significant repair did not begin until January 1944, so the Abercrombie missed the June 1944 Normandy invasion. The Abercrombie was again damaged, this time by two mines, off Malta on August 24, 1944. The Roberts took part in the Normandy invasion. The Abercrombie was broken up in 1954, the Roberts in 1965. The Romanian navy also operated seven old river monitors during the war, all of which had served in World War I. Four were built for the Romanian navy in 1907–1908, and three had seen service with the Austro-Hungarian navy during World War I and had been acquired with the defeat of the Central Powers. The monitors operated on the Danube, were heavily armored and yet of light draft, and were designed to provide fire support to troops ashore. The four original Romanian monitors were the Ion Bratineau, Alexandru Lahovary, Lascar Catargia, and Mihail Kogalniceanu. Displacing 670 tons and 208 ft. 3 in. in length, they drew only five and a half ft. of water. During the Second World War, they were each armed with three

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4.7-inch (120-mm) guns, and one 3-inch and two 47-mm antiaircraft guns. The three ex–Austro-Hungarian monitors were smaller; they displaced 443 to 541 tons and were 183 ft. 6 in. to 203 ft. 3 in. in length and were each armed with two or three 4.7-inch (120-mm guns). All three also mounted 37-mm and 20-mm antiaircraft guns. William L. Padgett and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Great Britain, Navy; HUSKY, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation; Romania, Navy; Scapa Flow.

References Buxton, I. L. Big Gun Monitors. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. London: Bracken Books, 1989. Paloczi-Horvath, George. From Monitor to Missile Boat: Coast Defense Ships and Coastal Defense since 1860. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Montgomery, Alfred Eugene (1891–1961) U.S. navy admiral who commanded carrier divisions in the Pacific theater. Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on June 12, 1891, Alfred Eugene Montgomery was commissioned as a line officer on graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1912. He briefly served aboard cruisers before transferring to submarines and commanded the F-1, which was lost in a collision while on maneuvers in December 1917. As a lieutenant commander, Montgomery commissioned and commanded the submarine R-20 between 1918 and 1920. Montgomery earned his pilot’s wings at Pensacola, Florida, in 1922 and was closely identified thereafter with naval aviation. In the late 1920s, he was the air officer of the aircraft carrier Langley, the U.S. Navy’s first carrier. A full commander by 1930, he commanded the Seattle Naval Air Station until 1932. He was executive officer of the carrier Ranger in the Pacific from 1934 to 1936 and its captain in the Atlantic from 1940 to 1941. Montgomery remained on board as chief of staff and aide to the commander, aircraft, Atlantic Fleet in 1941 and 1942. In June 1942, as a rear admiral, he took command of the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas. From August 1943, Montgomery commanded Carrier Division 12, and later Carrier Division 3 in the Pacific theater. He was almost continually engaged in operations until December 1944, commanding task groups that were usually composed of four fast carriers with escorting vessels. He participated in nearly all of the major Pacific engagements of that period, including the major fleet actions in the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) and gaining a reputation as an aggressive, forceful leader.

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Rotated back to the United States, Montgomery commanded the air component of the West Coast Fleet (1945) and, as a vice admiral, the Pacific Fleet Air Forces (1945–1946), rising by 1947 to command of the Fifth Fleet and then the First Task Fleet. Reverting to rear admiral, he held commands in Alaska and Bermuda before retiring in June 1951 in the grade of vice admiral, leaving his final assignment as commander of fleet air at Jacksonville, Florida. Montgomery spent his last years in Seattle, Washington, and died at Bremerton, Washington, on December 15, 1961. Richard G. Stone See also: Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; United States, Navy.

References Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. (Reprint of 1978 edition). Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. New York: McGrawHill, 1968.

Moreell, Ben (1892–1978) U.S. navy admiral who oversaw the construction of military facilities across the globe before and during the war years. Born on September 14, 1892, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ben Moreell was raised in St. Louis, Missouri. After graduating from Washington University with a degree in civil engineering and four years with the Engineering Department of the city of St. Louis, Moreell was commissioned a lieutenant (junior grade) in the Civil Engineer Corps of the U.S. Navy in 1917. He spent World War I in the Azores. After the war, Moreell remained with the navy. He then served at bases in the United States and in Haiti. From 1926 to 1930, he was with the Bureau of Yards and Docks. After a period in France studying European engineering techniques at the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Moreell returned to the bureau. In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and chief of the Civil Engineers of the U.S. Navy, as a rear admiral. In his new position, Moreell oversaw the construction of U.S. bases around the world. To build the infrastructure required by the navy during the war, he spent $9.25 billion. By the time the United States entered the war, Moreell had 70,000 men engaged in construction projects worldwide. All bases were built by private firms employing civilian laborers, and, wherever possible, Moreell worked on a

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cost-plus-fixed-fee contract basis rather than cost-plus-percentage contract basis. Worried that construction would stop in the event of war because civilians were prohibited by international law from carrying weapons, Moreell recommended the creation of a militarized construction battalion. Following the U.S. entry into the war and the capture of U.S. construction workers by the Japanese, Moreell received authorization from the Bureau of Navigation on January 5, 1942, to recruit a naval construction regiment composed of three battalions. Taking their name from the initials for “construction battalions,” the Seabees greatly aided the naval war effort by building air bases, docks, roads, bridges, and other facilities around the world. During the war, the Seabees constructed 40 domestic bases and 600 advanced bases in the Pacific and Atlantic. The Seabees’ contribution was honored in Moreell’s 1945 Distinguished Service Medal citation: “Displaying great originality and exceptional capacity for bold innovation … to the end that the Fleet received support in degree and kind unprecedented in the history of naval warfare.” Moreell advanced to the rank of vice admiral in February 1944, the first Civil Engineer Corps officer to hold that rank, and was made an admiral in June 1946. He retired from active duty that September and then headed a number of construction and steel businesses. Moreell died in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 30, 1978. Pamela Feltus See also: Seabees; United States, Navy.

References Castillo, Edmund L. The Seabees of World War II. New York: Random House, 1963. Huie, William Bradford. Can Do! The Story of the Seabees. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Moreell, Ben. The Admiral’s Log: God, Man, Rights, Government. Philadelphia: Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, 1958. Moreell, Ben. The Admiral’s Log II: In Search of Freedom. Philadelphia: Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, 1960.

Morison, Samuel Eliot (1887–1976) Noted U.S. naval historian and admiral who chronicled the naval events of World War II. Born on July 9, 1887, in Boston, Massachusetts, Samuel Eliot Morison attended Harvard University from 1904 to 1908. After one year spent studying at the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris, he returned to Harvard, where he completed his doctorate in 1913. He taught briefly at the University of California, Berke-

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ley, and then joined the History Department faculty at Harvard in 1915, where he remained until his retirement 50 years later. Leading a life of landfalls and departures, Morison spent three years at Oxford (1922–1925) as the first Harmsworth Professor of American History, and he retraced Columbus’s voyages (1937–1940) in preparation for his biography of the Italian explorer, Admiral of the Ocean Sea (1942), for which he received the Pulitzer Prize. Morison’s love of the sea, so evident in his early work The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860 (1921), and his belief in Francis Parkman’s participatory style of history led him to undertake his most difficult project after the United States entered World War II. Too old to receive a commission, Morison lobbied President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who appointed him the navy’s official historian in 1942. Commissioned a lieutenant commander in the naval reserves and permitted to roam the oceans at will, Morison obtained berths on combat vessels ranging from patrol boats to heavy cruisers, and he witnessed firsthand pivotal battles, such as Guadalcanal and Okinawa. Given complete access to files, Morison also attended planning sessions for crucial operations such as TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and conducted postoperational interviews with commanders. The resulting History of United States Naval Operations in World War II appeared in 15 volumes between 1947 and 1962. Promoted to rear admiral in 1951, Morison also received the Medal of Freedom in 1964, the highest civilian decoration that the president of the United States can bestow. Although John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography (1957) won Morison a second Pulitzer, biographer Gregory Pfitzer identifies The Oxford History of the American People as Morison’s crowning glory. Morison, who died in Boston on May 15, 1976, is remembered for his diversity, flair, and ability to steer a middle course between the professional demands of scholarship and the appetites of nonprofessional readers. David R. Snyder See also: Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; ICEBERG, Operation.

References Beck, Emily Morison, ed. Sailor Historian: The Best of Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. Pfitzer, Gregory M. “Morison, Samuel Eliot.” In American National Biography, edited by John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (Vol. 15, pp. 867–871). New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pfitzer, Gregory M. Samuel Eliot Morison’s Historical World: In Quest of a New Parkman. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991.

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Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas (1900–1979) British admiral who became supreme commander of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) in 1943. Born at Frogmore House on the grounds of Windsor Castle, Berkshire, England on June 25, 1900, Louis Francis Albert Victory Nicholas (“Dicky”) Mountbatten was the second son of Admiral of the Fleet Prince Louis of Battenberg (the family adopted the less Germanic name of Mountbatten in 1917 during World War I). Educated at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and Cambridge University, Mountbatten then accompanied his cousin Edward, the Prince of Wales and future King Edward VIII, on a tour of the Far East. Mountbatten entered the Royal Navy in 1916 during World War I and served in the Grand Fleet. He rose rapidly in rank, gaining expertise in communications. His first command was the destroyer Daring in 1934, and he was promoted to captain in 1937. In June 1939, he took command of the destroyer Kelly, and in September he was appointed captain of 5th Destroyer Flotilla. The Kelly was mined once, torpedoed twice, and finally sunk off Crete on May 23, 1941. The exploits of the Kelly were the subject of Noël Coward’s 1942 film In Which We Serve, which Mountbatten promoted. Mountbatten’s exploits, dash, and popularity brought him to the attention of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who selected him to be director of Combined Operations, with the rank of vice admiral. While he was director, several important raids were conducted, most notably against the French seaport of Dieppe on August 19, 1942. This operation was a costly failure, and Mountbatten bears much responsibility for this. The reverse did not affect his pop- Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas, Earl Mountularity, however, and it did pro- batten, was a British admiral and statesman. As director of combined operations, Vice Admiral vide lessons for future amphibious Mountbatten planned the Dieppe Raid of August operations, particularly the Nor- 19, 1942, a costly failure. (The Illustrated London mandy invasion of June 1944. News Picture Library)

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In August 1943, Churchill convinced U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to make Mountbatten supreme commander of SEAC. He took up his post in October, first at Delhi in India and later at Kandy in Ceylon. Mountbatten was present at the summit conferences at Cairo in December 1943 and Potsdam in July 1945. As SEAC commander, he made a number of important decisions, including that to continue fighting during the monsoon season, which resulted in the defeat of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. He took steps to reduce the impact of malaria, and he restored Allied morale. He also played a key role in the defense of Imphal by diverting air assets there. Mountbatten personally took the Japanese surrender at Singapore on September 12, 1945. The British government did not wish to inflame nationalist sentiment in Burma. As the war ended, Mountbatten therefore ordered that Burmese who had at some point collaborated with the Japanese occupation should not suffer reprisals unless they had been personally involved in atrocities. Mountbatten remained at his post until May 1946. Appointed the last viceroy and first governor-general of India, Mountbatten presided over the independence and division of India into the two states of India and Pakistan. He received an earldom in 1947. Mountbatten was first sea lord between 1955 and 1959, helping to carry out a restructuring of the British armed forces. He then became chief of the Defence Staff in 1960, retiring five years later. On August 27, 1979, Mountbatten was assassinated by the Irish Republican Army by a radiocontrolled bomb set off on his 30-ft. boat, which was en route to Donegal Bay in the Republic of Ireland. Three other people on the boat also died from the blast and two were seriously injured. Eugene L. Rasor See also: Crete, Naval Operations off; Great Britain, Navy; JUBILEE, Operation.

References Dennis, Peter. Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945– 46. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. Rasor, Eugene L. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, 1900–1979: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Villa, Brian Loring. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Ziegler, Phillip. Mountbatten: The Official Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. Ziegler, Phillip. Personal Diary of Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–1946. London: Collins, 1988.

Mulberries Artificial harbors constructed to support the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. Early invasion planning for the Allied assault on occupied Europe quickly revealed

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the need for securing a major port to support the invasion forces and ensure the operation’s success. The Dieppe raid of August 19, 1942, by British and Canadian forces demonstrated to the Allied planners that ports were too difficult to assault directly. It also validated fears that German defenders would be able to destroy vital facilities before a port could be captured. If the Allies could not capture a major port, they would have to build their own. The British War Office began the planning and construction of two artificial anchorages and ports to support the upcoming Allied invasion of France. The Combined Chiefs of Staff officially approved the artificial port concept at Quebec in August 1943. The project was code-named MULBERRY. The Allies would fabricate the two artificial ports in England, tow them across the English Channel, and establish them off the French coast. Mulberry A would support the U.S. invasion beaches, and Mulberry B would support the British beaches. The prefabricated ports incorporated numerous components that had code names of their own. The first step in the process involved the creation of artificial anchorages known as gooseberries. Engineers accomplished this feat by positioning and sinking a number of blockships on D-Day, June 6, 1944, to create artificial anchorages. Five such anchorages were created, two off Omaha Beach for the Americans and three off the British and Canadian beaches. The ships utilized were obsolete U.S., British, Dutch, and French warships and merchant vessels. Two of the anchorages served as the foundation for the two Mulberries. The outermost breakwater consisted of bombardons, large floating constructions that were 200 ft. in length, 25 ft. across, and weighed 1,500 tons. These were located approximately 5,000 ft. out from the high-water line. They enclosed an outer harbor, and 1,000 to 1,500 yards closer to shore, a row of sunken ships known as Corncobs and large concrete caissons known as Phoenixes created another breakwater to shelter the inner harbor. The floating and sunken breakwaters protected a series of piers, pier heads, and moorings for large vessels, such as Liberty ships, and smaller landing craft. Plans called for Mulberry A to have three pier heads, two pontoon causeways, and moorings for seven Liberty ships and five large and seven medium coasters. It was to have a capacity of 5,000 tons of cargo and 1,400 vehicles per day. Construction began on June 7, 1944, with a planned completion date of June 24. Construction proceeded rapidly. On June 10, the engineers completed the Omaha Beach Gooseberry, followed on June 13 by the Utah Beach Gooseberry. On June 16, the first LST (landing ship, tank) pier went into operation at Omaha, with one vehicle landing every 1.6 minutes. By midnight on June 17, U.S. Navy engineers working on Mulberry A had placed all 24 bombardons and 32 of 52 Phoenixes, along with mooring facilities for two Liberty ships. They also had completed the western LST pier, with work on the eastern pier under way. As that work progressed, construction on pontoon causeways at both beaches continued. The first and second pontoon causeway at Omaha entered service on

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June 10 and 20, respectively. At Utah, the first opened on June 13 and a second on June 16. The initial concept of the artificial port appeared to be proving its worth. Work on the British Mulberry B proceeded at a similar pace. Unfortunately for the Allies, the worst storm in the English Channel in a half century hit the Normandy coast on June 18, halting all landing operations for three days and, more importantly, destroying Mulberry A and forcing the Americans to abandon the artificial port. The destruction of Mulberry A made the capture of the port of Cherbourg all the more important. Further, as feared, the German defenders put up a stiff resistance, and the port did not fall until June 27 and only after it had been effectively destroyed. The first Allied cargo did not arrive through Cherbourg until July 16 and even then only in small amounts. By the end of July, cargo arriving in Cherbourg constituted only 25 percent of the total arriving over the beaches at Omaha and Utah. The great storm also seriously damaged Mulberry B off the British beaches, but it could be repaired. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, ordered that Mulberry A not be rebuilt and that parts from it be used to complete Mulberry B to the original specifications. When completed, Mulberry B became known as the Harbor at Arromanches. By October, the port enclosed two square miles of water and could berth 7 Liberty ships and 23 coasters at the same time. Intended for use only until French ports were repaired and put back into operation, the artificial harbor remained in service until closed on November 19. By the end of December, disassembly had begun. While the contribution of the Mulberries did not meet preinvasion expectations because of the destruction by the storm, the artificial harbors proved invaluable in the Allied supply effort. Fortunately for the Allies, DUKW amphibious trucks and LSTs proved more effective in moving supplies over the beaches than expected and were able to compensate for the shortfalls from the Mulberries. The combination of tonnage delivered over the beaches, through the Mulberries and through captured French ports, enabled Operation OVERLORD to succeed, leading to the victory in France. The Mulberries were an engineering marvel that further demonstrated the Allied technical expertise and ability to turn resources into military power. Steve R. Waddell See also: Amphibious Warfare; JUBILEE, Operation; Liberty Ships; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Bykofsky, J., and H. Larson. The U.S. Army in World War II: Transportation Corps Operations Overseas. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1957. Hartcup, Guy. Code Name Mulberry: The Planning, Building and Operation of the Normandy Harbours. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977.

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Ruppenthal, Roland G. The U.S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations—Logistical Support of the Armies. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1953, 1959.

Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré (1882–1965) French navy admiral who created and commanded Free French naval forces. Born at Marseille (Bouchres-du-Rhône) on April 17, 1882, Émile Muselier graduated from the French Naval Academy in 1902 and served in the Far East between 1903 and 1905. He then held ship assignments in the Mediterranean and attended the Gunnery School at Toulon before serving aboard cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1911, he became a gunnery instructor at Toulon. Muselier next served as the gunnery officer on the armored cruiser Edgar Quinet in the Mediterranean, where he took part in the first actions in the Adriatic during World War I. He commanded a battalion of marines ashore, distinguishing himself in fighting at Nieuport. He next commanded a battalion of naval artillery on the Western Front, before service with the government agency overseeing naval inventions. In April 1918, Muselier assumed command of the dispatch boat Scarpe. Promoted to lieutenant commander in July, he participated in operations first in the Atlantic and then in the Black Sea, aiding anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War. In 1920, Muselier joined the French delegation to the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Promoted to commander in July 1922, he served briefly in the military cabinet of the government, then commanded the torpedo boat Ouragan. He was promoted to captain in July 1926 and assumed command of the armored cruiser Ernest Renan in 1927. Following service ashore at Cherbourg, Muselier commanded the old semi-dreadnought Voltaire in 1930. He then served ashore at Toulon before taking command of the battleship Bretagne in September 1931. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1933, Muselier led the defenses at Cherbourg. After commanding the arsenal at Sidi-Abdallah and, in 1934, French navy units in Tunisia, Muselier had charge of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron during 1937 and 1938, with his flag in the Suffren. In September 1938, he headed the Marseille Defense Zone, and in October 1939, he joined the 2nd Section and was promoted to vice admiral. Muselier rallied to General Charles de Gaulle in July 1940 and created the Free French Navy, of which he was named commander in chief that October. His principal assistant in London was Captain Thierry d’Argenlieu. Muselier’s relations with the head of the Free French, de Gaulle, were soon stormy, however. Muselier commanded Free French naval units in the December 1941 seizure of the Vichycontrolled islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland. Muselier collaborated with the British in an attempt to oust de Gaulle as head of the Free French, and in March 1942, Muselier was replaced by Captain Philippe

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Auboyneau. In May, Muselier became inspector general of the Free French Navy, and in 1943, he transferred to Algiers and that June was named deputy commander in chief of French Maritime Forces. Suspended from his duties the following August, he next served as chief of the naval section of the French military commission dealing with German affairs. Muselier retired in June 1946. He wrote two books, Marine et Résistance and De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme (1946), in which he discussed the history of Free French naval forces as well as infighting among the Free French and his differences with de Gaulle. Muselier died in Toulon on September 2, 1965. Spencer C. Tucker See also: France, Navy; Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie.

References Anglin, Douglas G. Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941. Calgary, Canada: Penny Black, 1999. Chaline, E., and P. Santarelli. Historique des Forces Navales Françaises Libres. Paris: Service Historique de la Marine, Marine Nationale, 1990. Muselier, Émile H. D. De Gaulle contre le gaullisme. Paris: Éditions du Chêne, 1946. Muselier, Émile H. D. Marine et resistance. Paris: Flamarion, 1945. Muselier, Renard. L’amiral Muselier, 1882–1965: Le créateur de la Croix de Lorraine. Paris: Perrin, 2000.

N Nagano Osami (1880–1947) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Ko¯chi, Ko¯chi Prefecture, Japan, on June 15, 1880, Nagano Osami graduated second in his class of 105 cadets at the Japanese Naval Academy in 1900. Nagano participated in the siege of Port Arthur as commander of a land-based naval artillery unit during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Promoted to lieutenant in 1905, he was an instructor at the Japanese Naval Academy in 1906, then served as chief gunnery officer in the cruiser Itsukushima during 1906–1908. He graduated from the Japanese Naval War College in 1909. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1910, he was then chief gunnery officer in the battleship Katori. He studied in the United States at Harvard University from 1913 to 1915. During World War I, Nagano served as executive officer of two cruisers. Promoted to captain in 1918, Nagano commanded the cruiser Hirado during 1919– 1920, his first (and only) ship command. Nagano was the naval attaché to the United States from 1920 to 1923. He traveled to the United States on official visits again in 1927 and in 1933. Promoted to rear admiral in December 1923, Nagano was chief of Japanese naval intelligence in 1924. At the end of that year, he assumed command of the 3rd Battleship Division, and in 1925 he took command of the 1st China Expeditionary Force. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1927, Nagano commanded the Japanese Naval Academy from 1928 to 1930. He headed the Japanese delegation at the London Naval Conference of 1935–1936, where he presented the Japanese plan for parity in naval tonnage with the British and U.S. navies. When the Western powers rejected this, the Japanese left the conference. In 1936, Nagano became minister of the navy in the Hirota Ko¯ki cabinet. In 1937, he was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. From April 1941 to February 1944, Nagano served as chief of the Navy General Staff. Not a strong leader, he tended to follow recommendations presented by his subordinates. Nagano believed that war with the United States was inevitable, and he thus had little interest in U.S.-Japanese negotiations to avoid it. At the same time, although Nagano believed the Japanese navy could not defeat the U.S. Navy in war, he did not oppose the plans of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, to attack Pearl Harbor.

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In April 1943, Nagano was promoted to admiral of the fleet. By 1944, however, with Japan having suffered major military reversals, Nagano was removed from his post and replaced by Navy Minister Shimada Shigetaro¯. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Nagano was arrested and jailed in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. He was charged as a war criminal before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Nagano died on January 5, 1947, before the conclusion of the trial. Kotani Ken See also: Japan, Navy; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Shimada Shigetaro; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Marder, Arthur J. Old Friends, New Enemies. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Nagumo Chu¯ichi (1886–1944) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Yamagata Prefecture on March 25, 1886, Nagumo Chu¯ichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908 and from the Naval Staff College in 1920. Promoted to commander in 1924 and known as a torpedo expert, Nagumo commanded several cruisers before taking command of a destroyer squadron in 1930. He also became a strong advocate of naval air power, even though he was not an aviator and lacked carrier experience. Promoted to vice admiral in 1939, Nagumo took command in April 1941 of the First Air Fleet, which concentrated Japan’s six most powerful aircraft carriers into a single force. He opposed the Pearl Harbor operation advocated by his chief air officer Genda Minoru, the air fleet’s air wing commander Fuchida Mitsuo, and commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Nevertheless, his carriers attacked on December 7, 1941, crippling the U.S. Navy’s Pacific battle fleet. Nagumo was criticized in some quarters for his caution in refusing to carry out additional air strikes against port facilities or to attempt to locate and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers then at sea. Nagumo’s First Air Fleet next undertook strikes on Rabaul and Port Darwin before beginning operations in the eastern Indian Ocean that devastated Allied naval power in the region. The fleet returned to Japan to refit in the spring of 1942. The carriers Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku were detached to support the Port Moresby operation

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that ended with withdrawal after the Battle of the Coral Sea. Following their refit, the other four carriers sortied as the principal striking force for the Midway operation, which ended in their loss. The defeat at the Battle of Midway ruined Nagumo’s reputation. Afterward, he commanded carriers during the Guadalcanal Campaign, and in August and October 1942, he inflicted losses on U.S. forces in the Solomon Islands, but he also sustained heavy damage to his own air groups. Regarded as excessively cautious, Nagumo was relegated to a series of second-line shore commands Japanese vice admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi commanded the First Air Fleet that carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor until recalled to front-line on December 7, 1941, bringing the United States into service in late 1943 as comWorld War II. His carriers formed the principal Japanese mander of the 6,000-memstrike force in the Battle of Midway, which ended in their ber force assigned to defend loss. (Naval Historical Center) Saipan against an impending U.S. assault. The invasion began on June 13, 1944. Nagumo committed suicide there on July 6, 1944. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Fuchida Mitsuo; Genda Minoru; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Indian Ocean Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Goldberg, Harold J. D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.

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Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Stillwell, Paul, ed. Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Narvik, Naval Battles of (April 10 and 13, 1940) Anglo-German naval battles during the Norwegian Campaign of 1940. The Battle of Narvik comprises two separate engagements in the area of that Norwegian port, the first on April 10 and the other on April 13. On April 9, 1940, the Germans launched Operation WESERÜBUNG, their invasion of Norway. The operation involved six main invasion groups to take and hold the principal Norwegian ports. As part of WESERÜBUNG, they dispatched to the northern Norwegian port of Narvik under Commodore Friedrich Bonte a force of 10 large destroyers (Wilhelm Heidkamp [the flagship], George Thiele, Wolfgang Zenker, Baron von Arnim, Erich Giese, Erich Koellner, Diether von Roeder, Hans Lüdemann, Hermann Künne, and Anton Schmitt) transporting some 1,900 ground troops. At Ofotfjord they captured three Norwegian patrol boats. The destroyers then landed their troops. Norwegian ships detected the German destroyers as they approached Narvik, and early on April 9 the Germans were intercepted by the old (1905) Norwegian coastal battleship Eidsvold, with a main armament of two 210-mm (8.26-inch) guns and commanded by Captain Off Isaachsen Willoch. Willoch ordered the Germans to turn back. The Germans refused, demanding in turn that the Eidsvold surrender to them. When Willoch rejected the German demands and prepared to ram the lead German destroyer, the Germans opened fire with torpedoes, sinking the Eidsvold, which lost all but 8 of its crew of 193. Willoch was among the dead. The Germans then torpedoed and sank the Norge, the sister ship of the Eidsvold, commanded by Captain Per Askim; it went down with 101 of its crew; another 90 survived. No Germans were casualties in this battle. That same day, British captain Bernard A. W. Warburton-Lee, commanding the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla of five destroyers, was ordered to sink or capture German ships and transports near Narvik and recapture the town at his discretion. His flotilla consisted of the flagship Hardy, Havoc, Hotspur, Hostile, and Hunter. The British ships were smaller and with less armament than the German destroyers they were seeking out (1,340 tons versus 1,625 tons each; and four 4.7-inch guns versus five 5-inch guns each), but they arrived undetected off Narvik early on the morning of April 10, their approach concealed by a snowstorm. Warburton-Lee ordered his flotilla to attack German ships in the harbor, and the British destroyers sank the Wilhelm Heidkamp (Commodore Bonte was among those killed) and Anton Schmitt. They heavily damaged the Diether von Roeder,

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slightly damaged two others, and sank six laden ore cargo ships. The British destroyers also exchanged fire with German troops on shore before departing. As the British flotilla withdrew with only one ship slightly damaged, three German vessels emerged from an adjacent fjord and gave chase. Then, when it appeared Hardy’s force would successfully extract itself, two more German destroyers appeared from their anchorage further down Ofotfjord and attacked on the flanks with guns and torpedoes. In the engagement that followed, the British destroyer Hardy was hit several times and beached, the Hunter was sunk, and the Hotspur was damaged, but managed to escape. The Germans then withdrew because of a shortage of fuel. On the way out of the Vestfjord to the sea, the Havoc and Hostile fired upon the German ammunition ship Rauenfels, which exploded and sank. Warburton-Lee was among the British dead in the battle; he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. British naval reinforcements, including the cruiser Penelope, now blockaded the fjord, and on April 11, the German destroyer Erich Koellner sustained additional damage when it ran afoul of unchartered rocks. The Royal Navy was determined to sink the remaining German destroyers at Narvik, and on April 13, the Admiralty dispatched Vice Admiral William J. Whitworth with the battleship Warspite and nine destroyers to the site. The battleship’s reconnaissance Swordfish aircraft engaged and sank the German submarine U-64 and warned of German destroyers lying in ambush positions in side fjords. A destroyer action then commenced outside Narvik harbor in the early afternoon. Aircraft from the British carrier Furious tried to engage the German warships in advance of the Warspite’s arrival but were not successful, and two of them were lost. In the ensuing fighting, the Warspite’s 15-inch guns proved especially effective against the German ships and shore installations. German submarines launched several torpedo attacks against the British battleship, but were unsuccessful. With the German destroyers running low on ammunition, they retired up the Rombaks and Herjangs fjords, where they were pursued. In the engagement on April 13, the Erich Koerllner was the first German destroyer sunk. It was followed by the Hermann Künne, Diether von Roeder, and Erich Giese. The remaining German destroyers were then scuttled. The only German warships that survived in the area were four submarines and the tanker Jan Wellem. The British suffered serious damage to the destroyer Eskimo, which lost its bow but managed to stay afloat. Another British destroyer, the Bedouin, was slightly damaged. The Germans lost 316 men killed, the British 188, and the Norwegians 435 in both battles. Although he had discretionary authority to do so, Whitworth declined to send his marines and sailors into action against the German soldiers ashore, but he recommended that a military force be dispatched forthwith to exploit the situation because the Germans had limited ammunition reserves and their motor transport had been captured at sea on April 11. No force was sent until May 28, however.

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Combined with other losses sustained, the Germans paid a heavy price for their operations in Norway, especially in naval forces. However, Adolf Hitler considered the loss acceptable because it would protect his northern flank, secure continued access to vital Swedish iron ore, and provide bases for submarines and German surface raiders to operate in the north Atlantic. Britton W. MacDonald and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Germany, Navy; Norway, Navy.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Dickens, Peter. Narvik: Battles in the Fjords. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Haarr, Geirr H. The German Invasion of Norway April 1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. Vol. 1, The Defensive. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976.

Naval Armament Naval guns are classified by width of bore in inches and by caliber (the length of the barrel expressed as diameter of the bore). Thus, the U.S. Navy five-inch/.38caliber gun was 5 in. wide with a barrel length of 190 in. (5 times 38) or almost 16 ft. A gun’s power and ability to penetrate armor are roughly proportional to its size. Between the world wars, the Washington and London Naval Treaties defined warship types and sizes and influenced their design and armament. Most nations sought to build ships close to the limits of treaty-specified size and main armament: 16-inch guns for battleships, 8-inch guns for heavy cruisers, 6-inch guns for light cruisers, and 5-inch guns for destroyers. Although some ships straddled the treaty classifications (most notably Germany’s Deutschland-class pocket battleships), most large warships fit within the treaty categories. The German navy battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and pocket battleships of the Deutschland class mounted 280-mm (11-inch) guns, because the terms of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War II restricted Germany to that size capital ship armament. Otherwise, battleship main armament ranged from 12-inch guns in older battleships to 16-inch guns in the newer U.S. battleships and Britain’s Nelson and Rodney to the 18.1-inch guns of Japan’s super battleships Yamato and Musashi (the only battleships that exceeded the 16-inch Washington Treaty limit). Most British battleships, the Italian Littorio class, and the German Bismarck and Tirpitz battleships carried 15-inch guns, although Britain’s King George V–class ships

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mounted only 14-inch guns because the failed 1936 London Treaty would have limited navies to 14-inch guns. Many older Japanese and U.S. battleships also carried 14-inch guns. The battleship guns of the 1930s and 1940s were much more powerful than older guns of equivalent size. The U.S. battleship Iowa’s 16-inch/.50-caliber guns, for example, fired a much heavier shell with greater penetrating power 2,000 yards farther than the 16-inch/.45-caliber guns of the nation’s older battleships. With a few exceptions, the power of guns of similar age and size was roughly comparable across different navies. The 2,700-lb. shells fired by the 16-inch guns on the U.S. Iowa-class battleships were particularly powerful, whereas the 3,200-lb. shells fired by the Yamato and Musashi’s 18.1-inch guns were of mediocre quality, making the two guns roughly equal in striking power. Mounted in double or triple turrets—or in a few cases (Britain’s King George V class and France’s Dunkerque and Richelieu class) in quadruple turrets—and firing a variety of high-explosive and armor-piercing ammunition, these heavy guns gave World War II battleships considerable striking power against targets at sea and on land. Even at 20,000 yards, 11-inch guns could penetrate eight in. of armor, and 16-inch guns could penetrate a foot of armor at 30,000 yards. The range of guns varied depending on their age, size, shell design, propellant charge, and elevation. In the 1930s, most navies enlarged the gun ports of their older battleships to allow higher gun elevations and thus longer ranges. Most battleships could fire at ranges greater than 30,000 yards and some beyond 40,000 yards, but combat took place at shorter ranges, even after the introduction of effective fire-control radar. On May 24, 1941, the Hood and Bismarck opened fire at one another at 26,500 yards, and on October 25, 1944, in Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, U.S. radar-equipped battleships opened fire on the Japanese at 22,800 yards. The 6-inch and 8-inch guns common to cruisers fired shells that ranged in weight from 100 to 300 lb. The older 6-inch guns had ranges between 15,000 and 20,000 yards, and the superior 8-inch weapons sometimes managed 30,000 yards. Although they were unable to penetrate the thick armor of battleships, these weapons could wreak considerable damage on exposed and unarmored systems, as was seen when the three British cruisers with 6-inch and 8-inch guns engaged the lightly armored German pocket battleship Graf Spee at the battle of Río de la Plata on December 13, 1939, knocking out ammunition hoists, fire control, and other critical systems, but their shells bounced off the Graf Spee’s turrets and heavily armored areas. Similarly, off Guadalcanal on the night of November 14–15, 1942, a barrage of 8-inch Japanese shells failed to penetrate the thick armor of the U.S. battleship South Dakota, but they did considerable damage to its exposed areas. These weapons, though, proved more than sufficient to penetrate the thinner armor of cruisers and destroyers. Combined with torpedoes, they made cruiser and destroyer

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actions particularly deadly, as was demonstrated in the Battle of the Java Sea on February 17, 1942, and the Battle of Savo Island on August 8–9, 1942. Battleships generally carried secondary batteries of 5-inch or 6-inch guns, and cruisers carried secondary batteries of 3-inch to 5-inch guns for use against smaller ships, particularly attacking torpedo craft. All warships also mounted antiaircraft guns, and navies added more and more of these to their ships during the course of the war. For example, when it was completed in 1941, the Yamato mounted only 24 25-mm antiaircraft guns, but by 1945, it carried 150 25-mm guns and many 13-mm machine guns in addition to its 5-inch and 6-inch secondary batteries. Late in the war, U.S. battleships similarly mounted more than 125 antiaircraft guns in addition to their 5-inch secondary batteries. Several navies developed dual-purpose guns that proved effective against both ships and airplanes. The U.S. Navy’s 5-inch/.38-caliber was the best of these and helped make U.S. warships the most effective antiaircraft platforms of the war. U.S. battleships carried 16 to 20 of these in dual mounts. They formed the primary armament of U.S. destroyers and antiaircraft cruisers and made up the secondary battery of most U.S. heavy and light cruisers. The 5-inch gun fired 25 rounds per minute, had a range of 18,200 yards and a ceiling of 37,200 ft. and in some mountings could fire straight up. It earned a particularly deadly reputation among Japanese aviators even before proximity-fuse ammunition entered service. Only the 5-inch/.38-caliber fired proximity-fused ammunition, because the fuses were too large for smaller antiaircraft shells. In the last months of the war, the U.S. Navy began replacing it with the even more effective radar-controlled 5-inch/.54-caliber gun. The German dual-purpose 4.1-inch/.65-caliber was comparatively ineffective, and German capital ships deployed 5.9-inch antiship secondary batteries in addition to antiaircraft armament. These crowded the decks and sometimes interfered with one another. Italian and some Japanese battleships also deployed 5-inch or 6-inch antiship secondary batteries in addition to dual-purpose and antiaircraft guns. Britain developed several dual-purpose guns in the 4-inch and 5-inch range but never settled on a standard or manufactured them in sufficient numbers to equip all ships in the fleet. Only a few British destroyers carried dual-purpose guns. Japan developed a good 4.7-inch dual-purpose gun in the 1930s, but it lagged behind similar U.S. and British guns’ in performance by 1941. Many Japanese ships also lacked the high-angle mounts to maximize effectiveness against enemy aircraft. The increasing dominance of aircraft soon made antiaircraft weapons the most important and most often used warship armament, particularly in the Pacific theater, where U.S. battleships became valued for the tremendous quantity of antiaircraft fire they could generate rather than the striking power of their 16-inch guns. Most warships carried specialized antiaircraft guns that ranged from 40-mm and

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Gunnery practice for an antiaircraft 40-mm Quad Gun Mount aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-12), circa February 1945. (Naval Historical Center)

20-mm cannon to smaller machine guns such as the U.S. .50-caliber. The United States and Britain adopted the excellent Swiss Oerlikon 20-mm and the Swedish Bofors 40-mm, which replaced the U.S. Navy’s 1.1-inch machine guns and steadily displaced the Royal Navy’s 2-pounder “pom-poms.” The Bofors fired 120 rounds per minute and the shorter-ranged Oerlikon almost 500 rounds per minute. The Oerlikon accounted for one-third of the U.S. Navy’s antiaircraft kills, but it lacked the power of the Bofors to shatter kamikaze aircraft before they hit their targets. The Italian navy relied on reasonably effective 37-mm and 20-mm Breda antiaircraft guns. The German navy developed similar 37-mm and 20-mm weapons of its own but began replacing them with superior Bofors guns late in the war. Japan adopted a 25-mm Hotchkiss weapon as its primary antiaircraft gun. Plagued with problems, it attained only half the Oerlikon’s rate of fire and lacked the Bofors’ hitting power. Poor sights, particularly in its double and triple mountings, made it difficult to track the high-speed aircraft introduced later in the war, and this partly accounts for the Japanese navy’s poor air defense record. In a further demonstration of the changing face of naval warfare, both the Japanese and British navies

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experimented with antiaircraft shells for their battleship main armament but with only limited success. Stephen K. Stein See also: Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Destroyers; Java Sea, Battle of the; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Radar; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Savo Island, Battle of; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Battleships. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Garzke, William H., and Robert O. Dulin. Battleships: Allied Battleships of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Garzke, William H., and Robert O. Dulin. Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Garzke, William H., and Robert O. Dulin. Battleships: United States Battleships, 1935– 1992. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Poolman, Kenneth. The Winning Edge: Naval Technology in Action, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Worth, Richard. Fleets of World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001.

Naval Gunfire, Shore Support Gunfire from ships offshore was one of the great assets making possible Allied amphibious landings in both the European and Pacific theaters. The traditional adage “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort” had seemed borne out at Gallipoli in World War I. During the interwar years, most navies therefore neglected support of joint operations. For example, the U.S. Navy developed no bombardment ammunition for its battleships until 1940; the Japanese did not do so until 1942. Thus, the amphibious landings of World War II supported by effective naval gunfire present one of the great, if unexpected, success stories of 20th-century military operations. During the North African Campaign in 1941 and 1942, the British found most useful two old monitors, the Erebus and the Terror, which had been originally built to support British troops in Belgium in World War I. With the Allies trying to regain a foothold on the continent in 1943, naval gunnery assets proved one of their trump cards. In the invasions of French North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and finally Anzio, U.S. and British warships provided great assistance to Allied troops ashore. Naval gunfire really came into its own in 1944 during the Normandy invasion, Operation OVERLORD. Promises that heavy bombers would substitute for field

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artillery, unavailable until at least two days after the initial landings, proved hollow when most bombs fell behind the beaches. Fortunately, the Allies had mustered a strong bombardment force of 137 warships, including 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23 cruisers, and 105 destroyers. At Omaha Beach, 9 U.S. and 3 British destroyers moved as close as 900 yards to the shore to destroy German guns with counterbattery fire. U.S. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley concluded, “The Navy saved our hides.” He remarked on another occasion, “I would gladly have swapped a dozen B-17s for each 12-inch gun.” At Normandy, Allied warships fired approximately 141,000 rounds of 4-inch and larger shells, a majority of which were controlled by aerial spotters. In concluding that naval gunfire was approximately 10 times as accurate as bombing, the British also noted that casualties from friendly fire were rare. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel reported to Adolf Hitler that Allied naval gunfire was so effective “that no operation of any kind by either infantry or tanks is possible in the area commanded by this rapid-fire artillery.” Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt counted naval gunfire as one of the three principal factors in the German defeat at Normandy. Following the Saint-Lô breakout, British warships continued to assist Allied troops advancing along the coast into November 1944, the veteran battleship Warspite shooting until its guns were worn out. In the Pacific, naval gunfire support proved at least as important as in Europe. In their first test in this role, U.S. warships at Tarawa in late 1943 destroyed nearly all the Japanese artillery positions and wire communications. However, many enemy machine guns remained operational and inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking marines. In consequence, naval gunfire preparation for the next landing, Kwajalein, was more extensive. The official report concluded, “The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 ft., then dropped. All beach defenses were completely destroyed.” Thus, the Japanese increasingly sited their defenses specifically to avoid naval gunfire. At Iwo Jima, their deep tunnels enabled many soldiers to escape the extensive three-day bombardment, although the big naval guns, often firing at ranges of less than two miles, destroyed over 60 percent of the Japanese coastal artillery in the target area. The defending general, Kuribayashi Tadamichi, reported: “The firepower of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing possible.” In contesting the final Allied invasion of the war at Okinawa, the Japanese command deliberately chose to burrow into the coral ridges in the southern portion of the island to escape the fury of naval gunfire. Still, U.S. warships fired in support of troops 23,210 battleship projectiles and 261,000 5-inch to 8-inch rounds. During the war, the tonnage of ordnance laid down by Allied warships backing invasions totaled five or six times that delivered by aviation. The Axis powers gave far less attention to naval gunfire support, although the Italians did build some coastal monitors. In the closing stages of the war, the Germans employed crusiers

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and the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in support of retreating German units on the Courland coast. Only once did Japanese battleships bombard Allied troops. On October 14, 1942, at Guadalcanal, the Kongo and Haruna fired nearly 900 14-inch projectiles, mostly at Henderson Field. Given the small size of the target area, this proved the most devastating bombardment fired against U.S. troops in any war. Malcolm Muir Jr. See also: AVALANCHE, Operation; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Destroyers; DETACHMENT, Operation; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; ICEBERG, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Buxton, Ian. Big Gun Monitors: The History of the Design, Construction, and Operation of the Royal Navy’s Monitors. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Lewis, Adrian R. Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 11, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1957. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Official Naval History of World War II. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

Naval Strategy, Allied The successful execution of Allied naval strategies, especially those of Great Britain and the United States, proved decisive in the Allied victory in World War II. In the case of Britain, the effective use of naval power made possible its national survival while that of the United States was responsible for the defeat of Japan. Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, the naval forces of Britain and France found themselves arrayed against those of Germany. Britain, possessing the larger of the navies, was chiefly responsible for the formulation of naval strategy. The plan was roughly the same as that in World War I. First, the British instituted a blockade of Germany. British warships stopped and searched merchantmen steaming into the North Sea to deny contraband goods from being utilized by Germany. Although effective in World War I, this effort in World War II met with only limited success owing to a sweeping economic agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union. The German conquest of much of Western Europe in the spring of 1940 further undermined the blockade.


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The second portion of British strategy also mirrored World War I, as the Royal Navy was responsible for keeping open the seaborne lines of communication upon which Britain relied for the vast majority of its raw materials and food as well as manufactured goods for both the military and civilian sectors. To this end, the British promptly instituted a convoy system for the transport of supplies. The British concentrated on the Atlantic, although resources were also stretched to guard the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, while the French navy protected Allied interests in the Mediterranean. Later Canada and the United States assumed major responsibility for convoy protection on the Atlantic run. The ability of the British to protect their interests and remain in the war was greatly hampered with the June 1940 defeat of France and the loss of the powerful French navy. Although Britain was able to secure a part of the French fleet through Operation CATAPULT and also garnered 50 destroyers through the Destroyer for Bases Deal with the then benevolently neutral United States, British forces were stretched thin as they also had to dispute control of the Mediterranean owing to the June 1940 Italian entry into the war on the Axis side. The U.S. practice, beginning in mid-1941, of employing U.S. naval forces to escort convoys from the U.S. East Coast to Iceland offset this problem somewhat, but the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union compelled the British to divert naval forces to the protection of Arctic convoys bound to this new Allied power. As of June 1941, British naval strategy appeared ineffective given that shipping losses to German submarines by that date amounted to 5.7 million tons, while British shipyards could only replace a small fraction of that. The entry of the United States into the war as an Allied power following the December 7, 1941, attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor greatly improved Britain’s strategic situation at sea, despite the fact that Japanese navy was able in short order to sweep the British from most of their possessions in Asia. Unlike the Axis powers, Britain and the United States closely coordinated their efforts at sea to great advantage. While the European theater was not the primary one for the U.S. Navy, it did share in the protection of Allied supply lines to Britain, and, by early 1943, U.S. and Canadian naval forces had assumed responsibility for safeguarding convoys in the western and central Atlantic. The United States also contributed warships to the Allied war effort in Europe, particularly for operations in the Mediterranean, and it offset merchant losses through its massive shipbuilding capacity. By the late spring of 1943, Allied naval strategy was successful in that the Axis submarine menace was contained. Great Britain’s survival ensured a staging point for amphibious operations versus Axis Europe that resulted in the landings in North Africa, in Sicily, and Italy, and in France, with subsequent drives into Germany by Allied ground forces. While Britain was almost exclusively involved with the European theater of operations at sea, the United States directed its naval efforts at Japan in the Far East.

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Upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and the Allies suffered a succession of defeats at the hands of the Japanese. By early 1942, Japan had invaded the Philippines, which ultimately fell in May 1942, and conquered Malaya and taken the great British Pacific bastion of Singapore, while the ABDA Command—a collection of Australian, British, Dutch, and U.S. warships tasked with defending the Netherlands East Indies—had been destroyed, as the Japanese conducted operations to conquer that resources-rich area. Amidst these events, in early 1942, U.S. and British leaders agreed that naval operations would be divided into strategic theaters. The United States would concentrate on the Pacific while Britain dealt with the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Middle East, and Indian Ocean. U.S. strategists held to a plan that called for the recapturing of lost U.S. possessions and the conquering of Japanese Pacific holdings as forward bases to conduct fleet operations for an eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. Command of the Pacific was divided into two theaters—the southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur and the North, Central, and South Pacific under Admiral Chester Nimitz. MacArthur desired an advance of army and ground-based forces from Australia through the Dutch East Indies toward the Philippines. Nimitz, however, argued for the execution of Plan Orange, the naval strategy for the defeat of Japan formulated in the interwar years that called for U.S. naval forces to drive through the Central Pacific and seize Japanese island possessions through amphibious operations, while at the same time engaging and defeating the Japanese navy. The ultimate goal was to cut off the resources-poor Japanese home islands from supply and destroy its war-making capacity through strategic bombing from the captured islands. Because sufficient resources were ultimately available, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed both plans, although the bulk of naval assets were directed to Nimitz and his Pacific Fleet. Pending the arrival of new naval construction to offset the Pearl Harbor losses, operations first centered on the use of submarines to attack Japanese shipping, a series of carrier raids, and arresting the expansion of the Japanese defensive ring. Although the submarine campaign got off to a slow start, due in large part to faulty U.S. torpedoes, in May and June 1942, with the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, U.S. naval forces decisively halted the Japanese advance and destroyed much of Japanese naval aviation. U.S. industrial might, meanwhile, ultimately produced the world’s most powerful navy—indeed, larger than all other navies in the world combined. Japan proved unable to halt subsequent U.S. assaults in the South and Central Pacific during 1943–1944, in which the Americans replaced island-hopping with leap-frogging, in which some Japanese strong-points such as Rabaul and Truk were bypassed, cut off from resupply, and allowed to wither on the vine. In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt met in Pearl Harbor with MacArthur and Nimitz to discuss strategy. MacArthur argued that the next U.S. move


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should be the liberation of the Philippines; Nimitz, supported by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, wanted to bypass the Philippines entirely and secure Formosa. With sufficient assets now available to accomplish both, Roosevelt agreed with MacArthur that the Philippines should be retaken. This shifted Nimitz’s operations further north to Okinawa, which was to be the staging point for a projected eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. With the Japanese aware of U.S. plans to cut them off from the resources– especially oil—of the Netherlands East Indies, they gambled all in the war’s largest naval battle, Leyte Gulf, in October 1944. It ended with the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an effective fleet fighting force. These offensives, combined with the devastating toll exacted on Japanese merchant shipping by U.S. submarines, starved Japan of resources. The conquest of the Mariana Islands in the summer of 1944 provided B-29 bomber bases from which to strike the Japanese home islands in a highly effective strategic bombing campaign. The conquest of Iwo Jima in March 1945 and Okinawa in April—the latter being supported by the British Pacific Fleet, making it the first large-scale Allied operation in the Pacific since the opening of the war—virtually accomplished the goals of Plan Orange and ensured Japanese defeat. Sustained heavy bombing missions from the Marianas coupled with carrier operations against Japan and aerial minelaying and submarines destroyed Japan’s industrial centers, much of its transportation system, and the majority of its shipping. An invasion of Japan, planned for the fall of 1945, proved unnecessary following the Japanese surrender after the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The fact that the formal Japanese surrender took place on the decks of the battleship Missouri was a strong indication of the success of U.S. naval strategy and its place in the defeat of Japan. Eric W. Osborne See also: Adriatic, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea, Naval Operations in; Amphibious Warfare; Arctic Convoys; Atlantic, Battle of the; Baltic Sea, Area of Operations; Canada, Navy; CATAPULT, Operation; Central Pacific Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Truk, Raid on; United States, Navy.

References Creswell, John. Sea Warfare, 1939–1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, 1967. Jackson, Robert. The Royal Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

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Morison, Samuel. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1984, 1987.

Naval Strategy, Axis During the Second World War, Germany, Italy, and Japan pursued diverse naval strategies, usually without regard for those of their partners. The failure of the Axis powers, especially Japan, to win control of the seas had much to do with their defeat in the war. Germany’s naval strategy had been developed after Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933. In 1935 Britain, much to the displeasure of France and in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, concluded a naval agreement with Germany that granted the latter the right to build up to 35 percent the size of the British navy in surface ships and parity in submarines. Hitler had instructed his naval chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, not to expect war before 1943, and so Raeder had been busy building a balanced fleet that was to include aircraft carriers and would be able to project German power overseas. Both Hitler and Raeder envisioned the day when Germany might challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. The ambitious German Z Plan, spelled out in 1938, was to be completed by 1948. When war came in September 1939, this construction program was, of course, far from complete, and Germany found itself with the wrong type of navy with which to carry out a guerre de course (war against commerce). Raeder intended to employ such ships as he had to attack British commerce, using strong surface units as commerce raiders, since the navy in 1939 had available only 57 submarines, and half of these were not suitable for blue water operations. A good bit of the German navy–especially its destroyers—was also consumed in the successful German invasion of Norway in April 1940. Unfortunately for the German effort at sea, the defeat of France that June did not bring major naval acquisitions, for the armistice agreement left the fleet disarmed but in French hands. Then, in Operation CATAPULT, the British acquired or neutralized as many of the French ships as they could reach. German naval strength, apart from submarines, continued to diminish, and the use of German capital ships as surface raiders largely ended with the May 1941 sinking of the battleship Bismarck and Hitler’s increasing reluctance to risk further loss of his surface units. Ultimately, most of the capital ships either lost their guns or served as stationary gun platforms. For the remainder of the war, German strategy centered almost exclusively on the use of U-boats as commerce raiders in the Battle of the Atlantic seeking to cut


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the lifeline to Britain and force that nation from the war. Although the submarines exacted great damage to the Allied shipping—particularly that of Britain—the Allies contained that threat by May 1943 through the use of convoys, technological innovations, aircraft, and code breaking. By war’s end, little remained of the German fleet due to losses at the hands of the Allies, although the German navy was able to accomplish a great success in the evacuation of personnel from the Baltic states late in the war. With France near defeat, Italy entered the war in June 1940. Throughout the interwar period, Italian naval construction was based on the assumption that it would be deployed against France in the Mediterranean. Based in part on Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s concept of Italy as an aircraft carrier because of the relatively short distances in the Mediterranean, Italy did not commission such ships in the war. Italian naval strategy rested on the navy supporting operations in North Africa, disputing the Allies’ use of the Mediterranean’s central basin and blockading the Straits of Sicily so that Great Britain could not supply its Middle Eastern forces through the Mediterranean. While the Italian navy was on paper a substantial force and it had some fine ships, it suffered heavily from technological deficiencies, such as the lack of radar and sonar at the opening of the war and poor coordination with land-based air assets. After the first year of war, fuel shortages severely limited operations. In naval engagements fought with the British navy, Italy suffered several major defeats and won few clear-cut victories, but the navy did ensure that 86 percent of supplies and 92 percent of Italian and German troops it escorted to North Africa arrived safely. The navy also prevented Allied supply of the Middle East through the Mediterranean and maintained a blockade of Malta until November 1942. Despite these successes, Italian naval operations were insufficient to bring victory, and in 1943 Axis troops were cleared from North Africa, and Allied forces launched invasions of first Sicily and then Italy itself. In September 1943, Italy renounced its alliance with Germany and most of the fleet went over to the Allies, although Germany acquired some ships and sank several others, including the new battleship Roma. While the naval arm was important to both Germany and Italy in the war, it was essential to Japanese military strategy, for as an island nation, Japan required a powerful fleet to project its military power. By December 1941, the Japanese navy possessed a number of modern ships (and soon the two largest battleships ever to go to sea), more aircraft carriers than any other power with pilots who had gained experience in the fighting in China, the superb Long Lance torpedo, and probably the best-trained ship crews of any navy in the world. As in World War I, Japanese leaders saw the beginning of World War II as an opportunity to secure the natural resources that fate had denied their nation. But Japanese expansion in China and in French Indochina brought opposition from the United States in the form of economic sanctions, which were supported by

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both the British government and the Dutch government in exile. These economic sanctions—especially the cutoff of oil—threatened Japan’s very survival, and Tokyo decided on war rather than give up its hard-won China conquests and foothold in Indochina. Japanese leaders realized that the far greater industrial capacity of the United States would make such a war difficult, so they opted for Combined Fleet commander Yamamoto Isoroku’s plan of a preemptive strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, recently relocated to Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese goal here was to cripple the Pacific Fleet sufficiently to purchase time for the Japanese fleet and army to conquer the areas containing the needed natural resources (especially oil from the Netherlands East Indies) and then construct a defensive ring. The Japanese envisioned the U.S. fleet being savaged by submarines and surface ships with the Long Lance torpedo as it attempted to fight its way west across the Pacific and then a great battle or series of battles ending in Japanese victory. Japanese leaders believed that ultimately the United States would tire of the war and acknowledge Japanese hegemony in Asia. This strategy proved unworkable, and the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941 was a major mistake in that it unified the U.S. public squarely behind the war effort from the onset as nothing else could. As it turned out, the Japanese lacked the industrial strength to fortify the islands of their defensive perimeter to the point where they could be effectively defended. Additionally, while Japan enjoyed initial successes versus the United States Navy, especially in night actions, the industrial power of the United States vastly outstripped that of Japan, resulting in a navy larger than that of all other navies of the world put together. Although Japan had more carriers than any other nation (thanks to Yamamoto), much of its naval air power was smashed in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, and an inadequate pilot replacement program hindered the fleet air arm thereafter. The Japanese also had only a limited merchant marine capacity, especially in tankers, and they lacked convoy escort ships and had largely neglected antisubmarine warfare. They also trailed in the development of radar. In the end, Japanese will and training were overcome by improved U.S. training, technological advances such as radar and the variable time fuse (proximity fuse), superior aircraft, better trained pilots, and sheer numbers. The ability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to operate at great distance through the Fleet Train concept and acquisition of Japanese-held islands brought the eventual isolation of the Japanese home islands and that nation’s defeat. Eric W. Osborne See also: Adriatic, Naval Operations in; Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Central Pacific Campaign; CERBERUS, Operation; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German;

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Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; North Cape, Battle of; Raeder, Erich; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping; Yamamoto Isoroku; Z Plan.

References Creswell, John. Sea Warfare, 1939–1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, 1967. Gray, Colin S., and Roger Barnett. Seapower and Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Jackson, Robert. The Royal Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. New York: Scribner, 1995. Morison, Samuel. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1984, 1987.

Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater At the outbreak of World War II, the British navy forces in Atlantic home waters stood at 7 battleships (the Nelson, Rodney, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, Resolution, and Revenge), 3 battle cruisers (the Hood, Renown, and Repulse), 3 aircraft carriers (the Ark Royal, Courageous, and Hermes), 18 cruisers, 35 destroyers, 7 fleet minesweepers, and 16 submarines. The British Mediterranean Fleet comprised 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, and 44 destroyers. To bolster its forces in the Atlantic, especially in the escort of merchant shipping, the Royal Navy enjoyed the cooperation of the Royal Canadian Navy, which began the war with only 6 destroyers and 5 minesweepers but ended the conflict with more than 363 ships. In 1939, the French navy was the fourth largest and most modern in the world. France possessed 5 older battleships (the powerful new battleships Jean Bart and Richelieu were in the final stages of construction), 1 aircraft carrier, 2 modern battle cruisers (the Strasbourg and Dunkerque), 19 cruisers, 64 destroyers, and 77 submarines. In September 1939, much of this naval strength was deployed in the Mediterranean, West Indies, and Indochina. Poland had only a small navy in September 1939. It counted four destroyers, five submarines, one minelayer, and six modern minesweepers, as well as several auxiliary and training ships.

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Italy, neutral until 1940, had an impressive navy in September 1939 of 4 reconstructed World War I–era battleships, 7 heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 90 destroyers, and 97 submarines. The Soviet Union, officially neutral until June 1941, had begun an ambitious naval construction program, but in September 1939 it operated 3 old battleships, 6 cruisers, 4 destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, and 165 submarines. The outbreak of war in September 1939 caught the German navy in transition. Because Chancellor Adolf Hitler had said that war would not occur before 1943, German navy commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had been building a balanced fleet to include aircraft carriers. In September 1939, the German navy consisted of the 2 battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (the powerful battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were under construction), 3 pocket battleships (the Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee, and the Deutschland, soon renamed Lützow), 1 heavy cruiser (the Admiral Hipper, with 4 additional heavy cruisers under construction); 6 light cruisers, 34 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 56 submarines. In September 1939, the U.S. Navy may have been the world’s most powerful. It maintained 15 battleships, 5 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 37 cruisers, 149 destroyers, and 71 submarines. Although officially neutral when the war in Europe began, the United States lent unofficial support to the Allies. The United States divided its ships between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In September 1939, U.S. forces in the Atlantic, commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, consisted of 3 old battleships (the New York, Arkansas, and the Texas; battleship Wyoming was a training ship), the aircraft carrier Ranger, 8 cruisers, 43 destroyers, and 21 submarines. The United States had significant naval building programs under way that were centered on fast battleships and Essex-class aircraft carriers. In addition, Washington ordered 110 decommissioned World War I–vintage destroyers refurbished for service. David M. Beehler See also: Canada, Navy; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Poland, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Soviet Union, Navy; United States, Navy.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. London: Bracken Books, 1989.

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of numbers of ships deployed by the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific. Possessing more aircraft carriers than any other power and with the world’s most experienced naval air arm as well as the excellent Long Lance torpedo, the superbly trained Imperial Japanese Navy was indeed ready to run riot, at least in the short term. In the Pacific and Indian Oceans in early December 1941, the Japanese counted 10 battleships (this does not include the Yamato, the largest battleship ever built, which entered service later that month), 11 aircraft carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, 23 light cruisers, 129 destroyers, and 67 submarines. The Japanese ships were entirely in the Pacific, whereas the ships of the United States were split between the Atlantic and Pacific, and Great Britain had most of its naval strength in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; even Australian and New Zealand ships were serving abroad. The U.S. Navy possessed in both its Pacific and Asiatic Fleets a total of 9 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 13 heavy cruisers, 11 light cruisers, 80 destroyers, and 56 submarines. British Empire forces, including Australian and New Zealand ships still in the Pacific, numbered 1 battleship and 1 battle cruiser, 1 heavy cruiser, 7 light cruisers, and 13 destroyers. The Netherlands navy added 3 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, and 13 submarines. Thus, the total Allied force was inferior to that of Japan in numbers in everything except battleships (where they were equal), and submarines (69 to 67). Also, most Japanese ships were newer, faster, and more heavily armed than their Allied counterparts. These figures do not take into account training or command and language difficulties experienced by Allied forces. The naval strengths listed above are, however, misleading in the sense that they do not take into account ships under construction or the potential for new construction, a function of industrial capability. Here, as thoughtful Japanese strategists had known all along, Japan was no match for the United States, and the longer the war endured, the more likely that the early Japanese superiority would disappear. Those in Tokyo supporting war believed that a preemptive strike would sufficiently cripple U.S. naval strength, allowing Japan time to secure its resource base (the reason for the war) and build a defensive ring that would enable it to blunt U.S. attacks and force Washington to recognize Japanese hegemony in the region. As it turned out, this appraisal could not have been more incorrect. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Australia, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Netherlands, Navy; United States, Navy; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

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Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History. 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1993. Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

NEPTUNE, Operation (D-Day, June 6, 1944) Operation NEPTUNE was the English Channel crossing phase of Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of France. U.S. officials had long sought the earliest possible invasion of France as the way to win the war in the shortest possible time. They supported both GYMNAST, a British cross-channel invasion contingency plan for late 1942, and ROUNDUP, a 48-division invasion of France projected to occur by April 1943. The failure of the Allied raid on Dieppe, France (Operation JUBILEE), on August 19, 1942, however, led the Americans to concede to the British position that a cross-channel invasion was many months, if not years, in the future. Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and British planners, meanwhile, sought to interest the United States in a more opportunistic approach that would include operations in the Mediterranean theater, and the Americans reluctantly agreed. This led to Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and to subsequent British and U.S. landings in Sicily and Italy. The United States insisted, however, that the Italian Campaign would be a limited effort. At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, Soviet leader Josef Stalin pressed President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill for the cross-channel invasion. Stalin agreed to mount a major offensive by the Soviets on the Eastern Front to coincide with the landing. He also insisted that Roosevelt name the commander of the invasion force, and shortly after the conference, Roosevelt appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the post of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. The Germans were well aware of the Allied intention to invade northwestern Europe, and the coasts of Holland, Belgium, and France bristled with fortifications and booby traps. Organization Todt had begun erecting defenses there in mid1942. Over the next two years, the Germans used some 17.3 million cubic yards of concrete and 1.2 million tons of steel in thousands of fortifications. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who had command of Army Group B and the coastal defenses, disagreed with German commander-in-chief West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. Rommel was well aware from the campaign in North Africa what complete Allied domination of the air would mean. He believed that, if it was to be stopped at all, the invasion had to be defeated on the beaches. Rundstedt and Hitler placed their hopes in a large mobile reserve that would defeat the Allied forces once they were ashore. Indeed, Hitler welcomed the invasion as a chance to engage and destroy the British and U.S. forces. In Britain, the Allied armies could not be touched;

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in France, they could be destroyed. “Let them come,” he said. “They will get the thrashing of their lives.” Rommel did what he could, supervising the construction of elaborate defenses, the placement of a half million foreshore obstacles, and the laying of some 4 million mines. Rommel had at his disposal in the Fifteenth Army in northern France and the Seventh Army in Normandy a total of 68 divisions: 25 static coastal, 16 infantry and parachute, 20 armored and mechanized, and 7 reserve. The Germans were weak in the air and at sea, however. The Third Air Fleet in France deployed only 329 aircraft on D-Day. The German navy focused on expanding coastal artillery and laying mine barriers. German naval forces between Cherbourg and Ostend included five fleet torpedo boats and four motor torpedo boat (S-boote) flotillas. Germany also deployed four destroyers on the Biscay coast and 36 U-boats, most from French ports, during the campaign. Meanwhile, U.S. and British aircraft worked to soften the German defenses and isolate the beachheads. Between April 1 and June 5, 1944, Allied aircraft flew 200,000 sorties and dropped 195,000 tons of bombs. The Allies lost 2,000 aircraft in the process, but by D-Day they had largely isolated the landing areas, and they had achieved virtually total air supremacy. The Germans also greatly strengthened the channel port defenses, which Hitler ordered turned into fortresses. All of this was for naught, because the Allies came over the beaches and brought their own ports with them. In one of the greatest military engineering achievements in history, thousands of men labored in Britain for months to build two large artificial harbors known as mulberries. After the initial Allied landings, these were to be hauled across the English Channel and sunk in place. The Allies worked out precise and elaborate plans for the mammoth crosschannel invasion, code-named OVERLORD, to occur on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy. British admiral Bertram H. Ramsay had overall command of the naval cross–English Channel operation, code-named NEPTUNE, while British general Bernard Montgomery exercised overall command of the land forces. The object of the operation was “to secure a lodgment on the continent, from which further offensive operations can be developed.” The landing itself would be preceded by a night drop of paratroops. Three divisions were employed: the British 6th and the U.S. 82nd and 101st. The lightly armed paratroopers, operating in conjunction with the French Resistance, had the vital task of securing the flanks of the lodgment and destroying key transportation choke points to prevent the Germans from reinforcing their beach defenses. Two German panzer divisions were stationed just outside Caen. If they were permitted to reach the beaches, they could strike the amphibious forces from the flank and roll them up. The amphibious assault occurred early in the morning after the airborne assault with five infantry divisions wading ashore along the 50-mile stretch of coast,

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divided into five sectors. The designated beaches were, from west to east, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division (Utah), the U.S. 1st Infantry (Omaha), the British 50th Infantry (Gold), the Canadian 3rd Infantry (Juno), and the British 3rd Infantry (Sword). Operation OVERLORD proved a vast undertaking. The airborne forces alone would require 1,340 C-47 transports and 2,500 gliders. Ten thousand aircraft would secure the skies. Naval support for the invasion would come from 138 bombardment warships, 221 destroyers and other convoy escorts, 287 minesweepers, 495 light craft, and 441 auxiliaries. In addition, there were 4,000 landing ships and other craft of various sizes. Invasion commander General Eisenhower faced a difficult decision, given terrible weather in the days preceding the planned landing. Informed by his chief meteorologist that a break in the weather might occur, Eisenhower decided to proceed. This decision worked to the Allies’ advantage, because the Germans did not expect a landing in such poor weather. The French Resistance was informed by radio code, and the airborne forces took off. The airborne operation occurred on schedule on the night of June 5–6, but thick cloud banks, German antiaircraft fire, jumpy flight crews, and Pathfinders who were immediately engaged in firefights on the ground and unable to set up their beacons all led to premature drops and to paratroopers and gliders being scattered all over the peninsula and in the English Channel. Nonetheless, the wide scattering of forces caused confusion among the defenders as to the precise Allied plans. Most objectives were secured. The only possibility of German success was for the defenders rapidly to introduce panzer reserves, but this step was fatally delayed by two factors. The first was Allied naval gunfire support and air superiority of 30 to 1 over Normandy itself. The second factor was Hitler’s failure immediately to commit resources available elsewhere. He was convinced by Allied deception that the invasion at Normandy was merely a feint and that the main thrust would come in the Pas de Calais sector. The British controlled the entire German spy network in the United Kingdom and used it to feed disinformation to the Germans, while Operation FORTITUDE NORTH caused Hitler to believe that the Allies intended to invade Norway from Scotland, leading him to maintain and even reinforce the substantial German forces stationed there, and FORTITUDE SOUTH led Hitler to believe that the main Allied effort in France would come in the form of a subsequent landing in the Pas de Calais area, the narrowest point of the English Channel, and that the lodgment in Normandy was only a feint. Not until late July did Hitler authorize the movement of the Fifteenth Panzer Army from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. In effect, the deception totally immobilized 19 German divisions east of the Seine. Although units of the Fifteenth Army were moved west to Normandy before that date, this was done piecemeal and hence they were much easier for the Allies to defeat.

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Meanwhile, the Normandy invasion began. In the days beforehand, some 2,700 vessels manned by 195,000 men were on the move. In Operation NEPTUNE, they transported 130,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, 12,000 other vehicles, and 10,000 tons of supplies. Two U.S., two British, and one Canadian division were to be put ashore. The U.S. divisions came under the command of the First U.S. Army (Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley), the Anglo-Canadian formations under the command of Second British Army (Lieutenant General Miles C. Dempsey). Overall command at sea was the responsibility of Admiral Ramsay with responsibility devolved between the Western Naval Task Force (U.S. Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk) and the Eastern Naval Task Force (British Rear Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian). The assault convoys included some 16 transports, 106 LSTs (landing ships, tank), two other landing ships, and 867 landing craft, plus 72 landing craft in the fire support role in the U.S. sector; and 130 LSTs, 40 other landing ships, and 1,300 landing craft, plus 242 landing craft in the fire support role in the British and Canadian sector. Providing escort, cover, and general support were 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23 cruisers, 3 gunboats, 105 destroyers, and 1,073 smaller naval vessels. Warships from eight navies were present in the Allied order of battle. Of these, 79 percent were British and Canadian, nearly 17 percent were U.S., and the remainder were Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, and Polish. At about 5:30 a.m. on June 6, 1944, the bombardment ships opened up against the 50-mile-long invasion front, engaging the German shore batteries. The first U.S. assault troops landed 30 to 40 minutes later, and the British landing craft were ashore 2 hours later. The landing was in jeopardy only on Omaha Beach, where, because of rough seas, only 5 of 32 amphibious duplex-drive tanks reached the shore. Support artillery was also lost when DUKW amphibious trucks were swamped by the waves. Some landing craft were hit and destroyed, and those troops of the 1st Infantry Division who gained the beach were soon pinned down by a withering German fire. Bradley even considered withdrawal. At 9:50 a.m., however, the gunfire support ships opened up against the German shore batteries. Destroyers repeatedly risked running aground to provide close-in gunnery to assist the troops ashore; indeed several destroyers actually scraped bottom. By noon, the German defenders were giving way. Landings on the other beaches were much easier. Overall, for the first day, the Allies sustained some 10,300 casualties—4,300 British and Canadian and 6,000 U.S. A recent study suggests that a nighttime landing would have produced fewer casualties; still, the losses were comparatively light. Ramsay also had responsibility for the movement of the 146 pieces of the mulberry harbors across the English Channel by tugs. Although the two mulberries were put in place, unfortunately for the Allies, during June 19–20, a force 6–7 storm severely damaged Mulberry A in the U.S. sector. It also sank more than 100

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small craft and drove many more ashore, bringing to a halt the discharge of supplies. Vital ammunition stocks had to be flown in. Mulberry A was abandoned, but a strengthened Mulberry B provided supplies to both armies. The Allies put ashore 75,215 British and Canadian troops and 57,500 U.S. forces on D-Day. In the weeks following the initial landings, other infantry and armored divisions landed, a total of some 1 million men within a month. Operation NEPTUNE, the assault phase, officially ended on July 1. Stubborn German resistance and difficult terrain combined to cause the Allied ground offensive to proceed more slowly than planned, but by the end of June, the Allies had secured Cherbourg and the northern Carentan peninsula. Not until Operation COBRA on July 25–31 were the Allies able to break out. All northern France was then open for the highly mechanized Allied units to maneuver. On August 15, Allied forces also came ashore on the French Mediterranean coast in Operation DRAGOON (renamed from ANVIL), which had been delayed by the need to provide shipping for OVERLORD. The German defenders were now in full retreat, but it remained to be seen if the western Allies could maintain their fast-lengthening supply lines and end the war before the Germans could recover. Spencer C. Tucker and H. P. Willmott See also: DRAGOON, Operation; English Channel; JUBILEE, Operation; Kirk, Alan Goodrich; Mulberries; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

References Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. D’Este, Carlo. Decision in Normandy. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983. Hartcup, Guy. Code Name Mulberry: The Planning, Building and Operation of the Normandy Harbours. London: David and Charles, 1977. Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day, June 6, 1944. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. New York: Overlook Press, 2000. Lewis, Adrian R. Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945: Official History. Vol. 3, Part 2. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961. Schofield, B. B. Operation Neptune. London: Ian Allan, 1974.

Netherlands, Navy In the 17th century, the Netherlands had one of the world’s most powerful navies, and it had dueled with the English in midcentury for world maritime supremacy.

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The 20th century was a far cry from that era, however. The Royal Netherlands Navy (Koninklijke Marine) was small, and much of it was antiquated. Most of the Royal Netherlands Navy was allocated toward the defense of the Dutch colonial empire, especially the resources-rich Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch were well aware that the Japanese coveted the natural resources of Southeast Asia and especially the approximately 20 million barrels of oil produced yearly by the Netherlands East Indies. Nonetheless, the Netherlands did not have sufficient military resources to protect its overseas empire against the Japanese. As a consequence, Dutch naval strategy relied on delaying an aggressor pending the arrival of Allied support, most probably from Britain and/or the United States. As such, Dutch naval strategy in Asia relied heavily on the use of submarines and mine warfare to impose delay. The Dutch in fact led in the development of the Snorkel breathing device for submarines, which enabled them to operate submerged for long periods. Germany subsequently secured this technology, but it was slow to make use of it. The Netherlands had remained neutral in World War I, and there was strong popular sentiment in the country after that war against new armament programs. The major threat to the Netherlands in Europe was by land from Germany, and thus the army received the major share of what defense money was available. The bulk of Dutch naval strength was in minelayers, coastal defense motor torpedo boats, gunboats, and submarines. Although there had been limited naval construction in the 1920s and early 1930s, recognition by the government in the late 1930s of the threat posed by Japan came too late for significant additions to occur. In 1936, a cruiser, the Tromp, and one submarine were laid down, but plans during 1938–1941 to add three battle cruisers, three cruisers, four destroyers, and nine submarines resulted in only another Tromp-class cruiser, one destroyer, and six submarines joining the navy before the war. At the onset of war in September 1939, the Netherlands navy consisted of 4 cruisers (a fifth cruiser was almost complete), 8 destroyers, 16 minesweepers, 24 submarines, and torpedo boats and auxiliary craft. The navy also operated some 50 aircraft, most of which were obsolete. On May 10, 1940, when Germany launched an attack against Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, most of the Dutch navy was in Pacific waters. The Germans sank the sole Dutch destroyer in European waters, and a number of smaller vessels were scuttled to prevent them from falling into German hands. The lone cruiser there escaped to Britain and subsequently operated with British forces in the Mediterranean. Most of the Dutch merchant marine was overseas at the time of the German attack and rallied to the Dutch government-in-exile. In late May and early June, a number of Dutch ships participated in Operation DYNAMO, the evacuation of British forces from Dunkerque (Dunkirk), France. Nearly all remaining Dutch warships were in Asian waters at the beginning of the Pacific war in December 1941. Four cruisers, 7 destroyers, and 15 submarines were

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sunk by Japan in the battles of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942, which also claimed American-British-Dutch-Australian [ABDA] Command strike force commander Karel Doorman) and Sunda Strait (February 28–March 1). Those Dutch ships that survived, including the cruiser Sumatra, operated with the British Eastern Fleet. The Dutch ships that remained posed a supply problem for the Allies, because their parts were not compatible with those on British and U.S. navy ships, and thus a number were either laid up or scrapped. During the war, the Netherlands received an infusion of ships from the United States and Britain, including the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman (ex-HMS Neptune), three destroyers, and a number of minesweepers. Some of these ships were retained in the Royal Netherlands Navy after the war. Dutch naval units operating under the command of the Dutch government-inexile in London took part in convoy operations, served in the Mediterranean, and participated in Operation NEPTUNE, the Allied invasion of Normandy, France, on June 6, 1944. Spencer C. Tucker See also: ABDA Command; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; Java Sea, Battle of the; NEPTUNE, Operation; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Divine, A. D. Navies in Exile. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944. Lenton, H. T. Royal Netherlands Navy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968. Van Oosten, F. C. The Battle of the Java Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of (December 20, 1941–March 9, 1942) After attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces moved into Southeast Asia, invading Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. They also moved against the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia). Indeed, the desire of Japanese leaders to secure the vast oil and mineral resources of the Netherlands East Indies was one of the principal reasons behind the decision to go to war against the United States. The Netherlands East Indies is a collection of 17,508 islands rich in natural resources, including oil, tin, bauxite, and coal, and lying astride the equator and major shipping lanes. Japan planned a three-pronged semisimultaneous operation to secure the archipelago as quickly as possible. In the east, Japanese forces would move from forward bases in the southern Philippines on the islands of Ambon and Timor to sever communications and reinforcements from Australia. In the center, forces from the Philippines would push southward through Borneo and Celebes. In the

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west, Japanese forces would move against Sumatra as soon as Singapore was conquered. Finally, when all initial objectives were secured, the three forces would combine for an assault on Java, the center of Allied naval operations in southeastern Asia and headquarters of the joint Allied military command, ABDA (AmericanBritish-Dutch-Australian) Command, formed in January 1942 under British general Archibald Wavell. The disparity in naval strength is striking. Facing the attacking Japanese naval forces, the ABDA Command had a conglomerate of ships, including the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, and some British and Australian surface ships and Dutch units from the East Indies. Major ABDA Command warships included 2 heavy cruisers (the USS Houston and HMS Exeter); 2 seaplane tenders (the USS Langley and Childs); 7 light cruisers (the HNLMS De Ruyter, Java, and the Tromp, the USS Marblehead and Boise, and the HMAS Hobart and Perth); 22 destroyers; and 25 U.S. and 16 Dutch submarines. Area Japanese naval forces were under Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake, commander of the Second Fleet. Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army, had charge of the land forces in the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. Kondo¯ had available for deployment if required 4 fleet aircraft carriers (the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu¯, and the So¯ ryu¯), 2 light carriers, 1 seaplane carrier, 2 seaplane tenders, 2 battleships (the Kongo¯ and Haruna), 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and many minesweepers and auxiliaries in addition to transports. The Japanese offensive opened with heavy cruisers and destroyers escorting transports carrying elements of the Sixteenth Army to the northern Netherlands East Indies. Beginning on December 20, 1941, Japanese troops came ashore on oilrich Dutch Borneo as well as on Celebes and the Moluccas. Japanese land-based aircraft and Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ ichi’s First Air Fleet supported the operation. The poorly equipped soldiers of the 85,000-man Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, mostly indigenous forces of dubious fighting ability and in any case widely scattered over the islands, resisted as best they could. With the few ABDA Command air assets soon destroyed, all the Allies could hope to do was delay the Japanese advance. In a series of naval engagements, Japanese surface ships easily swept aside the outgunned ABDA Command naval units. These battles included Makassar Strait (January 23, 1942), Madoera Strait (February 4), Lombok Strait (Badung Strait, February 19–20), the decisive engagement of the Java Sea (February 27), and Sunda Strait and the Second Battle of the Java Sea (February 28–March 1, 1942). Of the ABDA Command naval forces, only four U.S. destroyers managed to escape to Australia, while an Australian and two British light cruisers and two British destroyers withdrew to Ceylon. Meanwhile, on February 28, Japanese forces came ashore near Batavia, the capital of Java. On March 9, the Dutch surrendered on Java. Japan now had control

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of virtually the entire Netherlands East Indies, adding another 70 million people and vast natural resources to its empire. At first, many Indonesians welcomed the Japanese as liberators, but the occupiers proved far more ruthless and exploitive than the Dutch. Although the Japanese were ultimately driven out, their defeat of the Dutch was a major factor in the end of their colonial rule. Spencer C. Tucker See also: ABDA Command; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of the; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Lombok, Battle of; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ ichi; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Collier, Basil. The War in the Far East 1941–1945: A Military History. New York: William Morrow, 1969. Kirby, Woodburn. The War against Japan. Vol. 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1959. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Zainu’ddin, Ailsa. A Short History of Indonesia. New York: Praeger, 1970.

NEULAND, Operation (February 1942–September 1943) German submarine campaign in the Caribbean. In the shadow of Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (DRUMBEAT), the German U-boat offensive against the U.S. East Coast, the German U-boat command conceived a second offensive against Allied shipping in U.S. waters. This new operation was named NEULAND and was aimed at Allied oil and gasoline shipments in and from the Caribbean Sea. The destruction of large numbers of tankers would have a serious impact on both the U.S. and the British economies, because, whereas the losses of dry-cargo tonnage were quickly replaced by new construction, tanker losses were not. Operation NEULAND, as with DRUMBEAT, began like a thunderclap against a poorly prepared foe, even though Admiral Karl Dönitz had dispatched five large Type IX U-boats to the Caribbean. On February 15, 1942, two U-boats entered the two most important oil ports of the Western Hemisphere—Saint Nicholas on Aruba and Willemstad on Curaçao—where they torpedoed several tankers and attempted to shell the refineries. Meanwhile, the other three U-boats created havoc along the crude oil routes from Lake Maracaibo (Venezuela) and in the anchorage of Trinidad, the main Allied base in the region. Although the Caribbean had been formally integrated into the U.S. seaward defense organization in July 1941, the initial response to the German threat was

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uncoordinated and ineffective. Between February 1 and June 1, 1942, German and Italian submarines encountered only minimal resistance in the Caribbean and sank 52 tankers (out of a total of 114 Allied tankers sent to the bottom in that period). The results were devastating: oil imports to Great Britain, which had stood at 1.1 million tons in February 1942, dropped to 623,000 in May. On May 2, the British government asked the U.S. government for a loan of 700,000 tons of tanker tonnage to avert fuel starvation of the British war effort. The United States complied by transferring a total of 854,000 tons to Great Britain and Canada. The measure incurred a temporary rationing of oil in the northeastern United States until sufficient tank car and pipeline capacity, a more efficient allocation of tanker tonnage, and, ultimately, new tanker construction alleviated the situation during the second half of 1942. Neither did the introduction of convoys in the Caribbean bring instant relief. The largely U.S. escort forces in the Caribbean were initially inadequately equipped and too inexperienced to take on the battle-hardened U-boat veterans. Nevertheless, by September 1942, the convoy system had forced the U-boats to concentrate around Trinidad in search of prey. Since February, the antisubmarine forces had accounted for six U-boats and had damaged several more. For the Germans, however, this was still a favorable exchange rate, given the destruction of 187 Allied merchant ships in the Caribbean to that point. Whereas the offensive against the U.S. East Coast fizzled out in August 1942, the offensive in the Caribbean continued in October, when the boats of the first wave returned after the necessary rest and maintenance period. Despite the stiffened resistance and ceaseless U.S. air patrols, German U-boats sank another 160 Allied merchant ships in the Caribbean theater until the end of the year. During the 319 days of the offensive, the U-boats had thus sunk a total of nearly 1.9 million tons of Allied shipping in the Caribbean, or 36 percent of all Allied merchant ship losses in 1942 worldwide. The second part of the offensive came to a climactic end with the destruction of two tanker convoys: TM.1, bound from Trinidad to Gibraltar, and TB.1, bound from Trinidad to Bahia (Brazil). In a spectacular four-day action from January 8 to 12, 1943, five U-boats sank seven of TM.1’s nine tankers. The shadow of defeat that hung over the German U-boat campaign in early 1943, however, did not spare the Caribbean theater. The reassignment of many boats to meet the Allied invasion fleet of North Africa (Operation TORCH) and the Allied air offensive in the Bay of Biscay, which forced many U-boats to abort their missions, resulted in a lull in Caribbean activities. When the German U-boat command attempted to revive the Caribbean theater following the collapse of the main U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic in May 1943, the offensive ended in failure before it could begin in earnest. Of 44 U-boats assigned to the renewed operation, 7 were lost in the Caribbean, but, even worse, 22 more—including 11 U-tankers and auxiliary U-tankers vital to the

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operation—were sunk during transit through the Bay of Biscay and through the Atlantic. The few fuel-starved U-boats that had made it into the Caribbean were hastily recalled after the loss of the U-tankers, and from September 1943 onward, U-boats ventured into Caribbean only occasionally to maintain a diversion of Allied antisubmarine assets. Dirk Steffen See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bay of Biscay, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation.

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1998. Kelshall, Gaylord. The U-Boat War in the Caribbean. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

New Zealand, Navy In 1939 the New Zealand Division of the British navy consisted of the light cruisers Achilles and Leander, two escort vessels, and one minesweeper trawler. Under the overall command of Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg, it served with the British navy. On October 1, 1941, the New Zealand Division officially became the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), and its ships were prefixed with HMNZS (His Majesty’s New Zealand Ship). During the course of the war, RNZN strength was increased by the addition of the cruiser Gambia in 1943 and the corvettes Arabis and Arbutus, 9 trawlers, several dozen minesweepers and antisubmarine patrol boats, and some 100 harbor defense launches and other small craft. The Achilles played an important role early in the war in the Battle of the Río de la Plata with the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee on December 13, 1939, when it was lightly damaged by splinters from near misses of German shells. It was damaged by a Japanese bomb off New Georgia in 1943. The Leander escorted the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to the Middle East in 1940, and then saw service in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, where it engaged and sank the Italian auxiliary cruiser Ramb I in February 1941. It then again served in the Mediterranean before returning to the Pacific and assisting in the destruction of the Japanese cruiser Jintsu. The Leander suffered serious torpedo damage during the Battle of Kolombangara (July 12–13, 1943), which kept it out of service for the remainder of the war.

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The light cruisers Achilles and Gambia and the Flower-class corvette Arbutus served with the British Pacific Fleet off Japan in 1945. HMNZS Gambia represented New Zealand at the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. The RNZN also contained the New Zealand section of the British navy’s Women’s Royal Naval Service. It numbered some 500 women by October 1944. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Great Britain, Navy; Kolombangara, Battle of; Río de la Plata, Battle of.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Dear, I. C. B., ed. The Oxford Companion to World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. London: Bracken Books, 1989.

Nimitz, Chester William (1885–1966) U.S. navy admiral of the fleet and commander of the Pacific Fleet. Born far from the sea on February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg, Texas, Chester William Nimitz graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1905. He served with the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, steadily advancing in rank and position. Promoted to lieutenant in 1910, he assumed command of the submarine Skipjack in 1912. He then studied diesel engine construction in Europe and supervised construction of the U.S. Navy’s first diesel ship engine. On U.S. entry into World War I in April 1917, Lieutenant Commander Nimitz served as chief of staff to the commander of submarines in the Atlantic Fleet (1917–1919). Following the war, Nimitz was appointed to the Navy Department staff in Washington, and in 1920 he transferred to Pearl Harbor to oversee construction of a new submarine base there. Over the next 20 years, he served in a wide variety of submarine billets as well as aboard battleships and destroyers. Promoted to captain in 1927, he also spent several tours in Washington and helped establish the first Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps programs in U.S. universities. He was assistant chief of the Bureau of Navigation during 1935–1938 and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. Nimitz then led first a cruiser division and then a battleship division. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, Nimitz was serving as chief of the Bureau of Navigation. On December 31, 1941, on the recommendation of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, President Franklin D. Roosevelt secured the promotion of Nimitz to

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full admiral and appointed him commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, replacing Admiral Husband E. Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. Although a single U.S. command in the Pacific would have been far more advantageous, General Douglas MacArthur would not agree to serve under a naval officer. As a result, two commands emerged. As commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Area, Nimitz directed all U.S. military forces in the Central Pacific and provided support to MacArthur and his southwest Pacific forces. Although the Allies made the war against Japan secondary to their Europe First strategy, Nimitz did not delay his plans to halt Japanese expansion, retake Japan’s gains, and push the war to the Japanese homeAdmiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, shown land. Using information provided by here in 1944, commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet U.S. code breakers about Japanese in World War II. Although the defeat of Germany plans, Nimitz halted the Japanese in- was the top Allied priority, Nimitz early on purvasion of Port Moresby in the Battle sued an aggressive strategy vis-à-vis Japan. of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and the (Naval Historical Center) Japanese effort to take Midway that June. The latter battle transferred the initiative to the United States. Nimitz and MacArthur cooperated in a series of island-hopping campaigns that progressed closer and closer to the Japanese mainland. Nimitz’s forces took the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, the Marshall Islands in February 1944, and the Mariana Islands in August 1944. In October, he joined MacArthur’s forces to retake the Philippines. Nimitz’s accomplishments were recognized in December 1944 by his promotion to the newly established five-star rank of admiral of the fleet. In early 1945, Nimitz directed the offensives against Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. His forces were preparing to invade Japan when the Japanese surrendered. On September 2, Nimitz signed the formal Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Nimitz returned to Washington in October and assumed the post of chief of naval operations. For the next two years, he supervised the postwar demobilization of men and ships and provided input into the development of nuclear-powered submarines. Nimitz retired in December 1947. In the following years, he briefly

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served as adviser to the secretary of the navy, and for two years (1948–1949), he was the United Nations commissioner for Kashmir. He also served for eight years as a regent of the University of California. Nimitz died on February 20, 1966, on Yerba Buena Island, near San Francisco, California. James H. Willbanks See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; DETACHMENT, Operation; Gilbert Islands Campaign; ICEBERG, Operation; Japan, Navy; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Knox, William Franklin “Frank”; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Naval Strategy, Allied; Signals Intelligence; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Brink, Randall. Nimitz: The Man and His Wars. New York: Penguin, 2000. Driskell, Frank A., and Dede W. Casad. Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral of the Hills. Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1983. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1962. Potter, Elmer B. “Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Stephen Howarth (pp. 129–157). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Potter, Elmer B. Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

Nishimura Shoji (1889–1944) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Akita Prefecture on November 30, 1889, Nishimura Shoji graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911 and specialized in navigation. After graduation from the Naval War College in 1918, Nishimura served as a navigation officer on destroyers and cruisers. Promoted to commander, he captained several destroyers from 1926 to 1929. He then commanded destroyer squadrons (1931–1936). Promoted to captain in 1934, Nishimura commanded the 10th Destroyer Division. From 1937 to 1940, he commanded first the cruiser Kumano, then the battleship Haruna, and then the 4th Torpedo Flotilla. Promoted to rear admiral in November 1940, he took command of 4th Destroyer Squadron. Nishimura’s 4th Destroyer Squadron participated at the beginning of the Pacific war in amphibious operations in the northern Philippines and Balikpapan and Borneo in the Netherlands East Indies and fought in the Battle of the Java Sea. In June 1942, Nishimura assumed command of the 7th Cruiser Division and fought in the naval battles off Guadalcanal. In 1943, Nishimura was promoted to vice admiral

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and assigned command of the 2nd Battleship Squadron. He commanded C Force, Southern Force in the SHO-1 Plan in an attempt to reach the U.S. landing beaches in Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait in the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf. Nishimura’s force consisted of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. Nishimura’s force was met in Surigao Strait by Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf’s Task Group 77.2 of 6 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 39 patrol torpedo boats. Early in the morning of October 25, 1944, Nishimura’s forces were first savaged by U.S. PT (patrol torpedo) boats and destroyers along the strait with the U.S. battleships and cruisers arranged athwart the end of the strait, in effect crossing the T of Nishimura’s formation. In the ensuing battle, all of Nishimura’s ships were sunk except the destroyer Shigure. Oldendorf lost no ships, and only one destroyer was badly damaged when it was caught in the crossfire of Japanese and U.S. gunfire. Nushimura died during the battle. Hirama Yoichi See also: Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Java Sea, Battle of the; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23-26, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Field, James A., Jr. The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947. Willmott, H. P. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam (1880–1955) British navy admiral. Born on January 16, 1880, into a military family stationed in India, Percy Noble entered the British navy in 1894. Seven years later, he took part in Queen Victoria’s funeral. Before and after World War I, the energetic and diplomatic Noble qualified as a signal specialist and served on a wide variety of destroyers and cruisers and on the royal yacht, often in staff positions. He also headed two boys’ training establishments and served on the naval staff as director of the operations division. Promoted to rear admiral in 1929 and to vice admiral in 1936, when he was also knighted, Noble became fourth sea lord in 1935 and commanded the China station from 1937 to 1940. Here he skillfully handled numerous Japanese threats against Hong Kong and Shanghai without provoking outright hostilities.

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In February 1941, Noble became commander-in-chief, Western Approaches, based at Liverpool, with primary responsibility for interdicting U-boat attacks on British-bound convoys. Realizing that specialized antisubmarine training was the key to success, he instituted intensive programs and exercises to this end and also improved coordination within convoy escort groups, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of convoy protection. A highly visible leader, Noble frequently went to sea with ships under his command and flew with Coastal Command aircraft. His efforts laid the foundations for the eventual success of British antisubmarine efforts in the Atlantic. In November 1942, Noble went to Washington as head of the British Admiralty delegation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His qualities of tact, firmness, and common sense all proved valuable in planning smoothly coordinated joint naval operations with U.S. forces. In 1943, Noble became first and principal naval aidede-camp to King George VI. He retired in January 1945 as rear admiral of the United Kingdom and died in London on July 25, 1955. Priscilla Roberts See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Convoys, Allied.

References Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Howarth, Stephen, and Derek Law, eds. The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Hughes, Terry, and John Costello. The Battle of the Atlantic. New York: Dial, 1977. Macintyre, Donald. The Naval War against Hitler. New York: Scribner’s, 1961. Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961.

Nomura Kichisaburo (1887–1964) Japanese navy admiral and diplomat. Born in Wakayama on December 10, 1887, Nomura Kichisaburo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1898 and fought in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He taught at the Japanese Naval Academy in 1905. Nomura then studied in Australia from 1908 to 1910 and in Germany in 1910 and 1911. Appointed naval attaché to the United States in 1914, Nomura was promoted to captain in 1917. He assisted at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I and at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922. Promoted to rear admiral in 1922, Nomura became vice chief of the Navy General Staff in 1926, when he was also promoted to vice admiral. In 1927 Nomura

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took command of the Third Fleet. On April 29, 1932, Nomura lost his right eye in an attack by Chinese aircraft on his ship off Shanghai. Promoted to admiral in 1933, Nomura retired from the navy in 1937. In 1939, Nomura was appointed foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Abe Nobuyuki. In February 1940, he was appointed Japanese ambassador to the United States, in large part because he was acquainted with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nomura negotiated with U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull and Roosevelt to ease tensions between the United States and Japan. In his negotiations with Hull, Nomura ran up against the belief of Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke that the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy would deter the United States from entering the war. In July 1941, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro dismissed Matsuoka as foreign minister, but too late for Nomura to improve the situation. In addition, Nomura was not informed in advance of his government’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941. During the Pacific war, Nomura was an adviser to the Privy Council, and after the Japanese surrender, he was elected as a member of the parliament. Nomura died in Tokyo on May 8, 1964. Kotani Ken See also: Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Butow, Robert. To¯jo¯ and the Coming of the War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961. Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007.

North Cape, Battle of (December 26, 1943) Naval battle fought between British and German naval units on December 26, 1943, off Norway. In the autumn of 1943, the Western Allies agreed to send 40 merchant ships per month to the Soviet Union via the Arctic to Murmansk. The chief German reaction to this effort was expected to come from two German submarine flotillas in Norway, but German navy commander Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz sought to employ German surface units as well. Dönitz had planned to use the battleship Tirpitz for this purpose, but it had been damaged in a British midget submarine raid in September. Gaining permission from German chancellor Adolf Hitler also proved difficult, but Dönitz persevered,

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and in December 1943, he was ready to attack. On December 19, he informed Hitler that the Germans would attack the next eastbound convoy. ULTRA intercepts and increased German air, surface, and submarine activity provided advance warning to British Home Fleet commander Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser of the German plans. On December 20, convoy JW 55B of 19 merchant ships sailed eastbound, and two days later the corresponding homebound convoy of 22 merchant ships departed Kola Inlet. Each convoy had a close escort of about a dozen destroyers. Long-range protection of both convoys fell to Vice Admiral Robert Burnett with the cruisers Norfolk, Belfast, and Sheffield. On December 22, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft spotted the eastbound convoy JW 55B. The British deciphered this sighting report and ordered all U-boats in the area to close with the convoy. Fraser guessed that German surface units in Norway, led by the battleship Scharnhorst, would join the hunt, and he departed Iceland on December 23 with the battleship Duke of York (the flagship), light cruiser Jamaica, and four destroyers. Fraser’s intention was to position his own surface forces between the Germans and their base at Altenfjord. On December 25, the homeward convoy had cleared the danger point, and four of its destroyers were therefore shifted over to the outward convoy. Meanwhile, Burnett’s cruisers were closing from the southeast. As anticipated, German rear admiral Eric Bey led the Scharnhorst and five large fleet destroyers to sea on December 25 from Altenfjord. His orders were contradictory; he was to attack the convoy but not to engage heavy enemy units encountered. Early the next morning, the Admiralty signaled to Fraser that the Scharnhorst was most probably at sea. Bey then ordered his destroyers to fan out ahead and sweep for the British convoy. The weather was appalling, marked by darkness and snow squalls. At 7:30 a.m. on December 26, Bey detached his destroyers to look for the convoy to the southwest. They must have come very close to it, but they did not sight it, and in the process, they lost touch with the Scharnhorst. At 9:00 a.m., the Belfast secured a radar contact on what proved to be the Scharnhorst about 30 miles from the convoy. The range then rapidly closed. At 9:24 a.m., the British cruisers fired starshells and the Scharnhorst immediately turned away. The Norfolk hit with its second or third 8-inch salvo, which knocked out the battleship’s FuMo27 radar. Bey replied with the ship’s aft turret as he maneuvered to break off the action. The four British destroyers detached from the westbound convoy now reached Burnett. Rather than pursue the Scharnhorst—the traditional job for cruisers in a covering role—Burnett turned northwest to protect the convoy. He gave as his reasons the poor visibility, the Scharnhorst’s superior speed in heavy seas, and his conviction that the Germans would renew the attack. Bey did indeed return. Shortly after noon, the Belfast reported a radar contact. A second action ensued that involved all three British cruisers and lasted about 20 minutes. Although the British claimed several hits, in fact the German ship went

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untouched while it had inflicted heavy damage on the Norfolk. The four destroyers were unable to carry out a torpedo attack because they were on Burnett’s port bow, and the Scharnhorst turned away in the opposite direction. Bey now headed south. This time Burnett pursued, continuously supplying position, course, and speed information that allowed Fraser to intercept. Fraser’s ships were closing from one side and Burnett’s from the other. The Duke of York picked up Scharnhorst on radar at 45,500 yards and locked in its gunnery radar at 25,800 yards. The Duke of York engaged when the range had dropped to 12,000 yards and hit the Scharnhorst with the first salvo; however, the Scharnhorst was a fast and well-armored ship, and Bey responded with a burst of speed. Returning fire, he tried to open the range. He was almost successful, but a British salvo disabled one of the Scharnhorst’s boiler rooms at a critical juncture, and Fraser’s cruisers and destroyers fired from both flanks a total of 55 torpedoes, of which probably 11 hit. The Scharnhorst went down at 7:45 p.m. The British ships searched for survivors, but only 36 of the German battleship’s 3,000-man crew were recovered. The last capital-ship duel in European waters ended in a British victory. James Levy See also: Bey, Erich; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Humble, Richard. Fraser of North Cape: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser (1888–1981). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Koop, Gerhard, and Klaus-Peter Schmolke. Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Winton, John. Death of the Scharnhorst. London: Antony Bird, 1983.

Norway, Navy The Norwegian navy of 1940 consisted largely of obsolete warships and fishery protection ships. Norway had not fought since the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1933 the defense budget was the smallest in recent history. It grew in the late 1930s as world tensions increased, but the naval construction program was modest and in any case undertaken too late.

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In 1940, the Norwegian navy consisted of two armored coast defense ships, the Eidsvold and Norge with main armaments of two 210-mm (8.26-inch) guns, launched in 1900 and forming the Panserskipsdivisjon (armored ship division). Two other older coast defense ships lay disarmed at Horten, a naval base outside of Oslo. The Germans sunk the first two at Narvik in their invasion of Norway in April 1940. The Germans captured the latter two and rearmed them as antiaircraft guardships. In terms of modern ships, Norway had a minelayer and four 600-ton torpedo boats. Several destroyers and torpedo boats were under construction at the time of the German attack. The remainder of the fleet consisted of 4 destroyers and 11 torpedo boats, all built before 1920; 9 submarines, and miscellaneous warships, one of which dated from 1858. Commander of the navy Rear Admiral H. E. Diesen was viewed as a political admiral. The officer corps had been gutted in the early 1930s as a consequence of budgetary constraints, and a substantial element within it supported Vidkun Quisling’s Norwegian Nazi Party. However, most officers rallied to king and country when Germany invaded. The dramatic event for the Norwegian navy in the war was the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. It was a surprise on two levels. It was a strategic surprise, because Norwegian leaders were more concerned by an invasion or limited naval action by the Allies, primarily the British navy. They did not foresee an attack from the smaller German navy, which presumably would not have command of the seas. The Germans also achieved surprise at the operational level, although a steady stream of warnings of German warships and troopships moving north arrived in the hours before the attack. After two months of fighting, 13 warships of the Norwegian navy and about 500 officers and sailors reached British ports. Only one of these ships was modern. The remaining Norwegian naval vessels were either sunk or incorporated into the German navy. The Norwegian navy used its older warships for training and patrol and minesweeping operations, and the Norwegian government-in-exile added to these more than 50 whaling ships that had been operating in the polar regions when Norway had been invaded. These 300- to 500-ton ships saw British and Norwegian service as minesweepers and in clandestine operations. More than 200 of the latter operations occurred in Norwegian waters as part of the “Shetland Bus, the clandestine special operations link between Shetland, Scotland and Germanoccupied Norway.” During the war, the Norwegian navy secured under Lend-Lease 5 U.S. World War I–era destroyers and 7 British-built destroyers. It obtained an additional 3 submarines, 7 corvettes, 3 submarine chasers, and 1 patrol craft, together with 29 motor torpedo and motor launches that saw much action in the English Channel and in Norwegian coastal waters.

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Norwegian navy ships participated in the Battle of the Atlantic, helped protect the convoys to Murmansk, and took part in Operations TORCH and OVERLORD. Of major combatants, Norway lost in battle one submarine while attempting to land agents in Norway, as well as two destroyers and three corvettes in the Atlantic. The Norwegian navy also operated a modest naval air arm from Scotland for patrols in the Norwegian and North Seas. Norway’s greatest contribution at sea during the war was its merchant marine. The fourth largest in the world, it amounted to more than 1,000 ships totaling more than 4.8 million tons. These supplied valuable revenue to the government-in-exile in London, but over 500 ships were lost in the course of the war. By 1945, Norway emerged with an effective and sizeable navy ready to help lead the way into collective military action under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Jack Greene See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Lend-Lease; Narvik, Naval Battles of.

References Haarr, Geirr H. The German Invasion of Norway April 1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Moulton, J. L. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940: A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions. London: Camelot Press, 1966. Salmon, Patrick, ed. Britain and Norway in the Second World War. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995.

O Oikawa Koshiro (1883–1958) Japanese navy admiral and minister of the navy. Born in Iwate Prefecture on February 8, 1883, Oikawa Koshiro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1903 and from the Torpedo School in 1910 as a torpedo specialist. He entered the Naval War College in 1913 as a lieutenant commander. During 1915–1922, he was aide-de-camp to Crown Prince Hirohito. Oikawa took command of the 5th Destroyer Squadron in 1922, and as a captain he commanded the cruisers Kinu and Tama. In 1924, Oikawa became the chief of the Operations Department of the Naval General Staff. After promotion to rear admiral in 1928, he was assigned to be chief of staff of the Kure Naval District. In 1932, he assumed command of the 1st Air Squadron. Appointed superintendent of the Japanese Naval Academy in 1933, Oikawa took command of the Third Fleet in 1935. Continuing his rapid rise, he became director of the Air Command in 1936. Promoted to vice admiral in 1938, he assumed command of the China Fleet. In 1940, he had charge of the Yokosuka Naval District. In September 1940, Oikawa was appointed minister of the navy. As naval minister, Oikawa was involved in making two fateful decisions: the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940 and the declarations of war against the United States and the United Kingdom. Although many in the Imperial Japanese Navy, including commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, opposed the Tripartite Pact, Oikawa was pressured to approve it. Although he privately told Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro that he lacked confidence in the navy’s ability to fight the United States, he later refused to speak as plainly to other cabinet members. Many have criticized his attitude, which stemmed from his desire to get along with everyone. Oikawa left his post in October 1941, conceding to General To¯ jo¯ Hideki’s rejection of his choice of Admiral Toyoda Soemu, a well-known opponent of army policies, to be his successor. Oikawa next became superintendent of the Naval War College and military adviser to the emperor. In November 1943, he headed the new Grand Escort Command Headquarters, composed of four escort carriers and a naval air group, to protect Japanese convoys against U.S. submarine attack. In August 1944, Okiawa resumed his position as chief of the Naval General Staff,

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although mounting Japanese defeats led to his withdrawal in April 1945. Oikawa died in Tokyo on May 9, 1958. Kita Yoshito See also: Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1984, 1987.

O’Kane, Richard Hetherington (1911–1994) U.S. navy officer. Born in Dover, New Hampshire, on February 2, 1911, Richard Hetherington O’Kane graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1934 and began a series of tours aboard cruisers and destroyers. He entered the submarine service in 1938. After duty aboard the minelaying submarine Argonaut, O’Kane reported to the submarine Wahoo in early 1942. When Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Morton took command of the Wahoo after its second war patrol, O’Kane became its executive officer. Morton and O’Kane then worked closely to develop more aggressive submarine tactics, which proved to be some of the most effective of the war. The Wahoo was soon the navy’s most effective submarine, sinking 16 Japanese vessels totaling 45,000 tons between May and July 1943. In July 1943, O’Kane was ordered to fit out and take command of the new submarine Tang. He commanded the Tang throughout its career, implementing and improving on the tactics that he and Morton had previously developed. On October 24, 1944, during its fifth war patrol, while between Taiwan and the Philippines in an attack on a Japanese convoy, one of the Tang’s own Mark XVIII torpedoes malfunctioned, circled back, and sank the submarine. Only O’Kane and eight of his crew survived the sinking; they were picked up by Japanese ships. The Tang was credited with sinking 24 Japanese ships totaling 93,285 tons. O’Kane spent the duration of the war in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp. For the Tang’s final patrol, O’Kane was awarded the Medal of Honor. O’Kane remains the highest-scoring submarine commander in U.S. naval history. O’Kane held various commands after the war. In 1949, he commanded Submarine Division 32. Promoted to captain in 1953, he attended the Naval War College and then commanded Submarine Division 7 at Pearl Harbor followed

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by the Submarine School at New London and Submarine Squadron 7. O’Kane retired from active duty as a rear admiral in 1957. He died in Petaluma, California, on February 16, 1994. Edward F. Finch See also: Submarines; Torpedoes; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping.

References

As captain of the U.S. Navy submarine Tang (SS-306), Richard H. O’Kane was the top-scoring American submariner in terms of ships sunk (31 credited during the war, reduced to 24 afterward). In a freak mishap, the Tang was sunk by one of its own torpedoes. O’Kane survived and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor. (Naval Historical Center)

Beach, Edward L. Submarine! New York: Holt, 1952. Blair, Clay. Silent Victory: The Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. O’Kane, Richard H. Clear the Bridge! The War Patrols of the USS Tang. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977. Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: The Story of Richard O’Kane and the U.S. Submariners in the Pacific War. Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 2001.

Oktyabrsky, Filip Sergeyevich (1899–1969) Soviet navy admiral. Born in the village of Lukshino, now in Kaliningrad Oblast, on October 23, 1899, Filip Oktyabrsky entered the Red Navy in 1918 and joined the Communist Party in 1919. After carrying out routine assignments, he commanded the Amur Military Flotilla in February 1938 and then the Black Sea Fleet from March 1939 to May 1943. He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1940 and to vice admiral in June 1941. Oktyabrsky directed the land defense of Odessa from July to October 1941 and executed a masterly evacuation of Odessa on the night of October 15–16. From November 1941 to June 1942, he directed the defense of Sevastopol against German attack, being evacuated on orders from Moscow at the last moment. Oktyabrsky

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again headed the Amur Military Flotilla from June 1943 to March 1944 and then commanded the Black Sea Fleet as a full admiral. Continuing as commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Oktyabrsky was also first deputy commander in chief of the navy until 1950. His criticism of naval policy led to his retirement that year, but he reemerged in 1957 to head the Black Sea Higher Naval School. In 1959, he joined the General Inspector’s Group. Oktyabrsky died in Sevastopol on July 8, 1969. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Soviet Union, Navy.

References Achkasov, V., and N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Fairhall, David. Russian Sea Power: An Account of Its Present Strength and Strategy. Boston: Gambit, 1971.

Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett (1887–1974) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Riverside, California, on February 16, 1887, Jesse Bartlett Oldendorf graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1909 as a passed midshipman and was commissioned an ensign two years later. During World War I, Lieutenant Oldendorf served on North Atlantic convoy duty. He next served as engineering officer on a cruiser and aboard a former German transport. A series of shore billets followed. From 1924 to 1927, Oldendorf commanded the destroyer Decatur. He then attended both the Army and Navy War Colleges (1928–1930). Following service on the battleship New York, Oldendorf served as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy (1932–1935). He then was executive officer on the battleship West Virginia. Promoted to captain in March 1938, he took command of the heavy cruiser Houston the next year. In 1941, he was assigned to the staff of the Naval War College. Promoted to rear admiral in January 1942, Oldendorf held a series of commands in the Aruba-Curacao and Trinidad sectors of the Caribbean and then commanded a task force in the Atlantic Fleet. In January 1944, Oldendorf was transferred to the Pacific and assumed command of Cruiser Division 4, which supported U.S. operations in the Marshall Islands against Truk and in the Mariana Islands and at Peleliu. In October 1944, Oldendorf commanded Seventh Fleet’s Fire Support Force of six prewar battleships (five of which had been rebuilt following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor), four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and numerous destroyers and patrol torpedo (PT) boats, all supporting the U.S. amphibious landing on Leyte Island in the Philippines.

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On the night of October 24–25, 1944, Oldendorf positioned his forces in Surigao Strait between Leyte and Mindanao to meet Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji’s Japanese Southern Force, part of the SHO-1 plan to destroy U.S. forces off the landing site. In a classic crossing the T, Oldendorf placed his battleships across the mouth of the strait to rain shells on Nishimura’s ships, which were proceeding in single-file line. At the same time, Oldendorf’s destroyers and PT boats lining the strait launched torpedoes from the flanks. Oldendorf’s ships also engaged a trailing Japanese force, the Second Diversion Attack Force, which was commanded by Vice Admiral Shima Kiyohide. Oldendorf’s ships scored one of the most complete U.S. naval victories of the war—sinking both Japanese battleships, damaging 3 of 4 cruisers, and sinking 3 of 10 destroyers without U.S. loss. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1944, Oldendorf then commanded Battleship Squadron 1 and Battleship Division 4 in support of landings in the Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. After recovering from an injury, he headed Task Force 95 at Okinawa from June to November 1945. In November 1945, Oldendorf took charge of the 11th Naval District and San Diego Naval Base. He ended his career in command of the Western Sea Frontier and the “moth-ball” (reserve) fleet at San Francisco (1947–1948). Oldendorf received promotion to admiral on his retirement from the navy in September 1948. He died in Portsmouth, Virginia, on April 27, 1974. Edward F. Finch and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Nishimura Shoji; Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23–26, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Reynolds, Clark G. “Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett.” In Famous American Admirals (pp. 243– 244). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Vego, Milan N. Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006. Willmott, H. P. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

¯ nishi Takijiro¯ (1891–1945) O Japanese navy admiral. Born in Hyo¯ go Prefecture, Honshu¯ Island, Japan, on June 2, ¯ nishi Takijiro¯ graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. 1891, O

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Promoted to ensign in 1913, he studied at the Gunnery School in 1914 and 1915 and was assigned to Yokosuka Naval Station from 1916 to 1918. One of the pio¯ nishi learned to fly in 1915. He served as Japaneers of Japanese naval air forces, O nese naval attaché in Britain and traveled in Britain and France from 1918 to 1922 to study naval aviation. ¯ nishi served as an instructor in the Kasumigaura Air TrainIn the mid-1920s, O ing Corps under Captain Yamamoto Isoroku. In the 1930s, he served in various staff and line positions in naval aviation, including heading the Training Section ¯ nishi took of the Naval Aviation Department. Promoted to rear admiral in 1939, O command of the 2nd Combined Air Corps, which flew shore-based, long-range Mitsubishi G3M (“Nell” in the Allied code system) bombers. Based in Hankow, he commanded strategic bombing operations in the Sino-Japanese War. In early ¯ nishi was appointed chief of staff to Vice Admiral Tsukahara Nishizo, 1941, O commander of Eleventh Air Fleet, the first entirely shore-based air fleet of its kind. In January 1941, commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Iso¯ nishi, then regarded as Japan’s foremost expert on naval aviation, roku ordered O and Genda Minoru, commander of the naval air group at Yokosuka, to plan an attack by carrier-borne aircraft against the U.S. Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. At the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Eleventh Air Fleet based in Taiwan made a decisive contribution to the Japanese military effort by destroying U.S. air power in the Philippines. ¯ nishi then held important administrative posts, including chief of the Naval O Aviation Department and deputy chief of the Aerial Weapons Department of the Ministry of Ammunition. In the latter capacity, he had the unenviable task of trying to reconcile navy-army demands for resources in aircraft production. ¯ nishi was appointed commander of the First Air Fleet in the In October 1944, O ¯ nishi adopted the tactic of suicide air Philippines. Facing a desperate situation, O attacks against U.S. warships. On his order, the first kamikaze operation was imple¯ nishi commanded kamikaze attacks from the Philippines and mented. Thereafter, O then from Taiwan until he was recalled to become vice chief of the Navy General Staff in May 1945. ¯ nishi strongly opposed Japanese acceptance of the PotsAt the end of the war, O dam Declaration. On learning of the surrender, he committed ritual suicide in Tokyo on August 16, leaving behind a statement expressing deep gratitude to those who had sacrificed themselves in kamikaze missions. Kotani Ken and Tohmatsu Haruo See also: Genda Minoru; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku.

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References Axell, Albert, and Hideaki Kase. Kamikaze: Japan’s Suicide Gods. New York: Longman, 2002. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Inoguchi, Rikihei, Nakajima Tadashi, and Roder Pineau. The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner. The Sacred Warriors: Japan’s Suicide Legions. New York: Avon, 1982.

Ormoc Bay, Battle of (December 3, 1944) U.S. navy raid on a Japanese anchorage conducted to interdict the delivery of supplies during the Leyte campaign. The U.S. Navy failed to exercise sea control over the eastern approaches to Leyte immediately after the landings there in October 1944, and this allowed the Japanese to ferry in reinforcements and attempt to fight a decisive battle on the island. Only in late November did U.S. minesweepers clear the passage around Leyte to allow the U.S. Navy to start sending surface strike groups east into the Camotes Sea to interfere with this Japanese traffic. On the afternoon of December 2, air reconnaissance reported a Japanese convoy en route to Ormoc, the main port on eastern Leyte. Naval command dispatched the freshly arrived Destroyer Division 120, commanded by Commander John Zahm, which included new large Sumner-class destroyers Allen M. Sumner, Cooper, and Moale to intercept. The Japanese force, consisting of the destroyer-transport T9, two landing ships, and the destroyer escorts Take and Kuwa, slipped into Ormoc Bay on December 2 and began off-loading late that evening. A few minutes before midnight, Division 120 arrived after an approach marked by Japanese air attacks. The U.S. ships were in line abreast to maximize their heavy forward armament and present a smaller target. At 11:55 p.m. on December 2, the Sumner detected contacts 20,000 yards to the north, and at 12:05 a.m. on December 3, Commander Zahm ordered his ships to engage. U.S. radar had picked up the Take and Kuwa, which were standing out of the bay. The U.S. destroyers severely damaged the Kuwa. The Japanese replied, supplemented by the dozens of 25-mm guns arming the landing ships, and this intense opposition disrupted the U.S. formation. The Sumner turned west at 12:08 a.m. to put some distance between itself and the enemy guns. Meanwhile, the Moale swerved

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in front of the Cooper to avoid torpedoes, forcing the Cooper to hold fire. After the Moale moved on, the Cooper engaged the Take, but the Japanese ship already had fired torpedoes. At 12:13 a.m., a Long Lance torpedo hit the Cooper amidships, and the U.S. ship jackknifed, sinking in just 30 seconds. At the same time, the Kuwa, torn apart by U.S. gunfire, followed the Cooper to the bottom of the bay. The two surviving U.S. destroyers withdrew, shooting as they fled and moderately damaging the Take. When he learned that the Cooper had sunk, Commander Zahm judged a rescue attempt too risky, and the U.S. destroyers turned for home. The Sumner had suffered minor damage from aerial attacks and one smallcaliber shell. Three rounds lightly damaged the Moale. Many near-misses peppered both ships with splinters. Three hours after the Americans departed, the Japanese convoy weighted anchor. The Take limped along on one engine, but the landing ships escaped major harm. The Cooper was the last large U.S. warship sunk in a surface naval action. The destroyer was a new ship with an untested crew fighting in bright moonlight. These factors contributed to the loss. The Americans fought another minor action in Ormoc Bay on December 12, and, although General Douglas MacArthur declared Leyte secure on December 25, Japanese resistance continued until May 1945. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Destroyers; Leyte Landings.

References Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte: June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

¯ ta Minoru (1891–1945) O Japanese navy admiral. Born on April 7, 1891, in Chiba Prefecture, Honshu Island, ¯ ta Minoru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He saw service O in a cruiser and in battleships and was promoted to lieutenant in 1916. After a year’s ¯ ta returned to active duty leave while he battled tuberculosis during 1917–1918, O and completed courses in the Torpedo School and Naval Artillery School. Following service on two battleships, he was an instructor at the Naval Engineering College. ¯ ta commanded a battalion Considered to be expert in amphibious operations, O of the Special Landing Forces (SNLF), the equivalent of the U.S. Marine Corps, ¯ ta was promoted to commander in 1934. in the 1932 First Shanghai Incident. O

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He commanded SNLF units until, in 1937, he assumed command of the oiler Tsurumi. He was promoted to captain the same year. ¯ ta was assigned to Kure Naval Station, Japan, as commander of the 6th In 1938, O SNLF. In 1941 he was assigned to command the SNLF in the China Area Fleet at ¯ ta returned to Japan in 1942 and took command of the 2nd ComWuhan, China. O bined Special Naval Landing Force that was assigned to capture Midway Island. When the Japanese lost the Battle of Midway, he was assigned command of the 14th Naval Base at Kavieng in Papua, New Guinea, as a rear admiral in 1943. In 1944 he returned to Japan as commander of the Coast Guard at Sasebo. ¯ ta was assigned to Okinawa. During the Battle of Okinawa In January 1945, O (March 16–June 21, 1945), he commanded all Japanese naval forces on the island, numbering some 10,000 men, half of whom were Okinawan natives who had been ¯ ta took charge of the defense of the Oroku conscripted and had little training. O Peninsula, but on June 6, the Japanese position was completely surrounded by U.S. marines. ¯ ta sent a farewell telegram to the Navy Department in Tokyo in On June 12, O which he praised the valor of his men and especially that of the Okinawan people and asked that, because of its sacrifices, Okinawa be granted special consideration from the Japanese government in the future. He committed suicide on June 13, ¯ ta was posthumously promoted to vice admiral. The underground bunker 1945. O in which he died is preserved in Tomigusuku City, Okinawa. Hasegawa Rei See also: ICEBERG, Operation; Midway, Battle of.

References Astor, Gerald. Operation Iceberg: The Invasion and Conquest of Okinawa in World War II. New York: Dell, 1996. National Institute for Defense Studies. Senshi Sosho. Vol. 17, Okinawa Homen Kaigun sakusen (Military History Series of the Pacific War: Naval Operations in Okinawa Area). Tokyo: Japan Asakumo Shinbunsha, 1968. ¯ O ta Hideo. Chichi ha Okinawa de Shinda (My Father Died in Okinawa). Tokyo: Japan Kobunken, 1989. Yozo Tamura. Okinawa Kenmin Kaku Tatakaeri: Ota Minoru Kaigun Chujoikka no Showashi [This is How the Residents of Okinawa Fought: The Story of Øta’s Family in the Showa Era]. Tokyo: Japan Kodansha, 1994.

Ozawa Jisaburo (1886–1966) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Miyazaki Prefecture on October 2, 1886, Ozawa Jisaburo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1909. While he was a young

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officer, Ozawa served as a torpedo officer on several ships and as an instructor at the Torpedo School. He served in destroyers from 1918 to 1921. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1921, Ozawa graduated from the Naval War College the same year. He commanded destroyers in 1924 and 1925 and then was assigned to the staff of the Grand Fleet as a specialist in torpedo tactics. Promoted to commander in 1926, he was an instructor at the torpedo school and also traveled in Europe and the United States for nine months. Japanese vice admiral Ozawa Jisaburo commanded the Promoted to captain in Southern Expeditionary Fleet at the onset of World War II. 1930, Ozawa commanded a As commander of the 1st Mobile Force of all-Japanese airdestroyer division in 1930 craft carriers, Ozawa suffered defeats in the 1944 battles of and 1931, and next he was the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. (Naval Historical Center) an instructor of tactics at the Naval War College. In 1934 and 1935, he commanded first the cruiser Maya and then the battleship Haruna. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1936, and in 1937 Ozawa was assigned as chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. He next commanded the 8th Cruiser Squadron and the 3rd Battleship Squadron, served as superintendent of the Torpedo School (1938), and commanded the 1st Fleet Air Group (1939). Despite his lack of expertise in this area, Ozawa was a forceful advocate for naval aviation. Promoted to vice admiral in 1940, Ozawa was appointed superintendent of the Naval War College in September 1941. In 1941, he assumed command of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet. On the outbreak of the Pacific war, from December 1941 to March 1942, his fleet supported the Japanese invasions of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He also conducted a successful commerce raiding operation into the Indian Ocean during March and April 1942. In November 1942, Ozawa took command of the Third Fleet, and in March 1944 he commanded the 1st Mobile Force (Carrier Force), which incorporated all remaining Japanese aircraft carriers. Ozawa suffered disastrous defeats in the June

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1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea (Operation A-GO) and in the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf (Operation SHO-1). In the latter, Ozawa’s mission was to serve as bait, his carriers luring Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet north in order to leave the U.S. landing site in Leyte Gulf undefended. In the battle, Ozawa’s force suffered heavy losses, although he himself is remembered in Japanese naval history as a brave and capable commander and one of the leading exponents of naval aviation. From November 1944, Ozawa was simultaneously vice chief of the Naval General Staff and president of the Naval Staff College. In May 1945, when Toyoda Soemu assumed the office of chief of staff of the navy, Ozawa became the last commander of the Combined Fleet. Ozawa died in Tokyo on November 9, 1966. Hirama Yoichi See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies Campaign; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23–26, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Denki Hernsan kai (Biographical editing committee), ed. Kaiso no Teitoku Ozawa Jisaburo [Reminiscences of Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo]. Tokyo: Harashobo, 1967. Ikeda Kioyshi. “Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa.” Trans. Colin Jones. In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Steven Howarth (pp. 278–292). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Vego, Milan N. Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

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P Panama Canal Major international shipping canal that links the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and that bisects the Panamanian isthmus in Central America. The Panama Canal was constructed by the United States between 1904 and 1913; it first was opened to commercial ship traffic in 1914. It is considered one of the great engineering feats of modern times. Approximately 41 miles in length, the Panama Canal functions by way of an elaborate series of locks, channels, and manmade lakes. It takes about nine hours for a ship to traverse the entire canal. The waterway can accommodate vessels ranging in size from small yachts to large commercial and military ships. It cannot accommodate some of the U.S. Navy’s largest and newest warships, however, and some supertankers and large container vessels are also unable to utilize it. The Panama Canal revolutionized shipping in the Western Hemisphere. Prior to its construction, a ship would have to cover some 14,000 miles, navigating around the entirety of the South American continent, to travel from New York to San Francisco. Once the canal was operational, the same journey entailed just 6,000 miles. This proved a boon to the U.S. Navy, which could move assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific and vice versa in a fraction of a time and at a much lower cost. The canal also ensured that the United States would be able to exert full control over the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. During World War II, the canal was controlled by the United States. It proved invaluable to the U.S. prosecution of a two-theater war and facilitated the movement of millions of troops and millions of tons of matériel and cargo to the Pacific theater. The Japanese developed plans to attack the Panama Canal utilizing giant I-400– class Sen-Toku special submarines 400 ft. in length and displacing 6,500 tons submerged. The subs were capable of each carrying three Aichi M6A1 Sieran floatplane torpedo bombers. The war ended before the Japanese could bring their plan to fruition. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: I-400–Class Japanese Submarines; Naval Strategy, Allied; Submarines.

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References Friar, William. Portrait of the Panama Canal: From Construction to the Twenty-First Century. Portland, OR: Graphic Arts Center, 2003. Parker, Nancy Winslow. Locks, Crocs and Skeeters: The Story of the Panama Canal. Greenwillow, NY: Greenwillow Books, 1996.

Panay Incident (December 12, 1937) Japanese sinking of U.S. Navy gunboat Panay in China. On December 11, 1937, because of the advance of Japanese troops, the United States evacuated its consulate personnel from Nanjing (Nanking) in the U.S. Navy river patrol craft Panay (PR-5), captained by Lieutenant Commander James Joseph Hughes. The Panay, a flatbottomed river patrol vessel, was part of the U.S. Navy’s Yangtze Patrol of the Asiatic Fleet, which was charged with the protection of U.S. lives and property in China. When the Panay set out, it had on board 5 officers, 54 seamen, 4 embassy personnel, and 11 civilians. The Panay was escorting three Standard Oil barges—the Mei An, Mei Ping, and Mei Hsia—up the Yangtze River (Chang Jiang). Two British gunboats, the Ladybird and Bee, and other British craft joined the flotilla. As the ships proceeded upriver, Japanese artillery opened fire on them. At 11:00 a.m. on December 12, the Panay and three barges anchored near Hoshien, upstream from Nanjing. Their crews hoisted U.S. flags on the ships and painted U.S. flags on the awnings and topsides. It was a clear, sunny day, and no guns on the Panay were manned or uncovered. At about 1:30 p.m., three Japanese Mitsubishi bombers flew over, dropping 18 bombs on the four vessels. One struck the forward section of the Panay, knocking down its foremast, disabling the forward 3-inch gun, and wrecking the pilothouse, radio room, sick bay, and fire room. The blast blew Commander Hughes across the pilothouse, breaking his thigh and incapacitating him. Executive Officer Lieutenant Arthur F. “Tex” Anders was struck in the throat by a bomb fragment. Unable to speak, he nonetheless assumed command and issued orders by writing them on a bulkhead. Another officer was badly wounded, as were several crew members and two civilian passengers. Immediately after the first Japanese strike, 12 additional Japanese aircraft arrived and dive-bombed the four ships, and nine other Japanese aircraft conducted repeated strafing runs for more than 20 minutes. The Panay’s crew fought back with .30-cal. machine guns, four of which were mounted on each side of the vessel. The guns could fire horizontally and vertically but not straight forward or aft, the directions from which the Japanese strafing planes struck. By 2:04 p.m., the Panay was sinking, and Captain Hughes ordered the crew to abandon ship. The Japanese then strafed the ship’s boats as they made their way to shore. In the attack, two of the three oil barges were also bombed and sunk. Assisted by friendly Chinese, the survivors were taken onboard the USS Oahu and Ladysmith and Bee two days later. In the attack, 43 sailors and 5 civilians were

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wounded. Two sailors and one civilian subsequently died of their wounds. Earlier in the day, a Japanese shore battery had fired on both the Ladybird and Bee, and each sustained damage, but their commanders did not hesitate to go to the aid of the Americans. The U.S. government formally protested the attack, leading Tokyo to issue a formal apology, claiming that the attack was accidental. U.S. radio intercepts revealed that the aircraft had attacked under orders and that it was not a mistake (this information was not revealed at the time for security reasons). Japan also agreed to pay reparations to the United States in the amount of $2,214,007.36. Doubtless, Tokyo was surprised that Washington did not take an even tougher line, but as a result of the attack, U.S. public opinion became even more strongly pro-China and anti-Japan. The following month, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the U.S. Congress to raise defense spending substantially, specifically requesting a 20 percent increase in the existing shipbuilding and replacement program, two additional battleships, two extra cruisers, and some smaller vessels. Uzal W. Ent See also: Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Koginos, Manny T. The Panay Incident: Prelude to War. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Studies, 1967. Levine, Robert H. The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930–1938. New York: Garland, 1988. Marolda, Edward, ed. FDR and the U.S. Navy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Perry, Hamilton Darby. The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor. Toronto, Canada: Macmillan, 1969. Tolley, Kemp. Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971.

PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation (January 13–July 19, 1942) German U-boat offensive conducted off the East Coast of the United States, in the Caribbean, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Brazil. Commander of German U-boats Vizeadmiral (vice admiral) Karl Dönitz welcomed the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 as an opportunity to widen the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. In planning Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (DRUMBEAT), Dönitz intended to operate larger Type IX U-boats with greater range against the United States and into the Caribbean. He would employ shorter-range Type VII U-boats off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, which were much closer to his U-boat bases.

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Dönitz requested 12 Type IX boats from the Naval War Command for the operation but was informed on December 10 that he would have only 6. Although submarine construction had accelerated, there were still too few U-boats available. Bad weather in the Baltic had also disrupted U-boat training, and the Naval War Command insisted on maintaining a large number of U-boats in the Mediterranean to assist Axis operations in North Africa. In the end, Type IX vessel U-128 was not ready at the start of the operation, so Dönitz had less than half the force he had requested. Operation DRUMBEAT began with only five Type IX U-boats from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. Seven Type VII U-boats went to Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. All were in place by mid-January 1942, and DRUMBEAT never involved more than a dozen German submarines at any one time. To keep the Americans off balance, a month after DRUMBEAT was launched, Dönitz switched its focus to the Caribbean, where several Italian submarines joined operations. The first victim of DRUMBEAT, the British freighter Cyclops, fell victim to U-123, a Type IX boat, on January 12, 1942. Other sinkings quickly followed. The United States was totally unprepared for the U-boat attacks. Coastal cities were ablaze with lights at night, silhouetting the merchant ships plying the coast and making them easy targets. There were also few escort vessels available, and merchant ships sailed independently in the hundreds because Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King refused to institute a convoy system, believing that an inadequately protected convoy system was worse than none. All this meant that through April 1942, German submarines sank 216 vessels aggregating 1.2 million tons in the North Atlantic, the vast majority of these in waters for which the U.S. Navy was responsible. This “American turkey shoot” for German submarines finally came to an end through a mandatory blackout of coastal U.S. cities, the instigation of convoys and antisubmarine training schools, the relocation of air assets to antisubmarine duties, and the addition of antisubmarine warships. Not only did merchant shipping losses drop off, but increasing numbers of U-boats were sunk. On July 19, 1942, Dönitz withdrew his last two U-boats from the East Coast of the United States, relocating his submarine assets back to the mid-Atlantic and signaling an end to the campaign. U.S. unpreparedness had come at a high price. Operation DRUMBEAT was arguably Germany’s most successful submarine operation of the entire war, resulting in the sinking of some 3 million tons of shipping. Undoubtedly, Dönitz would have enjoyed even greater success had he been able to employ more U-boats at the beginning of the campaign. Berryman E. Woodruff IV and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; NEULAND, Operation; United States, Navy.

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References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Gannon, Michael. Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks along the American Coast in World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1941–1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949.

Pearl Harbor, Attack on (December 7, 1941) Japanese military attack against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, which caused the United States to enter the war. By early 1941, tensions between Japan and the United States had reached the breaking point. Japan’s invasion of China beginning in 1937 and its occupation of French Indochina in 1940 and 1941 had led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to embargo scrap metal and oil and to freeze Japanese assets in the United States. The Japanese particularly resented the embargo on oil, characterizing it as “an unfriendly

Rescuers pull a seaman from the water as the 31,800-ton USS West Virginia burns at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (Library of Congress)

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act.” Japan had no oil of its own and had limited stockpiles. Without oil, the Japanese would have to withdraw from China. An army-dominated government in Tokyo now sought to take advantage of British, French, and Dutch weakness in Asia to push its own plans to secure hegemony and resources. Japan was determined to seize this opportunity, even if that meant war with the United States. The United States misread Tokyo’s resolve, believing that it could force Japan to back down. Both sides visualized the same scenario for war in the Pacific. The Japanese would seize U.S. and European possessions in the Far East, forcing the U.S. Navy to fight its way across the Pacific to relieve them. Somewhere in the Far East, a great naval battle would occur to decide Pacific hegemony. In March 1940, commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku scrapped the original plan—which called for using submarines and cruisers and destroyers with the Long Lance torpedo and savaging the U.S. battle fleet as it worked its way west—in favor of a preemptive strike against the U.S. fleet, which Roosevelt had shifted from San Diego to Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. Yamamoto believed that such an attack, destroying the U.S. carriers and battleships, would buy time for Japan to build its defensive ring. Yamamoto also misread U.S. psychology when he believed that such an attack might demoralize the U.S. people and force Washington to negotiate a settlement that would give Japan hegemony in the western Pacific. With both sides edging toward war, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and army Lieutenant General Walter C. Short made their dispositions for the defense of Oahu. Both men requested additional resources from Washington, but the United States was only then rearming, and little additional assistance was forthcoming. The Japanese, meanwhile, trained extensively for the Pearl Harbor attack. They fitted their torpedoes with fins so that they could be dropped from aircraft in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor, and they also planned to use large armor-piercing shells to be dropped as bombs from high-flying aircraft. No deck armor would be able to withstand them. Following the expiration of a self-imposed deadline for securing an agreement with the United States, Tokyo ordered the attack to go forward. On November 16, 1941, Japanese submarines departed for Pearl Harbor, and 10 days later the First Air Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi, sortied. This attack force was centered on six aircraft carriers: the Akagi, Hiryu¯, Kaga, Sho¯kaku, So¯ryu¯, and Zuikaku. They carried 423 aircraft, 360 of which were to participate in the attack. Accompanying the carriers were two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, and two tankers. Surprise was essential if the attack was to be successful. The Japanese maintained radio silence, and Washington knew only that the fleet had sailed. A “war warning” had been issued to military commanders in the Pacific, but few U.S.


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leaders thought the Japanese would dare attack Pearl Harbor. Nagumo planned to approach from the northwest and move in as close as possible before launching his aircraft, and then recover them farther out, forcing any U.S. air reaction force to fly two long legs. Nagumo ordered the planes to launch beginning at 6:00 a.m. at a point about 275 miles from Pearl Harbor. Two events should have made a difference to the Americans but did not. Before the launch, U.S. picket ships off the harbor entrance detected one Japanese midget submarine. Then they sank another. There were five Japanese midget submarines in the operation. Carried to the area by mother submarines, they were to enter the harbor and then wait for the air attack. Probably only one succeeded. Another warning came in the form of a radar report. At 7:00 a.m., a U.S. mobile radar station near Kahuku Point on the northern tip of Oahu detected the approach of a large number of aircraft about 130 miles out. However, personnel at the information center at Fort Shafter interpreted this as a flight of B-17s scheduled to arrive from California. The radar operator failed to report the key point that it was probably more than 50 aircraft; there were only 12 B-17s, which were in any case approaching from the east rather than the north. At 7:50 a.m., the first wave of Japanese aircraft began attacking the ships at Pearl Harbor and air stations at Ewa, Ford Island, Hickam, Kaneohe, and Wheeler. Most U.S. planes were destroyed on the ground. They were easy targets because Short, to avoid sabotage by the many Japanese on the island, had ordered the planes bunched together and ammunition stored separately. The attack achieved great success. Over some 140 minutes, the Japanese sank four of the eight U.S. battleships in the Pacific and badly damaged the remainder. Seven smaller ships were also sunk, and four were badly damaged. A total of 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, and 63 were badly damaged. The attack also killed 2,280 people and wounded 1,109. The attack cost the Japanese only 29 aircraft and fewer than 100 aircrew dead. The chief drawbacks in the raid from the Japanese point of view were that the U.S. carriers were away from Pearl Harbor on maneuvers and could not be attacked. The Japanese also failed to hit the oil tank storage areas, without which the fleet could not remain at Pearl. Nor had they targeted the dockyard repair facilities. Nagumo had won a smashing victory but was unwilling to risk his ships in further strikes. The task force recovered its aircraft and departed. Yamamoto’s preemptive strike was a brilliant tactical success. Japan could carry out its plans in the South Pacific without fear of significant U.S. naval intervention. However, the Pearl Harbor attack also solidly united U.S. opinion behind a war that ultimately led to Japan’s defeat. T. Jason Soderstrum and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Kimmel, Husband Edward; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Torpedoes; Yamamoto Isoroku

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References Clausen, Henry C. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment. New York: Crown, 1992. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Russell, Henry Dozier. Pearl Harbor Story. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001. Satterfield, Archie. The Day the War Began. New York: Praeger, 1992. Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982. Weintraub, Stanley. Long Day’s Journey into War: December 7, 1941. New York: Dutton, 1991. Willmott, H. P. Pearl Harbor. London: Cassell, 2001.

PEDESTAL, Operation (August 3–15, 1942) The last contested British Royal Navy operation to resupply Malta. Maintaining the effectiveness of the island’s aircraft and warship strike forces against the long and vulnerable Axis supply routes to North Africa was crucial, especially as the Allies prepared for a new offensive in the Western Desert and the invasion of Vichy French North Africa. In June, an effort to supply Malta with large convoys from both the east and west had led to the eastern operation, code-named VIGOROUS, of 11 merchant ships being turned back, while three of five freighters and the tanker Kentucky were lost in Operation HARPOON, the western operation. Malta thus faced a growing shortage of supplies, particularly of fuel, and, despite the risks of heavy losses among the merchant vessels and their escorting warships, the Allies decided to mount another convoy operation. Axis control of the North African coast ruled out a westbound convoy. An eastbound convoy would be vulnerable to attack from Sardinian and Sicilian bases for some 400 miles, requiring moonless nights, fast merchantmen, and a heavy escort for passage. Numbering 14 ships, including the tanker Ohio, the convoy carried 85,000 tons of supplies and 12,000 tons of fuel. Close escort to Malta was provided by the British navy in the form of Force X of 4 cruisers and 11 destroyers. Additional cover as far as the Skerki Channel would come from Force Z of 2 battleships, 3 carriers with 100 aircraft, 3 cruisers, and 13 destroyers. Two oilers and a tug, escorted by 4 corvettes, accompanied the armada. The carrier Furious, escorted by 8 destroyers, used this opportunity to fly off 40 Spitfires to reinforce Malta before returning to Gibraltar. Nine submarines were deployed to counter possible movements by Italian surface forces. On August 10, 1942, Axis forces received confirmation that the convoy had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar. Twenty submarines (18 Italian and 2 German) were deployed to intercept, and the convoy was shadowed from the air. At 1:15 p.m. on August 11, the German submarine U-73 torpedoed and sank the carrier

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Eagle and escaped. Two hours later, the first Axis air attack in the form of 36 German aircraft from Sardinia arrived. It inflicted no damage to the convoy at the cost of two of its planes shot down. Major air attacks from Sardinia commenced the next morning. Between 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., 134 Italian and 77 German aircraft made three attacks in five waves, slightly damaging the carrier Victorious and slowing the merchantman Decaulion, forcing it to proceed independently. The Axis forces lost 12 aircraft. Aircraft flying from Sicily entered the fray at 6:35 p.m., when 95 aircraft attacked in six waves. They made a glancing hit on the battleship Nelson, torpedoed the destroyer Foresight, and hit the carrier Indomitable with three bombs, putting the last two out of action. Force Z turned back to Gibraltar at 6:55 p.m., 20 minutes earlier than planned, but its carrier losses reduced the convoy’s air cover to six Beaufighters from Malta. At 7:30 p.m., as the convoy entered the Skerki Channel, Italian submarines struck. The Axum hit the cruisers Cairo and Nigeria and the tanker Ohio with one spread of four torpedoes. The Ohio continued, but the Cairo was scuttled and the Nigeria turned back to Gibraltar. A cruiser and two destroyers were detached from Force Z as reinforcements, but before they arrived, a German night air attack by 37 aircraft caused the loss of three freighters (including the Decaulion) and seriously damaged a fourth; the destroyer Ashanti, Admiral Burrough’s new flagship after the crippling of Nigeria, was also damaged. The Kenya was torpedoed by the submarine Alagi at 9:12 p.m. but could still steam at convoy speeds and so continued. On August 13, shortly after midnight, 19 Italian and 4 German motor torpedo boats commenced a series of attacks. The Italian boats sank the cruiser Manchester and three transports while the Germans accounted for one transport. Another freighter was damaged. By dawn, the convoy was scattered and reduced to 7 merchantmen (3 damaged) escorted by 2 cruisers and 16 destroyers. A planned interception by 6 Italian cruisers and 12 destroyers was called off by the naval command shortly before midnight, after one of the British cruisers sent back to reinforce the escort by Admiral Syfret was misidentified as a battleship. On their way back to base, the submarine Unbroken torpedoed two cruisers off Cape Milazzo. Air attacks from Sicily recommenced at 9:15 a.m., sinking two merchantmen and further damaging the Ohio. By 11:00 a.m., however, Spitfire fighter cover from Malta effectively prevented further successful attacks. Four merchantmen (one damaged) and the Ohio, barely afloat, entered Valetta’s Grand Harbor, bringing 32,000 tons of supplies and 11,500 tons of fuel to the garrison, sufficient for two months of operations. Force X successfully returned to Gibraltar through the gauntlet of Axis air, submarine, and motor torpedo boat attacks, losing only the damaged Foresight. Operation PEDESTAL was an Axis tactical victory. The British lost eight freighters, one carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer. One carrier, a cruiser, and a

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destroyer also suffered heavy damage. The Italians lost two submarines, and two cruisers and two submarines were heavily damaged. Aircraft losses on all sides were modest, considering the numbers engaged. Even so, the British, despite heavy merchant ship losses, had achieved a strategic victory through successfully resupplying Malta, which had an immediate serious impact on the Axis supply lines to North Africa at a critical moment. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Gibraltar; Mediterranean Theater Naval Operations.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Fioravanzo, Giuseppe. Le azioni navali in Mediterraneo. Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1970. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. Vol. 2, The Period of Balance. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956–1961. Shores, Christopher, Brian Cull, and Nicola Malizia. Malta: The Spitfire Year. London: Grub Street, 1988. Smith, Peter C. Pedestal: The Convoy that Saved Malta. London: William Kimber, 1970. Woodman, Richard. Malta Convoys 1940–1943. London: John Murray, 2000.

Philippine Islands, Japanese Invasion of (December 1941) Immediately after attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese moved to secure the resources of Southeast Asia. They invaded Malaya, but for the Japanese the prize was the Netherlands East Indies (today Indonesia) with its oil and other important natural resources. Before they could accomplish this, however, the Japanese had to secure the Philippine Islands, which are strategically placed between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. In 1941, the nearly 7,100 islands that comprise the Philippines had a population of some 17 million people. The United States had acquired the islands as a consequence of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Although U.S. war plans called for defense of the Philippines, Congress had done little to provide funding. In 1941, the Philippine army numbered only about 90,000 men, four-fifths of them Filipinos and the rest U.S. troops. The Philippine navy consisted of two torpedo boats and its air force had 40 aircraft. With war threatening, in July 1941 these forces were

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integrated into the new U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, commanded by Lieutenant General MacArthur, and the next month MacArthur began to mobilize and train the Philippine army’s reserve forces of 10 lightly armed infantry divisions. The Japanese attacked the Philippine Islands shortly after they struck Pearl Harbor, in devastating air raids on Clark and Iba Airfields on December 8, 1941. Having destroyed most U.S. combat aircraft in the islands on the ground, the Japanese sea invasion closely followed. Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake’s Second Fleet provided distant cover in the form of 2 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, and about 10 destroyers, but all major Japanese naval operations in the islands were the responsibility of Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral Takahashi Ibo¯. Takahashi’s invasion force was broken into seven subordinate commands: the Main Force, four Surprise Attack Forces, the Southern Philippines Support Unit, and the Minelaying Force. In all, Takahashi had available 1 light aircraft carrier (the Ryujo; 2 seaplane carriers; 2 converted seaplane tenders; 5 heavy cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 35 destroyers; and numerous minelayers, minesweepers, torpedo boats, subchasers, and other small ships in addition to transports. Takahashi could also call on naval aircraft, as well as cooperating army planes, based in Formosa. Facing these sizable Japanese forces, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, could call on only 1 heavy cruiser (the Houston, flagship), 1 light cruiser, 4 destroyers, 30 submarines, 6 gunboats, 2 seaplane tenders, 3 submarine tenders and repair ships, 5 minesweepers, 2 tankers, and several salvage vessels and tugs. Several dozen seaplanes were also available. The Japanese planned three landings on the big island of Luzon and one in Mindanao. The main landing was to be in the Lingayan Gulf with an advance on Manila. An initial force of 490 men came ashore on Batan Island on December 8; other landings of Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu’s 43,000-man Fourteenth Army occurred later that same month. By the end of December the Japanese had overrun most of Luzon. The conquest of the Philippines was delayed by the Japanese decision to advance the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by a month and by the American withdrawal into the Bataan Peninsula. The Americans and Filipinos were forced to surrender in May 1942. As elsewhere, there were collaborationist elements among the Filipinos, but resistance activities also occurred and guerrillas provided great assistance to U.S. forces in their reconquest of the islands in 1944–1945. The United States granted independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946. Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Hart, Thomas Charles; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Philippine Islands Campaign; Takahashi Ibo¯.

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References Lear, Elmer Norton. The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Leyte, 1941–1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1961. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

Philippine Islands Campaign (October 20, 1944–September 2, 1945) In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Pearl Harbor and there met with his two Pacific commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. MacArthur argued that the next U.S. move should be the liberation of the Philippines; Nimitz, supported by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, wanted to bypass the Philippines entirely and secure Formosa instead. The former made political sense, the latter military sense. In any case, with sufficient assets now available to accomplish both, Roosevelt agreed with MacArthur that the Philippines should be retaken. This shifted Nimitz’s operations further north to Okinawa, planned as the staging point for an eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. Retaking the Philippines was probably unnecessary. It may even have prolonged the war and increased U.S. casualties; but it was U.S. territory, and MacArthur had vowed, “I shall return.” Both plans had the same goal of cutting off Japan from strategic resources—especially oil—from the Netherlands East Indies. The resulting plan of operations called for MacArthur’s forces to land on Mindanao, while Nimitz secured Yap. The two would then combine to attack Leyte. MacArthur’s troops would then invade Luzon while Nimitz moved to the north against Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Nimitz gave Admiral William F. Halsey and his Third Fleet staff charge of the invasions of Yap and Leyte. One problem, overlooked at the time, loomed large. Leyte would be the first landing to involve two entire U.S. fleets and the first without unity of command. Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet was operating under MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command, while Halsey’s Third Fleet fell under Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Halsey had multiple tasks: to secure and maintain air superiority over the landing area; to support Kinkaid and the landings ashore; and to engage and destroy the Japanese fleet should that opportunity present itself. This divided command would have unfortunate consequences in the subsequent Battle of Leyte Gulf. The U.S. Philippine invasion had three main phases: first, the capture of Leyte Island, between the big island of Luzon to the north and Mindanao to the south; then, the capture of Luzon; and, finally, the clearing of other Japanese-held islands to the south. A precondition to such an undertaking was the neutralization

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of Japanese airpower. In wide-ranging preinvasion operations between October 7 and 16, Halsey’s Third Fleet and Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’s Far East Air Force struck all Japanese bases within range, while XX Bomber Command B-29 Superfortress bombers attacked Formosa from bases in China, decimating the rebuilt Japanese naval air arm and destroying some 700 Japanese aircraft and 40 ships. Japanese commander in the Philippines General Yamashita Tomoyuki had some 350,000 troops to defend the islands. The Japanese miscalculated U.S. intentions, believing that the U.S. effort would be against the big island of Luzon. There Yamashita had placed his Fourteenth Area Army and prepared defensive positions. Meanwhile, U.S. invasion forces headed for Leyte. U.S. planners assembled a vast amphibious force. The 700 vessels of Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet transported Lieutenant General Walter Krueger’s 194,000-man U.S. Sixth Army. Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s air-support escort carrier group consisted of 16 escort carriers, 9 destroyers, and 11 destroyer escorts. Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey commanded a close covering group of four cruisers (two of them Australian) and seven destroyers (two Australian). Admiral William Halsey’s powerful Third Fleet was to provide covering protection and engage the Japanese fleet should it decide to do battle. On October 20, following a heavy naval bombardment, four divisions went ashore on Leyte’s east coast on a 10-mile-wide front. The landing forces achieved surprise and there was scant resistance. By nightfall, some 132,400 men were ashore, along with 200,000 tons of supply and equipment. Japanese leaders knew that they would have to hold the Philippines to prevent the severing of the supply route between Japan and the vital oil and other resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Tokyo was thus prepared, once U.S. forces committed themselves, to gamble what remained of the Japanese fleet on a vast and complex naval operation. Thus, immediately on learning of the landings, the Japanese navy ¯ -GO ¯ Plan, and during October 23–26, the U.S. Navy won a deciinitiated the SHO sive victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, defeating the Japanese effort to attack the landing site from the sea. The battle smashed the Japanese navy, ending its days as a major fighting force. As U.S. forces moved inland, Yamashita reinforced Leyte. Between October 23 and November 11, he sent there some 45,000 reinforcements and 10,000 tons of supplies from Luzon and the Visayas, employing destroyers and transports that chiefly entered through the port of Ormoc in western Leyte. Gradually, Kenney’s Far East Air Force and Halsey’s Third Fleet aircraft choked off the stream of Japanese reinforcements, and, on November 11, attacks by Third Fleet aircraft decimated a Japanese convoy with 10,000 troop reinforcements. On December 7, U.S. forces came ashore at Ormoc Bay, cutting off the Japanese ability to reinforce the island.

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Meanwhile, in late October, U.S. forces landed on the adjoining Samar Island, and on December 15, they came ashore on the island of Mindoro in the northern Visayas, just south of Luzon, for use as an air base for the coming assault on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, a landing occurred in the Lingayan Gulf on the west coast of the big island of Luzon. In all, 10 U.S. Army divisions and 5 independent regiments took part in the fight for Luzon, making it the largest U.S. campaign of the Pacific war. U.S. forces landed on Palawan Island, the westernmost and fifth largest Philippine Island, on February 28. On April 17, U.S. troops came ashore on Mindanao, the last large Philippine island to be invaded. In all, U.S. forces made more than 60 amphibious landings in the Philippines. Isolated fighting continued in the islands until the final Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Ormoc Bay, Battle of.

References Breuer, William B. Retaking the Philippines: America’s Return to Corregidor and Bataan, 1944–1945. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986. Costello, John. The Pacific War, 1941–1945. New York: Rawson, Wade, 1981. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte: June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Smith, Robert Ross (2005). Triumph in the Philippines: The War in the Pacific. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.

Philippine Sea, Battle of the (June 19–21, 1944) Battle fought between the Japanese and U.S. navies and the largest aircraft carrier engagement in history. The Battle of the Philippine Sea virtually destroyed what remained of the Japanese naval aviation capability. In June 1944, U.S. forces launched Operation FORAGER to capture the Mariana Islands for use as bases for Boeing B-29 strategic bombing raids on Japan. On June 15, 1944, U.S. marines invaded Saipan, northernmost of the principal Marianas. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had overall command. His Fifth Fleet and its main strike force, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 58, provided support and protection. Task Force 58’s assets included 7 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 7 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 69 destroyers, and 956 aircraft. Also on June 15, the Japanese First Mobile Fleet under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo emerged from the Philippines through the San Bernardino Strait and headed

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¯, which was intended to draw the U.S. fleet into a denortheast in Operation A-GO cisive battle that would reverse the course of the war in the Central Pacific. Assembled over the preceding month, Ozawa’s force comprised 90 percent of Japan’s surface naval strength and consisted of 5 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 5 battleships, 11 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 473 aircraft. Ozawa believed his inferior aircraft numbers would be offset by the greater range of his planes and by the presence of 90 to 100 land-based aircraft on the islands of Guam, Yap, and Rota, with which he planned to attack the U.S. carriers to initiate the battle. As Ozawa’s own carriers came into range, his planes would launch a second strike, refuel and rearm on the islands, and then attack the Americans a third time while returning to the Japanese fleet. The U.S. submarine Flying Fish reported the Japanese sortie from the Philippines. Leaving his older battleships and several cruisers and destroyers to protect the Saipan beachhead, Spruance joined Mitscher’s Task Force 58 on June 18 to search for Ozawa. Misled by the commander of the Japanese land planes and unaware that most of them had been destroyed by attacks from Mitscher’s undamaged carriers, Ozawa launched four attack waves on the morning of June 19, only to lose 346 planes in what the victors called the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. That same day, the U.S. submarine Albacore sank the Taiho, Japan’s newest and largest carrier and Ozawa’s flagship; another submarine, the Cavalla, sank the Japanese fleet carrier Sho¯kaku. Spruance still did not know Ozawa’s precise location, and he rejected Mitscher’s urging that he move offensively toward the west for fear that the Japanese might flank him and get between him and the Saipan landing sites. Aerial night searches were deemed impractical because aircrews were exhausted and the moon was new. Although Mitscher dispatched extensive search missions through the morning and early afternoon of June 20, not until 4:00 p.m. were Ozawa’s ships finally sighted, at the extreme range of the U.S. aircraft. Despite his realization that his planes would return to their carriers in darkness and that many of them would probably exhaust their fuel beforehand, Mitscher ordered a massive strike. It found Ozawa’s ships shortly before dark and sank another fleet carrier, the Hiyo, and two oilers; severely damaged three other carriers, a battleship, a heavy cruiser, and a destroyer; and eliminated all but 35 of the remaining Japanese aircraft. The return flight of the U.S. aircraft became one of the most dramatic episodes of the Pacific war. Only 20 of the 216 aircraft sent out earlier had been lost in action, but 80 were lost in ditchings or crash landings. Ignoring the risk of Japanese submarines, Mitscher ordered his carriers to turn on all their lights to guide his fliers, and efficient search-and-rescue work recovered all but 49 airmen. Spruance pursued the retreating Japanese from midnight to the early evening of June 21, but he was slowed by his destroyers’ need to conserve fuel, whereas Ozawa accelerated the withdrawal begun after his losses on June 19.

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Although it effectively destroyed Japanese naval air power, the Battle of the Philippine Sea quickly became controversial; members of Mitscher’s staff condemned Spruance for not steaming farther westward on the night of June 18–19 to give Mitscher a more favorable launch position. Mitscher, for his part, was criticized for not sending out night searches on June 19–20 that might have found Ozawa sooner and allowed the Americans more daylight for their air attack on the Japanese fleet, perhaps even creating conditions for a surface engagement. Such a scenario, however, might have resulted in much greater losses for the U.S. side with no more strategic benefits than were actually gained. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; Central Pacific Campaign; Kurita Takeo; Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching”; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Montgomery, Alfred Eugene; Ozawa Jisaburo; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

References Dickson, W. D. The Battle of the Philippine Sea. London: Ian Allen, 1975. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1985. Tillman, Barrett. Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II. New York: New American Library, 2006. Y’Blood, William T. Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.

Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan (1888–1941) British navy admiral. Born on February 19, 1888, in Falmouth, England, Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips became a naval cadet in 1903. He joined the navigation branch of the service and served on the cruiser Bacchante during the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign, but he spent much of the rest of World War I in the Far East. Phillips attended the Naval Staff College (1919–1920); served on the Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military and Air Questions of the League of Nations (1920–1922); and was promoted to captain in June 1927. He ended a threeyear tour on the operational staff of the Royal Navy Mediterranean command in May 1928. Phillips was assistant director of plans at the Admiralty from 1930 to

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1932, served with the East Indies squadron from 1932 to 1935, and was director of plans at the Admiralty from 1935 to 1938. In April 1938, Phillips commanded the Home Fleet destroyer flotillas. He was promoted to rear admiral in January 1939 and served as deputy chief of the Naval Staff during 1939–1941. First sea lord and chief of the Naval Staff Sir Dudley Pound selected Phillips as deputy chief over several more senior officers. At first, Phillips had the confidence of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who recommended him for the rank of acting vice admiral in February 1940. The rapport between the two men gradually eroded, however. Phillips opposed Churchill’s proposal in September 1940 for retaliatory bombings of German cities. He also opposed Churchill’s preference in March 1941 to divert scarce forces from North Africa to bolster Greece. His personal contact with the prime minister practically ceased thereafter. An intelligent, hardworking officer, Phillips was also self-assured, lacked combat experience, and did not appreciate the need of warships for air cover. He was a short man, nicknamed “Tom Thumb” by some. Phillips was appointed commander in chief of the Eastern Fleet in May 1941, but he retained his duties as vice chief of the Naval Staff until October, when he took up his new command with the acting rank of admiral. He sailed for the Far East on October 25 in the new battleship Prince of Wales, which was joined en route by the old battle cruiser Repulse. Phillips arrived in Singapore on December 2, only to face the Japanese invasion of Malaya on December 8. Phillips had a difficult choice. He could attempt to oppose the Japanese amphibious landings in Malaya, or he could remain in Singapore. Phillips gambled on the offensive, and his Force Z—the Prince of Wales, Repulse, and four old destroyers— sailed on December 8 with the hope that radio silence, bad weather, and the element of surprise might enable him to catch the Japanese transports. His plan had some merit, because the Prince of Wales was stronger than any Japanese ship. Phillips also knew that the Japanese had no aircraft carriers, and he observed that the Japanese were taking risks in pushing their troopships forward. An unknown factor remained the strength of Japanese land-based aircraft, their range from their recently captured airfields, and the availability of British air cover. On December 9, Phillips was advised he would have no friendly air cover, but he elected to press on. Phillips had great faith in the antiaircraft armament of the Prince of Wales and did not believe land-based air power could sink capital ships while they were under way. No capital ship had yet been sunk at sea by aircraft. Discovered by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft on December 9, Phillips finally opted to turn around, but his Force Z was attacked by a large formation of Japanese land-based naval aircraft on the morning of December 10. Within two hours, both capital ships were sunk in what was Britain’s worst single naval defeat of the war. Phillips went down with his ship. His decisions of December 9–10 to

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maintain radio silence and not to request air cover remain open to criticism and a matter of debate. Jon D. Berlin See also: Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of.

References Great Britain, Ministry of Defense (Navy). War with Japan. Vol. 2, Defensive Phase. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995. Middlebrook, Martin, and Patrick Mahoney. Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979. Roskill, Stephen. Churchill and the Admirals. New York: William Morrow, 1978. Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

PLUTO (Pipe Line under the Ocean) PLUTO was the acronym/code word for Pipe Line under the Ocean or Pipe Line Underwater Transport of Oil. It was designed to supply petroleum to France following the Normandy invasion of June 6, 1944. A sustainable and considerable supply of petroleum was essential to maintain the highly mechanized and motorized Allied forces in their drive across France, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower identified PLUTO as second in importance only to the mulberry artificial harbors for the success of the invasion and subsequent liberation of France. A network of high-pressure pipelines, PLUTO carried vital petroleum products. The 3-in. pipelines were of two types. The HAIS was of lead with an outer steel winding, and the HAMEL was of steel. Each mile of HAIS pipe incorporated 24 tons of lead, 7.5 tons of steel tape, and 15 tons of steel outer armor, in addition to other materials such as cotton tape and jute serving. In all, PLUTO incorporated nearly 800 miles of pipe, the vast majority of which came from British manufacturers. PLUTO pumping stations were carefully disguised as buildings and gravel pits, even an ice cream shop. The pipe was laid from large floating steel bobbins known as “Conundrums,” for cone-ended drum. Each weighed 1,600 tons and carried 60 miles of pipeline. The first pipe-laying ship was the converted coastal freighter HMS Holdfast. As it and the other three pipe-laying ships towed one of the five conundrums across the channel, the cable unrolled from its bobbin and sank to the seabed. In all, a total of 34 pipe-laying ships and 600 officers and men were involved in the operation.

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The two principal pipelines were Bambi from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg and Dumbo from Dungeness in Kent to Boulogne. Bambi ultimately had 4 lines totaling 280 miles, while Dumbo came to number 17 lines totaling 500 miles of pipeline capable of pumping 1,350,000 gallons a day. Supplementing these were Tambola ship-to-shore pipelines. Although Bambi and Dumbo were ready by D-Day, the pipeline operation was delayed by the prolonged German defense of Cherbourg and mining of that port. In the meantime, oil went ashore to the Normandy beaches directly from tankers via mini pipelines. By September 18, when both pipelines were working, Allied forces had already retaken the city of Paris and broken the German army in France. Bambi closed on October 4 (U.S. tankers were then directly delivering fuel to Cherbourg and Le Havre), and Dumbo then supplied all the cross–English Channel pumping. PLUTO made it possible to dispense with a large number of tankers and removed them as possible targets. It also sharply reduced congestion at Mulberry B and the French ports once the latter were back in operation. By the end of the war in Europe, PLUTO had delivered 172 million gallons of petroleum to France. The vast majority of the PLUTO pipelines were salvaged during the period 1946–1949. Some of the pipe missed by the salvage operation may be seen in the Isle of Wight Shipwreck Centre and Maritime Museum at Arreton. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Auxiliary Vessels.

References Knight, Bob, Harry Smith, and Barry Barnett. PLUTO: World War II’s Best-Kept Secret. Bexley, UK: Bexley Council, 1998. Searle, Adrian. Pipe-line under the Ocean. Isle of Wight, UK: Shanklin Chine, n.d.

Poland, Navy One of the smaller navies in Europe, the Polish navy was the first Allied force to see combat in World War II. The commander of the Polish navy, Vice Admiral Jozef Unrug, had charge of 34 vessels, including four modern destroyers, a large minelayer, and five submarines. The Polish navy was unprepared for the scale of the German air and naval attacks launched on it beginning on September 1, 1939. Unrug, a former U-boat captain in the German Imperial Navy, foresaw the impending invasion and sent his three newest destroyers to Britain in late August. He knew that the lack of Polish antiaircraft

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defenses and concentration of much more powerful German naval units in the southern Baltic made defeat inevitable. Those ships that remained behind at Gdynia and Gdansk endured two days of constant German air and naval attacks that damaged or sank all of them except the submarines Orzel and Wilk, which managed to escape. Unrug and his staff withdrew to the naval base on the Hel peninsula after the invasion and were the last of the Polish military to surrender, on October 2, 1939. During the campaign, the Polish navy lost 26 vessels. Personnel casualties amounted to 1,500–2,000 men killed and perhaps 3,500 wounded. Some naval personnel escaped to Britain to serve with the remnants of their navy reorganized under Royal Navy command. The Poles received two new destroyers from the British through an Anglo-Polish Naval Accord of November 18, 1939. The destroyer Grom and submarine Orzel were sunk during the German invasion of Norway, and the destroyer Burza was heavily damaged during the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation. The navy of the Polish government-in-exile remained active in the Allied war effort, thanks to a steady flow of recruits from Polish refugees in Britain and the addition of new British destroyers and gunboats. The Polish navy participated in a wide range of actions, including the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck, protection of trans-Atlantic convoys, and the amphibious assaults on Sicily and Normandy. The 4,000 Polish navy officers and sailors operating in conjunction with the British manned 47 warships (including 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 5 submarines). They sank 9 enemy warships and 39 transport vessels. The Polish navy lost three destroyers and two submarines, and it suffered 404 dead and 191 wounded. Bradford Wineman See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; Dunkerque (Dunkirk) Evacuation of; HUSKY, Operation; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Divine, A. D. Navies in Exile. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944. Peszke, Michael A. Poland’s Navy, 1918–1945. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1999.

Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers (1877–1943) British admiral, first sea lord, and chief of the naval staff. Born on August 29, 1877, near Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers Pound entered the Royal Navy in 1891 and became a torpedo lieutenant in 1902. Promoted to captain in 1914, he was second naval assistant to First Sea Lord John Fisher (December 1914–May 1915). Pound fought in World War I as flag captain of the battleship Colossus (1915–1917), including service at the Battle of Jutland.

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Following the war, Pound served on the Admiralty staff (1917–1919), was head of the Royal Navy Plans Division (1922), and commanded the battle cruiser squadron (1929–1932). He was knighted in 1933 and served as second sea lord (1933– 1935). Pound returned to sea and became commander in chief of the Mediterranean Fleet (1936–1939), training its personnel for the impending war. On the eve of war, Pound was promoted to admiral of the fleet; he was named first sea lord, the highest Royal Navy post, in June 1939. He was already a tired man who consistently worked too hard and for long hours, and he had few hobbies with which to break the pressure. Yet under him, the navy planned and saw through the initial stages of the successful war at sea, although not without setbacks. Pound blamed himself for the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse to Japanese air attack in December 1941. In July 1942, wanting to clear convoy escorts for expected German surface attack, Pound ordered the Russia-bound convoy (PQ 17) merchant ships to scatter, and 22 of 35 were subsequently lost to U-boat attack. In an effort to lighten his load, Pound handed over chairmanship of the chiefs of staff to General Alan Francis Brooke (Lord Alanbrooke) on March 9, 1942, and a deputy first sea lord was appointed to assist him two months later. Pound declined a peerage, but he was awarded the Order of Merit in 1943. Following the death of his wife in July 1943, his own health failed. Although the cause was not realized at the time, he was suffering from a brain tumor that had made him increasingly sleepy in meetings. Pound eventually suffered a stroke while accompanying Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill to the Quebec Conference. He died on October 21 (Trafalgar Day), 1943, in London. Christopher H. Sterling See also: Convoy PQ 17; Great Britain, Navy; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of.

References Brodhurst, Robin. Churchill’s Anchor: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books/Leo Cooper, 2000. Nailor, Peter. “Great Chiefs of Staff: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 133 (Spring 1988), pp. 67–70. Roskill, Stephen. Churchill and the Admirals. New York: William Morrow, 1978.

Prien, Günther (1908–1941) German naval officer and U-boat captain. Born on January 16, 1908, in Lübeck on the Baltic coast, Günther Prien joined the merchant marines at age 15 to aid his divorced mother and two siblings. He impressed his superiors with his acumen and skill. He graduated from captain’s school in 1932 and, in 1933, entered the German

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navy. Commissioned an ensign, he volunteered for submarine school in 1935. During the Spanish Civil War, he served on U-26 off the coast of Spain. In 1938, Prien’s skill won him command of U-47, one of Germany’s new Type VIIB submarines. From the start of World War II, Prien’s submarine patrolled the Atlantic shipping lanes. He logged his first kill, a merchantman, on September 5, 1939. The next month, commander of German submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz picked Prien for a daring mission to penetrate the principal anchorage of the British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. On October 13, Prien was able to pass U-47 between sunken blockships in Kirk Sound and maneuver into the harbor. At about 1:00 a.m. on October 14, Prien fired four torpedoes at the battleship Royal Oak, sinking it. Three torpedoes fired at what Prien mistakenly believed to be the battle cruiser Repulse (actually the transport, later seaplane-tender, Pegasus) missed. Prien then departed the harbor, managing to avoid detection. This accomplishment was a major propaganda coup for the German navy, and German chancellor Adolf Hitler awarded Prien the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross for this deed. Prien was also promoted to Kapitänleutnant. Prien went on to sink 31 Allied ships and assisted in sinking 4 others, for a total of 213,283 tons. On March 8, 1941, British destroyers Verity and Wolverine surprised Prien’s U-47 and U-99 on the surface. The U-99 reported a nine-hour attack with more than 50 depth charges. It is possible that Prien’s U-47 succumbed to this assault, although another theory suggests that Prien counterattacked and his submarine was struck by one of his own circling torpedoes. In any case, all contact with U-47 was lost. Matthew Alan McNiece See also: Dönitz, Karl; Royal Oak, Sinking of; Submarines; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Hoyt, Edwin P. The U-Boat Wars. New York: Arbor House, 1984. Padfield, Peter. War beneath the Sea: Submarine Conflict, 1939–1945. London: John Murray, 1995. Williamson, Gordon, and Ramiro Bujeiro. Knight’s Cross and Oak Leaves Recipients 1939–40. London: Osprey, 2004.

Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of (December 10, 1941) Following World War I, British authorities decided to develop Singapore as the most important naval base in the Far East to concentrate British forces to protect

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the vast British imperial and commercial interests in the region. During the interwar period, a major base was created somewhat haphazardly, including land defenses and provisions for air support. Part of the plan involved deploying a large naval force to Singapore, a force as large as or larger than the Japanese battle fleet. The doctrine was called Main Fleet to Singapore. However, by the late 1930s, naval commitments in home waters and in the Mediterranean Sea reflected increased threats from Germany and Italy, so that at the beginning of World War II, the Royal Navy battle fleet was spread thinly. Finally, in October 1941, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill decided to deploy a squadron of capital ships to Singapore under new Eastern Fleet commander Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Some viewed this as the Main Fleet to Singapore force designed to overawe the Japanese from the seemingly impregnable base at Singapore. Phillips flew his flag in the Prince of Wales, a King George V–class battleship that was completed in March 1941. Britain’s newest capital ship, it had fought the German battleship Bismarck and carried Churchill to meet with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. It mounted a main armament of 10 14-inch guns in two quadruple and one double turret, along with 16 5.25inch quick-firing guns. It also was armed with 64 2-pounder pompoms, 8 40-mm Bofors, and 25 20-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns. The battle cruiser Repulse, completed in 1916 during World War I, accompanied it. That ship mounted 6 15-inch and 15 4-inch guns plus 4 4-inch quick-firing antiaircraft guns. The aircraft carrier Indomitable, which was to have accompanied these two capital ships, had run aground off Jamaica and was undergoing repairs. The decision to send the two capital ships to the Far East without air cover was fateful, as it deprived the squadron of the means to defend against Japanese air attack. Land-based air forces at Singapore were also inadequate. Churchill and Phillips, however, both believed that capital ships could not be sunk by aircraft while the ships were under way and were defending themselves with antiaircraft guns. The Prince of Wales and Repulse arrived at Singapore on December 2. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the two were the only Allied capital ships on station between Hawaii and the Mediterranean. On December 8, the Japanese invaded Malaya, and Phillips immediately took his ships to sea to intercept a Japanese convoy off of the Kra Isthmus of Malaya. His Force Z consisted of the two capital ships and the destroyers Vampire, Tenedos, Electra, and Express. With no British air cover available and all hope lost of surprising the Japanese naval units, Phillips ordered his ships to return to Singapore. At this point, Phillips received a report of another Japanese landing at Kuantan, closer to his position. He headed there but maintained radio silence so as to not alert the Japanese. This prevented the dispatch of British land-based aviation, which Phillips assumed would be forthcoming.

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The British ships had been sighted by a Japanese submarine, and on the morning of December 10, the Japanese launched massive air attacks against them. The Japanese force consisted of 86 twin-engine bombers, 18 high-level bombers, and 25 torpedo bombers of the First Air Fleet at land bases in Indochina. The attacks began at 11:15 a.m. Force Z was then about 50 miles off the east coast of Malaya. The Repulse was sunk first, then the Prince of Wales. Both ships were victims of air-launched torpedoes. The Repulse went down with 327 of its crew of 960; the Prince of Wales was struck by one or two 1,100-lb. bombs and as many as six torpedoes. Of its 1,612 crew members, the destroyers rescued 1,285. Neither Admiral Phillips nor Captain J. Leach, captain of the Prince of Wales, was among the survivors. The Japanese lost only three aircraft in the battle. The destruction of Force Z came as a great shock to the Royal Navy and British government and public. It has been characterized as a sign of the end of the battleship era. No longer could capital ships operate alone without air and subsurface protection. The associated surrender of Singapore to inferior numbers of Japanese forces in February 1942, the greatest defeat suffered by Britain in its modern history, was seen as the end of British, even Western, dominance in East Asia. Eugene L. Rasor and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Great Britain, Navy; Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan.

References Ash, Bernard. Someone Had Blundered: The Story of the Repulse and Prince of Wales. New York: Doubleday, 1960. Bell, Christopher M. The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars. London: Macmillan, 2000. Bennett, Geoffrey M. Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Franklin, A. G. C., and Gordon Franklin. One Year of Life: The Story of HMS Prince of Wales. London: Blackwood, 1944. Grenfell, Russell. Main Fleet to Singapore. New York: Macmillan, 1952. Hough, Richard. The Hunting of Force Z: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. London: Cassell, 1999. Middlebrook, Martin, and Patrick Mahoney. Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. New York: Scribner, 1977.

Princeton, U.S. Aircraft Carrier The Princeton (CVL-23) was a U.S. Navy Independence-class aircraft carrier. When it appeared that the new Essex-class aircraft carriers would not be ready for sea before 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered that the Cleveland-class

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cruisers then under construction be converted to light aircraft carriers. As it worked out, the Essex actually entered service before any of the new light carriers. The light Independence-class carriers had about a third of the displacement of a fleet carrier and were capable of carrying about half their number of aircraft. The Independence (CVL-22) was laid down at New York on May 1, 1942, and commissioned on January 1, 1943. The Independence and the other eight ships in its class displaced 10,662 tons standard load (14,751 tons full load) and were 622 ft. 6 in. in length overall with a beam of 71 ft. 6 in. (109 ft. 2 in. maximum width). They were capable of 31.6 knots and armed with 24 40-mm and 22 20-mm antiaircraft guns (number increased during the war). They carried 30 to 45 aircraft and had a crew complement of 1,569. The Princeton was the second ship of the class. Laid down at New York on June 2, 1941; launched on October 18, 1942; and commissioned on February 25, 1943, it arrived at Pearl Harbor in August. Its first duty was providing air cover for the occupation of Baker Island in September. It then carried out air strikes against Makin, Tarawa, Bougainville, and Rabaul. After steaming to Bremerton, Washington, it returned to the Pacific theater and, in January and February 1944, supported amphibious operations against Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok. It also supported landings in the Carolines, including Saipan. After taking part in the Battle of the

The U.S. Navy light carrier Princeton (CVL-23) steams off Seattle, Washington, on January 3, 1944. The Princeton was sunk on October 24, 1944, by a Japanese dive bomber during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The single bomb it dropped touched off ammunition below decks. (Naval Historical Center)

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Philippine Sea (June 19–21), it launched strikes against the Palaus and southern Mindanao and Luzon in the Philippines. On October 20, 1944, the Princeton supported the Leyte landings as part of Task Group 38.3. On October 24, Japanese land-based aircraft from Luzon located the task group, and shortly after 10:00 a.m., the Princeton was hit by a single bomb from a lone Japanese dive-bomber. The bomb passed through the flight deck before exploding, causing a great fire that soon led to other explosions. The crew fought the fire, but at 3:24 p.m., a second large explosion occurred, possibly caused by bombs in the ship’s magazine. The cruiser Birmingham, which was alongside assisting in fighting the fire, was badly damaged in the blast. The destroyer Irwin was also nearby and received damage but launched boats to pick up 646 survivors. By 4:00 p.m., the fires were out of control, and remaining personnel were evacuated. The Irwin then launched torpedoes at the Princeton in an effort to sink it. At 5:49 p.m., a massive explosion ripped through the carrier’s forward section, destroying that part of the ship. The remainder of the Princeton sank by 5:50 p.m. Although 1,361 members of the carrier’s crew were saved, 108 men were lost. The Birmingham lost 85 killed and 300 wounded. The destroyers Irwin, Morrison, and Reno sustained damage only. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Caroline Islands Campaign; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Mariana Islands Campaign.

References Bradshaw, Thomas I., and Marsha L. Clark. Carrier Down: The Sinking of the U.S.S. Princeton. Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1990. Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Hoyt, Edwin P. Leyte Gulf: The Death of the Princeton. New York: Lancer Books, 1972.

Proximity Fuse A fuse that detonates its explosive device within the optimal distance from its target, as opposed to fuses set to explode at a specific time after firing or fuses that pointdetonate. The proximity fuse is employed today with field artillery shells, although it was developed originally for antiaircraft artillery. Shells armed with mechanical time fuses were extremely difficult to set accurately because of the problems involved with determining an aircraft’s altitude and position, plus whatever evasive

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action the aircraft pilot might take. The proximity fuse was designed to detonate when the projectile got sufficiently close to the target, regardless of the time of flight involved. Most proximity fuses used for field artillery produce a uniform 20-meter height of burst over the target. The British, who led the world in radar, also pioneered development of the proximity fuse, beginning in 1939. In August 1940, the British shared with the United States government their research into radar and the proximity fuse, along with other important scientific work. The proximity fuse employed a micro radar unit mounted in the fuse body. When radar response indicated than an object was within a set range, the signal detonated the shell. Because of its size, the fuse was limited to shells of 75 mm or greater. The Americans called it the VT fuse, standing for variable time. The proximity fuse was a closely guarded secret, and fears that it might be compromised led to orders that initially prohibited its use except in actions over water. The proximity fuse was first successfully employed in June 1943, in 5-inch shells fired by the U.S. cruiser Helena to shoot down a Japanese bomber in the Pacific theater. The fuse proved of immense importance to naval units in defending against Japanese kamikaze aircraft. The British also employed the proximity fuse in antiaircraft guns against the German V-1 buzz bomb. Reportedly, such fuses were a key factor in allowing the British to shoot down 79 percent of the V-1s in the first week of the buzz bomb offensive. It was first used in land fighting on the continent of Europe during the desperate fighting of the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, when it proved highly effective in producing air bursts against German troops in the open. It was first employed over land in the Pacific theater in the shelling of Iwo Jima in February 1945. Although the Germans began work on such a device, neither they nor the Japanese produced one during the war. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships; Kamikaze.

References Baldwin, Ralph B. The Deadly Fuze. London: Jane’s, 1980. Hogg, Ian V. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Artillery. London: Hutchinson, 1987.

Pyke, Geoffrey Nathaniel (1894–1948) Eccentric British inventor who proposed, among other imaginative projects, that huge transports and aircraft carriers be made from ice. Born into a well-to-do family in London in 1894, Geoffrey Nathaniel Pyke studied at Wellington and then Cambridge, but he left school to pursue a career in journalism. As a Reuters

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correspondent in Denmark during the summer of 1914, Pyke reported on German military and naval movements until he was ejected from that country. He subsequently found work with the Daily Chronicle as a correspondent within Germany. Reaching Berlin in late September 1914, Pyke was soon jailed as a spy, but he escaped the following summer and returned to London. By the early 1920s, Pyke’s passions turned to the education of children, and he founded the Malting House School in Cambridge, which stressed laboratory sciences. Pyke designed a modified Harley-Davidson motorcycle to help the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. After he became a scientific adviser to Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in British Combined Operations in March 1942, certain examples of Pyke’s military-scientific ideas began to bear fruit, such as a prototype snowmobile known first as the “Plough” and then more commonly as the “Weasel.” Pyke also proposed making ships of ice to serve as unsinkable aircraft carriers for antisubmarine warfare and amphibious operations support. Both Mountbatten and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill supported the proposal and authorized development of the idea. The project was code-named HABBAKUK (an official spelling perpetuating an Admiralty clerk’s erroneous rendition of the prophet Habakkuk’s name). Pyke’s group concluded that the ice ship would need to be half a mile long, with a hull 30 ft. thick made of reinforced ice known as “Pykrete.” This mixture of solidly frozen water and wood pulp was stronger and more stable than ice and less inclined to melt. Pipes circulating cold air would keep the hull permanently frozen. A prototype 50-ft.-long Pykrete ship was built at Patricia Lake in Alberta, Canada, in spring 1943 and proved successful. The British were enthusiastic and put forth plans to build a fleet of these vessels, but the price tag was a staggering $70 million. The British could not afford this sum, and the Americans thought the project impractical, and none were built. After the war, Pyke helped the fledgling National Health Service solve staffing problems. Pyke, who battled depression all his adult life, committed suicide on the night of February 21–22, 1948. C. J. Horn and Gordon E. Hogg See also: Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of the; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas.

References Avery, Donald H. H. The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. Lampe, David. Pyke: The Unknown Genius. London: Evans Brothers, 1959. Mitchell, John. Eccentric Lives and Peculiar Notions. London: Harcourt, 1984.

Q Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, Sinking of (December 19, 1941) The June 1940 German defeat of France and entry into the war of Italy as an Axis power were great blows to the British because these events deprived them of the powerful French navy, which had been charged with the defense of British interests in the Mediterranean Sea. This duty now fell primarily to the British Mediterranean Fleet commanded by Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham and based at Alexandria, Egypt. In late 1941, the Italians devised a night raid against the British Mediterranean Fleet involving the use of midget submarines, specifically human torpedoes. Italy was the forerunner of these craft, producing the first of them during World War I. The craft for this operation was known as a Maiale (pig) because of its poor maneuvering ability. Electrically propelled, it had two crewmen in diving suits riding astride who would steer the torpedo toward its target ship. The detachable warhead would then be employed as a limpet mine, after which the crewmen would ride the torpedo away. The Maiale was 22 ft. in length by 21 in. in diameter and had a 485-lb. warhead. The Italians launched their operation on the night of December 18, 1941, upon obtaining intelligence that the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, the two most powerful warships of Cunningham’s force, were in port. The Italian submarine Scire, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Junio Valerio Borghese, surfaced about 1.3 miles off the entrance to Alexandria and launched three Maile craft. The commanders of these vessels were able to penetrate the harbor by following in the wake of three British destroyers. They subsequently sought out their targets in the early morning hours of December 19, as one each attacked the battleships and the third concentrated on the Norwegian tanker Sagona moored beside the Queen Elizabeth. Those attacking the battleships made sure to place their explosive charges in areas of the hull that would produce the most damage. While successful, the British did discover the crew of the craft deployed against Valiant, captured them, and imprisoned them aboard the battleship for questioning. Their capture, however, did not lead to the British being able to discover the placed charges, although one of the prisoners did warn the British about the possibility of an explosion. The first to detonate was the charge attached to the Sagona. The blast at 5:58 a.m. sank the tanker and damaged the bow of the nearby destroyer Jervis. The explosion

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of the next device attached to the Valiant at 6:05 a.m. occurred with all its men up from below and watertight doors closed. It flooded the battleship’s forward magazine. The last blast, at 6:16 a.m. opened to the sea the boiler rooms and engineering spaces of Queen Elizabeth. Both battleships settled on the harbor bottom. Within 48 hours, the British had taken prisoner three of the men from the remaining two Italian teams, one having been killed. The Scire remained on station for some 39 hours submerged and then escaped. The sinking of the Valiant and Queen Elizabeth deprived the British Royal Navy of its only battleships in the Mediterranean and shifted the balance of power in that theater. While both ships could be salvaged due to the shallow depth of the harbor, their loss allowed the Italians to better supply their forces in North Africa in the opening months of 1942. Eric W. Osborne See also: Borghese, Junio Valerio; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Brown; Force H; Force K; Great Britain, Navy; Human Torpedoes; Italy, Navy; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Naval Strategy, Allied; Naval Strategy, Axis.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Porch, Douglas. The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004. Sadkovich, James. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

R Rabaul The principal Japanese naval and air base in the southeast Pacific during World War II. The port of Rabaul, with its superb natural harbor, was located in the Bismarck Archipelago at the eastern end of New Britain Island, one of the islands mandated to Australia as a consequence of World War I. On January 24, 1942, the Japanese overwhelmed the Australian garrison of 1,500 men at Rabaul and soon began construction there of a large naval support facility protected by five airstrips and two air armies with more than 600 aircraft. Rabaul became the base of the Eighth Fleet, and from the port, the Japanese could defend the approaches to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and strengthen the southern flank of the region covered by their Central Pacific base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. U.S. army General Douglas MacArthur, Allied supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific Area, made the reduction of Rabaul a major objective. However, the position’s strength persuaded Allied leaders at the August 1943 Quadrant Conference in Quebec to cancel MacArthur’s plans for a direct assault in favor of a strategy of circumvention. Island-hopping was replaced by leapfrogging. Preparations began on October 12, 1943, with massive air attacks by the U.S. Fifth Army Air Force operating from New Guinea, followed on November 5 by carrier raids mounted by the Saratoga and Princeton. These U.S. attacks damaged surface naval forces, reduced air strengths, and forced the troops stationed at the Japanese garrison into a network of tunnels and caves, effectively ending Rabaul’s usefulness as a base. Under MacArthur’s command, Operation CARTWHEEL continued the strike on Rabaul from the air, and eventually, 29,000 Allied sorties delivered more than 20,500 tons of bombs there. At the same time, the Allies seized positions to the southeast on the island of Bougainville, at Cape Gloucester on the western end of New Britain, and to the north in the Admiralty and Saint Matthias Islands. By March 1944, the Japanese had withdrawn their major naval and air units, first to Truk and later to Palau, but 100,000 military and civilian personnel remained at Rabaul. Cut off from air or sea resupply, the Japanese garrison there suffered increasing deprivation until its surrender in August 1945. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Japan, Navy; Southeast Pacific Theater.

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References Dull, Paul. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950.

Radar System or technique used to detect the position, movement, and nature of distant objects. The term radar is an acronym that references the operating principles and function of this technology: radio detection and ranging. Radar systems transmit radio waves with the aid of a directional antenna, and they receive and process the radio emissions that reflect off distant objects. The range of target objects is determined by measuring the time it takes for the electromagnetic emission transmitted from the radar antenna to reach the object and return. The theoretical foundation of radar was established through the work of 19th-century scientists James Clerk Maxwell and Heinrich Hertz. Maxwell developed equations governing the behavior of electromagnetic waves in 1864. Inherent in his equations are the laws of radio-wave reflection, which were demonstrated by Hertz between 1886 and 1888. A number of early 20th-century scientists and engineers recognized the potential for radio-based detection systems. Radio direction-finding and distance-measuring experiments were conducted during World War I and in the 1920s. From these early efforts, several theoretical radar systems were proposed before World War II. Between 1934 and 1940, practical radar systems were developed independently in several countries as military instruments for detecting aircraft and ships. One of the first practical radar systems was devised in 1935 by Scottish physicist Sir Robert Watson-Watt. His success with this early system can be attributed to the fact that a number of critical technical components became available during the 1930s; it was Watson-Watt who integrated transmitters and receivers, modulators capable of generating microsecond pulses, and high-speed cathode-ray tubes to display search results. Much of this equipment was the by-product of civilian work on broadcast television. By the late 1930s, laboratories in Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union had all begun radar experiments on a modest scale. Japan did not take notice until 1941 but then hurried to catch up. Thus, all of the principal belligerents in World War II entered the conflict with some radar technology. At the insistence of Air Vice Marshal Hugh Dowding, Great Britain adopted radar in the late 1930s to augment the defenses of the home islands. Before the start of the war, Great Britain began construction of the Chain Home (CH) radar network, which was enhanced in 1939 with a number of Chain Home Low

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(CHL) stations, capable of detecting low-flying aircraft approaching the English coast. The CH and CHL stations comprised the first integrated radar defense system, staffed by crews who were trained to track incoming aircraft and relay tactical information to air defense control centers and air bases. The CH/CHL system played an important role during the Battle of Britain in 1940, giving British defenders valuable advance warning of the attacks launched by the German Luftwaffe. In September 1940, Britain provided the United States with examples of key radar components, including a magnetron, with the understanding that cooperation would lead to the further development of radar technology. The United States moved quickly. The Radiation Laboratory was established in 1940 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under the leadership of Lee DuBridge. Other emergency radar research programs were created in 1940 and 1941, and the close cooperation of Bell Laboratories, the Army Signal Corps, and the Naval Research Laboratory led to substantial improvements in the accuracy and range of radar equipment. High-power microwave radar systems were among the important advances made by the United States. Although Germany had the opportunity to exploit radar technology before World War II began, the indifference of the country’s political leadership hindered the development of the technology. Before the war, Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring, chief of the Luftwaffe, were reportedly suspicious of radar’s utility and antagonistic to the idea of adopting the technology as a defensive weapon. Later, interservice rivalries within Germany slowed the development of radar even further as resources for research and development became scarce. Germany did finally put into operation the Kammhuber Line, an interlocking system of radar, aircraft, and ground controllers that ran from the North Sea to southern France and went into full operation in September 1942. It was similar to the Chain Home system in scale and purpose, but the Allied use of long-range fighter escorts for bombers limited its value. Italian researchers had developed a prototype radar by October 1939, but the naval staff considered this technology futuristic and diverted funding and research into other areas. The first Italian radar, a combined search and fire-control system, did not appear shipboard until August 1941. Italy utilized its own equipment and that of Germany. The Japanese were late in developing and adopting radar technology, a fact that greatly advantaged the Allies in the Pacific theater fighting. However, although U.S. radar identified the Japanese aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the information was not utilized. Radar provided early warning of subsequent Japanese air strikes as well—for example, during the decisive Battle of Midway in June 1942, where the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers. Throughout World War II, continuous improvements to radar technology increased the accuracy of the U.S. Navy’s tracking and intercept capabilities.

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By 1943, thanks to aggressive research and development, the Allies had a wide variety of radar systems at their disposal. The technology evolved rapidly during the war, and specialized radar units were developed for early warning, battle management, airborne search, night interception, bombing, and gun aiming. Experiments with terrain-following radar for aircraft presaged the enhanced electronic avionics developed for jets and helicopters after the war. Air defense radar systems, which came to include fire control and gun-direction devices, proximity fuses, and increasingly accurate direction-finding and ranging capabilities, had greatly enhanced the accuracy of surface and antiaircraft fire by the end of the war. In the postwar years, as missiles replaced artillery as the backbone of air defense, radar technology improved still further, and radar systems were adapted for a number of useful purposes. As the systems became even more powerful and sensitive, radar was used in navigation, meteorology, and astronomy (the first radar emissions were reflected back from the moon in 1946). Shannon A. Brown See also: Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Proximity Fuse.

References Brown, Louis. A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives. Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Press, 1999. Buderi, Robert. The Invention That Changed the World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. Von Kroge, Harry. Gema: Birthplace of German Radar and Sonar. Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Press, 2000.

Raeder, Erich (1876–1960) German navy grand admiral and commander in chief until his resignation in 1943. Born in Wandsbek, Germany, on April 24, 1876, Erich Raeder joined the Imperial Navy in 1894, where his abilities and ambition brought him into close contact with State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II and the unique ideology that characterized German navalism. As Admiral Franz von Hipper’s chief of staff, Raeder participated with the German battle cruisers in the major operations of the High Seas Fleet during World War I, including the Battle of Jutland. In 1918, Raeder experienced the trauma of the naval mutinies and revolution, and he resolved never to see such events repeated. His role in the naval command’s support of the abortive, right-wing Kapp Putsch in 1920 threatened the future of the navy and his own career. Assigned to the naval archives, he wrote a two-volume

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German Navy grossadmiral (grand admiral) Erich Raeder visits the crew of the battleship Scharnhorst in April 1942 to express his appreciation for its successful escape from Brest, France, through the English Channel. Operation CERBERUS, also known as the Channel Dash, took place during February 11–13, 1942, and was an acute embarrassment to the British Navy. (Library of Congress)

study of Germany’s cruiser warfare in World War I, which defined his conception of naval strategy. In 1925, Raeder was promoted to vice admiral and appointed chief of the Baltic Naval Station in Kiel. He attempted to keep the navy above politics despite charges that he and the navy were engaged in antirepublican activities. In 1928, he was promoted to admiral and appointed chief of the naval command. In 1935, he became commander in chief of the Kriegsmarine (German navy) and a full admiral. Three years later, Adolf Hitler raised him to the rank of grand admiral. To ensure support for the navy’s rebuilding, Raeder established a firm, autocratic administration, demanding obedience and discipline. Initially skeptical about Hitler’s support for an expanded navy, he found the führer receptive to building a fleet as an instrument of power for a “greater Germany,” which reflected the legacy of the Tirpitz era. Given Hitler’s support for a powerful navy, Raeder was willing to accept the criminal excesses of the führer and his regime. He pressed hard for a greater share of resources in building a navy that was directed at Britain after 1938, but he soon found an impatient Hitler was unwilling to delay the building of

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battleships rather than U-boats and other ships more suited for a war against merchant shipping. Although unprepared for war in 1939 (Hitler had assured him that there would be no war before 1944), Raeder was determined to “die gallantly” for the future existence of the fleet. He called for a concentration of forces against Britain as the primary enemy and advocated a massive build up of U-boat forces and intensification of the naval war, even if this meant fighting the United States. Raeder opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union until Britain was defeated and argued vigorously for an alternative Mediterranean strategy. Following the loss of the battleship Bismarck in May 1941 and the failure of the German army in the Soviet Union, Raeder and the fate of his capital ships became increasingly irrelevant to Hitler. Raeder resigned in January 1943, to be replaced by the commander of U-boats, Admiral Karl Dönitz. Arrested at the end of the war, Raeder was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Nuremberg trials as a war criminal, but he was released on September 26, 1955. He spent his remaining years crafting his memoirs and attempting to justify his own actions and those of the navy in serving the Third Reich. Raeder died in Lippstadt on November 6, 1960. Keith W. Bird See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; SEA LION, Operation; WESERÜBUNG, Operation.

References Dülffer, Jost. Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau, 1920 bis 1939. Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste Verlag, 1973. Gemzell, Carl-Axel. Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maitimen Operationsplan. Lund, Sweden: C. W. Gleerup, 1965. Raeder, Erich. My Life. Trans. Henry W. Drexel. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Raeder, Erich. Struggle for the Sea. London: William Kimber, 1959. Thomas, Charles S. The German Navy in the Nazi Era. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Rainbow Plans Series of U.S. war plans immediately prior to World War II. Unlike the war plans of the 1920s, which were assigned one-color code names and had been developed for operations against another single nation, the Rainbow Plans envisaged conflicts

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against one or more opponents and with the cooperation or benevolent neutrality of other powers. The Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee began work in November 1938 and established five basic scenarios by June 1939. Rainbow 1 provided for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and protection of U.S. territories and trade. Rainbow 2 in addition envisaged a concerted effort with Britain and France in which the United States focused its attention on Pacific Ocean operations while its allies addressed Eastern Hemisphere conflicts. Rainbow 3 entailed the defense of the Western Hemisphere and offensive operations into the western Pacific by the United States alone. Rainbow 4 added to the defense of the Western Hemisphere the projection of troops as necessary into South America and the eastern Atlantic. Rainbow 5 considered a substantial U.S. military commitment in Europe, the eastern Atlantic, and/or Africa in concert with Britain and France. Rainbow 2 became the focus of the planning effort when war began in Europe. Its parameters generated a far more complex military situation than the old Plan Orange for a war between the United States and Japan had considered. The involvement of European nations made it highly probable that Japanese operations to the south would spread well beyond the Philippines into Southeast Asia, the East Indies, and the southwest Pacific, and efforts to contain all of these would entail substantial U.S. military commitments. The success of the German offensive in Western Europe by June 1940 radically changed the planning situation. War planning was predicated on, at best, German neutralization of Britain. Planning for Pacific operations (Rainbows 2 and 3) was abandoned, and the Rainbow 4 scenario was modified to accommodate the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere and U.S. possessions in the Pacific as far west as Midway and the Aleutian Islands against German, Italian, or Japanese aggression. Continued active British resistance prompted the initiation of strategic staff conversations between the United States and Britain that stretched from January 29 to March 29, 1941. From these emerged the parameters for Rainbow 5. Rainbow 5 assumed a conflict between the United States, the British Commonwealth, and their associated powers, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy or Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the other. The basic defensive objectives were to secure the Western Hemisphere, Britain and the British Commonwealth, and U.S. possessions against attack. The offensive objective was the defeat of Germany and its allies. To this end, the Western Allies would use all available means to apply economic pressure, conduct a sustained air offensive against Germany and its allies, seek to eliminate Italy at the earliest opportunity, and conduct limited offensives while building up substantial forces for the eventual assault on Germany. In the Pacific and Far East, Allied forces would conduct an active defense of their territories through attacks on enemy sea communications and offensives to secure the

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Caroline and Marshall islands areas. Rainbow 5 was the basic U.S. strategic plan when the United States entered the war, envisaging an active defense in the Pacific while focusing first on the defeat of Germany. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Destroyers-Bases Deal; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty.”

References Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. London: Oxford University Press, 1979. Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1980. Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Ross, Steven T. American War Plans, 1890–1939. London: Cass, 2002. Ross, Steven T. American War Plans, 1941–1945: The Test of Battle. London: Cass, 1997.

Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home (1883–1945) British navy admiral who was naval commander in chief for the Normandy invasion. Born at Hampton Court Palace in England on January 20, 1883, Bertram Home Ramsay joined HMS Britannia in 1898 and served on the North American and Red Sea stations (including a 1903–1904 landing in British Somaliland) and on Home Fleet destroyers before World War I. During that war, he held commands with the Grand Fleet and Dover Patrol. Following World War I, Ramsay commanded cruisers and a battleship, and, as a rear admiral, he was naval aide to King George V and Home Fleet chief of staff. He retired in December 1938 at the age of 55, his career apparently over. When World War II began, Ramsay returned to active duty and received command of the port of Dover. Following the German invasion of France in May 1940, he organized and executed Operation DYNAMO, the successful evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque between May 29 and June 5, 1940, for which he was knighted. Ramsay, now with the rank of acting admiral, was assigned to planning for Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and he directed the landings at Algiers and Oran on November 8, 1942. After the Axis collapse in North Africa, he planned the invasion of Sicily and commanded the eastern task force for the landings that began on July 10, 1943. Reinstated on the active list, he was appointed commander of British naval forces in the Mediterranean. On December 29, 1943, Ramsay was appointed Allied naval commander in chief for the upcoming Allied invasion of Normandy. He planned and executed this huge

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undertaking—Operation NEPTUNE—which involved more than 2,700 warships and well over 4,000 minor vessels supporting the initial landing of troops on five beaches, plus subsequent landings of troops and armor. Ramsay was criticized on occasion for his insistence on detailed planning, but he contended it was necessary given the complexity of the task, and the outcome certainly justified this assessment. For his efforts, he was promoted to full admiral on the active list in June 1944. Ramsay turned over control of the French ports from Le Havre southward, as they were captured, to the U.S. Navy, while retaining responsibility for those to the north and east. He later directed amphibious operations to clear the South Beveland Peninsula and Walcheren Island in October and November 1944, which opened the port of Antwerp. Ramsay died on January 2, 1945, when his plane crashed on takeoff from the airfield at Toussus-le-Noble, near his headquarters at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Amphibious Warfare; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; HUSKY, Operation; Mulberries; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; NEPTUNE, Operation.

References Chalmers, W. S. Full Cycle: The Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959. Love, Robert W. Jr., and John Major, eds. The Year of D-Day: The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay. Hull, UK: University of Hull Press, 1994. Stephen, Martin. The Fighting Admirals: British Admirals of the Second World War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Rawalpindi, Loss of (November 23, 1939) British armed merchant cruiser sunk after single-handedly engaging the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, during their first wartime voyage into the Atlantic. The Rawalpindi was built in 1925 by Harland and Wolff of Belfast, Northern Ireland, for the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P & O) service between Britain, India, and the Far East. At 16,697 tons, it was 568 ft. long and could carry 600 passengers in two classes, along with 380 crewmen, at a maximum speed of 17 knots. In August 1939, the Admiralty requisitioned the Rawalpindi as an armed merchant cruiser for use in Britain’s naval blockade of Germany, equipping it with eight 6-inch guns. With a crew consisting primarily of naval reservists under the command of Captain E. C. Kennedy, it was assigned to the Northern Patrol between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, there to intercept German merchant shipping

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and to escort convoys. In the late afternoon of November 23, its crew sighted what Kennedy identified as a pocket battleship of the Deutschland class, but, in fact, it was the Scharnhorst, with a main battery of nine 11-inch guns. The sighting was reported to the headquarters of the Home Fleet. The Rawalpindi was then ordered by the Germans to heave to and maintain radio silence, but Kennedy responded by turning toward the German ships and laying a smoke screen. After the Rawalpindi ignored a warning shot across the bow, the Scharnhorst opened fire with its large guns at about 8,250 yards and was soon joined by the Gneisenau. Kennedy returned fire and scored one ineffective hit on Scharnhorst, but the rest of his shots fell short by hundreds of yards. After 10 minutes, the Germans disengaged on receiving false reports of torpedo tracks, but the Rawalpindi was left burning fiercely. The ship remained afloat another three hours, during which time the Germans searched for survivors. Kennedy and 270 others were lost; of 38 survivors, 27 were rescued by the Germans and the remainder by the British cruiser Newcastle. The Rawalpindi’s arrival on the scene reinforced the decision of the German task force commander, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, to abandon his mission on grounds of poor visibility and British knowledge of his presence. He was criticized for that decision on his return to Germany. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Marschall, Wilhelm.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Kludas, Arnold. Great Passenger Ships of the World. Vol. 3, 1924–1935. Wellingborough, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1976.

Red Sea, Naval Operations in The Red Sea extends 1,200 nautical miles from the port of Suez in Egypt to Bab el Mandeb, its narrow outlet into the Gulf of Aden. At its widest, the Red Sea is only 200 miles across. In peacetime, all of the traffic between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal traveled the Red Sea, making it one of the world’s most strategic bodies of water. Italy’s East African base at Massawa was situated astride this critical sea route, and with the Sicilian Channel closed upon the outbreak of war, Italy theoretically possessed the ability to block maritime access to Egypt. In June 1940, Italy’s East African naval squadron consisted of seven destroyers, eight submarines, two old torpedo boats, five old motor torpedo boats, and a large colonial sloop all concentrated at Massawa. Naval command considered that, due

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to the squadron’s limited stocks of fuel and ammunition, its mission was to survive and practice sea denial with its submarines for the duration of a six-month war. British Empire forces included three light cruisers, four destroyers, and three sloops. This Red Sea Squadron was tasked with blockading the Italian East African coast, preventing reinforcements from reaching there and, most importantly, protecting Allied shipping lanes to Suez and Aden. Hostilities opened with an Italian submarine offensive, but the British had suspended all shipping two weeks before war, and only one ship of 8,215 gross register tonnage fell victim. In return, Allied antisubmarine forces sank four Italian submarines, losing a destroyer in the process. Operations were complicated by what one participant described as the torture of the region’s “blazing heat and incredible humidity” and even by periodic sandstorms in port and at sea. Two Italian submarines were lost as a direct consequence of malfunctions in their inadequate air-conditioning systems. The first convoy BN1 (BN for Bombay, Northward, while BS stood for Suez to Aden) departed Aden for Suez on July 2, 1940. On six occasions in July, August, and September, Italian destroyers made night sorties in response to reports of Allied ships passing Massawa, but they failed to make contact. Submarines and aircraft only sank two merchantman (one each), totaling 9,288 gross register tonnage during this period. On the night of October 20–21, 1940, four Italian destroyers operating in two sections intercepted Convoy BN7, numbering 34 ships of British, Norwegian, French, Greek, and Turkish origin, which was escorted by the light cruiser, Leander, a destroyer, three sloops and two minesweepers hailing from the navies of Great Britain, New Zealand, India, and Australia. The convoy escaped damage, but the destroyer Kimberley sank the Italian destroyer Nullo on its return to base. An Italian shore battery disabled the Kimberley, but the Leander towed it to safety. Although its oil stocks were running short, the Regia Marina attempted to intercept Allied convoys on December 3, 1940, and on January 24, and February 2, 1941. Only during the last sortie did two of three destroyers make contact with Convoy BN14, but all their torpedoes missed. In March 1941, British forces invading Italian East Africa neared Massawa. On April 2, the five remaining Italian destroyers attempted a desperate raid against Port Sudan, but one dropped out en route because of engine problems, and the other four were intercepted at dawn on April 3 while 30 miles short of their objective by bomber squadrons disembarked from the British aircraft carrier Eagle. The aircraft sank two of the destroyers, and the other two were scuttled by their crews on the Arabian coast. The last significant Red Sea naval event of the war occurred on April 8 during the occupation of Massawa, when an Italian motor torpedo boat severely damaged a British light cruiser.

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The destruction of Italian naval forces in the Red Sea relieved the need for convoys and the last BN convoy arrived in Suez on April 13. British forces captured Assab, Italy’s final Red Sea outpost, on June 10. Suez continued to be a serious bottleneck, however, especially when German aerial mines caused its closure. In May 1941, for example, 117 ships waited outside Port Suez to be unloaded, providing rich targets for Axis aircraft. As late as October 1941, the Allied Suez escort force still retained four light cruisers, four destroyers, and two sloops. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Suez Canal.

References Gill, Hermon G. The Australian Navy 1939–1942. Adelaide: Griffen Press, 1957. Lupinacci, Pier Filippo. La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Vol. 10, Le operazioni in Africa Orientale. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1976.

Reeves, Joseph Mason (1872–1948) U.S. navy admiral who was a forceful advocate for naval aviation. Born in Tampico, Illinois, on November 20, 1872, Joseph Mason Reeves graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1894. Beginning his naval career as an engineer, he became a gunnery officer, known for his skill in training his men to fire rapidly and accurately. As with most naval officers, Reeves interspersed seagoing, staff, and teaching appointments, and he served a tour as naval attaché to Italy. His initial command was the navy’s first electricity-driven ship, the Jupiter, an experimental collier; during World War I, he commanded the battleship Maine. In 1925, Reeves volunteered to become an aviation observer and learned to fly. In October 1925, he became commander of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, including the navy’s first aircraft carrier. He switched this force’s emphasis from breaking records, performing stunts, and testing to intensive training in aviation warfare tactics, with a special focus on upgrading aircraft carrier capacities. In military exercises in 1928 and 1929, Reeves conducted successful mock air assaults on Hawaii and the Panama Canal, demonstrating the effectiveness of air power and giving new impetus to developing a powerful carrier task force. In 1933, Reeves commanded the U.S. Battle Fleet, and in 1934, he served as commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, the first aviation officer ever appointed to that post. As Japan abrogated the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and became increasingly assertive in Asia, he stressed fleet security and preparedness for war. He ordered extensive naval maneuvers designed to test U.S. naval effectiveness under wartime conditions, including exercises near Pearl Harbor and Midway Island.

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Although Reeves retired from the navy in December 1936, his support for naval aviation and efforts to prepare for conflict contributed substantially to his country’s fighting success in World War II. Reeves was recalled to emergency duty in 1940. He served in the office of the secretary of the navy on the Roberts Commission that investigated the Pearl Harbor disaster. He was also the Navy Department’s Lend-Lease liaison officer and a member of the Munitions Assignment Board. He retired for a second time in 1946 and died at Bethesda Naval Hospital, in Maryland, on March 25, 1948. Priscilla Roberts See also: Lend-Lease; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States, Navy.

References Hayes, John D. “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, USN (1872–1948).” Naval War College Review 23 (November 1970), pp. 48–57, and 24 (January 1972), pp. 50–64. Melhorn, Charles M. Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the American Carrier, 1911–1929. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974. Turnbull, Archibald D., and Clifford L. Lord. History of United States Naval Aviation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949. Wildenberg, Thomas. All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2003.

Rennell Island, Battle of (January 29–30, 1943) Naval battle fought between U.S. and Japanese forces off Guadalcanal. At the beginning of 1943, the Japanese were gathering shipping at Rabaul, Buin, and Java for the evacuation of their forces from Guadalcanal, but the United States assumed this buildup was a major Japanese effort to reinforce the island. The U.S. Navy’s South Pacific commander, Admiral William Halsey, assembled substantial naval assets, and with relief of the last marine elements on Guadalcanal requiring the dispatch of a number of transports to the island, he decided to send five separate task forces with the transports in hopes that the Japanese would challenge the passage. Sufficient fuel was not available for the Japanese to make a major naval effort, but they did commit air units. The U.S. ships assembled at different points and then moved north in six separate groups. Three of these did not participate in the subsequent battle: one force of four light cruisers and four destroyers, another of the battleships North Carolina and Indiana, and a third force around the carrier Saratoga. A fourth group, centered on the carrier Enterprise, did see action. These four trailed the two forward groups— the first consisting of three President-class transports and the Crescent City and the

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second being Task Force (TF) 18, a close-support group of cruisers, escort carriers, and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen. TF 18 took the brunt of the subsequent fight. The force included the heavy cruisers Wichita, Chicago, and Louisville; the light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, and Columbia; the escort carriers Chenango and Suwannee; and eight destroyers. The transports departed Nouméa on January 27, the same day the support group left Efate. The ships were to rendezvous 15 miles off Cape Hunter on the southwest coast of Guadalcanal at 9:00 p.m. on January 30. To make the rendezvous on time, Giffen was forced to leave behind the two escort carriers with two destroyers at 2:00 p.m. on January 29. On the afternoon of January 27, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and submarines had located Giffen’s ships. The Japanese then sent out some 30 Mitsubishi G4M (“Betty”) medium land-based bombers from Munda Field, Buka, and probably Rabaul. The last combat air patrol aircraft retired at sunset, leaving the six U.S. cruisers without air protection. TF 18 was then about 50 miles north of Rennell Island, moving northwest toward the rendezvous point at 24 knots. Its ships were in a rivet-shaped formation, with the destroyers in a semicircle two miles in advance of the cruisers, which were steaming in two lines 2,500 yards apart. Before sunset, U.S. ship radars identified the approach of the Japanese bombers, but Giffen did not order either a change of course or a different formation to defend against air attack. The Japanese torpedo bombers circled to the south of the U.S. formation and then split into two groups for a low-level attack. The first Japanese effort was futile and cost one aircraft, but attacks continued after dark, aided by air-dropped flares. The Mark-32 proximity fuse, employed in U.S. antiaircraft shells for one of the first times, helped claim a number of attacking aircraft, but Japanese torpedoes heavily damaged the Chicago. At 10:00 p.m., Giffen ordered a change of course. The Japanese aircraft failed to detect the change, and most then departed for home. The Louisville took the stricken Chicago in tow and began to move it toward Espiritu Santo at a speed of four knots. Admiral Halsey in Nouméa ordered the escort carriers Chenango and Suwannee to provide combat air patrol to protect the two cruisers, and he diverted a tug and other vessels to assist. By 3:00 p.m., the tug Navajo, screened by six destroyers, had the Chicago under tow. There was as yet no combat air patrol when the Japanese struck with a dozen Bettys. Aware of their approach, the Enterprise had launched F-4F Wildcats to intercept them. U.S. aircraft then shot down some of the Bettys, but nine survived to attack the crippled cruiser, while the Navajo made a futile effort to position the cruiser with its bow toward the attackers. Although seven of the last Bettys were shot down, four torpedoes struck the Chicago. It sank within 20 minutes, the escorting ships collecting 1,049 survivors.

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Although the Battle of Rennell Island was a defeat for the United States and demonstrated Japan’s success in night fighting, the Japanese concentration on Task Force 18 enabled the U.S. transports to continue on unmolested and land their troops and supplies without incident, as did a second convoy of five transports arriving at Guadalcanal on February 4. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Giffen, Robert Carlisle “Ike”; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Proximity Fuse; Rabaul; Southeast Pacific Theater; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Jersey, Stanley Coleman. Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949.

Reuben James, Sinking of (October 31, 1941) The loss of the U.S. Navy destroyer Reuben James (DD 245) to the German submarine U-552 on October 31, 1941, helped move the United States closer to entering World War II. The Reuben James was a Clemson-class “Four Piper” destroyer, named for the U.S. sailor who, interposing his own body, had saved the life of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur during the Barbary Wars. Commissioned in 1920, “the Rube,” as the destroyer came to be known, displaced 1,200 tons, was capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots, and was armed with 4 4-inch guns and 12 21-inch torpedoes. On the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the Reuben James was assigned to patrol duty off the East Coast of the United States. In March 1941, the Rube joined Squadron 31 in the Atlantic, where it was part of the Northeastern Escort Force assigned to escort convoys as far east as Iceland and as far west as the United States. On October 31, 1941, the Reuben James (under Lieutenant Commander H. L “Tex” Edwards) was some 600 miles west of Iceland, with 4 other destroyers escorting 44 merchantmen in the eastbound convoy HX.156. It was steaming on the port beam of the convoy abreast of the last ship in the column that morning when it was hit without warning on the port side by a torpedo fired by the German U-552. Evidently, the torpedo explosion touched off ammunition in the destroyer’s forward magazine and split the ship in two. The stern remained afloat for about five minutes, and then it, too, sank. Only 45 men, including a chief petty officer,

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survived; 115 others, including Edwards and all the other officers, went down with the ship. Within days, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had transferred the Coast Guard to the U.S. Navy. The next week, Congress amended the Neutrality Act by authorizing the arming of U.S. merchantmen and removing restrictions that denied European waters to U.S. shipping. The U.S. Navy could now convoy Lend-Lease goods all the way to British ports. The Reuben James was the only U.S. Navy ship lost to the German navy before the United States entered World War II. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Destroyers; Lend-Lease.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1941. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1953.

Riccardi, Arturo (1878–1966) Italian navy admiral and naval chief of staff. Born in Pavia, Italy, on October 30, 1878, Arturo Riccardi enlisted in the navy in 1892 and was commissioned on graduation from the Naval Academy at Livorno (Leghorn) in 1897. In 1904, he distinguished himself in rescue operations following a fire in the transport Marco Polo and was decorated. Riccardi was aide-de-camp of the Duke of Genoa from 1910 to 1914. During World War I, he served in torpedo boats. Promoted to lieutenant commander, he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the battle fleet. In 1924, Riccardi was made chief of staff and chief of operations of the Taranto Naval Command. From February to May 1925, he was chief of the secretariat of the navy minister. He was promoted to commodore in 1931 and commanded the Taranto Navy Arsenal. Promoted to rear admiral in 1932, he next served as director of naval personnel until 1934. From May 1934 to July 1935, Riccardi commanded the 4th Division. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1935, and for the next two years, he headed the Personnel and Military Service. In 1937 and 1938, he was commander of the Upper Tyrrhenian Sea Naval Department. From February 1938 to July 1939, Riccardi commanded the 1st Fleet, with his flag in the battleship Conte di Cavour. In September 1939, he took command of a special escort command, Comando Difesa Traffico MARICOTRAF. Because of his seniority and his position as a senator, he also served in a series of largely ceremonial posts, including president of the Navy Superior Council and the Admirals

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Committee and then, days before Italy entered the war, president of the Technical Services Committee. When Admiral Domenico Cavagnari was relieved following the successful British air assault on Taranto, Riccardi replaced him as chief of staff of the Italian navy. Promoted to full admiral on October 29, 1942, he retained his post until July 26, 1943, when Benito Mussolini was deposed. Riccardi’s legacy still evokes disagreement. Some asserted that he was not admired in the navy, where it was rumored that his career had benefited from connections and where he was seen as a bureaucrat rather than a commander. Others maintain that he was known as an excellent sailor and as a harsh but fair commander. Riccardi died in Rome on December 26, 1966. Alessandro Massignani See also: Cavagnari, Domenico; Italy, Navy; Taranto, Attack on.

References Giorgerini, Giorgio. La guerra italiana sul mare: La marina tra vittoria e sconfitta. Milan, Italy: Mondatori, 2000. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Río de la Plata, Battle of (December 13, 1939) Naval battle in the South Atlantic; first major surface engagement of World War II. Grossadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder, commander of the German navy, envisioned using his capital ships as commerce raiders and ordered his captains to avoid engaging enemy warships, even inferior forces, because even light damage could be fatal to a raider operating in distant waters given Germany’s lack of foreign bases. On September 1, 1939, the German pocket battleship Graf Spee, commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, was already at sea, cruising in the South Atlantic in company with the supply vessel Altmark. The Graf Spee was one of the three-ship Deutschland class. The others were the Deutschland and the Admiral Scheer. These capital ships represented the design compromises faced by Germany as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War I. Because of caliber and weight restrictions, the ships nominally displaced 10,000 tons and boasted a main battery of six 11-inch guns. Armor was equivalent to that of a typical cruiser, but these ships were slower than most in that class, possessing a top speed of 28 knots. In short, the Deutschland-class vessels were heavily armed, lightly protected warships designed primarily for commerce raiding. During the course of three months, the Graf Spee sank 10 British merchantmen totaling 50,000 gross tons. To combat the German surface raiders, the Royal Navy

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positioned hunting groups in areas where German cruisers would likely search for prey. One such was Force G, commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood, operating in the South Atlantic. Harwood’s squadron included the heavy cruisers HMS Exeter (six 8-inch guns) and Cumberland (eight 8-inch guns) and the light cruisers HMS Ajax and HMNZS Achilles, each armed with eight 6-inch guns. By early December, Langsdorff decided to return to Germany after one final victory. Intelligence indicated a valuable convoy sailing from the Río de la Plata under escort. Despite standing orders, he decided to engage this enemy force. On December 13, 1939, lookouts aboard the Graf Spee spotted masts on the horizon. They were three of Harwood’s cruisers (the Cumberland had remained in the Falkland Islands to undergo repairs). Langsdorff ordered his ship to close with the British ships and fired the first salvo at 6:17 a.m. while Harwood divided his force into two sections, with the light cruisers cooperating and Exeter operating from a different quarter to complicate his enemy’s targeting. Exeter bore the brunt of the battle, because Langsdorff considered it to be the greatest threat. Langsdorff initially engaged the light cruisers with his 5.9-inch secondary armament, but throughout the battle, he switched the main battery’s targets, complicating the Graf Spee’s fire control. In the exchange of fire, the Exeter absorbed several 11-inch hits that eventually disabled its main armament. The Ajax and Achilles also sustained damage, the former losing use of its aft turrets. Gunnery on both sides was adequate, although the British in particular suffered spotting problems. Nonetheless, the Graf Spee took its share of punishment. At least 18 shells caused damage that included a large hole in the ship’s bow as well as destruction of the ship’s galley and freshwater plant. At 7:40 a.m., Langsdorff disengaged and made for the neutral port of Montevideo, Uruguay. Langsdorff hoped to make repairs at Montevideo, but Uruguayan officials only allowed the belligerent 72 hours in port. Ironically, the British also wanted to keep Graf Spee there longer, to allow time for reinforcements to arrive. Langsdorff despaired that he could not return to Germany, given the condition of the ship. His own expectations, along with British disinformation, led him to believe the battle cruiser Renown and aircraft carrier Ark Royal awaited him outside the harbor. Both were en route, but neither would arrive for several days. After discussions with Berlin, on December 17, 1939, Langsdorff had the Graf Spee weigh anchor and sailed to just beyond Uruguay’s territorial limit. There, in the Río de la Plata estuary, Langsdorff scuttled his ship rather than waste the lives of his crew. Tugs transported the Germans to Argentina, where most spent the war in internment. Total human casualties in the Battle of the Río de la Plata were 37 German and 73 British dead. There was another casualty of the battle. On December 20, Captain Langsdorff took a hotel room in Buenos Aires. There he wrapped himself in his ship’s ensign and committed suicide with a pistol. The Graf Spee remains buried

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The German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee, once the pride of the German Navy, is shown here sinking off Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 17, 1939. The ship was scuttled by her commander, Captain Hans Langsdorff, to avoid internment or additional combat with British warships. Two days later, Langsdorff committed suicide. (AP/Wide World Photos)

in the mud of the Río de la Plata. The battle was the first important victory won by the British in World War II. Rodney Madison See also: Altmark Incident; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Germany, Navy; Harwood, Sir Henry; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Raeder, Erich; Z Plan.

References Grove, Eric. The Price of Disobedience: The Battle of the River Plate Reconsidered. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Pope, Dudley. Battle of the River Plate. Rev. ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Galahad Books, 1969.

Rogge, Bernhard (1899–1982) German navy admiral who became commander of Kampfgruppe (combat team) Rogge in 1943. Born in Schleswig, Germany, on November 4, 1899, Bernhard Rogge served in the merchant marine during World War I and continued in the

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merchant marine service after the war. Although he had a Jewish grandparent, he was exempted from Nazi racial laws and given command of the training vessel Albert Leo Schlageter in February 1938. In July 1939, he was promoted to captain and assumed command of the armed merchant cruiser Atlantis. Designated Ship 16, the Atlantis began cruising as a commerce raider on March 11, 1940. Rogge sank his first ship on May 5 in the South Atlantic. He soon sailed to the Indian Ocean, where he met with great success. The Atlantis sank 22 ships weighing an aggregate 145,697 tons, the most of any commerce raider during the war. On November 22, 1941, while on its return to Germany, the Atlantis stopped for repairs and refueling from a U-boat in the South Atlantic; there, the raider was surprised by the British heavy cruiser Devonshire and sunk. Rogge and most of his crew survived, and their lifeboats were taken in tow by the U-126. The crew of the Atlantis set records for 622 continuous days at sea and for sailing more than 102,000 nautical miles. Rogge made it back to Germany, where Adolf Hitler personally awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross. In 1942, Rogge was appointed inspector general of training establishments and commander of fleet training formations. In March 1943, he was promoted to Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) and given command of Kampfgruppe Rogge. In 1945, he was promoted to Vizeadmiral (equivalent to U.S. vice admiral) and commanded the 3rd Battle Group in the Baltic. In 1955, Rogge joined the new West German Bundesmarine (navy) as a vice admiral. He died in Reinbek bei Hamburg, Germany, on June 29, 1982. Frank Toomey See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Germany, Navy.

References Duffy, James. Hitler’s Secret Pirate Fleet. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. Rigg, Bryan. Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Ruge, Friedrich. Der Seekrieg: The German Navy’s Story, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Von der Porten, Edward. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969.

Romania, Navy When Romania began rearmament in the 1930s, Hungary was seen as the nation’s most likely opponent in war. Accordingly, Romanian land and air services were built up at the expense of the navy. In 1939, the Marina Regalã Românã (RRN,

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Royal Romanian Navy) consisted of 4 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 3 motor torpedo boats (MTBs), 4 escort and patrol craft, 1 minelayer, 1 submarine, 7 river monitors, and 35 merchantmen. Few were of recent construction. Seven Savoia-Marchetti S-55 single-wing and 11 S-62 biplanes comprised the Romanian seaplane fleet. During the war, Germany and Italy provided additional craft, including submarine chasers and five Italian Costiero B–class midget submarines. Romania also built six Dutch-designed torpedo boats and assembled two German-manufactured U-boats (the Rechinul and Marsuinul) at Galati during the war. By June 1941, the RRN had 40 military vessels. Its air support had similarly increased. Opposing the Romanian navy was the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. On June 22, 1941, the Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 78 MTBs, and 44 submarines, plus 797 naval aircraft. Against such a superior enemy Romania adopted a defensive strategy. Romania laid thick minefields around the ports of Sulina and Constanta and along a coastal corridor. In the process, the 406-ton Romanian gunboat Locotenent Lepri Remus hit a stray mine and sank on January 11, 1940, the largest RRN ship sunk in the war. The two largest and most modern units of the Romanian navy were the Regele Ferdinand–class destroyers Regele Ferdinand and Regina Maria. They displaced 1,400 tons standard and carried five 4.7-inch guns and six 21-inch torpedoes. The Sea Division guarded the coastline, supported by coastal artillery and 20 aircraft of the 102nd Sea Plane Flotilla. The Sea Division had the destroyers Marasesti and Marasti, built by Italy in 1918 and 1919, respectively, each with a main armament of four 4.7-inch guns. Its gunboats, the Locotenent-Comandor Stihi Eugen and Sublocotenent Ghiculescu, both of French origin, dated to 1916 and mounted two 3.9-inch main guns each. The Romanian Danube Division consisted of two sections. The River Naval Force had three monitors, two MTBs, a landing company, an underwater defense group, and a service group. The Tulcea Tactical Group had two monitors and four MTBs, an underwater defense group, and a supply convoy. The Sulina Naval Detachment protected the Danube Delta, and the Upper Danube Sector guarded the river from Cazane to Portile-de-Fier. Both depended on seven pre–World War I river monitors and a handful of smaller craft. On September 1, 1942, on the Kerch (Kersch) Peninsula, RRN and German vessels successfully conducted the largest Axis amphibious assault of the European war. “Romania’s Dunkerque”—the evacuation of German, Romanian, and auxiliary troops from the Crimea during April and May 1944—earned a German Knights Cross for the commander of the Black Sea Division, Contraamiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) Horia Marcellariu. More than 100,000 men were saved in this operation. On the eve of the Soviet invasion of Romania in 1944, the RRN had 54 warships and auxiliaries on the Black Sea. An additional 37 warships and 100 auxiliary craft were on the Danube. On September 5, all ships were handed over to the Soviets.

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Most of the Sea Division was bottled up in port, but the river flotilla fought for the Soviet Union until the war’s end. Gerald D. Swick See also: Aircraft, Naval; Auxiliary Vessels; Aviation, Naval; Black Sea, Area of Operations; Convoys, Axis; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Monitors; Soviet Union, Navy.

References Bernád, Dénes. Rumanian Air Force: The Prime Decade, 1938–1947. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1999. Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Titans: World War II at Sea. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Statiev, Alexander, “Romanian Naval Doctrine and Its Tests in the Second World War.” War in History 15, no. 2 (2008), pp. 191–210. Tarnstrom, Ronald. L. Balkan Battles. Lindsborg, KS: Trogen Books, 1998.

ROYAL MARINE, Operation (May 1940) Code name for a British plan to mine the Rhine River. On November 17, 1939, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill proposed mining Germany’s inland waterways. He suggested introducing mines into the Rhine from French tributaries and between Strasbourg and Lauter, where the left bank was French territory, while Royal Air Force bombers dropped additional mines into Germany’s other rivers and canals at the same time. Churchill hoped that thousands of small, 20-lb. mines might overwhelm German countermeasures and completely halt traffic on Germany’s waterways. Such mines would be more than sufficient to damage or sink river barges. To avoid causing problems with the neutral Kingdom of the Netherlands, the mines would deactivate after several days, hopefully before they drifted across the Dutch frontier. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the War Cabinet approved the plan, and Churchill began assembling the mines. The French government and military, however, remained cool to the idea, especially Premier Édouard Daladier. By March 1940, Britain had assembled more than 6,000 mines, and Churchill wanted to begin deploying them in the Rhine. The Allied Supreme War Council then endorsed plans to lay mines along the Norwegian coast and bomb the Ruhr in combination with Operation ROYAL MARINE in an effort to shut down German industry. However, newly appointed French premier Paul Reynaud, fearing German retaliation with a possible strike on Paris, rejected ROYAL MARINE and any bombing or mining of German industry, so only the mining of the Norwegian coast went forward in April. Reynaud insisted on a three-month delay before launching ROYAL MARINE in order to give the

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French air force time to prepare for German retaliation. He later agreed that Britain could launch the operation should German forces invade France or Belgium. The Royal Air Force hastily implemented the plan after German troops opened their offensive into France on May 10, 1940. In the first week of fighting, they introduced more than 1,700 mines into the Rhine. These effectively halted river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz and damaged several pontoon bridges. By May 24, more than 2,300 mines had been placed, and these drifted into the Rhine, Moselle, and Meuse Rivers. In the closing days of the campaign, the Royal Air Force dropped some additional mines in night sorties. As Churchill later wrote, Operation ROYAL MARINE’s limited success was “swept away in the general collapse of French resistance.” The operation did, however, lay the groundwork for later minelaying efforts by both the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and Coastal Command. Over the next two years, the British placed almost 16,000 mines, which sank some 369 German vessels totaling an estimated 361,821 tons. Stephen K. Stein See also: Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying.

References Ashley, L. R. N. “The Royal Air Force and Sea Mining in World War II.” Air University Quarterly Review 14, no. 4 (Summer 1963), pp. 38–48. Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. Vol. 1, The Gathering Storm. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948. Ellis, Lionel F. The War in France and Flanders, 1939–1940. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953. Gilbert, Martin, ed. The Churchill War Papers. Vol. 1, At the Admiralty, September 1939– May 1940. New York: Norton, 1993.

Royal Navy Volunteer Reserves Traditionally the permanent strength of the Royal Navy was quite small. On January 1, 1939, it numbered fewer than 10,000 officers and only about 109,000 seamen. The Royal Marines added another 12,400 officers and men. The marines manned up to a quarter of the guns aboard ship and were available for landing parties. These permanent personnel were, however, barely sufficient to man the ships of the active fleet. To operate the ships of the reserve fleet that had not undergone modernization in the period between the wars required the calling up of some 71,000 reservists. These included members of Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), consisting of members of the Royal Fleet Reserve who had completed 12 years of service, and officers in the merchant service who had joined the RNR and who had

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received some naval training; and some 6,000 men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). The addition of the reserves enabled the Royal Navy to expand to some 200,000 personnel by full mobilization in August 1939. Wartime losses and the addition of new ships during the course of the conflict led to further personnel expansion, with by far the greatest officer additions occurring in the RNVR. It reached a total of 48,000 officers (comprising three-quarters of the officers in the wartime navy) and 5,000 ratings, the volunteers coming from both Britain and throughout the empire. The RNVR particularly made its mark in the Battle of the Atlantic, where many of its officers commanded destroyers, corvettes, frigates, and submarines. It impact was also strong in the Fleet Air Arm, where a number of its members commanded squadrons. At peak strength in mid-1944, the Royal Navy numbered 863,500 officers and men, including 73,400 members of the Women’s Royal Navy Service. The vast majority of the additional personnel, however, came as a consequence of the National Service Acts and were to serve for “hostilities only.” Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Great Britain, Navy; Great Britain, Women’s Royal Navy Service.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1991. Chatterton, Edward K., and Kenneth Edwards. The Royal Navy: From September 1939 to September 1945. 5 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942–1947. Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960.

Royal Oak, HMS, Sinking of (October 14, 1939) Incident in which a British battleship was lost to a German submarine attack within the Home Fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. Built as one of five superdreadnoughts of the Revenge class, the Royal Oak was launched in November 1914. On May 31, 1916, two weeks after commissioning, it fought at Jutland. It stayed with the Grand Fleet for the rest of the war and served in the Atlantic and Mediterranean until 1937, when it joined the Home Fleet. The Royal Oak and the other ships in its class were 624 ft. long, displaced 28,000 tons, and carried a main battery of 8 15-inch guns, with a secondary armament of 14 6-inch guns. When World War II began in September 1939, the Royal Oak was based at Scapa Flow, which, as in World War I, was Britain’s main fleet anchorage in a


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war with Germany. Nonetheless, substantial weaknesses in Scapa Flow’s defenses led the commander of German submarines, Konteradmiral (equivalent to U.S. rear admiral) Karl Dönitz, to conceive an attack within the harbor that might destroy British faith in its security and usefulness. To carry out the mission, he chose Lieutenant Commander Günther Prien of U-47, who set out in his Type VII-B boat from Kiel on October 8. German aerial surveys on October 11 and 12 showed 5 battleships and battle cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, and 10 cruisers at anchor in Scapa Flow, but this low-level reThe British battleship Royal Oak in the Atlantic. The Royal Oak was torpedoed and sunk at the Royal Navy anchor- connaissance, along with an age of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands on October 14, uncoordinated sortie by the 1939, in a daring attack by German submarine U-47, battleship Gneisenau and commanded by Lieutenant Commander Günther Prien. other German surface units, (Roger Viollet/Getty Images) persuaded the Admiralty that an attack was imminent. The British dispatched their large ships into the North Sea and then moved almost all of them to Loch Ewe in northwest Scotland. Only the Royal Oak, which until then had been used as a convoy escort, returned to Scapa Flow. On the moonless night of October 13, U-47 began a surface approach to Scapa Flow through a gap in the sunken blockship barriers revealed by aerial photography. During the four-hour passage, Prien submerged once to avoid detection by a passing merchant ship and learned that, even with illumination from the northern lights, targets were not visible through his periscope. Back on the surface, he narrowly escaped entanglement in a blockship’s mooring cable but emerged into the main anchorage shortly after midnight. Prien identified the only suitable targets as the Royal Oak and the battle cruiser Repulse (he had misidentified the latter vessel, for it was actually the seaplane carrier Pegasus). The U-47 fired four torpedoes, scoring only one hit. The torpedo struck the Royal Oak on the starboard bow, causing its crew to believe a small

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internal explosion had occurred. After a shot from his stern tube also missed, Prien fired three more reload torpedoes from his bow tubes. All struck the Royal Oak amidships, and 13 minutes later, the battleship capsized. Of its crew, 833 men were lost and only 424 survived. Believing that destroyers had seen him, Prien retired quickly, reaching open water unmolested more than two hours later, after another difficult passage by a slightly different route. The British Admiralty grimly announced the sinking of Royal Oak on October 15, ironically on the same day an additional blockship ordered weeks earlier arrived at Scapa Flow to close the gap by which Prien had entered. On October 17, Prien returned in the U-47 to Wilhelmshaven and a national celebration. The Royal Oak remains at the bottom of Scapa Flow and is designated a war grave. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Battleships; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Prien, Günther.

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 1, The Hunters, 1939–1942. New York: Random House, 1996. Raven, Alan, and John Roberts. British Battleships of World War Two. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Snyder, Gerald S. The Royal Oak Disaster. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. Taylor, David. Last Dawn: The Royal Oak Tragedy at Scapa Flow. London: Argyll, 2008. Weaver, H. J. Nightmare at Scapa Flow: The Truth about the Sinking of H.M.S. Royal Oak. Peppard Common, UK: Cressrelles, 1980.

S Saalwächter, Alfred (1883–1945) German navy admiral. Born in Neusalz an der Oder in the German part of Silesia on January 20, 1883, Alfred Saalwächter entered the German navy as a cadet in April 1901. He was promoted to Leutnant zur See (equivalent to U.S. navy ensign) in September 1904 and to Oberleutnant (lieutenant junior grade) in March 1906. Following initial training, he held various seagoing assignments. Promoted to Kapitänleutnant (lieutenant) in April 1911, he served in the operations department of the admiralty staff in Berlin until 1915. In March 1915, Saalwächter became flag lieutenant of the battleship Friedrich der Grosse, flagship of the High Seas Fleet. In February 1916, he entered U-boat service. Following training, he commanded in succession U-25, U-46, and U-94 until March 1918. Remaining in the navy after the war, Saalwächter was promoted to Korvettenkapitän (lieutenant commander) in 1920. Following assignments in the naval administration, he took command of the light cruiser Amazone in 1926. Promoted to Fregattenkapitän (commander), he commanded the battleship Schlesien. Saalwächter was promoted to Kapitän zur See (captain) in October 1928 and to Konteradmiral (rear admiral) in October 1932. During 1933–1938, he was inspector for naval instruction. Promoted to Vizeadmiral (vice admiral) in April 1933 and to Admiral (full admiral) in June 1937, he assumed command of the North Sea naval station of Wilhelmshaven in October 1938. With the beginning of World War II in September 1939, Saalwächter commanded German naval operations in the North Sea. Promoted to Generaladmiral (fleet admiral) in January 1940, Saalwächter played a leading role in the planning and execution of Operation WESERÜBUNG, the German invasion of Norway. For his contribution he was awarded the Knights Cross. In the summer of 1940, he took command of Navy Group West, in which post he was responsible for directing operations of German surface units in the North Atlantic and English Channel, including Operation CERBERUS (the “Channel Dash”) in February 1942. He was replaced in September by Admiral Wilhelm Marschall. Saalwächter resigned from the navy on November 30, 1942, shortly before the remaining heavy German surface units ceased their activity in the Atlantic. Imprisoned by the Soviets in June 1945, he was convicted that October by a Soviet military tribunal of war crimes

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and was executed by firing squad in Moscow on December 6. A Russian court exonerated him in 1994. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; CERBERUS, Operation; Ciliax, Otto; Marschall, Wilhelm; WESERÜBUNG, Operation.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Doubleday, 1975. Hildebrand, Hans H., and Ernest Henriot. Deutschlands Generale und Admirale Teil 1: Deutschlands Admirale 1849–1945 Band 3. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio-Verlag, 1990. Patzwalt, Klaus D., and Veit Scherzer. Das Deutsche Kreuz 1941–1945: Geschichte und Inhaber Band II. Norderstedt, Germany: Verlag Klaus D. Patzwalt, 2001. Witthöft, Hans Jürgen. Lexikon zur Deutschen Marinegeschichte. Herford, Germany: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977.

Saint-Nazaire, Raid on (March 28, 1942) British commando raid on the French port of Saint-Nazaire on the Bay of Biscay. The port of Saint-Nazaire had one of the few dock facilities capable of accommodating the German battleship Tirpitz and was the only such facility on the French coast. The plan to raid the port was developed by Captain J. Hughes-Hallet of British Combined Operations. Known as Operation CHARIOT, it called for commandos to ram a ship loaded with explosives into the dock to demolish it while other forces landed to destroy additional port facilities. Wrecking the dry dock might prevent the Germans from sending the Tirpitz from Norway on a sortie against the Atlantic convoys because it would lack repair facilities in France. On the afternoon of March 26, 1942, the British strike force sailed from Falmouth. Commander R. E. D. Ryder had charge of the naval forces, and Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Newman commanded the landing party. The naval force consisted of the destroyer Campbeltown (the obsolete former U.S. Navy Buchanan acquired under the 1940 Destroyers-Bases Deal), 16 naval launches, a motor gun boat, and a motor torpedo boat. The Campbeltown was packed with four tons of timed explosives. Destroyers Tynedale and Atherstone provided escort. The flotilla, flying the German naval ensign and flashing German recognition signals, entered SaintNazaire harbor early on March 28, while the destroyers stood outside the port. At 1:30 a.m., the Germans, although initially fooled, opened fire with shore artillery, but the darkness hampered the accuracy of their fire. At 1:34 a.m., the Campbeltown slammed into the dry dock’s outer caisson at 18 knots. The force of the impact crushed the bow for 36 ft. and drove the ship onto

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the caisson a full 12 in. into the steel gate, while some 260 commandos poured off the Campbeltown and launches to destroy machinery, several buildings, bridges, and smaller vessels. German reinforcements arrived, and the firing soon became intense. Although three motor launches and the two escorting destroyers escaped to Britain under air cover, most of the commandos were left behind. At 10:30 a.m., high-ranking German officers and engineers were at the dry dock to inspect the damage when the explosives in the destroyer’s bow detonated. Another charge aboard the motor torpedo boat destroyed the lock gates of the SaintNazaire basin. Some 400 Germans were killed in the raid, most of them in the explosion aboard the Campbeltown. Among the dead were two of the commando officers who had refused to reveal the presence of the explosives. The British lost the motor torpedo boat, the motor gun boat, and 12 motor launches. Of 621 raiders who participated, 169 were killed and 200 captured; 5 escaped to Spain. The British had achieved their primary objective, because the Germans were unable to use the dry dock for the remainder of the war. Operation CHARIOT has been dubbed the “greatest raid of all.” Stephen Patrick Ward See also: Destroyers-Bases Deal; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Dorrian, James D. Operation Chariot: St. Nazaire Raid 1942. London: Leo Cooper, 1997. Gerrard, Howard. St. Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid. London: Osprey, 2001. McRaven, William. Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996.

Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French Seizure of (December 24, 1941) Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, island territories of France off the coast of Newfoundland with a population of fewer than 4,500 in 1941, became a cause célèbre in the winter of 1941–1942. Following the German defeat of France in June 1940, the government of the Saint-Pierre and Miquelon territory recognized the French government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain in Vichy. Although there was some Free French agitation, threats to bring in Vichy forces kept most such sentiments under control. At the same time, control over the islands was a minor issue for the governments of Canada, Britain, and the United States. Britain advocated Free French control over the territory, whereas the United States vehemently opposed any change, and Canada attempted to hold a middle ground. In 1941, increased German U-boat activity in the North Atlantic added greater weight to the matter, because it was feared that the territory’s radio station was

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broadcasting information detrimental to Allied interests. Proposals were circulated among Ottawa, London, and Washington for pressure to be brought to bear on the territorial government to transfer authority over the station, proposals that received further impetus after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Learning of the possibility that authority would be transferred, head of Free French forces in London Charles de Gaulle decided to forestall any Anglo-British action. On December 22, 1941, Vice Admiral Émile Henri Muselier, commander of the Free French Navy, departed Halifax with the three corvettes Mimosa, Alysse, and Acorit and the submarine Surcouf, then the world’s largest. Ostensibly leaving on a training exercise, Muselier instead sailed for Saint-Pierre, some 365 miles to the northeast. He arrived there in the early morning hours of December 24. Security was lax, and Muselier sent ashore a landing party of several dozen men and easily seized control of its strategic locations without a shot being fired. Muselier arrested the leaders of the Vichy government and quickly held a plebiscite on December 25 to demonstrate the wishes of the majority of the people to support the Free French. The vote was 783 in favor of Free France, 14 against, and 215 blank or null and void ballots. In Washington, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was enraged, because he believed that de Gaulle had acted with British approval and support. Although Hull was under attack from U.S. media, which was increasingly critical of what it regarded as his appeasement policies toward Vichy, Hull released an inflammatory statement calling for a return to the status quo in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon and insisting that Canada enforce the return of the territory to Vichy control. The governments of Canada, Britain, and the Free French all refused to follow the U.S. dictates. Although various plans and projects were suggested, the islands remained in Free French hands. The end result for de Gaulle, however, was less than he had hoped. He had managed to secure one of France’s territories for his cause, but, contrary to his ambitions, it did not lead to any other territories opting to follow his flag. In addition, this event exacerbated de Gaulle’s poor relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was already suspicious of his motives, and hampered de Gaulle’s later activities. Daniel M. German See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; France, Navy; Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré.

References Anglin, Douglas G. Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941. Calgary, Canada: Penny Black, 1999. Chaline, E., and P. Santarelli. Historique des forces navales françaises libres. Paris: Service Historique de la Marine, Marine Nationale, 1990. Hanna, W. “La prise de St-Pierre et Miquelon par les forces de la France Libre, Noël 1941.” Revue de l’histoire de l’Amérique française 16 (1962), pp. 369–387.

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Sakai Saburo (1916–2000) Japanese navy pilot and ace. Born on August 26, 1916, at Saga on the island of Kyushu, Sakai Saburo joined the navy in May 1933. As naval aviation pilot second class and later ensign, Sakai became one of Japan’s well-trained fighter pilots. After service in China from 1938 to 1941, Sakai fought in the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941. He then fought in the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. He was credited with 64 aerial victories, placing him fifth in Japanese aces of the war. Sakai’s most intense aerial combats were over Port Moresby, Lae, and Buna from April to July 1942. He was badly wounded over Guadalcanal on August 7. Blinded in his right eye, he was assigned to training duties. Sakai’s fellow pilots continued to fly the Mitsubishi A6M Reisen (code-named the Zero by the Allies), even as this unarmored aircraft became outgunned by newer and more powerful U.S. aircraft. Japan’s training system could not make up for pilot losses, and poorly trained pilots with insufficient hours flew obsolescent planes. Japan’s pilot situation was so desperate that Sakai reentered aerial combat at Iwo Jima in the summer of 1944. He then flew as a test pilot in Japan. His last aerial combat was an attack that downed a Boeing B-29 Superfortress on August 13, 1945. After the war, Sakai wrote his memoirs, Samurai! describing his experiences, and gave motivational lectures. He was also active in meeting with his wartime opponents. Sakai died on September 22, 2000, in Tokyo. John W. Whitman See also: DETACHMENT, Operation; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Japan, Navy; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Hata Ikuhiro and Izawa Yasuho. Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Horikoshi Jiro. Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992. Sakai Saburo. Samurai! New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957. Sakaida, Henry. Imperial Japanese Navy Aces, 1937–1945. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 1999.

Sakonji Naomasa (1890–1948) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Kagoshima City on June 6, 1890, Sakonji Naomasa graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912 and held several assignments as a communications and torpedo officer. Promoted to commander in 1930 and to

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captain in 1935, he was assigned as commanding officer of the gunnery training ship Setsu in 1936. Sakonji was then director of the Hangzhou Special Service Agency in China. At the beginning of the Pacific war, Sakonji was Japanese naval attaché in Thailand. He left that post in May 1942 as a rear admiral and was assigned command of the 16th Cruiser Squadron. Later he was chief of staff of the China Fleet. In February and March 1944, while Sakonji was commanding the 16th Cruiser Squadron, the Southwest Area Fleet carried out surface raiding operations into the Indian Ocean. Sakonji issued orders that all crews and passengers in Allied ships encountered be killed. This came about from a request of German leader Adolf Hitler, who, on January 3, 1942, had suggested to Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi that the Axis powers kill the crews of Allied ships to help counter superior Allied shipbuilding capacity. Hitler told Oshima that he had ordered his U-boat commanders to carry out this policy. Oshima relayed Hitler’s request to Tokyo, and one year later the Japanese navy Combined Fleet received oral instructions from chief of the Imperial Naval Staff Admiral Nagano Osami to execute crew members of captured ships, except those who might be able to provide useful intelligence. During the February 1944 operation, Captain Mayuzumi Haruo of the cruiser Tone sank the British merchant ship SS Behar and rescued 108 survivors, of whom 4 subsequently died. Thirty-two of the captives were disembarked at Batavia in mid-March. En route to Singapore on March 18 on board the Tone, Sakonji reprimanded Mayuzumi for not carrying out the orders of the Southeast Area Fleet to kill any survivors, whereupon 65 survivors still on board the Tone were executed. Promoted to vice admiral in October 1944, Sakonji became chief of staff of the China Area Fleet. After the war, a British military court in Hong Kong tried both Sakonji and Mayuzumi for the Behar incident. The two held that they were carrying out a direct order, but Sakonji was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed on January 21, 1948. Mayuzumi was also convicted and sentenced to seven years of hard labor at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo. Hirama Yoichi See also: Japan, Navy; Leyte Landings.

References Evans, David, ed. The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers. 2nd ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993. Krug, Hans J., and Yoichi Hirama. Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

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Sansonetti, Luigi (1888–1959) Italian navy admiral. Luigi Sansonetti was born in 1888 in Rome. He was appointed a midshipman in 1906 and earned a medal for bravery in the 1911 landings at Tripoli during the Turkish-Italian War. In the 1920s, he acquired a reputation as an organizer and was promoted to captain in 1934. In autumn 1936, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the navy’s chief of staff, chose Sansonetti as his deputy after Sasonetti demonstrated an exceptional ability to resolve complex political, strategic, and tactical problems while commanding the cruiser Fiume during the Spanish Civil War. Sansonetti was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. In June 1939, Sansonetti accompanied Admiral Cavagnari to Germany for the first meeting between the top commands of the Regia Marina and the German navy. However, in August 1939, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini appointed Admiral Odoardo Somigli deputy chief of staff over Cavagnari’s objections. As compensation, Sansonetti received command of the VII (light cruiser) Division, and he led this force at the Battle of Calabria, firing the opening salvos of the action. In December 1940, Sansonetti took command of the III (heavy cruiser) Division. On March 28, 1941, he fought in the Gavdos action, aggressively ignoring fleet commander Admiral Angelo Iachino’s instructions to break off his pursuit of a British cruiser squadron. According to his critics, this action compromised the timetable of the entire operation by 50 minutes. However, Iachino never openly criticized Sansonetti’s decision. The position of deputy chief of staff opened up again in the aftermath of Italy’s Cape Matapan defeat, and Sansonetti received this position on July 15, 1941. A better organizer than his predecessor, Inigo Campioni, and a fine diplomat, Sansonetti was able to manage both the Germans and Iachino, who was his senior and had aspired to that same position. Because he exercised operational control at Italian naval headquarters, Sansonetti determined the course of his nation’s effort at sea between July 1941 and September 1943. By spring 1943, he had come under criticism from the younger admirals and officers for a lack of aggressiveness, a trait which Sansonetti’s supporters preferred to consider a cool strategic vision. When Admiral Raffaele de Courten become the new chief of staff in July 1943, he stated he had different ideas, but he retained Sansonetti as his deputy because it was not time for shake-ups in the command, given the change in government and the national crisis sparked by the pending Allied invasion; moreover, there was no other man available with such a complete understanding of the central command’s structure and operations. Following the armistice and the disintegration of Italy’s army and air force, Sansonetti remained in Rome and kept the Supermarina in operation despite the chaos, while de Courten accompanied King Victor Emmanuel III in his flight across the

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peninsula. On September 9, against de Courten’s prior instructions, Sansonetti ordered the battle fleet to sail to an Allied port instead of La Maddalena, after the German attack against that base. He also ordered the squadron at Taranto to Malta when it appeared that German forces were threatening that Italian naval base. After Rome fell to the Germans, Supermarina had to shut down. Sansonetti evaded capture, and, after a 23-day cross-country trek, he made it to Allied lines. He recovered his position, but it was clear that de Courten would have preferred the fleet to scuttle rather than regroup in Allied controlled ports. On April 19, 1944, Sansonetti was relieved and became the president of the admiral’s council, a prestigious but powerless position usually reserved for retired admirals. Sansonetti left the navy in 1951 and died on November 7, 1959, the result of a horseback riding accident. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cavagnari, Domenico; de Courten, Raffaele; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy.

References Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Sansonetti. Vito. “Storia navale e ammiragli.” Rivista Marittima (August/September 1990; November 1990), pp. 113–120, 122. Sansonetti. Vito. “Un valoroso ammiraglio e un recente libro di storia navale.” Rivista Marittima (July 1990), pp. 111–112.

Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the (October 26–27, 1942) Important carrier battle off the Santa Cruz Islands between the United States and Japan. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands was the fourth in a series of sea battles for control of the Solomon Islands. Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal were fighting to regain Henderson Field, and Japanese naval forces sought to establish air supremacy there. The battle occurred off the Santa Cruz Islands some 250 miles east of the Solomons. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey commanded U.S. South Pacific Forces; Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid had operational command of the Hornet and Enterprise, the only two U.S. aircraft carriers left in the Pacific theater. Vice Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake’s task force, centered on carriers Sho¯kaku, Zuiho¯, Junyo¯, and Zuikaku, sought to gain air superiority over Guadalcanal, assisting Japanese land forces in retaking Henderson Field.


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Japanese aircraft prepare to take off from an aircraft carrier, probably the Shokaku, on the morning of October 26, 1942, during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. (Naval Historical Center)

On October 26, Halsey moved to block the Japanese advance. Halsey initiated the battle when he ordered U.S. naval units to search for the Japanese. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted the Japanese first, and, at 7:40 a.m., dive-bombers from the Enterprise damaged the light Japanese carrier Zuiho¯ . Japan countered with 62 Kate torpedo planes from Sho¯ kaku and 21 Zero fighters from Zuikaku and Zuiho¯. At 7:45 a.m., Kinkaid sent out another force of 19 Wildcat fighters, 29 Dauntless SBD dive bombers, and 25 Avenger TBF torpedo bombers. The two strike forces spotted one another while heading toward their respective targets. Zeros attacked the Enterprise strike force and destroyed eight U.S. planes without loss. After this brief fight, the Japanese aircraft continued toward the U.S. carriers. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Hornet’s combat air patrol had been vectored to the wrong location. Japanese torpedo planes and dive-bombers attacked the Hornet simultaneously. The carrier absorbed four bombs, two torpedoes, and a Japanese plane that crashed through the flight deck, whereon two of its bombs detonated. The Hornet was left dead in the water. Thirty-eight of 53 Japanese aircraft were shot down. On the other hand, U.S. aircraft hit Sho¯ kaku, forcing it out of the fight, and nearly hit Zuikaku. The U.S. planes also damaged the Japanese navy heavy cruiser Tone. The Hornet’s second wave of aircraft attacked the heavy cruiser Chikuma and killed many of its crew at their antiaircraft stations. The second Japanese strike from the Zuikaku, divided because the Kate torpedo planes had to rearm, attacked the destroyer Porter at 10:00 a.m., leaving it dead in the water. The Japanese planes then

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struck the carrier Enterprise, which had escaped the first attack. At 10:17 a.m., four Japanese bombs hit the Enterprise’s port bow and forward elevator. Thirty minutes later, the second part of the strike force struck the Enterprise again, with minimal success because of deadly antiaircraft fire, much of it from the battleship South Dakota. Japanese planes also struck the cruiser San Juan, but it sustained little damage. Twenty-four of 44 aircraft in the two Japanese strike units were shot down. By the end of the day, the Hornet lay dead in the water, and the Enterprise was out of action. Halsey now ordered a withdrawal to preserve the Enterprise, and Kondo¯ pursued. The Hornet was under tow at 2:55 p.m. when Junyo’s second strike wave of Kates attacked and severely damaged it. Kinkaid ordered the ship scuttled. Despite eight U.S. torpedo hits, the carrier was still afloat when two Japanese destroyers finally sank it with Long Lance torpedoes at 1:35 a.m. on October 27. Kondo¯ then called off the pursuit. During the withdrawal, U.S. planes hit both the Japanese destroyer Teruzuki and the carrier Junyo¯. The destroyer Mahan was another casualty of the battle. It collided with the battleship South Dakota and had to go to a dockyard. Kondo¯ might have achieved a more decisive victory had he continued the pursuit, because Halsey probably would have been forced to stand and fight to protect the damaged Enterprise. During the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese lost 99 aircraft. Sixty-eight pilots and 77 crewmen were killed. Aircrew losses continued to affect Japan, which, unlike the United States, had no effective pilot replacement system. Zuikaku, Zuiho¯, and Chikuma were all out of action for many weeks. On the other hand, the United States lost the Hornet and the destroyer Porter (torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, probably the I-21), and the Enterprise was damaged, although it continued limited service off Guadalcanal while undergoing repairs. Eighty U.S. aircraft, 18 pilots, and 8 crewmen were lost. Although on paper the Battle of Santa Cruz was a defeat for the United States, it prevented the Japanese from disrupting U.S. land operations on Guadalcanal. Alexander D. Samms See also: Aircraft Carriers; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Southeast Pacific Theater.

References Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal: The Carrier Battles. The Pivotal Aircraft Carrier Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. New York: Crown Publishers, 1987. Hammer, David J. Bombers versus Battleships: The Struggle between Ships and Aircraft for the Control of the Surface of the Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Lundstrom, John B. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Savo Island, Battle of

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Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

Savo Island, Battle of (August 9, 1942) Naval battle in the long struggle between Japan and the United States for control of the Solomon Islands. On August 7, 1942, to protect the lines of communication between the United States and Australia, U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal and captured a nearly complete Japanese airfield. U.S. vice admiral Frank Jack Fletcher commanded the landing support force. It included the aircraft carriers Saratoga, Wasp, and Enterprise; the battleship North Carolina; 5 heavy cruisers; 1 light cruiser; 16 destroyers; and 3 oilers. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner had command of the amphibious force of some 75 transports and support vessels. On the evening of August 8, claiming inadequate fuel, Fletcher withdrew his carriers. Two days of air operations had also reduced his air strength by 21 percent, but the principal reason for the decision was that Fletcher feared the loss of his carriers in the restricted waters surrounding Guadalcanal. British rear admiral Victor Crutchley commanded the screening force of cruisers and destroyers. Crutchley deployed his ships in four main groups on the night of August 8–9 to protect the transports. The U.S. cruiser Chicago and destroyers Bagley and Patterson, along with the Australian cruisers Australia and Canberra, patrolled the area south of Savo Island. The U.S. cruisers Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy and the destroyers Helm and Wilson patrolled east of Savo Island. The U.S. cruiser San Juan, destroyers Monssen and Buchanan, and the Australian cruiser Hobart patrolled between Guadalcanal and Florida Island. A final group, mostly destroyers, remained near the transports. Finally, the U.S. destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot individually acted as pickets seaward of Savo Island. Within hours of the U.S. landings on August 7, Japanese vice admiral Mikawa Gunichi sailed from Rabaul with the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa along with the light cruisers Yubari and Tenryu and the destroyer Yunagi. He planned to contest the Allies and attempt to destroy the transports at the landing site. At 10:45 p.m. on August 8, Turner called a meeting to discuss the withdrawal of Fletcher’s carriers. Crutchley sailed to the meeting in the Australia, signaling Captain Howard D. Bode of the Chicago that he had tactical command. Bode never received the message. Shortly after midnight, the Japanese superior ability in night operations was confirmed when Mikawa’s force slipped past the U.S. destroyer pickets undetected. The Japanese then attacked at high speed and in column. At 1:40 a.m., the Patterson was struck by a shell, opening the battle. Over three minutes, the Canberra

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absorbed 24 large-caliber shells and two torpedo hits and was put out of the action without firing a shot. The ship sank the next day. The Chicago was next. A torpedo struck its bow, and a shell hit the foremast. Confused as to his position, Bode ordered the Chicago away from the Japanese. Unintentionally, the Japanese then divided into two nearly equally strong formations. Both attacked the Vincennes group. In 22 minutes, all three U.S. cruisers were out of action, and by the next day all had sunk. Over the course of the battle, the Japanese also damaged the destroyer Ralph Talbot. The destroyer Jarvis, which had been damaged the preceding day in an air attack, sustained further punishment. Japanese planes sank it on August 9 as it limped to Australia for repairs. At 2:40 a.m., Mikawa withdrew without attacking the transports at the landing site, which would have had a much more decisive impact on the battle for Guadalcanal. Mikawa feared reprisals from Allied aircraft, not knowing that Fletcher had already departed. In only half an hour, the Allies lost four heavy cruisers and one destroyer. Three other ships were heavily damaged; 1,023 men were dead and another 709 wounded. The Japanese ships suffered some 10 shell hits, 38 dead, and 33 wounded. The only major Japanese loss came on the return, when the U.S. submarine S-38 torpedoed and sank the Kako as it was about to enter Kavieng harbor. The Allied disaster in the Battle of Savo Island was due to several causes. First, the Allies ignored reports from an Australian patrol plane that had spotted Mikawa’s group on August 8 and other intelligence indicating a Japanese response to the landings. Furthermore, Crutchley issued patrol plans leaving great gaps that radar could not cover in the restricted waters around Savo Island. Additionally, there was a lack of communication among the Allied ships. Each group was unaware of the location of the others. Allied sailors were also exhausted after two days at general quarters. In contrast, Mikawa concentrated his forces. Japanese sailors were fresh and superbly trained in night-fighting techniques. There were multiple inquiries into the disaster, but none laid the blame on any one individual. Scrutiny fell on Bode, but he was not punished. Nevertheless, he committed suicide in 1943. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz summed up the defeat succinctly when he attributed it to “lack of battle mindedness.” Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison called it “probably the worst defeat ever inflicted on the United States Navy in a fair fight.” Rodney Madison See also: Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Mikawa Gunichi; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Turner, Richmond Kelly.

Scapa Flow

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References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Loxton, Bruce, with Chris Coulthard-Clark. The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Lundstrom, John B. Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner. Disaster in the Pacific: New Light on the Battle of Savo Island. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Scapa Flow The main base of the British Home Fleet in World War II. Located in the Orkney Islands off northern Scotland, Scapa Flow is one of the great natural harbors/ anchorages in the world. Sheltered by Mainland, Graemsay, Burray, South Ronaldsay, and Hoy islands, it encompasses almost seven square miles of water with depths suitable for the anchoring of large ships. The British Royal Navy first used and fortified the site as an anchorage in 1812 during the Napoleonic Wars for basing warships to protect merchant ships subject to attack by French privateers. In 1905, the Admiralty became interested in Scapa Flow as a base for the Home Fleet, and during World War I, it was home to both the British Grand Fleet and the Northern Patrol enforcing the naval blockade of Germany. Scapa Flow was the base for the Home Fleet during World War II because it was geographically well suited for warships protecting the Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union as well as for closing the entrance to the North Sea. Additionally, a naval base built during World War I to service warships existed at Lyness on the island of Hoy. The British expanded this facility during the war to store up to 100,000 tons of oil for the fleet. Depot ships anchored in Scapa Flow also supplemented supplies provided from ashore. The anchorage lacked adequate defense against aerial or submarine attack at the outbreak of the war, and the October 14, 1939, sinking of the British battleship Royal Oak by a German submarine led to efforts to increase the defenses. Among these was the construction of what became known as the Churchill Barriers—four causeways that closed Kirk Sound, Skerry Sound, Water Sound, and East Weddel Sound and formed the eastern approaches to Scapa Flow—to render penetration by German submarines of the main anchorage more difficult. While not complete until almost the end of the war, these barriers broke the surface of the water in 1942,

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thus sealing approaches to Scapa Flow. The British employed some 1,200 Italian prisoners of war in the construction of the causeways, technically a breach of the Geneva Convention that banned the use of prisoners of war in labor associated with a country’s war effort. Buttressing the defense of the anchorage were booms, trawlers for minesweeping duty, and antisubmarine vessels. To protect against air attack, the British added 25 antiaircraft guns, radar facilities, and barrage balloons. Finally, the British extended defensive works on the island that housed gun emplacements to guard the anchorage and port facility. Scapa Flow remained in use as a base for the British Royal Navy until its closure in 1956. Eric W. Osborne See also: Great Britain, Navy; Royal Oak, HMS, Sinking of.

References Konstam, Angus. Scapa Flow: The Defenses of Britain’s Great Fleet Anchorage, 1914– 1945. London: Osprey, 2009. Lavery, Brian. Churchill’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1939–1945. London: Conway Maritime, 2006.

Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships A class of two battleships built for the German navy in the late 1930s. Originally conceived as a more heavily armored Deutschland class, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau quickly became political footballs in a game of technological oneupsmanship. German chancellor Adolf Hitler wanted each ship to have the same armament and speed as the Deutschland class but to carry more armor, giving a displacement of 19,000 tons. The Kriegsmarine argued for a third 11-inch triple turret to increase the displacement to 26,000 tons. At first, Hitler refused because of Versailles Treaty limitations, but he later acquiesced. Then it was learned the new French Dunkerque-class ships were to mount 15-inch guns, and Hitler promptly ordered the Scharnhorst class to be equipped with the same size guns. Because the 11-inch triple turret was available and development of the 15-inch was several years away, the ships were built with 11-inch turrets with the understanding that these would be replaced with the higher caliber later. As built, each ship displaced 34,841 tons standard load and 38,900 tons deep load. Measuring 753 ft. 11 in. in overall length, they had a beam of 98 ft. 5 in. Three propellers drove each ship at 32 knots. Armor protection varied from 13.75 to 6.75 in. on the belt and 14 to 6 in. on the main turrets to 3 in. on the deck. Main armament consisted of 9 283-mm (11.1-inch) guns. Secondary armament included

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12 150-mm (5.9-inch), 14 105-mm, and 16 37-mm guns. The ships also each had 8 20-mm antiaircraft guns and carried three to four aircraft. Their wartime complement varied between 1,669 and 1,840 men. During the winter of 1938–1939, each ship was refitted with an “Atlantic bow” with greater sheer and flare to counteract their tendency to take water and spray forward when under way. Both also received additional antiaircraft armament during the war: the Scharnhorst received 24 20-mm guns and Gneisenau received 12 20-mm. The Scharnhorst was also later fitted with 6 533-mm torpedo tubes taken off the light cruiser Nürnberg. The Scharnhorst was laid down at Wilhelmshaven Dockyards in May 1935, launched in June 1936, and commissioned on January 7, 1939. It took part in the April 1940 invasion of Norway, where it was damaged. Nonetheless, it and the Gneisenau sank the British carrier Glorious the next month. In February 1942, the two German ships escaped from Brest, France, in the famous “Channel Dash”) through the English Channel, but the Scharnhorst was damaged en route. The Scharnhorst was sunk on its way to attack an Arctic convoy on December 26, 1943, by the British battleship Duke of York and the cruisers Belfast, Jamaica, and Norfolk. All but 36 of its 1,900-man crew perished in the battle. The wreck was discovered in September 2000. The Gneisenau was laid down at the Deutsche Werke yards at Kiel in May 1935, launched in December 1936, and commissioned on May 21, 1938. Hit with the Scharnhorst in a Royal Air Force attack on Brest, France, it reached Kiel without incident, but was badly damaged in another air raid and was moved to Gdynia (Gdansk, Poland). Decommissioned in July 1942, its main armament was taken for coastal batteries: three guns being installed near the Hook of Holland and six in Norway. The 150-mm secondary armament saw similar service. The Gneisenau was scuttled at Gdynia as a blockship in March 1945. It was broken up by a Polish company during 1947–1951. Walter W. Jaffee See also: ALPHABET, Operation; CERBERUS, Operation; Courageous Class, British Aircraft Carriers; Germany, Navy; North Cape, Battle of.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Kemp, Peter. The Escape of the Scharnhorst and Genisenau. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975. Koop, Gerard. Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Ogden, Michael. The Battle of North Cape. London: William Kimber, 1962. Winton, John. The Death of the Scharnhorst. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983.

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Schepke, Joachim (1912–1941) German navy officer and submarine commander. Born on March 8, 1912, in Flensburg, Germany, Joachim Schepke entered the German navy in 1930. As a junior lieutenant, he commanded the Type II coastal submarines U-3 and U-19 before he assumed command of the U-100, a Type VIIC oceangoing submarine, on May 30, 1940. On the evening of September 21, 1940, Schepke attacked the 41-ship Allied convoy HX.72 and succeeded in sinking seven ships with a total of 50,340 gross register tonnage within only four hours, earning him the Knights Cross. Schepke further distinguished himself in convoy battles against SC.7 and SC.11. From the latter convoy, he sank seven ships within 13 hours. For these successes, he was awarded the Oak Leaves. During a wolf pack night attack on March 17, 1941, comprising the U-37, U-74, U-99 (Lieutenant Otto Kretschmer), U-100, and U-110 against convoy HX.112, Schepke’s boat suffered depth charging by Royal Navy destroyers Walker and Vanoc. The U-100 escaped, but Vanoc used its newly installed Type 286 M radar to detect the boat on the surface at a range of some 1,000 yards. The destroyer rammed and sank U-100, killing Schepke and most of his crew. It was the first recorded sinking of a U-boat attributed to radar detection. Schepke has been credited with sinking 37 ships totaling 145,842 gross register tonnage. Dirk Steffen See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm; Radar; Submarines; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Kurowski, Franz. Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes der U-Bootwaffe 1939–1945 (The U-boat Arm’s Holders of the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross 1939– 1945). Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas, 1987. Rohwer, Jürgen, and G. Hümmelchen. Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Showell, Jak Mallmann. The U-boat Century: German Submarine Warfare, 1906–2006. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Seabees U.S. Navy Construction Battalions. Organized during the opening days of U.S. involvement in the war, the Seabees built the infrastructure that enabled the navy to extend its operations globally during World War II. Seabees turned the jungles

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of the Pacific islands into the docks and air bases that allowed the United States to carry out its island-hopping and leapfrogging strategies and to conduct the strategic bombing of Japan. As U.S. involvement in the war approached in 1941, Rear Admiral Ben Moreell saw that the continued construction of overseas bases, which would be essential to the United States in the event of war with Japan, would be in jeopardy because the civilian crews, which were prohibited from carrying weapons by international law, were at risk from enemy attack. As a solution, he advocated institution of an organization composed of skilled construction laborers who were naval personnel. After the labor unions protested that these battalions would take work away from civilian construction workers, Moreell agreed that his units would only serve overseas, leaving stateside construction for civilian contractors. On January 2, 1942, Congress authorized the organization of Naval Construction Battalions, the nickname Seabee being derived from the initials C and B. The Seabee symbol was a flying fighting bee wearing a sailor cap and carrying a machine gun, wrench, and hammer. The slogan of the Seabees was Construimus, Batiumus (we build, we fight).

African American Seabees, members of the U.S. Naval Construction Battalions, circa 1942. Seabees played an important role in the Pacific theater during World War II, constructing airstrips, bridges, roads, and buildings. (National Archives)

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In a change from other navy units, Seabees were commanded by officers of the Civil Engineering Corps who were trained for construction work. The 250,000 men and 8,000 officers who became Seabees were the men who had built U.S. subways and skyscrapers. Seabees were recruited based on their civilian skills and experience in more than 60 skilled trades. Because experience was the key factor, normal physical standards applied to fighting men were relaxed. Seabees ranged in age from 18 to 50, with the average being 37. There were reports that some Seabees were as old as 60. Seabees also received higher pay than the average enlisted man; their pay was equivalent at least to that of petty officers. Because their primary mission was to build, not fight, the Seabees spent only three weeks at boot camp and received only basic small-arms training. Seabees served in all the war theaters and took part in most of the major operations, but the majority of them served in the South Pacific theater. They built new naval bases and additions to existing ones, docks, staging facilities, warehouses, hospitals, roads, and airstrips. Aided by such innovations as Marston mats, Quonset huts, and prefabricated buildings, Seabee units were able to construct large air bases in a matter of days. Special battalions were also organized, known as Seabee Special Battalions. The first Seabee Special Battalion was composed of enlisted men trained as stevedores and longshoremen to unload the ships in combat zones. Among other units were those that maintained the bases, repaired tires, built pontoon bridges, drove trucks, and handled the transportation and storage of fuel. Although they were not organized as a fighting unit, individual Seabees received 33 Silver Stars and 5 Navy Crosses during the war. Pamela Feltus See also: Gilbert Islands Campaign; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Moreell, Ben; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Two-Ocean Navy Program; United States, Navy.

References Castillo, Edmund L. Seabees of World War II. New York: Random House, 1963. Huie, William Bradford. Can Do! The Story of the Seabees. Annaplis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Kimmel, Jay. U.S. Navy Seabees: Since Pearl Harbor. Portland, OR: Cory Stevens, 1995.

SEA LION, Operation (Unternehmen SEELÖWE, 1940) German plan for an invasion of Britain. As early as November 1939, the commander of the German navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, had ordered a study

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of the feasibility of a landing in Britain. The study was to detail the problems the small German navy would confront in conducting an invasion in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy. Following the successful German occupation of Norway and the progress of the German army against France, Raeder ordered a second study and presented the results to a surprised Adolf Hitler on June 4, 1940. The führer had not yet considered the invasion of England as a possibility. Raeder’s purpose in this case, unlike his energetic promotion of the occupation of Norway (Operation WESER), was to forestall any attempt by others to influence Hitler for a rash descent on Britain. The Naval Command still had reservations against an invasion, especially after heavy losses in the Norwegian Campaign, and Raeder continued to argue that the primary focus should remain on the surface, air, and U-boat campaign against Britain’s maritime supply lines. Even with Germany’s improved geographic position as a consequence of its acquisition of the French Atlantic and English Channel ports, available sealift transport and landing craft were both lacking. With the defeat of France, Hitler still held to his idea that the British would see reason and be forced to the peace table. He also feared that a total defeat of England would benefit the United States and Japan. The failure of London to respond to Hitler’s peace feelers, however, led him to issue a directive on July 2, 1940, to initiate immediate preparations for an invasion. On July 16, Hitler issued Directive 16, “On Preparation for a Landing Operation against England,” which placed the navy primarily in a transport role. The key precondition for Operation SEA LION, as the invasion of Britain was to be known, projected for September 15, 1940, was German air superiority. The German army’s demand for a broad-front landing caused an intense debate with naval leaders, who preferred a narrow-front approach. Both services vigorously sought to persuade Hitler to support their proposal. Initially, the army won support for its plans, but a compromise was eventually reached on August 26. The army also had no real enthusiasm for an enterprise that, as Raeder lectured them, was not another river crossing. In its planning, the navy estimated that convoying 13 divisions in the initial assault wave against Britain would require 155 transports and more than 3,000 smaller craft: 1,720 barges, 470 tugs, and 1,160 motorboats. Conflicting interests and rivalries prevented any real collaboration among the army, navy, and air force. The massive preparations undertaken by the navy to assemble the necessary landing craft have been well documented and indicate that the navy did its best to comply with the führer’s decision. However, the debate still lingers as to whether SEA LION (Unternehmen SEELÖWE in German) was simply a propaganda ploy and a diversion for other military operations, especially as Hitler was already contemplating an invasion of the Soviet Union. Certainly, Raeder was skeptical, and he persistently pointed out the impact of the invasion preparations on the navy and

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maritime transportation, as well as the risks of mounting an operation and supplying an invasion force of at least 40 divisions in waters controlled by the enemy. For Raeder, SEA LION remained a last resort, but he loyally continued preparations. Even as he began to sense Hitler’s equivocation over SEA LION, Raeder spoke positively of the chances for a successful landing. On August 1, 1940, a Hitler directive ordered the Luftwaffe to switch its preinvasion tactics to a strategic air offensive and to be prepared to switch targets at any time if a new invasion date was set. The failure of the Luftwaffe to control the skies over Britain and the approach of bad weather resulted in the decision to indefinitely postpone the invasion. On October 12, SEA LION was definitively deferred until the spring of 1941. Until 1942, it continued to serve as a deception. For Hitler, SEA LION became a means of psychological warfare. Raeder continued to report on the navy’s ongoing planning efforts (e.g., the development of new landing craft), but, as he later reflected, these had been to no effect and had needlessly tied up resources. Yet SEA LION had allowed Raeder to keep the navy and its needs in front of the führer. If the navy’s grand building plans in the aftermath of a defeat of the Soviet Union had been successful, no direct attack on Britain would have been necessary. Keith W. Bird See also: Convoys, Allied; Germany, Navy; Raeder, Erich.

References Ansel, Walter. Hitler Confronts England. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960. Haining, Peter. Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940. London: Robson, 2004. Kiesler, Egbert. Hitler on the Doorstep: Operation “Sea Lion”: The German Plan to Invade Britain, 1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Salewski, Michael. Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung: 1939–1945, Bd. I. 1935–1941. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Bernard and Graefe, 1970.

Sfax, Action off (April 16, 1941) Mediterranean Sea naval action between units of the Italian and British navies. The action resulted from the first nocturnal interception and destruction of an Italianescorted convoy to Africa by British surface forces. Faced by an Axis advance toward Egypt and under pressure from London to stop the flow of supplies to Africa, the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, ordered the 14th Destroyer Flotilla of the Jervis, Janus, Nubian, and Mohawk under

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Captain P. J. Mack to reinforce the submarines and aircraft operating from Malta against Axis traffic. The flotilla arrived on April 11, the same day Axis troops laid siege to the port of Tobruk in Libya. The flotilla’s first two sorties were unproductive, but on April 13, a convoy of four German transports and one Italian transport departed Naples for Tripoli escorted by the Italian 8th Destroyer Squadron under Captain Pietro De Cristofaro. It consisted of the Tarigo, Baleno, and Lampo. A Malta-based aircraft sighted the convoy on the morning of April 15, and the British destroyers weighed anchor that evening. Heavy winds scattered the Axis convoy, and it had fallen four hours behind schedule by the time it regrouped off Cape Bon, Tunisia at 10:00 p.m. on April 15. The British were searching along the convoy’s estimated track and nearly missed it due to the delay, but at 1:58 a.m. on April 16, lookouts aboard the Jervis reported shadows six miles ahead. The wind was gusting at 40 mph and the air was heavy with dust blowing off the continent. While the British maneuvered to position the quarter moon behind the Axis ships, Italian and German lookouts saw nothing of the menace approaching from astern. When it opened fire at 2:20 a.m., the Jervis was a mere 2,400 yards off the starboard quarter of the Baleno, the rear escort. Salvos from the Jervis and Janis quickly disabled the Baleno, the crew of which thought their ship was under air attack. Then the rear British destroyers, the Nubian and Mohawk, pushed up the convoy’s starboard side, while the other two swung up the port side. The Tarigo, which had been in the lead, reversed course as ships blazed up behind it. At 2:35 a.m., the Nubian spotted the Tarigo as it emerged from the smoke, and the two ships traded salvos from a thousand yards as they passed The Tarigo attracted the fire of the other British destroyers, and at 2:40 a.m., the Jervis hit the Italian warship with a torpedo. As the Italian flagship went dead in the water, the British destroyers returned to their execution of the transports. Suddenly a torpedo struck the Mohawk, blowing away the ship’s aft section; an enterprising ensign aboard the Tarigo had manually aimed and fired the torpedo just a minute before. At 2:53 a.m., another torpedo struck the Mohawk, and the large British destroyer began to settle. The Lampo, located on the convoy’s far side, was last to enter the action, ineffectively attacking the Nubian with guns and torpedoes. The Nubian’s reply inflicted serious damage on the Lampo, which eventually grounded on Kerkenah Bank to keep from foundering. After dispatching the Lampo, the Nubian chased down the last transport, which was fleeing southeast, and set it ablaze. Two transports eventually joined the Lampo grounded on the banks, while the Tarigo and the other three transports sank outright. The Baleno capsized on the morning of April 17.

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In this debacle, the Axis lost 1,700 men, 300 vehicles, and 3,500 tons of supplies. The British lost the Mohawk; the other three destroyers suffered only slight splinter damage. The Axis convoys continued, however. Two arrived in Tripoli without loss four days later, and Italian naval headquarters regarded the destruction of the Tarigo convoy as an anomaly based upon lucky air reconnaissance. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Page, Christopher, ed. Naval Staff Histories. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 2, November 1940–December 1941. London: Frank Cass, 2002. “Report of an Action against an Italian Convoy on the Night of the 15th/16th April, 1941.” London Gazette Supplement (May 12, 1948).

Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896–1951) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Merrimack, New Hampshire, on October 30, 1896, Forrest Percival Sherman graduated second in his class in 1917 from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. From then onward, he won a reputation as a brilliant, cerebral tactician and skilled mediator. In 1922, he became a naval aviator, and his subsequent career assignments focused heavily on aviation. In 1932, he commanded Fighting Squadron 1 aboard the aircraft carrier Saratoga. From 1933 to 1936, he was director of the Board of Ordnance’s Aviation Ordnance Section, and from 1937 to 1940, he was aviation officer of the U.S. Fleet. In 1940, Sherman joined the War Plans Division, drafting plans for hemispheric defense, serving on the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and attending the August 1941 Atlantic Charter conference. Promoted to captain, in May 1942 Sherman assumed command of the aircraft carrier Wasp, but he lost his ship to the Japanese submarine I-19 on September 15, 1942, during the Battle of Guadalcanal, winning the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism. Sherman then spent a year at Pearl Harbor as chief of staff to Vice Admiral John H. Towers, commander of the Pacific Fleet’s air elements. His talent for staff work, including operational planning, force deployment, and logistical support, caused Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander U.S. Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, to appoint Sherman his planning officer as a rear admiral. As deputy chief of staff

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(plans), Sherman devised and implemented much of Nimitz’s strategy in the Pacific theater, including which specific islands would be attacked or bypassed. He also sometimes represented Nimitz, always ably, before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He stood beside Nimitz and Admiral William Halsey at the Japanese surrender ceremonies of September 1945. Returning to Washington, Sherman was promoted to vice admiral in December 1945. As deputy chief of naval operations, he became heavily involved in formulating both unification of the armed forces and Cold War strategy. After emphasizing to President Harry S. Truman the potential Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, an important influence in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine of February 1947, Sherman became the first commander of the new U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean. In November 1949, Sherman became chief of naval operations as a full admiral. Sherman supported U.S. intervention in the Korean War in 1950 and proposed the successful naval blockade of North Korea. He also gave cautious approval to the September 15, 1950, Inchon Landing and backed Truman in his relief of general of the army Douglas MacArthur and the primacy of Europe in U.S. defense planning. While on a diplomatic assignment to Naples, Italy, Sherman suffered a fatal heart attack on July 22, 1951. Priscilla Roberts See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Towers, John Henry; United States, Navy.

References Barlow, Jeffrey G. Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968. Reynolds, Clark G. “Forrest Percival Sherman, November 2, 1949–July 22, 1951.” In The Chiefs of Naval Operations, edited by Robert W. Love Jr. (pp. 209–232). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.

Sherman, Frederick Carl (1888–1957) U.S. navy admiral and aircraft carrier commander. Born in Port Huron, Michigan, on May 27, 1888, Frederick Carl Sherman graduated from the U.S. Naval

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Academy, Annapolis, in 1910 and was commissioned an ensign in 1912. Before World War II, he served on battleships and submarines, and during the war, he commanded a submarine on Atlantic seaboard patrols. After the war, Sherman rotated between shore and sea assignments, including two stints as a student at the Naval War College. In 1936, he qualified as a naval aviator, and by the time he took command of the aircraft carrier Lexington in 1940, Sherman had become an ardent proponent of naval air power. Shortly after the United States entered World War II, Sherman’s pilots carried out raids against Japanese bases on New Britain Island and New Guinea. Sherman was promoted to rear admiral in April 1942. In the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, his forces sank the Japanese light aircraft carrier Shoho, although damage from Japanese bombs forced Sherman to scuttle the Lexington. Later that year, Sherman was appointed commander of Task Force 16, and in 1943 he headed Carrier Division 2. In these posts, Sherman participated in operations in the South and Central Pacific theaters, helping to neutralize Japanese air power in these areas, sinking or damaging many enemy ships, and earning a reputation as an aggressive leader and a skilled tactician. As with other air admirals, he believed that naval air forces, organized into multicarrier task forces, were the key to victory in the Pacific war, and at one point he urged that aviators should be in command of all task forces that included carriers. Following assignment in the United States from March to August 1944 for a rest, Sherman became commander of Task Group 38.3/58.3 and took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, supporting the landings on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and engaging in raids against Japan. Shortly before the end of the war, Sherman was promoted to vice admiral and given command of the 1st Fast Carrier Task Force and Task Force 58. In January 1946, Sherman was named commander of the Fifth Fleet, his final post before retiring from the navy in March 1947. Sherman died in San Diego, California, on July 27, 1957. John Kennedy Ohl See also: Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; DETACHMENT, Operation; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Reynolds, Clark. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. New York: McGrawHill, 1968. Sherman, Frederick C. Combat Command: The American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War. New York: Dutton, 1950.

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Vego, Milan N. Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Shimada Shigetaro (1883–1976) Japanese navy admiral, minister of the navy, and chief of the navy General Staff. Born in Tokyo on September 24, 1883, Shimada Shigetaro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904 and participated in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following the war, he entered the gunnery school and became a gunnery officer. From 1916 to 1919, Shimada was in Italy, first as a resident officer, then as assistant attaché, and later as attaché. In 1904, Shimada joined the navy General Staff and became an instructor at the Naval War College. Promoted to captain in 1928, he commanded first the cruiser Tama and then the battleship Hiei (1928). Following promotion to rear admiral in 1929, Shimada became chief of staff of the Second Fleet and then chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1930. In 1931, he became the director of the Submarine School, and in 1932, he was chief of staff of the Third Fleet. He next held various posts on the navy General Staff. Promoted to vice admiral in 1934, Shimada became the deputy chief of the Naval Staff until he was assigned as commander of the Second Fleet in 1937. Promoted to admiral in 1940, Shimada became the commander in chief of the China Fleet, and later he served as the commander in chief of the Kure and Yokosuka Naval Districts. In October 1941, Shimada became minister of the navy in the cabinet of Prime Minister To¯jo¯ Hideki, who had rejected the first candidate, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, who was known to be “anti-army.” Shimada owed his appointment to his ability to get along with those around him. Although he shared the navy’s reluctance to go to war against the United States, he found that it was impossible to swim against the tide and followed To¯jo¯’s policies. In February 1944, Shimada assumed the office of chief of the navy General Staff, tasked with To¯jo¯’s demand to conduct the war at sea more effectively. From that date, Shimada concurrently held the offices of minister of the navy and chief of the navy General Staff. Navy and intellectual circles denigrated him, whispering that “Shimada is To¯jo¯’s puppet.” Following the loss of Saipan, in July 1944 To¯jo¯ reluctantly ordered Shimada to resign before resigning himself. In January 1945, Shimada went on the reserve list. After the war, Shimada was arrested by Allied authorities as a Class A war criminal. Tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, he was sentenced to life in prison, but he was released in 1956. Shimada died in Tokyo on June 7, 1976. Asakawa Michio See also: Japan, Navy; Nagano Osami; Toyoda Soemu.

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References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Shinano, Japanese Aircraft Carrier Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier and the largest carrier ever built until the U.S. Navy’s Forrestal class of the 1950s. Third in the projected four-ship Yamato class of Japanese super battleships, the Shinano was laid down at the Yokuska Navy Yard on May 4, 1940. It was complete up to the main deck by the June 1942 Battle of Midway, in which the Japanese lost four carriers. The Japanese then decided to convert the Shinano into an aircraft carrier. Based on the Battle of Midway, it received an armored flight deck. The ship was seen as a floating base for refueling, rearming, and maintaining aircraft from other carriers. As a result, despite its large size and a 550-ft.-long aircraft hangar, it would have carried only 47 aircraft for self-defense (total hanger capacity was only about 70 aircraft). Reflecting its new mission, it had large holds for fuel, munitions, and spare parts in the spaces where gun turrets were to have been located. Launched on October 8, 1944, the Shinano displaced 73,040 tons fully loaded and was 872 ft. 8 in. in overall length and 119 ft. 11 in. in beam. Its design speed was 27 knots. Antiaircraft armament consisted of 16 5-inch and 145 25-mm guns, along with 336 5-inch rocket launchers. It had a crew of 2,400 men. On November 29, 1944, the Shinano was being moved to Kure for its final fitting out when the U.S. submarine Archerfish intercepted it in the Inland Sea and hit it with four torpedoes aft. Having retained its battleship triple-hull protection, the carrier continued to travel at 16 knots. However, an untrained crew and the fact that many of the ship’s watertight compartments were not yet complete resulted in the carrier sinking later that day. C. J. Horn See also: Aircraft Carriers; Midway, Battle of; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Alden, John. U.S. Submarine Attacks during World War II: Including Allied Submarine Attacks in the Pacific Theater. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Enright, Joseph F. Shinano! The Sinking of Japan’s Secret Supership. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987.

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SHINGLE, Operation (Anzio Amphibious Operation, January 22–May 25, 1944) Allied amphibious operation in western Italy. On September 3, 1943, British General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army landed in southern Italy in Operation BAYTOWN. Six days later in Operation AVALANCHE, U.S. forces under Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark landed at Salerno some 30 miles south of Naples. Able German commander in Italy Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal) Albert Kesselring soon established a strong line north of Naples to contain these Allied thrusts. Known as the Gustav Line, this formidable position took full advantage of the difficult terrain of central Italy, and four separate Allied attempts to break the German line here failed. British prime minister Winston Churchill, the prime mover behind the Italian campaign, now pushed for an amphibious operation to the northwest in order to outflank the Gustav Line for a drive on Rome. The operation took place near the town of Anzio on the Tyrrhenian Sea. Rome was some 37 miles distant. Anzio was an incredible opportunity thrown away. Sufficient landing craft were scraped together for two divisions. British vice admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay had command of the naval forces, consisting of 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, more than 60 other ships including minesweepers, and 238 landing craft. These transported some 40,000 Allied troops and more than 5,000 vehicles. Clark had overall command of the Anzio operation, while Major General John Lucas commanded the actual invasion force centered on the British 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. Code-named Operation SHINGLE, the invasion occurred early on January 22, 1944. It caught the Germans by surprise and proceeded virtually unopposed. Two days before it took place, the Allies launched a diversionary strike against Cassino along the Gustav Line, and Kesselring had rushed two reserve divisions there from Rome. Consequently, on January 22, there were no German reserves to meet a swift Allied thrust to Rome. By midnight on January 22, 36,000 men and 3,200 vehicles were ashore at the cost of only 13 Allied dead. Lucas did get valuable amounts of supplies ashore quickly, which enabled the Allies to beat back subsequent German counterattacks, but he was overly cautious and failed to take advantage of the temporary German weakness to secure the critical nearby Alban Hills. Although the U.S. 504th Parachute Regiment was available for that purpose, Clark had vetoed its employment. The chief reason for the failure at Anzio was insufficient resources in the initial assault. This was owing to an agreement releasing landing craft and other assets from Italy to prepare for the upcoming Normandy invasion. Lacking adequate resources at Anzio, the Allies would have been better off by mounting a decisive operation along the Gustav Line. The Anzio beachhead soon developed into a precarious situation whereby the Allied forces were in danger of being hurled into the sea. Both sides built up their

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forces, and Anzio settled into stalemate. Finally, on May 17, the Allies broke through the Gustav Line in costly frontal assaults that the Anzio attack was supposed to have rendered unnecessary. On May 25, Allied forces from Anzio and the Gustav Line linked up. They entered Rome on June 4. Critics argue that the Allied campaign in Italy was an unnecessary sideshow. Defenders claim that Anzio taught the United States and Britain a crucial lesson in amphibious warfare: get off the beaches as quickly as possible and drive inland. Michael S. Neiberg and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; AVALANCHE, Operation; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home.

References Blumenson, Martin. Anzio: The Gamble That Failed. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001. D’Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Graham, Dominick, and Shelford Bidwell. Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943–45. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operation in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. January 1943–June 1944. Reprint. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001. Trevelyan, Raleigh. Rome ’44: The Battle for the Eternal City. New York: Viking Press, 1982.

Ship’s Combat Information Center The concept of a command space where all the relevant combat information is integrated and applied to directing a ship’s and naval task group’s weapons arose from the early battles of World War II’s Pacific Campaign, during which Allied naval units faced mass waves of Japanese aircraft. The early radars provided adequate warning of the approach of these aircraft, but the early radar plotting rooms were neither large enough nor well arranged to depict the overall tactical picture in a fashion that enabled commanders to deploy their forces effectively. Naval warfare was now three dimensional, with threats coming from below and above, as well as on the sea surface. Moreover, the advent of radar and naval air power as a decisive combat arm had transformed naval warfare into engagements involving larger numbers of enemy and friendly force contacts over far greater expanses of ocean. It had also accelerated the pace of battle far beyond that which could be directed from the traditional open bridge. Early radar plotting rooms enabled commanders to track and command forces against a handful of targets, but the need to detect incoming raids and rapidly direct


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fighter aircraft to intercept enemy aircraft required something better. The U.S. Navy applied the lessons learned from the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway to design a new command space where information from all the ship’s sensors (e.g., radar, sonar, and visual lookouts) as well as reports from fleet headquarters and other ships were received, plotted, analyzed, and presented to the ship’s or task group’s commander and from which he issued his orders. The first Combat Information Center (CIC) as it is known today was employed during the Gilbert Islands Campaign in November 1943. The captain of the U.S. Navy destroyer Fletcher (DD-445), Commander William M. Cole, and his executive officer LCDR Joseph C. Wyle, generally are credited with establishing the first operational combat application for using the space. The commanding officer remained on the bridge, while the executive officer remained in radar plot advising the captain on the tactical situation. The Fletcher performed so effectively in the early battles that it was placed in the van for the Battle of Tassaforanga, leading three other destroyers. Although that battle was a disaster, the destroyer action was successful. Cole’s and other after-action reports were studied and the lessons applied. Radar plotting rooms were expanded to accommodate the faster and larger volume of information available. By early 1945, the CIC concept and doctrine had emerged, but it was the Battle for Okinawa that drove it to the form that exists today. The Japanese defenders threw hundreds of kamikaze (suicide) aircraft at the fleet daily, almost simultaneously with the fleet directing several thousand of its aircraft in strikes ashore and conducting naval gunfire support. It was a complex fleet air defense and battle management problem that nearly overwhelmed the unit commanders’ ability to command. Four months later, the navy issued Radar Bulletin Number 6, the first navywide CIC manual. Although technology has changed the method, means, and equipment in the CIC, the principles derived from World War II remain largely unchanged to this day. Aircraft carrier CICs came to be called Combat Direction Centers after 1979, but the most significant change affecting CICs was the development of the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) in the 1980s, when the advent of Soviet supersonic long-range bombers and antiship cruise missiles expanded the naval task group’s area of interest out to several thousand miles and required the task group commander to coordinate his task group’s operations with commands ashore. With his area of interest and span of control far exceeding that of the ship’s commander, it became necessary to separate the ship’s CIC or the task group commander’s command center. All flag-configured U.S. Navy ships now have a TFCC where strategic intelligence information is integrated with reports on the situation overland to enable the admiral to command a joint task group that may include air force, army, and marine units. Carl Otis Schuster See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; ICEBERG, Operation; Kamikaze; Midway, Battle of; Tassaforanga, Battle of.

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References Brown, Louis, Technical and Military Imperatives: A Radar History of World War II. Philadelphia: Institute of Physics, 1999. Radar Bulletin No. 6. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department, July 7, 1945.

Sho¯kaku Class, Japanese Aircraft Carriers Class of two Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers, considered to be the most successful Japanese carriers of World War II. Based on the Hiryu¯, the Sho¯kakuclass ships were greatly enlarged and much improved. They displaced 25,675 tons standard load and 32,105 tons full load. They measured 844 ft. 10 in. in overall length with a beam of 85 ft. 4 in. With their experimental bulbous bows, they had a maximum speed of 34.2 knots. Armament consisted of 16 127-mm (5-inch) guns and 42 25-mm antiaircraft guns. They carried 84 aircraft (72 operational and 12 reserve). Wartime complement varied from 1,660 to 1,850 men. The Sho¯kaku was laid down at the Yokosuka Navy Yard on December 12, 1937; launched on June 1, 1939; and completed on August 8, 1941. Zuikaku was laid down by Kawasaki, Kobe, on May 15, 1938; launched on November 27, 1939; and completed on September 25, 1941. The two were teamed as Carrier Division 5 for the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequently saw action in nearly every major carrier battle of the Pacific war, missing only Port Darwin and Midway. U.S. bombs damaged the Sho¯kaku twice in 1942, in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7, 1942, and off Guadalcanal on October 25, 1942. The two ships reunited in 1944; but on June 19, off the Marianas, the Sho¯kaku was sunk by three torpedoes from U.S. submarine Cavalla. The Zuikaku was damaged the next day by a bomb, but it was repaired in time to participate in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944), where it was sunk by seven torpedoes and nine bombs on October 25, while serving as a decoy. Anthony Tully See also: Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Japanese Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the.

References Brown, David. Aircraft Carriers. New York: Arco, 1977. Dickson, David. “The Shokakus.” Warship International 1 (1971), pp. 15–44.

Sho¯ Plans Japanese naval plans developed to meet threats posed by the U.S. Navy. As early as July 21, 1944, the Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo issued a directive for

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subsequent “urgent operations.” The Combined Fleet was to maintain the strategic status quo and take advantage of tactical situations to seize the initiative “to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces.” On July 26, the Naval General Staff informed Combined Fleet commander Admiral Toyoda Soemu that the operations would be known by the Sho¯ (Victory) code name. The Japanese developed four Sho¯ plans to combat the next U.S. offensive move; Sho¯ Ichi Go (Operation Victory 1) covered defense of the Philippine archipelago. Sho¯-2 was for the defense of the Kuriles and Ryukyus; Sho¯-3 was for southern and central Japan; and Sho¯-4 covered threats against northern Japan and the Kurile Islands. For Sho¯-1, which Tokyo expected to be the plan implemented, the Japanese planned to commit the entire Combined Fleet. It called for holding the fleet back and letting the Americans make their landings, then launching an all-out naval attack. Toyoda knew this would be a gamble. He said after the war that if things went well, the Japanese might have achieved “unexpectedly good results,” but at worst there was a chance of losing the entire fleet. Toyoda believed that chance had to be taken. He knew all too well that, should the United States retake the Philippines, even with the fleet left intact, Japanese shipping lanes to the south—especially to the vital resources of the Netherlands East Indies—would be completely cut off. Thus, even if the fleet were able to return to Japanese waters, it would not be able to secure fuel. And if the fleet was to remain in southern waters where it could obtain fuel, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and weapons. Thus Toyoda concluded, “There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the Philippines.” Japanese naval air strength, however, had been severely reduced in the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea, and during October 12–14, U.S. carrier planes and army B-29s struck Japanese airfields on Formosa, Okinawa, and the Philippines. These attacks had the effect of denying the Japanese navy badly needed land-based air support; this fact alone probably doomed the Japanese plan. The Japanese did add extra antiaircraft guns to their ships in an attempt to offset the lack of air power, but offensively they would have to rely on naval gunnery and some land-based planes in the Philippines. As it turned out, these assets were completely insufficient in the ensuing Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 23–26, 1943. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Field, James A. Jr. The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho¯ Operation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.

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Sidon, Engagement off (June 9, 1941) Concerned by the fact that German aircraft had staged through the French mandate of Syria en route to assist an anti-British coup in Iraq and fearing a sudden German strike against the territory with the speed and power of Berlin’s attack on Crete, Great Britain, British Empire, and Free French units invaded Syria on June 8, 1941. French naval assets in the area consisted of the large destroyers of the 3rd Scout Division commanded by Captain Raymond Gervais de Lafond—the Guépard and Valmy—the sloop Élan, and three submarines. The Mediterranean Fleet, gravely weakened by the losses suffered off Crete, initially committed a squadron commanded by Vice Admiral E. L. S. King, consisting of three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Learning that British forces were off southern Lebanon, the Guépard and Valmy sortied from Beirut at 7:00 a.m. on June 8 to investigate. They shelled an Australian column on the coast road and then returned north. When Admiral King learned that enemy warships had fired on the Australians, he returned to find the French gone. King dispatched four destroyers—the Janus, Jackal, Isis, and Hotspur— under Commander J. A. W. Tothill to sweep north along the coast while he returned to Haifa. The naval command in Beirut, meanwhile, ordered Gervais de Lafond’s division to return south. It had reached Sidon, when, at 3:25 p.m., it sighted destroyer masts to the southwest. The British ships were strung out, with Janus leading Jackal by a mile, Hotspur a mile behind Jackal, and Isis inshore two miles south of Hotspur. When Commander Tothill sighted the large French destroyers, he rang up full speed without waiting to concentrate. Gervais de Lafond surprised the British commander, however, when his ships loosed their first salvo from 16,000 yards. Although the second broadsides straddled, Janus continued to close range as Jackal steamed hard to catch up. The French turned west while the straggling British line assumed a parallel heading. Then, at 3:43 p.m. at a range at 10,000 yards, the Guépard struck Janus hard with three shells. With steam escaping and a boiler out of action, the Janus drifted to a stop and was hit two more times. At this juncture, the Jackal overhauled Janus and wrapped smoke around the stricken ship. At 3:54 p.m., the French ships ceased fire and turned east. A few minutes later, Gervais de Lafond sighted the Isis speeding north to join the fight. With half his ammunition already expended, the French captain turned north as the rest of the British flotilla gave chase. As they steamed up the Lebanese coast, the French hit Jackal, igniting a small fire, while a British shell lightly damaged the Guépard at 4:21 p.m. The British finally broke off the chase at 4:46 p.m. The Janus was towed to Haifa, where it burned out of control until 5:00 a.m. the next day. The British Admiralty concluded that Tothill should have concentrated


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and it expressed surprise at the accuracy of French gunnery. The French squadron fought minor engagements against Allied warships on June 16 and June 22 before withdrawing to France on July 9, five days before an armistice ended the fighting in Syria. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: France, Navy; Gervais de Lafond, Raymond; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Guiot, Pierre. Combats Sans Espoir: Guerre Navale en Syrie–1941. Paris: La Couronne Littéraire, n.d. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Page, Christopher, ed. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 2, November 1940– December 1941. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Signals Intelligence The collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions that provide insight into an enemy’s technological capabilities. The broader category of signals intelligence (known today as SIGINT) includes both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT includes the monitoring of radio and telephone traffic, the decryption of coded messages, and analysis of message content. ELINT is the collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions such as telemetry and radar signals. This essay discusses COMINT. Communications intelligence played a key role in World War II. In the 1920s, the knowledge that cryptanalysis had achieved important results in several countries during World War I led to the development of new and improved cipher methods and especially new cipher machines. These were produced not only for diplomatic and military communications but for use in business. American Edward Hugh Hebern had been working since 1917 to develop a rotor-driven machine, but he secured a U.S. patent only in 1924. Also in 1917, German Arthur Scherbius experimented with a similar machine; he secured a German patent on February 23, 1918. He was followed in October 1919 by Dutch inventor Hugo Alexander Koch and Swede Arvid Gerhard Damm. In 1923, Scherbius purchased the Koch patents and produced a new rotor-driven cipher machine known as Enigma. Scherbius demonstrated the Enigma machine in 1923 at Bern and in 1924 at the World Postal Congress at Stockholm. He developed several versions of the Enigma; the commercial version, Enigma-D, was

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purchased by several countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The Enigma influenced production of cipher machines in other countries for military uses. In Sweden, engineer Boris Hagelin began his improved machine series; in Great Britain, Type X was an improved Enigma. In Japan, a special version was constructed, and experiments led to the 97-shiki-O-bun In-ji-ki for high-level diplomatic communications (later identified by the United States with the code name “Purple”). During the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalist side and their allied Italians employed Enigma-D machines, and the Italians also used an Enigma version known as Alfa. The Poles developed their own cipher machine, Lacida, and the Czechs experimented with a version driven by compressed air rather than electricity. Boris Hagelin successfully marketed his machines in Sweden and France; later with the Italian navy; and, finally, in the United States, where 140,000 copies of his M-209 machine were built. The Germans relied heavily on the Enigma machine for military communications during the war. Only in 1975, with the publication of Frederick Winterbotham’s book The Ultra Secret, did it become generally known that Allied cryptanalysts had unlocked the secrets of the Enigma machine and that Allied intelligence had been able to read the most secret German military and diplomatic communications, although not in real time. Winterbotham’s book was only the first in a flood of publications about Allied code breaking. These included work published by the Poles, who, in 1932 and 1933, had been the first to crack the secrets of the Enigma; the French, who had delivered to the Poles cipher materials secured from a German agent; the British, who established at Bletchley Park a decryption center; and the Americans, who also came into this operation and worked to break the Japanese codes. The concentration on Enigma obscured the fact that there was not one Enigma machine but rather several versions. Moreover, Bletchley Park could break only some of the cipher key nets of Enigma, depending on the number of signals sent in the daily settings of the various key nets. Concentration on Enigma also led to neglect of the many other machine- or hand-cipher systems of other nations, which were tackled by the cryptanalysts of many countries with mixed success. The German defeat of Poland in September 1939 came so rapidly that Polish cryptanalysts had virtually no impact on that campaign. Evacuated by way of Romania to France, however, they joined the French Deuxième Bureau (intelligence service), which was operating closely with the British. But Allied efforts against the German Enigma key nets only had limited success at first and did not greatly influence Allied operations until mid-1940. With the defeat of France, that nation’s cryptanalysts went to the unoccupied southern zone. From there, some Poles went on to Algeria and then joined the British at Bletchley Park.


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On the Axis side, the German naval decryption service, the XB-Dienst, enjoyed considerable success in breaking the hand-cipher systems of the Royal Navy, which at this time did not use machines but rather super-enciphered codebooks. This fact enabled German warships in most cases to evade superior British forces. It also provided the Germans with information about Allied convoys. In May 1940, Bletchley Park at last was able, with only short delays, to decrypt the main operational Enigma key net of the German Luftwaffe. This was aided by the introduction of the first “bombes”—devices developed by mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman to determine the daily settings of the German machines. These intercepts, now known by the intelligence code name of ULTRA, influenced the Battle of Britain, as daily reports by the German air groups revealed their strengths and intended operations. Using this information, Britain’s “home chain” radar, and a system of coast watchers, the British could use fewer fighter aircraft with maximum efficiency, sending fighters aloft at the right time to intercept incoming German bombers. But Bletchley Park could not then break the Enigma key nets of the German army. Of special importance at the time was breaking the German navy key nets, especially those used by the U-boats. The German Enigma machine was known to the British from a replica the Poles had constructed and delivered to France and Britain in August 1939, but the problem was the wiring of the cipher rotors. Only five of these were known; but the German navy used eight, and these had to be identified, together with information about the cipher settings, which changed daily. This was only accomplished in May and June 1941. Despite decoding delays, the Allies were able to read German radio signals and thus had the means to destroy their surface supply organization in the Atlantic. This in turn forced the Germans to cancel commerce raiding operations by their large surface combatants. Also, from early August 1941, it became possible to decrypt U-boat radio traffic, which made it possible for the Allies to reroute their Atlantic convoys around the German U-boat dispositions. This prevented the sinking of perhaps 300 Allied merchant ships in the second half of 1941. Not all German officials had confidence in the security of the ciphers. Admiral Karl Dönitz tried several times after mid-1941 to improve the system. He introduced a code for the grid map positions and a separate cipher key net for the Atlantic U-boats. Then, on February 1, 1942, Dönitz ordered the introduction of an improved cipher machine known as M4, which had a divided Umkehrwalze B reflective rotor and an additional, fourth, rotor called Greek Beta. This change produced an 11-month blackout at Bletchley Park in reading German U-boat traffic. At the same time, XB-Dienst was able—partially in 1942 and more so in 1943—to decrypt the Anglo-American super-enciphered codebook Naval Cipher No. 3 used for communication with the convoys. Although there were decoding delays, the

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decryption led to excellent results for the U-boats in the North Atlantic until early spring 1943. On October 30, 1942, in the Mediterranean, a German U-boat was forced to surface, and a specially trained British boarding party was able to board it and salvage important cipher materials, especially the weather short signal book. This was used to find “cribs,” the cipher/clear text compromises that aided in determining daily settings of the M4 machine. Thus, from mid-December 1942, Bletchley Park could once again send to the submarine tracking room of the Admiralty the dispositions of the German U-boat wolf packs in order to reroute convoys. But there were now so many wolf packs that new tactics had to be found to avoid repetition of the heavy losses incurred in mid-March, when the Germans introduced a new weather short signal book, producing a new blackout. By concentrating the available bombes to U-boat traffic, Bletchley Park was again able after only 10 days to break the U-boat cipher. Coupled with this, the Allies committed additional antisubmarine forces, very-long-range aircraft, hunterkiller groups of destroyers and the first escort carriers, radar in escort ships and lightweight radar in aircraft, high-frequency direction finders, and Leigh lights. The turning point came in late May 1943, when Dönitz redeployed his submarines from the North Atlantic convoy routes to the Central Atlantic and to distant operational areas. At the same time, Bletchley Park decrypted the orders, enabling the British to relocate their air groups from the convoy routes to Britain over to a strong offensive against U-boat routes in and out of the Bay of Biscay. In June 1943, the British realized that the Germans had decrypted their signals, and the Admiralty changed to a new super-enciphered code, Naval Cipher No. 5, which led to a blackout for XB-Dienst. On July 1, the Germans introduced a new Greek rotor C/Gamma, but this led to only a short interruption in decryption at Bletchley Park because of the introduction of a new high-speed bombe. Development in the United States of high-speed bombes led to the transfer in November 1943 of decryption work on the U-boat cipher to the U.S. decryption organization Op-20G, while Bletchley Park concentrated on the German Enigma ciphers of the German air force and the army, both of which had substantially increased the number of their key nets. Bletchley Park’s first break into the German army ciphers had come as the Germans prepared to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. This provided information about German deployment of forces to Poland and preparation of trains specifically to transport prisoners of war, clear proof that the deployments were not simply an effort to blackmail the Soviet Union. During the invasion, Bletchley Park was able to intercept and read a great many German signals. Because the British did not trust the security of the Soviet code and cipher systems, decryptions from the German forces on the Eastern Front were transmitted to Moscow in a special secure cipher and only under cover stories. It is as yet unknown whether the Soviets were aware


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Civilian and military personnel at work at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, England, in 1943. This British codebreaking operation (top secret Ultra) cracked the German Enigma codes and undoubtedly shortened World War II. (SSPL/Getty Images)

from their spies in Britain, including Kim Philby and especially John Cairncross at Bletchley Park, of the source of the information and, if so, whether Soviet leader Josef Stalin trusted it. Also, while the German army, navy, and air force decryption services were able to read Soviet codes and some ciphers and use the information thus obtained in operations, we do also not know how extensively and when the Soviets could decrypt German signals. Signals intelligence was of great importance in the Mediterranean theater. When Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, the Allies could read many of the Italian codes and ciphers. In addition, some ciphers were captured from Italian submarines forced to surface. But the Italians soon changed many of their systems, and decryption fell off sharply as a result. Then, in February 1941, Bletchley Park cracked the German air force cipher Light Blue and the Italian version of the Enigma known as Alfa, used for radio communication between Rome and the Dodecanese Islands. These successes had important consequences, most notably in defeating the Italian navy at the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.

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In May 1941, decryption of the German signals provided excellent intelligence concerning German plans to invade Crete, but the British defense of the island failed because the German air force controlled the skies and because the intercepts included misleading information about a German seaborne invasion. As it transpired, this was not a significant German effort, but it led the British to shift defensive assets to the north, away from the airfields, where the main German assault occurred. The Battle of Crete revealed both the advantages and disadvantages of signals intelligence regarding enemy intentions. From June 1941, Bletchley Park’s decryption of the Italian Hagelin naval cipher machine C-38m used in communications between Supermarina in Rome and Tripoli had important consequences for Axis resupply of Axis forces in the western desert. Axis shipping losses increased dramatically in the second half of 1941 and 1942, when it became possible to vector Allied submarines and surface warship strike groups from Malta to intercept Italian convoys between Sicily and the Tunisian coast and Tripoli. The British always tried first to send reconnaissance aircraft to report the target, so the signals they sent prevented the Italians from recognizing the true source of the information. Decrypted signals had to be used judiciously. Thus Afrika Korps commander General Erwin Rommel exaggerated the evils of his supply situation to gain additional support, causing British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill twice to order his commanders in the field to begin offensives that then failed in Rommel’s counterattacks. Rommel also learned much about British force strengths in Egypt, because the U.S. military attaché in Cairo used a code broken by the Italians for his reports. Allied commanders also made different use of SIGINT results in operations extending from El Alamein to Tunisia and during the landing operations at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. Revelations of the ULTRA secret in 1975 did force a reconsideration of the military reputations of several Allied commanders, including Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. In connection with the preparation of the Normandy invasion, the Allies in Operation FORTITUDE successfully used radio deception to convince the Germans of the presence in southeast England of a U.S. army group commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, a force that in fact did not exist. This false information led Adolf Hitler to believe that the Normandy invasion was a feint and that the Allies planned to make their major cross–English Channel attack in the Pas de Calais area. Hitler thus held back his panzer divisions of the Fifteenth Army from Normandy until too late and then sent them piecemeal into action. The Western Allies also succeeded in the decryption of the German army teleprinter cipher machine used for communications between the highest levels from the army High Command and field armies. This was made possible by development of the first electronic precursor of the later computers, the Colossus machine, which


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became operational in spring 1944. It proved important in halting the German counterattack against the breakthrough at Argentan and led to the encirclement of strong German forces at Falaise. But Allied reliance on ULTRA intelligence, as the German decryptions were known, meant the German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) of late December 1944 took the Allies unawares, because the Germans had observed strict radio silence and used only secure land lines for communication. Other belligerents and also neutral powers employed SIGINT during the war. The Finns cracked many Soviet codes, and the Swedish mathematician Arne Beurling broke into the German naval teleprinter Siemens T-52 cipher machine. German teleprinter lines running through Swedish territory were tapped there. Swedish intelligence officers, who favored the Allied side, delivered information to the British naval attaché at Stockholm. Thus, the Admiralty learned of the German plan to attack convoy PQ 17 in July 1942 with large surface ships, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft, whereon British first sea lord admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound ordered the convoy to scatter without waiting for the report of the departure of the German task forces. This led to catastrophe for the convoy, because German aircraft and U-boats sank two-thirds of its merchant ships. The rising number of cipher key nets employed by the Germans also overstretched Bletchley Park capacities. Thus, even by mid-1942, of about 50 key nets then in use, Bletchley Park could only decrypt about 30, and these with varying time delays and gaps. SIGINT was also influential in the Far East theater. In September 1940, U.S. cryptanalysts under the leadership of William Friedman broke the Japanese diplomatic Purple cipher. (Recently it has been revealed that both the Germans and Soviets were also able to break Purple.) Thus, during negotiations with Japan in 1941, the U.S. State Department not only knew the documents the Japanese diplomats would present but also their specific negotiating instructions. Purple intercepts provided clear evidence in late 1941 that Japan had decided to break off negotiations. But the diplomatic communications gave no hints of Japanese military plans, and the Japanese army codes were still difficult to decrypt. The Japanese navy’s super-enciphered codes, especially JN.25—an earlier version of which had been broken—could not be read after changes in the codebooks and super-enciphering tables. Thus, U.S. military and naval leaders had to depend on traffic analysis and direction finding, which did provide clear evidence, supported by optical observations, of the deployment of Japanese forces for attacks against the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. There was, however, no direct indication of an attack against Pearl Harbor, which thus came as a great surprise. Breaking the new version of JN.25 and other Japanese codes took time, because reconstructing the tables and codebook was always difficult after changes. In 1942, by clever evaluation of vague indications, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort concluded that the Japanese planned first to invade New Guinea and then to strike at Midway. This conclusion enabled Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Chester

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Nimitz to counter the Japanese moves, leading to the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. During the struggle for the Solomon Islands in late 1942 and 1943, U.S. cryptanalysts learned to decrypt the Japanese codes more quickly, and, by 1944, they could, in most cases, provide timely decryptions of Japanese signals in support of strategic operations. Of special importance was the success in breaking the Maru cipher for Japanese logistical support to the islands they held in the Pacific. This allowed U.S. submarines to be directed with considerable accuracy to intercept positions, which in turn produced rising losses in the already thinly stretched Japanese merchant ship capacity and in Japanese warships. SIGINT closely supported General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Forces from New Guinea to the Philippines and the Central Pacific Forces under Admiral Nimitz against the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islands and finally against Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In the Indian Ocean area, British cryptanalysts were able to break Japanese army and air force codes. On the other side, the Japanese had only limited success in decryption operations. In consequence, they employed mainly traffic analysis and direction finding for their military and naval operations. There is no doubt that signals intelligence was of great importance to all belligerents in the war. It is also true that the Allies were much more effective in its use. SIGINT alone did not win the war for the Allies, but undoubtedly it significantly shortened the length of the conflict. Jürgen Rohwer See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bay of Biscay, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Central Pacific Campaign; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Electronic Intelligence; Hunter-Killer Groups; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Midway, Battle of; NEPTUNE, Operation; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Alvarez, David. Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II. London: Frank Cass, 1999. Bauer, Friedrich L. Decrypted Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology. New York: Springer, 1997. Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books, 2000. Bertrand, Gustave. Enigma: ou la plus grande enigme de la guerre 1939–1945. Paris: Plon, 1973.

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Boyd, Carl. Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1993. Drea, Edward J. MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Hinsley, F. H., et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War. 5 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979–1990. Lewin, Ronald. The Other Ultra: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan. London: Hutchinson, 1982. Rohwer, Jürgen, and Eberhard Jäckel, eds. Die Funkaufklärung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, Germany: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979. Welchman, Gordon. The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes. New York: McGrawHill, 1982. Winterbotham, Frederick W. The Ultra Secret. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975. Winton, John. Ultra in the Pacific: How Breaking Japanese Codes and Ciphers Affected Naval Operations against Japan, 1941–1945. London: Leo Cooper 1993.

Sirte, First Battle of (December 17, 1941) The First Battle of Sirte, an important Mediterranean air and naval battle between the Great Britain and Italy, occurred because both nations were conducting simultaneous convoy operations at sea. The British were trying to get a tanker, the Breconshire, to a fuel-starved Malta. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian departed Alexandria on December 16, 1941, with the Breconshire, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers. Meanwhile, British Force K of three light cruisers and six destroyers sortied from Malta to meet it. Simultaneously, Italy dispatched supply ships to North Africa. This effort was particularly important, given heavy Italian shipping losses over the previous months. Seven destroyers and a torpedo boat provided close escort for two small convoys totaling four merchant ships and carrying 400 vehicles, 17 tanks, 10 artillery pieces, and other supplies. Their close escort, commanded by Vice Admiral Carlo Bergamini, consisted of the battleship Caio Duilio, two light cruisers, and three destroyers. Italian vice admiral Angelo Iachino’s covering force was also at sea. It consisted of the battleships Littorio, Giulio Cesare, and Andrea Doria as well as 2 heavy cruisers and 10 destroyers. Bergamini had developed the battleship convoy, with which he had enjoyed success following earlier Italian convoy disasters. The battleship escort operated near the slow-moving convoys and maneuvered in such a way as to remain close to them. At the same time, Iachino’s heavier force was steaming between Vian’s force and the main Italian convoy east of Malta. The Italians learned through radio intercepts that British cruisers had departed Alexandria, and, on December 16, their reconnaissance aircraft and German Ju-52s flying troops from Greece to North Africa sighted the Breconshire and reported it

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as a battleship. Later that day, the British ships came under ineffective Italian air attack. Iachino assumed that British battleships were at sea hunting for his convoys, although in reality the lack of escorts and the threat of German submarines prevented the commander of British forces in the Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, from dispatching battleships from Alexandria. Iachino then increased speed to 24 knots, the fastest the Doria could manage, and steamed to engage. Vian had been joined by Force K and was aware of Iachino’s approach from aerial reconnaissance early in the afternoon. He turned to the south, away from Iachino, to protect the Breconshire. Vian was also aware that additional Italian forces were at sea. On December 17, Vian’s ships had again been subjected to Italian air attack, and the British antiaircraft fire had been observed by Iachino’s fleet, which then closed. Sunset was approaching when contact was made. The Italians opened fire at extreme range of 35,000 yards, dropping to 24,000 yards. Vian detached the two destroyers, and later all of Force K, to protect the Breconshire, which then steamed south to escape. Italian fire for this range was quite accurate, and their shells straddled several British ships. The British destroyers made smoke and advanced on the Italians, who countered by ordering their destroyers forward. The British destroyers boldly moved forward, but Vian almost immediately ordered them to retire on the main force. With night coming on, Iachino ordered a withdrawal. Vian, under orders from Admiral Cunningham, did not try to force a night engagement. One British destroyer suffered one dead and sustained very minor damage. In the morning, Vian ordered Force K to escort the Breconshire into Valetta, Malta, while he retired on Alexandria. Meanwhile, the two Italian convoys arrived safely at Tripoli and Benghazi. In an ancillary development on December 19, Force K, trying to intercept the Axis convoys, ran into an Italian minefield near Tripoli. One cruiser and a destroyer were lost and two cruisers were damaged at a cost of more than 600 dead. Jack Greene See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Iachino, Angelo; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sirte, Second Battle of; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Holland, James. Fortress Malta: An Island under Siege, 1940–1943. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

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Playfair, I. S. O., et al. The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Vol. 3. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Smith, Peter C., and Edwin Walker. The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces. London: Ian Allen, 1974. Woodman, Richard. Malta Convoys, 1940–1943. London: Jack Murray, 2000.

Sirte, Second Battle of (March 22, 1942) Mediterranean air and naval battle fought between the British and Italians as a consequence of British efforts to resupply Malta. Conditions on the British island were dire in 1942, with the Royal Navy able to pass only a few ships through the gauntlet of Axis air and naval forces dominating the Mediterranean. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Britain’s naval commander in the Mediterranean, was determined that the next effort to resupply Malta would be successful. On March 20, 1942, British convoy MW.10 of four merchant ships, including the tanker Breconshire, departed Alexandria for Malta with fuel and provisions. Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian commanded an escort force of four light cruisers, nine large destroyers, and seven small Hunt-class destroyers. A light cruiser and a destroyer were ordered from Malta to join it. Five British submarines were also on patrol. German reconnaissance aircraft located the British convoy on the evening of March 21, and the next morning, a British submarine off the port of Taranto reported an Italian naval force headed south. Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino commanded the battleship Littorio, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. Two other Italian destroyers ordered to sea failed to arrive in time to participate in the battle. The Axis powers also had six submarines on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. The Italian ships lacked radar (the first effective set would not be installed until May), but they did have command of the air, and Iachino knew the British lacked battleships. By March 22, Vian was nearing Malta and had lost one Hunt-class destroyer, torpedoed by a U-boat. At 2:10 p.m. on March 22, the British sighted the three Italian cruisers and four destroyers. Vian now carried out the procedures decided on earlier. Five destroyers continued on with the convoy, while Vian’s remaining cruisers and destroyers made smoke and launched torpedo attacks against the Italian ships. The Italian ships then drew off. Vian’s detached forces had barely regained the convoy when, at 4:37 p.m., the Italian fleet again came in sight. Iachino’s intention was to steam to the southwest and cut off Vian from Malta, at the same time positioning himself downwind of the immense smoke screens being laid down by the British ships. Vian’s force consistently charged and fell back, feinting and threatening the remainder of

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the afternoon, as the range slowly closed. With the approach of darkness, Iachino closed to within 5,000 yards. Fire from the Littorio damaged two British destroyers; two other British warships suffered minor shell damage. But with nightfall and lacking radar, Iachino decided to withdraw, despite having suffered only one British shell hit on the Littorio. During Iachino’s return to Taranto, however, two Italian destroyers foundered in a storm with heavy loss of life. The Luftwaffe sank two of the British transports short of Malta. The other two reached Malta, but they had been only partly offloaded before they, too, were sunk by air attack. One of the British destroyers damaged in the battle on March 22 was later sunk at Malta, again from the air, while undergoing repairs. The success of the Axis blockade of Malta led to another failed British attempt to resupply the island in June. Jack Greene See also: Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Iachino, Angelo; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Sirte, First Battle of; Vian, Sir Philip Louis.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Holland, James. Fortress Malta: An Island under Siege, 1940–1943. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009. Pack, S. W. C. The Battle of Sirte. London: Ian Allen, 1975. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Santoni, Alberto. La Seconda Battaglia Navale della Sirte. Rome: Edizioni dell’ateneo, 1982. Woodman, Richard. Malta Convoys, 1940–1943. London: Jack Murray, 2000.

Skerki Bank, Battle near (December 2, 1942) The naval action resulting from the nighttime interception of an Italian convoy to Tunisia by British warships operating from Algeria. Following Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa on November 8, 1942, German and Italian troops withdrew into Tunisia and began building up their forces there. During the first critical weeks following the Allied invasion, the Allied naval command headed by the Royal Navy’s Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, commander in chief in the Mediterranean, did not interfere with the stream of Italian shipping crossing

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the Sicilian Channel. Malta’s Force K was not reestablished until November 27 due to concerns about air support. On November 30, Cunningham constituted Force Q, commanded by Rear Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt with three light cruisers and two destroyers, at Bône in Algeria. Signals intelligence from Luftwaffe Enigma intercepts informed the Allied naval command of an important Italian/German convoy of four transports designated Convoy H en route from Palermo to Bizerta, Tunisia, and, at 5:30 p.m. on December 1, Force Q sallied on its first mission. Although Italian intelligence intercepted and decrypted the aerial sighting report that the British deemed necessary to protect the secret of their penetration of Enigma, naval headquarters decided there was not time to withdraw Convoy H and that it must proceed. Convoy H had an unusually strong escort commanded by Captain Aldo Cocchia. It consisted of the destroyers Da Recco, Camicia Nera, and Folgore and the torpedo boats Clio and Procione. When Captain Cocchia learned that enemy warships threatened his force, he decided on a change of course to the south, hoping that this might confuse the forces searching for him. Unfortunately, the order confused his own force more, because some ships did not receive the order and some did not execute it correctly. Thus, Convoy H was scattered when Harcourt’s ships appeared on the original convoy track. The light cruisers Aurora, Sirius, and Argonaut led, followed by the destroyers Quiberon and Quentin. At 12:38 a.m., the cruisers engaged one transport, setting off its cargo of munitions. In response, Cocchia ordered his warships to counterattack. The Camicia Nera advanced and, at 12:43 a.m., launched six torpedoes from an estimated range of 2,200 yards and then retired north as British salvos splashed closely around. The Folgore also fired six torpedoes at very close ranges before withdrawing. However, at 12:52 a.m., nine 5.25-inch shells hit the Italian destroyer, resulting in a large fire and extensive flooding. The Folgore took on a 20-degree list and, at 1:16 a.m., capsized, with the loss of 126 men. The Procione turned to counterattack after sighting the Sirius 2,000 yards off its starboard bow, but at 12:53 a.m., a broadside ravaged the torpedo boat and slaughtered the forward gun crew. The Procione withdrew southwest and never opened fire. The Clio made smoke and fired at British searchlights and muzzle flashes, while the Da Recco maneuvered to launch torpedoes. Meanwhile, British warships sailed alongside the convoy, firing and launching torpedoes at targets of opportunity. By 1:25 a.m., they had reached the head of the formation and began to circle back to the west. All four transports were either sunk or on fire by this time. At 1:30 a.m., the Da Recco closed to within 4,500 yards of the British ships, but the destroyer’s torpedo attack failed and concentrated fire from the Sirius, Quiberon, and Quentin killed 118 crewmen and left the ship dead in the water. Following this incident, the British column set course for Bône.

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Harcourt’s force had sunk every merchant ship. It had also sent to the bottom the Folgore, heavily damaged the Da Recco, and moderately damaged the Procione. Nearly 2,200 Axis sailors and troops lost their lives. Harcourt’s ships had suffered only splinter damage. Force Q did not make it back to base unscathed, however. German aircraft surprised it at 6:30 a.m. and sank the Quentin. Nonetheless, the battle was a major setback for the Italian navy. Although its counterattack was piecemeal and poorly coordinated, it was remarkable that the convoy escort had failed to inflict any damage whatsoever on the British. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Malta; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References Cocchia, Aldo. La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Vol. 8, La difesa del traffico con l ’Africa Settentrionale dal 1 ottobre alla caduta Della Tunisia. Rome: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1964. Levine, Alan J. The War against Rommel’s Supply Lines 1942–1943. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. O’Hara, Vincent P. Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Snorkel A hollow mast through which a submarine draws air from the surface so that it may operate internal combustion engines while submerged. Although suggestions for such a device emerged in the U.S. Navy as early as 1914 and primitive arrangements were even tested contemporaneously by Imperial Russian Navy submarines, there were no operational installations of snorkels until the late 1930s. In 1933, Lieutenant Commander Jan J. Wichers of the Royal Netherlands Navy took out a patent for an extensible air mast and subsequently developed his concepts further to incorporate an automatic head valve, intermediate cushioning via a float to compensate for pressure variations, and internal connections and air containers within the submarine. The Dutch knew it as the snuiver (literally “sniffer”). The first installations were in the Dutch submarines O-19 and O-20, completed in 1939. They incorporated a motor drive to extend or lower the mast, although the exhaust tube was fixed. Both boats sailed to the Netherlands East Indies, where they operated against Japan after December 1941. The succeeding Netherlands O-21 class carried a fully extensible system. When Germany invaded and conquered the Netherlands in May 1940, the O-21 through

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O-24 escaped to Britain, where Royal Navy designers studied them but took little interest in their breathing devices, which were removed before the submarines reentered service. German technicians, too, found this equipment of little use when they examined the captured O-25, O-26, and O-27 and also had it removed before deployment. In 1943, however, German interest in the concept revived, largely at the instigation of designer Hellmuth Walter. He urged its adoption to permit extended submerged U-boat operation while using diesels as a counter to the ever more successful Allied antisubmarine campaign. Wichers’s design was modified to use the entire boat interior as an air cushion from which the engines could freely aspirate. After urgent testing, installation began in September 1943, with initial priority going to equipping boats already operational, followed by new construction vessels. The first submarine fitted with the snorkel was the U-58, operating in the Baltic. In service, snorkel-equipped U-boats proved capable of operations in areas the Allies considered safe from submarines. Nevertheless, they suffered from two operational problems that have continued to concern submariners: restricted speed while snorkeling and a greater detection signature. Wartime installations limited U-boats to five to six knots, while the head float was both a relatively large radar target and a cause of visible spray. Postwar examination of captured U-boats rapidly inspired the U.S., British, and Soviet navies to install snorkel equipment in submarines, moves quickly followed by other navies. Testing soon revealed a third problem: the diesels transmitted their entire noise signature into the surrounding water and made snorkeling submarines easy to detect. Furthermore, improved designs that allowed greater underwater speed only exacerbated the wake problem. Consequently, most snorkel design effort since the late 1940s has focused on reducing the size and radar reflectance of the head, careful streamlining to diminish wake formation, and rigorous machinery sound reduction. Despite its disadvantages, the snorkel has equipped almost every operational submarine since the early 1950s. Nuclear boats rely on snorkels to run important auxiliary machinery when submerged, while the very operational efficiency of conventional and closed-cycle vessels requires them. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Submarines.

References Friedman, Norman. U.S. Submarines since 1945: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Polmar, Norman, and Jurrien Noot. Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718– 1990. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Rössler, Eberhard. The U-boat. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

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Solomon Islands Naval Campaign (August 1942–February 1943) Extended six-month South Pacific naval campaign between Allied and Japanese forces that halted the Japanese Pacific advance. Between May and July 1942, Japan sought to expand its defensive ring into the eastern and central Solomon Islands. As a part of this drive, it sent elements of the Eighth Army to occupy the island of Guadalcanal. On July 6, the Japanese began construction of an airfield there, from which they would be able to bomb the advanced Allied base at Espíritu Santo. News of the construction project forced U.S. commanders to expedite their plan for the Solomons, known as Operation WATCHTOWER. Conceived and advocated by U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King, WATCHTOWER called for securing the island of Tulagi as an additional base to protect the U.S.Australia lifeline and as a starting point for a drive up the Solomons to Rabaul. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, U.S. commander in the South Pacific under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, then dispatched an amphibious force under Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner lifting Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division from Nouméa to the Solomons. Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher’s threecarrier task force provided protection. On August 7, 1942, the marines went ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal and captured the airfield, which they renamed Henderson Field. The airfield soon became the focal point of fighting on the island. In all, the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal included 10 major land actions, 50 engagements involving warships or aircraft, and 7 major naval battles. The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather ships in driblets. The Americans soon had Henderson Field operating; U.S. land-based air power controlled “the Slot” (the narrow channel through the Solomon Islands) during the day, but the Japanese initially controlled it at night. The Imperial Japanese Navy excelled at night fighting, for which its crews had been intensively trained, as was shown in the Battle of Savo Island. When he learned of the landings at Guadalcanal, Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi at Rabaul immediately made plans to reinforce the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal and to attack the vulnerable ships at the landing site. Meanwhile, Vandegrift needed four days to unload all the transports, but Fletcher replied that he could not leave his carriers in position more than 48 hours, and he began removing them on the evening of August 8. On the night of August 8–9, Mikawa arrived off the landing site and proceeded to administer the worst defeat suffered by the U.S. Navy in a fair fight. In the Battle of Savo Island, Mikawa sank four Allied cruisers (three U.S. and one Australian) and a destroyer. Three other ships sustained heavy damage. Mikawa did not suffer any losses in the battle, although one of his cruisers was sunk by a U.S. submarine in the return to Rabaul. Mikawa, however, had hauled off


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without attacking the vulnerable transports. The battle clearly demonstrated Japanese superior night-fighting techniques, excellent gunnery, and the effectiveness of Japan’s Long Lance torpedo. Both sides now reinforced Guadalcanal, but U.S. possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance. Rushed to completion, it ultimately boasted about 100 U.S. aircraft. At night the so-called Tokyo Express of Japanese destroyers and light cruisers steamed down the channel between the islands and into the sound to shell Marine positions and deliver supplies. The latter effort was never sufficient and only haphazard. It often consisted of drums filled with supplies pushed off the ships to drift to shore. The next major naval action was the August 22–25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo dispatched to Guadalcanal a convoy of destroyers and transports carrying troop reinforcements. Admiral Kondo¯ Nobutake steamed from Truk toward the Solomons with a task force to provide protection. Fletcher’s carrier aircraft intercepted the Japanese and sank the light carrier Ryujo and several other vessels, but the carrier Enterprise suffered damage. On August 31,

A Japanese Type 99 (Val) dive bomber trails smoke as it dives toward the U.S. aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-8) during the Solomon Islands Campaign on the morning of October 26, 1942. The plane struck the ship’s stack and flight deck. A Type 97 (Kate) torpedo bomber is flying over the carrier after dropping its torpedo, and another Val is off the ship’s bow. Note the antiaircraft shell burst with fragments striking the water. (Naval Historical Center)

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the Japanese torpedoed and badly damaged the carrier Saratoga, reducing U.S. carrier strength to only the Wasp. The Wasp in turn fell victim to a Japanese submarine on September 15. The carrier was so badly damaged by three torpedoes that it had to be scuttled. Another major naval encounter, the Battle of Cape Esperance, occurred during October 11–13. The Americans detected a Japanese convoy off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. In a night engagement on October 12–13, the Japanese lost a cruiser and a destroyer and had a cruiser heavily damaged; one U.S. destroyer was lost, and two cruisers were damaged. The next day, U.S. aircraft sank two other Japanese destroyers that were searching for survivors. Although the battle was not decisive, it was the first U.S. Navy night victory against the Japanese, and it substantially lifted U.S. morale. In October, there were important command changes: Vice Admiral William F. Halsey replaced Ghormley, and Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced Fletcher. Meanwhile, Admiral Kondo¯’s repositioning of ships and Halsey’s instructions to Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet brought on a fourth naval battle for control of the Solomons: the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. In the ensuing engagement of October 26, each side launched simultaneous strikes against the other. In the exchange, U.S. aircraft badly damaged the Japanese light carrier Zuiho¯ and fleet carrier Sho¯kaku. The U.S. carrier Hornet was also severely damaged and was placed under tow; but with Kondo¯’s ships closing in, it was abandoned to be sunk by Japanese destroyers. Japan won the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, leaving the United States with only one carrier in the South Pacific, but the Japanese sustained such losses that they were unable to exploit the situation. From November 12 to 15, a series of intense sea fights took place off Guadalcanal. In the first, on November 12–13, U.S. ships and land aircraft blocked reinforcement of the island by Japanese troops in 11 transports protected by destroyers. At the same time, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, commanding five cruisers and eight destroyers, moved to intercept a powerful Japanese force under Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki that included two battleships that sought to shell Henderson Field. In a night action east of Savo Island, both sides suffered heavy losses. Abe lost the battleship Hiei (badly damaged in the fight, it fell prey to U.S. aircraft the next morning) and two destroyers. The United States lost two cruisers and four destroyers. Virtually all other ships on both sides were damaged. Rear admirals Callaghan and Norman Scott were among the dead, but Tanaka was forced to turn back, and the planned Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field was canceled. On November 13 and 14, Tanaka returned with his reinforcement convoy, and a force of cruisers under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji shelled Henderson Field. However, it failed to knock out the airfield and U.S. aircraft sank one cruiser and damaged another as Nishimura’s force withdrew north. The aircraft then attacked Tanaka’s convoy and sank six transports.


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During the third phase of the naval battle of Guadalcanal (November 14–15), Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee with two battleships and four destroyers met and defeated yet another Japanese force under Kondo¯ near Savo Island. The United States lost two destroyers, but Kondo¯ lost the battleship Kirishima and a destroyer. The net effect of this three-day battle was that Tanaka landed only some 4,000 troops. The Japanese lost six transports sunk, but they had to beach another four, representing some 70,000 tons of scarce shipping. Most important from the U.S. standpoint was that U.S. forces now had around-the-clock control of the waters around Guadalcanal. On November 30, U.S. and Japanese naval forces again clashed in the Battle of Tassafaronga. Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright moved with five cruisers and seven destroyers to intercept Tanaka’s force of eight destroyers carrying supplies to Guadalcanal. In the ensuing fight, Japan lost one destroyer, while the United States had one cruiser sunk and three others badly damaged. As the numbers of U.S. troops ashore steadily grew and Japanese strength dwindled, at the end of December, Tokyo decided to abandon Guadalcanal entirely, and the naval battles of the Solomons came to an end. The final battle of the campaign was a skirmish off Rennell’s Island on January 30, 1943, a victory for Japan. However, by this time the Japanese had almost completely withdrawn from Guadalcanal. The sustained battle for Guadalcanal gave U.S. naval forces the initiative and led to improved U.S. Navy night-fighting and fire-control techniques that served it well in the long years of fighting ahead. William P. McEvoy and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Abe Hiroaki; Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Japan, Navy; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kondo¯ Nobutake; Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching”; Midway, Battle of; Mikawa Gunichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Rennell Island, Battle of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly; United States, Navy.

References Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, November 13, 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Hamel, Eric M. Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942. New York: Crown, 1988. Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

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McGee, William L. The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville—Pacific War Turning Point. Vol. 2, Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII. Tiburon, CA: BMC Publications, 2002. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.

Somerville, Sir James Fownes (1882–1949) British navy admiral. Born at Weybridge, Surrey, on July 17, 1882, James Fownes Somerville entered the Royal Navy as a cadet aboard HMS Britannia in 1897. During World War I, he distinguished himself in the Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign in 1915. Assigned to the navy Signal School, he was director of the Signal Department in the Admiralty from 1924 to 1927. In 1931, Somerville commanded a cruiser. Following service at Portsmouth, he won promotion to rear admiral and had charge of destroyer flotillas in the Mediterranean Fleet. He then commanded the East Indies station, but was invalided home in 1938 with tuberculosis and placed on the retired list as a vice admiral in July 1939. When World War II began, Somerville volunteered his services. He distinguished himself working on the development of radar and then as Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay’s subordinate during the Dunkerque evacuation. After the fall of France, the Royal Navy established a covering force at Gibraltar with Somerville in command. In Operation CATAPULT, Somerville negotiated with French Admiral Marcel Gensoul in an attempt to neutralize French naval units at Mers-el-Kébir. His Force H launched successive attacks on Oran and Dakar with aircraft and gunfire. The Ark Royal’s aircraft then struck Italian bases at Genoa, Livorno, and on Sardinia and Sicily, and Force H covered multiple convoys to Malta from August 1940 to March 1942. Force H fought in the Battle of Cape Teulada on November 26, 1940, and played a decisive role in the hunting down of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941. In March 1942, Somerville took command of the Eastern Fleet, conducting holding operations against the Japanese First Air Fleet’s Indian Ocean offensive. His carriers covered the Diégo-Suarez and Madagascar operations in May and September 1942 before withdrawing to serve elsewhere. Somerville’s Eastern Fleet carriers recommenced offensive operations in 1944 until he relinquished command in August. He was reinstated an admiral on the active list after five years’ war service at sea. Somerville went to Washington, D.C., in October 1944 to head the British naval delegation. He became admiral of the fleet in May 1945 and retired permanently the next year. Somerville died at Wells, Somerset, on May 19, 1949. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; CATAPULT, Operation; Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; Indian Ocean Campaign; Malta; Mersel-Kébir, Battle of; MENACE, Operation; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home.

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References Brown, J. David. Carrier Operations in World War II: The Royal Navy. London: Ian Allan, 1968. Dannreuther, Raymond. Somerville’s Force H. London: Aurum Press, 2005. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940– 1943. London: Chatham, 1998. Macintyre, Donald. Fighting Admiral: The Life and Battles of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville. London: Evans Brothers, 1961. Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea, 1939–1945. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954–1961. Simpson, Michael, ed. The Somerville Papers. Aldershot, UK: Scolar Press, for the Naval Records Society, 1995.

Sonar Sonar—known as ASDIC (for Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) in British and Commonwealth navies until the 1950s—was the most important underwater detection device during World War II. Sonar took two forms: in its active form, it emitted sonic impulses and measured distance and direction through receiving their reflections; in its passive form, it determined bearing and range through comparative analysis of received sound. The Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee produced an experimental sonar set in 1918, but the first operational units did not go to sea until 1928 (aboard British A-class destroyers). By 1940, most major navies deployed some form of active sonar aboard antisubmarine vessels. All were searchlight units that used high-frequency emissions (20 to 40 kilocycles). They had short ranges (to 3,500 yards) and were ineffective at speeds much above 15 knots. Such sets also had a 200-yard dead zone and slow operating rates, and they determined direction but not depth. Most navies, in consequence, relied heavily on hydrophones for submarine search and used sonar primarily for attack guidance. Major wartime sonar developments attempted to address these deficiencies. Power rotation and improved displays enhanced operating rates, and streamlined steel domes raised useful search speeds. Dual-frequency sets (operating at either 14 or 30 kilocycles) enhanced ranges, and tilting transducers helped to eliminate, or at least reduce, the dead zone. Realization of the performance capabilities of German submarines, in particular, drove sonar development. The introduction of heavy depth charges and the monster Mark X* weapon to counter deep-diving U-boats required methods for accurately determining the target’s depth because of the still relatively slow sink rate of these weapons. For accurate depth determination, Britain developed a specialized sonar (Type 147B) that was fitted from 1943 to some Atlantic escorts in addition to its standard type.

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A simultaneous line of development—scanning sonar that used an omnidirectional transmitter coupled to an array of fixed receiving transducers—offered a possible solution to several of the search problems: range, depth determination, and the dead zone. Such equipment required greater power to maintain range. However, since rotation was eliminated, it could be larger and so could operate at lower frequencies, enhancing performance. The successful operational deployment of such equipment in Allied navies, however, had to wait until after the war. Wartime submarines also carried sonar. Most navies relied on active sets for target detection, but Germany pursued a different course with its GHG (Gruppen-Horch-Gerät) equipment, a standard installation from 1935. An array of sound-receiving diaphragms on each side of the bow connected to a pulse-timing compensator and provided bearings of received noise. This apparatus could detect single ships out to 16 miles and large groups to 80 miles, but the bearings it provided were insufficiently precise for accurate attacks. At short ranges, however, a supplemental swiveling hydrophone (Kristall-Basisgerät) generated bearings accurate to within one degree. Finally, to obtain ranges, U-boats carried an active sonar (SUApparatus) developed from surface-warship sets, although this was rarely used since its emissions revealed a submarine’s presence. Trials late in the war, however, using GHG with SU-Apparatus demonstrated that as few as three active pulses sufficed to determine target distance, course, and approximate speed. At the outbreak of war, sonar was widely—though mistakenly—regarded as rendering the ocean transparent in the search for submarines. Its limitations, however, were rapidly appreciated, and major corrections were implemented. By 1942, sonar was an integrated part of a suite of search sensors that included, most importantly, radar and shipborne high-frequency direction finding. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Depth Charges; Hunter-Killer Groups.

References Brown, D. K. Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development, 1923–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Friedman, Norman. Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Southeast Pacific Theater The U.S. Navy’s strategy for the defeat of Japan by a thrust through the Central Pacific depended on control of the southeastern Pacific, particularly the Panama Canal


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region through which all shipping destined for the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific theaters transited. In this regard, the Imperial Japanese Navy squandered a huge potential strategic advantage in not challenging the United States in these waters using its large and capable submarine force. But Japanese doctrine called for submarines to operate in direct fleet support or as scouting forces. Japan never adopted the more aggressive commerce raiding and interdiction roles for its submarines that were employed with great success by both Germany and the United States in the Atlantic and the western Pacific. In this regard, once the anticipated threat to the Panama Canal failed to materialize, the United States dedicated little in the way of naval protection to shipping in the region. The March 1941 ABC Conference of Britain, Canada, and the United States established Pacific operational areas that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconfirmed in March 1942. The agreement gave the navy operational control over the central, southern, northern, and southeastern Pacific areas of operation; the army was responsible for the southwest Pacific. Further, the Pacific Military Council determined in March 1943 that all of the Pacific should be under the strategic command of Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific, although General Douglas MacArthur held overall command of the southwest Pacific. The actual boundaries had been established earlier in Joint Chiefs of Staff directives of April 4, 1942, to MacArthur and Nimitz that outlined the southeastern Pacific as everything east of a line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the mid-Pacific near Clipperton Island and then southward to the South Pole. To patrol this vast ocean area, Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth commanded a tiny force of three older light cruisers and several destroyers. As events played out, however, Shafroth’s force proved more than sufficient, given the lack of Japanese activity. Concern between the Pearl Harbor attack and the Midway victory over the security of the Panama Canal did not reflect in the naval defenses initially allotted to the region. To protect not only the canal itself but also transiting shipping, the U.S. Army had capable forces, but only in the 10-mile-wide Panama Canal Zone. The various Latin American countries offered little in terms of genuine security, even after Mexico and Colombia declared war on the Axis powers in 1942–1943. The navy provided only minimal resources for Rear Admiral Clifford E. Van Hook’s Panama Canal Force, consisting of the elderly destroyers Borie, Barry, Tattnall, and Goff along with the gunboat Erie, 2 patrol craft, 2 small converted motor yachts, and 24 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft. Although a few Japanese submarines entered the area as part of the June 1942 Japanese naval offensive against Midway and the Aleutian Islands, they did no damage. However, German U-boats did tremendous destruction to shipping on the Caribbean side of the canal, including two sinkings just outside the eastern entrance. But, again, the Japanese threat, which might have included carrier strikes, a possibility envisioned in war plans prior to December 1941 (Rainbow 5), never materialized on the Pacific side. Nor did the large 5,200-ton Japanese submarines of the I-400 class carrying three bomber-seaplanes

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(fielded in late 1944 and clearly designed for operations against the U.S. west coast and the Panama Canal) ever deploy to the region as anticipated. Despite the ultimate lack of a credible Japanese threat to U.S. shipping in the southeastern Pacific, a fact not realized until later in the war, naval commanders in 1942 assigned whatever escort assets were available to open-ocean vessels, particularly troop convoys transiting to the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters and Pearl Harbor. In late January 1942, Shafroth’s light cruisers Trenton and Concord and some destroyers escorted two large convoys from the canal through to Bora Bora with 4,500 men assigned to the construction of a new naval fueling station. At about the same time, the carrier Lexington and its assigned force escorted an eight-ship convoy carrying 20,000 troops through the southeastern Pacific (two for Christmas Island, two for Canton Island, and four for New Caledonia). In retrospect, the failure of the Imperial Japanese Navy to harass Allied shipping or to attempt even limited interdiction operations in the southeastern Pacific represented a tremendous missed strategic opportunity. Although such a southeastern Pacific campaign would likely not have changed the eventual outcome of the war, it certainly would have mitigated Allied pressure in other Pacific areas of operation and complicated thrusts against the Japanese defensive perimeter. Stanley D. M. Carpenter See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Panama Canal; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Southwest Pacific Theater.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War 1941–1945. New York: Touchstone, 1991.

Southwest Pacific Theater Geographical area known to Japan as the Southern Resource Area and also the Southeast Area and to the Allies as the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Major land areas in this theater were the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. In August 1942, the boundary was redrawn to exclude Guadalcanal and certain others of the Solomon Islands.


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Japan entered the SWPA in a quest for natural resources, and especially oil. Oil powered Japan’s economy and its armed forces, and the U.S. embargo of oil had helped trigger the Japanese decision to go to war against the United States. Dependent on foreign oil imports and rapidly using up its stocks, Japan needed to secure oil, the absence of which would paralyze Japanese industry within a year and immobilize the fleet within two years. Oil resources in the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese leaders believed, would make Japan self-sufficient in that vital commodity. Japanese Southern Army headquarters in Saigon in French Indochina supervised army operations from the Philippines south. Navy leaders, meanwhile, decided that U.S. airfields and fleet bases could not be tolerated on the flank of this advance. Japanese Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu’s Fourteenth Army with two divisions invaded the Philippines beginning on December 8, 1941. U.S. resistance officially ended on May 7, 1942. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi’s Sixteenth Army with three divisions invaded the Netherlands East Indies beginning on December 20. Dutch resistance there ceased on March 8. The Japanese had an inadequate shipping capacity during the war. By May 1942, the Japanese were securing oil from the conquests, but the fleet was only using about 42 percent of its merchant tanker capacity. Iron, manganese, chrome, and copper awaited exploitation in the Philippines. Japan desperately needed bauxite from the Netherlands East Indies for aircraft aluminum. Nickel was available from the Celebes. Local Japanese commanders were inefficient at developing these resources, and what materials the Japanese did extract from Borneo, Java, and Sumatra encountered shipping bottlenecks. As Japan pushed south, its navy engaged in several actions. The Battle of the Java Sea largely destroyed the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) fleet. The United States won a small victory against Japanese transports in the Battle of Makassar Strait (or Balikpapan). There was also a fight at Badung Strait, and the Allied cruisers Houston and Perth were destroyed in the Battle of Sunda Strait. The short-lived ABDA Command collapsed in early March 1942, and the Japanese breached the Malay Barrier. The startling successes of their initial campaigns encouraged the Japanese navy leadership to propose that five divisions invade Australia. Shipping and logistics, however, posed insurmountable problems, because Japan, already short of shipping capacity, had lost 700,000 tons of shipping—nearly 12 percent of total capacity— sunk or severely damaged in the first four months of war. The Japanese army had never considered operating in the SWPA and had not planned how to campaign over such a large area and with such extended lines of communications. Japanese army planners estimated that to capture Australia would require 12 divisions and 1.5 million tons of shipping. Japan did not have the military assets and resources for such an operation. Australia was simply one continent too far.

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Rather than invade Australia, Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo ordered six of the divisions that had participated in the southern operations back to the Japanese home islands, China, and Manchuria. Planners redirected their logistical effort to the northwest and west when they should have been building bases—especially air bases—and establishing and supplying garrisons in the south. On March 30, 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Southwest Pacific Area. General Douglas MacArthur received command. It succeeded the ABDA area formed on January 15 as well as the Australia–New Zealand Area established at the end of January. The first priority was to strengthen lines of communications to Australia and to build up logistics and airpower. The air war here would be primarily land based. Japan landed troops on New Guinea in February and March 1942. Japan sought Port Moresby on the south coast as an air base, part of its campaign to cut the lines of communications to Australia and to deny the port as a base for Allied counterattacks. In the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, the U.S. Navy deflected the Japanese seaborne invasion attempt. The Japanese then attempted to seize Port Moresby by land, crossing over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Australian forces fought a delaying action south toward Port Moresby that weakened the Japanese and ultimately halted this thrust. The Australians then drove the Japanese back to New Guinea’s north coast. A Japanese landing at Milne Bay failed, boosting Allied morale. On July 2, 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to begin an offensive to clear the Japanese from New Guinea. This effort was limited by the availability of forces and because the U.S. army and navy were both constrained by the priority given to Europe. The long fight for Buna concluded in late January 1943. The Australians and Americans executed shore-to-shore and ship-to-shore operations up New Guinea’s coast. Rabaul on New Britain was initially a target, but the United States chose to bypass that major Japanese bastion, cutting it off from outside resupply. Although progress was slow, the Allies kept the initiative, imposed a tremendous drain on Japanese resources, and prevented the Japanese from consolidating their conquests. Weather, disease, and inhospitable terrain inflicted heavy losses on all combatants in this theater, but especially on the Japanese. Particularly devastating to Japan was the loss of so many of its air assets, and the destruction of Japanese transports in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea gave Japan a stark warning of the precariousness of its position. The Americans launched almost every operation so as to extend their air umbrella and logistics closer to the Philippines. The strategy of island-hopping, which made use of growing U.S. Navy strength in the theater, allowed U.S. forces to advance, yet bypass strong Japanese ground forces. Allied shipping constraints and a shortage of service troops were greater impediments to the advance than shortfalls in combat troops.


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The SWPA was the location of one of two major U.S. offensives (comprising mainly land-based air and ground forces) aimed at Japan. The second location was the Central Pacific, in which the U.S. offensives comprised mainly carrier air and sea power. The Japanese had insufficient assets to meet both offensives and were often off balance as they tried to maneuver against the two. Japan was simultaneously heavily committed in Burma and China and had to maintain major forces in Manchuria as a check on potential action by the Soviet Union. The U.S. SWPA and Central Pacific offensives indirectly supported each other early in the campaigns and then directly supported one another as they converged at the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area. The speed, flexibility, and mass of the two Allied thrusts neutralized the defender’s traditional advantage of interior lines of communications. Coordination between the U.S. Army and Navy of current and future operations was critically important. The Japanese regarded campaigns in New Guinea as a means to delay their enemies, reduce enemies’ resources, and gain time to reorganize for a counteroffensive. Rather than weakening the Allies, however, the campaigns here became a drain on Japanese manpower, ships, and aircraft. Allied airpower cleared Japanese from the air and sea. Nowhere did the Japanese stop the advance, nor could they sustain the attrition that went with it. The vast majority of Japanese troop and logistics shipping occurred in SWPA waters. Oil moved north through these waters, and U.S. submarines attacked the vital Malaya /Netherlands East Indies–Japan line of communications. Japan lost half its cargo-carrying capacity in 1944 to air and submarine attacks. Critical oil and raw materials required for war production in the home islands were sent to the ocean bottom. The Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 largely destroyed what remained of Japanese naval aviation. Japanese navy leaders then developed plans for a decisive battle, depending on the avenue of the U.S. advance. When the United States invaded the Philippines in October, Japan immediately initiated its plan, which resulted in the Battle of Leyte Gulf—the greatest naval battle, in terms of ships and numbers of men engaged, in history. In the ensuing battle, the U.S. Navy all but destroyed the Japanese navy as an organized fighting force. The inability of Japan to transport men and supplies to Leyte and its similar difficulties in supplying and reinforcing Luzon hastened Japan’s defeat in the Philippines. The U.S. conquest of the Philippines enabled U.S. air power there to sever the seaborne supply lines between the Japanese home islands and its Southern Resource Area. U.S. Navy forces swept into the South China Sea in January 1945 and severed Japanese lines of communications with Indochina. The U.S. conquest of the Philippines, the ability of carrier task forces to go wherever they pleased, and the strangulation wrought by the submarine fleet completely isolated the Southern Resource Area.

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Curtiss SB2C-3 Helldiver aircraft bank over the U.S. aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-12) before landing, January 1945. The aircraft are returning from strikes on Japanese shipping in the China Sea. (Naval Historical Center)

Large Japanese ground forces remained in Indochina and in the Netherlands East Indies, but they could play no role in defense of the home islands, nor could raw materials reach the home islands. This fact made MacArthur’s use of Australian forces in Borneo in mid-1945 all the more questionable. It was a campaign with little strategic value. The last operations in the SWPA were U.S. preparations for the invasion of Japan. The Philippines provided staging areas for 18 U.S. Army divisions, large numbers of aircraft, logistics organizations, and hundreds of ships. With Japan’s surrender in August, operations in the SWPA came to an end. The conclusion of hostilities did not bring peace, however, because wars in which indigenous peoples sought independence from their colonial occupiers soon began. John W. Whitman See also: ABDA Command; Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of the; Kolombangara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of;

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Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Sunda Strait, Battle of.

References Bergerud, Eric. Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000. Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The Land Campaign in the South Pacific. New York: Penguin Books, 1996. Craven, Wesley F., and James E. Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vols. 1, 4, 5. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958. Hattori Takushiro. The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War. 4 vols. Trans. Headquarters, 500th Military Intelligence Service Group. Tokyo: Masu, 1953. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vols. 3–6, 8, 12–13. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001. Morton, Louis. United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989.

Soviet Union, Navy When World War II began in September 1939, the Soviet navy was in the process of implementing significant changes in its naval policies. In late 1935, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had switched from the strategic concept of a small war at sea and planned to build a large oceangoing fleet. In August 1939, the Naval Staff had finalized a building plan for the next 10 years for 15 battleships, 16 battle cruisers, 2 light aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 36 destroyer leaders, 163 destroyers, 442 submarines, and many smaller vessels. Of the new construction, only 1 cruiser, 4 leaders, 13 destroyers, and 158 submarines had been completed by the time the war began. In addition to these, the Soviet navy had available only 3 old battleships, 5 cruisers, 17 destroyers, and 7 submarines. During the November 1939–March 1940 war against Finland, the Baltic Fleet carried out shore bombardment and submarine operations against supply traffic to Finland. The fleet sank only a few Finnish ships, at the cost of one submarine lost. The end of the war, however, pushed the Soviet borders forward in the Arctic by inclusion of the entire Fisherman’s Peninsula (Poluostrov Rybachii) and in the Baltic in the Karelian sector. These territorial acquisitions and Hanko at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a new naval base greatly improved the defenses of Leningrad, the Soviet Union’s second-largest city. The nonaggression pact with Germany of August 23, 1939, brought further territorial gains for the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1940, acting under its secret provisions, the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic states, further improving the

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A Soviet battleship fires a broadside on August 2, 1941. (AP/Wide World Photos)

base situation for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In the Black Sea, Soviet territorial gains in Bessarabia created an additional buffer for Odessa and allowed the establishment of a Danube Flotilla. The rising danger of war with Germany forced the Soviet navy in October 1940 to scale down its naval building program. Although Soviet intelligence agencies received many reports about German preparations for an attack, and British and U.S. leaders also sent warnings based on their intelligence reports, Stalin refused to believe Adolf Hitler would attack the Soviet Union before he concluded the war in the west by subduing Britain. He even forbade preparations for a preventative counterattack into the German deployments, which his General Staff had proposed. The German attack of June 22, 1941, therefore, caused great disorder and led to heavy Soviet losses, especially in the army and air force, but also to the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. The program to build an oceangoing fleet had to be scrapped as well. By that time, 4 cruisers, 7 destroyer-leaders, 30 destroyers, and 204 submarines had been commissioned, and the Soviets had added 4 submarines from the Estonian and Latvian fleets to their own forces. Ships in the Far East yards would be completed, whereas the bigger ships in the western yards were laid up for completion after the

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war. Of the ships partly completed, only 3 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 10 cruisers, 2 destroyer-leaders, 42 destroyers, and 91 submarines would be launched. The Baltic Fleet—now comprising 2 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 2 destroyerleaders, 19 destroyers, and 70 submarines—had to defend the entrances to the Bay of Riga and the Gulf of Finland by laying mine barrages. At the same time, the Germans and the Finns (the Finns had, in the so-called Continuation War, reentered the war as a cobelligerent of Germany to secure the territory lost to the Soviet Union earlier) tried to blockade the Baltic Fleet by laying mines. The German attack forced the Soviets to abandon its Baltic bases and the Finnish harbor at Hanko, incurring great losses in the process. The German Juminda barrage of mines was particularly effective, augmented as it was by air attacks against Soviet ships in the enclosed harbor fortress at Kronstadt and at Leningrad. In 1941, the Leningrad shipyards managed to complete 7 destroyers and 5 submarines, but the Soviet Union lost 1 battleship, 15 destroyers, and 28 submarines to mine and air attacks, with many more vessels damaged. From 1942 until October 1944, the Baltic Fleet was confined to the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland by German and Finnish mine barrages. Only the submarines could even try to break out into the open. This tactic met with some success in 1942, when the Soviets launched 31 submarine operations; 22 of these breached the mine barriers and reached the Baltic, where they sank 25 ships. Twelve submarines, however, were lost in these actions. In 1943, all attempts to break through the barriers failed, and 4 more submarines were lost. Only after the Finnish truce of October 1944 did Soviet submarines again try to reach the Baltic Sea. By the end of the war, the remaining 22 submarines managed to sink 35 ships, including the liners Wilhelm Gustloff, General Steuben, and Goya. The Wilhelm Gustloff was the largest German ship ever sunk by a Soviet submarine; some 9,300 people lost their lives. In the case of the General Steuben, of 4,000 people aboard (including 2,000 German military wounded), only 300 survived; and in the case of Goya, only 183 survived of some 7,000 passengers and crew. Most of those perishing in these German ships were refugees from East Prussia and the Baltic states. Baltic Fleet vessels, operating in conjunction with aircraft, also supported the operations of the Red Army in late 1944 and early 1945. They carried out landing operations in the Gulf of Finland and on the Baltic Islands, and they also attacked German naval forces in the area. In June 1941, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of 1 old battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 destroyer-leaders, 14 destroyers, and 44 submarines. The German invasion of the Ukraine that month forced the fleet to first support and then evacuate the cities captured by German and Romanian forces in operations beginning in the Danubian estuaries and lasting through mid-1942. Nikolaev, which contained the chief Soviet building yards, had to be evacuated that August. The cruisers, leaders, and destroyers already launched there were towed to Caucasian ports, and the remaining ships were destroyed before the German forces occupied the city.

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Between August and October, German and Romanian forces surrounded Odessa by land, and Soviet forces there had to be supported by the fleet, which then evacuated the city successfully. For six months, the Soviet main base at Sevastopol also had to be supplied and supported by naval operations that involved nearly all available naval forces. In December 1941, the fleet undertook a great amphibious operation against German forces occupying the Kerch Peninsula in an attempt to relieve the defenders at Sevastopol. By May 1942, however, the Germans had annihilated the Soviet ground forces, and only remnants could be successfully evacuated. During and to the very end of the final German attack on Sevastopol, Soviet surface ships and submarines attempted to supply the fortress and evacuate the wounded. In the course of these operations, which lasted through mid-July 1942, the Black Sea Fleet lost 1 cruiser, 2 destroyer-leaders, 9 destroyers, and 12 submarines. Five of the submarines were lost during operations to interdict Axis sea traffic on the west coast of the Black Sea, an area heavily mined by both the Germans and Romanians. From August 1942 until September 1943, the Black Sea Fleet concerned itself primarily with the supply of harbors on the Caucasian coast that were endangered by the continuing German offensive. This allowed the Red Army to hold Taupse, and naval landing operations coordinated with submarine and motor torpedo boat attacks assisted in the Soviet offensive on the Kuban Peninsula as well. Here Soviet forces successfully interrupted sea traffic between Romania and Crimea. The attacks against German sea traffic along the west coast, however, were largely a failure. The battle for the Crimea began in October 1943 and lasted until May 1944. The Black Sea Fleet again tried to disrupt sea traffic from Konstanta to Sevastopol with submarines, light surface forces, and air attacks. On Stalin’s order, the larger ships were kept out of these operations. After a short pause, in August 1944 the Red Army began its offensive into Romania. Once Romania capitulated, Bulgaria was occupied, and the Germans were forced to scuttle the remainder of their naval forces in the Black Sea—effectively ending naval combat in that theater. Between July 1942 and the end of Black Sea naval operations, the Black Sea Fleet lost 1 destroyer-leader, 2 destroyers, and 14 submarines. A few small submarines were transferred via inland waterways from the Arctic and by rail from the Pacific to augment the fleet there, but they arrived too late to participate in operations against German-Romanian shipping. The Soviet Northern Fleet began the war with 8 destroyers and 15 submarines. Its first task was to support the Red Army in halting the German offensive toward Murmansk. The submarines were then sent to attack German supply traffic along the Norwegian coast from the Lofoten Islands to Kirkenes, although they met only limited initial success. A few British submarines sent to Murmansk for some months achieved slightly better results. The Northern Fleet was soon augmented

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by the transfer of 8 submarines along interior waterways from the Baltic in 1941. Another 5 submarines came from the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, and 12 new submarines arrived from the Caspian during that time as well. The fleet carried out operations throughout the war, inflicting some losses on German shipping and losing 25 submarines, mainly to mine barrages and antisubmarine forces. The fleet also supported Allied convoys over the final portion of the route to Murmansk with destroyers—including 3 sent from the Pacific Fleet via the northern sea route—and naval aircraft. The main defense burden for these convoys, however, fell to the British Home Fleet. In the later years of the war, British and U.S. surface ships and submarines assisted in defending the northern sea route as well. Overall, the Northern Fleet suffered minimal losses beyond the submarines; only 3 destroyers and some escort vessels and auxiliaries were damaged or sunk. The Soviet Pacific Fleet served as a reservoir of personnel and for the training of naval crews for most of the war. However, the Pacific Fleet transferred a few destroyers to the Northern Fleet, along with some submarines. In the last month of the war, strengthened by Lend-Lease deliveries of U.S. ships, the Pacific Fleet took part in the war against Japan, conducting landing operations on the east coast of Korea, Sakhalin Island, and in the Kurile Islands. Lend-Lease played a vital role in securing the route along the Aleutian Islands to Kamchatka and Soviet bases in the Far East, especially Vladivostok. This proved to be a much safer route than either Murmansk or Arkhangelsk for Allied supplies to reach the Soviet Union, not least because of the Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact of March 1941. The fleet lost only five submarines through accidents during these operations, though two were eventually recovered. One more submarine, which was en route to the Northern Fleet, was lost to a Japanese submarine attack just off the west coast of the United States. A submarine also went down in the final days of the war, sunk in all likelihood by a Japanese mine. Outside of these major theater operations, the Soviet navy also used river flotillas. The first flotilla operations came on the Pripjet River in September 1939 against the Poles. Other operations followed: on the Danube and the Dnieper in 1941; on the Volga in 1942; and on the Danube again in 1944 and 1945. Flotillas carried out operations on Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega from 1941 to 1944, and they assisted the Red Army in its operations on smaller seas, rivers, and lakes. Jürgen Rohwer See also: Baltic Sea, Area of Operations; Black Sea, Area of Operations; Convoys, Allied; Lend-Lease.

References Achkasov, V. I., and N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

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Berezhnoi, S. S. Flot SSSR Korabli i suda lendlisa. St. Petersburg, Russia: Spravochnik Velen, 1994. Berezhnoi, S. S. Korabli i suda VMF SSSR 1928–1945. Moscow: SpravochnikVoenizdat, 1988. Berezhnoi, S. S. Troefi i reparatsi VMF SSSR. Yatkutsk, Russia: Spravochnik, 1994. Herrick, Robert W. Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968. Meister, Jürg. Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London: MacDonald and Jane’s, 1977. Rohwer, Jürgen, and Gerhard Hümmelchen. Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books, 1992. Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Stalin’s Ocean-going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programs, 1935–1953. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

Spitsbergen Of tactical and strategic importance, the Norwegian islands of Spitsbergen are located in the Arctic Sea north of the mainland. Extending over some 23,658 square miles, the islands comprise the major share of the larger Svalbard group. During the war, Allied convoys regularly passed through this territory carrying Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. In 1943, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall noted in a public speech that while World War I for him had exemplified the importance of roads, railroads, and rivers, World War II demonstrated dramatically the importance of oceans. His comment bears directly on the role of Spitsbergen. Ocean currents and climate gave Spitsbergen strategic importance. The North Atlantic drift, an extension of the Gulf Stream, brings abnormally warm water north of the Arctic Circle directly past the islands, continuing to the ice-free Russian port of Murmansk and dissipating in the vicinity of Novaya Zemla. During the war, both sides established weather stations and port and loading facilities in the islands, and they also mined coal there. After Germany conquered Norway in 1940, it occupied Spitsbergen. In August 1941, a Canadian raiding party centered on the 49th Battalion of the Edmunton Regiment attacked and destroyed a German meteorological station in the islands, wrecked asbestos and gypsum mines, and destroyed about 450,000 tons of mined coal and 275,000 gallons of oil. The raiders then evacuated the Norwegian population to England. Later, about 2,000 Russian miners were transported to a northern Soviet port and hence to the islands. The Allies also established a base there. Germany carried out a major raid on Spitsbergen on September 8, 1943. Operation SIZILIEN included two battleships, the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, five destroyers, and four other vessels. The raiders departed Altafjord on September 6. On

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September 9, they destroyed by gunfire Allied coal and port facilities and weather stations. By that date, however, the Allies were firmly in control of the islands. Arthur I. Cyr See also: Germany, Navy; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.

Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick (1896–1955) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Dorchester, Massachusetts, on January 8, 1896, Clifton Albert Frederick Sprague graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1918. He served on board the gunboat Wheeling in the Mediterranean from June 1917 to October 1918. Following shore duty, Sprague qualified as a naval aviator at Pensacola Navy Air Station in 1920. He then served aboard the airship tender Wright on the West Coast (1920–1923). From 1926 to 1928, Sprague was stationed at Hampton Roads Naval Air Station, where he helped develop arresting gear for aircraft-carrier landings. He was then assistant air officer aboard the aircraft carrier Lexington (1928–1929) before commanding a patrol squadron aboard the Wright at San Diego, in the Panama Canal Zone, and at Pearl Harbor. He served once again at the Hampton Roads Naval Air Station before helping to outfit the Yorktown, where he was air officer from 1937 to 1939. From 1939 to 1941, he commanded auxiliaries. Sprague was commanding the seaplane tender Tangier at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked on December 7, 1941. In June 1942, Sprague became chief of staff of the Gulf Sea Frontier, helping to develop convoy techniques. In 1943, he commanded the Seattle Naval Air Station. Promoted to captain, Sprague outfitted the carrier Wasp and brought it into commission that November. He continued as skipper of the Wasp through the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Promoted to rear admiral in August 1944, Sprague commanded escort carrier Task Unit 77.4.3 (“Taffy 3”) in the invasion of Leyte Island in the Philippines. On the morning of October 25, 1944, Japanese Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo’s superior force surprised the Americans in Leyte Gulf. Sprague’s command of 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, and 4 destroyer escorts was nearest to an advancing Japanese force that numbered 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and

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11 destroyers. While ordering his destroyers to attack the Japanese, Sprague summoned air support from other escort-carrier groups. His defensive efforts eventually led the Japanese to withdraw. Sprague’s handling of the battle, as well as the bravery of the men on the destroyers, are credited with preventing the Japanese force from destroying the U.S. transports anchored off the invasion beaches. In February 1945, Sprague took command of Carrier Division 26, participating in support of the U.S. landings at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. He then headed Carrier Division 2. In summer 1946, Sprague commanded Joint Task Group 1.1.2 and Navy Air Group Joint Task Force 1 in the Bikini atomic bomb tests. From 1946 to 1948, he was chief of naval air basic training at Corpus Christi, Texas. He commanded Carrier Division 6 in the Mediterranean in 1948 and 1949 and the 17th Naval District and Alaskan Sea Frontier from 1941 to 1951. Sprague retired in November 1951 as a vice admiral. He died in San Diego, California, on April 11, 1955. Edward F. Finch See also: DETACHMENT, Operation; Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Reynolds, Clark G. “Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick ‘Ziggy.’ ” In Famous American Admirals (pp. 322–324). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Wukovits, John F. Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Sprague, Thomas Lamison (1894–1972) U.S. navy admiral. Born in Lima, Ohio, on October 2, 1894, Thomas Lamison Sprague graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1917. Following U.S. entry into World War I, he served in Atlantic convoy duty aboard a cruiser and then on antisubmarine patrol aboard the destroyer Montgomery, commanding it as a lieutenant in 1920. Sprague next underwent flight training at Pensacola Naval Air Station and was designated a naval aviator. Staff and flight assignments followed. During 1931 and 1932, he commanded Scouting Squadron 6. He then supervised a laboratory at the Philadelphia naval aircraft factory, was air officer aboard the carrier Saratoga in 1935 and 1936, and served as superintendent of naval air training at Pensacola from 1937 to 1940. Sprague served as executive officer of the carrier Ranger in

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the Atlantic in 1940 and 1941. He next helped to commission the new escort carrier Charger and took command of it during Chesapeake Bay training operations for antisubmarine patrols. Following a tour of duty as chief of staff to the commander of air units in the Atlantic Fleet in the first half of 1943, Sprague fitted out and commanded the carrier Intrepid through operations in the Marshall Islands and off Truk. He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1944 and assumed command of Carrier Division 22, which comprised 18 escort carriers and numerous destroyers and destroyer-escorts, for operations off Guam and the Philippine Islands. On the morning of October 25, 1944, Sprague’s division, designated Task Group TG 77.4 (“Taffy 1”), was divided into three groups spread across Leyte Gulf supporting the amphibious operation when a powerful Japanese surface force under Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo surprised the Americans. Sprague ordered all of his aircraft to attack the enemy while two of his groups made smoke and moved away from the foe. The other group (TG 77.4.3, “Taffy 3”), commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague (no relation), bore the brunt of the Japanese attack. The ferocity of the U.S. counterattack convinced Kurita that his forces had encountered the bulk of the U.S. fleet, not merely an escort carrier group. Kurita then called off the attack, sparing both Thomas Sprague’s unit and the vulnerable transports supporting the invasion of Leyte. Sprague next commanded Carrier Division 3 off Okinawa (April–June 1945) and Task Force 38.1 off Japan (July–August 1945). Following the war, Sprague was first deputy chief and then chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (1946– 1949). He was promoted to vice admiral in August 1949, and he then commanded all air units in the Pacific Fleet until his retirement in April 1952. He returned briefly to duty in 1956 and 1957 to negotiate with the Philippine government about bases in the Philippines. Sprague died in Oakland, California, on September 17, 1972. Edward F. Finch See also: Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick; Truk, Raid on.

References Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle for Leyte Gulf, 23–October 26, 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. New York: Scribner, 1995. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Reynolds, Clark G. “Sprague, Thomas Lamison.” In Famous American Admirals (pp. 325– 326). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

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Vego, Milan N. Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Spruance, Raymond Ames (1886–1969) U.S. navy admiral. Born on July 3, 1886, in Baltimore, Maryland, Raymond Ames Spruance grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in September 1906. Spruance’s early assignments included service on the battleship Minnesota during the around-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet. His first command was the destroyer Bainbridge in 1913. During World War I, Spruance rose to the rank of commander and commanded a troop ship. He then commanded destroyers, attended the Naval War College, served in the Office of Naval Intelligence, taught at the Naval War College, and commanded the battleship Mississippi. Spruance was promoted to captain in 1932 and to rear admiral in 1939. In July 1941, he took command of Cruiser Division 5 of four heavy cruisers and support ships at Pearl Harbor. As surface screen commander for Vice Admiral William F. Halsey’s carriers, he participated in raids on the Gilberts, Marshalls, Wake, and Marcus islands and in the raid on Tokyo in April 1942. When Halsey was confined to the hospital with a severe skin allergy, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, on Halsey’s recommendation, appointed Spruance to replace him as Task Force 16 commander. Spruance brilliantly handled the air and naval assets availRaymond A. Spruance was one of World War II’s most able to him, and his forces capable naval leaders. He helped orchestrate the deciwon the Battle of Midway. sive American victory at Midway in June 1942 and comNimitz then named Spruance manded the Fifth Fleet during notable island conquests in the Central Pacific. (Naval Historical Center) his chief of staff.

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In May 1943, Spruance was promoted to vice admiral. In August, he took command of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area, which became known as the Fifth Fleet in April 1944. Promoted to admiral in February 1944 and operating from the heavy cruiser Indianapolis as his flagship, he led campaigns against Japanese naval forces and island strongholds from the Gilberts and Marshalls through the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Spruance directed Operation HAILSTONE, the highly successful raid on Truk in February 1944 that destroyed 12 Japanese warships and auxiliaries, 26 merchant ships, and some 249 aircraft. Although the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19– 21, 1944) was a major defeat for Japan, in which it suffered the loss of 3 carriers, 2 oilers, and more than 600 aircraft, Spruance came under criticism in some quarters for not being sufficiently aggressive. Spruance took command of the Pacific Fleet from Nimitz in November 1945. Congressman Carl Vinson, a strong supporter of Admiral Halsey, blocked efforts to secure Spruance’s promotion to admiral of the fleet (five-star rank). In an unprecedented step, Congress did eventually pass a bill providing that Spruance would receive full admiral’s pay on retirement for the rest of his life. In February 1946, Spruance became the president of the Naval War College. He retired from the navy in July 1948 and served as ambassador to the Philippines during 1952–1955. Spruance died on December 13, 1969, in Pebble Beach, California. The Spruance class of modern destroyers, the last of which were decommissioned in 2005, were named for him. William Head See also: DETACHMENT, Operation; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the.

References Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. Forrestel, Emmet P. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN: A Study in Command. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007.

Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty” (1880–1972) U.S. navy admiral and chief of naval operations. Born in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1880, Harold Raynsford Stark graduated in 1903 from

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the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, where he acquired the nickname Betty for a remark made by Revolutionary War hero John Stark. He was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Navy in 1905. Stark participated in the Great White Fleet’s 1907–1909 around-the-world cruise, and, as a World War I staff officer, he helped coordinate Anglo-American naval operations. He then commanded a flotilla in the Mediterranean, and he subsequently captained torpedo boats, destroyers, and an armed cruiser. Stark graduated from the Naval War College in 1924 and then served as an aide to the secretary of the navy from 1930 to 1933. Promoted to rear admiral in November 1934, he was chief of the Bureau of Ordnance from 1934 to 1937. After his promotion to vice admiral, he commanded all cruisers in the Battle Force in 1938 and 1939. During these years, Stark was a staunch proponent of naval preparedness. In August 1939, one month before World War II began in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Stark chief of naval operations as a full admiral. Stark, who shared Roosevelt’s profoundly interventionist outlook, immediately launched an expansion program designed to make the U.S. Navy the world’s largest naval force. His memorandum Plan D (Dog), prepared for Roosevelt in November 1940, delineated what became the fundamental U.S. wartime strategy—that Germany, the greatest threat to the United States, must be defeated first. Convinced that Britain’s survival was essential to U.S. national security, in early 1941, Stark proposed and held staff talks with a high-level British delegation. The resulting ABC-1 (America-Britain-Canada) Rainbow 5 strategic agreement, much of which Stark drafted, became the basis of wartime Anglo-American cooperation. Stark constantly urged Roosevelt to do more to assist Britain, and, by autumn 1941, U.S. naval forces were effectively at war with Germany in the Battle of the Atlantic. Although Stark attempted to improve Pacific fortifications and naval strength, he opposed measures (such as an oil embargo) that might provoke forceful Japanese responses. Like other U.S. military and civilian officials, he failed to interpret correctly or transmit to Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, U.S. commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, deciphered cable traffic indicating that Japan might attack the United States’ Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii. One investigation later faulted him for this misjudgment. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt replaced Stark as commander of U.S. naval forces with Admiral Ernest J. King. In March 1942, Roosevelt dispatched Stark to Britain as commander of U.S. naval forces in the European theater. Stark performed valuable wartime liaison functions between London and Washington, established and later dismantled certain U.S. naval bases in Europe, directed logistical support for U.S. naval forces, and served as Wash-

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ington’s unofficial envoy to Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle. Stark retired from active duty in 1946 and died in Washington, D.C., on August 20, 1972. Priscilla Roberts See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Kimmel, Husband Edward; King, Ernest Joseph; Knox, William Franklin “Frank”; Leahy, William Daniel; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States, Navy.

References Cowman, Ian. Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific, 1937– 1941. Washington, DC: Berg, 1996. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978. Simpson, B. Mitchell, III. Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939–1945. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. Stoler, Mark A. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

STARVATION, Operation The mining by U.S. aircraft of Japan’s home waters. By 1945, Japan had withdrawn most of its remaining merchant shipping to the home islands, where it operated principally in coastal waters, relatively safe from submarine attack. After some delays and interservice squabbles in which U.S. Army Air Forces Major General Curtis LeMay protested the diversion of his aircraft to this mission, on March 27, 1945, U.S. B-29s of the Mariana Islands–based XXI Bomber Command launched Operation STARVATION. It was a systematic mining campaign designed to disrupt Japan’s overseas and interisland trade, complete the submarine blockade, and thus prevent food and raw materials from reaching Japan. B-29s planted mines outside Japan’s major ports, in the Inland Sea, and in critical straits, particularly the heavily trafficked Shimonoseki Strait. Japan proved to be as unprepared for mines as it had been for submarines. It relocated searchlights and antiaircraft batteries in an effort to shoot down the minelaying B-29s, and it increased research into mine countermeasures, but the efforts were inadequate. Japan never developed effective techniques to sweep acoustic and pressure mines. Instead, the Japanese continued to sail ships into mined waters, hoping to run ships through the minefields faster than the United States could lay additional mines. In May 1945, U.S. mines sank or disabled more Japanese ships than did submarines. Mines blocked 19 of Japan’s 22 principal shipyards, preventing the repair of

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damaged ships. Arrivals at Japan’s industrial ports dropped from 800,000 tons in March to 250,000 tons in July, when food displaced coal and iron as Japan’s predominant import. Yet Japan failed to import sufficient food to meet its people’s needs, and average daily per capita food intake dropped from 1,900 calories in 1944 to 1,680 calories by midsummer 1945. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese (millions, according to some estimates) faced imminent starvation, and growing numbers of Japan’s remaining factories were rendered idle for lack of raw materials. Mining sorties accounted for only 5.7 percent of XXI Bomber Command’s sorties that summer. Short of mines and more interested in bombing Japanese cities, the XXI Bomber Command never devoted the effort to laying mines that the navy had hoped for. Yet, at a cost of only 15 planes, 1,528 B-29 sorties dropped 12,135 mines into Japanese home waters by the war’s end. These damaged or sank at least 750,000 tons of Japanese shipping (possibly as much as 1.25 million tons) and closed most of Japan’s ports. Damaged ships piled up in Japanese ports, and mercantile traffic dropped to a trickle. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz described Operation STARVATION’s results as “phenomenal.” It proved a vital element of the strategy of blockade and bombing that forced Japan’s surrender. Stephen K. Stein See also: Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Minelaying; Nimitz, Chester William.

References Johnson, Ellis A., and D. Katcher. Mines against Japan. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. Lott, Arnold S. Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Naval Analysis Division, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign against Japan. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1969. Sallagar, Frederick M. Lessons from an Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation Starvation). Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1974.

Strait of Gibraltar Narrow channel of water that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea and that separates Spain from Morocco. At its narrowest point, the passageway between Europe and Africa is just 7.7 nautical miles, although its waters are deep, ranging from 985 ft. to nearly 3,000 ft. Ferries and relatively swift boats can navigate the Strait of Gibraltar in about 35 minutes. The two points of land flanking the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar (one of which is the Rock of Gibraltar

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in southern Spain) have been known since antiquity as the “Pillars of Hercules.” There are several small islets within the channel. The strategic importance of the strait cannot be overemphasized; it provides the only entrance into and exit out of the Mediterranean in the west and is the only direct link between the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The wave action at the surface of the strait tends to be moderate, but shipping interests using the strait must nevertheless be careful, because water moving over a shallow, underwater sill that separates the two bodies of water can create unpredictable currents. The climate of the region tends to be warm and arid, meaning that the strait is not usually subjected to severe storms or unpredictable weather. The British bastion at Gibraltar was a critically important stronghold for the Allies during the Second World War. From there, the invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH) was planned and coordinated in 1942. The Allies, especially the British, struggled mightily to keep the strait open to shipping—no easy task given German submarine warfare during 1941–1944, repeated Italian attempts to wage underwater warfare and harass Gibraltar itself during 1942–1943, and a Vichy French attack on Gibraltar in July 1940. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: Gibraltar; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of.

References Fa, Darren, and Clive Finlayson. The Fortifications of Gibraltar: 1068–1945. London: Osprey, 2006. Jackson, William. The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar. 2nd ed. Grendon, Northamptonshire, UK: Gibraltar Books, 1990.

Strait of Sicily The relatively narrow channel of water that separates the western Mediterranean Sea and the Tyrrhenian Sea from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Strait of Sicily, also known as the Sicilian Channel or Sicilian Strait, lies between the Italiancontrolled island of Sicily to the north and east and Tunis (North Africa) to the south and west. The Italians refer to the strait as the Canale di Sicilia, or the Stretto di Sicilia. The Strait of Sicily is approximately 100 miles across at its widest point and has a maximum depth of some 1,037 ft. The strait is known for its powerful and sometimes erratic currents, which make navigating it by boat or ship a challenging task. Oceanographers have discovered that its deeper currents run generally east to west, while shallow and surface currents travel in the opposite direction. There

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are several islands within the Strait of Sicily, of which the largest by far is Pantelleria, which is situated about 60 miles southwest of Sicily and 40 miles northeast of Tunis. The strait has significant geographic and strategic value because it controls the only direct sea access route from Western Europe to North Africa and the Middle East. The island of Malta, another strategically significant landmark, lies just to the east of the strait. The Strait of Sicily was the locale of numerous naval encounters between Italian vessels and British and U.S. ships during the prelude to the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) in 1943. The Italians also mined parts of the waterway to stymie Allied shipping. In May 1943, the Allies used the strait during Operation RETRIBUTION, a naval effort to block an Axis withdrawal from North Africa. The Allies secured Pantelleria that same month as a prelude to their invasion of Sicily. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: HUSKY, Operation; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in.

References D’Este, Carlo. Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988. Mangone, Gerarad J., ed. The International Straits of the World. Vol. 4, The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943–June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954.

Stump, Felix Budwell (1894–1972) U.S. navy admiral. Born on December 15, 1894, in Parkersburg, West Virginia, Felix Budwell Stump graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1917. He served in the cruiser Cincinnati during World War I. Following the war, Stump underwent flight training at Pensacola in 1919 and 1920, and he earned an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1923. Stump then was assigned to Torpedo Squadron 2 on the experimental aircraft carrier Langley. Later, he was navigator of the carrier Lexington and then executive officer of the carrier Enterprise in 1940 and 1941. Stump’s World War II service started with his transfer in January 1942 from commanding officer of the Langley to the staff of the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet. Following the dissolution of that command, he spent eight months as air officer to the commander, Western Sea Frontier. In December 1942, Stump commissioned the new carrier Lexington, and he commanded it in operations against Tarawa, Wake Island, the Gilbert Islands, and Kwajalein.

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Stump commanded escort Carrier Division 24 for most of 1944. As part of Task Force 52, he supported landings in the Mariana Islands in the summer of 1944. Stump commanded Task Unit 77.4.2 (known as “Taffy 2”) during the invasion of Leyte in the fall of 1944. During this operation, his escort carriers engaged Admiral Kurita Takeo’s powerful Center Force at the battle off Samar and sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Chikuma. Stump commanded Task Unit 77.12.1 in support of the landings at Mindoro in December 1944. He then commanded the San Fabian Carrier Group during the landings on Luzon in January 1945. In the spring of 1945, Stump supported the invasion of Okinawa with his escort carriers. Stump became chief of Naval Air Technical Training in June 1945, a post he held until his promotion to vice admiral in December 1948. In July 1953, Stump became commander in chief, Pacific and Pacific Fleet. Later, in March 1955, he was appointed U.S. military adviser to the South East Asia Treaty Organization. Stump retired in August 1958. He died at Bethesda, Maryland, on June 13, 1972. Robert Krumel See also: Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Marianas Islands Campaign; Wake Island, Battle for.

References Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Submarines During the period between the two world wars, the world’s major navies constructed small classes of submarines that served the dual purpose of meeting immediate operational needs and providing data for the development of improved vessels. By the mid-1930s, most of these navies had evolved one or two basic types that were well matched to their operational requirements, had attained substantial design maturity, and were suited to large-scale series production. The vast majority of submarines that served during World War II, rather than having radical new designs, were of standardized types that had been modified in the light of operational experience. These standardized submarine types shared many common features. Functionally, they were submersibles rather than true submarines; their designs were optimized for operation on the surface, and they had only limited capabilities while

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submerged. Underwater, they relied on electric motors powered by large storage batteries for propulsion; on the surface, they used diesel engines for propulsion and to recharge the batteries. The submarines incorporated substantial numbers of torpedo tubes and reload torpedoes, and they also mounted guns for use against surface or aerial targets. Their operational range was a function of the capacity of their bunkers for diesel fuel; their radius of action while submerged was limited by battery cell capacity. Maximum speed while submerged usually was not much more than half their surface speed, and maintaining high submerged speeds was impossible for any length of time without totally draining the batteries and forcing the submarine to the surface. Consequently, most navies during the conflict primarily operated their submarines as stealthy surface vessels that could submerge for evasion or escape before or after an attack.

Britain British submarine development was influenced by the cruiser and fleet submarine concepts. The main thrust of early evolution between the wars centered on the overseas patrol type, which displaced 1,475 tons on the surface and had a range of 10,900 miles at eight knots, a submerged endurance of 36 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 500 ft. Armament included a battery of 8 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes and a 4-inch deck gun. A group of similar-sized minelaying submarines also was built, as was a small series of very fast large submarines for work with the fleet, but both of these developments proved very expensive and of limited operational usefulness. In the early 1930s, a fresh start was made with the Swordfish class, which was designed for offensive patrols in narrow waters. These boats displaced 640 tons standard. They had a cruising range of 3,800 miles at nine knots on the surface and 36 hours at three knots submerged, and they could dive to 300 ft. Armament was 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and a 3-inch gun. A larger overseas patrol type, the Triton class, appeared in 1937. These displaced 1,090 tons standard; they had a cruising range of 4,500 miles at 11 knots on the surface and 55 hours at 3 knots submerged, and they could dive to 300 ft. Armament was 10 torpedo tubes with 16 torpedoes and a 4-inch gun. Britain concentrated its production of submarines during the war on these two types, producing a total of 62 of the S type and 53 of the T type. Just before the war, the Royal Navy developed a small submarine for training not only crews and new commanding officers but also antisubmarine vessels. When war came, the design was quickly adapted for operational use, and the submarine proved particularly useful in confined waters such as the North Sea and Mediterranean. The U class displaced between 540 and 646 tons on the surface, with a range of 3,600 miles at 10 knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at

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2 knots, and a diving depth of 200 ft. Armament included a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 10 torpedoes and a 3-inch deck gun. A total of 71 boats were constructed of this class and its slightly improved successors of the V class. Although they were useful boats in the early part of the war, the later examples diverted resources from construction of more effective vessels. Britain also built some 36 midget submarines; with four-man crews, these vessels attacked ships at anchor in harbor.

France France constructed three series of submarines in the period between the wars: large oceangoing long-range vessels for worldwide service and for operation with the fleet, smaller boats for offensive patrols in European waters, and a successful group of minelayers. The first postwar French submarines were of the 1922 and 1923 programs and were based on the study of German U-boats taken as reparations. These nine submarines of the Requin class had a standard surface displacement of 947 tons and were armed with ten 21.7-inch torpedo tubes, one 3.9-inch deck gun, and two 25.2-mm machine guns. The 31 large submarines of the Redoutable class (launched between 1928 and 1937) generally were regarded as very effective boats. They displaced 1,384 tons standard on the surface; their maximum range was 10,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface, and their submerged endurance was 60 hours at 2 knots. They had a battery of 11 torpedo tubes (7 of them in two remotely controlled trainable external mounts) with a total of 13 torpedoes and a single 3.9-inch deck gun. The French also constructed several smaller seagoing patrol-type submarines. A 1922 building program called for four 600-ton boats. These were the Sirène-class, nine of which were eventually built. Several other patrol-type submarine classes were authorized in the years before the war, but not all were complete when France fell in June 1940. These submarines displaced between 600 and 900 tons. The Aurore class, the last series of French submarines being constructed when World War II began, displaced 893 tons and were armed with nine 21.7-inch torpedo tubes (three in an external remotely controlled trainable mount) plus a single 3.9-inch deck gun and two 13-mm machine guns. The French minelaying submarines of the Saphir class displaced 761 tons on the surface and could cruise for 7,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. They had a submerged endurance of 48 hours at 2 knots and could safely operate to a depth of 250 ft. They carried 5 torpedo tubes (3 in a trainable external mount) with 7 torpedoes, 32 mines, and a single 3-inch deck gun. The French navy also operated the largest submarine in the world at the outbreak of the war. The Surcouf, designed for long-range commerce warfare, displaced 2,880 tons standard on the surface and had a range of 10,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. It had a range of 60 hours at 2 knots submerged and could operate safely

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at a depth of 250 ft. The Surcouf’s battery included no fewer than 12 tubes (8 in external mounts) with 22 torpedoes, two 8-inch guns in a special turret mounting, and a seaplane stowed in a hangar and launched with a catapult. The Surcouf also was equipped with a special compartment to accommodate prisoners taken from intercepted vessels and a small motor launch to transport boarding parties. The submarine proved to be successful in peacetime, but it never operated as designed during combat because of the fall of France and the boat’s subsequent loss in a collision.

Soviet Union At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Soviet Union deployed the world’s largest submarine force, with 168 boats in service. Soviet mass production of submarines began early and produced a wide variety of types. There were two basic series of M-type coastal submarines, two basic medium submarine series (the S type, derived from the same basic design as the German Type VII, and the Shch or Pike type of indigenous origin), minelayers of the L type, and long-range boats of the K type. The final M type displaced 283 tons when surfaced, had a range of 4,500 miles at 8 knots on the surface or 36 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 295 ft., and had a battery of 2 torpedo tubes with 4 torpedoes and a 45-mm antiaircraft gun. The S type displaced 856 tons surfaced, had a range of 9,500 miles at 9 knots on the surface or 45 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 330 ft., and had a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and a 4-inch deck gun. Their indigenous rivals displaced 587 tons, had a range of 3,650 miles at 7 knots on the surface or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 295 ft., and carried 6 torpedo tubes with 10 torpedoes. The minelayers displaced 1,108 tons, had a range of 10,000 miles at 8.6 knots on the surface or 60 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 ft., and carried 8 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes and 20 mines. The K-type boats were very popular with their crews and were regarded as the best Soviet submarines of the war. These displaced 1,480 tons, had a range of 15,000 miles at 9 knots on the surface or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 ft., and carried 10 torpedo tubes with 24 torpedoes. Despite this variety, the Soviet Union’s yards produced a great many submarines, completing some 200 boats during the course of the war.

United States The U.S. Navy took the process of type standardization the farthest, entering World War II with a single basic design that was improved but never replaced during the course of the conflict. These fleet boats emerged through the crystallization and synthesis of a series of designs produced to meet requirements for fleet submarines

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to accompany the battle fleet, cruiser submarines for long-distance raiding, and patrol submarines for offensive operations in the Pacific. Nine vessels (essentially experimental prototypes) in five classes were produced between 1921 and 1934, ranging in size from 1,100 tons to 2,700 tons standard on the surface. Overall, these submarines were not very successful, suffering problems with their diesel machinery, diving ability, and general reliability, but they provided valuable experience and data for an improved design. The new series that began with the Porpoise class of 1934 were of 1,310 to 1,475 tons standard on the surface. They introduced diesel-electric reduction drive, which proved vastly more reliable than previous arrangements. Surface cruising range was 11,000 miles at 10 knots, and they had a patrol endurance of 75 days. They could operate for up to 48 hours submerged at 2 knots and had a safe-operatingdepth limit of 250 ft. A battery of 6 to 8 torpedo tubes with 16 to 24 torpedoes was fitted, along with a light deck gun. Between 1934 and 1940, 38 submarines of this group were constructed, and they formed the backbone of the U.S. submarine force when the United States entered the war. The Gato class that followed became the first wartime standard class. Displacement rose to 1,526 tons, the torpedo tube battery increased to 10 tubes, and safe depth increased to 300 ft. They were followed by the very similar Balao class; its deeper safe-operating depth of 400 ft. was accomplished by substituting high-tensile steel for the mild steel used in earlier boats. The Tench class introduced dieselelectric direct drive that brought about a significant reduction in noise and internal machinery space, leading to the addition of four reload torpedoes to the outfit. A total of 221 submarines from these three classes were completed during or immediately after the war. Significant wartime modifications included reducing superstructure, adding radar, and enlarging the gun armament by fitting 4-inch or 5-inch deck guns and adding multiple light antiaircraft weapons.

Germany The Germans developed their submarines clandestinely, since the Versailles Treaty prohibited them such weapons. Design work continued for foreign navies, with production undertaken in the customers’ yards under German supervision. The first new German submarine, U-1, was completed only five weeks after German chancellor Adolf Hitler’s repudiation of the Versailles Treaty on June 29, 1935. The overwhelming majority of the 1,150 U-boats commissioned between 1935 and 1945 belonged to two groups: the 500-ton Type VII medium boats and the 740-ton Type IX long-range submarines. The Type VIIC displaced between 760 and 1,000 tons on the surface; it had a cruising range of 6,500 to 10,000 miles at 12 knots on the surface and 80 miles at 4 knots submerged. It had a battery of

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German Navy submarine U-255, a Type-VIIC U-boat, approaches its berth in Bergen, Norway. Based in Norway during 1942–1943, U-255 was one of the most successful German submarines to operate in the Arctic during the war. It survived the war, having sunk a U.S. destroyer escort and 10 merchant ships. (Naval Historical Center)

5 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes, an 88-mm deck gun, and ever-increasing numbers of light antiaircraft weapons. Almost 700 of these boats in all their variants entered service during World War II. The Type IXC displaced 1,120 tons; it had a cruising range of 11,000 miles at 12 knots on the surface and 64 hours at 2 knots submerged. It had a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 22 torpedoes, a 105-mm deck gun, and ever-increasing numbers of light antiaircraft weapons. Almost 200 of this type and its variants were commissioned. Germany also commissioned several other important types of submarines during the war. Among the most important were the Type X minelayers and the Type XIV supply boats. Both variants operated as replenishment vessels for operational boats during the Battle of the Atlantic, providing fuel, provisions, medical supplies, reload torpedoes, and even medical care and replacement crew members. Consequently, they became prime targets for Allied antisubmarine forces, and few survived. The other major vessels were the radical Type XXI and Type XXIII boats designed for high submerged speed and extended underwater operation. Revolutionary streamlined hull shapes, greatly increased battery space, and the installation of snorkels allowed these boats to operate at submerged speeds that made them very difficult targets for Allied antisubmarine forces. However, confused production

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priorities and the general shortage of materials late in the war prevented more than a very few from putting to sea operationally.

Italy Italian submarines were of four basic types: very large oceangoing cruiser submarines, large minelayers, large long-range patrol boats, and medium-size vessels. The cruisers were few and proved rather unsuccessful, especially because they were slow to dive; they saw little operational service. The minelayers were much more successful. They displaced between 1,054 and 1,305 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 8,500 miles at nine knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 ft. Armament included a battery of 6 to 8 torpedo tubes with 8 to 14 torpedoes, 36 mines, and one or two 3-inch deck guns. The two series of patrol submarines emerged as essentially standard designs immediately before the war began. The larger group displaced between 920 and 1,000 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 9,000 miles at eight knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 ft. Armament included a battery of 8 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and one 4-inch deck gun. The smaller group displaced between 650 and 680 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 5,000 miles at eight knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 ft. Armament included a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and one 4-inch deck gun. These smaller patrol submarines were very successful boats and performed well in the shallow, clear waters of the Mediterranean. The larger boats performed quite effectively in the Atlantic.

Japan Japan constructed very large submarines intended to operate primarily as integral components of the battle fleet. The kaidai (admiralty) type design was based on a large German cruiser submarine from World War I, and the type evolved into a series of 24 boats in five classes, constructed between 1921 and 1935. These vessels displaced between 1,390 and 1,635 tons standard, had operating ranges between 10,000 and 14,000 miles at 10 knots, carried a battery of 6 to 8 tubes with 14 to 16 torpedoes, could operate submerged for 36 hours at two knots, and had a safe operating depth of between 200 and 250 ft. Japan also developed very large cruiser submarines of the junsen (cruiser) type between 1924 and 1938. These eight huge vessels had standard displacements of between 1,970 and 2,231 tons and an operational range of 24,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. They could dive safely to 300 ft.

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In 1939, Japan essentially standardized its large submarine type with a vessel design displacing about 2,100 tons and capable of cruising on the surface for 14,000 miles at 16 knots or 24,000 miles at 10 knots. They could dive to 330 ft. Three models were produced—a headquarters type emphasizing communications and command facilities, an attack type emphasizing torpedo armament, and a scouting type that added hangar space and a catapult for a small reconnaissance floatplane. Some 46 of these large submarines were constructed, plus 3 others that brought together the facilities of all three types into the sen-toku (special submarine) type, a single monster hull displacing 3,530 tons standard. Japan also constructed 10 final examples of the kaidai type early in World War II. Japan also developed and constructed a series of medium submarines intended for coastal work. In addition, Japan expended considerable effort on the development of midget submarines: small boats with two-man crews intended for stealthy attacks on ports and roadsteads after they were transported close to the scene of operation by larger submarines. Finally, late in the war, Japan was developing submarines with high underwater performance, but these never entered service. Technology played a major part in determining the effectiveness of submarines. Most navies encountered problems with their torpedoes early, especially those submarine arms that relied on magnetic rather than contact pistols. Radar development conferred a special advantage on Allied submarines in particular, offsetting the edge in optical quality possessed by German and Japanese boats. U.S. submarines were almost unique in their level of habitability, and they were almost the only boats that featured full air-conditioning and adequate space for their crews to sleep. Sonar developed rapidly, as did countermeasures; some navies put considerable effort into stealth and self-defense measures by emphasizing use of wakeless electric torpedoes and special antiescort homing torpedoes. The course of the submarine war demonstrated that those arms that fell behind in the technological battle suffered disproportionately heavily in combat. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Depth Charges; Hunter-Killer Groups; I-400–Class Japanese Submarines; Leigh Light; Sonar; Submarines, Midget; Torpedoes; Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik).

References Bagnasco, Erminio. Submarines of World War Two. London: Cassell, 2000. Carpenter, Dorr, and Norman Polmar. Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Fontenoy, Paul E. Submarines: An Illustrated History of their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007.

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Friedman, Norman. U.S. Submarines through 1945: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Gardiner, Robert, ed.. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. Polmar, Norman, and Jurrien Noot. Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718– 1990. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Rössler, Eberhard. The U-boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Werner, Herbert A. Iron Coffins: A Personal Account of the German U-Boat Battles of World War II. London: Cassell Military, 1999.

Submarines, Midget Midget submarines include small submarines, human torpedoes, and submersibles. Although envisioned as a low-cost, mass-producible weapon against both shipping and warships, midget submarines as a group achieved little success. First developed by Italy and adopted by Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, midget submarines have had a history of futility with only occasional success. Other than the unprecedented success of the British X-Craft, midget submarines proved costly in terms of human losses and ineffectual in the overall war effort. However, their low production costs doubtless made the designs attractive to increasingly desperate nations. On November 1, 1918, Italian divers riding a modified torpedo sank the ex-Austrian, now Yugoslav dreadnought Viribus Unitas. This provided the foundation for the first human-torpedo designs. The Italians continued to experiment with these craft and used them in World War II against the British in the Mediterranean and The crew of a British Navy midget submarine, following against the Soviet Union in the a demonstration at an English port on May 12, 1944. Black Sea. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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When a prototype of the Siluro a Lenta Corsa (slow-running torpedo) class of submersibles proved hard to handle during testing, its operators cursed the boat with the enduring name of Maiale (pig). A two-man crew straddled the 22-ft.-long and 21-ft.-wide Maiale. Mounted on the nose was a 485-lb. warhead that was 5 ft. 11 in. long, which would be attached underneath the keel of a target. Later, the Maiale employed heavier warheads weighing 550 and 660 lb. Shrouded propellers afforded propulsion through netted waters. Operating from one end of a converted tanker, several Maiale boats engaged in assaults against British ships at Gibraltar. Although many of their operators were captured or killed, these efforts nonetheless produced results. Three crews sank more than 20,000 tons of British ships at Gibraltar on September 19, 1941. On December 19, three crews were captured after heavily damaging the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria. Similar attacks damaged other ships but at the loss of most of the operators. However limited their success, the Maiale-class design gave rise to the Forzatori di Basi. CB-class craft were the only ones of this type to see action. In these, a four-man crew conned a boat 49 ft. 3 in. by 9 ft. 10 in. armed with two 17.7-inch (450-mm) torpedoes. Most of the operational CB craft were used in a blockade of Sevastopol in the summer of 1942. The Italians planned to conduct a raid on New York harbor by a refitted version, the CA.2-class boat. On May 25, 1943, however, British warships sank the Marconi-class submarine Leonardo da Vinci, which was to shuttle the CA.2 across the Atlantic. A German program, hoping to build on the success of the Maiale, was perhaps the most extensive yet least productive effort by the warring powers to build a midget submarine. The Biber (beaver) was a small, single-man vessel armed with two torpedoes attached underneath. The Molch (salamander) was its larger cousin. During September 25–26, 1944, Molch boats attacked Allied vessels supporting Operation DRAGOON. Seven of the nine Molch boats involved were sunk, with no Allied vessels lost. During the first months of 1945, 70 Molch and Biber craft were lost, having sunk only seven Allied ships and damaged two. The Neger (Negro) was a slight improvement with increased range. On July 5, 1944, a flotilla of Neger boats attacked the Allied Normandy invasion fleet, losing 15 of 24 of their own and sinking only the British minesweepers Magic and Cato. The flotilla attacked again on July 7–8, losing all 21 Neger boats to antisubmarine forces and sinking only one additional minesweeper, HMS Rylades. The German navy ordered more than 1,000 Seehund (seal) design craft, but only 138 were commissioned. Operated by a two-man crew and armed with two torpedoes, 35 Seehund craft were lost in early 1945 over the course of 140 missions, having sunk only eight Allied ships. The Japanese counterpart to these, the Ko-Hyoteki, was well designed but had a poor service record. The Type A–class boats had a crew of two aboard a vessel

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78.74 ft. long by 6 ft. wide that was armed with two torpedoes. Piggybacked on C1-class submarines, five Ko-Hyoteki boats took part in Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Ensign Sakamaki Kazuo of the Ko-Hyoteki that ran aground near Bellows Field became the first U.S.-held Japanese prisoner of war. The Japanese also deployed Type B–class boats off their Pacific islands. Slightly larger and slower than the Type A, these boats could carry a three-man crew for two or three days. Seven Type-B Ko-Hyoteki craft were sunk in attacks on DiégoSuarez and Sydney on May 31, 1942, in which they damaged two British warships and sank a ferry. On January 5, 1945, No. 82 launched its two torpedoes at the U.S. cruiser Boise, which was carrying General Douglas MacArthur and his staff. The cruiser evaded the torpedoes, and one of its escorts rammed and sank the Japanese midget sub. The naval version of Japanese kamikaze (divine wind) suicide aircraft came in the form of the Kaiten (heaven-shaker). Essentially a human-guided torpedo, it had a 3,416-lb. warhead. Limited range and dependence on a “mother” submarine severely restricted the effectiveness of these, and 900 men and several mother submarines were lost in largely unsuccessful limited operations from November 1944 through July 1945. The British, after fortifying their Mediterranean harbors against the Italian and German raiders, designed their own improved midget submarines. On November 21, 1943, the British used four Welmans, a single-man boat with threeknot speed, against a floating U-boat dock near Bergen, Norway. One man was captured when his Welman became entangled in antisubmarine netting; the other three craft encountered various other problems. They escaped to the north, and all three were scuttled. The Chariot was a much-improved design. It was essentially a hollowed-out 21-inch torpedo with a 600-lb. detachable warhead. Only six operations involving Chariots were launched, including an aborted attack on November 1, 1942, against the German battleship Tirpitz. The British also sank an Italian cruiser completing for sea in 1943 and attacked and sank the German (ex-Italian) heavy cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia at La Spezia on June 21 and June 26, 1944, respectively. The British X-Craft exemplified the best designs and the most successful midget submarines of the war. Three types saw the most service: the X510, X20, and XE series. Each had a four-man crew aboard a boat 49 ft. 3 in. by 5 ft. 9 in., could achieve nearly six knots in speed, and could dive to about 300 ft. Craft X5 through X10 were all tasked with sinking the Tirpitz. The crews of the X6 and X7 successfully placed charges that severely damaged the German battleship in its harbor at Bergen, but both crews were captured. The X20 and X23 served an important role in the Allied D-Day invasion of Normandy, placing a navigational beacon just before the invasion of June 6, 1944. In 1945, several of the XE class saw action in the Far East. On July 31, multiple operations achieved success, including the sinking

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of the Japanese cruiser Takao by the XE1 and XE3 and the destruction by the XE4 and XE5 of the underwater telephone cables connecting Saigon to Hong Kong and Singapore. Daring in design and operations, midget submarines represented the marriage of technology and desperation. The difficulty of transport and the risks of loss of support craft and personnel outweighed the benefits of these small craft. Although midget submarines and human torpedoes did have some spectacular successes, their limited range, speed, and offensive capabilities rendered them largely ineffectual. Matthew Alan McNiece See also: Borghese, Junio Valerio; DRAGOON, Operation; Human Torpedoes; Kaiten; Submarines; Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, Sinking of; Tirpitz, Attacks on.

References Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Kemp, Paul. Midget Submarines of the Second World War. London: Chatham, 1999. Preston, Anthony. The Royal Navy Submarine Service: A Centennial History. London: Conway Maritime Press, 2001. Spertini, Marco, and Erminio Bagnasco. I mezzi d’assalto della Xa Flottiglia MAS 1940– 1945. Milan: Ermanno albertelli, 1991.

Suez Canal Canal linking the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. First opened in 1869 and designed to facilitate worldwide commercial and military shipping interests, the Suez Canal is located in northern Egypt and runs on a north-south axis. When the canal began operations, it revolutionized shipping because it offered a short link between Europe and Asia and did away with the need for navigating around the entire African continent. The canal’s northern terminus is at Port Said; its southern terminus is situated at Port Tawfik in the Egyptian city of Suez. The Suez does not have locks; instead, water flows into the waterway from the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea; within the canal is the Great Bitter Lake, where excess sea water can be stored. The lake also helps to offset tidal action, keeping the water level in the Suez relatively uniform. At the time of World War II, the British controlled the waterway, which was a significant strategic advantage for the Allies. The Suez Canal can accommodate ships with drafts as deep as 62 ft. and maximum beam of 245 ft. 3 in. All but the largest supertankers can navigate the canal. At the start of World War II, Egypt and the Suez Canal became vital to British defenses and military strategists. The Axis powers fought to seize control of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

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This effort was finally defeated in November 1942, a consequence of the Battle of El Alamein and Operation TORCH. The canal played a crucial role in the struggle. The Egyptian government nationalized the canal in 1956, touching off the Suez Crisis of that year. The Suez Canal remains vitally important to the world economy, and considerable quantities of oil from the Middle East pass through it each year. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. See also: Great Britain, Navy.

References MacGregor, Andrew. A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Schonfield, Hugh Joseph. The Suez Canal in Peace and War, 1869–1969. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969.

Sunda Strait, Battle of (February 28–March 1, 1942) Southwest Pacific naval battle between Allied and Japanese forces. By February 1942, the collective Allied defense of the southwest Pacific, the ABDA (AmericanBritish-Dutch-Australian) Command, had largely collapsed. Following the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, two major Japanese invasion forces steamed toward the island of Java. The larger of the two, the Western Attack Force, detached 13 transports to conduct landings at Eratan Wetan and Merek. The remaining 43 transports, screened by two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seven destroyers approached Bantam Bay just east of the entrance to Sunda Strait. An additional force, which included the aircraft carrier Ryujo, two heavy cruisers, and two destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral Kurita Takeo, stood off in the Java Sea to support the various operations. Allied intelligence knew of the Japanese intention to land in the region but did not know the exact timetable. Believing a landing would not occur until the following day, overall ABDA naval commander Dutch vice admiral Conrad Helfrich ordered the surviving Allied naval forces to reassemble at Tjilatjap in an effort to halt the Japanese. The U.S. heavy cruiser Houston and Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth exited Batavia harbor at 7:00 p.m. on February 28 as ordered. Their escort, the Dutch destroyer Evertsen, was delayed, however, and did not take part in the coming battle. The crews of both Allied ships were exhausted after weeks of incessant action. Morale was also low; Japanese forces had handed the Allies one defeat after another. Neither ship carried a full load of fuel, both were low on ammunition and in need of maintenance, and the Houston’s after turret was inoperable following a Japanese air attack on February 4.

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At 10:39 p.m. on February 28, the Japanese destroyer Fubuki spotted the Perth and Houston approaching Bantam Bay shortly after the transports had begun discharging their troops. The Fubuki reported the sighting and, unseen by the Allied vessels, maintained contact. At this point, only three destroyers, including the Fubuki, were in the vicinity. The closest heavy cruisers were 20 miles north of the bay. At 11:14 p.m., the Perth spotted the Harukaze, recognized it as a Japanese destroyer, and opened fire. This prompted the Fubuki to launch nine torpedoes, but all missed. The Allied ships circled to port as the light cruiser Natori, followed by three additional destroyers, came into view. It is not certain whether the Allied captains realized they had come upon the main invasion fleet. The cruisers fired upon the light cruiser and destroyers. Two more Japanese destroyers arrived, bringing the number engaged to eight. Light damage was inflicted on Perth, Shirayuki, and Harukaze as the destroyers launched several torpedo attacks and the Allied cruisers circled and successfully avoided 28 torpedoes fired against them. By 11:46 p.m., the heavy cruisers Mikuma and Mogami, supported by one destroyer, opened fire from the north. The Houston hit Mikuma at 11:55 p.m., inflicting light damage. Captain Waller, his ship down to practice shells, decided to lead the force into Sunda Strait. At midnight, Mogami fired six torpedoes while two destroyers launched 18. At 12:05 a.m. on March 1, Mogami’s torpedoes, which had run past their intended targets, entered Bantam Bay at 48 knots and struck three army transports, the minesweeper W2, and the Ryujo Maru—headquarters ship of General Imamura Hitoshi, commander in chief of the Sixteenth Army. The explosion threw the general into the water. He reached shore three hours later, after swimming through oilcoated water. Four of the destroyer torpedoes, however, struck the Perth in quick succession, and the light cruiser sank at 12:12 a.m. Captain Albert H. Rooks, skipper of the Houston, seeing that the way west was blocked, turned his ship east and continued to fight, resorting to firing star and practice shells once the ship’s live ammunition had been expended. The heavy cruisers, with ranges less than 7,000 yards, began to punish the U.S. ship. Shrapnel killed Rooks five minutes after he had issued an abandon-ship order at 12:25 a.m. By that time, the Houston had absorbed overwhelming punishment. Several torpedoes had struck the U.S. cruiser as well as numerous 8-inch and smaller-caliber shells. A salvo penetrated the after engine room, bursting steam lines and killing the entire engine room crew. The Houston finally rolled over and sank at 12:45 a.m. on March 1. The Houston lost 693 men, and the Perth lost 351 in the battle. During the battle, the Japanese ships fired 87 torpedoes. The 703 survivors of both Allied ships spent the next three and a half years as Japanese prisoners of war. Excluding the transports, damage among Japanese ships

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was light. Worst hit was the destroyer Harukaze, which had three men killed and five wounded. The Battle of Sunda Strait finalized the Japanese navy’s victory at sea in the East Indies. Rodney Madison and Vincent P. O’Hara See also: ABDA Command; Java Sea, Battle of the; Kurita Takeo; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Southwest Pacific Theater.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Hornfischer, James D. Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR’s Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. New York: Bantam Books, 2006. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. Schultz, Duane P. The Last Battle Station: The Story of the U.S.S. Houston. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Winslow, W. G. The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

Suzuki Kantaro¯ (1867–1948) Japanese navy admiral and prime minister of Japan (1945). Born in Osaka on January 18, 1867, Suzuki Kantaro¯ graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1887 and the Naval War College in 1898. He saw combat in the 1894–1895 SinoJapanese War and in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following service in a variety of positions at sea and ashore, including command of the Naval Academy, Suzuki was promoted to admiral in 1923. In 1925, he became chief of the Naval General Staff. He retired in 1929. Transferring to the reserves, he was appointed grand chamberlain to the emperor and a member of the Privy Council. Suzuki served in that post until he was badly wounded by assassins during a failed military coup attempt on February 26, 1936. On April 5, 1945, Suzuki was recalled from retirement to replace Koiso Kuniaki as prime minister. Faced with Japan’s military collapse, Suzuki’s cabinet remained deadlocked over whether to surrender or fight a last-ditch battle in defense of the home islands. Although Suzuki continued to maintain a bellicose pose in public, he supported foreign minister To¯go¯ Shigenori’s desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to enlist the help of the Soviet Union as a mediator with the United States.

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By August 1945, the situation for Japan had become dire. On August 6, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima; it was followed with an atomic attack on Nagasaki three days later. Meanwhile, on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. Nevertheless, the members of Suzuki’s cabinet were unable to reach a decision until Emperor Hirohito broke the deadlock himself. Suzuki and his cabinet resigned on August 17, 1945, two days after accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Suzuki died in Noda-city in Chiba Prefecture on April 7, 1948. John M. Jennings See also: Japan, Navy.

References Butow, Robert J. C. Japan’s Decision to Surrender. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Feis, Herbert. Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961. Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 1999. Sigal, Leon V. Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Sydney, Australian Cruiser The sinking of the Australian light cruiser Sydney in November 1941 was the worst naval disaster in that nation’s history. Constructed in England for the Australian government, the Perth-class Sydney was commissioned in September 1935. At 562 ft. 3 in. overall length and displacing 6,830 to 7,105 tons standard load, it was capable of 32.5 knots. It was armed with eight twin-mounted 6-inch and four 4-inch guns, as well as eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. The Sydney’s World War II service was initially limited to patrol and escort duties in the Indian Ocean. After Italy entered the war, the Sydney was dispatched to the Mediterranean. There it took part in several engagements, ferried troops and supplies to Crete, and shelled Italian shore positions in North Africa. Returning to Australia in February 1941, the Sydney resumed its duties in the Indian Ocean, where German commerce raiders were known to be active. On November 19, 1941, commanded by Captain Joseph Burnett, the Sydney was returning to its base at Fremantle when, more than 100 miles off the west coast of Australia, its crew spotted an apparent merchant ship some 11 miles distant. The


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ship in question identified itself as a Dutch merchantman but was in fact the disguised German commerce raider Kormoran. At 19,000 tons and commissioned in September 1940, the Kormoran was armed with six 150-mm (5.9-inch), one 75-mm, four 37-mm, and five 20-mm guns. It also had six 533-mm torpedo tubes and was carrying several hundred mines. Apparently assuming the ship in question to be friendly, Burnett closed to about 1,000 yards, thereby nullifying his own ship’s advantages in speed and longerrange guns. The Sydney was parallel to the Kormoran when the German raider suddenly opened fire with its heretofore disguised main guns and torpedoes. One of the latter ripped into the Sydney’s bow, inflicting tremendous damage that flooded the forward portion of the ship and rendered A and B turrets useless. In all, the Kormoran fired 87 150-mm rounds at the Australian ship. Following an exchange of fire lasting approximate a half hour, the Sydney limped away down in the bow with heavy damage to its bridge and most of its boats destroyed. Two hours later, burning fiercely, it sank with the loss of all its 645 men. Not only was this the greatest loss of life ever suffered by the Australian navy, but the Sydney was also the largest Allied warship sunk in the war with all hands lost. The Komoran was also damaged fatally. One of the Sydney’s shells put its engines out of action and set the ship on fire. With hundreds of mines aboard his ship that might at any time explode, the Komoran’s captain ordered the crew to abandon ship and the ship scuttled. It went down about 14 miles distant from the Sydney. Eighty members of the 400-man crew were lost. The rest were recovered and became prisoners of war. A search for the Sydney was undertaken only after a lapse of five days, when the cruiser failed to return to Fremantle. Many Australians doubted the veracity of the accounts of the battle by the Kormoran’s crew, leading to wide-ranging conspiracy theories. The remains of both ships were finally located in March 2008. In August 2009, an Australian special commission investigating the sinking largely confirmed the German account but left unanswered the question of why Burnett had brought his ship into such a vulnerable position. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Australia, Navy; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German.

References Chessneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980. Frame, Tom R. HMAS Sydney: Loss and Controversy. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993. Olson, Wesley J. Bitter Victory: The Death of HMAS Sydney. Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2002.

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Stevens, David. The Royal Australian Navy in World War II. London: Allen & Unwin, 2004.

Sydney, Japanese Raid on (May 31, 1942) Sydney, a major Australian port for Allied merchant shipping, was within striking distance of Japanese oceangoing submarines based in Rabaul and New Guinea. In an attempt to disrupt this vital Allied commerce, Japanese naval officials ordered submarines to attack the harbor. On the night of May 31, 1942, the I-22, I-24, and I-27 arrived at Sydney, and each deployed a Type A two-man midget submarine to penetrate the port’s defenses and torpedo shipping that lay at anchor. The element of surprise was lost when the midget submarines approached antitorpedo netting in the harbor. Allied forces were alerted when one of the Japanese craft became entangled in the nets. The U.S. heavy cruiser Chicago then opened fire on the submarine but failed to hit it and only inflicted damage on the shore. The failure to hit the midget submarine notwithstanding, the Japanese crew elected to scuttle their boat. A second midget submarine avoided the nets and launched its torpedoes. One failed to detonate, but the other hit an accommodation ship, the explosion killing 19 servicemen and wounding 11 more. The fate of this midget submarine is unknown, although presumably it sank during the attack. The crew of the third midget submarine, after being hunted for hours by a collection of Australian light warships, chose to commit suicide. Contributing to the attack of their diminutive counterparts, the fleet submarines, joined by the I-21 and I-29, shelled Newcastle and Sydney with their deck guns and sank three merchantmen with gunfire and torpedoes as they left port, before retiring to base. After the raid, the Allies recovered one of the midget submarines. Following its study by naval architects, it went on a tour of Australia in an effort to raise the morale of the Australian people. Today it is on display at the Australian War Museum in Canberra. The Japanese submarine attack against Sydney was the last executed by Japanese naval forces against Australian ports in World War II. Eric W. Osborne See also: Australia, Navy; Rabaul; Submarines, Midget.

References Carruthers, Steven L. Australia under Siege: Japanese Submarine Raiders, 1942. Sydney, Australia: Solus Books, 1987. Clark, Hugh V. To Sydney by Stealth. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1966.

T Takagi So¯kichi (1893–1979) Japanese navy admiral. Born on August 9, 1893, in Kumamoto Prefecture on Kyushu Island, Takagi So¯kichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy In 1915. He served in a number of different ships before graduating from the navigation school in 1921. Promoted to lieutenant, he then served as navigation officer on the submarine tender Komahashi and patrol vessel Manshu. In 1927, Takagi graduated from the Naval War College and was promoted to lieutenant commander and posted as naval attaché to France until 1930. On his return to Japan, he was assigned as private secretary to the naval minister for two years until his promotion to commander. A weak constitution confined Takagi to land assignments for the remainder of his naval career. From 1933 to 1936, he taught in the Naval War College, where he had Prince Takamatsu as a student. In 1937, Takagi was promoted to captain and assigned to the Navy Department as chief of the research section. Here he developed ties for the navy with the political leadership and Japanese intellectuals. From 1939 onward, Takagi organized study groups of leading experts to discuss policy as well as diplomatic and economic topics in the hopes of preventing an arbitrary decision by the military authorities to go to war. With the Sino-Japanese War continuing without resolution, Takagi opposed war with the United States. In 1942, Takagi was removed from his post in the research section and was assigned as chief of staff of the Maizuru Naval District. In May 1943, he was promoted to rear admiral and began maneuvering with his confidants about how to extract Japan from the war. Minister of the Navy Shimada Shigetaro asked Takagi to investigate the reasons for the Japanese defeats of 1942. Going well beyond the scope of his charge, Takagi analyzed all aspects of Japan’s strategic situation and reached the conclusion that a Japanese defeat in the war was inevitable. Believing that the only way he could end Japan’s involvement was through a change in government, Takagi concluded that the only solution was to assassinate Prime Minister To¯jo¯ Hideki, but he was forced from office in July 1944 before the attempt could be carried out. In the fall of 1944, Takagi became a member of the research department of the Navy Staff College, and Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa ordered him to undertake a study of how Japan might withdraw from the war. He continued to work on this until Japan’s surrender in August 1945.

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After the war, Takagi served in the Higashikuni Naruhiko cabinet as a secretary and helped revise the Japanese constitution. Takagi wrote a number of books of military history, but the most important of his publications was his diary covering the period 1937 to 1945. A best-seller in Japan, it provided an insider’s view of activities in the highest levels of the Japanese government and navy toward the end of the war. Takagi So¯kichi died in Chigasaki, Kanagawa, Japan, on July 27, 1979. Hasegawa Rei See also: Suzuki Kantaro¯; Takamatsu Nobuhito; Yonai Mitsumasa.

References Butow, Robert C. Japan’s Decision to Surrender. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Fujioka Taishu. Kaigun Shoushou Takagi So¯kichi [Rear Admiral Takagi So¯kichi]. Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1986. Hirase Tsutomu. Takagi So¯kichi Seiden [Biography of Takagi So¯kichi]. Tokyo: Kojinsha, 2008. Takagi So¯kichi. Jidenteki Nihonkaigun Shimatsuki [Autobiography of Takagi So¯kichi]. Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1971. Takagi So¯kichi. Takagi So¯kichi Nikki [Diary of Takagi So¯kichi]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1985.

Takagi Takeo (1892–1944) Japanese navy admiral who commanded a cruiser squadron, a carrier task force, and the Sixth (Submarine) Fleet during the war. Born in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, on January 25, 1892, Takagi Takeo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911 and from the Navy Staff College in 1925. He then commanded the submarines Ro 28 and Ro 68 and later joined the staff of the submarine flotilla. As a captain, he commanded the cruisers Nagara and Takao and the battleship Mutsu between 1933 and 1938. Following his promotion to rear admiral in 1938, Takagi was appointed as chief of staff of the Second Fleet and then became the director of the Second Department of the Naval General Staff. In September 1941, he took command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron. At the beginning of the Pacific war, Takagi’s forces supported the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and then headed to the Netherlands East Indies as the covering force for the landing on Java. In the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942), Takagi’s 5th Squadron attacked with torpedoes to sink two Dutch light cruisers and one Dutch and two British destroyers. His force also damaged a British heavy cruiser. Promoted to vice admiral in March 1942, Takagi commanded a carrier task force, with the fleet carriers Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku acting as a cover force for the

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seaborne invasion of Port Moresby in New Guinea. In the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, the Japanese navy won a tactical victory, exchanging the loss of the light carrier Shoho for the U.S. fleet carrier Lexington and damaging the fleet carrier Yorktown. In a strategic sense, however, Japan lost the battle, as Takagi’s superior, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, called off the Port Moresby invasion and Takagi’s two fleet aircraft carriers, Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku, either were so badly damaged or had lost so many aircraft that both were unavailable for the pivotal Battle of Midway the next month, whereas the Yorktown was able to participate. In 1943, Takagi was assigned to command the Sixth (Submarine) Fleet, based in Saipan. He died there by suicide on July 8, 1944, and was promoted to brevet admiral that same day. Asakawa Michio See also: Coral Sea, Battle of the; Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi; Japan, Navy; Java Sea, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. Van Oosten, F. C. The Battle of the Java Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

Takahashi Ibo¯ (1888–1947) Japanese navy admiral. Born in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, on April 20, 1888, Takahashi Ibo¯ graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908. Commissioned an ensign in 1910 and a lieutenant in 1914, he graduated from the Imperial Naval War College in 1919 and was promoted to lieutenant commander and assigned as chief gunnery officer of the battleship Iwami. From August 1923 to August 1925, Takahashi was naval attaché to the United Kingdom, during which time he was promoted to commander. Returning to Japan, he became the executive officer of the cruiser Tama, after which he took command of the light cruiser Tenryu¯. He was also a member of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference in late 1929. Promoted to captain on November 30, 1929, Takahashi took command of the heavy cruiser Atago in 1932, and the next year he commanded the battleship Kirishima. Promoted to rear admiral on November 15, 1935, Takahashi served on

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the Navy General Staff, where he urged that Japan include the Netherlands East Indies within its economic control sphere. Promoted to vice admiral on November 15, 1939, Takahashi commanded the Mako Guard District. In early December 1941, Takahashi took command of the Third Fleet. In this post he had responsibility for Japanese naval operations in the invasion of the Philippine Islands. Takahashi then commanded Japanese naval forces in the invasion of Java in the Netherlands East Indies. On March 10, 1942, Takahashi was transferred to command the newly created 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and in April to command the newly created Japanese vice admiral Takahashi Ibo, commander Southwest Area Fleet. In Novem- of the Third Fleet, aboard his flagship, the Fusober 1942, he became commander class battleship Yamashiro, in 1941. (Roger Viollet/ of the important Kure Naval Dis- Getty Images) trict in Japan, holding this position until he retired in 1944. Takahashi died on March 18, 1947. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Invasion of; Philippine Islands Campaign.

References Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. New York: Harper & Row, 1992. Schom, Ronald. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1943: Pearl Harbor through Guadalcanal. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004.

Takamatsu Nobuhito (1905–1987) Japanese Imperial prince and navy officer during the war. Born on January 3, 1905, the third son of Emperor Taisho and younger brother of Emperor Hirohito

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(1901–1989), Takamatsu Nobuhito graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy and the Naval War College. He pursued a career as a gunnery officer in the Imperial Navy. In November 1941, following several line and staff appointments, Commander Prince Takamatsu became a member of the Operation Planning Section of the Navy General Staff. In November 1942, he was promoted to captain, and in August 1944, he was appointed deputy head of the Yokosuka Gunnery School. As a liberal thinker in the navy and within the Imperial family, Prince Takamatsu was highly critical of the government’s decision to go to war with the United States, and during the war, he advocated an early peace with the Allies. Indeed, he cautioned Hirohito that if Japan did go to war with the United States, the Japanese navy would be unable to wage a war that endured for more than two years. He was also adamantly opposed to the Japanese incursion into Manchuria in 1931 and the decision to wage full-scale war in China in 1937, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. After the Battle of Midway in 1942, Takamatsu urgently pleaded with his brother to seek a peace settlement with the United States, which caused a serious rift within the Imperial family. Elements in Japan opposed to Premier General To¯jo¯ Hideki, including Prince Konoe Fumimaro, saw in Prince Takamatsu a possible candidate for prime minister, but such a development never came to pass. In mid-July 1944, after the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Saipan, Takamatsu, other members of the Imperial family, and other Japanese notables played a significant role in removing To¯jo¯ from office. After the war ended in 1945, Takamatsu was involved in numerous charitable organizations. Takamatsu died in Tokyo on February 3, 1987. His posthumously published diaries, not released until the mid1990s, are an important source for the study of Japanese political history of the 1930s and 1940s. Tohmatsu Haruo See also: Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of.

References Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: HarperCollins, 2000. Large, Stephen J. Emperor Hirohito and Sho¯wa Japan: A Political Biography. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Takamatsu Nobuhito. Takamatsunomiya nikki [Diaries of Prince Takamatsu]. 8 vols. Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ko¯ ronsha, 1995–1997. Wetzler, Peter. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998.

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Tanaka Raizo (1892–1969) Japanese navy admiral who was famous for his night-fighting prowess and his supply runs to provision Japanese troops. Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, on April 27, 1892, Tanaka Raizo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913 and trained as a torpedo specialist. He developed a reputation for excellence in seamanship. Promoted to captain in 1935, he held command of destroyers, the cruiser Jintsu, and then the battleship Kongo. In 1937, he took charge of a destroyer squadron. Promoted to rear admiral in October 1941, Tanaka commanded the 2nd Destroyer Squadron, one of the most highly trained units of the Japanese navy and especially expert in night action. In his flagship, the cruiser Jintsu, Tanaka was involved in most major battles of the first 18 months of the war. He was particularly well known for the so-called Tokyo Express—the nightly supply runs to Japanese army units on Guadalcanal. Called by the Americans “Tenacious Tanaka,” he regularly carried out his assignments, often in the face of superior Allied naval forces equipped with radar, and gained a reputation in the West as one of the most brilliant and indefatigable Japanese navy commanders of the war. In the Battle of Tassafaronga on November 30, 1942, a superior U.S. force under Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright intercepted Tanaka’s ships trying to float barrels of supplies ashore to Guadalcanal. The ships were not deployed for combat, and Tanaka lost a destroyer, but his crews used their Long Lance torpedoes to good effect and sank one U.S. cruiser and damaged three others before making their escape. However, two weeks later, after two successful supply missions, a U.S. patrol torpedo boat sank Tanaka’s flagship, the destroyer Teruzuki. Tanaka was wounded in this incident and on December 27 was reassigned to command of an obscure naval base in Burma, allegedly for criticizing his superiors’ decision to squander scant Japanese destroyer assets in trying to supply Japanese island outposts. Although promoted to vice admiral in 1944, Tanaka did not again see combat. He died in Yamaguchi, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, on June 9, 1969. Hirama Yoichi See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Japan, Navy; Kolombangara, Battle of; Tassafaronga, Battle of.

References Crenshaw, Russell S. The Battle of Tassafaronga. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1995. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

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Russell, Jack D. Derailing the Tokyo Express. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991. Tanaka, Raizo. “The Struggle for Guadalcanal.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 82 (July 1956), pp. 687–699 and 83 (August 1956), pp. 815–831.

Taranto, Attack on (November 11, 1940) British navy raid on the principal Italian naval base, the fortified harbor of Taranto. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, British Mediterranean Fleet commander, and Rear Admiral Sir Arthur Lumley St. George Lyster of the carrier Illustrious planned the operation, code-named JUDGMENT. The date for the raid was to be October 27, 1940, the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar and a night with a full moon. Thirty Fairey Swordfish were slated to make the attack from the aircraft carriers Illustrious and Eagle. The Swordfish, although it was a 10-year-old biplane, was nonetheless a reliable, sturdy torpedo platform, especially effective in night operations. A fire on the Illustrious, which destroyed several aircraft, forced postponement of the operation. Then the Eagle, which had sustained near misses from Italian bombs, was found to have been more seriously damaged than originally estimated. As a consequence, the attack was delayed until the next full moon, when the raid was conducted by the Illustrious alone. Twenty-one Swordfish fitted with extra fuel tanks participated, with 11 of them armed with torpedoes and the remainder carrying bombs and flares. The torpedoes were modified to negate the effects of “porpoising” in the harbor’s shallow water. At 8:30 p.m. on November 11, the Illustrious launched its aircraft some 170 miles from Taranto. All six of Italy’s battleships were in the harbor, where they were protected by barrage balloons, more than 200 antiaircraft guns, and torpedo nets, although the quantity of the latter was far short of the number the Italian navy considered necessary. The British planes set out in two waves an hour apart. The first wave achieved complete surprise when it arrived at Taranto at 11:00 p.m. The pilots cut off their engines and glided in to only a few hundred yards from their targets before releasing the torpedoes against the battleships, which were illuminated by the flares and Italian antiaircraft tracers. The Conte di Cavour was the first battleship struck, followed by the Littorio. In the second attack at 11:50 p.m., the Littorio was struck again, and the Caio Duilio was also hit. In the two attacks, the Conte di Cavour and Caio Duilio each took one torpedo and the Littorio absorbed three. The Conte di Cavour was the only battleship to sink, and it went down in shallow water. Italian tugs towed the other two damaged ships to shore. The cruiser Trento and destroyer Libeccio were both hit by bombs, but the bombs did not explode and caused only minor damage. Fifty-two Italian sailors died in the attack. The British lost two planes; the crewmen of one were rescued by the Italians.

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The Conte di Cavour was later raised and towed to Trieste to be repaired, but the work was not completed and it was never recommissioned. The Littorio was overhauled by March 1941, and the Duilio, which was transferred to Genoa, was repaired and returned to Taranto in May 1941. The Taranto raid thus deprived Italy of its naval advantage and at least temporarily altered the Mediterranean balance of power. It also underscored the effectiveness of naval aircraft and was useful to the Japanese. Japan was already working on techniques to employ air-dropped torpedoes in shallow water. Taranto provided confirmation for its plan to strike Pearl Harbor. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Sea, Naval Operations in; Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Fioravanti, Giuseppe. Le azioni navali in Medtierraneo dal 10 giugno 1940 al 31 marzo 1941. Vol. 4, La marina italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Rome: Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Marina, 1976. Lowry, Thomas P. The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995. Schofield, Brian B. The Attack on Taranto. London: Ian Allan, 1973. Smithers, A. J. Taranto, 1940: “Prelude to Pearl Harbor.” Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Tassafaronga, Battle of (November 30, 1942) Battle between Japanese and U.S. naval forces during the Guadalcanal Campaign. Responding to intelligence that the Japanese navy intended to resupply Guadalcanal on the night of November 30, 1942, the South Pacific commander, Admiral William F. Halsey, dispatched Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright’s Task Force 67 (TF 67)—consisting of the heavy cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola, and Northampton, the light cruiser Honolulu, and six destroyers—to intercept Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo’s 2nd Destroyer Squadron, which was steaming in a southeasterly direction. Tanaka had eight destroyers, six of which carried supply drums; the other two destroyers were unencumbered. To avoid enemy identification and detection problems, the Americans formed into one destroyer and two cruiser groups, each having one ship equipped with the new SG surface-search radar. Cruiser scout planes were to provide reconnaissance and night illumination. Destroyers took station on the engaged bow of the cruisers to deliver a torpedo attack prior to the commencement of gunnery.

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Tanaka sought to avoid a general engagement. He intended to have his destroyers drop their floating supply drums, to be retrieved by small Japanese craft from the beaches. As TF 67 approached the Lengo Channel on a northwesterly heading, the lack of a U.S. forward destroyer picket proved a critical mistake. Tanaka was cruising only two miles off the Guadalcanal beach but remained undetected until radar picked up his column dead ahead at 23,000 yards. However, no flare planes had been able to launch to illuminate the Japanese ships. Wright delayed in ordering the destroyers to commence their torpedo attack, believing the range was greater than the 7,000 yards reported by the destroyer Fletcher at 11:20 p.m. Thus, the initial tactical advantage provided by radar had been squandered, with the loss of four precious minutes until Wright unleashed the destroyers. The Japanese column had already passed abaft the destroyers’ port beam, making hits difficult as the range opened. At about 9,000 yards, the U.S. cruisers opened fire, hitting the nearest Japanese destroyer, the Takanami. Several ships fired illumination star shells, but the accuracy of the U.S. gunfire was poor. Well drilled in night detection, maneuver, and torpedo tactics, Tanaka’s crews executed a column turn and launched 20 torpedoes at the U.S. ships even while sustaining some shell hits themselves. At 11:27 p.m., the Minneapolis suffered two torpedo hits, destroying its bow. Putting its rudder over hard right to avoid a collision, the New Orleans took a torpedo near a magazine, which blew off its bow back to No. 2 turret. The third ship in line, the Pensacola, veered left to avoid the New Orleans but took a torpedo hit at 11:39 p.m. that flooded the after engine room and knocked out three turrets and all power. Steaming behind the three damaged U.S. cruisers, the Honolulu avoided any hits, but the Northampton was not so fortunate. That ship first turned right with the Honolulu, then back to a westerly heading. Two torpedoes struck it at 11:48 p.m., destroying the after engine room and setting the ship afire from the mast to the stern. Tanaka reformed his squadron for a second but unsuccessful attack and then cleared the area by 1:30 a.m., with the undamaged Honolulu in fruitless pursuit. The Minneapolis limped safely into Tulagi harbor, as did the New Orleans and Pensacola, all heavily damaged. The Northampton sank at 3:04 a.m., with the loss of 58 hands. Jury-rigged to make the voyage home, all three damaged cruisers returned to action by October 1943. The Tassafaronga debacle resulted from superb Japanese night-fighting training and techniques combined with poor U.S. gunnery and the failure to detach destroyers ahead for forward operations. Stanley D. M. Carpenter See also: Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Radar; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Torpedoes.

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References Crenshaw, Russell S. Jr. The Battle of Tassafaronga. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1995. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–45. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Jersey, Stanley Coleman. Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2008. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1953.

Theobald, Robert Alfred (1884–1957) U.S. navy admiral who commanded the North Pacific Force. Born in San Francisco, California, on January 25, 1884, Robert Alfred Theobald graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1907 and was commissioned an ensign. Over the next years, he served in a variety of assignments at sea and in shore posts, impressing his superiors with his skills in gunnery, his seamanship, and his intellectual acumen. During the 1930s, Theobald was both a student and an instructor at the Naval War College. He commanded the battleship Nevada, served as a member of the navy’s General Board, and commanded a cruiser division and later a destroyer flotilla. Shortly after the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Rear Admiral Theobald took charge of the destroyers in the Pacific Fleet. In May 1942, he was appointed commander of the North Pacific Force. Since the force initially had a main body of only five cruisers and four destroyers, Theobald was inclined to be cautious in moving against the Japanese in the Aleutian Islands, an approach that placed him at odds with the more aggressive-minded army commanders in the theater. The conflict between Theobald and the army, along with the admiral’s irritation at being assigned to a backwater in the war, angered Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet. On January 4, 1943, Nimitz relieved Theobald, who then took charge of the First Naval District and the Boston Navy Yard. Theobald retired from the navy in February 1945. After the war, Theobald involved himself in the Pearl Harbor controversy, arguing that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet in 1941 and a friend of long standing, and Lieutenant General Walter Short, commander of the Hawaiian Department, were unfairly made the scapegoats for the Japanese success on December 7, 1941. In his book The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack (1954), Theobald charged that President

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Franklin D. Roosevelt and members of his administration did not adequately warn Hawaiian commanders of a possible attack and had shifted the blame to Kimmel and Short to cover up their own errors in judgment. Theobald died in Boston on May 13, 1957. John Kennedy Ohl See also: Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States, Navy.

References Garfield, Brian. The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. New York: Doubleday, 1969. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Morton, Louis. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific—Strategy and Command. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962. Theobald, Robert Alfred. The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack. New York: Devin-Adair, 1954.

Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie (1889–1964) French admiral and commander of Free French naval forces. Born in Brest, Brittany, France, on August 7, 1889, Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu graduated from the École Navale in Brest in 1906 and was commissioned in the navy. During World War I, he served in the French marines and commanded a patrol boat in the Mediterranean. In September 1919, Thierry d’Argenlieu left the navy and entered the Carmelite Order as Père Louis de la Trinité (Father Louis of the Trinity). In February 1932, he became provincial superior in Paris. In 1939, he was called back into the navy at Cherbourg, and in February 1940, he was appointed captain. Captured by the Germans on June 19, Thierry d’Argenlieu escaped three days later and joined Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French movement in Britain by the end of the month. Thierry d’Argenlieu participated in the ill-fated September 1940 Free French attack on Vichy forces at Dakar and was wounded three times. He then took command of Free French naval forces in Equatorial Africa. Operating in conjunction with Colonel Philippe Leclerc on land, he led the naval operations at Gabon. Between February and May 1941, Thierry d’Argenlieu led a mission to Canada seeking to rally support for de Gaulle, and by July, he was named high commissioner for the Pacific, which involved, in conjunction with the other Allies,

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defending French territories in the Pacific region and easing diplomatic tensions between Free French administrators in Tahiti and New Caledonia. The following year, in May, he helped rally the Wallis and Futuna islands to the Free French. In June 1943, Thierry d’Argenlieu was promoted to rear admiral and became commander in chief of all Free French naval forces. Following the liberation of France, he was advanced to vice admiral in December 1944 and named chef d’état major general adjoint de la marine. He had been named a compagnon de la liberation on January 29, 1941, when he also became the first grand chancellor of that order, serving until 1958. After the war, the French government sent Thierry d’Argenlieu to San Francisco in April 1945 as a delegate to the meetings that involved the formation of the United Nations and then to Indochina as high commissioner to reestablish French control there. His efforts to roll back the colonial clock and his decision to employ force and order the shelling of Haiphong by the cruiser Suffren on November 23, 1946, led directly to the outbreak of the First Indo-China War (1946–1954). In June 1946, Thierry d’Argenlieu was promoted to admiral. The following year, he was recalled to Paris, and in 1948, he returned to his monastery in Brest. He died in Relecq-Kerhuon (Finistère), France, on September 7, 1964. John MacFarlane See also: Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; MENACE, Operation.

References Alford, Élisée. Le Père Louis de la Trinité, Amiral Thierry d’Argenlieu. Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, 1969. Auphan, Gabriel Adrian Joseph Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Trans. A. C. J. Abalot. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges. Souvenirs de guerre, juin 1940—janvier 1941. Paris: Plon, 1973.

Tirpitz, Attacks on (1941–1944) The German battleship Tirpitz, sister to the Bismarck, was commissioned at Wilhelmshaven, Germany, in February 1941. Recognizing the threat posed by this powerful warship, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command flew 269 sorties in five separate attacks against Wilhelmshaven in January 1941, in an effort to destroy it. On February 28, Bomber Command flew another 116 sorties with the same goal. As with the Bismarck, the Tirpitz, which was based in Norway beginning in January 1942, posed a threat to Allied shipping and tied up many Allied ships in the

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Home Fleet that could better be deployed elsewhere. As a consequence, between 1942 and 1944, large numbers of Allied ships and aircraft (most of them British), assisted by the Norwegian Resistance, attacked the battleship in Norwegian waters. On the nights of March 30–31 and April 27, 1942, the RAF struck the Tirpitz at Föttenfjord, near Trondheim. The latter strike involved RAF Lancaster bombers and achieved complete surprise, but no bombs hit the battleship. In July 1943, Allied ships, including the U.S. Navy battleship Alabama, seeking a diversion for the Sicily invasion, tried unsuccessfully to lure the Tirpitz from its hiding place in Norway’s waters and into the North Atlantic. On September 6, 1943, the Tirpitz saw its only real offensive action of the war when it sortied to shell Spitsbergen. On September 22, the British midget submarines X-6 and X-7 slipped through German defenses at Kaa Fjord, Norway, and their crews managed to plant mines on the battleship’s hull. The explosions severely damaged the Tirpitz, but the Germans were able to effect repairs. Then, on April 3, 1944, 40 Barracuda aircraft flying from the Royal Navy carriers Victorious and Furious attacked. The Tirpitz took 14 hits. Though disabled, it remained afloat, and, again, the Germans made repairs. More powerful bombs were necessary, and the RAF turned to British inventor Sir Barnes Wallis, who had created the skip-bombs used in the Dam Buster raids. Wallis developed a 12,000-lb., armor-piercing bomb known as “tallboy.” On September 11, 1944, 38 Lancaster bombers left Scotland for airfields in the northern Soviet Union, from which they planned to attack the Tirpitz. On September 15, 27 bombers of RAF Squadrons 9 and 617, carrying 20 tallboys, took off from Yagodnik, near Archangel, for Kaa Fjord. With the mountains screening their approach, they caught the German defenders by surprise. One tallboy went through the Tirpitz’s forecastle, exploding in its hull. Several other near misses severely damaged the ship’s engines. The Germans then decided not to repair the Tirpitz, and on October 15, they moved it to Tromso to serve as a semistatic heavy artillery battery. On October 29, the British, unaware of the extent of the damage inflicted on the ship, sent 37 Lancasters equipped with extra fuel tanks from Lossiemouth, Scotland, on a 2,250-mile mission against the Tirpitz, but none of their 32 tallboys hit home. On November 12, 1944, with German fighters now stationed nearby, Wing Commander Willis Tait led his 32 Lancasters on a wide-sweeping route over Sweden, which confused the German defenders. Arriving over the Tirpitz, the British scored three direct hits. One tore a 100-ft. hole in the Tirpitz’s hull, detonating the magazines and capsizing the battleship. A total of 917 men in its crew died. After the war, a Norwegian salvage company bought the rights to the German battleship, and between 1948 and 1957, it salvaged most of the hulk for scrap. William Head See also: Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Germany, Navy.

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References Dulin, Robert O., and William H. Garzke. Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Gray, Edwyn. Hitler’s Battleships. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Ireland, Bernard. Jane’s Battleships of the 20th Century. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. Koop, Gerhard, and Klaus-Peter Schmolke. Battleships of the Bismarck Class: Bismarck and Tirpitz. Trans. Geoffrey Brooks. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Koop, Gerhard, and Klaus-Peter Schmolke. The Battleship Tirpitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Peillard, Leonce. Sink the Tirpitz. Trans. Robert Laffont. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1968.

Tokyo Raid (April 18, 1942) One of a half dozen U.S. carrier raids in the months after the December 1941 attack at Pearl Harbor, the Tokyo Raid of April 18, 1942, was the first U.S. air strike on the Japanese home islands. Since the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States had suffered a series of costly defeats, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt rarely failed to stress to his military chiefs the need to strike Japan. Captain Francis S. Low, operations officer on the staff of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, suggested that army bombers utilize carriers for a raid. King and Commanding General of Army Air Forces Lieutenant General Henry W. “Hap” Arnold approved, and Arnold picked Lieutenant Colonel James “Jimmy” H. Doolittle of his staff as army coordinator. Ultimately, Doolittle led the mission. The planners knew that Japanese picket ships were stationed 500 miles off the home islands. For that reason, attacking planes would have to be launched at 550 miles out. Although bombers could take off from carriers, they would not be able to return to them and would thus have to fly on to Zhuzhou (Chuchow), China, a flight of 2,000 miles. There they were to refuel, then fly on to Chungking 800 miles away. The B-25 Mitchell was the only army bomber with that range that could take off from a carrier. The plan called for the B-25s to bomb Japan at night and then land at the Chinese fields the next morning. The carrier Hornet, commanded by Captain Marc A. Mitscher, would transport them. On April 2, the Hornet sailed from San Francisco, California, with 16 specially modified B-25s aboard. A few days later, it rendezvoused with the carrier Enterprise, which was to provide air cover. The Enterprise, commanded by Captain George D. Murray, also had Task Force (TF) 16 commander Vice Admiral William Halsey aboard. TF 16 included the two carriers, four cruisers, eight destroyers, and two oilers. Two U.S. Navy submarines also operated near the Japanese coast to report on enemy ship movements and weather conditions.

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The Japanese were aware from radio traffic that something was in the offing, perhaps an attack on Japan itself. Combined Fleet headquarters ordered naval aircraft concentrated in the Tokyo area and alerted picket boats off shore beyond the range of carrier aircraft. At 7:38 a.m. on April 18, about 650 miles off the Japanese coast, the picket boat No. 23 Nitto Maru detected the carriers. Although the U.S. cruisers promptly sank it, it was able to get off a radio message reporting the presence of U.S. carriers. Halsey now jettisoned the plan to fly the B-25s off on the afternoon of April 19 and bomb Tokyo at night. At 8:00 a.m., Halsey flashed this message to the Hornet: “Launch planes. To Colonel Doolittle and his gallant command Good Luck and God bless you.” Doolittle’s B-25 was the first plane airborne, at 8:20 a.m.; all the planes were away within an hour. This was the only time in the war that U.S. Army Air Forces bombers were launched from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier on a combat mission. TF 16 then turned about and departed the area at flank speed. Bad weather hid the U.S. warships from Japanese search planes, and TF 16 escaped unscathed. The B-25s achieved total surprise because the Japanese assumed an attack range of 200 miles and thus a later launch. At 12:30 p.m.Tokyo time, Doolittle’s aircraft dropped the first bombs. Each bomb load consisted of two 500-lb. high explosive and two 500-lb. incendiary bombs. Most of the planes struck Tokyo, although Kobe, Yokohama, and Nagoya were also bombed. No B-25s were downed over Japan, and only one was hit by antiaircraft fire. All, however, were subsequently lost as the fields in China were unready to receive them. Of the 80 crewmen, 3 died of injuries, 4 were seriously injured, 5 were interned in the Soviet Union until they managed to escape to Iran in 1943, and 8 were captured by the Japanese and 3 of these were executed. Another died in captivity. The raid inflicted little material damage, but it and the other U.S. carrier attacks had far-reaching effects. The raids led the Japanese to shift four fighter groups to the defense of Tokyo and other cities. It also led to a punitive army expedition in China in which perhaps 250,000 Chinese died. Most importantly for the course of the war, it increased support in Tokyo for pushing the outer defensive ring farther and adopting Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s plan to draw out the U.S. fleet and destroy it. This latter led to the decisive Japanese defeat in the Battle of Midway on June 3–6, 1942. The raid also lifted U.S. morale (Roosevelt told the American people it had been launched from “Shangri-La”). For his part in the attack, Doolittle was promoted to brigadier general and awarded the Medal of Honor. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku.

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References Doolittle, James H. I Could Never Be So Lucky Again. New York: Bantam Books, 1991. Glines, Carroll V. The Doolittle Raid: America’s Daring First Strike against Japan. New York: Orion, 1988. Morrison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Schultz, Duane. The Doolittle Raid. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988.

Torpedoes Self-propelled weapons armed with explosive charges designed to be launched by ships, submarines, or aircraft against enemy ships. Torpedoes were the deadliest of naval weapons, especially when launched from submarines. The torpedo was invented by Englishman John Whitehead for the AustroHungarian navy in 1866, but those in use by 1939 were far more capable than his seven-knot, flywheel-driven weapon. However, except for Japan, no nation entered World War II with torpedoes that differed significantly from those of World War I. All were straight running and had the same top speeds (39 knots to 47 knots), ranges (2,500 yards to 7,000 yards), and depth-setting mechanisms as those of the earlier war. A few countries had influence warheads that were expected to detonate as they passed under the ship’s hull, thereby breaking its back, but those weapons proved unreliable in early operations and had to be withdrawn until their technical faults were corrected. However, by war’s end, the most advanced torpedoes had homing guidance and a complex variety of influence warheads, and, more important, they had become the critical weapon of war between naval forces on and above the surface and those below. Employed mostly by submarines, torpedoes were responsible for more than 30 percent of the warship losses and 70 percent of merchant shipping losses inflicted during the war. Those statistics are rather ironic given that, before the war, submarines were not expected to play a significant role in naval operations and that the three naval powers that employed torpedoes most effectively suffered torpedo reliability problems during the war’s early years. U.S. and German difficulties with their weapons’ warheads, depth-setting mechanisms, and guidance systems are the best known, but Great Britain suffered similar problems with its own torpedoes. However, the Royal Navy accepted the fleet’s reports and corrected the technical faults within nine weeks of receiving the first report. The United States and Germany waited nearly a year to examine their problems, and another year passed before they corrected their weapons’ deficiencies. Nonetheless, those two countries best demonstrated the deadly effectiveness of the submarine-torpedo combination in naval warfare. In fact, Germany and the United States possessed the most technologically advanced torpedoes at war’s end, with the former having the best antiship

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torpedo and the latter the world’s only antisubmarine torpedo, designated the Mark 24 mine to hide its true nature. For its part, Japan entered the war with the only torpedoes that were significantly better than those used in World War I. Some Japanese submarine and ship torpedoes employed an oxygen-alcohol power train that gave their torpedoes a speed of almost 50 knots and a range exceeding 42,000 yards, with little wake. They also had the war’s most powerful warheads (weighing more than 1,000 lb.) and were extremely reliable, providing Japan’s highly trained crews with a critical advantage in ship-to-ship and submarine-to-ship engagements. Japan, however, wasted that technological advantage by not employing the torpedoes’ most deadly platform, the submarine, effectively. Moreover, unlike Germany, Japan never developed a homing system to guide its torpedoes toward a ship’s engine noises or wake. More importantly, by 1943, naval air power and air defenses including radar had increased engagement ranges to the point that, in many cases, submarines became the torpedo’s only tactically viable delivery platform, rendering Japan’s advantage in torpedo range all but irrelevant. After the First World War, France designed a larger, more powerful torpedo, which resulted in the impressive 21.7-inch Model 1923DT. A submarine version, which emphasized speed over range, was also developed. Italian torpedoes were generally reliable. In fact, Italy’s aircraft-carried torpedoes were so much better than Germany’s that Luftwaffe antishipping squadrons preferred to use Italian models rather than their own, and Germany imported nearly 1,000 Italian aerial torpedoes during the war. Soviet torpedo development was generally unsuccessful until the 1932 purchase of an Italian 21-inch weapon that formed the basis for the major types used by the Soviets during the war. Whereas Japan had gone to 61-cm (24-inch) torpedoes (but only in surface ships, for Japanese submarines used the 21-inch oxygen-driven torpedo), many of the minor navies still employed the smaller and older torpedoes on their ships and submarines, but 45-cm (450-mm) torpedoes were carried primarily by Japanese aircraft until 1943, when they also began to carry the larger 533-mm models. Much has been written about the revolutionary changes torpedoes underwent in the course of the war. Most of this transformation was driven by the Battle of the Atlantic between the Western Allies and the German Kriegsmarine (navy), where torpedo and antisubmarine-detection systems shaped the course of the battles. Denied heavy weapons by the Versailles Treaty, post–World War I Germany’s naval doctrine underemphasized torpedo engagements. This situation changed when Adolf Hitler came to power and, with the navy under Admiral Erich Raeder, sought to build a large, conventional German naval force capable of challenging Britain on the seas. Partly as a result of this concentration, there were no new designs or concepts in torpedo warfare before the U-boat arm’s effectiveness became essential to Germany’s war effort after 1940. By 1942, however, Germany had homing torpedoes that guided onto the target ship’s engine noises and pattern-running

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Crewmen arm a Torpedo Squadron 51 (VT-51) Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber on the light carrier USS San Jacinto (CVL-30), October 25, 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The torpedo is a Mark 13, fitted with wooden water-entry shrouds around its nose and tail assembly. (Naval Historical Center)

torpedoes that made evasion difficult. Research programs included wake-homing, active sonar-based terminal guidance, and even a rocket-propelled high-speed torpedo, which, however, never got past the drawing board. Fortunately for the Allied powers, Germany’s research and development effort lacked direction before Admiral Karl Dönitz took command of the Kriegsmarine in January 1943. As torpedoes proved critical to the German U-boat arm, so too did they figure in the Western Allies’ struggle against the U-boat. The Allies developed search and guidance systems for torpedoes to attack maneuvering underwater submarines. The Mark 24 mine employed from Allied antisubmarine aircraft used a descending circular search and passive acoustic homing guidance to seek, find, and attack submerged German submarines by detecting and following the noises made by the U-boats’ machinery. The Mark 24 was the precursor to modern antisubmarine torpedoes, as was the German homing torpedo, father to the antiship torpedoes carried by today’s submarines. Carl O. Schuster See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Mines, Sea; Raeder, Erich; Submarines.

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References Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Ellis, John. The World War II Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants. London: Aurum Press, 1993. Grey, Edwyn. The Devil’s Device: Robert Whitehead and the History of the Torpedo. Rev. ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Miller, Nathan. War at Sea. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Van Der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at (November 27, 1942) When British and U.S. forces invaded French North Africa on November 8, 1942, 81 ships of the French navy were anchored at Toulon, France, under the command of Admiral Jean de Laborde. Only a third of these ships were ready to sail. Another third required significant work, and the remainder had been decommissioned in accordance with the armistice with Germany. Even before the July 1940 armistice with Germany, the French government had promised Britain that it would order the fleet destroyed if necessary in order to prevent it falling into German hands. This pledge notwithstanding, London made an effort to secure units of the French fleet, and at Mers-el-Kébir during Operation CATAPULT in July 1940, British ships opened fire on French ships, sank a number of them, and killed nearly 1,300 French seamen. Despite these actions, France honored its pledge. Two years later, after arranging a cease-fire with the Allies in North Africa on November 11, 1942, French navy commander Admiral Jean Darlan ordered the fleet to sail from Toulon to North Africa. That same day, German soldiers began occupying the area around the port city and positioned artillery to fire on the fleet should it attempt to depart. While the Germans tightened their noose, the fleet’s officers debated their options. They feared both a German effort to capture the French ships from the land and a repetition of the incident at Mers-el-Kébir. Most remained loyal to the Vichy government and opposed the idea of attempting to sail the fleet to Africa, although the officers subsequently had to quell anti-German demonstrations on several ships. Darlan tried to convince the Vichy minister of the navy, Admiral Paul Auphan, to order the fleet to sail, but Vichy officials replaced Auphan with the more pliable Admiral Jean Abrial. They negotiated an agreement with the Germans that promised the neutrality of the Toulon naval base and handed over the remaining 158 ships of France’s merchant fleet (totaling 646,000 tons). German forces, however, continued their preparations to seize Toulon. On November 14, Laborde ordered all ship crews to make the necessary preparations to scuttle in order to prevent the capture of their vessels. German troops

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entered the Toulon base in force at 4:45 a.m. on November 27, but they failed to surprise the French. Laborde then ordered the ships scuttled, and most had sunk by the time German soldiers reached the piers at 6:20 a.m. French crews sabotaged critical systems and heavy guns with explosives to prevent their salvage, and they detonated explosives on those ships in dry dock. Five submarines managed to reach the open sea, and of these, one was lost at sea, three joined the Allies in North Africa, and one was interned in Spain. In all, the French scuttled 77 ships, roughly half the tonnage of the entire French navy. The total included 3 battleships (the Strasbourg, Dunkerque, and Provence), 7 cruisers, a seaplane tender, 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 18 smaller craft. German and Italian engineers subsequently managed to salvage and repair four destroyers, two torpedo boats, and two submarines. Stephen K. Stein See also: Abrial, Jean Marie Charles; Auphan, Paul Gabriel; CATAPULT, Operation; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de; Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of.

References Auphan, Paul, and Jacques Mordal. The French Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959. Koburger, Charles W. The Cyrano Fleet: France and Its Navy, 1940–1942. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Tovey, Sir John Cronyn (1885–1971) British navy admiral. Born in Borley Hill, Rochester, Kent, England, on March 7, 1885, John Cronyn Tovey entered the Royal Navy’s cadet training establishment, HMS Britannia, in 1900. As commander of the destroyer Onslow, he distinguished himself in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 by conducting a torpedo attack under heavy German fire. After the war, Tovey attended the Royal Naval Staff College and the Defence College, worked in the Admiralty Plans Division, and commanded a destroyer flotilla in 1925. In 1932, he took command of the battleship Rodney. Promoted to commodore early in 1935, he was advanced to rear admiral that same year. His first seagoing flag appointment was as rear admiral for destroyers in the Mediterranean Fleet in March 1938. At the beginning of World War II, Vice Admiral Tovey was commander, Light Forces, Mediterranean Fleet. He led four light cruisers against the Italian main fleet in the Battle of Calabria on July 9, 1940. In October 1940, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill named Tovey to replace Sir Charles Forbes as commander in chief,

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Home Fleet. In this post, Tovey led the hunt for the German battleship Bismarck. He commanded in person aboard the battleship King George V when it and Rodney pummeled the Bismarck into a burning wreck on May 26, 1941. Despite one mistake when he thought the Bismarck far north of its actual position, he had conducted the operation well. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the extension of British and U.S. aid to the Soviet Union, Tovey’s Home Fleet had to deal with attacks on Allied convoys to Murmansk and Archangel by German U-boats, bombers, and surface ships based in Norway. The difficult assignment of defending the convoys was largely accomplished, except for convoy PQ 17 in July 1942. At that time, Tovey was under orders to keep the main fleet clear of German air bases and so could do little as the convoy was savaged. Tovey was part of another controversial episode, the struggle to secure B-24 bombers for convoy escort. He insisted that the key to an Allied victory was the Battle of the Atlantic, and he harried the Admiralty with calls for long-range aircraft to counter the U-boats. This made him very unpopular with Churchill, who was enthusiastic about strategic bombing. In May 1943, just as the Atlantic battle was being won in no small part due to the aircraft Tovey had been demanding, Churchill replaced him as commander in chief of Home Fleet. Tovey then assumed the post of commander in chief of The Nore. He was on the short list to be first sea lord in 1945 but was passed over as being “too obstinate,” and he retired. Tovey was made a baron in 1946. He later served four years as a lay official in the Church of England. He died in Funchal, Madeira, on January 12, 1971. James Levy See also: Atlantic, Battle of the; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Forbes, Sir Charles Morton; Great Britain, Navy.

References Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1991. Roskill, Stephen. Churchill and the Admirals. New York: Collins, 1977.

Towers, John Henry (1885–1955) U.S. navy admiral and pioneer naval aviator who played a key role in developing the navy’s air arm during the war years. Born in Rome, Georgia, on January 20, 1885, John Henry Towers graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1906. He qualified as a pilot in 1911, only the second U.S. navy officer to win his wings, and he then helped develop and test early naval aircraft. In 1913, he led the

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navy’s first air unit in exercises in the Caribbean. In 1914, he commanded the naval aircraft in operations at Veracruz, Mexico. During World War I, Towers served as assistant director of the new Division of Naval Aviation in the office of the chief of naval operations, helping to organize the navy’s air effort, including antisubmarine activity. After the war, as an early and committed advocate of naval air power, he commanded the navy’s first aircraft carrier, the Langley, between 1927 and 1928. Towers also studied at the Naval War College and commanded the San Diego Naval Air Station and the aircraft carrier Saratoga. In June 1939, Towers was promoted to rear admiral and began a three-year appointment as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, where he oversaw the growth of U.S. naval air forces and pilot training. Under his leadership, the air arm of the navy grew from 2,000 aircraft in 1939 to 39,000 in 1942. In October 1942, he became commander of U.S. naval aviation in the Pacific and was promoted to vice admiral. In early 1944, Towers became deputy commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area. However, his fervent advocacy of naval aviation created enemies and kept him from a combat assignment until July 1944, when he received command of Task Force 38, too late in the war to see any significant action. Promoted to full admiral, Towers assumed command of the Fifth Fleet in November 1945 and of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in February 1946. In the immediate postwar years, he consistently opposed the creation of an independent air force. He headed the General Board until his retirement in December 1947 and then worked as assistant to the president of Pan American World Airways. Towers died in Saint Albans, New York, on April 30, 1955. Molly M. Wood See also: Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Aviation, Naval; United States, Navy.

References Reynolds, Clark G. Admiral John Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Turnbull, Archibald D., and Clifford L. Lord. History of United States Naval Aviation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949.

Toyoda Soemu (1885–1957) Japanese navy admiral who became commander in chief of the Combined Fleet ¯ ita Prefecture, Japan, on May 22, 1885, into a Samurai family, in 1944. Born in O Toyoda Soemu graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1905 and became a gunnery officer. He graduated from Gunnery School, then taught there, before also graduating from the Naval War College.

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Between 1919 and 1922 as a lieutenant commander, Toyoda was a resident officer in Britain. Promoted to captain in 1925, Toyoda commanded the cruiser Yura and then the battleship Hyuga. In 1927, he took command of Submarine Division 7. Promoted to rear admiral in 1931, he was assigned as chief of the Intelligence Department. He next served as chief of the Operations Department of the Naval General Staff, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet (1933), and chief of the Education Bureau of the Navy Ministry (1934). Promoted to vice admiral in 1935, Toyoda assumed command of the Second Fleet and then the Fourth Fleet in 1937. Thereafter, he was assigned as chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry and chief of the Shipbuilding Office. Promoted to admiral in September 1941, Toyoda commanded the Kure Naval District. In 1941, he was recommended for the post of minister of the navy, but General To¯jo¯ Hideki blocked the appointment because of Toyoda’s strong antiarmy sentiments. Toyoda joined the Supreme War Council in November 1942 and assumed command of the Yokosuka Naval Yard in May 1943. In May 1944, Toyoda succeeded Admiral Koga Mineichi as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. He was firmly committed to the policy of making a strong offensive strike. His first attempt took place in Operation A-GO and resulted in the June 19–20, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea, which turned out to be a catastrophic defeat for Japan. Nonetheless, Toyoda continued his policy of initiating a major offensive fleet action, and he developed a series of contingency plans (the ¯ operations). Operation SHO ¯ -1 culminated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, waged SHO from October 23 to 26, 1944. The largest naval battle in history, it was a major Japanese defeat. In April 1945, Toyoda instituted steps to save Okinawa, resulting in kamikaze attacks, including that of the battleship Yamato. Toyoda replaced Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo as navy chief of staff in May 1945 and held that position to the end of the war. He was one of the triumvirate of die-hard military leaders, along with Generals Umezu Yoshijiro and Anami Korechika, who rejected unconditional surrender. Following the war, Toyoda was arrested as a war criminal. He was then tried but acquitted. Released in September 1949, he died in Tokyo on September 22, 1957. Hirama Yoichi See also: Kamikaze; Koga Mineichi; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Sho¯ Plans; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Toyoda Soemu. Saigo no Teikoku Kaigun [The last of the Imperial Navy]. Tokyo: Sekai no Nihon-sha, 1950.

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Y’Blood, William T. Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

Truk, Raid on (February 17–18, 1944) In November 1943, the U.S. Navy unleashed its Central Pacific Campaign, capturing Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands. Then in early February 1944, U.S. amphibious forces seized Kwajalein and Roi Namur in the Marshall Islands. These successes allowed an immediate leap forward to Eniwetok Atoll, just 660 miles northeast of Truk, the major Japanese bastion in the Central Pacific. In response, the Japanese decided to abandon Truk as the principal base for the Combined Fleet, leaving there just the Fourth Fleet with 2 training cruisers and 8 destroyers, along with approximately 50 merchant ships and auxiliaries. Only a week after the Japanese withdrawal, Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, arrived off Truk with three fast carrier groups of 5 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 6 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 22 destroyers. At 6:45 a.m., Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander of Task Force 58, began launching 70 Grumman F6F Hellcats from 90 to 100 miles east-northeast of Truk in the first of what would be 30 separate air attacks that day and the next. The Japanese had little warning of the raid, and of the 45 of their fighters that met the initial onslaught, 30 were shot down. As the U.S. aircraft attacked shipping, airfields, and shore facilities on the many islands within the massive lagoon, a number of ships got underway in an effort to flee. The cruiser Katori, the destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and the auxiliary Akagi Maru cleared the lagoon’s north exit at 9:00 a.m. Spruance learned of this Japanese exodus at 9:42 a.m. Although Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers jumped the fleeing squadron and sank the Akagi Maru and crippled the Katori and Maikaze, Spruance decided to form a surface task group to hunt down the Japanese. This consisted of Battleship Division 7 with the New Jersey and Iowa; Cruiser Division 6 with the heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans; and Destroyer Squadron 46 with the Izard, Burns, Charrette, and the Bradford. Coached by carrier planes (and undergoing a few nuisance attacks from Japanese aircraft) the task group first sighted and sank an armed trawler, the Shonan Maru, at 2:46 p.m. It then found the Katori and at 3:16 p.m. Spruance ordered the two heavy cruisers, screened by the Bradford and Burns, to sink it. Meanwhile, the Nowaki and the damaged Maikaze appeared. When the topmasts of the battleships rose into view, the Nowaki fled to the west. The Maikaze and Katori, however, launched torpedoes at the battleships rushing down upon them. At 3:34 p.m., one streaked between the New Jersey and Iowa. The Iowa recorded that another passed close down the port side and a third crossed 100 yards astern. Two minutes later, the Minneapolis made a hard turn to avoid a fourth torpedo. Nonetheless, the U.S. gunnery was overwhelming. At 3:37 p.m., the Katori’s bow rose out of the water and it sank stern first, some guns being served

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to the end. The Maikaze succumbed to a combined bombardment from the New Jersey, Izard, and the Charrette as they raced past as close as 7,000 yards. Meanwhile, the Nowaki had sent a salvo of long-running 24-inch torpedoes back toward the U.S. formation. At 3:45 p.m., the New Jersey lofted a three-gun salvo toward the fleeing warship at a range of 32,200 yards. The Iowa did the same, its initial range 35,700 yards. Both ships believed their first broadsides straddled. Then a torpedo streaked across the Iowa’s bow. As the Nowaki steamed into the glare of the sun, the battleships resorted to radar for aiming and spotting. More straddles followed. Finally, with the range 39,000 yards, they ceased fire and the lucky Japanese destroyer escaped unharmed. In the attack on Truk on November 17–18, U.S. aircraft and ships shot down 70 of the 365 Japanese aircraft present and destroyed as many as 200 more on the ground. They also sank 2 light cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 4 destroyers, and two small submarine chasers and 2 submarine tenders, an aircraft ferry, 5 tankers, and 21 other transports/freighters/ auxiliaries, all totaling some 191,000 tons of shipping. The United States lost 25 planes, although many more were damaged. On the night of February 17, however, a Japanese torpedo-bomber attacked and damaged the carrier Intrepid. It was out of action until June. The U.S. flyers were disappointed that they did not get a chance to hit the Japanese battle fleet, but their efforts still represented the greatest one-day total of shipping sunk during the entire war. The raid also ended Truk’s usefulness for the Combined Fleet. The raid was also the only surface action involving the Iowaclass battleships, and their final salvos were the longest-range broadsides ever fired against an enemy by a ship underway at sea. Vincent P. O’Hara See also: Central Pacific Campaign; Iowa Class, U.S. Battleships; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Mark Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames.

References Bernstein, Marc D. “Hail Storm at Truk.” Naval History 8 (January/February 1994), pp. 17–24. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Turner, Richmond Kelly (1885–1961) U.S. navy admiral who oversaw many of the amphibious operations carried out by U.S. forces in the Pacific theater. Born on May 27, 1885, in Portland, Oregon, Richmond Kelly Turner graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1908.

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Following service in World War I, he held a variety of posts, eventually qualifying as a pilot at the age of 42. Turner attended the Naval War College in 1935 and remained there until 1938 as head of the Strategy Section. He then became director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department in Washington, D.C. In March 1941, Turner was promoted to rear admiral. Following the U.S. entry into World War II, Turner assumed additional duties as assistant chief of staff to Admiral Ernest J. King. In this dual capacity, he played a significant role in strategic planning for the Pacific theater. In July 1942, he became commander of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, and he directed most U.S. amphibious landings in the Pacific during the war. “Terrible Turner” had a reputation for being both brilliant and hot-tempered. His first operation involved the amphibious landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in August 1942. Turner also had charge of amphibious assaults in the central Solomons: Russell Island (February 1943) and Rendova Island (June 1943). As U.S. forces readied for their drive through the Central Pacific, he received command of the Fifth Amphibious Force, U.S. Fifth Fleet. Turner planned and commanded the landings against the Gilbert Islands of Makin and Tarawa (November 1943). In early 1944, he also had charge of the landings against the Marshall Islands of Kwajalein (January–February 1944) and Eniwetok (February 1944). He was promoted to vice admiral in February 1944. In March, Turner became commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific, while simultaneously retaining command of the Fifth Amphibious Force. He directed the June–August invasions of the Mariana Islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. He also commanded the amphibious forces in the onslaughts against Iwo Jima (February 1945) and Okinawa (March–June 1945). In May 1945, in the midst of the Okinawa Campaign, Turner received promotion to admiral. He next worked on plans for the invasion of Japan (Operation OLYMPIC), scheduled for the fall of 1945. He attended the Japanese surrender ceremonies on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay. Following the war, Turner served as U.S. naval representative on the United Nations Military Committee until his retirement in July 1947. Turner died in Monterey, California, on February 12, 1961. R. Kyle Schlafer See also: Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; DETACHMENT, Operation; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; King, Ernest Joseph; Landing Craft; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Spruance, Raymond Ames; United States, Navy.

References Alexander, Joseph. Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

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Coletta, Paolo E. “Admiral Richmond K. Turner.” In Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, edited by Stephen Howarth (pp. 363–379). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Dyer, George, C. The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. 2 vols. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Two-Ocean Navy Program Massive U.S. Navy expansion approved by Congress in 1940. Because agreements signed at the Washington Conference in early 1922 had limited most U.S. naval construction, the United States could counter the rising naval power of Japan only by shifting naval assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific. After 1933, however, Germany’s rearmament raised new potential dangers in the Atlantic; meanwhile, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself a naval enthusiast, viewed naval expansion as one of many economic stimuli designed to end the Great Depression, and he promoted building programs in 1933 and 1934 to bring U.S. numbers of noncapital ships up to treaty-authorized limits. In 1935, Germany and Britain reached an agreement stipulating that the German fleet could have up to 35 percent of the tonnage of the Royal Navy, and in 1936, Japan abandoned its 1922 limits. A twoocean war now became a real possibility for U.S. planners. Early in 1938, Roosevelt proposed a 20 percent increase in U.S. warship tonnage, an increase that Congress approved on May 17. Through the remainder of 1938 and into 1939, as Germany’s aggressive moves led to the absorption of Czechoslovakia and prompted Anglo-French guarantees to Poland regarding its security, Roosevelt concluded that the greater danger to U.S. national interests lay in the Atlantic rather than the Pacific, with a special concern for defending the Panama Canal. After World War II began in September 1939, Roosevelt organized a “neutrality patrol” in the western Atlantic, defined in October 1939 as lying west of a line from the Saint Lawrence River to Trinidad. Germany’s conquest of the Low Countries and France in May and June 1940 affected the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. French possessions in Indochina and Dutch holdings in the Netherlands East Indies were tempting targets for the Japanese, as were the Philippines. On June 14, 1940, as he was still planning a defensive posture in the Pacific while making the Atlantic the main theater of U.S. naval operations, Roosevelt requested a 25 percent increase in the carrier, cruiser, and submarine tonnage authorized in May 1938, amounting to an 11 percent rise in total U.S. fleet tonnage. Three days later, after German troops had occupied Paris, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark asked Congress to appropriate $4 billion for a two-ocean navy. This represented a 70 percent increase in the combat fleet and would add 1,325,000 tons of new construction, amounting to 257 ships above the 488 that already existed or were being built at that time.

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Roosevelt signed the Two-Ocean Navy Act on July 19, 1940. The largest naval appropriation in U.S. history, it authorized construction of 2 new Iowa-class and 5 Montana-class battleships, 6 Alaska-class battle cruisers, 18 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, 43 submarines, and 15,000 aircraft. It also provided for the purchase or conversion of 100,000 tons of auxiliary ships and the expenditure of $50 million for patrol, escort, and miscellaneous vessels. Although modified to meet the changing demands of the war, the act created the combat core of the U.S. Navy as it developed from the middle of 1942 through the remainder of the war and for much of the decade that followed. Under its aegis were built the Essex-class carriers, Baltimore-class heavy cruisers, Cleveland- and Atlanta-class light cruisers, Bristol- and Fletcher-class destroyers, and numerous submarines and smaller surface vessels. John A. Hutcheson Jr. See also: Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Panama Canal; Rainbow Plans; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty”; United States, Navy.

References Abbazia, Patrick. Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975. Hagan, Kenneth J. This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. New York: Free Press, 1991. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.

U Ugaki Matome (1890–1945) Japanese navy admiral who formed a special unit to carry out kamikaze attacks against U.S. forces in the Pacific theater. Born in Okayama Prefecture, Japan, on February 15, 1890, Ugaki Matome graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. He served at sea, graduated from the Naval Staff College in 1923, and then joined the Naval General Staff. He studied in Germany, commanded battleships, and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. In August 1941, Ugaki became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Ugaki was involved in planning the Pearl Harbor attack and all other Combined Fleet operations until he and Yamamoto were shot down in their aircraft over Bougainville on April 18, 1943. Ugaki survived, although he was seriously wounded. He returned to Tokyo to recuperate. On February 25, 1944, Ugaki took command of the 1st Battleship Division consisting of the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi. He fought at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and throughout the Marianas and Leyte campaigns. He returned to the Naval General Staff in November, and then, on February 10, 1945, he assumed command of the Fifth Air Fleet, controlling the remaining Japanese naval air forces on Kyushu, the frontline defense of the home islands. Emulating the example from ¯ nishi Takijiro¯, Ugaki formed the Special Attack the Philippines of Rear Admiral O Corps (Tokkotai) to conduct kamikaze attacks against the U.S. fleet. The Tokkotai was heavily engaged at Okinawa, using both standard-production naval aircraft and specialized, rocket-propelled suicide attackers (Ohka) launched from medium bombers, and inflicted significant U.S. losses. After the U.S. victory on Okinawa, Ugaki was engaged in refitting Fifth Air Fleet preparatory to repelling an invasion of Kyushu. On August 15, 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito broadcast his decision to surrender. Ugaki determined to die in the Tokkotai spirit and led an abortive suicide attack on the U.S. fleet off Okinawa, which he did not survive. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Aviation, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Fuchida Mitsuo; Genda Minoru; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte

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¯ nishi TakiLandings; Mariana Islands Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; O jiro¯; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Feifer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atom Bomb. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. Goldstein, Donald M., and Katherine V. Dillon, eds. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. Millot, Bernard. Divine Thunder: The Life and Death of the Kamikazes. New York: McCall, 1971. Sheftall, M. G. Blossoms in the Wind: Human Legacies of the Kamikaze. New York: NAL Caliber, 2005.

Ulithi Western Pacific atoll. Located in the Caroline Islands some 103 nautical miles east of Yap, Ulithi consists of 40 islets (four of which are inhabited) totaling only about 1.7 square miles in area around one of the largest lagoons in the world, some 22 miles long and up to 15 miles wide and capable of holding up to 700 ships. Some 1,200 miles from Okinawa and 3,660 miles from Pearl Harbor, Ulitihi is about half way (360 miles from each) on a direct line between Guam and Pelileu. The first European to arrive at Ulithi was Portuguese navigator Diego da Rocha in 1526. The Japanese established a radio and weather station there early in World War II but evacuated it in the early summer of 1944. Supported by U.S. Navy ships under Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, the U.S. Army 323rd Regimental Combat Team of the 81st Infantry Division landed unopposed on September 23, 1944. A few days later, a battalion of Seabees arrived. The Americans soon removed the natives to Fedarai and converted the remaining islands into bases to support navy ships and personnel. This included an air base on Falalop islet. Within a few months, there were more than 600 ships at Ulithi staging for Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa. In January 1945, Seabees completed a recreation center on Mogmog Island capable of accommodating up to 9,000 officers and men. The Japanese carried out occasional raids but inflicted only limited damage. On March 11, 1945, the U.S. aircraft carrier Randolph was hit and damaged by a kamikaze aircraft that had flown all the way from Japan.

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Today Ulithi is administered by the state of Yap in the Federated States of Micronesia. Ulithi’s population in 2000 was 773. Falalop is the most accessible islet. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Blandy, William Henry Purnell; Fleet Train; ICEBERG, Operation; Seabees.

References Arnold, Bruce Makoto. “An Atoll on the Edge of Hell: The U.S. Military’s Use of Ulithi during World War II.” Unpublished M.A. thesis, Sam Houston State University, 2007. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte: June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

United States, Navy U.S. naval preparations for war were under way long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The government was well into the move away from its post–World War I emphasis on naval arms limitation as a consequence of the outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1937. On May 7, 1938, Congress passed a naval expansion bill authorizing a 20 percent increase in the overall tonnage of the navy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers hoped that this step would deter Japan from further expansion in the Pacific that might threaten U.S. interests there. The Japanese, however, continued their expansionary moves. The concern of the Roosevelt administration over this failure was heightened by the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 and the string of Allied defeats there that followed. On June 20, 1940, believing that the United States might soon stand alone in the face of Axis aggression, Congress passed a second naval expansion bill, which called for a two-ocean navy through a 70 percent increase in overall naval tonnage. Despite the fact that the bulk of the navy was based in the Pacific, the initial deployment of U.S. naval forces in World War II was in the Atlantic theater and took place while the United States was still technically neutral. President Roosevelt aligned the United States with the European Allied powers, and following the fall of France, he sent material aid to Great Britain. This included the Destroyers-Bases deal of September 2, 1940, that saw 50 World War I vintage U.S. destroyers transferred to the Royal Navy and ultimately the passage of Lend-Lease legislation that transferred significant military equipment to powers fighting the Axis. The transport of these supplies across the Atlantic via merchant convoys led to the need to protect them against German submarines. By mid-1941, U.S. naval forces were engaged in escorting convoys to Iceland, where they then became Britain’s responsibility. This situation led to an escalation

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U.S. ships enter Ulithi Anchorage after strikes against Japanese positions in the Philippine Islands. The carriers Langley and Ticonderoga lead, followed by the battleships Washington, North Carolina, and South Dakota and four cruisers. (National Archives)

of hostilities with the September 1941 German torpedo attack on the escorting destroyer Greer. Roosevelt responded with a shoot-on-sight order regarding Axis warships threatening convoys. On October 31, 1941, a German submarine torpedoed and sank the U.S. destroyer Reuben James, the first U.S. warship lost in World War II. Yet war for the United States came not in the Atlantic but in the Pacific. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the nation formally joined the Allied side. The U.S. Navy, which by late December was under the direction of the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, faced a multiple-theater conflict. In the Atlantic, the war at sea centered on the protection of Allied supply lines to Great Britain. Although the Battle of the Atlantic was fought primarily by British and Canadian forces, the United States contributed through the deployment of convoy escorts largely under the direction of the Atlantic Fleet commander, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll. In early 1943, the United States assumed responsibility for the protection of convoys in the central Atlantic. In addition to the destroyer forces deployed for this duty, special hunter-killer groups based around escort carriers executed search-and-destroy operations against Axis submarines. Through the use of radar and sonar, these forces played an important role in the Allied victory in the critical Battle of the Atlantic. By the close of

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the war, U.S. naval units had accounted for 25 percent of the 781 German U-boats sunk during the conflict. In addition to commerce protection, the U.S. Navy also contributed warships to aid the Royal Navy in fleet surface operations in the Atlantic. In March 1942, the United States sent its first naval task force, centered on the aircraft carrier Wasp, into the Atlantic. The U.S. Navy provided critical gunfire support and sealift in all the Allied amphibious operations of the war, beginning with Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and extending through Operation OVERLORD, the Normandy invasion. As with the U-boat war, the British provided the lion’s share of the vessels required for this task. Initial U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean theater was the result of Allied disagreement over the strategy to attack the European Axis powers. Although the United States favored an attack on German-held France via the English Channel, to take place in mid-1943, the prevailing British view called for a peripheral attack via the Mediterranean. This attack took the form of the November 1942 Operation TORCH, the amphibious invasion of North Africa. The Royal Navy conducted assaults on the Mediterranean beachheads of northern Africa, and the United States had responsibility for the Atlantic coast. The majority of the naval units covering the landing forces and providing fire support were British, and overall command of the naval force rested with the Royal Navy, but the U.S. Navy employed a task force under Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt that included one fleet carrier, three battleships, and four converted escort carriers. Following this operation, U.S. involvement increased through the mid-1943 Allied invasion of Sicily. Hewitt once again commanded a U.S. squadron under the direction of the Royal Navy. This arrangement was repeated in the Allied invasion of mainland Italy. In Operation NEPTUNE, the naval portion of the June 6, 1944, Normandy invasion, of all the Allied gunfire support ships—7 battleships, 23 cruisers, and 80 destroyers—the United States supplied 3 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 31 destroyers. These ships provided invaluable supporting fire for amphibious forces landing on the beaches. The final major Allied landing in the Atlantic theater, Operation DRAGOON—the August 1944 invasion of southern France—was predominantly composed of U.S. units and under the command of Admiral Hewitt. The U.S. gunfire support ships included 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, and 59 destroyers. Although the involvement of the U.S. Navy in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean was eclipsed by that of the Royal Navy, the chief reason for this was that the United States bore the brunt of the naval war in the Pacific. This effort faced great challenges from the outset, as the U.S. Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, was gravely wounded by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which put all of the fleet’s battleships out of commission. In any case, the initial U.S. effort in the vast Pacific centered on U.S. Navy carriers, which

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had not been in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The denuded U.S. Pacific Fleet was further weakened following the loss of the British capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse on December 10, 1941, and the February 1942 destruction of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, a collection of Allied warships. As a result of these blows, the U.S. Navy was, for most of the war, the sole Allied naval force pitted against the Japanese, who seized the U.S. possessions of Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. Amid these disasters, U.S. and British military officials met in early 1942 and resolved that the United States would assume responsibility for the Pacific theater. U.S. strategists realized that, to defeat Japan, it was necessary to recapture lost U.S. possessions and take Japanese Pacific holdings, thus isolating the Japanese home islands and starving their war machine of supplies. Command of the Pacific was divided into two theaters to achieve this end. The southwest Pacific was under General Douglas MacArthur, who pursued an advance from Australia through the Netherlands East Indies to the Philippines. The North, Central, and South Pacific areas were assigned to Admiral Chester Nimitz, who succeeded Admiral Kimmel as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Consequently, Nimitz was in charge of the majority of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. He pursued War Plan Orange, a prewar strategy that called for an advance toward Japan through the Central Pacific. These operations, however, could not take place until the country’s industrial strength produced more warships to augment the force that remained after Pearl Harbor. War Plan Orange saw the role of submarines as scouts for the U.S. battle line, but after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy deployed its submarines with the destruction of Japanese overseas commerce as a key mission. Surface units were charged with preventing further Japanese expansion. While the submarine war unfolded, a critical concern was the threat posed to Australia, which was both a vital naval base and an area to station troops. The need to protect Australia led to the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. This engagement aborted a Japanese landing at Port Moresby in New Guinea. Japan’s attempt to take Midway Island and draw out and destroy the U.S. carriers led to the pivotal Battle of Midway in June 1942. The loss of four of Japan’s finest carriers in this battle was a great blow to further Japanese expansion in the Pacific and, in a very real sense, the turning point in the Pacific war. The U.S. Navy subsequently implemented its plan to defeat Japan. The amphibious operations that ensued were made possible by the tremendous wartime naval production of the United States. By 1944, the U.S. Navy was larger than all other navies of the world combined, and the Pacific Fleet comprised 14 battleships, 15 fleet carriers, 10 light carriers, 24 cruisers, and hundreds of destroyers and submarines. The Japanese, whose industrial base was much smaller than that of the United States, could not match this production.

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One of the keys to Allied victory in the war was the ability of U.S. Navy task forces to operate at great distances across the vast Pacific. To support this effort, the navy created an extensive logistics network. This Service Force Pacific Fleet, known as the “fleet train,” included tankers and supply and repair ships moving in the wake of the combat ships. A massive system of re-provisioning and repair, the fleet train markedly reduced the need for combat ships to spend precious time moving to and from their home bases and thus greatly increased the number of combat ships deployed. In the Central Pacific, the navy lifted army and marine elements to take Japanese-held islands in the Marshall, Caroline, Mariana, and Philippine islands. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf from October 23 to 26, 1944, the U.S. Navy eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as a cohesive fighting force and cut the Japanese off from their southern resources area. The Allied conquest of Okinawa in mid1945 signaled to U.S. amphibious forces the completion of Plan Orange. With the destruction of the IJN and the seizure of bases within striking distance of Japan, the home islands were both isolated and subjected to the strategic bombing of cities and the devastation of coastal trade. Equally important in the isolation of Japan was the submarine campaign, the most successful guerre de course (war against trade) in modern history. Of Japan’s total of 8 million tons of merchant shipping (at best marginal for meeting Japanese requirements in peacetime), U.S. submarines sank almost 5 million tons, thus crippling Tokyo’s ability to supply the home islands, especially with oil. By the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy had participated in every major theater of the naval war. The cost was high, as the navy lost 36,674 officers and enlisted personnel. In the Battle of Okinawa alone, Japanese kamikaze attacks caused the navy more casualties than it had suffered in all its previous wars combined. Materially, the navy lost 2 battleships, 4 fleet aircraft carriers, 1 light carrier, 6 escort carriers, 12 cruisers, 68 destroyers, and 47 submarines in the course of the war. Nevertheless, the manpower and industrial strength of the United States had not only made good the losses, but also augmented the navy to the point that its size in both personnel and ships eclipsed that of all the other naval powers of the world combined. This force was critical to the Allied victory in World War II. Eric W. Osborne See also: Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of the; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Caroline Islands Campaign; Central Pacific Campaign; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Cruisers; Destroyers; Destroyers-Bases Deal; DETACHMENT, Operation; DRAGOON, Operation; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Greer, Attack on; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Hewitt, Henry Kent; Hunter-Killer Groups; Ingersoll, Royal Eason; Kearny, Torpedoing of; Kimmel, Husband Edward; King, Ernest Joseph; Lend-Lease;

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Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; NEPTUNE, Operation; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Prince of Wales and Repulse, Sinking of; Reuben James, Sinking of; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Submarines; Two-Ocean Navy Program; United States, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Services; United States Marine Corps; U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping.

References Blair, Clay. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Howarth, Stephen. To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1998. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Hoyt, Edwin. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Miller, Nathan. The United States Navy: A History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1962. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. Muir, Malcolm Jr. “The United States Navy.” In Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II, edited by James J. Sadkovich (pp. 1–17). New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

United States Carrier Raids (February 1–April 18, 1942) Beginning with the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Allies had suffered a series of defeats in the Pacific in December 1941 and January 1942. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was determined to hit back with his carriers, the only real effective weapons apart from submarines that he had available. In early January 1942, the carrier Yorktown helped escort a convoy carrying marine reinforcements to American Samoa. That mission accomplished, Nimitz ordered Vice Admiral William F. Halsey to take the offensive against the Japanese. On January 25, the Yorktown and its sister ship the Enterprise departed Samoan waters. Six days later, they separated into two task forces (TF). TF 8, centered on the Enterprise and including the heavy cruisers Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Chester, and three destroyers, would raid the Marshall Islands; TF 17, centered on the Yorktown, with the heavy cruiser Louisville and light cruiser St. Louis and four destroyers, would attack both the Marshall Islands and Gilbert Islands. Halsey sent


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the Enterprise and three screening destroyers against Wotje, Taroa Island in Maloelap Atoll, and Roi and Kwajalein islands in Kwajalein Atoll, all in the Marshalls. He ordered Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance with the Northampton and Salt Lake City to bombard Wotje, while the Chester shelled Maloelap. Meanwhile, the Yorktown task force under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher would attack Jaluit and Mili Atolls in the southern Marshalls and Makin Atoll in the Gilberts. Aircraft from the Enterprise enjoyed the most success. They attacked a number of Japanese ships at Kwajalein and aircraft on the ground. They also struck new Japanese ground installations. A predawn launch and severe thunderstorms hampered efforts by the Yorktown’s aircraft against Japanese installations and shipping at Jaluit Atoll, and seven of its planes were lost. Other planes from the Yorktown struck Japanese installations and ships at Makin and Mili. The Japanese were caught by surprise. A patrolling fourengine Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” flying boat attempted to attack the destroyers and then the Yorktown but was shot down by Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters. Poor weather, lack of suitable targets, and the approach of darkness led to cancellation of a second attack on Jaluit. By the late afternoon of February 1, both task forces were steaming at flank speed for Pearl Harbor when radar on the Enterprise detected six Mitsubishi G3M Nell bombers heading for it. This was their second mission of the day; earlier these same aircraft had bombed and damaged the cruiser Chester. Antiaircraft fire from the Enterprise shot down one of the Nells. Several of the others were damaged, but they were able to drop three bombs each. The Enterprise took evasive action, but one close miss showered the ship with fragments and set off a small fire, mortally wounding one sailor. The flight leader then attempted to crash his plane into the Enterprise but struck only a glancing blow before falling into the sea. Later, two other Nells attacked. Their bombs missed thanks to evasive maneuvers, and one of the Nells was shot down. Halsey returned to Pearl Harbor on February 6. Because of the close proximity of Japanese airfields, he was indeed fortunate to have only the Chester receive a bomb hit and to lose only 12 planes. Despite optimistic pilot reports, only one Japanese ship had actually been sunk, although many others had been heavily damaged. Nine Japanese planes had been destroyed on the ground, and three fighters had been shot down. Ninety Japanese had perished, including the area commander, a rear admiral. The raid also revealed U.S. deficiencies. Aircraft required self-sealing gasoline tanks and armor protection, and there was also a clear need for IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) to identify returning aircraft. Carrier fighter complements also had to be increased and those of torpedo and dive-bombers reduced. There was no question, however, that the raid was worth its cost. Although Tokyo dismissed it as “aerial guerrilla warfare,” it revealed the vulnerability of the Japanese island outposts to U.S. carrier attack.

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Nimitz did not wait long before sending out the carriers again. Thus, while the Japanese were hitting Darwin on February 19, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown led TF 11, centered on the aircraft carrier Lexington against the principal Japanese base of Rabaul in the Solomon Sea. Nimitz hoped this attack would divert the Japanese from attacking Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea, which had been revealed by radio intercepts as a Japanese objective. On February 20, the Lexington was about 350 miles from Rabaul when radar picked up an unknown aircraft. Wildcats from the Lexington shot down this Mavis flying boat. Another was also “splashed,” but a third got away. Soon thereafter, the Lexington came under attack from two flights of nine Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bombers. All their bombs missed. In this largest air encounter of the Pacific theater to date, counting the two Mavises downed earlier, the Wildcats shot down 19 of 20 Japanese aircraft encountered for only two of their own lost. Fearing other attacks that would include dive bombers, however, Brown had no choice but to abort his mission. Although the Japanese pilots had saved Rabaul from attack, the abortive U.S. raid paid an important dividend by convincing the Japanese command on Truk that landings scheduled for Port Moresby and Tulagi that March were too risky and should await the arrival of additional carriers sent by Combined Fleet commander Yamamoto Isoroku. This delayed the Japanese invasion attempt until the end of April, which culminated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Another U.S. carrier strike occurred on February 24, when aircraft from the Enterprise attacked Wake Island. Then on March 4, its planes hit Marcus Island, halfway between Wake and Iwo Jima near the Japanese Bonin Islands and only 1,000 miles from Tokyo. Damage inflicted was slight. On March 6, the Yorktown rendezvoused with TF 11 centered on the Lexington and, under the command of Vice Admiral Brown, steamed for Rabaul and Gasmata to attack Japanese shipping there in an effort to check the Japanese advance and to cover the landing of Allied troops at Nouméa, New Caledonia. The task force was the most powerful assembled by the United States in the war to date. Centered on the two carriers, it also contained 8 heavy cruisers (7 U.S. and 1 Australian) and 14 destroyers. As TF 11 was steaming toward Rabaul, it received word that on March 7, Japanese forces had landed in the Huon Gulf on the northeast coast of Papua/New Guinea at Salamaua and at Lae. This news led Brown to change his objective from Rabaul to the SalamauaLae area. On the morning of March 10, the two carriers launched 104 aircraft from the Gulf of Papua. The planes would thus have to fly north some 125 miles, over the Owen Stanley Mountains, to reach their objective. This difficult route, however, provided both security for the task force and surprise for the attacking aircraft.


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Indeed, complete surprise was achieved, and there was no Japanese air opposition. After strafing and bombing Japanese ships and troops ashore, the planes returned to the carriers with only one Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless dive bomber lost to Japanese antiaircraft fire. The Japanese suffered four transports sunk and a number of other vessels damaged. A month later, the Americans carried out their most ambitious attack to date, the first U.S. bombing raid on the Japanese home islands. The Tokyo Raid of April 18, 1942, usually known as the Doolittle Raid for its commander, army Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle, saw 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers fly off the carrier Hornet, with the aircraft carrier Enterprise along to provide air cover. Although the least successful of the U.S. carrier raids in military terms, it was spectacular in its propaganda value. It led the Japanese to shift aircraft for the defense of their home islands and it formalized decisions already taken in Tokyo to expand the Japanese outer defensive ring and silenced critics of Admiral Yamamoto’s plan to draw out

A U.S. Army Air Force North American B-25 Mitchell medium bomber takes off from USS Hornet during the first U.S. air raid on Japan. Known as the Doolittle or Tokyo Raid of April 18, 1942, the raid did little damage but caused the Japanese to relocate military assets and was a great boost to U.S. morale. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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the U.S. fleet and destroy it. On May 5, Imperial Headquarters directed Yamamoto to carry out his plan to occupy Midway Island and key points in the western Aleutians. This set up the decisive Battle of Midway in early June. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Brown, Wilson Jr.; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tokyo Raid; Yamamoto, Isoroku; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers.

References Belote, James H., and William M. Belote. Titans of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001.

United States Coast Guard U.S. sea service that played a notable role in antisubmarine and escort efforts in the North Atlantic, in domestic port safety and security missions, and in amphibious operations in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters while at the same time carrying out its peacetime search-and-rescue and law-enforcement responsibilities. During World War II, the Coast Guard saw worldwide action manning destroyers, transports, and auxiliary vessels, as well as cutters, patrol boats, and landing craft. The late 1930s and early 1940s brought the expansion of the Coast Guard in terms of missions, ships, and personnel. The Lighthouse Service joined the Coast Guard in July 1939, and the Bureau of Marine Inspection transferred to the service in 1942, strengthening its marine safety and security mission. As war approached for the United States, the service began preparing its 19,000 men and cutter fleet for war. Even before the United States formally entered the war, the service went on a wartime footing when, in September 1941, Coast Guard Commandant Rear Admiral Russell R. Waesche ordered cutters to don wartime paint schemes and, pursuant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s order, to engage German and Italian submarines and aircraft operating west of 26 degrees west longitude. The Coast Guard cutter Northland promptly seized a German weather station and supporting trawler on the Greenland coast in September 1941. Then, on November 1, 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Coast Guard transferred to the Navy Department. On North Atlantic escort duty, the Coast Guard sank 12 German submarines and rescued more than 1,000 Allied sailors, while losing the cutters Escanaba

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and Alexander Hamilton to hostile action. Notable in this service was the cutter Bibb’s rescue of nearly 250 survivors from three ships sunk by U-boats in convoy SC.118 during February 1943 and the destruction of U-175 by the cutters Spencer and Duane in April 1943. Coast Guard cutters also provided important escort and antisubmarine service in the Greenland Patrol Area, including the October 1944 capture of the German auxiliary Externsteine, the only German surface combatant taken at sea by U.S. forces during World War II. At home, Coast Guard captains of the port oversaw marine safety and security and assumed responsibility for the inspection of commercial vessels and the administration of professional seamen. Search-and-rescue stations and a wartime beach patrol provided coastal surveillance for Axis submarines and espionage activity. The volunteer Temporary Reserve was also formed and provided numerous civilian vessels for coastal patrol duties. Seaman John Cullen of Station Amagansett on Long Island, New York, helped foil German saboteurs when, while conducting a beach patrol in June 1942, he discovered them landing. Cutters, small boats, and aircraft all played an important role in antisubmarine and rescue efforts in the western Atlantic. During the war, the Coast Guard rescued some 1,500 sailors from vessels torpedoed along the U.S. Atlantic coast. The Coast Guard manned attack transports and LSTs (landing ships, tank) and applied its small-boat handling skills to operating landing craft in all the major amphibious assaults of the war. Just as significantly, Coast Guard surfmen trained others for this dangerous and difficult duty. The Coast Guard crews of the attack transport Leonard Wood and the attack cargo ship Aquarius each participated in eight amphibious assaults. Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro, operating from the Coast Guard–manned attack transport Hunter Liggett, led a group of landing craft evacuating U.S. marines near Matanikau on Guadalcanal in September 1942. Munro beached his Higgins boat between a large Japanese force and the marines on the beach, shielding the other boats from hostile fire and engaging the Japanese with light weapons while the evacuation was completed. In the course of the fighting, he was fatally wounded by Japanese fire. For his actions, Munro was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Active in numerous assaults in the European theater as well, the Coast Guard had a large presence at Normandy. The 60 83-ft. Coast Guard patrol boats assigned to search-and-rescue duties during the Operation OVERLORD assault rescued more than 1,500 Allied soldiers whose landing craft had been destroyed on D-Day. As commandant, Admiral Waesche piloted the service through the war and oversaw the enlistment of women and blacks into the Coast Guard. Led by Captain Dorothy C. Stratton, the Women’s Reserve—better known as the SPARs (an acronym from the Latin and English versions of the Coast Guard motto)—played an important support role during the war. More than 230,000 men and 10,000 women

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served in the Coast Guard over the course of World War II. Ultimately, their skill and bravery were the service’s major contributions to victory. Thomas J. Stuhlreyer See also: Amphibious Warfare; Antisubmarine Warfare; United States, Navy; Waesche, Russell Randolph.

References Johnson, Robert Erwin. Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard. www.uscg.mil.

United States Marine Corps Founded in 1775 as a shipboard security force for the Continental Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps struggled to maintain its institutional viability while performing numerous and varied missions around the globe during the first century of its existence. Sustained by its reputation as a rapidly deployable, tenacious combat force, the corps and its civilian proponents argued that the U.S. expansionist policies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries demanded a naval infantry force capable of seizing and defending advanced naval bases. Progressive Marine Corps leaders had begun preparing this new doctrine when World War I interrupted their planning, although the valiant exploits of the corps during this conflict further endeared the service to the U.S. public. Following World War I, the prevalent antimilitarism of the 1920s ushered in a period of military retrenchment, and the resulting scramble for available funds heightened interservice rivalries. The Marine Corps’s lack of a clearly defined mission brought tremendous scrutiny on its funding and reductions in its strength that threatened its very existence. A massive public relations campaign featuring the marine service in policing domestic mail routes and protecting U.S. interests in Latin America and China bolstered the Marine Corps’s public image and political clout with Congress, allowing the marines to withstand meager appropriations and perpetuate the claim of being the United States’ premier fighting force. In the early 1920s, U.S. military strategists began planning for numerous wartime contingencies, focusing primarily on Japan, the nation’s Pacific rival. Recognizing the navy’s need to secure advance operating bases on islands west of Hawaii in any war against Japan, the Marine Corps adopted amphibious assault as its raison d’être.


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Integrating the newly constituted Fleet Marine Force into the U.S. Navy, the marines streamlined their bureaucracy and concentrated on preparations for seizing and defending advance bases in the Pacific. The Marine Corps assigned personnel to naval intelligence and planning staffs and began educating its officers in the tactics of amphibious operations. Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete” Ellis’s exhaustive studies of Japanese-held Pacific islands in the early 1920s formed the nucleus of the marines’ amphibious assault doctrine. In 1934, the Marine Corps published a more exhaustive guide to amphibious operations, The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, and held a series of fleet landing exercises designed to test its concepts. These exercises were crucial in highlighting the need for detailed logistical planning, speed in ship-to-shore movement, overwhelming fire superiority from air and naval bombardment, and specialized equipment to successfully carry out opposed landings. Although marine aviation utilized previous experience in Latin America to develop rudimentary close-air support tactics based on dive-bombing (which the German Luftwaffe then adopted), the navy’s ambivalence toward developing close-in naval gunfire support techniques and constraints on the procurement of new equipment severely limited the development of U.S. amphibious warfare prior to 1939. Between 1939 and 1941, as the U.S. military buildup went forward, the Marine Corps tripled in size from some 25,000 to 75,000 men and improved its amphibious capabilities. However, the Marine Corps was spread thinly to cover a wide range of duties in garrisons and aboard ships, from Iceland to the Caribbean to Hawaii and numerous smaller islands throughout the Pacific. On December 7, 1941, marines aboard battleships at Pearl Harbor and at nearby airfields assisted in defending Hawaii against the Japanese attacks. Elsewhere in the Pacific, isolated marine garrisons on Guam and in China had little choice but to surrender. Marines on Wake Island and in the Philippines valiantly attempted to resist Japanese invasions, but Wake fell after two weeks of resistance, and the Philippines surrendered in May 1942. Marines were at the forefront of early U.S. operations against Japan. In the southwest Pacific, the 1st Marine Division carried out assaults in the Solomon Islands in August 1942. The long campaign for Guadalcanal revealed the complexities of conducting amphibious operations under battle conditions, including the need for increased logistical support and a simplified command-and-control structure. Advancing up the Solomons from 1942 to 1944 toward the Japanese fortress at Rabaul, the marines found themselves engaged in jungle warfare against a determined Japanese foe. In 1943, encouraged by success in the Solomons, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps undertook a thrust through the Central Pacific toward the main Japanese islands. The atolls of the Gilbert and Marshall islands proved a different kind of challenge to the marines than the jungle warfare of the southwest Pacific. Ineffective

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fire support, confused communications, and the lack of proper equipment made the initial assault at Tarawa a bloody and sobering affair, which produced the greatest loss for the marines since service in 1918 during World War I. Employing the lessons learned from Tarawa to refine their amphibious doctrine, the marines advanced through the key Marshall Islands atolls of Kwajalein, RoiNamur, and Eniwetok. During the summer of 1944, marines landed on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas. They also learned how to conduct sustained combat operations on these larger, extensively fortified islands. In the fall of 1944, marine infantry and aviation forces assisted General Douglas MacArthur’s advance on the Philippines. Marines landed on Peleliu in September and suffered heavy casualties in a savage, week-long battle. From September 1944 to April 1945, Marine Corps tactical air support became a vital component of army operations on Leyte and Luzon. In February 1945, the marines invaded the island of Iwo Jima in their most spectacular and costly operation of the war. Nearly the entire 21,000-man Japanese garrison died defending the island, while inflicting almost 30,000 casualties on U.S. forces in a 36-day slugfest. During the battle, a journalist snapped a photo of five marines and one navy corpsman raising a flag on Iwo’s Mount Suribachi. This image instantly became an icon of Marine Corps valor and esprit de corps as well as a symbol of U.S. fortitude in World War II. In June 1945, the marines and the army secured Okinawa, just 360 miles from Japan, after three months of ferocious combat in the hills and caves across the island. After the Japanese surrender on August 1945, the marines served throughout the Pacific in occupation duties. World War II was a defining moment for the marines. Their seemingly prophetic development of amphibious assault doctrine in the interwar period proved invaluable to winning the Pacific campaigns, and their prior planning and experience also aided the army-led invasions of Europe. The corps had grown to 20 times its prewar strength, with approximately 500,000 men in six Marine infantry divisions and four Marine air wings. It had honed its amphibious doctrine, while expanding its aviation and combat support capabilities. Although the corps comprised less than 5 percent of the U.S. military in the war, marines constituted nearly 10 percent of all U.S. wartime casualties, with 19,733 killed and 67,207 wounded. Despite continued and often heated interservice clashes between the army, the navy, and the new U.S. Air Force, the marines’ combat performance during World War II further attached the corps to the public, thus ensuring the service would survive demobilization as a separate institution within the navy and an elite component of the U.S. military establishment. Derek W. Frisby See Also: Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; DETACHMENT, Operation; Eniwetok, Battle of; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Higgins,

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Andrew Jackson; Landing Craft; Marshall Islands Naval Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Turner, Richmond Kelly; United States Navy; Wake Island, Battle for.

References Alexander, Joseph. A Fellowship of Valor: The Battle History of the United States Marines. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Frank, Benis M., George W. Garand, Frank O. Hough, Douglas T. Kane, Verle E. Ludwig, Bernard C. Nalty, Henry I. Shaw Jr., Truman R. Stroubridge, and Edwin T. Turnbladh. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. 5 vols. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1958–1968. Millett, Allan R. “Semper Fidelis”: A History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1991. Moskin, J. Robert. The U.S. Marine Corps Story. Rev. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987. Simmons, Edwin H. The United States Marines: A History. 4th ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

United States Navy Carrier Raid against Japan (February 10–18, 1945) The first U.S. carrier strike against the Japanese home islands since the Tokyo (Doolittle) Raid of April 1942, the operation of February 10–18, 1945, was intended as a diversion prior to the U.S. assault of Iwo Jima, but also to destroy as many Japanese aircraft as possible. Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the U.S. Third Fleet had wanted to hit the Japanese home islands since October but circumstances would not permit this. On January 16, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and his staff relieved Halsey and his staff, and Third Fleet again became Fifth Fleet. At the same time, Vice Admiral Mark A. Mitscher relieved Vice Admiral John S. McCain as commander Fast Carrier Force, and Task Force (TF) 38 now became TF 58. It fell to Spruance to carry out the raid. TF 58 was organized into five task groups (TG.1 through TG.5), comprising in all 11 fleet carriers, 5 light carriers, 8 battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 5 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, and 77 destroyers. Spruance flew his flag in the heavy cruiser Indianapolis. There was some apprehension over the raid because half of the carrier air groups would be undertaking their first mission. To enhance protection against anticipated kamikaze attacks, the number of fighters aboard the fleet carriers were increased to 73 F4U Corsairs and F6F Hellcats and 30 dive-bombers and torpedo bombers. TF 58 departed Ulithi Atoll on February 10. Everything possible was done to conceal its objective, including radio deceptions and the employment of long-range

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reconnaissance aircraft. This was accomplished, thanks also to thick weather, which, however, also affected subsequent air operations. The carriers arrived at their launch position some 60 miles south of Honshu and 125 miles southeast of Tokyo by dawn on February 16. Although flying conditions were poor, air strikes commenced immediately, with the first target the airfields around Tokyo Bay. Following strikes on these and aircraft factories, the attackers shifted their attention to shipping. Air strikes continued until late on February 17, when deteriorating weather forced Spruance to call off the attacks and depart. Generally speaking, Japanese reaction was sporadic and light. Results were substantial, although hardly spectacular. TF 58 aircraft claimed a number of ships and small craft sunk in Tokyo Bay. More impressive results were registered against airfields and factories. Although the figures are undoubtedly high, TF 58 claimed 341 Japanese aircraft shot down in the air and 190 destroyed on the ground. U.S. losses were 60 planes in combat and 28 to operational causes from 738 sorties—although a total of 2,761 sorties were flown, including combat air patrols. Task Groups 58.2 and 58.3 arrived off Iwo Jima on February 18, ready to support the marine assault there the next day. Spencer C. Tucker See also: DETACHMENT, Operation; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Kamikaze; McCain, John Sidney; Mitscher, Mark Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tokyo Raid.

References Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific 1945. Reprint. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1960. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

United States Pacific Fleet Established in 1920, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was commanded in December 1941 by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and based at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The fleet had been moved there by order of President Franklin Roosevelt the previous February. Kimmel was relieved of his command following the December 7 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was followed by Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet) Chester W. Nimitz, who took up command there on December 25, 1941. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Pacific Fleet had been organized into a Battle Force and a Scouting Force (there was also a Base Force and an Amphibious Force). Nimitz reorganized it into four task forces, each centered on a fleet aircraft

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carrier with accompanying cruisers and destroyers. Scouting duties were left to aircraft and submarines. Although there were a half dozen battleships available (three were transferred from the Atlantic) these were a good deal slower than the carriers and thus could not operate with them. They were relegated to convoy, patrol, and shore bombardment duties. The navy’s offensive fire power was now centered in the aircraft carriers and the new dreadnoughts, which were formed into carrier task forces. When the fast battleships came into service, they served the additional useful function of providing antiaircraft protection for the carriers. In March 1942, Nimitz was also given command of all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. This was divided into North Pacific, Central Pacific, and South Pacific. Then on March 15, 1943, Seventh Fleet was formed at Brisbane, Australia. It was first commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpenter, but in November, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced him. Known as “MacArthur’s Navy,” it operated under General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the South Pacific theater. The South Pacific command became Third Fleet, also on March 15, 1943. It was commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey, who answered to Nimitz. In June 1944, its on-shore headquarters was moved to Pearl Harbor. The fleet operated in and around the Solomon Islands, the Philippine Islands, Formosa (now Taiwan), Okinawa, and the Ryukyus. It also was stationed in Japanese waters at the end of the war. To improve efficiency, Nimitz worked out a system whereby staffs rotated in command of the fleet for major operations. The ships were the same. When Halsey and his staff were in command, it was designated as the Third Fleet. But when Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and his staff were in charge, it became Fifth Fleet. The system extended to some subordinate commanders. Thus, Fast Carrier Task Force (TF) 38 of Third Fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral John S. McCain, but when the carriers were part of Fifth Fleet, they became TF 58 under Vice Admiral Mark A. Mitscher. First Australian and then British naval units operated with the fleet under U.S. command. This system worked perfectly, giving staffs some down time and the opportunity to plan the next strike, which they would then execute. An ancillary benefit was that this confused the Japanese into believing that they were two separate fleets operating against them. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; McCain, John Sidney; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Spruance, Raymond Ames.

References Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1984.

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U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese Shipping (1941–1945) One day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark declared unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. On the outbreak of the war, the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic and Pacific Fleet submarine forces included 55 large boats and 18 medium-sized ones (out of a total of 111). Some 73 submarines were under construction. Yet until April 1, 1942, U.S. submarines sank only a modest 93,300 tons of Japanese shipping, less than one-tenth of what an average of 100 operational German submarines sank in the same period. At this stage of the war, U.S. submarine operations suffered from the early loss of the Philippines, for which the poorly developed Australian submarine bases could not compensate. In addition, the campaign was hobbled by a doctrine that required submarines to concentrate on enemy heavy warships and by the chronic problems of the Mark XIV torpedoes. Following the erratic performance in 1942 that yielded a total of 620,616 tons of Japanese merchant shipping, the U.S. submarine campaign gathered pace in 1943. The smaller S-class coastal submarine and the T-class fleet submarines were gradually replaced by the larger and more capable submarines of the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes. Beginning in mid-1942, the U.S. Navy began installing the first SJ surface search radars in the submarines, which further enhanced their combat value (German submarines, by comparison, only received radars in mid-1944), and in October 1943, the torpedo problems were finally resolved. The Japanese mercantile fleet amounted to 6.4 million tons at the time of Pearl Harbor. Following the cessation of neutral shipping to Japan, this volume was barely sufficient to cover the needs for industrial and civilian imports (3 million tons) and the movement of troops and supplies across the sea. The situation was briefly alleviated by the capture of 1 million tons of merchant ships during the Japanese advance in early 1942. By mid-1943, however, the U.S. submarine campaign had already eaten up these small gains made by captures and new construction. In 1943, the U.S. submarine service was fully committed to the war against the Japanese sea lines of communications, even though an operational order issued by Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in June 1943 still listed aircraft carriers and battleships as prime targets. Key traffic patterns of Japanese shipping had been identified, and U.S. submarines operating from Pearl Harbor and Australian bases conducted systematic patrols of such choke points as the Luzon bottleneck. Because the Japanese navy failed to respond to the increasing threat and organize valuable transports and cargo vessels into convoys, Japan lost 1.668 million tons of merchant shipping in 1943, with submarines accounting for 1.34 million tons of the total. The volume of imports into Japan fell from 35 million tons in 1942 (already


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down from a peacetime level of 67 million tons) to 27 million in 1943. In late 1943, the Japanese navy reluctantly committed itself to convoying some of the more valuable transports and cargo ships, but the assets assigned remained woefully short of what was necessary to stem or even reduce the bloodletting. In addition, Japanese escort ships possessed neither active sonars nor radars, and their depth charges were ineffective. Nonetheless, U.S. submarine losses were substantial. In response to the Japanese convoys, the U.S. Navy introduced the Coordinated Submarine Attack Groups—small, ad hoc wolf packs. Throughout 1944, U.S. submarines continued to inflict crippling losses on the Japanese merchant marine, amounting to 2.43 million tons. In 1944, Japanese imports dropped to a mere 16 million tons. Figures for the key materials were even more alarming. Oil imports fell from 1.75 million barrels per month in August 1943 to 360,000 barrels in July 1944. After September 1943, at best only 28 percent of the petroleum shipped from the southern regions actually made it to the home islands, and during the last 15 months of the war, only an average of 9 percent did. By the time the massive strategic air attacks began to lay waste to Japan’s cities, a substantial part of the industry located therein was already idle due to the lack of materials. The destruction of more than 3 million tons of Japanese merchant shipping in 1944 left barely enough tonnage to cover the basic military requirements of the Japanese army and navy, much less those of the civilian sector. During this phase of intensive war on the enemy’s sea lines of communications, the U.S. submarines also achieved some remarkable successes against Japanese warships. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19, 1944, they claimed two Japanese carriers (Taiho¯ and Sho¯kaku), and during the prelude to the Battle of Leyte Gulf (for which no less than 29 submarines had been deployed), they sank two heavy cruisers and fatally damaged a third on October 23, 1944. Toward the end of 1944, the diminutive Japanese escort force was raised to the status of an escort fleet and provided with somewhat better means, including aircraft, simple radar sets, and useful depth charges. Thus, in the last quarter of 1944, the Japanese antisubmarine forces reached their peak efficiency (as did the U.S. submarines), sinking four U.S. submarines in October and another four in November. Thereafter, crushing Allied naval and air superiority and the lack of fuel oil put an end to most organized Japanese naval activities, although not before U.S. submarines had scored further spectacular successes against the Japanese fleet. In November, the U.S. submarine Archerfish sank the giant carrier Shinano on its shakedown cruise, and the Sealion dispatched the battleship Kongo¯; in December, Redfish’s torpedoes claimed the new carrier Unryo¯ in the East China Sea. The number of U.S. submarine successes—of any kind—declined steeply in 1945 for want of suitable targets and because of a highly successful mining campaign in the Japanese home waters that year, which claimed the lion’s share of the 1.6 million tons of Japanese shipping lost in 1945. U.S. submarines entered the

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last sanctuaries of Japanese shipping in the Sea of Japan in June 1945 to ravage the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet but found targets exceedingly scarce thereafter. During the last months of the war, the submarines were confined to seeking what little coastal traffic had managed to escape the mine barrages and the attention of U.S. aircraft. When the war was over, Japan’s merchant fleet had been reduced to 12 percent of its prewar size, and only half of the surviving ships—a paltry 312,000 tons of mostly minor vessels were in operation due to fuel shortages. In addition to their economic impact, the U.S. submarines played a decisive role in paralyzing Japan’s maritime empire in the western and southwestern Pacific by denying the Japanese the use of their interior lines of communications for the movement of troops and equipment by sea. Thus, they facilitated the advance of the U.S. amphibious forces, which could safely bypass the immobilized and isolated Japanese island garrisons. The U.S. submarine service began the war with 111 boats, added 203, and lost 52 (50 of them in the Pacific). Of the 16,000 submariners who sailed on war patrols, 3,506 did not return—a casualty rate of 22 percent, the highest of all arms in the U.S. services during the war. Nevertheless, the U.S. submarine campaign in World War II was the only campaign of its type in the history of naval warfare that can be rated a complete success. The submarines played a decisive role in the war by incapacitating Japan’s economy. Of the 7.8 million tons of Japanese merchant shipping lost between 1941 and 1945, nearly two-thirds (4.8 million tons) was sunk by U.S submarines, which were also responsible for one-third of the Japanese warship losses. Dirk Steffen See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Convoys, Axis; Depth Charges; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Lockwood, Charles Andrew Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Radar; Shinano, Japanese Aircraft Carrier; Sonar; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty”; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States, Navy.

References Blair, Clay. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Parillo, Mark P. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993. Van Der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

V Vella Gulf, Battle of (August 6–7, 1943) Battle fought on the night of August 6–7, 1943, when a U.S. destroyer force under Commander Frederick Moosbrugger intercepted a Japanese transport group off northwest Kolombangara. Following the Battles of Kula Gulf and Kolombangara, the Japanese had switched to the Vella Gulf–Blackett Strait supply route. On the night of August 1–2, the Japanese had made a successful run by this route, the only opposition coming from an unsuccessful attack by U.S. patrol torpedo boats. Against the advice of his ship captains, who worried that the Americans would be waiting, the Japanese commodore, Captain Sugiura Kaju, decided to try it again. This time, however, the South Pacific Command had intelligence concerning the operation, and on August 5, Commander Moosbrugger received orders to sweep Vella Gulf on the night of August 6–7 with a force of six destroyers. Moosbrugger, with Destroyer Division 13—the Dunlap, Craven, and Maury— and Commander Roger R. Simpson’s Destroyer Division 15—the Lang, Sterett, and Stack—led his destroyers in two columns into the gulf. The sky was overcast, and rainsqualls reduced visibility to less than 4,000 yards. Moosbrugger hugged the shore of the high, volcanic cone of Kolombangara. At 11:33 p.m. on August 6, U.S. radar picked up the Japanese destroyers: Sugiura in the Hagikaze, followed by the Arashi, Kawakaze, and Shigure. The Japanese ships, crammed with 50 tons of supplies and 900 troops, sailed into an ambush. Moosbrugger had been privy to Captain Arleigh Burke’s planning for a night destroyer action, and he executed the attack with near perfection. At 11:41 p.m., with Simpson’s division covering, Moosbrugger commenced a torpedo attack on the unsuspecting Japanese column, which bore 6,300 yards off his port bow. The 12th Destroyer Division then turned away to avoid any Japanese torpedoes. Simpson turned to port to cross the Japanese T, and a few minutes later, as the three leading Japanese destroyers exploded in flames that lit up the dark night, he opened fire. Only the Shigure, lagging behind because of engine problems, escaped—and then only because the torpedo that struck its rudder failed to detonate. For Japan, the Battle of Vella Gulf marked the first time it had been bested in a night destroyer action. The second time, in the Battle of Cape St. George,

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Burke himself, in an action remarkably similar to Vella Gulf, would administer the defeat. Ronnie Day See also: Burke, Arleigh Albert; Kolombangara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of.

References Calhoun, C. Raymond. Tin Can Sailor: Life Aboard the USS Sterett, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Crenshaw, Russell Sydnor Jr. South Pacific Destroyer: The Battle for the Solomons from Savo Island to Vella Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Hara, Tamichi, Fred Saito, and Roger Pineau. Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York: Ballantine Books, 1961. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.

Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of (October 6–7, 1943) The last surface action of the New Georgia Campaign. The battle resulted from Japan’s decision to evacuate 600 of its troops on Vella Lavella Island. For this purpose, the Japanese put together at Rabaul a transport group of three old destroyers, five subchasers, and eight smaller craft supported by the destroyers Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazegumo, Yugumo, Shigure, and Samidare, under the command of Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji. Allied aircraft promptly reported the Japanese operation, but the only U.S. Navy force available to intercept consisted of the destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier, and O’Bannon, under the command of Captain Frank R. Walker. Three additional destroyers under Captain Harold O. Larson were detached from convoy duty and sent speeding to reinforce Walker, but they arrived too late to participate in the action. The sea was calm, and a brilliant half moon made for excellent visibility when a Japanese search plane reported at 8:58 p.m. that Walker’s force consisted of one cruiser and four destroyers, the first of a number of mistakes the Japanese were to make. Ijuin allowed the subchaser group to proceed on to Vella Lavella (this group had left earlier and was ahead of the main body), but he ordered the destroyertransports (which were also ahead of the main body) back to the Shortlands; their two escorts, the destroyers Samidare and Shigure, were to join the main group. Walker made contact at 10:31 p.m., and his radar picked up the two Japanese groups just before they joined. Walker made for the larger group. Ijuin mishandled

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his force, missed a chance to cross the T, and ended up with his ships staggered and the Yugumo masking the torpedo tubes of the other three. In the exchange that followed, U.S. gunfire and a torpedo sank the Yugumo, but not before a torpedo from the latter struck the Chevalier a mortal blow. The O’Bannon, following through thick gun smoke, collided with the Chevalier, and, although it was able to back clear, it was also out of the fight. The Selfridge continued on alone as all five of the Japanese ships headed west (Japanese aircraft had reported Larson’s force coming up from the south as cruisers), but at 11:06 p.m., a torpedo caught the Selfridge on its port side. Ijuin fled the scene, leaving the U.S. destroyer Chevalier damaged so badly that it had to be scuttled; the other two ships were barely able to limp home to Tulagi. The subchaser group meanwhile rescued the stranded Japanese troops and escaped unnoticed. The final chapter was written the next morning, when four U.S. patrol torpedo (PT) boats were sent in five miles west of Vella Lavella to look for survivors. The PT 163 picked up 33 of the Yugumo’s crew and put in at Biloa to transfer them to the army; at that point, one of the Japanese men killed a sailor with his own gun and was in turn slain, along with three other prisoners who joined in the fray. Ronnie Day See also: Kolombangara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Rabaul; Vella Gulf, Battle of.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Japanese Imperial Navy (1941–1945). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. McGee, William L. The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville—Pacific War Turning Point. Vol. 2, Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII. Tiburon, CA: BMC, 2002. Morrison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July 22, 1942–May 1, 1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960. O’Hara, Vincent P. The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Vian, Sir Philip Louis (1894–1968) British navy admiral. Born in London on June 13, 1894, Philip Louis Vian entered the Royal Navy in 1910. Educated at the Hillside School and the Royal Naval Colleges of Osborne and Dartmouth, he served in destroyers and cruisers during World War I and the interwar years. At the beginning of World War II, Vian was commanding a reserve destroyer flotilla on Atlantic convoy duty. He soon distinguished himself as an aggressive and

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effective leader of light forces. As commodore commanding the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, composed of four modern Tribal-class destroyers and a cruiser, he seized the German navy supply ship Altmark in Norwegian territorial waters on February 16, 1940, and freed 299 British prisoners held in it. He also distinguished himself in the 1941 Norwegian Campaign and in the chase of the German battleship Bismarck, which led to his early promotion to rear admiral that July. Vian then led Force K, a squadron of light cruisers, in offensive operations along the Norwegian coast until he was transferred to command Cruiser Squadron 15 in the Mediterranean in October 1941. In the Mediterranean, Vian further demonstrated his skill as his ships covered resupply convoys to Malta, most notably during the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. In 1943, he commanded a squadron of five escort carriers charged with providing fighter cover and close-air support for Operation AVALANCHE, the Salerno landings. Force V, operating in light winds and confined waters, provided more than half of all air support during the operation’s first four days. This success was tempered, however, by Vian’s inexperience in carrier operations, which showed in extraordinarily high operational losses. Vian then led the Eastern Task Force covering the Normandy invasion (Operation NEPTUNE) before taking command of the British carrier squadron destined for the Pacific. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1944. After preliminary strikes against oil refineries in Sumatra, the carriers joined the U.S. Pacific Fleet in March 1945 at Okinawa. After two months of providing important air support to U.S. land operations on that island, the British Pacific Fleet withdrew to refit, then rejoined the U.S. Third Fleet for the final attack on the Japanese home islands. Vian’s adaptability to carrier warfare requirements supported the integration of U.S. practice into the Royal Navy, and his drive was manifest in the fleet’s accomplishments. Following World War II, Vian served ashore and afloat until his retirement in 1952, when he was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet. Vian died at Ashford Hill, Berkshire, England, on May 27, 1968. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Altmark Incident; AVALANCHE, Operation; Aviation, Naval; Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Central Pacific Campaign; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; ICEBERG, Operation; Malta; McCain, John Sidney; Narvik, Naval Battles of; NEPTUNE, Operation; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home; Sirte, Second Battle of.

References Brown, J. David. Carrier Operations in World War II: The Royal Navy. London: Ian Allan, 1968. Brown, J. David, ed. The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets. Liverpool, UK: Brodie, 1995.

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Smith, Peter C. Task Force 57. London: William Kimber, 1969. Vian, Sir Philip. Action This Day. London: Mullee, 1960.

Victory Ship An improved Liberty cargo ship design produced in U.S. and Canadian yards. A total of 531 Victory ships were built during World War II; three others were constructed in 1946. Commissioned by the United States War Shipping Administration shortly after its formation in February 1942, the Victory was an improved Liberty design with higher speed (15 to 17 knots as opposed to 11 for the Liberty). The first ship was the SS United Victory. Completed on February 28, 1944, it entered service a month later. Most Victory ships were oil-fired, although some produced in Canadian yards were capable of utilizing either oil or coal. Their hulls were also strengthened, and to reduce stress (several Liberty ships had experienced hull fractures), their frames were 36 in. apart as opposed to 30 in. in the Liberty design. They were also slightly larger than the Liberty ships. Displacing 15,200 tons, they were 455 ft. in overall length and 62 ft. in beam (versus 441 ft. 6 in. and 57 ft. in the Liberty). They also presented a very different appearance, with a raked bow and cruiser stern for higher speed. Most Victory ships were armed with an antisubmarine 5-inch gun mounted at the stern and antiaircraft armament consisting of a single bow-mounted 3-inch gun and 8 20-mm cannon. These weapons were manned by United States Naval Armed Guard personnel, who were members of the navy. Some of the Victory ships were armed with the 5-inch stern-mounted gun and antiaircraft protection of 1 quad 40-mm Bofors cannon, 4 dual 40-mm Bofors cannon, and 10 single 20-mm cannon. These ships were crewed exclusively by U.S. Navy personnel. Of Victory ships built during the war, 414 were standard cargo ships and 117 were attack transports. Because they entered service late in the conflict, only five Victory ships were sunk during the war. Following the war, most were placed in reserve, although a number served thereafter in a wide variety of roles. For example, the SS Simmons Victory became the electronic intelligence collection ship USS Liberty (AGTR-5), which was attacked and severely damaged by Israeli forces during the Six-Day War of June 1967. Some Victory ships remain in the National Defense Reserve Fleet and three are museum ships: the SS American Victory at Tampa, Florida, the SS Lane Victory at Los Angeles, California, and the SS Red Oak Victory at Richmond, California. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Liberty Ships.

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References Culver, John A. “A Time for Victories.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 103 (February 1977), pp. 50–56. Lane, Frederic C. Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Sawyer, L. A., and W. H. Mitchell. Victory Ships and Tankers: The History of the “Victory” Type Cargo Ships and of the Tankers Built in the United States of America during World War II. Cambridge, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1974.

W Waesche, Russell Randolph (1886–1946) U.S. Coast Guard admiral and commandant during World War II. Born on January 6, 1886, at Thurmont, Maryland, Russell Randolph Waesche was educated at Purdue University and the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service School of Instruction (later the U.S. Coast Guard Academy). After commissioning in October 1906, he served aboard and commanded several cutters. In 1915, Waesche was assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as the chief of the Communications Division, where he served throughout World War I. During the 1920s, he commanded several patrol cutters and destroyers and returned to headquarters in 1928 as the chief ordnance officer. In 1932, he was appointed as the aide to the new commandant, Rear Admiral Harry G. Hamlet. In June 1936, he succeeded Hamlet as commandant and was promoted to the rank of rear admiral. From 1936, Waesche oversaw the growth, reorganization, and modernization of the Coast Guard, its vessels, and its facilities; and in the latter half of 1941, he prepared the service for war. In September, he transmitted President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s order for all cutters to engage German and Italian aircraft and submarines west of 26 degrees west longitude. On November 1, Roosevelt ordered the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy Department. During the course of the war, Waesche worked closely with both Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to ensure the Coast Guard successfully prosecuted both its peacetime and wartime missions. Even while diligently preserving his service’s identity, he pursued a policy of unprecedented cooperation with the navy and army, in which Coast Guardsmen served with distinction in every theater of operations. He ensured that the Coast Guard’s unique capabilities in such areas as small-boat handling and Arctic operations were recognized and utilized in the war effort. Waesche shaped the postwar Coast Guard as he worked diligently to have the service returned to the Treasury Department and to retain several missions acquired during the war, including marine inspection and licensing. After seeing his service through unprecedented changes and challenges, the Coast Guard’s first four-star admiral and arguably its most important commandant retired from active

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service in December 1945. Waesche died in Bethesda, Maryland, on October 17, 1946. Thomas J. Stuhlreyer See also: King, Ernest Joseph; United States, Navy; United States Coast Guard.

References Johnson, Robert Erwin. Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Willoughby, Malcolm F. The U.S. Coast Guard in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957.

Wake Island, Battle for (December 8–23, 1941) Strategically located in the Central Pacific and a U.S. possession since 1899, Wake Island is actually a small atoll of three islets–Wake, Peale, and Wilkes. It comprises only 2,600 acres of sand and coral and is located some 2,000 miles west of Hawaii and 600 miles from the Marshall Islands, then a Japanese stronghold. It served primarily as a refueling stop for the trans-Pacific Pan American Airways Clipper Service; but, as war loomed between the United States and Japan, both sides recognized its value as a reconnaissance base. The United States began fortifying Wake in early 1941. That December, the island had some 1,221 civilian workers and some 530 military personnel, including 449 members of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under Major James P. S. Devereux. Navy Commander Winfield S. Cunningham exercised overall command. The defenders had 6 5-inch naval guns, 12 3-inch antiaircraft guns, 18 .50-caliber machine guns, and 30 .30-caliber machine guns. On December 4, 12 Grumman F-4F Wildcats flew off the carrier Enterprise and landed at Wake’s partially completed airstrip. Within a few hours of its December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan also moved against Guam and Wake. Guam fell quickly, but at Wake Island the Japanese received their first military rebuff of the war. At noon on December 8, 18 Japanese land-based bombers from the Marshall Islands struck Wake, destroying eight of the Wildcats on the ground and inflicting other damage. They also killed 23 marine aviation personnel and wounded another 11. Ten civilian employees of Pan American Airways were also killed. Although riddled by Japanese machine-gun fire, the Pan-Am Clipper was able to take off with a capacity load of civilians that afternoon. Japanese air attacks continued for two more days. Convinced that the defenses on Wake Island had been sufficiently reduced, a Japanese invasion force arrived off the island on the morning of December 11.

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It consisted of the light cruisers Yubari, Tenryu, and Tatsuta; six destroyers; two patrol boats; and two transports with 450 men of the Special Naval Landing Force (Japanese marines). The defenders held their fire until the Japanese were at pointblank range. After a short, sharp fight, the Japanese withdrew—but not before they had lost the destroyers Hayate (literally blown from the water, it was the first Japanese warship sunk in the Pacific war) and Kisaragi. The cruiser Yubari was badly damaged, and other Japanese ships were also hit and damaged. In Hawaii, meanwhile, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was preparing a relief expedition that would commit all three of his aircraft carriers. The Saratoga was to make the relief attempt, while the Enterprise and Lexington with other ships carried out diversionary raids against the Marshall Islands and stood ready to assist. The expedition was delayed and did not sail until December 16. Commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher, it consisted of the Saratoga; the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, and the San Francisco; 10 destroyers; the seaplane tender Tangier (carrying a marine battalion); and the fleet oiler Neches. The task force was forced to travel at only 13 knots, however—the top speed of the Neches. In Pearl Harbor, meanwhile, Vice Admiral William S. Pye temporarily replaced Kimmel (who had been relieved) as new Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz made his way to Hawaii. Pye ordered the Lexington task force under Vice Admiral Wilson E. Brown to reinforce Fletcher and insisted that Fletcher refuel before entering a possible battle zone. This imposed further delay so that the relief forces were still some 600 miles from Wake when a second Japanese expeditionary force arrived at the island on December 23. With reports of Japanese carriers and battleships near Wake Island, aware that Washington considered Wake Island “a liability, not an asset,” and informed by radio message from Cunningham that the Japanese had come ashore and that “the issue is in doubt,” Pye ordered the relief expedition to return to Pearl Harbor. This second Japanese expeditionary force was much stronger than the first. It included four heavy cruisers and about 1,500 marines. The aircraft carriers Hiryu¯ and So¯ryu¯, which had participated in the Pearl Harbor raid, were detached to provide distant support in the form of air strikes. Following a preliminary bombardment, the Japanese landings began before dawn. Most of the defenders were tied down manning the heavy guns and few were available to act as infantry. Superior Japanese numbers told, and, informed that no help would be forthcoming, Cunningham decided that morning he had no choice but to surrender. In the two battles for Wake Island, the Japanese lost 820 killed, 1 light cruiser heavily damaged, 2 destroyers and 2 patrol boats sunk, and at least 7 to 8 aircraft shot down and another 20 damaged. U.S. losses totaled 130 killed, 49 wounded, 2 missing in action, and 12 aircraft destroyed. A total of 433 military and 1,104 civilians were made prisoner.

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All the defenders, except for about 100 civilians, were sent to prison camps. The Japanese put the remainder to work finishing the air station. They were executed in October 1943 (the Japanese commander Rear Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu Sakaibara was later convicted of war crimes and executed). Although the heroic marine defense of Wake Island provided a boost to U.S. morale, Japan now controlled the line of communications across the Central Pacific and was free to move against the Philippines. M. R. Pierce and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Amphibious Warfare; Brown, Wilson Jr.; Cunningham, Winfield Scott; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Lexington Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers; Nimitz, Chester William; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers.

References Cressman, Robert J. The Battle for Wake Island: A Magnificent Fight. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Kinney, John F., and James M. McCaffrey. Wake Island Pilot: A World War II Memoir. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995. Sloan, Bill. Given up for Dead: America’s Heroic Stand at Wake Island. New York: Bantam Books, 2003. Urwin, Gregory J. W. Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

Walker, Frederick John (1896–1944) British navy captain and one of the most important Allied exponents of antisubmarine warfare. Born at Plymouth, England, on June 3, 1896, Frederick John Walker entered the Royal Navy in 1909. He served with the Grand Fleet during most of World War I. In 1921, Walker began seriously studying antisubmarine warfare. He attended the first specialist course at the navy’s Anti-Submarine School, then became fleet antisubmarine officer aboard battleships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. In 1933, he was promoted to commander and took command of an ASDIC-equipped destroyer, the Shikari, but then had charge of the yacht of the commander in chief, China Station for three years. In 1937, Walker became experimental officer at the Anti-Submarine School, the appointment he held at the outbreak of World War II. Walker’s career was apparently at a dead end, because the Royal Navy held that any concern about antisubmarine warfare was a solved problem. Walker joined Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay’s staff in Dover as operations officer and was heavily engaged in Operation DYNAMO, the evacuation of the British

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Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque. He pleaded to return to sea and finally received command of the sloop Stork, flagship of Escort Group 36, in September 1941. The group’s first assignment was to escort Convoy HG.76, composed of 31 merchantmen and a naval auxiliary, from Gibraltar. During an epic battle from December 14 to 23, Walker’s group fought off air and submarine attacks, losing two merchantmen, an escort, and the escort carrier Audacity, but sinking five U-boats in the process. Walker demonstrated the skillful combination of effective deployment of surface and aerial assets with relentless determination and aggressive hunting that became his trademark. Promoted to captain in June 1942, Walker received a shore assignment at Liverpool shortly afterward, but he returned to sea in February 1943 in command of the sloop Starling, flagship of the Support Group 2. While ashore, he had convinced Admiral Sir Max Horton of the potential value of hunter-killer groups of fast, modern antisubmarine vessels, and this command was his opportunity to prove it. For the next year, Walker’s group hunted U-boats relentlessly, destroying 16 and demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt the validity of his concept. Walker drove himself no less hard. The most successful antisubmarine warfare commander in history, he died prematurely in Liverpool on July 9, 1944. Paul E. Fontenoy See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Evacuation of; Horton, Sir Max Kennedy; Hunter-Killer Groups; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home.

References Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. 2, The Hunted, 1942–1945. New York: Random House, 1998. Burn, Alan. The Fighting Captain: Frederick John Walker and the Battle of the Atlantic. London: Leo Cooper, 1993. Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. 3 vols. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956–1961. Wemyss, D. E. G. Relentless Pursuit. London: W. Kimber, 1955.

Wanklyn, Malcolm David (1911–1942) British navy officer and the first submariner to win the Victoria Cross in World War II. Born in Kolkata, India, on June 28, 1911, Malcolm David Wanklyn joined the Royal Navy in 1925. Trained at Dartmouth Naval College, he was assigned in 1930 as a midshipman first to the battleship Marlborough and then to the battle cruiser Renown. From 1932 he, served in submarines in the Mediterranean Fleet and then at Portsmouth. In 1936 he was promoted to first lieutenant. At the

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beginning of World War II, Wanklyn commanded the submarine H-32. In August 1940, he took command of the Upholder, then still under construction, a small 630ton U-class submarine armed with four 21-inch torpedo tubes (eight torpedoes) and a 76-mm (3-inch) deck gun, with a crew of 31 to 33 men. Promoted to lieutenant commander and having already torpedoed and sunk an Italian tanker and a merchant ship, Wanklyn won the Victoria Cross for an action on the evening of May 24, 1941. He was south of Sicily on his seventh patrol in the Upholder, when he sighted an Italian troop convoy with a strong destroyer escort. Although the submarine’s listening gear was inoperative and fading light made periscope observation doubtful, Wanklyn was able to work to a favorable position to torpedo and sink the 18,000-ton troopship Conte Rosso and then escape after evading 37 depth charges dropped by the destroyers. Wanklyn was lost, along with his entire crew, when the Upholder was sunk on its 25th patrol, becoming overdue on April 14, 1942. Most likely, it was sunk by depth charges dropped by the Italian torpedo boat Pegaso northeast of Tripoli that day, but it may have been damaged or sunk by German aircraft that attacked a supposed submarine in the same area on April 14, just before the Pegaso attack. It may also have been lost three days earlier, when a submarine reportedly encountered a minefield near Tripoli. Wanklyn is considered the most successful British submarine commander of the war in terms of total tonnage sunk in the war, having been credited with sinking 21 Axis ships, totaling some 140,000 tons and including a destroyer, troopships, tankers, and supply and store ships. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Submarines.

References Allaway, Jim. Hero of the Upholder: The Story of Lieutenant Commander M. D. Wanklyn VC. DSO** The Royal Navy’s Top Submarine Ace. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1991. Harvey, David. Monuments to Courage: Victoria Cross. London: Naval and Military Press, 2009. Laffin, John. British VCs of World War 2: A Study in Heroism. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 1997. Mars, Alastair. British Submarines at War 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971.

Warspite, British Battleship British battleship and most famous ship of its type in the Royal Navy during the 20th century. The Warspite was one of the five Queen Elizabeth–class battleships

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completed for the Royal Navy during 1915–1916 (Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant, Barham, and Malaya); a sixth ship, the Agincourt, was canceled in 1914). Built at the Devonport Dockyard, the Warspite was laid down on October 31, 1912; launched on November 26, 1913; and completed in March 1915. Displacing 27,500 tons standard load (31,500 tons at deep load), the Warspite was 645 ft. 9 in. in overall length and 90 ft. 10 in. in beam. It was protected by a 6-in. to 13-in. armor belt and armed with 8 15-inch guns in four turrets, two each fore and aft. Secondary armament consisted of 14 6-inch guns, 2 3-inch antiaircraft guns, and 4 21-inch torpedo tubes. Capable of 23 knots speed, it had a complement of 2,215 to 2,951 officers and men. The Warspite immediately joined the Grand Fleet in World War I. It grounded on September 16, 1915, and underwent repairs, then collided with its sister ship Barham on December 3. The Warspite saw its first action in the Battle of Jutland (May 31–June 1, 1916), when it was heavily damaged. It narrowly averted destruction when a shell hit jammed its rudder, forcing it to steam in circles under fire from the lead ships of the German battle line, but finally managed to escape. It sustained damage following another collision, this time with the Valiant on August 24, 1916. The Warspite underwent modernization during 1924–1926 and joined the Mediterranean Fleet. During 1934–1937, the Warspite underwent a major reconstruction. It received new engines, increased armor, and a totally new superstructure. This considerable undertaking proved its worth in World War II. In April 1940 during the German invasion of Norway, the Warspite participated in the destruction of eight German destroyers, striking at least one with its main battery of 15-inch guns. The battleship saw extensive service in the Mediterranean, and in the Battle of Calabria one shell hit the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare. At the Battle of Matapan, Warspite’s salvos destroyed two Italian heavy cruisers. After service in the Indian Ocean, it returned to the Mediterranean in June 1943. Off Salerno the Warspite suffered bomb damage that blew a hole in the bottom of its hull and damaged one of its aft 15-inch gun turrets. The Warspite was never fully repaired after this attack, but temporary repairs were effected. In June 1944, it shelled targets on the Normandy coast of France in preparation for the D-Day invasion. The Warspite received further damage that same month from a mine, but this too was patched up and the battleship returned to shore bombardment duties. The Warspite was sold for scrapping in March 1946, despite a concerted effort by British citizens to make it a permanent memorial. On April 23, 1947, the Warspite ran aground at Prussia Cove, Cornwall, while being towed to the scrap yard. Over the next nine years, it was broken up where it lay. Eric W. Osborne See also: AVALANCHE, Operation; Calabria, Battle of; HUSKY, Operation; Narvik, Naval Battles of; NEPTUNE, Operation.

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References Ballantyne, Iain. Warspite: The Fighting Life of HMS Warspite: Britain’s Most Heroic Warship. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Gray, Randal, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Roskill, Stephen W. H.M.S. Warspite: The Story of a Famous Battleship. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Tarrant, V. E. Battleship Warspite. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Wasp, U.S. Aircraft Carrier The eighth U.S. Navy ship to bear that name, the Wasp (CV-7) was built at the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., Quincy, Massachusetts. It was laid down on April 1, 1936; launched on April 4, 1939; and commissioned on April 25, 1940. It was the last U.S. carrier to be severely limited by provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty. A modified Ranger in design, it displaced 14,700 tons standard load and 18,450 tons

A British Royal Air Force Spitfire V fighter takes off from the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Wasp in May 1942, probably during the Wasp’s second Malta aircraft ferrying mission. (Naval Historical Center)

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full load. It was 720 ft. in overall length and 81 ft. 7 in. in beam (100 ft. maximum). Capable of 29.5 knots, it mounted 8 5-inch and 16 1.1-inch guns and 24 .50-caliber machine guns. It carried 76 aircraft and had a crew complement of 2,167. Following a shakedown cruise off the East Coast, the Wasp joined the Atlantic Fleet and for 18 months engaged in training and routine peacetime patrols. Its most celebrated missions occurred in the spring of 1942, when it became the first U.S. Navy aircraft carrier to enter the Mediterranean. That April and May, it delivered Royal Air Force Spitfire Mk. V fighters to the island of Malta to combat Axis air raids. In the summer of 1942, the Wasp sailed to the Pacific and participated in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi Landings. On September 15, the Wasp was steaming with the carrier Hornet, the battleship North Carolina, and 10 other warships convoying transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment from Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, to reinforce Guadalcanal in the Solomons, when Japanese submarine I-19 scored two direct torpedo hits on it. The torpedoes struck near gasoline tanks and magazines. Vicious fires led to internal explosions that forced the abandon-ship order at 3:20 p.m. A total of 193 men had been killed and 366 wounded. To prevent the carrier from falling in the hands of the Japanese, Captain Forrest Sherman directed the destroyer Lansdowne to sink it. Despite three additional torpedo hits, the Wasp remained afloat for some time, finally going down by the bow at 9:00 p.m. Its name lived on in the Essex-class Wasp (CV-18), commissioned in November 1943. Mary Ann Kan See also: Aircraft Carriers; Essex Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Malta; Sherman, Forrest Percival.

References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Freeman, Robert H. Requiem for a Fleet: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal, August 1942– February 1943. Ventnor, NJ: Shellback Press, 1984. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

WESERÜBUNG, Operation (April 1940) Code name for the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, the first and only joint operation of German armed forces in the war. Weserübung means “Wesser exercise,” the Wesser being a river in Germany. On the order of Adolf Hitler, the commander of the German navy Admiral Erich Raeder instigated plans to occupy

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Norway to protect Swedish iron ore imports and to forestall an expected Allied invasion. Norway would also provide the German navy with bases for surface raiders and U-boats to break out into the Atlantic for its commerce war. The Altmark incident of February 1940 provided strong evidence, in German eyes at least, of a pro-British stance in the Norwegian government, on the grounds that the Norwegians had not defended their territorial waters against the British. Hitler was convinced that the British intended to invade Norway, a move he sought to forestall. Psychological considerations also played a role, but Raeder warned Hitler that such a venture would violate all the rules of naval warfare and would force the commitment of virtually the entire German navy. Until this point in the war, the navy had made no significant contribution, and it was not slated to have a major role in the upcoming campaign against France. Hitler placed operational planning for the first time under his Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command). His stipulation that forces for WESERÜBUNG, the code name for the invasion, be placed under a special command threatened the autonomy of both the army and the Luftwaffe. For the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Hitler committed a total of some 120,000 troops, the vast majority of these assigned to Norway. The initial invasion force sent by sea to Norway was to be transported there in six separate groups: (1) 10 destroyers would move some 2,000 mountain troops to occupy the northern port of Narvik, with the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau providing distant cover; (2) the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers would lift 1,700 troops to Trondheim; (3) the light cruisers Köln and Königsberg, artillery training ship Bremse, transport Karl Peters, two torpedo boats, and five motor torpedo boats would transport 1,900 men to Bergen; (4) the light cruiser Karlsruhe, three torpedo boats, seven torpedo boats, and submarine tender Tsingtau would carry 1,100 men to Kristiansand; (5) the heavy cruiser Blücher, heavy cruiser Lützow, light cruiser Emden, three torpedo boats, and eight minesweepers would move to Oslo with 2,000 troops; and (5) four minesweepers would transport 150 troops to Egersund. On April 4, 1940, Hitler decided the operation would begin five days later. On April 8, the British began their own mining operation in Norwegian waters, which was to be followed by the landing of troops. German naval units were, however, already at sea and successfully stole a march on the British. Strong Norwegian resistance, assisted by Allied forces, led to sharp fighting, particularly at Narvik, where 10 German destroyers were trapped by British naval units, including the battleship Warspite, and were destroyed. At one point, Hitler lost his nerve and ordered the Narvik forces to seek internment in Sweden. Raeder convinced Hitler to change his mind and send reinforcements to Oslo instead of using the more dangerous sea routes to Trondheim and Bergen. The successful German campaign against France and the Low Countries, begun on May 10, caused the British and French to


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withdraw their forces from Norway during June 5–8. On June 10, the Norwegian armed forces surrendered. Raeder ordered his battleships to attack enemy shipping and protect supply shipments for German relief forces linking up with German forces at Narvik (Operation JUNO, June 4–9). On June 8, the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau encountered the British aircraft carrier Glorious at sea steaming for Scapa Flow and sank it with gunfire. The Glorious had, in addition to Hurricane fighters, a half dozen Swordfish torpedo bombers on board, but for some reason none of its aircraft were aloft. The German battleships also sank both of the two escorting British destroyers, but one of them, the Acosta, succeeded in torpedoing and damaging the Scharnhorst. As a result, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall chose to return to base, perhaps saving several nearby British convoys steaming without battleship escort. Royal Navy losses in the campaign had been severe: a fleet carrier and 2 cruisers, as well as a number of smaller ships. In addition, 8 large merchantmen, including 2 troop ships and 2 tankers, were lost, but the destroyers suffered the most. Nine were sunk and another 12 were damaged. In WESERÜBUNG, the German navy lost its new heavy cruiser Blücher, 2 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers. Other ships were damaged. These losses created serious operational problems for the German surface navy. Moreover, WESERÜBUNG had revealed serious command problems, leading to the replacement of the second fleet commander of the war, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall. In addition, a large number of torpedo failures had cost the U-boats major opportunities to inflict more serious damage on the Royal Navy. Yet for the German navy, WESERÜBUNG was its major “feat of arms” of the war. Hitler considered Norway as Germany’s “zone of destiny,” to be defended at all costs, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union, but this opened a considerable drain on German resources, as the navy and army were forced to commit major resources to defend Norway. Keith W. Bird See also: Altmark Incident; Germany, Navy; Marschall, Wilhelm; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Raeder, Erich; Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships; Warspite, HMS.

References Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. Trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler. London: Macdonald, 1974. Dildy, Douglas C. Denmark and Norway, 1940: Hitler’s Boldest Operation. London: Osprey, 2007. Hubatsch, Walther. “Weserübung”: Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940. Göttingen, Germany: Musterschmidt, 1960. Raeder, Erich. Struggle for the Sea. London: William Kimber, 1959.

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Roskill, Stephen W. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1960. Salewski, Michael. Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung: 1935–1945. Vol. 1, 1935–1941. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Bernard and Graefe, 1970.

Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, Sinking of The sinking of three ships evacuating German personnel from the Baltic during January to April 1945 included history’s worst maritime disaster. The 25,000-ton Wilhelm Gustloff was launched in 1937 as the flagship of Adolf Hitler’s “Strength through Joy” movement, which provided low-cost vacations for German workers. The Wilhelm Gustloff was employed as a cruise ship until World War II, when it became a floating barracks for German submariners training in the Baltic. With the advance of the Soviet army on the Eastern Front, the Wilhelm Gustloff was pressed into service to evacuate German personnel from the Baltic. On the night of January 30, 1945, it was sunk in the Baltic Sea by the Soviet submarine S-13 (commanded by Captain Third Class Alexander Marinseko). When it went down, the ship was carrying nearly 1,000 submariners and other military personnel, but just before it sailed, it had taken on a large number of refugees, so there were probably more than 8,000 people on board. The ship sank quickly, and only 964 survivors were picked from the sea. Some of these died of their wounds or exposure, so the total number of people who perished in the tragedy probably exceeds 7,000. The Wilhelm Gustloff was the largest German vessel ever sunk by a Soviet submarine. More people were lost in that ship than in the sinking of either the Titanic in 1912 or the Lusitania in 1915. On February 10, 1945, the S-13 sank another German liner—the General von Steuben—with 3,000 people on board, including 2,000 wounded German troops. Only 300 of them survived. A third German liner, the Goya with more than 6,000 people on board, most of them wounded German soldiers, was sunk by another Soviet submarine on April 15, and only 183 survived. Many Germans erroneously believed that the Wilhelm Gustloff was marked with red crosses and was a noncombatant. In reality, the ship mounted antiaircraft guns and was transporting naval personnel as well as refugees. It should not have been permitted to sail virtually unescorted. A footnote to its sinking is the speculation that the ship may have been carrying a priceless art treasure—the carved amber panels commissioned by King Frederick I of Prussia in the early 18th century. The Wilhelm Gustloff, General Steuben, and Goya had been taking part in what was the largest seaborne evacuation in history. The sinking of the three liners, with the loss of more than 15,000 people, obscured the fact that only 1 percent of the refugees the Germans evacuated from the Baltic by sea perished. This operation, carried out from January to May 1945, was the greatest German navy success of the war and also a personal triumph for Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, who directed

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the operation. Despite shortages of fuel and shipping and threats from mines, air attacks, and submarines, the German navy transported more than 2 million Germans by sea to the west ahead of the advancing Red Army. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy.

References Dobson, Christopher, John Miller, and Ronald Payne. The Cruelest Night. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. Koburger, Charles W. Steel Ships, Iron Crosses, and Refugees: The German Navy in the Baltic, 1939–1945. New York: Praeger, 1989. Sellwood, Arthur V. The Damned Don’t Drown: The Sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Wilkinson, Theodore Stark “Ping” (1888–1946) U.S. navy admiral who had command of the III Amphibious Force in the Pacific. Born in Annapolis, Maryland, on December 22, 1888, Theodore Stark “Ping” Wilkinson graduated at the top of his class in 1909 from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. In 1912, he earned a master of science degree from George Washington University. He was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for U.S. operations at the port of Veracruz, Mexico. During World War I, Wilkinson served in the Bureau of Ordnance, designing mines and antisubmarine depth charges. Between the wars, Wilkinson, a specialist in gunnery, captained a destroyer, was fleet gunnery officer for the Scouting Force, and served in shore assignments as an ordnance officer and secretary to the navy’s General Board from 1934 to 1937. A battleship captain for most of 1941, Wilkinson became director of Naval Intelligence in October of that year. He escaped blame for the December 1941 Pearl Harbor attack because the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence was another bureau’s responsibility, even though his office gathered intelligence information. Promoted to rear admiral in April 1942, Wilkinson took command of Battleship Division 2 that August, and in January 1943, he became deputy commander of the South Pacific Force, under Admiral William F. Halsey. During the Solomon Islands Naval Campaign, he not only solved numerous operational problems, but also exercised his considerable diplomatic skills on often contentious Allied colleagues. From July 1943 to late 1945, Wilkinson commanded the III Amphibious Force, with headquarters at Guadalcanal. He firmly advocated a leapfrogging strategy of avoiding heavily fortified Japanese-held islands and concentrating on easier

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targets. Wilkinson successfully organized landings on Cape Torokina, Green Islands, New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Treasury Island, Bougainville, Palau Island, Leyte, and Lingayen Gulf on Luzon, winning promotion to vice admiral in September 1944. His final wartime assignment was to airlift General Robert Eichelberger’s Eighth Army to Tokyo Bay on the day of the Japanese surrender in September 1945. Returning to Washington, Wilkinson became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff joint strategic survey committee. He drowned when his automobile accidentally plunged off the car ferry at Norfolk, Virginia, on February 21, 1946. Priscilla Roberts See also: Halsey, William Frederick Jr.; Leyte Landings; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of.

References Dorwart, Jeffery. Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik) German submarine tactic involving coordinated attacks against Allied convoys. The battle for the Atlantic hinged on the Allied ability to produce sufficient ship tonnage to move supplies and matériel to strategic points, whereas the Germans sought to sink as much of that tonnage in as short a time as possible. Early in the war, the U-boats operated mostly as lone raiders, partly due to the small numbers available for operations. To counter the U-boats, the Allies turned to convoys with armed escorts for protection, thereby causing the U-boats to focus on evasive tactics to survive rather than sinking merchant tonnage. Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of the German submarine force, recognized that, unless the U-boats could overcome the defenses of Allied merchant convoys, the tonnage war would inevitably be lost. His solution was a concept that came to be called Rudeltaktik, or wolf pack attack—a method for U-boats to penetrate a convoy’s antisubmarine defenses and destroy the merchant ships. Once a U-boat located an Allied convoy, other submarines would be vectored to that location. Groups of U-boats would then attack on the surface at night at relatively high speeds, maximizing the effect. U-boats would operate in a hit-and-run manner, launching their attack and then fleeing on the surface before the convoy’s surface escorts could react.

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Dönitz’s intelligence staff also broke the British convoy codes and were able to supply specific information concerning departure and arrival schedules, escort strength, and weather reports from all ocean areas. Success in the intelligence war was critical in locating targets for U-boat concentrations. By late 1942, Dönitz had over 200 operational U-boats with which to implement wolf pack operations. Some Italian submarines also participated. A wolf pack generally consisted of 6 to 9 U-boats, but some utilized as many as 20 to 30. Wolf packs were identified with code names, such as LOWENHERZ (LIONHEART) or STREITAXT (BATTLE AXE), giving the submariners a sense of cohesion and collective focus for the operation. Each pack deployed into a concave patrol line with about 10 miles between each pack member. Using darkness, the U-boats would operate on the surface to lessen the effectiveness of Allied ASDIC, and the compact silhouette of the U-boat helped provide natural protection. The patrol line combed the Atlantic in an east or west direction, maintaining radio silence while under control by radio from Dönitz’s command post at Lorient, France. When an individual submarine sighted a convoy, its crew would immediately radio the convoy’s position and course to Dönitz’s headquarters, which would then relay orders for the pack to concentrate the line inward on the projected course of the convoy. The U-boat that originally established contact would shadow the convoy at a safe distance and keep headquarters advised of any change in the convoy’s course. When at least three U-boats came in contact with the convoy, the attack began, and Dönitz turned immediate control of the battle over to the individual U-boat commanders. The wolf pack, however, had little opportunity to cooperate tactically, as Allied radio detection prohibited communications between individual boats. However, the multiboat attack would confuse and disrupt the escorts, thereby improving each boat’s chance of gaining an effective position from which to launch an attack. The U-boats would fire a salvo of three or four torpedoes along several paths to increase the chances of a hit. Because the convoy formed a compact target, a single salvo might result in several hits on different ships within the formation. After their attacks, the U-boats submerged to escape counterattack. Unless the convoy managed to elude the wolf pack by a radical change of course, the merchant ships might be hounded by the pack over several successive nights. The action would be broken off only when the U-boats had exhausted their torpedoes or the convoy reached a point where continuous air cover could be provided. These tactics resulted in the sinking of almost 400,000 tons of Allied shipping per month during late 1942, with a peak occurring in November, when 118 ships were sunk for a total of 743,321 tons. The Achilles heel of the wolf packs, however, was the radio communications between the U-boats and Dönitz’s headquarters. The Allies introduced highfrequency direction-finding equipment in faster Allied escort vessels to drive

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away the shadowing U-boat, thereby forcing it to submerge or destroying it with depth charges or air attack. Allied technical superiority, the use of long-range aircraft, and code breaking culminated in May 1943, when the Allies destroyed over 40 German submarines. “Black May” signaled the defeat of the wolf packs as the ratio of Allied tonnage produced to tonnage sunk by the U-boats tipped against the Germans. During World War II, more than 130 wolf packs operated against Allied shipping, sinking more than 2,759 Allied merchant ships and 138 warships and killing almost 60,000 seamen. Of the 1,170 U-boats Dönitz employed throughout the war, 753 were lost, along with some 29,000 crewmen. Steven J. Rauch See also: Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Leigh Light; Signals Intelligence; Sonar; Submarines.

References Edwards, Bernard. Dönitz and the Wolf Packs. London: Cassell, 1999. Time-Life Books. Wolf Packs. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1989. Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War Two. New York: Ballantine Books, 1974.

Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) U.S. Navy Women’s Reserve (1942–1948). The acronym WAVES stood for Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service. The WAVES was established on July 30, 1942, under Public Law 689, H.R. 6807, an amendment to the Naval Reserve Act of 1938. The first director of the WAVES, Lieutenant Commander Mildred McAfee, was also the president of Wellesley College in Massachusetts. Public Law 689 specifically stated that the WAVES would remain restricted to the continental United States and not serve on board naval vessels or aircraft. This restriction is, however, misleading, because women did serve on ships and in combat areas as nurses in the Navy Nurses Corps, established in 1908. The restriction keeping WAVES in the continental United States did not last, and by September 1944, they were allowed to volunteer for duty in Alaska, Hawaii, the Caribbean, and Panama. By the end of the war, women constituted nearly 2 percent of the U.S. Navy. In some areas, such as the Navy Department in Washington, over half the uniformed personnel were WAVES. WAVES served in many noncombat roles during the war. Eighty were naval air navigators. Some trained future naval aviators in instrument flying and served as

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gunner’s mates to teach men antiaircraft gunnery. Others were involved with decoding messages or with the hospital corps. Well over 85,000 women served in the WAVES during World War II. A study conducted in 1944 showed that the WAVES then in service released from noncombat duties sufficient male personnel to man 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, and 50 destroyers. There was also a Coast Guard women’s auxiliary, the SPARS (combining the Latin and English versions of the Coast Guard motto, Semper Paratus, meaning “always ready”) and the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (MCWR). The WAVES became a permanent part of the navy in 1948 when Congress passed the Women’s Armed Service Integration Act (Public Law 625). This step eventually led to the full integration into the armed forces of all women’s units in the 1970s. Suzanne S. Finney See also: United States, Navy; United States Coast Guard.

References Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall. Crossed Currents: Navy Women in a Century of Change. Washington, DC: Batsford Brassey, 1999. Godson, Susan H. Serving Proudly: A History of Women in the U.S. Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1992. Wingo, Josette Dermody. Mother Was a Gunner’s Mate: World War II in the WAVES. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

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Y Yamaguchi Tamon (1892–1942) Japanese admiral and commander of Carrier Division 2. Born in Shimane Prefecture, Japan on August 17, 1892, Yamaguchi Tamon graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. Trained as a torpedo officer, he was promoted to senior lieutenant in 1918. He was then assigned to assist in the effort to return to Japan the submarines that formed part of the German reparations in 1919. Yamaguchi attended Princeton University in the United States between 1921 and 1923 and then graduated from the Naval Staff College in 1924. He next served on the Naval General Staff. Promoted to commander in 1928, he was a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1929–1930 London Naval Disarmament Conference. Yamaguchi was promoted to captain in 1932 and served as naval attaché in the United States between 1934 and 1937. Thereafter, he commanded the battleship Ise and the First Combined Air Fleet in China, engaged in air operations over China. Promoted to rear admiral in 1940, Yamaguchi assumed command of Carrier Division 2, composed of the aircraft carriers Hiryu¯ and So¯ryu¯. A close confidant of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, he was an outspoken supporter of Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor plan and, later, his Midway plan. Yamaguchi and the cautious Vice Admiral Nagumo Chu¯ichi were often at odds. During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamaguchi urged Nagumo to make follow-up strikes on Pearl Harbor facilities and to destroy the U.S. carriers absent on December 7, 1941, but Nagumo refused. In early 1942, Yamaguchi took part in actions against the British in the Indian Ocean. Yamaguchi and his carriers next participated in the Battle of Midway. Again, he and Nagumo disagreed on tactics. On June 4, 1942, Yamaguchi stressed the necessity for the Japanese to strike first, and on the sighting of the U.S. carriers, he urged that the Japanese launch an immediate dive-bomber attack without the torpedo bombers, but Nagumo refused. Nagumo’s decisions left his carriers vulnerable, and three of the four were sunk by U.S. Navy dive-bombers. With his own carrier Akagi sinking, Nagumo transferred command of air operations to Yamaguchi. Twice Yamaguchi launched attacks against what he thought were two different U.S. carriers; actually, there was only one, the Yorktown. Although Yamaguchi lost 24 aircraft, his attacking planes badly damaged the Yorktown, and it was later sunk by a Japanese submarine. As Yamaguchi prepared a third strike that evening,

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U.S. dive-bombers from the carriers Enterprise and Yorktown mortally damaged the Hiryu¯. Yamaguchi assumed blame for the loss of his ship and refused to leave it. His staff tried to dissuade him, as they believed that he was invaluable to the Japanese navy, but Yamaguchi rejected their appeals. The 800 survivors then abandoned ship, and Hiryu¯ was scuttled, sinking on June 5. Yamaguchi was last seen reciting poetry and sipping tea. William Head and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chu¯ichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Fuchida Mitsuo and Masatake Okumiya. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955. Ienaga Saburo. The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945. New York: Pantheon, 1978. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin, 1981. Prange, Gordon W., Donald Goldstein, and Kathleen Dillon. Miracle at Midway. New York: Penguin, 1982.

Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943) Japanese navy admiral who devised the December 1941 attack against U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor. Born in Nagaoka, Honshu, Japan, on April 4, 1884, Yamamoto Isoroku was the biological son of the former samurai Takano Sadayoshi and the adoptive son of Yamamoto Tatewaki. Educated at the Japanese Naval Academy (1901–1904), he fought in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and took part in the great Japanese naval victory in the Battle of Tsushima. He attended the Naval Staff College in 1915 and 1916. Initially trained in gunnery, Yamamoto became a leading advocate of naval air power during the 1920s and 1930s, in part because of his experiences as chief executive officer at Kasumigaura Naval Flight School between 1924 and 1926, when he became a pilot as well. Also significant in forming Yamamoto’s perceptions were his two periods as a resident officer in the United States. Between 1919 and 1921, he studied English at Harvard University. Promoted to captain in 1923, he served as naval attaché in Washington, D.C., from 1926 to 1928. Yamamoto’s time in the United States persuaded him of that country’s unlimited economic potential and the relatively low quality of the U.S. Navy.

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On returning to Japan from the United States, Yamamoto took command of the aircraft carrier Akagi and used it as a platform to test out new concepts in naval aviation. He was a delegate to the 1929–1930 London Naval Conference. He became chief of the navy’s technical service in 1930 and was promoted to rear admiral the next year. In this position, he pushed the development of modern aircraft for the navy. In 1933, Yamamoto took command of the 1st Naval Air Division. He headed the Japanese delegation to the 1935–1936 London Naval Conference, where he presented Tokyo’s position that it would no longer abide by the 5-to-5-to-3 naval ratio with the United States and Britain. He returned home a national hero. Appointed vice minister of the navy in 1936, Yamamoto opposed his government’s decision to proceed with construction of the giant Yamato-class battleships, believing they were a waste of precious resources. Unable to overcome the reliance on traditional battleships, Yamamoto nonetheless pushed the construction of aircraft carriers, long-range bombers and flying boats, and the new Zero fighter. His opposition to the increasingly belligerent official position led to his removal from his government post. Appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in August 1939 and promoted to full admiral in November 1940, Yamamoto opposed Japan’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and the movement toward war with the United States. Although he allegedly remarked privately that he would “run wild” for six months to a year, he had “utterly no confidence” after that. Nonetheless, he rejected the navy’s original plan to lie in wait for the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Far East, after the U.S. ships had been savaged by submarine and torpedo attacks. Instead, Yamamoto devised a preemptive strike against the Pacific Fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. He hoped that by crippling U.S. naval power at the war’s outset, Japan might use the breathing spell that would ensue to conquer the Southern Resource Area and erect an impregnable defensive barrier. Yamamoto did what he could to prepare his fleet for war, purging ineffective officers and insisting on realistic, rigorous—even dangerous—training, both day and night, so that when war came, the fleet was the best trained in the world, certainly at night fighting. However, he ignored technological advances, such as radar, which Japanese ships did not receive until 1943. The success of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, enhanced Yamamoto’s prestige, which he used to persuade the Naval General Staff to accept his overly complex Midway plan in April 1942. Designed to draw out the remnants of the U.S. Fleet—specifically the carriers absent from Pearl Harbor on December 7—Yamamoto’s Midway campaign ended in disaster on June 4–6 with the Combined Fleet’s loss of four fleet carriers, a blow from which the Japanese navy never recovered. Although the tide of the Pacific war clearly shifted in favor of the Allies after Midway, U.S. leaders remained wary of Yamamoto’s leadership. Accordingly, when U.S. intelligence learned that Yamamoto intended a one-day inspection trip

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to the northern Solomons in April 1943, the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, with the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dispatched aircraft to intercept his plane. On April 18, U.S. Army Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighters shot down Yamamoto’s aircraft near Buin in southern Bougainville Island, killing the admiral. His remains were recovered and returned to Tokyo, where he was honored with a state funeral. Bruce J. DeHart and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on.

References Agawa Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Tokyo: Kondansha International, 1979. Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Fuchida Mitsuo and Okumiya Masatake. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955. Hoyt, Edwin P. Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: McGrawHill, 1990. Potter, John D. Yamamoto: The Man Who Menaced America. New York: Viking, 1965. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Prange, Gordon W., Donald Goldstein, and Kathleen Dillon. Miracle at Midway. New York: Penguin, 1982. Wible, J. T. The Yamamoto Mission: Sunday, April 18, 1943. Fredericksburg, TX: Admiral Nimitz Foundation, 1988.

Yamato, Suicide Sortie of (April 6–7, 1945) The sinking of the Japanese battleship Yamato is a classic case of a surface warship, unsupported by air cover, succumbing to devastating air attack. Built at the Kure Naval Yard and launched in 1941, the battleship Yamato was armed with a main battery of nine 18.1-inch guns. By 1945, it was also armed with some 150 antiaircraft and machine guns. In response to the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, the Japanese navy prepared a desperate surface ship sortie and air attack against U.S. naval forces investing the island. On April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-GO, in which the Second Fleet would join the battle for Okinawa. With no carriers and aircraft to protect his ships, Second Fleet commander Vice Admiral Ito¯ Seiichi initially refused the order, which he considered a suicide mission for his fleet. Vice Admiral Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke ultimately prevailed on Ito¯ to agree, however.

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The plan called for the Yamato, supported by the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers, to steam to Okinawa and attack Allied shipping there. The Yamato would then be run aground, where, as a stationary battery, it would provide gunfire support to the Japanese defenders on Okinawa. The Yamato was only provided sufficient fuel for a one-way mission. Ito¯ Seiichi, aware it was a suicide mission, had overall charge of the operation and was aboard the Yamato, which was commanded by Rear Admiral Aruga Kosaku. U.S. Navy forces off Okinawa had been alerted to the approaching sortie by signals intelligence, and the Japanese task force was quickly detected by U.S. submarines as it emerged from the southernmost exit of Japan’s Inland Sea on April 6. Because all available Japanese aircraft were targeted at naval forces around Okinawa, the Yamato was left exposed and vulnerable to air attack. U.S. carrier-based aircraft commenced their attacks on the Japanese task force on April 7 at 12:32 p.m. The Japanese warships were subjected to repeated air attacks, but they only shot down 10 of 386 attacking aircraft. Amid massive explosions, the ship sank at 2:23 p.m., less than two hours after the air attacks began. The U.S. report on the ship’s sinking claimed hits by at least 11 torpedoes and 8 bombs; Japanese survivors put the total at nearer to 16 torpedoes and 18 bombs. Only 269 of the Yamato’s 2,767 crew members survived. The light cruiser Yahagi and four of the destroyers were also sunk, but four damaged destroyers escaped back to Japan. Glenn E. Helm See also: Battleships; ICEBERG, Operation; Ito¯ Seiichi; Japan, Navy; Signals Intelligence; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

References Barlow, Jeffrey G. “The Battle for Okinawa.” In Great American Naval Battles, edited by Jack Sweetman (pp. 371–387). Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific, 1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Spurr, Russell. A Glorious Way to Die: The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato. New York: Newmarket Press, 1981. Yoshida, Mitsuru. Requiem for Battleship Yamato. Trans. Richard Minear. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships The Japanese Yamato-class battleships were the largest battleships ever built. Of five of its class originally planned, only Yamato and its sister Musashi were finished as battleships. A third ship, Shinano, was completed as an aircraft carrier.

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The Japanese battleship Yamato, photographed here during its trials in 1941; the Yamato and its sister ship Musashi were the largest battleships ever built. (Naval Historical Center)

The Yamato was built in great secrecy. Its keel was laid at the Kure Naval Yard on November 4, 1937; the ship was launched on August 8, 1940, and commissioned on December 16, 1941. The Yamato-class ships displaced 62,315 tons standard load and 69,990 tons at full load (in contrast, the U.S. Iowa class displaced 57,540 tons at full load). The Yamato-class ships measured 862 ft. 9 in. in overall length and 121 ft. 1 in. in beam. The armor belt was 16.1 in. and deck armor 9.1 in. in thickness. Armament consisted of 9 18.1-inch main guns in three triple turrets, 12 6.1-inch guns, 12 5-inch antiaircraft guns, 24 25-mm antiaircraft guns, and 4 13-mm machine guns. Each also carried seven floatplanes, launched from two catapults. The ships had an armor belt of 16.1 in. and turret armor of 25.6 in. They were capable of speeds up to 27.7 knots. Crew size was some 2,500 men. The Yamato had a rather uneventful career. Assigned as Fleet Commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s flagship in February 1942, it was part of the Japanese Midway operation but saw no action in that battle. The Yamato might have played an important role in the fighting for control of the Solomon Islands, but Japan was reluctant to risk such a national symbol. With subsequent activities curtailed by the shortage of oil, the ship’s actions were severely limited, and it saw little combat.


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On December 24, 1943, the U.S. submarine Skate attacked the Yamato near Truk, damaging it on the starboard side near turret 3, which resulted in the flooding of a magazine. The Yamato returned to Japan for repairs, which were completed at Kure by April 1944. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Yamato and Musashi formed the core of Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo’s Force A. Kurita sailed from Brunei with a powerful force that included 5 battleships and 10 heavy cruisers. The Yamato sustained two bomb hits in the Sibuyan Sea while under way to San Bernardino Strait, where it and what remained of Kurita’s force encountered a force of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts of escort carrier group Taffy 3, at the Battle of Samar. Although it escaped intact from this encounter, it also did not inflict any damage. The Yamato’s next and final mission was an attempt to disrupt the U.S. landing on Okinawa, where it was to be beached and its guns employed as artillery support for operations ashore. Loaded with only sufficient fuel to make a one-way trip, the Yamato set out from Japan and was spotted by U.S. submarines and tracked. Aircraft from Task Force 58 attacked the Japanese battleship on April 7, 1945. It took between 9 and 12 aerial torpedoes and 6 bombs to sink the Yamato. Only 269 of its 2,767 crew members survived. The Musashi, built by Mitsubishi at Nagasaki, was laid down on March 29, 1938; launched on November 1, 1940; and commissioned on August 5, 1942. It joined the Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu in the 1st Battleship Division, and, following trials and gunnery drills, it was declared fully operational in December. The Musashi saw even less combat than the Yamato. In February 1943, it replaced the Yamato as Yamamoto’s flagship. In mid-May 1943, it deployed as part of a task force to the northern Pacific but failed to encounter U.S. forces. It subsequently was part of a task force dispatched to the Aleutians but returned to Japan when the Americans recaptured Attu Island before its arrival. At the end of July, after receiving upgrades in fire control and radar in Japan, the Musashi steamed for Truk. It remained there until February 1944 and took part in several attempts to intercept U.S. carrier forces that were, however, unsuccessful. Departing Palau on March 29, the Musashi came under attack by the U.S. submarine Tunny. It managed to evade five of the six torpedoes fired at it, but the sixth damaged the forward area of the ship and caused 18 casualties. After repairs at Kure, when it also received upgrades that included enhanced antiaircraft protection, it sailed for Okinawa to join the Second Fleet under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo. During the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944), the Musashi escorted the Japanese fast carriers. In October, the battleship was at Brunei preparing as part of Admiral Kurita’s force for the counterattack of the U.S. landings at Leyte that led to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. On October 24 in the Sibuyan Sea, Kurita’s task force came under heavy U.S. air attacks. The Musashi was damaged forward in the first attacks, forcing it to reduce speed to only 10 knots. It sank that same evening,

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overwhelmed by 17 bombs and 10 to 19 torpedo hits. A total of 1,023 of her 2,399man crew died; the remainder were rescued by Japanese destroyers. Eighteen U.S. aircraft were lost in the attack. John A. Komaromy and Spencer C. Tucker See also: Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Ozawa Jisaburo; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Shinano, Japanese Aircraft Carrier; Solomon Islands Naval Campaign; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yamato, Suicide Sortie of.

References Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Dulin, Robert O., and William H. Garzke. Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Jentschura, Hansgeorg, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Skulski, Janusz. The Battleship Yamato. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Whitley, M. J. Battleships of World War II: An International Encyclopedia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Yoshimura, Akira. Battleship Musashi: The Making and Sinking of the World’s Biggest Battleship. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1999.

Yonai Mitsumasa (1880–1948) Japanese navy admiral and statesman during the war years. Born in Iwate Prefecture, Japan, on March 2, 1880, Yonai Mitsumasa graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1901 and served in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following his graduation from the Naval War College in 1914, he held various major posts, including military attaché, staff officer, and commander of a battleship. In 1925, he was promoted to flag officer. Appointed commander of the Second Fleet, Yonai became commander in chief of both the Combined Fleet and the First Fleet in 1936. In February 1937, he assumed the post of minister of the navy in the cabinet of Premier Hayashi Senju¯ro¯, and he was promoted to admiral of the navy in April of that year. He remained in this post in both Konoe Fumimaro’s first cabinet and Hiranuma Kiichiro’s cabinet. In the first negotiations for the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan in the summer of 1938, Yonai foiled efforts to conclude the alliance, working in cooperation with Vice Minister of the Navy Yamamoto Isoroku and strongly opposing its main supporters, such as Japanese army leaders. In August 1939, Yonai was discharged because the Hiranuma cabinet was compelled to resign en bloc, but his previous post brought him appointment to the position of military councilor.

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In January 1940, Yonai assembled a new cabinet based on the support of Emperor Hirohito. Yonai opposed Japan’s plans to go to war with the United States. Army leaders therefore forced the cabinet to resign en bloc by employing the extreme action of withdrawing the minister of the army from the government, knowing that no Japanese cabinet could be formed without ministers of the army and navy. In July 1944, with Japan’s military situation fast deteriorating, Yonai and Koiso Kuniaki formed a new cabinet on the resignation of Premier General To¯jo¯ Hideki. By special order of the emperor, Yonai was reappointed minister of the navy in the Koiso cabinet. He remained in this post in Suzuki Kantaro¯’s cabinet in April 1945 to help lay the groundwork for the postwar period and in the cabinets of both Higashikuni Naruhiko and Shidehara Kijuro. Yonai died in Tokyo on April 20, 1948. Tomoyuki Takemoto See also: Japan, Navy; Suzuki Kantaro¯; Takagi So¯kichi; Yamamoto Isoroku.

References Agawa Hiroyuki. Yonai Mitsumasa. Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1978. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Ogata Taketora. Ichigunjin No Shogai: Teitoku Yonai Mitsumasa [Life of a military man: Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa]. Tokyo: Kowado, 1983. Sims, Richard. Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868–2000. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Takada Makiko. Nihon No Magarikado: Sangoku Gunji Domei To Yonai Mitsumasa [The turning point for Japan: The Tripartite Pact and Mitsumasa Yonai]. Tokyo: Rokusoshobo, 1984. Takamiya Tahei. Yonai Mitsumasa. Tokyo: Jijitsushinsha, 1986.

Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers The three ships of the U.S. Navy’s Yorktown class of large aircraft carriers were, in effect, the first modern aircraft carriers. The Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet had been designed from experience with other carriers and were the forerunners of the formidable Essex-class carriers that joined the fleet at the end of 1942. All three Yorktown-class ships were built at Newport News, Virginia, and commissioned during 1937–1941. They displaced 19,875 tons standard load and 25,484 tons full load. They were 809 ft. 4 in. in length overall (824 ft. 9 in. on the flight deck) and 83 ft. in beam (109 ft. 6 in. in maximum width of the flight deck). Capable

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The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Yorktown (CV-5), anchored in Hampton Roads, Virginia, in October 1937. Badly damaged in the Battle of Midway, the Yorktown was sunk by the Japanese submarine I-168 on June 7, 1942, while under tow. (Naval Historical Center)

of 32.5 knots speed, they were protected by an armor belt ranging in thickness from 2.5 in. to 4 in., with only 1.5 in. of deck armor. Initial armament consisted of 8 5-inch guns in single mounts and 16 1.1-inch guns in four mounts, and 24 .50caliber machine guns (from February 1942, the machine guns were replaced with 30 20-mm Oerlikon cannon; antiaircraft capability underwent continued expansion during the war so that by its end the Enterprise mounted 11 quadruple-mounted 40-mm, eight twin-mounted 20-mm, and 16 single 20-mm guns). The Yorktownclass carriers operated 96 aircraft (the 1938 air group consisted of 18 fighters, 36 torpedo bombers, 37 dive-bombers and 5 utility aircraft). They had a crew complement of 2,175 men. The Yorktown (CV-5) was laid down on May 21, 1934; launched on April 4, 1936; and commissioned on September 30, 1937. It was operating in the Atlantic at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Ordered to the Pacific, in January 1942 it escorted a convoy carrying marine reinforcements to American Samoa, then took part in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands carrier raids and, in mid-March, joined the carrier Lexington in attacking Japanese forces that had landed at Lae and Salamaua in eastern New Guinea. It participated


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in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8), when its aircraft and those of the Lexington sank the light Japanese carrier Sho¯ho¯ and damaged the fleet carrier Sho¯kaku. Japanese aircraft from the Sho¯kaku and Zuikaku found both U.S. carriers and so severely damaged the Lexington that it had to be scuttled. The Yorktown was hit by a single bomb that penetrated the flight deck and exploded below, killing or badly wounding 60 men. At Pearl Harbor, the Yorktown was put back in service in only three days, enabling it to participate with the Enterprise and Hornet in the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), when its aircraft fatally damaged the Japanese carrier So¯ryu¯. The Yorktown was badly damaged by Japanese aircraft, however. Protected by a screen of destroyers, the Yorktown was in tow when it was sunk by Japanese submarine I-168 on June 7. The Enterprise (CV-6), known affectionately as “The Big E,” was laid down on July 16, 1934; launched on October 3, 1936; and commissioned on May 12, 1938. Its aircraft provided the air cover for the Tokyo (Doolittle) Raid of April 18, 1942. During the Battle of Midway, its SBD Dauntless dive-bombers helped account for the loss of the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Hiryu¯. The Enterprise was damaged in the battles off Guadalcanal but was repaired in time to take part in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 16, 1942. Again damaged, it was repaired at Pearl Harbor and returned to action, and its air group helped to sink the Japanese battleship Hiei. After undergoing a major refit in the second half 1943, the Enterprise then took part in the U.S. strikes against the Japanese Pacific islands, and its aircraft helped sink the Japanese battleship Musashi in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). Hit by a Japanese kamikaze in May 1945, it was out of action the remainder of the war. Repaired, it was nonetheless decommissioned on February 17, 1947, and assigned to reserve as an antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS-6) in July 1953. Although there was an effort to have the ship preserved as a memorial, it was sold to be broken up for scrap on July 1, 1958. The Hornet (CV-8) was laid down on September 26, 1939; launched on December 14, 1940; and commissioned on October 20, 1941. The Hornet carried the 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers that struck Tokyo and other Japanese cities on April 18, 1942. Later, its aircraft initiated the Battle of Midway. It then took part in the naval battles off Guadalcanal. In the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the Hornet was struck by two Japanese bombs. After several more hits, the ship’s engines and communications went dead. Although efforts were made to take it in tow, the damage was too extensive; this and closing Japanese forces led to its abandonment. The Hornet was sunk by torpedoes from Japanese destroyers on the morning of October 27. It had been in service little more than a year. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Aircraft Carriers; Guadalcanal, Naval Battles of; Kamikaze; Kongo Class, Battleships; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Tokyo Raid; U.S. Carrier Raids; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships.

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References Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Crossman, Robert. That Gallant Ship: U.S.S. Yorktown (CV-5), Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories, 2000. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Rose, Lisle A. The Ship That Held the Line: The USS Hornet and the First Year of the Pacific War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Stafford, Edward Peary. “The Big E”: The Story of the USS Enterprise. New York: Random House, 1962.

Yoshida Zengo (1885–1966) Japanese navy admiral in command of the China Area Fleet in 1942 and 1943. Born in Saga, Japan, on February 4, 1885, Yoshida Zengo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904. Commissioned an ensign the following year, he was a student at the torpedo school in 1907. He was promoted to lieutenant commander in 1915 and was appointed a staff officer of the Third Fleet. Promoted to captain in 1923, Yoshida commanded, in turn, the battleships Kongo and Mutsu. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1929, and he was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1931 and made head of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry in 1933. Advanced to vice admiral in 1934, Yoshida was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in 1938. From August 1938 to September 1940, Yoshida served as minister of the navy in the cabinets of Abe Nobuyuki, Yonai Mitsumasa, and Konoe Fumimaro. During this period, he joined Yonai, Vice Minister of the Navy Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, and head of the Bureau of Naval Affairs Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi in strongly opposing the Tripartite Pact, which they believed would lead to war against the United States and Great Britain. Leaders of the Japanese army and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yo¯suke, however, pressured Japanese naval leaders, and the pact was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Yoshida was so shocked by this decision that he resigned his post. Yoshida suffered a brief period of mental illness, but he returned to the navy. Promoted to admiral in November 1940, he commanded the China Area Fleet in 1942 and 1943 and then served as head of the Naval War College from December

Yugoslavia, Navy

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1943 until his retirement from the navy in June 1945. Yoshida died at Tokyo on November 14, 1966. Kotani Ken See also: Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi; Japan, Navy; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yonai Mitsumasa.

References Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1936–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950. Marder, Arthur J. Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. 2 vols. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981–1990.

Yugoslavia, Navy Following the First World War, the new state of Yugoslavia received from the former Austro-Hungarian navy 12 modern motor torpedo boats (MTBs), 4 obsolete minesweepers, 4 river monitors, and a number of auxiliary vessels. In the 1920s, Yugoslavia purchased from Germany 6 M-class minesweepers and the old cruiser Niobe. In the early 1930s, Yugoslav shipbuilding yards produced 2 destroyers, 5 small mine tenders, and a gunboat. Yugoslavia also purchased other warships abroad to include 2 destroyers, 4 submarines, 8 Orjen-class MTBs (from Germany), 2 coastal motor boats, and a number of auxiliary vessels. In 1940, Italy and Yugoslavia operated the only navies in the Adriatic. Yugoslavia’s principal navy base was Kotor (Cattaro) on its south coast. The Royal Yugoslav navy experienced little activity in the war until the nation was invaded by the Axis powers on April 6, 1941. One destroyer, 4 small torpedo boats, and 10 MTBs of the Yugoslav navy deployed to assist in an attack on the Italian enclave at Zara, but Italian bombers soon put them to flight. The Italians also carried numerous landings in the Dalmatian Islands. In the end, Italy captured nearly the entire Yugoslav navy. Only four ships escaped this fate; one destroyer was blown up in harbor, while 1 submarine and 2 MTBs were able to join the Allies to form the nucleus of the Royal Yugoslav Navy in exile. In September 1943, the Royal Yugoslav Royal Navy gained a corvette and, after Italy switched sides and joined the Allies, it received back the surviving ships from those the Italians had captured in 1941. In mid-1944, the Yugoslavs received eight MTBs under the U.S. Lend-Lease program. At the end of the war, the Yugoslav government assumed control of all ships that had belonged to the navy before the war. It also took control of some former Italian warships. In November 1945, the

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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came into being, and all ships belonging to the Royal Yugoslav Navy were transferred to its control. The naval arm of the Yugoslavian People’s Liberation Army came into being on December 18, 1941. It was popularly known as “Tito’s Navy,” for Yugoslav Partisan resistance leader Josip Broz (Tito). These consisted of small fishing boats with makeshift armor and armed first with captured Italian weapons and then those provided by the British. Some of the vessels had grenade launchers. In August 1944, Tito’s Navy received 12 LCTs (landing craft, tank). Following the defeat of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Germans carved out a puppet state in Croatia. They then assisted the creation of a Croatian Black Sea Detachment at Varna. After the Italian government switched sides in September 1943, Germany expanded its support to the Croatians, eager to have their aid in fighting the Yugoslav resistance. The Germans thus transferred to the Croatians some of the ships belonging to the former Yugoslavian Royal Navy as well as providing it other small craft of their own. When Italy switched sides in September 1943, the Germans sought to secure the Adriatic. Toward that end, they outfitted six ships of some 200 tons each. The Partisans captured one of these in April 1944; it became the largest ship in Tito’s navy. Other ships were secured when their crews defected to the Allies—some from the German puppet Croatian navy—or when ships were transferred from the Allies. During the course of the war, the Partisans utilized about 90 small vessels as warships and perhaps 200 as transports. Following the war, those that survived were returned to their original owners. Spencer C. Tucker See also: Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Landing Craft; Lend-Lease.

References Chesneau, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946. New York: Mayflower Books, 1980. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. London: Jane’s, 1989. Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Z Z Plan German naval construction program initiated prior to World War II. The Z Plan had its origins in the early 1930s and was based on Adolf Hitler’s assertion that no major military undertakings would be initiated until 1944 or 1945. Under restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty following World War I, the German navy was limited to 6 pre-dreadnought battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and no submarines. The Z Plan, which clearly violated the Versailles Treaty, called for a powerful balanced fleet, and it was eagerly supported by the commander of the German navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and his fellow admirals, who were in competition with the army and air force for scarce strategic resources. Hitler approved the Z Plan on January 27, 1939, three months before he revoked the British-German Naval Agreement of 1935 that had limited his navy to a maximum of 35 percent of its British counterpart; that move itself was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. The Z Plan received supreme priority and called for a powerful fleet of surface ships and submarines centered on 6 super-battleships of 56,000 tons (H-class), 12 small battleships of 20,000 tons, 4 aircraft carriers, 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, 90 torpedo boats, and 240 U-boats. Four battleships of the Bismarck and Scharnhorst classes (two each) and 5 heavy cruisers, as well as the 3 Deutschland-class pocket battleships already completed or under construction, would join this planned fleet. The total program would include 800 vessels of all types and was scheduled to be completed in 1948. Later, the completion date was advanced to 1944. At the beginning of World War II, the program was canceled, but it was revived again in July 1940 after the defeat of France. The plan was even expanded with schemes for a postwar German navy of some 1,200 ships, including 25 battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 100 cruisers, and 400 U-boats. At that time, the program also foresaw a massive buildup of harbors in many of the newly occupied territories, among them the French Atlantic coast and Norway. Trondheim was to become the largest German naval base in Europe. Colonies overseas would provide additional bases, with control of the Atlantic to follow in a second phase. Contrary to this unrealistic plan, little construction was actually undertaken because of the lack of human and industrial resources. After the German defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943, the Kriegsmarine (German navy) suspended all

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construction of heavy surface warships in favor of submarines. Since September 1939, industrial facilities had been geared to the rapid completion of the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, the cruisers Prinz Eugen and Seydlitz, the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, as well as the buildup of submarines. The Seydlitz and Graf Zeppelin were never completed. Hitler saw the Z Plan as a means whereby Germany would be able to challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. The plan remains one of the most striking examples of the lack of realism in German military planning. From its inception, the program wasted enormous resources, and up to 1943, it worked against a buildup of submarines, the major threat to British and U.S. mastery of the Atlantic. Martin Moll See also: Bismarck and Tirpitz, German Battleships; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Scharnhorst Class, German Battleships.

References Dülffer, Jost. Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau, 1920–1939. Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1973. Raeder, Erich. Struggle for the Sea. London: William Kimber, 1959. Thies, Jochen. Architekt der Weltherrschaft: Die “Endziele” Hitlers. Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976. Thomas, Charles S. The German Navy in the Nazi Era. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea

September 1, 1939

German forces invade Poland

September 3, 1939

Great Britain and France declare war on Germany, beginning the Second World War

September 17, 1939

The German submarine U-29 sinks the British battleship Courageous

October 14, 1939

The German submarine U-57 sinks the British battleship Royal Oak at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands

December 13, 1939

Battle of the Río de la Plata

December 17, 1939

The German pocket battleship Graf Spee is scuttled off Montevideo, Uruguay

April 9, 1940

German forces invade Norway and Denmark

April 10, 1940

First Battle of Narvik

April 13, 1940

Second Battle of Narvik

April 15, 1940

British forces land at Narvik and Trondheim

May 10, 1940

German forces invade the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France

June 4–26, 1940

Operation DYNAMO, evacuation of British and French forces at Dunkerque (Dunkirk)

June 5–8, 1940

In Operation ALPHABET, Allied forces evacuate Norway

June 8, 1940

The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sink the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two accompanying destroyers that had been taking part in the evacuation of

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Allied forces from Norway; the Scharnhorst is damaged by a torpedo June 10, 1940

Italy declares war on France and Great Britain

July 1, 1940

German submarines attack Allied merchant ships in the Atlantic Ocean

July 3, 1940

In Operation CATAPULT, British navy units secure portions of the French fleet but engage and sink a number of French warships at Mersel-Kébir, Algeria

July 9, 1940

Battle of Calabria

July 16, 1940

German leader Adolf Hitler approves Operation SEA LION, an invasion of Great Britain by water, set for August 1940

July 17, 1940

German leader Adolf Hitler declares a blockade of Great Britain

July 19, 1940

Battle of Cape Spada

September 3, 1940

Destroyers-Bases Deal between the United States and Britain announced by U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt, by which Britain receives 50 World War I–vintage U.S. destroyers in return for leases on bases in the Western Hemisphere

September 23–25, 1940

British and Free French forces attack Dakar

September 27, 1940

Axis Tripartite Pact signed between Germany, Italy, and Japan

October 1940

German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and heavy cruiser Hipper operate against Allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean

October 10, 1940

German leader Adolf Hitler postpones Operation SEA LION, the plan to invade Britain by water

October 10–17, 1940

Convoy battle in the North Atlantic

November 11–12, 1940

The British navy mounts an air strike on the Italian Fleet at Taranto

November 27, 1940

Battle of Cape Spartivento (Sardinia)

February 8–11, 1941

Convoy battle of Cape St. Vincent


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February 9, 1941

British Force H from Gibraltar shells Genoa and Leghorn

March 11, 1941

U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt signs LendLease Bill

March 28, 1941

Battle of Cape Matapan

May 21–June 1, 1941

British naval operations off Crete, first turning back German seaborne forces and then evacuating British land forces beginning on May 31

May 24, 1941

The German battleship Bismarck sinks the British battle cruiser Hood

May 27, 1941

British naval units sink the German battleship Bismarck

June 22, 1941

Germany, Italy, and Romania declare war on the Soviet Union

November 13, 1941

The German submarine U-81 sinks the British carrier Ark Royal

November 25, 1941

The German submarine U-331 sinks the British battleship Barham off Cyrenaica

December 7, 1941

A Japanese carrier task force attacks the U.S. Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Islands

December 8, 1941

The United States, Britain, and other Allied powers declare war on Japan. Japanese forces attack Malaya, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines

December 9, 1941

Japanese forces invade the Gilbert Islands

December 10, 1941

Japanese aircraft sink the British battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse off Malaya. Japanese forces take Guam

December 10–12, 1941

Japanese forces land on Luzon in the Philippines

December 11, 1941

Italy and Germany declare war on the United States

December 12, 1941

Battle of Cape Bon

December 14–23, 1941

Convoy battle off Portugal

December 16, 1941

Japanese forces invade Borneo

December 17, 1941

First Battle of Sirte

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December 19, 1941

Italian special forces disable two British battleships in Alexandria harbor

December 25, 1941

Japanese forces take Hong Kong

January 1, 1942

Japanese forces invade the Netherlands East Indies

January 13, 1942

Germany begins U-boat offensive along the eastern coast of the United States

January 25, 1942

Japanese forces land at Lae, New Guinea

February 1, 1942

U.S. carrier forces raid the Marshall Islands


In Operation CERBERUS (the Channel Dash), the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen pass through the English Channel from Brest, France, to Wilhelmshaven, Germany

February 19, 1942

Japanese carrier forces attack Darwin, Australia

February 27, 1942

Battle of the Java Sea

February 28, 1942

Japanese forces land at Bantam Bay in western Java

March 13, 1942

Japanese forces land in the Solomon Islands

March 22, 1942

Second Battle of Sirte

April 5, 1942

Japanese naval forces raid Colombo Harbor, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka)

April 18, 1942

Tokyo Raid (Doolittle Raid); U.S. carrier raid on the Japanese home islands with B-25 bombers flying off the carrier Hornet

May 5–8, 1942

British forces land in Madagascar

May 7–8, 1942

Battle of the Coral Sea

June 3–6, 1942

Battle of Midway Island

June 4, 1942

Japanese forces attack and invade the Aleutian Islands

June 12–16, 1942

HARPOON and VIGOROUS convoys depart Gibraltar and Alexandria to resupply the island of Malta, but only 2 of 17 transports reach Malta


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July 2–13, 1942

Allied Convoy PQ 17 sustains heavy losses at the hands of the Germans while en route to the Soviet Union

July 3, 1942

Japanese forces land on Guadalcanal

August 7, 1942

U.S. marines land on Guadalcanal and Tulasi

August 8–9, 1942

Battle of Savo Island

August 10–15, 1942

PEDESTAL convoy travels from Gibraltar to Malta

August 19, 1942

British and Canadian forces raid Dieppe, France

August 23–25, 1942

Battle of the Solomon Islands

October 11–12, 1942

Battle of Cape Esperance

October 26–27, 1942

Battle of Santa Cruz Island

November 8, 1942

In Operation TORCH, Allied forces land in Algeria and Morocco in North Africa


First night battle off Guadalcanal


Second night battle off Guadalcanal

November 27, 1942

France scuttles 77 ships of its navy at Toulon to keep them from falling into the hands of Germany

November 30–December 1, 1942

Battle of Tassafaronga

December 31, 1942

Battle of the Barents Sea

March 2–4, 1943

Battle of the Bismarck Sea

March 16–30, 1943

Battles of Atlantic Convoys HX.229 and SC.122, the largest of the war

March 26, 1943

Battle of the Komandorski Islands

April, 1943

Improved antisubmarine warfare measures introduced by the Allies help turn the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic in the spring

April 18, 1943

Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s aircraft is shot down in U.S. aerial ambush

May 11, 1943

U.S. troops attack Japanese-held Attu Island in the Aleutians

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May 22, 1943

German navy commander Admiral Karl Dönitz suspends U-boat operations in the North Atlantic

June 30, 1943

U.S. forces retake Attu Island in the Aleutians

July 6, 1943

Battle of Kula Gulf

July 10, 1943

In Operation HUSKY, U.S. and British forces invade Sicily

July 12–13, 1943

Battle of Kolombangara

August 6, 1943

Battle of Vella Gulf in the Solomon Islands

August 8, 1943

The Italian government signs an armistice with the Allies

August 9, 1943

In Operation AVALANCHE, Allied forces land at Salerno and Taranto, Italy

September 3, 1943

British forces land at Calabria, Italy. U.S. landings on Lae and Salamaua

November 1, 1943

U.S. forces invade Bougainville, Solomon Islands

November 2, 1943

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

November 19, 1943

U.S. forces land in the Gilbert Islands

December 26, 1943

Battle of the North Cape

January 22, 1944

In Operation SHINGLE, Allied forces land at Anzio, Italy

January 29, 1944

U.S. carriers raid the Marshall Islands in support of landings there

January 31, 1944

U.S. forces land on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands


U.S. naval forces raid Truk in the Caroline Islands

April 22, 1944

U.S. landing on Hollandia

June 6, 1944

In Operations NEPTUNE and OVERLORD, Allied forces cross the English Channel to land in Normandy, France

June 15, 1944

U.S. forces invade Saipan in the Mariana Islands

June 19–21, 1944

Battle of the Philippine Sea


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July 21, 1944

U.S. forces land on Guam in the Mariana Islands

August 15, 1944

In Operation DRAGOON, Allied forces land in southern France

September 21–22, 1944

U.S. carrier raid on Manila Harbor

October 10–16, 1944

Battle for Formosa (today Taiwan)

October 20, 1944

U.S. forces land on Leyte in the Philippine Islands

October 23–26, 1944

Battle of Leyte Gulf, history’s largest naval battle

October 24, 1944

The Japanese employ Kamikaze suicide aircraft for the first time, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf

January 9, 1945

U.S. forces land on Luzon in the Philippine Islands

January 30, 1945

A Soviet submarine sinks the German passenger ship Wilhelm Gustloff evacuating personnel from the Baltic, bringing the deaths of probably more than 7,000 people in history’s worst maritime disaster

February 19, 1945

U.S. forces land on the island of Iwo Jima

April l, 1945

U.S. forces land on Okinawa

May 2, 1945

German forces in Italy surrender

May 7, 1945

End of the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany surrenders unconditionally at Rheims, France

May 8, 1945

Formal German surrender and V-E Day (victory in Europe)

June 10, 1945

Australian forces invade Borneo

July 16, 1945

U.S. carriers begin raids against the Japanese home islands

August 15, 1945

Japan capitulates unconditionally

September 2, 1945

The formal Japanese surrender ceremony occurs aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. V-J Day (victory over Japan) is celebrated

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Glossary of World War II Naval Terms

AA Antiaircraft. abaft

Further aft than. In or toward the stern.

ABDA American-British-Dutch-Australian Command. abeam At right angles, laterally, to a ship’s fore-and-aft line or directly abreast a ship’s side.

A ship loose from its moorings.

adrift

aft Near, toward, or at the stern of the ship. The opposite of forward and fore. AH U.S. Navy designation for hospital ship. aircraft carrier Ship designed to carry aircraft, which can fly off of and land on the ship. Aircraft carriers were of a variety of sizes, including escort, light, and fleet sizes. AM U.S. Navy designation for minesweeper. amidships, or midships The center part of the ship, between the fore and aft sections and between the port and starboard sides. antiaircraft battery

Weapons designed to be used primarily against aircraft.

AP Armor-piercing. AS Antisubmarine. ash can, or can

Slang for depth charge.

assumed position Position which the navigator assumes the ship to be when using the intercept method of celestial navigation. This can also be the ship’s dead reckoning position or estimated position. astern Behind a ship. ASW

Antisubmarine warfare.

athwart

At right angles to a point; across.

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aweigh Said of an anchor immediately when it is broken out of the ground and when its cable is up and down. ballast Additional weight placed low in the hull to improve stability. Can be external (outside the hull) or internal (inboard) and permanent (as in concrete) or temporary (as in salt-water tanks). battery A group of guns (or, today, missile launchers) or the armament of a surface ship. battle cruiser Capital warship mounting a battery of large-caliber guns, usually both faster and less heavily armored than a battleship. battleship Large, heavily armored warship mounting a main battery of the largest-caliber guns. battle wagon

Slang term for battleship.

BB U.S. Navy designation for battleship. beam The breadth of a ship measured at the widest point. The waterline beam is the measurement of this breadth at the point where the hull touches the waterline. bearing The horizontal direction of one terrestrial point from another. bilge The rounded part of the ship’s body where the bottom curves up toward the sides. bilges The lowest part inside the hull where bilge water collects. Bilge water accumulates as a result of spray, rain, condensation, leaks, and so on. bow

The forward end of a ship.

bridge The main control point of a ship. brig

U.S. Navy slang for ship’s prison.

broadside All the guns capable of firing on one side of a ship firing at once. CA U.S. Navy designation for heavy cruiser. cable

A unit of measurement equal to 120 fathoms or 720 ft.

CAM ship Acronym for catapult assisted merchantman, the term for a British merchant vessel fitted with a catapult to launch fighters to provide defensive cover for the North Atlantic convoys. capital ship carriers. cartel ship

The largest warships, generally battleships, battle cruisers, and fleet Ship used to transport prisoners.

CC U.S. Navy designation for battle cruiser. CIC C in C

Combat Information Center. Commander-in-chief.


CL CNO

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U.S. Navy designation for light cruiser. Chief of naval operations.

CO Commanding officer; the senior officer of a ship. concentrated fire

The firing of the batteries of two or more ships at one target.

conn To direct the helmsman as to the movements of the helm. conning tower The captain’s battle station on a cruiser or battleship, located forward of the bridge. contact mine A mine designed to detonate on contact with a ship’s hull. continuous fire Firing of each gun when ready, without regard to the readiness of any other gun. continuous turret fire Firing of each turret as soon as ready, without regard to the readiness of other turrets. course Direction sailed by a vessel. This may be true, magnetic, compass, or gyro course, depending on the instrument and techniques used in its determination. cruiser Class of gun-firing warship, second only to the battleship in size and offensive power. Cruisers possessed moderate armor and armament and were capable of high speed. They were the successors of frigates in the age of fighting sail, which were primarily employed as reconnaissance ships for the main battle fleet, in commerce protection, commerce raiding, surface combat against enemy vessels of similar or smaller strength, and blockades. Twentieth-century cruisers performed the same functions. Heavy cruisers (U.S. Navy designation CA) usually mounted 8-inch guns, while light cruisers (CL) carried 6-inch guns or smaller. CVA U.S. Navy designation for an attack aircraft carrier. CVE

U.S. Navy designation for escort aircraft carrier.

CVL U.S. Navy designation for small aircraft carrier. CVS U.S. Navy designation for seaplane carrier. DD U.S. Navy designation for destroyer. DE U.S. Navy designation for destroyer escort. dead reckoning Determining the position of a vessel based on the course steered and distance sailed, not accounting for tides and currents. destroyer Fast, highly maneuverable yet long-endurance warship developed to escort larger warships and battle groups or merchant convoys to defend them against first torpedo boats but then also submarines and aircraft. destroyer escort Warship along the lines of but smaller than a destroyer, developed primarily for convoy escort and antisubmarine warfare duties.

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divided fire

Fire directed by one ship at multiple targets.

division A group of warships formed for tactical or command purposes. The U.S., British, French, Italian, and Japanese navies grouped their capital ships and cruisers into divisions, usually under the command of a rear admiral. In the U.S. and British navies, two destroyer divisions formed a destroyer flotilla, while in the Japanese navy, several destroyer divisions formed a destroyer squadron. DL Destroyer leader. A destroyer with command facilities or extra armament designed to lead a destroyer flotilla. DM U.S. Navy designation for light minelayer. draft (1) Vertical distance from the lowest point of keel to the waterline; (2) the depth of water at which a vessel floats. estimated position A vessel’s position advanced on the chart from a previous fix of observed position. executive officer (XO)

Officer who is second in command of a vessel or squadron.

fathom Unit of measurement equal to six ft. fix Position of vessel plotted from two or more position lines. flagship flat top

Ship carrying an admiral who is in command of a fleet or squadron. Slang for aircraft carrier.

fleet Generically, the entire operational strength or a nation’s navy. Specifically, a group of ships organized for tactical or command purposes often formed of divisions of capital ships and cruisers and flotillas or squadrons of smaller vessels, as in the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the British Home Fleet, or the German High Seas Fleet. fleet submarine fleet.

Submarine designed to operate with (usually ahead of ) a battle

flotilla Group or squadron of small ships. The word derives from the Spanish diminutive of flota, a fleet; thus, flotilla means “little fleet.” A flotilla includes all small surface vessels, often under the command of a captain in the case of a U.S. or British destroyer flotilla. The Americans, British, and Germans formed their destroyers, minecraft, and patrol vessels into units called flotillas, which often included two or more subunits called divisions. fore

Toward or near the bow.

frigate In World War II terminology, a warship smaller and slower than a destroyer but larger and faster than a sloop, designed primarily for convoy and antisubmarine warfare work. general quarters (GQ) Call to man battle stations in preparation for action. HA High angle.


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HE High explosive. heading

Direction in which a vessel’s bow is pointing; its course.

heel To list to one side as a result of wind pressure or shift in weight. HMS His Majesty’s ship. HQ Headquarters. hulk A ship hull usually stripped of engines and condemned as unseaworthy. Hulks are frequently utilized as floating depots in a harbor or roadstead. Hulks were often guardships to protect a naval installation or anchorage and might be sunk in wartime as blockships to protect an anchorage and impede the enemy. On occasion, they were equipped with guns and used as floating batteries. hull

Body of a vessel, excluding superstructure and rudder. Shot in the hull, normally fired at point-blank range.

hulled

hunter-killer operation Coordinated antisubmarine operation consisting of air, surface, and, occasionally, subsurface components. IJN Imperial Japanese Navy. in ordinary A ship laid up in reserve. international waters

All waters apart from nations’ territorial waters.

keel Backbone of a vessel. The lowest timber or steel plate running fore and aft along the centerline of the hull.

Kriegsmarine, German navy ship.

KM

knot Unit of speed at sea, equal to one nautical mile (2,025 yards or 1,852 meters) per hour. LCI U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, infantry. LCM U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, mechanized. LCP U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, personnel. LCT U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, tank. LCU U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, utility. LCV U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, vehicle. LCVP lee

U.S. Navy designation for landing craft, vehicle, personnel.

The direction toward which the wind blows.

leeward liberty

Downwind, away from the winds. Authorized absence from duty.

liberty ship Cargo ships produced in large numbers and on an emergency basis, mostly by the United States during the Second World War.

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LKA U.S. Navy designation for amphibious cargo ship. LPD

U.S. Navy designation for amphibious transport, dock.

LSD U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, dock. LSI U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, infantry. LSM U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, medium. LST

U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, tank.

LST(H)

U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, tank (hospital).

LSV U.S. Navy designation for landing ship, vehicle. LVT U.S. Navy designation for landing vehicle, tracked. MAC ships Acronym for merchant aircraft carrier ships, British merchant ships (usually grain ships or tankers) fitted with a flight deck and that superseded the earlier CAM (catapult assisted merchantman) ships in providing emergency air cover for World War II convoys in the North Atlantic beyond the range of landbased aircraft. magazine

Place aboard ship where ammunition is stored.

magnetic torpedo Torpedo equipped with an apparatus making it explode at its point of nearest approach to the target vessel. main battery

Ship’s battery made up of its largest guns or missiles.

MG Machine gun. midshipman Officer cadet or lowest ranking officer. minesweeper Ship specifically designed to remove sea mines. Mk Mark. motor torpedo boat Very small warship, generally armed with torpedoes, that relies upon stealth and high speed to attack larger vessels. nautical mile Unit of measurement at sea, equal to 6,076 ft. or one minute of latitude. naval beach group Naval command component of an amphibious unit containing a beachmaster unit, an amphibious construction battalion, and a boat unit. officer of the deck (OOD) Officer on watch and in charge of the ship. Everyone on the ship is subordinate to the OOD, with the exception of the commanding officer (CO) and executive officer (XO). overtaking beam.

Coming up to another vessel from any point abaft the other vessel’s

periscope Prismatic telescope fitted on submarines, used to observe surface vessels and other objects while the submarine is submerged.


periscope depth sea level.

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Submersion of a submarine so that only its periscope is above

petty officer Naval rank equivalent to a noncommissioned officer (between officers and enlisted sailors). PGM U.S. Navy designation for patrol gunboat, motor. picket boat A boat providing sentinel duty. pilot A qualified navigator authorized to pilot or direct incoming and outgoing vessels in a particular pilotage area. plot A mark made on a navigation chart to outline course, speed, bearing, and position of the ship and various objects on the shore and sea. poop

Rear upper deck.

port The left-hand side of the ship when facing forward. PT U.S. Navy designation for motor torpedo boat. Q-ship

Decoy ships designed to lure submarines into making a surface attack.

quarterdeck Part of the deck that is designated for both official and ceremonial functions. It is also where crew members board the ship by gangways. raking RAN rating sailor. RCN

To fire projectiles the length of an enemy ship. Royal Australian Navy. Grade below the rank of officer; also a specialized navy job for an enlisted Royal Canadian Navy.

RIN Royal Indian Navy. river gunboat Small warship carrying one or more guns, with a broad underwater body and a shallow draft. Utilized in inland waters. RN Royal Navy (British navy). RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy. rudder Device for steering vessel, usually fitted at the stern. salvo SANF

Simultaneous firing of a number of guns. South African Naval Force.

scuttling The intentional sinking of a ship by its own crew, usually by the letting of water into the hull. sea lines of communication (SLOC)

Essential sea routes for military operations.

sloop Oceangoing vessel ranging in size from a small cruiser to about half the size of a destroyer, designed to escort commercial vessels or show the flag in foreign stations.

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sound (1) Narrow passage of water between land masses; (2) To find the water’s depth by measuring distance from keel to water’s bottom. squadron A detachment of ships on an expedition commanded by a flag officer. Also a specific formation of warships organized for tactical and command purposes. Italy, France, and Japan organized their destroyers into squadrons, usually commanded by a captain or a rear admiral. SS

U.S. Navy designation for submarine.

starboard

The right-hand side of the ship when facing forward.

stern The aft end of a ship. TB U.S. Navy designation for torpedo boat. TBS Talk between ships. A high-frequency, short-range radio system for tactical communications between ships operating in close proximity. torpedo boat Warship smaller than a destroyer using torpedoes as its main armament. France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and several minor navies deployed torpedo boats during the Second World War. train

To move a gun or gun turret in a horizontal plane.

TT Torpedo tube. underway Condition when a ship is not secured to the shore or ground; does not necessarily mean that the vessel is making way through the water. USN United States Navy. USS United States ship. van The foremost division of any naval armament or the part that leads way into battle or advances first. VT Variable time. A type of fuse designed to explode within a certain distance of a target. wardroom The officers’ mess. watch Period of time in which the nautical day is divided, usually four-hour intervals. weather decks well deck

Decks that are open to the wind and sea.

Part of an upper deck bounded by bulkheads that support higher decks. Spencer C. Tucker

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List of Editors and Contributors

Volume Editor Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Senior Fellow Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc.

Associate Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Fellow Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc.

Assistant Editors Dr. Eric Osborne Assistant Professor of History Virginia Military Institute Vincent P. O’Hara Independent Scholar

Contributors Professor Asakawa Michio Tokyo Science University Lieutenant Colonel J. G. D. Babb U.S. Army (Ret.) 865

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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Nicholas W. Barcheski Virginia Military Institute Professor Robert L. Bateman Georgetown University Dr. Colin F. Baxter Department of History East Tennessee State University David M. Beehler Virginia Military Institute Dr. Jon D. Berlin Joint Military Intelligence College Dr. Keith W. Bird Chancellor, Kentucky Community and Technical College System James Birdseye Independent Scholar Andy Blackburn Independent Scholar Walter Boyne Independent Scholar Dr. Shannon A. Brown National Museum of American History Smithsonian Institution Dr. Stanley D. M. Carpenter Professor of Strategy and Policy United States Naval War College Dr. James T. Carroll Associate Professor Iona College


Dr. Sherwood S. Cordier Professor Emeritus of History Western Michigan University Dr. Arthur I. Cyr Clausen Distinguished Professor Director, Clausen Center Carthage College Dr. Ronnie Day Professor Emeritus East Tennessee State University Dr. Bruce J. DeHart Associate Professor of History University of North Carolina at Pembroke M. Taylor Emery Instructor of English Department of Languages and Literature Austin Peay State University Brigadier General Uzal W. Ent Pennsylvania National Guard (Ret.) Pamela Feltus Independent Scholar Dr. Edward F. Finch Executive Director, Stephenson County Historical Society Suzanne S. Finney Independent Scholar Paul E. Fontenoy Curator of Maritime Research North Carolina Maritime Museum Dr. Jonathan Ford Independent Scholar

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Dr. Arthur T. Frame Professor of Strategy and Operational Warfare U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Dr. Timothy L. Francis Independent Scholar Anthony L. Franklin Virginia Military Institute Bruce Hampton Franklin Independent Scholar Dr. Derek W. Frisby Assistant Professor Middle Tennessee State University Daniel M. German Library and Archives Canada Nathan L. Gilbert Virginia Military Institute Jack Greene Military History Workshop International David M. Grilli Virginia Military Institute Second Lieutenant Kyle D. Haire Independent Scholar Jason R. Harr Ensign, U.S. Navy Virginia Military Institute Hasegawa Rei Independent Scholar Dr. William P. Head Historian/Chief, WR-ALC Office of History U.S. Air Force


Glenn E. Helm Director, Navy Department Library Dr. Hirama Yoichi Rear Admiral (Ret.) Gordon E. Hogg Director, Special Collections Library University of Kentucky Captain C. J. Horn Department of History United States Military Academy, West Point Dr. John A. Hutcheson Jr. Vice President for Academic Affairs Dalton State College Walter W. Jaffee Independent Scholar Dr. Lance Janda Associate Professor Cameron University Dr. John M. Jennings Department of History United States Air Force Academy Mark C. Jones Independent Scholar Mary Ann Kan Independent Scholar Gary Kerley North Hall High School Professor Kita Yoshito Chuo University Japan

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John A. Komaromy Virginia Military Institute Dr. Kotani Ken National Institute for Defense Studies Robert Krumel Montgomery Central High School Dr. Thomas Lansford Dean, Gulf Coast University of Southern Mississippi Dr. James Levy Hofstra University–New College Dana Lombary Independent Scholar Britton W. MacDonald Independent Scholar Rodney Madison Texas Christian University Alessandro Massignani Independent Scholar Dr. Jack McCallum Adjunct Professor Department of History and Geography Texas Christian University William P. McEvoy University of West Alabama Dr. Matthew Alan McNiece Department of History, Political Science, Geography Howard Payne University Dr. Martin Moll University of Graz Austria


Troy D. Morgan Independent Scholar Dr. Malcolm Muir Jr. Professor of History Virginia Military Institute Dr. Benjamin E. Nehrke Virginia Military Institute Dr. Michael S. Neiberg Professor of History University of Southern Mississippi John Noonan Virginia Military Institute Vincent P. O’Hara Independent Scholar Dr. John Kennedy Ohl Professor of History Mesa Community College Dr. Eric W. Osborne Professor of History Virginia Military Institute William L. Padgett Independent Scholar Douglas Peifer Independent Scholar M. R. Pierce Assistant Professor U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Fellow Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc.

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Dr. Eugene L. Rasor Emeritus Professor of History Emory & Henry College Steven J. Rauch Command Historian U.S. Army Signal Center Dr. Priscilla Roberts Associate Professor of History School of Humanities Honorary Director, Centre of American Studies University of Hong Kong Dr. Jürgen Rohwer Library of Contemporary History Germany Alexander D. Samms Task Force Engineer U.S. Army Dr. Stanley Sandler Retired Historian U.S. Army Special Operations Command Dr. Claude R. Sasso Adjunct Professor William Jewell College Dr. Elizabeth D. Schafer Independent Scholar R. Kyle Schlafer Program Supervisor Texas Capitol Visitors Center Captain Carl Otis Schuster U.S. Navy (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Hawaii Pacific University


T. P. Schweider U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.) Robert W. Serig Virginia Military Institute Dr. Terry Shoptaugh University Archives Minnesota State University-Moorhead Dr. Charles R. Shrader Independent Scholar Dr. David R. Snyder Austin Peay State University T. Jason Soderstrum Iowa State University Dirk Steffen Director, AEGIR Security Solutions Ltd Dr. Stephen K. Stein University of Memphis Dr. Christopher H. Sterling Professor of Media and Public Affairs George Washington University Dr. Richard G. Stone Department of History Western Kentucky University Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Stuhlreyer Independent Scholar Gerald D. Swick Independent Scholar Dr. Tohmatsu Haruo Associate Professor Tamagawa University Japan

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Tomoyuki Takemoto Doshisha University, Japan Frank Toomey Virginia Military Institute Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Senior Fellow Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc. Anthony Tully Independent Scholar Dr. John P. Vanzo Department of Arts and Sciences Bainbridge College Dr. Thomas D. Veve Associate Professor of History Dalton State College Dr. Steve R. Waddell U.S. Military Academy, West Point Stephen Patrick Ward Virginia Military Institute Dr. Andrew J. Waskey Professor of Social Science Dalton State College Dr. David Westwood MLRS Books Ltd United Kingdom Gregory C. Wheal Virginia Military Institute Lieutenant Colonel John W. Whitman U.S. Army (Ret.)


Dr. James H. Willbanks Director, Department of Military History U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Dr. H. P. Willmott Independent Scholar Dr. Bradford Wineman Associate Professor of Military History U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Fort Leavenworth Landon Winkelvoss George Washington University Harold Lee Wise Adjunct Professor College of the Albermarle Dr. Molly M. Wood Associate Professor of History Wittenberg University Berryman E. Woodruff IV Virginia Military Institute Todd M. Wynn Virginia Military Institute

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875


Categorical Index

Individuals

Conolly, Richard Lansing, 183 – 184, 484 Crace, Sir John Gregory, 200, 205 – 206 Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles, 104 – 105, 213 – 214, 649, 650 Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne, 64, 100, 121 – 122, 135, 149 – 150, 151, 166, 208, 214 – 215, 223, 314, 318, 320, 348, 361, 611, 658, 680, 681, 682 – 683, 739 Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres, 215 – 216 Cunningham, Winfield Scott, 216 – 217, 790

Abe Hiroaki, 2 – 3, 56, 137, 326, 328, 333, 688 Abe Koso, 3 – 4 Abrial, Jean Marie Charles, 4 – 5, 751 Ainsworth, Walden Lee, 10 – 11, 427 – 428, 435 Arima Masafumi, 53 – 54, 411 – 412 Arnauld de la Perière, Lothar von, 55 Aruga Kosaku, 56 – 57, 811 Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond, 64 – 65, 527 – 528 Auphan, Paul Gabriel, 65 – 66, 751

Da Zara, Alberto, 221 – 222, 478, 479 Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François, 65, 165, 219 – 220, 281, 282, 441, 442, 751 De Courten, Raffaele, 100, 222 – 224, 645 Dönitz, Karl, 44, 58 – 59, 61, 98, 192 – 193, 197, 242 – 244, 288, 301, 451, 483, 558, 566, 585 – 586, 604, 618, 637, 673, 750, 800, 802 – 803 Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie, 1, 244 – 246, 405, 468, 474

Barbey, Daniel Edward, 87 – 88 Bergamini, Carlo, 99 – 100, 679 Bey, Eric, 103 – 104, 567 Blandy, William Henry Purnell, 116 – 117, 236, 762 Bloch, Claude Charles, 118 – 119 Borghese, Junio Valerio, 121 – 122, 389, 611 Brown, Wilson Jr., 130 – 131, 199, 770, 791 Burke, Arleigh Albert, 132 – 134, 157 – 158, 256, 417, 783 Callaghan, Daniel Judson, 2, 137 – 138, 326, 328, 333, 688 Campioni, Inigo, 99, 135, 140 – 141, 155 – 157, 241, 366 Canaris, Wilhelm Franz, 144 – 145 Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler, 161 – 162, 779 Cavagnari, Domenico, 99, 167 – 168, 629, 645 Christie, Ralph Waldo, 176 – 177 Ciliax, Otto, 172, 177 – 178

Fechteler, William Morrow, 266 – 267 Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty, 267 – 268 Fitch, Aubrey Wray, 200, 269 – 270 Fletcher, Frank Jack, 199, 200, 253, 269, 272 – 274, 331, 332, 649, 686, 687, 688, 769, 791 Fluckey, Eugene Bennett, 274 – 276 Forbes, Sir Charles Morton, 276 – 277, 752 Forrestal, James Vincent, 275, 280 – 281, 375, 421, 425

877

878

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Categorical Index

Fraser, Bruce Austin, 124, 127, 287 – 288, 320, 381, 567, 568 Friedeburg, Hans Georg von, 288 – 289 Fuchida Mitsuo, 220, 290 – 291, 530 Fukutome Shigeru, 292 Fushimi Hiroyasu, 292 – 293 Gallery, Daniel Vincent Jr., 295 – 296 Genda Minoru, 296 – 297, 530 Gervais de Lafond, Raymond, 162, 163, 302 – 303, 670 Ghormley, Robert Lee, 137, 303 – 304, 331, 333, 339, 686, 688 Gibbs, William Francis, 304 – 305 Giffen, Robert Carlisle “Ike,” 162, 307, 626 Godfrey, John Henry, 313 – 314 Godfroy, René Émile, 166, 314 – 315 Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich, 33, 315 – 316, 440 Halsey, William Frederick Jr., 11, 128, 137, 159, 254, 304, 326, 328, 333, 338 – 340, 381, 382, 385, 430, 437 – 438, 459 – 460, 461 – 462, 463, 517, 581, 594 – 595, 625, 626, 646, 647, 661, 688, 708, 709, 740, 746, 768, 769, 777, 779, 801 Hart, Thomas Charles, 1, 340 – 341, 474, 593 Harwood, Sir Henry, 341 – 342, 447, 478, 630 Hasegawa Kiyoshi, 342 – 343 Hashimoto Mochitsura, 343 – 344, 375 Hewitt, Henry Kent, 72, 162, 249, 347 – 349, 361, 765 Higgins, Andrew Jackson, 349, 445 Holland, Lancelot Ernest, 106, 350 Horton, Sir Max Kennedy, 351 – 352, 793 Hosogaya Boshiro, 27, 353 – 354, 429, 489 Iachino, Angelo, 99 – 100, 149, 366 – 367, 477, 492, 645, 679, 680, 682 Ichimaru Rinosuke, 370 – 371 Ijuin Matsuji, 256, 373 – 374 Ingersoll, Royal Eason, 379 – 380, 764 Ingram, Jonas Howard, 380 – 381 Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi, 3, 199, 383 – 384, 735, 818

Ito¯ Seiichi, 56, 394 – 395, 810 – 811 Iwabuchi Sanji, 395 – 396 Kaiser, Henry John, 409 – 410, 465 Keyes, Roger John Brownlow, 415 – 416 Kikkawa Kioyshi, 416 – 417 Kimmel, Husband Edward, 119, 417 – 418, 489, 562, 588, 710, 742, 765, 778, 791 Kimura Masatomi, 110, 418 – 419 King, Ernest Joseph, 39 – 40, 47, 87, 127, 131, 183, 289, 331, 375, 379, 420 – 421, 445, 457, 543, 586, 594, 686, 710, 746, 758, 764, 789 Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin, 27, 177, 333, 339, 422 – 423, 437, 459, 460, 463, 594, 595, 646, 688, 779 Kirk, Alan Goodrich, 423 – 424, 553 Knox, William Franklin “Frank,” 280, 421, 424 – 426 Koga Mineichi, 292, 426 – 427, 755 Komura Keizo, 430 – 431 Kondo¯ Nobutake, 69, 221, 253, 328, 329, 330, 333, 334, 404, 431 – 432, 501, 557, 593, 646, 648, 687, 688, 689 Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm, 434 – 435, 654 Kurita Takeo, 339, 436 – 438, 458, 460, 462, 705, 707, 715, 727, 813 Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke, 394, 438 – 439, 820 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 439 – 440 Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de, 66, 441 – 442, 751 – 752 Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm, 238, 342, 446, 446 – 447, 629 – 631 Leahy, William Daniel, 447 – 449 Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching,” 328, 329, 334, 339, 449 – 450, 459, 689 Lockwood, Charles Andrew Jr., 467 – 468 Lütjens, Günther, 106 – 107, 469 – 471, 483 Marschall, Wilhelm, 29, 205, 482 – 483, 622, 639, 799 McCain, John Sidney, 461, 486 – 487 McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert, 488 McMorris, Charles Horatio “Soc,” 27, 353, 429, 489

Categorical Index Mikawa Gunichi, 504 – 505, 649, 650, 686 Miles, Milton Edward, 176, 505 – 506 Mitscher, Marc Andrew, 133, 159, 170, 368, 395, 430, 459, 461, 480, 485, 487, 516 – 517, 596 – 597, 598, 746, 755, 777, 779 Montgomery, Alfred Eugene, 361, 362, 519 – 520 Moreell, Ben, 520 – 521, 655 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 521 – 522, 650 Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas, 180, 407, 416, 523 – 524, 610 Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré, 527 – 528, 642 Nagano Osami, 293, 394, 529 – 530, 644 Nagumo Chu¯ichi, 53, 56, 123, 253, 290, 320, 377, 378, 404, 481, 501, 503, 530 – 532, 557, 588 – 589, 807 Nimitz, Chester William, 131, 169, 200, 246, 253, 271, 275, 304, 333, 375, 382, 421, 459, 462, 463, 480, 483, 501, 502, 503, 542 – 543, 561 – 563, 589, 594, 650, 660, 677 – 678, 686, 693, 708, 709, 712, 742, 766, 768, 770, 778, 780, 791 Nishimura Shoji, 82, 437, 458, 563 – 564, 575, 688 Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam, 352, 488, 564 – 565 Nomura Kichisaburo, 565 – 566 Oikawa Koshiro, 69, 571 – 572 O’Kane, Richard Hetherington, 572 – 573 Oktyabrsky, Filip Sergeyevich, 573 – 574 Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett, 459, 461, 564, 574 – 575 ¯ nishi Takijiro¯, 575 – 577, 761 O ¯ ta Minoru, 578 – 579 O Ozawa Jisaburo, 123, 170, 339, 378, 426 – 427, 430, 437, 458, 460, 461, 579 – 581, 596 – 597, 755 Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan, 123, 320, 598 – 600, 605 Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers, 187 – 188, 215, 599, 602 – 603, 677

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Prien, Günther, 603 – 604, 637 – 638 Pyke, Geoffrey Nathaniel, 609 – 610 Raeder, Erich, 105 – 106, 178, 181, 243, 299 – 301, 470, 483, 544, 548, 616 – 618, 629, 656 – 658, 749, 797 – 799, 821 Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home, 250, 361, 551, 553, 620 – 621, 665, 690, 792 Reeves, Joseph Mason, 624 – 625 Riccardi, Arturo, 223, 628 – 629 Rogge, Bernhard, 63 – 64, 69, 631 – 633 Saalwächter, Alfred, 639 – 640 Sakai Saburo, 643 Sakonji Naomasa, 643 – 644 Sansonetti, Luigi, 155, 223, 645 – 646 Schepke, Joachim, 654 Sherman, Forrest Percival, 267, 660 – 661 Sherman, Frederick Carl, 661 – 663 Shimada Shigetaro¯, 530, 663 – 664, 733 Somerville, Sir James Fownes, 123, 135, 155 – 156, 166, 278, 306, 318, 376, 377, 498, 690 – 691 Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick, 460, 461, 705 – 706 Sprague, Thomas Lamison, 460, 464, 595, 706 – 707 Spruance, Raymond Ames, 158, 169, 236, 308, 368, 480 – 481, 484, 502, 503, 517, 596 – 597, 708 – 709, 755, 769, 777, 779 Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty,” 235, 379, 423, 709 – 711, 759 Stump, Felix Budwell, 714 – 715 Suzuki Kantaro¯, 729 – 730, 815 Takagi So¯kichi, 733 – 734 Takagi Takeo, 200, 245, 405, 406, 734 – 735 Takahashi, Ibo¯, 593, 735 – 736 Takamatsu Nobuhito, 733, 736 – 737 Tanaka Raizo, 253, 333, 406, 687, 688, 738, 740 Theobald, Robert Alfred, 27, 742 – 743 Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie, 743 – 744

879

880

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Categorical Index

Tovey, Sir John Cronyn, 187, 277, 350, 752 – 753 Towers, John Henry, 381, 660, 753 – 754 Toyoda Soemu, 56, 394, 427, 430, 438, 457 – 458, 480, 571, 581, 663, 669, 754 – 756 Turner, Richmond Kelly, 170, 236, 308, 331, 333, 368, 480, 484, 649, 686, 757 – 758 Ugaki Matome, 761 – 762 Vian, Sir Phillip Louis, 30, 72, 128, 477, 478, 553, 679, 681, 785 – 786 Waesche, Russell Randolph, 772, 773, 789 – 790 Walker, Frederick John, 792 – 793 Wanklyn, Malcolm, 793 – 794 Wilkinson, Theodore Stark “Ping,” 801 – 802 Yamaguchi Tamon, 53, 807 – 808 Yamamoto Isoroku, ’99, 253, 254, 292, 296, 383, 394, 426, 438, 500, 501, 529, 530, 546, 576, 588 – 589, 747, 761, 770, 771 – 772, 808 – 810, 812, 814 Yonai Mitsumasa, 383, 733, 814 – 815, 818 Yoshida Zengo, 818 – 819

Events Adriatic, naval operations in, 5 – 8, 494, 527 Aegean Sea, naval operations in, 8 – 10, 153 – 154, 389 Aleutian Islands Campaign, 27 – 28, 307, 353, 419, 422, 428 – 429, 489 ALPHABET, Operation, 28 – 29, 204 Altmark incident, 30 – 31, 629, 786 antishipping campaign off Norway, 42 – 43 ARCHERY, Operation (Vågsøy Island Raid), 50 – 51 Athenia, SS, sinking of, 57 – 58 Atlantic, Battle of the, 44 – 46, 48, 54 – 55, 57, 58 – 63, 90 – 91, 106 – 107, 107 – 109, 138 – 139, 142 – 144, 181 – 183, 190 – 194, 197, 212, 228, 234, 299 – 300, 352, 392, 407 – 408, 414 – 415, 434 – 435, 464 – 465, 544 – 545, 569 – 570, 609 – 610,

621 – 622, 641 – 642, 710, 752 – 753, 763 – 764 Automedon, sinking of, 63 – 64, 68 – 69, 183 AVALANCHE, Operation, 17, 35, 72 – 74, 214 – 215, 278, 665, 786 Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of, 1, 81 – 83, 341, 404, 473 – 474, 557, 563, 695 Baltic Sea, area of operations, 83 – 86, 112 – 115, 512, 699 – 701 Bandar Shahpur, Battle of (Operation COUNTENANCE), 86 – 87 Bay of Biscay, Battle of, 96 – 97, 180, 299 – 300, 310, 451, 455, 640, 674 Bay of Biscay offensive, 97 – 99 Beta Convoy Battle, 100 – 102 Biak, Battle of, 104 – 105 Bismarck Sea, Battle of, 109 – 111, 162, 419, 696 Bismarck, sortie and sinking of, 17, 54, 62, 67, 91, 94, 105 – 107, 182, 211, 278, 306, 318, 350 – 351, 413, 469, 470, 488, 534, 535, 544, 548, 602, 618, 690, 744, 753, 786 BITING, Operation (Bruneval Raid), 111 – 112 British naval blockade of the European Axis powers, 125 – 127 Brittany, Battle of, 129 – 130, 175 Calabria, Battle of, 99 – 100, 135 – 136, 141, 222, 318, 491, 645, 752, 795 Cape Bon, Battle of, 146 – 147, 493, 659 Cape Esperance, Battle of, 137, 147 – 149, 304, 333, 688 Cape Matapan, Battle of, 17, 67, 149 – 151, 214, 318, 366, 645, 675 Cape Passero, action off, 151 – 153 Cape Spada, Battle of, 8 – 10, 153 – 154 Cape Spartivento, Battle of, 155 – 157, 278, 350, 491 Cape St. George, Battle of, 132, 157 – 158, 257, 417, 783 Caroline Islands campaign, 158 – 161, 212, 410 – 411, 480, 607, 678, 767 Casablanca, Battle of, 162 – 165, 185, 302

Categorical Index CATAPULT, Operation, 165 – 167, 219, 278, 281, 282, 314, 498, 541, 544, 690, 751 CERBERUS, Operation, 103, 172 – 173, 178, 617, 639 Channel Islands Campaign, 173 – 175 CLAYMORE, Operation, 51, 178 – 179 Convoy PQ 13, attack on, 186 – 187 Convoy PQ 17, 52, 187 – 188, 603 Convoys SC.122 and HX.299, Battle of, 196 – 198 Coral Sea, Battle of the, 3, 14, 74, 168, 198 – 202, 206, 269, 273, 337, 378, 383, 422, 456, 501, 531, 562, 662, 667, 668, 678, 696, 735, 766, 770 Crete, naval operations off, 8 – 10, 32, 67 – 68, 206 – 208, 523 – 524 Darwin, raid on, 67 – 68, 220 – 221, 290, 355, 376, 530, 668 DETACHMENT, Operation, 37, 116, 133 – 134, 236 – 237 Diégo Suarez, Japanese raid on, 239 – 240, 388, 690 Dodecanese Islands Campaign, 8, 32, 141, 240 – 242 DOWNFALL, Operation, 37, 128, 246 – 248 DRAGOON, Operation, 35, 64, 216, 248 – 249, 445, 466, 554, 724, 765 Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation of, 4 – 5, 32, 143, 250 – 252, 555, 602, 620, 633, 690, 793

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326 – 330, 337, 339, 383, 395, 422, 426, 431, 435, 450, 487, 503, 504, 522, 535, 540, 563, 625, 643, 660, 668, 694, 738, 758, 773, 775 Guadalcanal Naval Campaign, 35 – 36, 269, 272, 273, 330 – 335, 417, 438, 487, 531, 646, 740, 741 Haguro, Japanese Navy Cruiser, sinking of, 124, 256, 337 – 340 HUSKY, Operation, 5 – 6, 34 – 35, 278, 360 – 363, 374, 494, 508, 714 ICEBERG, Operation, 37, 116, 128, 133, 144, 171, 184, 212, 247, 258, 320, 344, 367 – 369, 411, 413, 430, 458, 487, 517, 522, 539, 543, 562, 579, 594, 662, 706, 755, 762, 789 Indian Ocean Campaign, 123 – 125, 127, 239, 296, 300, 376 – 379, 387, 530, 541, 549, 560, 580, 678 Indianapolis, sinking of, 344, 348, 374 – 376, 709 Inland Sea, U.S. and British Carrier Operations, 381 – 383, 711 IRONCLAD, Operation, 123 Japanese East Indies Campaign, 403 – 405 Java Sea, Battle of the, 1, 245, 337, 341, 404, 405 – 406, 473 – 474, 536, 556, 557, 573, 695, 727, 734 JUBILEE, Operation, 407 – 408, 550

Franco-Thai War, 284 – 286

Kearny, torpedoing of, 325, 414 – 415 Kolombangara, Battle of, 11, 427 – 428, 436, 560, 738, 783 Komandorski Islands, Battle of the, 27, 353, 428 – 430, 489 Kula Gulf, Battle of, 11, 427 – 428, 435 – 436, 783

Gilbert Islands Campaign, 158 – 159, 169, 174, 212, 307 – 309, 383, 480, 483, 562, 667, 709, 756, 768, 816 Greer, attack on, 324 – 325, 414, 764 Guadalcanal, naval battles of, 2 – 3, 68, 137, 147 – 149, 169, 212, 213, 232,

Les Sept Iles, action off, 96 – 97, 454 – 456 Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 11, 68, 76, 159, 184, 286, 337, 339, 394, 412, 419, 422, 430, 433, 436, 437, 439, 457 – 463, 464, 487, 517, 519, 535, 543, 564, 574, 575, 577, 578, 580, 594, 595,

Eastern Solomons, Battle of the, 2, 56, 243 – 255, 273, 332, 337, 373, 422, 431, 457, 505, 687 Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of, 132, 157 – 158, 256 – 257, 337, 373

881

882

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Categorical Index

662, 668, 669, 697, 705, 750, 755, 761, 767, 776, 781, 813 Leyte landings, 463 – 464 Ligurian Sea, Battle of the, 466 – 467, 495 Lombok, Battle of, 404, 468 – 469, 557 Lyme Bay, Battle of, 471 – 472

643, 669, 677, 684, 694, 695, 734, 736, 759 NEULAND, Operation, 558 – 560 North Cape, Battle of, 52, 103, 186 – 190, 566 – 568, 653 Ormoc Bay, Battle of, 577 – 578, 595

Madoera Strait, Battle of, 404, 474 – 475, 557 Malta Convoy Battles, 99 – 100, 136, 477 – 480 Mariana Islands Campaign, 11, 17, 78, 132, 158 – 159, 400, 457, 480 – 482, 517, 543, 562, 596, 678, 711, 715, 758, 761, 767 Marshall Islands Naval Campaign, 3, 169, 307, 308, 309, 480, 483 – 486, 517, 562, 574, 678, 707, 756, 767, 768, 790, 816 Mediterranean Sea, naval operations in, 5 – 8, 54, 100 – 102, 125 – 127, 135 – 136, 146 – 147, 153 – 157, 193, 207 – 208, 214 – 216, 305 – 306, 324, 392, 467, 475 – 479, 490 – 496, 507 – 508, 518, 541, 545, 550, 560, 590 – 592, 622 – 624, 658 – 660, 670 – 671, 712 – 714, 726 – 727 MENACE, Operation, 496 – 498 Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of, 165, 166, 185, 219, 278, 282, 283, 314, 387, 490, 497, 498 – 500, 690, 713, 751 Midway, Battle of, 2, 13 – 15, 16, 27 – 28, 53, 56, 168, 170, 199, 253, 273, 290, 296, 338, 353, 395, 422, 430, 431, 437, 438, 456, 500 – 504, 531, 546, 579, 615, 624, 664, 667, 668, 678, 693, 708, 737, 766, 772, 807, 816 MINCEMEAT, Operation, 361, 506 – 508 Narvik, Naval Battles of, 103, 213, 532 – 534 NEPTUNE, Operation, 35, 88 – 89, 89, 144, 173 – 175, 354, 408, 472, 525, 550 – 554, 601, 620 – 621, 676, 725, 765, 786 Netherlands East Indies, Japanese invasion of, 1, 244, 341, 356, 403, 406, 417, 431, 468, 474, 542, 543, 549, 555, 556 – 558, 563, 580, 592, 593, 594,

Panay incident, 584 – 585 PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation, 224, 558, 585 – 587 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 2, 13, 16, 69, 76, 92, 93, 119, 137, 168, 198, 199, 221, 269, 271, 286, 290, 296, 300, 320, 338, 344, 382, 386, 394, 401, 403, 415, 416, 421, 423, 425, 430, 433, 438, 456, 483, 504, 529, 541, 542, 546, 550, 561, 566, 572 – 573, 574, 576, 587 – 590, 592 – 593, 604, 615, 624 – 625, 642, 667, 693, 705, 710, 742, 746, 761, 764, 765 – 766, 768, 775, 778 – 779, 780, 790, 801, 809 PEDESTAL, Operation, 476, 590 – 592 Philippine Island Campaign, 368, 543, 562, 572, 576, 594 – 596, 669 Philippine Islands, Japanese Invasion, 231, 341, 403, 431, 463, 556, 592 – 594, 643, 677, 695, 734, 736, 775 Philippine Sea, Battle of the, 78, 170, 261, 292, 337, 375, 401, 411, 430, 433, 439, 458, 481, 487, 519, 580, 581, 596 – 598, 608, 705, 709, 755, 781, 813 Prince of Wales and Repulse, sinking of, 76, 92 – 94, 108, 123, 320, 350, 431, 470, 599, 603, 604 – 605, 766 Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, sinking of, 611 – 612, 725 – 726 Rawalpindi, loss of, 126, 621 – 622 Red Sea, naval operations in, 86 – 87, 560, 622 – 624, 726 – 727 Rennell Island, Battle of, 334, 625 – 627, 689 Reuben James, sinking of, 415, 627 – 682, 764 Río de la Plata, Battle of, 182, 211, 238, 342, 446, 447, 535, 560, 629 – 631

Categorical Index ROYAL MARINE, Operation, 634 – 635 Royal Oak, HMS, sinking of, 547, 605, 636 – 638, 651 Saint-Nazaire, raid on, 640 – 641 Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French seizure of, 641 – 642 Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the, 2, 16, 42, 53, 76, 333, 422, 431, 439, 646 – 648, 688, 817 Savo Island, Battle of, 68, 147, 213, 303, 326, 331, 334, 504, 536, 649 – 651, 686, 688 SEA LION, Operation, 300, 443, 656 – 658 Sfax, action off, 658 – 660 SHINGLE, Operation, 495, 665 – 666 Sidon, engagement off, 185, 302, 670 – 671 Sirte, First Battle of, 149 – 151, 366, 493, 679 – 681 Sirte, Second Battle of, 100, 279, 366, 477 – 479, 493, 681 – 682, 786 Skerki Bank, battle near, 590, 682 – 684 Solomon Islands Naval Campaign, 2, 11, 15, 36, 68, 109 – 111, 132, 137, 147 – 148, 157 – 158, 161, 168, 199, 296, 320, 331, 370, 395, 417, 426, 433, 500, 517, 531, 613, 643, 662, 678, 686 – 690, 694, 758, 770, 775, 779, 801, 812 – 813 STARVATION, Operation, 711 – 712 Sunda Strait, Battle of, 1, 67, 68, 404, 473 – 474, 556, 557, 695, 727 – 729 Sydney, Japanese raid on, 732 Taranto, attack on, 5 – 8, 17, 76, 92 – 93, 99, 135, 156 – 157, 168, 214, 318 – 319, 366, 477, 491, 646, 681, 739 – 740 Tassafaronga, Battle of, 334, 667, 689, 738, 740 – 742 Tirpitz, attacks on, 22, 41, 43, 52, 84, 92, 106, 107 – 109, 188, 640, 704, 744 – 746 Tokyo Raid, 183, 338, 500, 517, 708, 746 – 748, 771, 777, 817 Toulon, scuttling of French fleet at, 66, 165, 167, 442, 494, 499, 751 – 752 Truk, raid on, 159, 161, 169, 383, 485, 542, 574, 613, 707, 709, 756 – 757

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United States carrier raids, 130 – 131, 456 – 457, 768 – 772 United States Navy carrier raid against Japan, 777 – 778 Vella Gulf, Battle of, 232, 436, 783 – 784 Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of, 784 – 785 Wake Island, Battle for, 2, 33, 174, 184, 217, 269, 273, 383, 456 – 457, 766, 770, 775, 790 – 792 WESERÜBUNG, Operation, 31, 299, 312, 532, 639, 797 – 800 Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, sinking of, 85, 195, 354, 532, 701, 800 – 801 Yamato, suicide sortie of, 56 – 57, 95, 254, 272, 369, 394, 430, 437, 458, 460, 501, 534, 535, 536, 549, 755, 761, 810 – 811

Groups and Organizations ABDA Command, 1 – 2, 245, 341, 404, 405, 468, 474, 542, 556, 557, 695, 727, 766 Arctic convoys, 43, 51 – 52, 187 – 190, 190 – 194 Australia, navy, 1, 67 – 68, 86 – 87, 111 – 112, 122 – 125, 153 – 154, 549, 730 – 731 British Eastern Fleet, 122 – 125, 556 British Pacific fleet, 123 – 125, 127 – 129, 246, 271 Bulgaria, navy, 112 – 115, 131 – 132 Canada, navy, 45, 142 – 144, 547 China, navy, 175 – 176 Cockleshell heroes, 180 – 181 Contre-Torpilleurs, 184 – 185 Convoy PQ 17, 52, 187 – 188, 603 Convoys, Allied, 44, 59, 61 – 62, 67 – 68, 103, 109, 122 – 125, 142 – 143, 172, 186 – 187, 187 – 188, 190 – 194, 196 – 197, 203, 242, 300, 326, 374, 434 – 435, 476, 477 – 479, 488, 493, 495, 541, 545, 559, 567 – 568, 590, 601 – 602, 627 – 628, 654, 681

883

884

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Categorical Index

Convoys, Axis, 43, 82, 100 – 102, 146 – 147, 194 – 196, 207, 300, 318, 454 – 456, 590, 659, 682 – 684 Finland, navy, 268 – 269 fleet train, 71, 127 – 128, 270 – 272, 546, 762, 767 Force H, 54, 72, 106, 135, 155 – 156, 166, 277 – 278, 306, 318, 350, 361, 387, 470, 498, 690 Force K, 278 – 279, 679, 680, 683, 786 France, navy, 4 – 5, 64 – 65, 65 – 66, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 166 – 167, 184 – 185, 203, 281 – 284, 441 – 442, 527 – 528, 641 – 642, 670 – 671, 717 – 718, 743 – 744, 749 frogmen, 289 – 290 German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders, 139 – 140, 297 – 298 Germany, navy, 8 – 10, 38 – 39, 55, 93 – 95, 103, 106 – 107, 125 – 127, 144 – 145, 172 – 173, 190 – 194, 194 – 196, 203, 263 – 265, 299 – 302, 446 – 447, 466 – 467, 482 – 483, 509 – 510, 548, 585 – 586, 621 – 622, 636 – 638, 653, 656 – 658, 719 – 721, 744 – 745, 749 – 750 Great Britain, navy, 1, 38 – 39, 67 – 68, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 100 – 102, 106 – 107, 123 – 125, 125 – 127, 149 – 151, 151 – 153, 165 – 167, 172 – 173, 180 – 181, 190 – 194, 202 – 203, 207 – 208, 214 – 215, 263 – 265, 316 – 322, 322 – 323, 376 – 378, 415 – 416, 488, 508 – 509, 549, 604 – 606, 621 – 622, 636 – 638, 716 – 717 Great Britain, Women’s Royal Navy Service, 322 – 323, 561, 636 Greece, navy, 323 – 324 human torpedoes, 319, 357 – 359, 611 hunter-killer groups, 48, 58, 257, 295, 352, 359 – 360, 451, 674, 692 India, navy, 374 Italian Social Republic, navy, 388 – 390

Italy, navy, 5 – 6, 8 – 10, 93 – 95, 99 – 102, 121 – 122, 135 – 136, 139 – 141, 149 – 151, 151 – 153, 153 – 154, 155 – 157, 167 – 168, 194 – 196, 214 – 215, 263 – 265, 389, 390 – 394, 491 – 492, 494, 510, 548, 612, 623, 628 – 629, 645, 721 Japan, navy, 1, 31 – 32, 82, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 194 – 196, 203, 346 – 347, 365, 376 – 378, 397 – 403, 410 – 411, 426 – 427, 500 – 503, 549, 643 – 644, 721 – 722, 738, 748 – 749 Netherlands, navy, 1, 122 – 125, 554 – 556 New Zealand, navy, 122 – 125 Norway, navy, 532 – 533, 568 – 570 Poland, navy, 83 – 85, 547, 601 – 602 Romania, navy, 112 – 115, 131 – 132, 518 – 519, 632 – 634 Royal Navy volunteer services, 635 – 636 Seabees, 521, 654 – 656, 762 Soviet Union, navy, 33, 83 – 85, 112 – 115, 262 – 265, 315 – 316, 439 – 440, 510, 548, 573 – 574, 699 – 704, 718, 749 United States Coast Guard, 772 – 774, 789, 805 United States Marine Corps, 331 – 332, 774 – 777 United States, navy, 1, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 122 – 125, 176 – 177, 190 – 194, 202 – 203, 420 – 421, 424 – 425, 449, 500 – 503, 510, 548, 549, 585 – 586, 718 – 719, 759 – 760, 763 – 768, 804 – 805 United States Pacific Fleet, 184, 198, 417, 459, 467, 483, 520, 546, 778 – 779 Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), 804 – 805 Yugoslavia, navy, 4 – 8, 819 – 820

Categorical Index

Places Bab el Mandeb Strait, 81 Bletchley Park, 61 – 62, 117 – 118, 313, 672 – 677 English Channel, 25, 174, 190, 258 – 259, 300, 302, 357, 371, 407, 443, 454, 518, 525, 526, 551, 553, 569, 601, 617, 653, 657, 765 Gibraltar, 106, 125 – 127, 135, 146, 155, 166, 191, 213, 305 – 306, 358, 387, 390, 470, 475, 490, 498, 590, 591, 712, 724 Malta, 100 – 101, 146, 151 – 152, 155, 191, 204, 215, 306, 319, 475 – 477, 490 – 493, 518, 545, 590, 659, 676, 681, 682, 690 Panama Canal, 400, 506, 583 – 584, 693, 705, 759 Rabaul, 15, 110, 130 – 131, 157 – 158, 169, 199, 200, 290, 296, 308, 331, 334, 373, 383, 419, 422, 456, 504 – 505, 542, 607, 613 – 614, 649, 686, 696, 732, 770 Scapa Flow, 29, 178, 204, 312, 482, 518, 604, 636 – 637, 651 – 652 Southeast Pacific Theater, 91, 211 – 212, 422, 427 – 428, 436, 542, 613, 647 – 648, 692 – 694 Southwest Pacific Theater, 87 – 88, 104 – 105, 109 – 111, 132 – 133, 147 – 149, 157 – 158, 211 – 212, 542, 656, 693, 694 – 699, 740 – 741 Spitsbergen, 704 – 705 Strait of Gibraltar, 590, 712 – 713 Strait of Sicily, 713 – 714 Suez Canal, 81, 122 – 125, 390, 490, 622 – 623, 726 – 727 Ulithi, 160, 358, 762 – 763, 777

Ideas and Movements air-sea rescue, 25 – 26, 349

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amphibious warfare, 31 – 38, 111 – 113, 116, 139 – 140, 158 – 161, 170, 178 – 179, 183 – 184, 349, 407 – 408, 423 – 424, 442 – 446, 485 – 486, 494 – 495, 524 – 526, 551 – 552, 621, 666, 758, 772 – 774, 790 – 792 antisubmarine warfare, 43 – 50, 58, 67 – 68, 97 – 98, 138 – 139, 142 – 144, 192, 194 – 196, 203, 204, 295, 325, 345 – 346, 380, 414 – 415, 514 – 516, 558 – 560, 684 – 685, 691 – 692, 715 – 722, 750 aviation, naval, 25 – 26, 74 – 79, 109 – 111, 753 – 754 blockade running, 96, 119 – 121, 125 – 127, 455, 493 – 494 camouflage, naval, 139 – 140 Commerce Raiders, Surface, German, 63 – 64, 69, 181 – 183, 630, 632, 730 – 731 Destroyers-Bases Deal, 231, 234 – 235, 425, 541, 640, 763 Kamikaze, 17, 21, 37, 53, 56, 76, 212, 258, 261, 369, 410, 411 – 414, 450, 461, 576, 609, 667, 725, 761, 767, 778, 817 Lend-Lease, 21 – 22, 52, 414, 425, 451 – 454, 569, 625, 703, 704, 763, 819 minesweeping and minelaying, 45, 68, 82, 83 – 85, 103, 114, 166, 174 – 175, 300, 446, 466, 508 – 509, 510 – 514, 569, 572, 593, 633, 711 – 712, 717, 718, 720, 721, 728 naval gunfire, shore support, 116, 158 – 161, 348, 538 – 540, 620 – 621 Rainbow Plans, 618 – 620, 693, 710, 759 – 760 Sho¯ Plans, 668 – 669 signals intelligence, 51, 62, 100 – 102, 106 – 107, 117 – 118, 129 – 130,

885

886

|

Categorical Index 146 – 147, 178 – 179, 195, 196, 255, 313, 562, 671 – 679, 803 – 804

Two-Ocean Navy Program, 259, 759 – 760 U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese shipping, 48 – 50, 400 – 401, 467 – 468, 572 – 573, 780 – 782 Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik), 44, 58, 138 – 139, 414, 654, 674, 802 – 804 Z Plan, 181, 299, 544, 821 – 822

Technologies, Agreements, Objects, and Artifacts aircraft carriers, 12, 17, 18 – 24, 47 – 48, 70, 76 – 77, 190 – 194, 197, 198 – 202, 381 – 382 aircraft, naval, 12 – 18, 74 – 79, 98, 138 – 139, 197 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 38 – 39, 107, 545 – 546 antiaircraft defense of surface ships, 39 – 42, 116, 608 – 609 Ark Royal, British aircraft carrier, 19 – 20, 29, 54 – 55, 106 – 108, 155 – 156, 204, 278, 315, 319, 470, 493, 497, 499, 547, 630, 690 Atlantis, German armed merchant cruiser, 63 – 64, 183, 297, 317, 632 auxiliary vessels, 69 – 71, 511 – 514, 546, 601, 632 – 633 barrage balloons, 88 – 89 battle cruisers and battleships, 90 – 91, 151, 534 – 538 Bismarck and Tirpitz, German battleships, 76, 92, 107 – 109, 278, 300, 350, 358, 534, 548, 605, 690, 822 CAM (Catapult Assisted Merchantman) ships, 70, 138 – 139, 473 corvettes and sloops, 189, 202 – 203 Courageous class, British aircraft carriers, 19, 29, 203 – 205 cruisers, 41 – 42, 184 – 185, 208 – 213

Decoy Ships (Q-Ships), 139, 224 – 225 defensively equipped merchant ships, 225 – 226 depth charges, 45 – 46, 193, 203, 226 – 228, 345, 451, 654, 691 – 692 destroyer, escorts and frigates, 203, 228 – 229 destroyers, 41 – 42, 129 – 130, 184 – 185, 229 – 234, 454 – 456, 536 Deutschland class, German battleships, 38, 210, 237 – 239, 534, 622, 629, 652 electronic intelligence, 52, 117 – 118, 255 England, U.S. destroyer, 257 – 258, 346 Essex class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 20, 259 – 262, 548, 760, 796 – 797 fast attack craft, 263 – 266 Franklin, U.S. aircraft carrier, 53, 260, 286 – 287, 368 glide bombs, 73, 309 – 311 Glowworm, British destroyer, 311 – 313 Hedgehog, 228, 229, 257, 345 – 346 hell ships, 346 – 347 Hood, British battle cruiser, 90 – 91, 93, 106, 108, 209, 278, 350, 350 – 351, 470, 499, 535, 547 hospital ships, 310, 354 – 357 I-400 – Class Japanese submarines, 365 – 366, 583, 721 – 722 Iowa class, U.S. battleships, 41, 93, 95, 384 – 387, 756 – 757 Kaiten, 358, 410 – 411, 725 Kongo class, Japanese battleships, 90, 209, 384, 432 – 434 landing craft, 442 – 446 Leigh Light, 97 – 98, 450 – 451 Lexington class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 19, 456 – 457 Liberty ships, 225, 410, 465 – 466, 525, 787 MAC (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) ships, 71, 138, 473 – 474 mine warfare vessels, 84, 514 – 516

Categorical Index mines, sea, 45, 68, 125 – 126, 312, 317, 508 – 510, 634 – 635, 711 – 712, 750 monitors, 362, 517 – 519 mulberries, 408, 424 – 527, 551, 553, 600 naval armament, 534 – 538 PLUTO (Pipe Line under the Ocean), 600 – 601 Princeton, U.S. aircraft carrier, 24, 163, 460, 606 – 608 proximity fuse, 40 – 41, 608 – 609, 616 radar, 61, 97 – 98, 111 – 112, 142, 148, 150, 186 – 187, 196 – 197, 326, 359, 372, 391, 427, 435, 451, 466, 481, 545, 614 – 616, 666, 690, 740, 764, 770, 780 – 782, 803 Scharnhorst class, German battleships, 29, 52, 178, 652 – 653 Shinano, Japanese aircraft carrier, 22, 76, 664, 781, 811 ship’s combat information center, 666 – 668 Sho¯ kaku class, Japanese aircraft carriers, 20, 53, 668 snorkel, 555, 684 – 685 sonar, 46, 142, 345, 451, 545, 691 – 692, 764, 780 – 782, 803 – 804 submarines, 27, 83, 106 – 107, 121 – 122, 139 – 140, 145, 169, 176 – 177, 317, 340, 343 – 344, 391, 398 – 399, 414 – 415, 420, 434 – 435, 441, 467 – 468, 541, 542, 555, 583, 589, 684 – 685, 715 – 723, 780 – 782 submarines, midget, 121 – 122, 723 – 726, 732, 745

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Sydney, Australian cruiser, 67, 153 – 154, 730 – 731 torpedoes, 45, 48, 59, 62, 82, 96 – 97, 116, 124 – 125, 146 – 147, 157 – 158, 176 – 177, 205 – 206, 263, 332 – 333, 414 – 415, 455, 471, 502, 513, 532, 542, 572, 589, 722, 731, 748 – 751, 780 Victory ship, 787 – 788 Warspite, British battleship, 73, 94 – 95, 103, 135 – 136, 150, 208, 213, 310, 317, 533, 794 – 796 Wasp, U.S. aircraft carrier, 253, 260, 332, 476, 649, 660, 688, 705, 765, 796 – 797 Yamato class, Japanese battleships, 40, 41, 365, 400, 437, 664, 809, 811 – 814 Yorktown class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 20, 260, 815 – 818

Miscellaneous identification, friend or foe, 371 – 373, 769 naval strategy, Allied, 540 – 544, 583, 611 – 612 naval strategy, Axis, 544 – 547, 611 – 612 naval strengths, Atlantic Theater, 548, 759 – 760 naval strengths, Pacific Theater, 68 – 69, 168 – 171, 548 – 550, 693 – 694, 759 – 760

887


Index

Aaron Ward, U.S. battleship, 233, 328 ABC Conference (1941), 169, 693 ABDA Command, 1 – 2, 245, 341, 404, 405, 468, 474, 542, 556, 557, 695, 727, 766 Abdiel class, British minelayer, 516 Abe Hiroaki, 2 – 3, 56, 137, 326, 328, 333, 688 Abe Koso, 3 – 4 Abe Nobuyuki, 566, 818 Abe Toshio, 468 Abemama Atoll, 308 Abercrombie, British monitor, 362, 518 Abetz, Otto, 219 Abrial, Jean Marie Charles, 4 – 5, 751 Abukuma, Japanese light cruiser, 429, 437 Acasta, British destroyer, 204 – 205, 482 Achilles, British light cruiser, 342, 447, 560, 561, 630 Acorit, French corvette, 642 Addu Atoll, 123, 377 Admirable class, U.S. minesweeper, 515 Admiral Graf Spee, German battleship, 30, 107, 122, 182, 211, 238, 300, 317, 341 – 342, 446 – 447, 535, 548, 560, 629 – 631 Admiral Hipper, German battleship, 182, 188, 301, 312, 470, 548, 798 Admiral Nakhimov, German hospital ship, 354 Admiral of the Ocean (Morison), 522 Admiral Scheer, German battleship, 177, 182, 188, 238, 268, 481, 540, 548, 629 Admirals’ Revolt, 133 Adriatic, naval operations in, 5 – 8, 494, 527

Adriatic Sea, 185, 389 Aegean Islands, 149, 518 Aegean Sea, naval operations in, 8 – 10, 153 – 154, 389 ¯ , Operation. See Philippine Sea, Battle A-GO of the Agano, Japanese light cruiser, 256 Agile, French dispatch boat, 302 Agnew, W. G., 100 – 101, 279 Ainsworth, Walden Lee, 10 – 11, 427 – 428, 435 Air Self-Defense Forces, Japanese, 296 aircraft, naval, 12 – 18, 74 – 79, 98, 138 – 139, 197 aircraft carriers, 12, 17, 18 – 24, 47 – 48, 70, 76 – 77, 190 – 194, 197, 198 – 202, 381 – 382. See also specific aircraft carriers Airone, Italian torpedo boat, 151, 153 air-sea rescue, 25 – 26, 349 Air-Sea Rescue Agency (1944), 26 air-to-surface vessel (ASV), 311, 451 Ajax, British vanguard cruiser, 150, 152, 153, 447, 630 Ajax, French submarine, 497 Akagi, Japanese aircraft carrier, 290, 296, 404, 438, 501, 503, 557, 588, 756, 807 Akatsuki, Japanese cruiser, 327 Akigumo, Japanese destroyer, 784 Akitsuki-class ships, Japanese, 232 Akiyama Teruo, 436 Alabama, U.S. battleship, 745 Alagi, Italian submarine, 591 Alaska class, U.S. battle cruisers, 91

889

890

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Index

Albacore, U.S. submarine, 597 Albanian Naval Command, 222 Albatros, French destroyer, 162, 164 Alberico Da Barbiano, Italian light cruiser, 146 – 147 Albert Leo Schlageter, German training vessel, 632 Albert M. Boe, U.S. Liberty ship, 464 Alberto Di Giussano, Italian light cruiser, 146 – 147 Alcione, Italian torpedo boat, 151, 152 Aleutian Islands Campaign, 27 – 28, 307, 353, 419, 422, 428 – 429, 489 Alexander, Harold, 361 Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 773 Alexandru Lahovary, Romanian monitor, 518 Alfieri, Italian destroyer, 150 Algeria, 5, 494 Algérie, French cruiser, 282 Algiers, 165, 528 Allen M. Sumner, U.S. destroyer, 577 Allen M. Sumner class, U.S. destroyer, 232 Allied Control Commission, 527 Allied Convoy Conference (1943), 47 Allied Expeditionary Forces, 550 Allied Pipe Noise Maker, 513 Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee (ASDIC), 44, 46, 58, 318, 792, 803. See also sonar Allied Supreme War Council, 634 ALPHABET, Operation, 28 – 29, 204 Alsterufer, block runner, 96 Altmark incident, 30 – 31, 629, 786 Alysse, French corvette, 642 Amagi, Japanese aircraft carrier, 382 Amagiri, Japanese destroyer-transport, 157 Amatsukaze, Japanese destroyer, 327 Amazon, British destroyer, 189 Amazone, German light cruiser, 639 AMC. See armed merchant cruiser American-British-Dutch-Australian Command. See ABDA Command Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 348 Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 758 Amphibious Support Task Force, 116, 236, 423

amphibious warfare, 31 – 38, 111 – 113, 116, 139 – 140, 158 – 161, 170, 178 – 179, 183 – 184, 349, 407 – 408, 423 – 424, 442 – 446, 485 – 486, 494 – 495, 524 – 526, 551 – 552, 621, 666, 758, 772 – 774, 790 – 792 Amphibious Warfare Section, U.S. navy, 87 – 88 Amur Military Flotilla, Soviet, 573 – 574 Anacapa, U.S. Q-ship, 225 Anami Korechika, 755 Andaman Islands, 337, 376 Anders, Arthur F. “Tex,” 584 Andrea Doria, Italian battleship, 679 Angaur Attack Group, 116 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 38 – 39, 107, 545 – 546 Anglo-Polish Naval Accord, 602 Anson, British battleship, 350 antiaircraft defense of surface ships, 39 – 42, 116, 608 – 609 antishipping campaign off Norway, 42 – 43 Anti-Submarine Inspectorate, 222 antisubmarine warfare, 43 – 50, 58, 67 – 68, 97 – 98, 138 – 139, 142 – 144, 192, 194 – 196, 203, 204, 295, 325, 345 – 346, 380, 414 – 415, 514 – 516, 558 – 560, 684 – 685, 691 – 692, 715 – 722, 750 Antoine, British Q-ship, 224 Anton Schmitt, German destroyer, 532 ANVIL, Operation. See DRAGOON, Operation Anzio, Italy, 495, 538, 665, 676 Aoba, Japanese heavy cruiser, 382, 426, 504, 649 Aosta, Italian cruiser, 222 Aquarius, U.S. Coast Guard attack cargo ship, 773 AQUILA, Operation, 120 Aquileia, Italian hospital ship, 355 Arabis, New Zealand corvette, 560 Arashi, Japanese destroyer, 783 Arbutus, New Zealand corvette, 560 Archerfish, U.S. submarine, 664, 781 ARCHERY, Operation (Vågsøy Island Raid), 50 – 51

Index Arctic convoys, 43, 51 – 52, 187 – 190, 190 – 194 Ardent, British destroyer, 204 – 205, 482 Arethusa, British battle cruiser, 210 – 211 Argonaut, U.S. minelaying submarine, 572, 683 Ariel, Italian torpedo boat, 151, 152, 153 Arima Masafumi, 53 – 54, 411 – 412 Arisan Maru, Japanese ship, 347 Ark Royal, British aircraft carrier, 19 – 20, 29, 54 – 55, 106 – 108, 155 – 156, 204, 278, 315, 319, 470, 493, 497, 499, 547, 630, 690 Arkansas, U.S. battleship, 548 Armed Guard, U.S. Navy, 226 armed merchant cruiser (AMC), 182 – 183 Armistice of June 1940, 185, 494 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers, 111 Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee, 619 Arnauld de la Perière, Lothar von, 55 Arno, Italian hospital ship, 355 Arnold, Henry W. “Hap,” 746 Artigliere, Italian destroyer, 151, 152 Aruba-Curacao, 574 Aruga Kosaku, 56 – 57, 811 Asagumo, Japanese battleship, 327, 406 Asaka Maru, Japanese merchant cruiser, 429 Asaki Maru, Japanese hospital ship, 356 Ascari, Italian destroyer, 478 Ascension Island, 380 ASDIC. See Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee Ashanti, British destroyer, 174, 591 Ashigara, Japanese cruiser, 128 Asiatic Fleet, U.S., 404, 423, 557, 561, 593 Asiatic Torpedo Flotilla, 272 Askim, Per, 532 ASR. See air-sea rescue Asterion, U.S. decoy, 225 Astoria, U.S. cruiser, 649, 791 ASV. See air-to-surface vessel ASW. See antisubmarine warfare Atago, Japanese heavy cruiser, 328, 329, 373, 459 Athabaskan, Canadian Tribal class destroyer, 143 – 144, 310

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Athenia, SS, sinking of, 57 – 58 Atherstone, British destroyer, 640 Atik, U.S. decoy, 225 Atlanta, U.S. light cruiser, 326, 327, 328 Atlanta class, U.S. light cruisers, 760 Atlantic, Battle of the, 44 – 46, 48, 54 – 55, 57, 58 – 63, 90 – 91, 106 – 107, 107 – 109, 138 – 139, 142 – 144, 181 – 183, 190 – 194, 197, 212, 228, 234, 299 – 300, 352, 392, 407 – 408, 414 – 415, 434 – 435, 464 – 465, 544 – 545, 569 – 570, 609 – 610, 621 – 622, 641 – 642, 710, 752 – 753, 763 – 764 Atlantic Charter Conference, 660 Atlantic Convoy Conference, 359 Atlantic Fleet, U.S., 161, 183, 307, 379, 380, 420, 421, 423, 506, 517, 519, 561, 574 Atlantic Wall, 173, 509 Atlantis, German armed merchant cruiser, 63 – 64, 183, 297, 317, 632 Attu Island, Japanese, 27 – 28, 353, 422, 429, 489, 501 Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond, 64 – 65, 527 – 528 Auchinleck, Claude, 313 Audacity, British escort carrier, 47, 138 – 139, 793 Augusta, U.S. heavy cruiser, 162, 163 – 164 Auk class, U.S. minesweeper, 515 Auphan, Paul Gabriel, 65 – 66, 751 Aurora, British light cruiser, 100 – 102, 279, 683 Austin, B. L., 256 Australia, 199, 556, 557, 695 – 696 Australia, Australian cruiser, 649 Australia, British heavy cruiser, 497, 498 Australia, navy, 1, 67 – 68, 86 – 87, 111 – 112, 122 – 125, 153 – 154, 549, 730 – 731 Australian Beanfighters, 110 Automedon, sinking of, 63 – 64, 68 – 69, 183 auxiliary vessels, 69 – 71, 511 – 514, 546, 601, 632 – 633 AVALANCHE, Operation, 17, 35, 72 – 74, 214 – 215, 278, 665, 786 aviation, naval, 25 – 26, 74 – 79, 109 – 111, 753 – 754

891

892

|

Index

Axum, Italian submarine, 591 Ayanami, Japanese destroyer, 329 Azalea, British Flower-class corvette, 471 Bab el Mandeb Strait, 81 Bacchante, British cruiser, 598 Baden, German battleship, 108 Badeong Strait, Battle of. See Lombok, Battle of Badsworth, British destroyer escort, 478 Badung Strait, Battle at, 695 Bagley, U.S. destroyer, 649 Bainbridge, U.S. destroyer, 708 Balao class, U.S. submarines, 719 Baleno, Italian destroyer, 659 Balikpapan (Makassar Strait), Battle of, 1, 81 – 83, 341, 404, 473 – 474, 557, 563, 695 Balkans, 324, 507 Ballard, Robert D., 108 – 109 Balloon Command, Royal Air Force, 88 – 89 Baltic Fleet, Soviet, 700 – 701 Baltic Sea, area of operations, 83 – 86, 112 – 115, 512, 699 – 701 Banckert, Dutch destroyer, 474 Bandar Shahpur, Battle of (Operation COUNTENANCE), 86 – 87 Bande Nere, Italian light cruiser, 153 – 154 Banff Strike Wings, 43 Bangor class, British ships, 515 Barb, U.S. submarine, 274, 276 BARBAROSSA, Operation, 119 – 120 Barbey, Daniel Edward, 87 – 88 BARCLAY, Operation, 507 Barents Sea, Battle of, 52, 301 Barham, British battleship, 93 – 94, 150, 208, 319, 493, 497, 498, 795 Bari, destroyer force at, 6 Barker, U.S. destroyer, 474 Baron von Arnim, German destroyer, 532 barrage balloons, 88 – 89 Barry, British destroyer, 693 Basque, French destroyer, 466 Bataan Peninsula, 593 Bateau, Soviet freighter, 186 battle cruisers and battleships, 90 – 91, 151, 534 – 538. See also specific battle cruisers; specific battleships

Battle Fleet, U.S., 624 Battle Force, 118, 418 Battle of the Bulge, 609, 677 Battleship Force, U.S., 303 battleships, 41 – 42, 91 – 96, 549. See also specific battleships Bay of Benghal, 124 Bay of Biscay, Battle of, 96 – 97, 180, 299 – 300, 310, 451, 455, 640, 674 Bay of Biscay offensive, 97 – 99 BAYTOWN, Operation, 72, 665 Beagle, British destroyer, 189 Béarn, French light cruiser, 19, 23, 166, 282, 441 Beatty, David, 39 Bechtolsheim, Theodor F. von, 129 Bedouin, British destroyer, 478, 479, 533 Bee, British gunboat, 584 – 585 BEF. See British Expeditionary Force Behar, British merchant ship, 644 Belfast, British cruiser, 567 – 568, 653 Belleau Wood, U.S. light aircraft carrier, 171 Benevolence, U.S. hospital ship, 457 Benham, U.S. destroyer, 272, 329 Bennington (CV-20), U.S. carrier, 260 Bergamini, Carlo, 99 – 100, 679 Berkeley, British destroyer, 407 Berkey, R. S., 463, 595 Berwick, British heavy cruiser, 156 Beta Convoy Battle, 100 – 102 Betio Island, 308 Beurling, Arne, 677 Beverley, British destroyer, 189 Beveziers, French submarine, 498 Bey, Eric, 103 – 104, 567 Biak, Battle of, 104 – 105 Bibb, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 773 Biber, German midget submarine, 724 Bideford, Canadian sloop, 310 Big Horn, U.S. decoy, 225 Bird class, U.S. minesweeper, 515 Birmingham, U.S. cruiser, 74, 460, 608 Biscay coast, 551 Bisciani, Ugo, 101 Bismarck, Otto von, 108 Bismarck, sortie and sinking of, 17, 54, 62, 67, 91, 94, 105 – 107, 182, 211, 278, 306, 318, 350 – 351, 413, 469, 470,

Index 488, 534, 535, 544, 548, 602, 618, 690, 744, 753, 786 Bismarck and Tirpitz, German battleships, 76, 92, 107 – 109, 278, 300, 350, 358, 534, 548, 605, 690, 822. See also Tirptitz, attacks on Bismarck Archipelago, 339, 613, 694 Bismarck Sea, Battle of, 109 – 111, 162, 419, 696 Bismarck Sea, sinking of, 413 BITING, Operation (Bruneval Raid), 111 – 112 Black Cat PBY reconnaissance aircraft, 427 Black May (1943), 98, 243 Black Sea, Area of Operations, 8, 9, 112 – 116, 131 – 132, 494, 527, 701 – 703, 723 Black Sea Fleet, Soviet, 33, 112 – 115, 315, 573, 574, 633, 701 – 702 Black Sea Higher Naval School, 475 Black Swan class, British sloop, 202 Blackburn Skua, British aircraft, 204 Blackhouse, Roger, 276 Blackpool, British minesweeper, 513 Blakely, U.S. destroyer, 130 Blandy, William Henry Purnell, 116 – 117, 236, 762 Blankney, British destroyer escort, 478 Bletchley Park, 61 – 62, 117 – 118, 313, 672 – 677 Bloch, Claude Charles, 118 – 119 blockade running, 96, 119 – 121, 125 – 127, 455, 493 – 494 Blomberg, Werner von, 288 Blue, U.S. destroyer, 649 Blyskawica, Polish ship, 129 – 130 Bode, Howard D., 649 – 650 Bofor, Swedish gun, 537 Bogue, U.S. escort carrier, 360 Boise, U.S. navy cruiser, 82, 104 – 105, 148, 404, 557 Boisson, Pierre, 497 Bolzano, Italian heavy cruiser, 136, 149, 155, 393, 725 Bonnier, Fernand, 220 Bonte, Friedrich, 103, 532 Boom Patrol Detachment, 180 Borghese, Junio Valerio, 121 – 122, 389, 611

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Borie, British destroyer, 693 Borneo, 81 – 82, 337, 404, 474, 556, 557, 563 Borum, U.S. destroyer escort, 174 Bosporus Straits, 112 Bougainville, 157, 256, 257, 373, 417, 607, 613, 645, 793, 802, 810 Boulonnais, French fleet destroyer, 162, 163 – 164 Bountiful, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Boxer (CV-21), U.S. carrier, 260 Boxer Uprising (1900), 118 Boyle, British destroyer, 162 BP. See Bletchley Park BPF. See British Pacific fleet Bradford, British heavy cruiser, 756 Bradley, Omar N., 539, 553 Breconshire, British tanker, 279, 679 – 681 Breslau, German cruiser, 242 Brestois, French fleet destroyer, 162, 163 – 164 Bretagne, French battleship, 93, 165, 282, 499, 527 Bretagne class, French battleship, 282 Brezhnev, Leonid, 315 Bridlington, British minesweeper, 513 Brindisi-Valona route, 5 – 6 Bristol, British destroyer, 162 Bristol Beaufort torpedo bomber, 13 Bristol class, U.S. destroyer, 760 Britain, Battle of (1940), 25, 46, 407, 615 Britannia, HMS, 620, 690, 752 British Blue Funnel, 68 British Coastal Command, 46 British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 128 British East Africa Campaign, 122 British East Indies Fleet, 127 British Eastern Fleet, 122 – 125, 556 British Expeditionary Force (BEF), 206, 234, 250, 620 British Home Fleet. See Home Fleet, British British Loyalty, British oil tanker, 239 British naval blockade of the European Axis powers, 125 – 127 British Pacific fleet, 123 – 125, 127 – 129, 246, 271 British Power Boat, 264, 265 British War Cabinet, 63, 525

893

894

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Index

British X-Craft, midget submarines, 723 British-German Naval Agreement (1935), 821 Brittany, Battle of, 129 – 130, 175 Brivonesi, Bruno, 99, 101 Brodie, Bernard, 42 Brooke, Alan Francis, 603 Brooke-Popham, Robert, 63, 68 Brooklyn, U.S. light cruiser, 162, 163 Broome, J. E., 187 Brown, Wilson Jr., 130 – 131, 199, 770, 791 Brunei Bay, 458 Bruneval Raid. See BITING, Operation Brutus, British Q-ship, 224 Buchanan, U.S. destroyer, 640, 649 Buckley class, U.S. destroyer, 257 Buckner, Simon Bolivar, 368 Bude, British minesweeper, 513 Bulgaria, navy, 112 – 115, 131 – 132 Bulldog, British destroyer, 175, 189 Bulmer, U.S. destroyer, 474 Bunker Hill (CV-17), U.S. carrier, 260 Bureau of Aeronautics, U.S., 39, 420, 487, 516, 754 Bureau of Engineering, U.S., 505 Bureau of Marine Inspection, U.S., 772 Bureau of Naval Personnel, U.S., 707 Bureau of Navigation, U.S., 87, 447, 521, 560 Bureau of Ordnance, U.S. Navy, 40 – 41, 116, 118, 132, 295, 447, 660, 710, 801 Bureau of Yards and Docks, U.S., 520 Burke, Arleigh Albert, 132 – 134, 157 – 158, 256, 417, 783 Burma, 403, 556 Burnett, Joseph, 730 Burnett, Robert, 567, 568 Burns, British heavy cruiser, 756 Burntisland Shipbuilding Company, 473 Burrough, Harold, 278, 591 Burza, Polish destroyer, 602 Butaritari Island, 308 Caio Duilio, Italian battleship, 679, 739 – 740 Cairncross, John, 675 Cairo, British antiaircraft cruiser, 478, 479, 591

Calabria, Battle of, 99 – 100, 135 – 136, 141, 222, 318, 491, 645, 752, 795 Calhoun, William L., 271 California, Italian hospital ship, 355 California, U.S. battleship, 95, 118, 130, 489 Callaghan, Daniel Judson, 2, 137 – 138, 326, 328, 333, 688 CAM (Catapult Assisted Merchantman) ships, 70, 138 – 139, 473 Camicia Nera, Italian destroyer, 151, 152, 683 Camotes Sea, 577 camouflage, naval, 139 – 140 Campanula, British corvette, 189 Campbeltown, British destroyer, 235, 640, 641 Campioni, Inigo, 99, 135, 140 – 141, 155 – 157, 241, 366 Camranha Bay, Battle of, 419 Canada, navy, 45, 142 – 144, 547 Canadian Escort Force, 45 Canadian 5th Support Group, 310 Canaris, Wilhelm Franz, 144 – 145 Canberra, Australian cruisers, 334, 649 – 650 Cape Bon, Battle of, 146 – 147, 493, 659 Cape Corse, 466 Cape Engaño, Battle of, 339, 461 Cape Esperance, Battle of, 137, 147 – 149, 304, 333, 688 Cape Gloucester, 613 Cape Matapan, Battle of, 17, 67, 149 – 151, 214, 318, 366, 645, 675 Cape of Good Hope, 190, 298, 387 Cape Passero, action off, 151 – 153 Cape Spada, Battle of, 8 – 10, 153 – 154 Cape Spartivento, Battle of, 155 – 157, 278, 350, 491 Cape St. George, Battle of, 132, 157 – 158, 257, 417, 783 Cape Teulada, Battle of, 141, 155, 690 Capitani Romani class, Italian cruisers, 390 Carden, Sackville, 415 Carducci, Italian destroyer, 150 Caribbean Sea, 541, 558 Caribbean Sea Frontier, U.S., 307 Carlson, Evans R., 3

Index Caroline Islands campaign, 158 – 161, 212, 410 – 411, 480, 607, 678, 767 Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler, 161 – 162, 779 Carrier Force. See 1st Mobile Force, Japanese CARTWHEEL, Operation, 162, 256, 613 Casablanca, Battle of, 162 – 165, 185, 302 Casablanca, meeting at, 48 Casablanca class, U.S. ships, 21 – 22 Casablanca Conference (1943), 360, 385 Casardi, Ferdinando, 153 – 154 Castelorizzo, British landing in, 8 Castle class, British corvettes, 202 – 203 CATAPULT, Operation, 165 – 167, 219, 278, 281, 282, 314, 498, 541, 544, 690, 751 Catapult Aircraft Merchantman. See CAM CATCHPOLE, Operation, 486 Catsgrove, British Q-ship, 224 Cavagnari, Domenico, 99, 167 – 168, 629, 645 Cavalla, U.S. submarine, 597, 668 Cavour, U.S. battleship, 95, 135 Celebes, 404, 474, 556 Centaur, Australian hospital ship, 356 Center Force, Japanese, 458 Central China Fleet, 353 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 449 Central Pacific Campaign, 90 – 91, 158 – 159, 168 – 172, 420 – 422, 467 – 468, 480 – 483, 489, 542, 597, 662, 678, 693, 694, 756 – 757, 767, 775 CERBERUS, Operation, 103, 172 – 173, 178, 617, 639 Cesare, Italian battleship, 95, 99, 135 – 136, 155 Ceylon, 376 – 378, 387 CH. See Chain Home Chacal class, contre-torpilleurs, 184 – 185 Chain Home Low (CHL) stations, 615 Chain Home (CH) radar network, 614 Chamberlain, Neville, 415, 634 Channel Dash. See CERBERUS, Operation Channel Islands Campaign, 173 – 175 Chariot, British midget submarine, 725 CHARIOT, Operation, 640, 641 Charles F. Ausburne, British flagship, 157

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Charybdis, British light cruiser, 455 Chenango, U.S. escort carrier, 626 Cherbourg, 526, 527, 551, 601 Chester, U.S. heavy cruiser, 760, 768 Chevalier, U.S. destroyer, 784, 785 Chiang Kai-shek, 454 Chicago, U.S. heavy cruiser, 200, 626, 649, 650, 732 chief of naval operations (CNO), 448 Chikuma, Japanese naval cruiser, 2, 430, 647, 715 Childs, British seaplane, 404, 557 China, navy, 175 – 176 China Area Fleet, 343, 383, 426, 579, 644, 818 China Sea Fleet, 431, 432, 644 Chinese Naval General Headquarters, 175 Cho¯ka, Japanese cruiser, 504 CHL. See Chain Home Low Chokai, Japanese heavy cruiser, 649 Christie, Ralph Waldo, 176 – 177 Churchill, Winston L. S., 1, 9, 30, 34, 48, 63, 127, 156, 165, 215, 234 – 235, 240, 241, 248, 252, 287, 313, 342, 360, 407, 415, 453, 497, 498, 506 – 507, 523, 550, 599, 603, 605, 610, 634, 665, 676, 752, 753 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency CIC. See Combat Information Center Cigno, Italian torpedo boat, 146 – 147 Ciliax, Otto, 172, 177 – 178 Cincinnati, U.S. cruiser, 714 Città di Jesi, Italian airship, 223 Città di Trapani, Italian hospital ship, 355 Civil Engineering Corps, 656 Clark, Mark W., 66, 72 – 73, 219, 665 Claxton, British ship, 157 CLAYMORE, Operation, 51, 178 – 179 Clemson class, U.S. “Four Piper” destroyer, 627 Cleveland, U.S. light cruiser, 256, 626 Cleveland class, U.S. cruisers, 606 – 607, 760 Clifton, Joseph C., 308 Clio, Italian torpedo boat, 683 Clyde, British submarine, 483 CNO. See chief of naval operations

895

896

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Index

Coastal Command, Royal Air Force, 97 – 98, 565 COBRA, Operation, 554 Cochia, Aldo, 683 Cockleshell heroes, 180 – 181 The Cockleshell Heroes film, 181 Cold War, 661 Cole, William M., 667 COLLAR, Operation, 350 Colleoni, Italian light cruiser, 8, 153 – 154 Collins, John, 154 Colossus, British battleship, 602 Columbia, U.S. light cruiser, 256, 626 Columbus, U.S. heavy cruiser, 506 Combat Direction Centers, 667 Combat Information Center (CIC), 667 Combined Bureau, Middle East, 117 Combined Fleet, British, 127, 610, 640 Combined Fleet, Japanese, 328, 373, 383, 394, 426, 427, 438, 457, 460, 480 – 481, 500, 529, 546, 580, 644, 663, 669, 754, 756, 761, 770, 809, 814 Combined Operations Command, 34, 180, 407, 523 Combined Striking Force, Allied, 245, 474 Comfort, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Comfort class, U.S. hospital ships, 357 COMINT. See communications intelligence Command Squadron 617, Royal Air Force Bomber, 48 Commandant Delage, French sloop, 162 Commandant Teste, French seaplane, 165, 500 Commando Order, of Hitler, 180 Commencement Bay class, U.S. ships, 21 Commerce Raiders, Surface, German, 63 – 64, 69, 181 – 183, 630, 632, 730 – 731 communications intelligence (COMINT), 255, 671 Communist Party, 573 COMPASS, Operation, 518 Conolly, Richard Lansing, 183 – 184, 484 Consolation, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Consolidated B-24 Liberator, U.S., 46, 48 Conte di Cavour, Italian battleship, 491, 628, 739 – 740

Conte Rosso, Italian troopship, 794 Continuation War (1941 – 1944), 269, 701 Contre-Torpilleurs, 184 – 185 Converse, British ship, 157 Convoy PQ 13, attack on, 186 – 187 Convoy PQ 17, 52, 187 – 188, 603 Convoy QP 11, attack on, 188 – 190 Convoys, Allied, 44, 59, 61 – 62, 67 – 68, 103, 109, 122 – 125, 142 – 143, 172, 186 – 187, 187 – 188, 190 – 194, 196 – 197, 203, 242, 300, 326, 374, 434 – 435, 476, 477 – 479, 488, 493, 495, 541, 545, 559, 567 – 568, 590, 601 – 602, 627 – 628, 654, 681 Convoys, Axis, 43, 82, 100 – 102, 146 – 147, 194 – 196, 207, 300, 318, 454 – 456, 590, 659, 682 – 684 Convoys SC.122 and HX.299, Battle of, 196 – 198 Cook, F. N., 111 – 112 Cook, James, 57 Coolidge, Calvin, 130 Cooper, U.S. destroyer, 577, 578 Coordinated Submarine Attack Groups, 781 Coral Sea, Battle of the, 3, 14, 74, 168, 198 – 202, 206, 269, 273, 337, 378, 383, 422, 456, 501, 531, 562, 662, 667, 668, 678, 696, 735, 766, 770 Cornwall, British cruiser, 377 CORONET, Operation, 246, 247 – 248 corvettes and sloops, 189, 202 – 203 Cossack, British destroyer, 30 Cotentin Peninsula, 551 Council of National Liberation, 64 COUNTENANCE, Operation of. See Bandar Shahpur, Battle of Courageous, sinking of, 59, 74, 203, 204, 547 Courageous class, British aircraft carriers, 19, 29, 203 – 205 Courbet, French battleship, 165, 166 Courland Peninsula, 85 Cox, C.W.H., 111 – 112 Cox, Daniel H., 305 Crace, Sir John Gregory, 200, 205 – 206 Craven, U.S. destroyer, 783 Crescent City, U.S. transport, 625

Index Crete, 149, 323, 476, 491, 670, 676 Crete, evacuation from, 207 – 208, 214 Crete, naval operations off, 8 – 10, 32, 67 – 68, 206 – 208, 523 – 524 Crimean peninsula, 112 – 115, 702 CROSSROADS, Operation, 116 cruisers, 41 – 42, 184 – 185, 208 – 213. See also specific cruisers Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles, 104 – 105, 213 – 214, 649, 650 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 315 Cullen, John, 773 Cumberland, British heavy cruiser, 630 Cuniberti, Vittorio, 90 Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne, 64, 100, 121 – 122, 135, 149 – 150, 151, 166, 208, 214 – 215, 223, 314, 318, 320, 348, 361, 611, 658, 680, 681, 682 – 683, 739 Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres, 215 – 216 Cunningham, Winfield Scott, 216 – 217, 790 Curteis, Sir Alban T. B., 477 Curtiss, U.S. seaplane, 217 Cushing, U.S. cruiser, 326, 328 Cyclops, British freighter, 586 Cyprus, British Q-ship, 224 Da Recco, Italian destroyer, 683 Da Zara, Alberto, 221 – 222, 478, 479 Dace, U.S. submarines, 459 Dakar, Battle of, 166, 185, 216, 283, 497, 690, 743 Daladier, Édouard, 634 Dale, U.S. destroyer, 272 Dallachy Strike Wings, 43 Dalmation islands battlegrounds, 7 Damm, Arvid Gerhard, 671 Danis, A. L., 414 Danube, 511, 518, 703 Danube Flotilla, Soviet, 315, 700 Dardanelles Campaign, 10, 65, 415, 488, 690 d’Argenlieu, Thierry, 527 Daring, British destroyer, 434, 523 Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François, 65, 165, 219 – 220, 281, 282, 441, 442, 751

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Darter, U.S. submarines, 459 Darwin, raid on, 67 – 68, 220 – 221, 290, 355, 376, 530, 668 Dau, Heinrich, 30 D-Day. See NEPTUNE, Operation De Courten, Raffaele, 100, 222 – 224, 645 De Cristofaro, Pietro, 659 de Gaulle, Charles, 64, 66, 497, 498, 527, 642, 743 De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme (Muselier), 528 De Kooy Naval Airfield, 244 De Ruyter, Dutch light cruiser, 1, 245, 337, 404, 405, 468, 557 Decatur, Stephen, 627 Decatur, U.S. destroyer, 574 Decima MAS, Italian special forces, 389, 392 Decoux, Jean, 285 Decoy Ships (Q-Ships), 139, 224 – 225 defensively equipped merchant ships, 225 – 226 Delfino, Italian submarine, 323 Delhi British light cruiser attack, 7 Dempsey, Miles C., 553 DEMS. See Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships Denmark Strait, Battle of, 106, 351 Dennison, Alistair, 117 Denver, U.S. light cruiser, 256 Department of Miscellaneous Weapons Development, U.S., 345 depth charges, 45 – 46, 193, 203, 226 – 228, 345, 451, 654, 691 – 692 DERANGE, Operation, 98 DERVISH, Operation, 52 DESERT STORM, Operation, 386 destroyer, escorts and frigates, 203, 228 – 229. See also specific destroyers; specific escorts Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, 133 Destroyer Group Arctic, 188 destroyers, 41 – 42, 129 – 130, 184 – 185, 229 – 234, 454 – 456, 536. See also specific destroyers Destroyers-Bases Deal, 231, 234 – 235, 425, 541, 640, 763

897

898

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Index

DETACHMENT, Operation, 37, 116, 133 – 134, 236 – 237 Deutschland, German battleship, 182, 238, 446, 548 Deutschland class, German battleships, 38, 210, 237 – 239, 534, 622, 629, 652 Devereux, James P.S., 790 Devonshire, British cruiser, 64, 205, 388, 632 Dido class, of British battle cruisers, 211 Diégo Suarez, Japanese raid on, 239 – 240, 388, 690 Dieppe Raid, 34, 523, 525, 550 Diesen, H. E., 569 Diether von Roeder, German destroyer, 532 – 533 Diomede, British light cruiser, 213 Directorate of Air-Sea Command, 26 dive-bombing, 12, 15 Dobbie, William, 475 Dodecanese Islands Campaign, 8, 32, 141, 240 – 242 Dogfish, U.S. submarine, 275 Donegal Bay, 524 Dönitz, Karl, 44, 58 – 59, 61, 98, 192 – 193, 197, 242 – 244, 288, 301, 451, 483, 558, 566, 585 – 586, 604, 618, 637, 673, 750, 800, 802 – 803 Doolittle, James H. “Jimmy,” 338, 517, 746, 747, 771 Doolittle Raid. See Tokyo Raid Doorman, Karel Willem Frederik Marie, 1, 244 – 246, 405, 468, 474 Doria, Italian battleship, 99 Dorington Court, British ship, 465 Dorsetshire, British cruiser, 107, 377, 378 Douglas SBD Dauntless, 163, 771 Dover Patrol, 620 Dowding, Hugh, 250, 614 DOWNFALL, Operation, 37, 128, 246 – 248 D’Oyly-Hughes, Guy, 29, 204 DRAGOON, Operation, 35, 64, 216, 248 – 249, 445, 466, 554, 724, 765 Drea, Edward, 246 Dresden, German carrier, 144 DRUMBEAT, Operation. See PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation

Duane, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 773 DuBridge, Lee, 615 Duguay-Trouin, French light cruiser, 166 Duilio, Italian battleship, 99, 222, 491 Duke of York, British battleship, 94, 103, 567, 568, 653 DUKEDOM, Operation, 337 DUKW amphibious trucks, 362, 526, 553 Dulverton, British destroyer, 310 Duncan, U.S. destroyer, 148 Dunkerque, French battle cruiser, 90, 93, 165, 166, 282, 499, 547 Dunkerque class, French battleship, 535, 652 Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation of, 4 – 5, 32, 143, 250 – 252, 555, 602, 620, 633, 690, 793 Dunlap, U.S. destroyer, 783 Duquesne, French heavy cruiser, 166 Dutch Harbor, 429 DYNAMO, Operation, 555, 620, 792 Eagle, British aircraft carrier, 19, 135, 225, 319 East China Sea, 395, 430 East Prussia, evacuation of, 85 Eastern Front, 550 Eastern Naval Task Force, 553 Eastern Sea Frontier, 422 Eastern Solomons, Battle of the, 2, 56, 243 – 255, 273, 332, 337, 373, 422, 431, 457, 505, 687 Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 425 Eboué, Félix, 497 Eclipse, British destroyer, 186 Edgar Quinet, French armored cruiser, 527 Edgehill, British Q-ship, 224 Edinburgh, British escort, 188 – 190 Edison, British destroyer, 162 Edward VIII (king), 523 Edwards, H. L. “Tex,” 627 Effingham, British cruiser, 287 Egret, British sloop, 310 Egypt, 207, 314, 323, 387, 475, 477, 491 – 493, 611, 622, 726 – 727 Eidsvold, Norwegian battleship, 532, 569 Eighth Air Force, U.S., 311

Index Eighth Fleet, Japanese, 383, 504, 613 Eighth Fleet, U.S., 348, 517 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 72, 241, 248, 306, 349, 361, 550, 552, 600 El Alemein, Battle of, 494, 727 El Hank, 162 – 164 Élan, French sloop, 670 Elan class, German ships, 515 Elbe estuary, 173 Electra, British destroyer, 406, 605 electromagnetic waves, 614 electronic intelligence, 52, 117 – 118, 255 Eleventh Air Fleet, Japanese, 296, 576 ELINT. See electronic intelligence Ellis, Earl “Pete,” 775 Ely, Eugene B., 74 Emden, German light cruiser, 434 Emmanuel, Victor, III, 223 Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of, 132, 157 – 158, 256 – 257, 337, 373 EM-type mines, 509 ENCLOSE I, Operation, 98 ENCLOSE II, Operation, 98 Encounter, HNLMS, 337, 406 England, U.S. destroyer, 257 – 258, 346 English Channel, 25, 174, 190, 258 – 259, 300, 302, 357, 371, 407, 443, 454, 518, 525, 526, 551, 553, 569, 601, 617, 653, 657, 765 Enigma cipher machine, 671 – 672, 683 Eniwetock Atoll landings, 158 – 159, 170, 484, 485, 486, 607, 756, 776 Enterprise, British light cruiser, 96 – 97, 332, 333, 338, 422, 433, 485, 501, 503, 625, 626, 647, 648, 687, 714, 746, 768, 769, 771, 790, 791, 808, 815 – 816 Enterprise, U.S. aircraft carrier, 253, 254, 649 Erdmenger, 96 – 97 Erebus, British monitor, 518, 538 Erich Giese, German destroyer, 532, 533 Erich Koellner, German destroyer, 532, 533 Ericsson, John, 517 Erie, British gunboat, 693 Ernest Renan, French armored cruiser, 527 Escanaba, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 772

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Eskimo, British destroyer, 129, 174, 533 Essex, U.S. light carrier, 260, 607 Essex class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 20, 259 – 262, 548, 760, 796 – 797 Eugenio di Savoia, Italian light cruiser, 222, 478 Euro, Italian destroyer, 310 Evertsen, Dutch destroyer, 727 Excellent, HMS, 276, 287 Exeter, HMS, 1, 2, 337, 342, 404, 405, 406, 447, 630 Express, British destroyer, 605 Externsteine, German auxiliary ship, 773 Fagalde, Maurice, 4 Fairey Swordfish biplane, 473, 739 Fanning, U.S. destroyer, 161 Farenholt, U.S. cruiser, 148 fast attack craft, 263 – 266 Fast Carrier Task Force 58. See Task Force 58 Fechteler, William Morrow, 266 – 267 Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty, 267 – 268 Fidelity, British Q-ship, 224 Fifth Fleet, Japanese, 353, 385, 419, 431, 755 Fifth Fleet, U.S., 236, 368, 484, 520, 709, 754, 777 The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack (Theobald), 742 Finland, navy, 268 – 269 Finnegan, U.S. destroyer escort, 411 First Air Fleet, Japanese, 296, 320, 438, 530, 588, 690 First Indo-China War, 744 First Naval District, 131 First Shanghai Incident (1932), 570 First Task Fleet, 520 Fisher, John, 90, 602 Fitch, Aubrey Wray, 200, 269 – 270 Fiume, Italian heavy cruiser, 149 – 150, 155 – 156 Fleet Air Arm, 172 Fleet Marine Force, 775 fleet train, 71, 127 – 128, 270 – 272, 546, 762, 767

899

900

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Index

Fletcher, British destroyer, 741 Fletcher, Frank Jack, 199, 200, 253, 269, 272 – 274, 331, 332, 649, 686, 687, 688, 769, 791 Fletcher, U.S. light cruiser, 105, 327, 667 Fletcher class, U.S. cruiser, 232, 760 Fliegerkorps X, German, 475 – 476 FLINTLOCK, Operation, 170, 484 Florida, U.S. battleship, 116 Flower class, RCN corvette, 142 – 143, 471 Fluckey, Eugene Bennett, 274 – 276 Flying Fish, U.S. submarine, 597 Focke Wulf Fw200 Condor, 138 Folgore, Italian destroyer, 683 Foote, Japanese destroyer, 256 FORAGER, Operation, 170, 480, 596 Forbes, Sir Charles Morton, 276 – 277, 752 Force A, 376, 377 Force B, 149 – 150, 376, 377 Force C, 564 Force D, 155 – 156 Force de Raid, 185 Force G, 447 Force H, 54, 72, 106, 135, 155 – 156, 166, 277 – 278, 306, 318, 350, 361, 387, 470, 498, 690 Force I, 204 Force K, 278 – 279, 679, 680, 683, 786 Force Q, 683 Force V, 786 Force W, 477, 478 Force X, 314, 477 Force Z, 320, 591, 599, 605, 606 Ford, Wilbraham, 146 Foresight, British destroyer, 189 – 190, 591 Forester, British destroyer, 189 – 190 Formidable, British carrier, 150, 207 – 208 Formosa, 343, 463, 543, 595, 669, 779 Forrestal, James Vincent, 275, 280 – 281, 375, 421, 425 FORTITUDE NORTH, Operation, 552, 676 FORTITUDE SOUTH, Operation, 552 Fortress Europe, 61, 408 Forzatori di Basi, Italian midget submarine, 724 Fougueux, French fleet destroyer, 162, 163 Fourth Fleet, Japanese, 383, 755 Fourth Fleet, U.S., 88, 199, 380, 489

France, 525, 541 France, navy, 4 – 5, 64 – 65, 65 – 66, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 166 – 167, 184 – 185, 203, 281 – 284, 441 – 442, 527 – 528, 641 – 642, 670 – 671, 717 – 718, 743 – 744, 749 Franco-Thai War, 284 – 286 Franklin, U.S. aircraft carrier, 53, 260, 286 – 287, 368 FRANKTON, Operation. See COCKLESHELL, Operation Fraser, Bruce Austin, 124, 127, 287 – 288, 320, 381, 567, 568 Free French Forces, 64, 166, 314, 497, 743 – 744 Free French Navy, 527, 528, 642 French Equatorial Africa, 497 French Indochina, 122 – 123, 545 French Maritime Forces, 528 French Mediterranean Squadron, 65 French North Africa, 52, 66, 162, 166, 214, 215, 300, 306, 319, 442, 541, 550, 590, 682, 751 French Resistance, 181, 551, 552 French West Africa, 497 Freyberg, Bernard, 207, 560 Friedeburg, Hans Georg von, 288 – 289 Friedman, William, 677 Friedrich der Grosse, German battleship, 638 Friedrichshaven summit (1939), 167 FRIENDSHIP, Operation, 506 Fritsch, Werner von, 145 Fritsch Affair, 145 frogmen, 289 – 290 Frondeur, French fleet destroyer, 162, 163, 164 Frost, John, 111 – 112 Frost, L.H., 325 Fubuki, Japanese heavy cruiser, 148, 728 Fuchida Mitsuo, 220, 290 – 291, 530 Fukutome Shigeru, 292 Fulmine, British destroyer, 102 Furious, British aircraft carrier, 19, 74, 204, 590, 745 Furutaka, Japanese heavy cruiser, 148, 649 Fury, British destroyer, 186

Index Fushimi Hiroyasu, 292 – 293 Fuso, Japanese battleship, 2, 95, 460, 564 Gabbiano class, Italian corvettes, 391 Galatea, British cruiser, 276 Gallery, Daniel Vincent Jr., 295 – 296 Gallipoli Campaign, 690 GALVANIC, Operation, 169 – 170, 308 Gambia, New Zealand cruiser, 560, 561 Gambier Bay, U.S. carrier, 461 Garibaldi, Italian light cruiser, 149 Gato class, U.S. submarines, 719 Geiger, Roy S., 368, 481 Genda Minoru, 296 – 297, 530 Geneva Arms Limitation Conference, 426 Geneva Convention, 652 Geniere Aviere, Italian destroyer, 151, 152 Genoa, 302, 488, 690, 740 Gensoul, Marcel Bruno, 498, 499, 690 George Thiele, German destroyer, 532 George V (king), 620 George VI (king), 477, 565 German Ardennes Offensive, 677 German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders, 139 – 140, 297 – 298 German High Seas Fleet, 108 German Imperial Navy, 601 German U-boat campaign, 559 Germany, 10, 83, 126, 212, 224 Germany, navy, 8 – 10, 38 – 39, 55, 93 – 95, 103, 106 – 107, 125 – 127, 144 – 145, 172 – 173, 190 – 194, 194 – 196, 203, 263 – 265, 299 – 302, 446 – 447, 466 – 467, 482 – 483, 509 – 510, 548, 585 – 586, 621 – 622, 636 – 638, 653, 656 – 658, 719 – 721, 744 – 745, 749 – 750. See also Kriegsmarine; Luftwaffe Gervais de Lafond, Raymond, 162, 163, 302 – 303, 670 GHG. See Gruppen-Horch-Gerät Ghormley, Robert Lee, 137, 303 – 304, 331, 333, 339, 686, 688 Gibbs, Frederic Herbert, 304 Gibbs, William Francis, 304 – 305 Gibraltar, 106, 125 – 127, 135, 146, 155, 166, 191, 213, 305 – 306, 358, 387, 390,

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470, 475, 490, 498, 590, 591, 712, 724. See also Strait of Gibraltar Giffen, Robert Carlisle “Ike,” 162, 307, 626 Gilbert Islands Campaign, 158 – 159, 169, 174, 212, 307 – 309, 383, 480, 483, 562, 667, 709, 756, 768, 816 Giorgios Averoff, Greek armored cruiser, 323 Giulio Cesare, Italian battleship, 222, 679, 795 Glasgow, British light cruiser, 96 – 97 Glassford, William A., Jr., 82 glide bombs, 73, 309 – 311 Gloire class, French light cruiser, 500 Glorious, British aircraft carrier, 29, 74, 76, 203 – 204, 205, 287, 482, 653, 799 Gloster Gladiator, British aircraft, 204 Gloucester, British light cruiser, 135, 152 Glowworm, British destroyer, 311 – 313 Gneisenau, German battleship, 103, 106, 126, 172, 173, 178, 182, 204, 277, 301, 317, 470, 482 – 483, 532, 548, 621 – 622, 637, 652, 798 Godfrey, John Henry, 313 – 314 Godfroy, René Émile, 166, 314 – 315 Goff, British destroyer, 693 GONDOLA, Operation, 98 Goodeve, Charles, 346 GOODWOOD, Operations, 43 Göring, Hermann, 250, 615 Gorizia, Italian heavy cruiser, 155, 725 Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich, 33, 315 – 316, 440 Gort, John, 475 Gossage, E. Leslie, 88 Gossamer, British minesweeper, 189 Goto Aritomo, 148 Government Code and Cypher School, British, 117 Gradisca, Italian hospital ship, 355 Graf Spee. See Admiral Graf Spee Graf Zeppelin, German airship, 438, 822 Graham, Cosmo, 86 Grand Escort Command Headquarters, 571 Grand Fleet, British, 418, 431, 580, 620, 636, 651, 792, 795 Great Britain, navy, 1, 38 – 39, 67 – 68, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 100 – 102, 106 – 107,

901

902

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Index

123 – 125, 125 – 127, 149 – 151, 151 – 153, 165 – 167, 172 – 173, 180 – 181, 190 – 194, 202 – 203, 207 – 208, 214 – 215, 263 – 265, 316 – 322, 322 – 323, 376 – 378, 415 – 416, 488, 508 – 509, 549, 604 – 606, 621 – 622, 636 – 638, 716 – 717 Great Britain, Women’s Royal Navy Service, 322 – 323, 561, 636 Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. See Mariana Islands Campaign Great White Fleet, U.S., 161, 270, 338, 347, 379, 422, 710 Greece, 5 – 6, 8, 214, 491, 492, 599 Greece, navy, 323 – 324 Greer, attack on, 324 – 325, 414, 764 Gregory, U.S. destroyer-transport, 417 Gremyashchi, Soviet destroyer, 186 Grenville, British destroyer, 455 Grom, Polish destroyer, 602 Grumman F4F Wildcat, 13 – 14, 163 – 164, 769, 790 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, 308, 320, 371, 485, 756 Grumman TBF Avenger, 14 – 15, 171 Gruppen-Horch-Gerät (GHG) equipment, 692 Guadalcanal, naval battles of, 2 – 3, 68, 137, 147 – 149, 169, 212, 213, 232, 326 – 330, 337, 339, 383, 395, 422, 426, 431, 435, 450, 487, 503, 504, 522, 535, 540, 563, 625, 643, 660, 668, 694, 738, 758, 773, 775 Guadalcanal, U.S. escort carrier, 295 Guadalcanal Naval Campaign, 35 – 36, 269, 272, 273, 330 – 335, 417, 438, 487, 531, 646, 740, 741 Guam, 11, 170, 171, 184, 383, 480, 481, 562, 707, 758, 762, 766, 775, 790 Guam, U.S. battle cruiser, 91 Guépard, French destroyer, 302, 670 guerre de course (war against commerce), 544 Gulf of Aden, 622 – 623 Gulf of Finland, 84, 699, 701 Guomindang government, of China, 175, 198 Gurkha, British destroyer, 40

Gustav Line, 665 – 666 Guzzoni, Alfredo, 361 Gwin, U.S. cruiser, 329 GYMNAST, Operation, 550 HABBAKUK, Project, 610 Hagelin, Boris, 672 Hagikaze, Japanese destroyer, 783 Hague Conventions, 57, 356 Haguro, Japanese Navy Cruiser, sinking of, 124, 256, 337 – 340 Haida, Canadian Tribal-class destroyer, 129 – 130, 143 HAILSTONE, Operation, 709 HAIS pipeline, 600 Hale, Willis H., 159 Halfbeak, U.S. submarine, 275 Halifax, HMCS corvette, 142 Hall, John L., 72 Halsey, William Frederick Jr., 11, 128, 137, 159, 254, 304, 326, 328, 333, 338 – 340, 381, 382, 385, 430, 437 – 438, 459 – 463, 517, 581, 594 – 595, 625, 626, 646, 647, 661, 688, 708, 709, 740, 746, 768, 769, 777, 779, 801 HAMEL pipeline, 600 Hamilton, L.H.K., 187 Hamlet, Harry G., 789 Hancock (CV-19), U.S. carrier, 260 Hangzhou Special Service Agency in China, 644 HANNIBAL, Operation, 354 Hans Lüdemann, German destroyer, 532 Harbor at Arromanches, 526 Harcourt, C.H.J., 683 Hardy, British flagship, 532, 533 Hardy, Cecil Campbell, 477, 478, 479, 533 HARPOON, Operation, 222, 477, 478, 590 Harrier, British minesweeper, 189 Harris, Arthur, 48 Hart, Thomas Charles, 1, 340 – 341, 474, 593 Harukaze, Japanese destroyer, 728 Haruna, Japanese battle cruiser, 376, 382, 394, 404, 540, 557, 563, 580 Haruna class, Japanese battleships, 432 – 433 Harwood, Sir Henry, 341 – 342, 447, 478, 630 Hasegawa Kiyoshi, 342 – 343

Index Hashimoto Mochitsura, 343 – 344, 375 Hashimoto Shintaro¯, 338 Hasler, Herbert G. “Blondie,” 180 – 181 Hasty, British destroyer, 153 – 154 Hatsukaze, Japanese destroyer, 256 Haven, U.S. Hospital ship, 357 Haven class, U.S. hospital ships, 357 Havoc, British battleship, 121, 154, 229, 532, 533 Hawaiian Sea Frontier, 489 Hawker Hurricanes, British aircraft, 204 Hayate, Japanese destroyer, 791 HEAVEN NUMBER ONE, Operation. See TEN-ICHI, Operation Hebern, Edward Hugh, 671 Hedgehog, 228, 229, 257, 345 – 346 Hel, Polish naval base, 83 Hela, German cruiser, 352 Helena, U.S. light cruiser, 148, 326, 327, 435, 436, 609 Helfrich, Conrad E.L., 245, 341, 727 Heligoland Bight, Battle of, 203, 415 hell ships, 346 – 347 Helldiver dive-bomber, 15 Helle, Italian minelayer, 323 Helm, U.S. destroyer, 649 Henderson Field, U.S. air base, 2, 148, 253, 254, 326, 328, 330, 331, 333 – 334, 417, 432, 646, 686, 687, 688 Hermann Göring Division, German, 362 Hermann Künne, German destroyer, 532, 533 Hermes, British aircraft carrier, 123, 166, 320, 377, 497, 547 Hermione, British cruiser, 388 Hero, British destroyer, 153 Hertz, Heinrich, 614 Hesse, Kurt, 407 Hewitt, Henry Kent, 72, 162, 249, 347 – 349, 361, 765 Heydrich, Reinhard, 145 Heye, Hellmuth, 312 HF/DF. See high-frequency direction-finding Hiei, Japanese navy battleship, 2, 3, 137, 326, 327, 328, 333, 663, 688, 817 Hiei class, Japanese battleships, 432 – 433 Higashikuni Naruhiko, 734, 815 Higgins, Andrew Jackson, 349, 445

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Higgins Lumber and Export Company, 349 High Seas Fleet, 616 high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF), 197, 359 Hikawa Maru, Japanese hospital ship, 356 Hilfskreuzers, German AMC, 182 Hipper, Franz von, 616 Hirado, Japanese cruiser, 529 Hirohito (emperor), 56 – 57, 248, 343, 571, 730, 736, 737, 761, 815 Hiroshima, 543, 730 Hirota Ko¯ki cabinet, 529 Hiryu¯, Japanese fleet carrier, 404, 501, 503, 557, 588, 668, 791, 807 History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Morison), 522 Hitler, Adolf, 9, 38 – 39, 51, 57, 63 – 65, 69, 84, 103, 107, 115, 145, 172, 178, 180, 181, 207, 211, 219, 223, 235, 238, 242, 243, 244, 250, 283, 299, 301, 318, 407, 442, 470, 476, 498, 507, 534, 539, 544, 548, 550 – 552, 566, 604, 615, 617 – 618, 632, 644, 652, 657 – 658, 676, 700, 719, 749, 797 – 799, 821 Hiyo, Japanese fleet carrier, 597 Hobart, Australian cruiser, 404, 557, 649 Hodge, John R., 368, 463 Hoel, U.S. destroyer, 461 Hokoku Maru, Japanese cruiser, 239 Holdfast, HMS, 600 Holland, John P., 357 Holland, Lancelot Ernest, 106, 350 Home Fleet, British, 52, 188, 312, 350, 488, 567, 604, 620, 622, 636, 651, 703, 745, 753 Homma Masaharu, 593, 695 Hong Kong, 564 Honolulu, U.S. cruiser, 426, 435, 740, 741 Honshu, Invasion of, 247 Hood, British battle cruiser, 90 – 91, 93, 106, 108, 209, 278, 350, 350 – 351, 470, 499, 535, 547 Hope, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Hopkins, Harry, 453 Hornet, U.S. aircraft carrier, 53, 260, 333, 432, 501, 517, 537, 647, 687, 688, 698, 746, 747, 771, 797, 815, 817 Horton, Sir Max Kennedy, 351 – 352, 793

903

904

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Index

Hosho, Japanese aircraft carrier, 74, 438 Hosogaya Boshiro, 27, 353 – 354, 429, 489 hospital ships, 310, 354 – 357. See also specific hospital ships Hostile, British flagship, 532, 533 Hotspur, British flagship, 532, 533, 670 Houston, U.S. cruiser, 1, 404, 405, 406, 474, 557, 574, 593, 695, 727 Howe, British battleship, 123, 127, 350 Hube, Hans, 361 Hughes, James Joseph, 584 Hughes-Hallett, J., 407, 640 Hull, Cordell, 566, 642 human torpedoes, 319, 357 – 359, 611 Hunt class, British destroyer escorts, 228, 477, 478, 681 Hunter, British flagship, 532, 533 Hunter Liggett, U.S. Coast Guard attack transport, 773 hunter-killer groups, 48, 58, 257, 295, 352, 359 – 360, 451, 674, 692 Huron, Canadian destroyer, 129 – 130, 143, 174 HUSKY, Operation, 5 – 6, 34 – 35, 278, 360 – 363, 374, 494, 508, 714 Hussar, British minesweeper, 189 Hyakutake Haruyashi, 148 Hydra, German merchant ship, 174 Hyperion, British destroyer, 153 – 154 Hyuga, Japanese battleship, 382, 755 I-400 – Class Japanese submarines, 365 – 366, 583, 721 – 722 Iachino, Angelo, 99 – 100, 149, 366 – 367, 477, 492, 645, 679, 680, 682 Iberville, French cruiser, 302 ICEBERG, Operation, 37, 116, 128, 133, 144, 171, 184, 212, 247, 258, 320, 344, 367 – 369, 411, 413, 430, 458, 487, 517, 522, 539, 543, 562, 579, 594, 662, 706, 755, 762, 789 Iceland Battle, 106, 414 Ichimaru Rinosuke, 370 – 371 ICHITEN, Operation, 56 identification, friend or foe, 371 – 373, 769 IJN. See Imperial Japanese Navy Ijuin Matsuji, 256, 373 – 374 Ikazuchi, Japanese destroyer, 327

Ilex, British destroyer, 153 – 154 Illinois, U.S. battleship, 386 – 387 Illustrious, British aircraft carrier, 21, 75, 92, 214, 318, 388, 491, 739 Imamura Hitoshi, 404, 557, 695 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), 15, 168, 171, 196, 223, 247, 369, 397, 543, 549, 571, 668, 694, 767. See also Japan, navy Imperial Naval Air Service (Zeppelins), 55 Imperial Naval General Staff, 199 Impero, Italian battleship, 92 In Which We Serve film, 523 Inchon Landing, 661 Indefatigable, British carrier, 124 Independence (CVL-22), U.S. aircraft carrier, 309, 607 Independence class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 22 India, navy, 374 Indian Ocean Campaign, 123 – 125, 127, 239, 296, 300, 376 – 379, 387, 530, 541, 549, 560, 580, 678 Indiana, U.S. battleship, 266, 625 Indianapolis, sinking of, 344, 348, 374 – 376, 709 Indochina, 547, 759 Indochina War, 65 Indomitable, British carrier, 124, 388, 591, 605 Indonesia. See Netherlands East Indies Ingersoll, Royal Eason, 379 – 380, 764 Ingram, Jonas Howard, 380 – 381 Inland Sea, U.S. and British Carrier Operations, 381 – 383, 711 Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi, 3, 199, 383 – 384, 735, 818 Intelligence Division, 426 Inter-American Defense Board, 506 International Military Tribunal, 244, 530 Intrepid, British destroyer, 260, 261, 310, 757 Ion Bratineau, Romanian monitor, 518 Ionian Sea, 7, 491 Iowa, U.S. battleship, 271, 384, 385, 535, 756, 757 Iowa class, U.S. battleships, 41, 93, 95, 384 – 387, 756 – 757 Iowa Jima, Battle of, 116, 133

Index Iran, navy, 86 – 87 Irene Forsyth, U.S. decoy, 225 IRONCLAD, Operation, 123, 387 – 388 Iroquois, Canadian Tribal class destroyer, 143 Irwin, U.S. destroyer, 608 Isaac Sweers, Dutch destroyer, 146 – 147 Ise, Japanese battleship, 382, 426 Ishizaki Noboru, 239 Isis, British destroyer, 670 Isokaze, Japanese destroyer, 784 Italia, Italian battleship, 92, 309 Italian armistice, 6, 309 Italian Campaign, 34, 248, 550 Italian East Africa, 622 – 623 Italian Socialist Republic, Navy, 388 – 390 Italo-Turkish War, 221, 240 Italy, 5 – 6, 541, 545, 550 Italy, navy, 5 – 6, 8 – 10, 93 – 95, 99 – 102, 121 – 122, 135 – 136, 139 – 141, 149 – 151, 151 – 153, 153 – 154, 155 – 157, 167 – 168, 194 – 196, 214 – 215, 263 – 265, 389, 390 – 394, 491 – 492, 494, 510, 548, 612, 623, 628 – 629, 645, 721 Ithuriel, British destroyer, 478, 479 Ito¯ Seiichi, 56, 394 – 395, 810 – 811 Itsukushima, Japanese cruiser, 529 Iwabuchi Sanji, 395 – 396 Iwami, Japanese battleship, 735 Iwo Jima, Battle of, 171, 358, 368, 370, 372, 411, 413, 517, 539, 543, 562, 662, 678, 706, 709, 758, 770, 776 Izaki Shunji, 427 Jackal, British destroyer, 670 Jacobs, Randall, 87 Jamaica, British cruiser, 653 James, British destroyer, 310 Jan Wellem, German tanker, 533 Janus, British destroyer, 302, 658, 670 Japan, navy, 1, 31 – 32, 82, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 194 – 196, 203, 346 – 347, 365, 376 – 378, 397 – 403, 410 – 411, 426 – 427, 500 – 503, 549, 643 – 644, 721 – 722, 738, 748 – 749. See also Imperial Japanese Navy Japanese East Indies Campaign, 403 – 405

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Japanese Naval Academy, 2, 296, 342, 343, 370, 383, 394, 395, 416, 419, 426, 430, 436 – 438, 504, 529, 563, 565, 575, 578, 663, 729, 734, 735, 737, 754, 761 Japanese Naval Self-Defense Force, 430 Jarrell, Albert E., 104 Java, Dutch light cruiser, 1, 245, 404, 406, 468, 557 Java Sea, Battle of the, 1, 245, 337, 341, 404, 405 – 406, 473 – 474, 536, 556, 557, 573, 695, 727, 734 Java Sea, Second Battle of, 404 Javelin, British ship, 129 Jean Bart, French battleship, 93, 94, 162, 163, 164, 165, 282, 547 Jeanne d’Arc, French cruiser, 219 Jellicoe, George, 241 Jellicoe, John, 276 Jenkins, U.S. destroyer, 162 Jeremiah O’Brien, U.S. Liberty ship, 465 Jervis, Norwegian battleship, 267, 268, 310, 611, 658, 659 Jintsu, Japanese cruiser, 253, 406, 427 – 428, 560, 738 John D. Edwards, U.S. destroyer, 474 John D. Ford, U.S. destroyer, 82 – 83 John I. Thornycroft and Company, 311 John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography (Morison), 522 John W. Brown, U.S. Liberty ship, 465 Johnson, Alfred W., 548 Johnson, Louis, 281 Johnston, U.S. destroyer, 461 joint army-navy nuclear tests, 116 Joint Expeditionary Force. See Task Force 51 Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve, 116 Joint Intelligence Committee, British, 248, 313 Joint Military Board, U.S., 88 Jones, Basil, 129 Jones, George C., 143 Joshima Takagi, 148 JUBILEE, Operation, 407 – 408, 550 JUDGMENT, Operation, 739 Jumna, Indian sloop, 374 Juneau, U.S. light cruiser, 326, 327, 328

905

906

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Index

Jun’yo¯, Japanese aircraft carrier, 23, 646, 648 Jupiter, U.S. ship, 406, 624 Jutland, Battle of, 90, 93, 276, 351, 390, 446, 488, 602, 616, 795 KA. See Kontaktauslösung Kaga, Japanese fleet carrier, 404, 501, 503, 557, 588 Kagawa Kiyoto, 157 Kaiser, Henry John, 409 – 410, 465 Kaiser Permanente Health Plan, 409 Kaiten, 358, 410 – 411, 725 Kaiyo, Japanese escort carrier, 382 Kaju Sugiura, 337 – 338 Kako, Japanese cruiser, 431, 505, 649, 650 Kamikaze, 17, 21, 37, 53, 56, 76, 212, 258, 261, 369, 410, 411 – 414, 450, 461, 576, 609, 667, 725, 761, 767, 778, 817 Kamikaze, Japanese destroyer, 337 Kammhuber Line, 615 Kandahar, British destroyer, 279 Kanimbla, German AMC, 86 Karel Doorman, Dutch aircraft carrier, 556 Karlsruhe, German cruiser, 288 Kashii, Japanese training cruiser, 395 Kasumigaura Naval Air Station. Japan, 438, 576 Katori, Japanese battleship, 529, 756 Kattegat Straits, 120 Kato¯ Tomosaburo¯, 343, 397 Kawakaze, Japanese destroyer, 783 Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company, 432 Kazegumo, Japanese destroyer, 784 Kearny, torpedoing of, 325, 414 – 415 Kelly, British destroyer, 523 Kennan, George, 280 Kennedy, E. C., 621 – 622 Kenney, George C., 109, 463, 464, 595 Kentucky, U.S. battleship, 384, 386, 387, 590 Kenya, British cruiser, 591 Kerama Retto, landings on, 116, 258 Kerch Peninsula, 113 – 114, 702 Kesselring, Albert, 72 – 73, 362, 665 Keyes, Roger John Brownlow, 415 – 416 KFKs. See Kriegsfischkutter

Khrushchev, Nikita, 315 Kiel Canal, 511 Kikkawa Kioyshi, 416 – 417 Kimmel, Husband Edward, 119, 417 – 418, 489, 562, 588, 710, 742, 765, 778, 791 Kimura Masatomi, 110, 418 – 419 King, E.L.S., 670 King, Ernest Joseph, 39 – 40, 47, 87, 127, 131, 183, 289, 331, 375, 379, 420 – 421, 445, 457, 543, 586, 594, 686, 710, 746, 758, 764, 789 King George V, British battleship, 94, 107, 108, 128, 534, 753 King George V class, British battleship, 287, 535, 605 Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin, 27, 177, 333, 339, 422 – 423, 437, 459, 460, 463, 594, 595, 646, 688, 779 Kinkaid, Thomas W., 422 Kinu, Japanese cruiser, 571 Kinugasa, Japanese destroyer, 649 Kirishima, Japanese battleship, 2, 94, 326 – 328, 330, 334, 395, 432, 450, 504, 689, 735 – 736 Kirishima class, Japanese battleships, 432 Kirk, Alan Goodrich, 423 – 424, 553 Kiska Island, 353, 422, 429, 501 Kisragi, Japanese destroyer, 792 KMA anti-invasion mine, 509 – 510 Knox, William Franklin “Frank,” 280, 421, 424 – 426 Koch, Hugo Alexander, 671 Koga Mineichi, 292, 426 – 427, 755 Koh Chang, battle at, 285 Kohlauf, Franz, 455 Ko-Hyoteki, Japanese midget submarine, 724 – 725 Koiso Kuniaki, 482, 729 Kola Bay, 195 Köln, German light cruiser, 434 Kolombangara, Battle of, 11, 427 – 428, 436, 560, 738, 783 Komahashi, Japanese submarine, 733 Komandorski Islands, Battle of the, 27, 353, 428 – 430, 489 Komet, German commerce raider, 297 Komura Keizo, 430 – 431

Index Kondo¯ Nobutake, 69, 221, 253, 328, 329, 330, 333, 334, 404, 431 – 432, 501, 557, 593, 646, 648, 687, 688, 689 Kongo¯, Japanese battle cruiser, 376, 404, 431, 437, 540, 557, 738, 781 Kongo class, Japanese battleships, 90, 209, 384, 432 – 434 Kongo Maru, Japanese AMC, 199 Königsberg cruiser, 17 Konoe Fumimaro, 566, 571, 737, 814, 818 Kontaktauslösung (KA) mine gear, 253, 509 Korean War, 95, 133, 261, 430, 661 Kormoran, German AMC, 67, 297, 731 Kortenaer, Netherlands destroyer, 406 Kramer, Max, 309 Krancke, Theodor, 268 Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm, 434 – 435, 654 Kriegsfischkutter (KFKs), 70 Kriegsmarine, 6 – 7, 10, 23, 83, 96, 103, 115, 126, 264, 299, 466, 467, 470, 617, 652, 749, 821 – 822. See also Germany, navy Kronshtadt, 83 – 85 Krueger, Walter, 463, 595 Kuban Bridgehead, 114 – 115 Kujawiak, Polish ship, 478, 479 Kula Gulf, Battle of, 11, 427 – 428, 435 – 436, 783 Kumano, Japanese naval cruiser, 2, 563 Kure Harbor, 382, 433 Kure Naval Station, 579 Kuretake, Japanese destroyer, 430 Kuribayashi Tadamichi, 37, 236, 539 Kurile Islands, U.S. attacks on, 27 Kurita Takeo, 339, 436 – 438, 458, 460, 462, 705, 707, 715, 727, 813 Kusaka Ryu¯nosuke, 394, 438 – 439, 820 Kuwa, U.S. destroyer escort, 577, 578 Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich, 439 – 440 Kwajalein invasion, 116, 158, 170, 184, 307, 484, 539, 607, 714, 756, 758, 769, 776. See also FLINTLOCK, Operation K-XVIII, Dutch submarine, 82 Kyuji Kubo, 376 Kyushu, invasion of, 246, 761

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La Gracieuse, French sloop, 162 La Grandière, French sloop, 162 La Maddalena, 494 Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de, 66, 441 – 442, 751 – 752 Ladybird, British gunboat, 584 – 585 Laffey, U.S. cruiser, 372 Laird, Cammell, 54 Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, 448 L’Alcyon, French fleet destroyer, 162, 164, 303 Lambridge, British Q-ship, 224 Lamotte-Picquet, French cruiser, 285 Lampo, Italian destroyer, 659 Lanciere, British destroyer, 156 Landguard, Canadian sloop, 310 landing craft, 442 – 446 landing craft, infantry (LCI), 362 landing craft, support [large] (LCS(L)), 445 landing craft, tank (LCT), 362, 445 landing craft mechanized (LCM), 349 landing craft personnel (LCP), 349 landing craft personnel large (LCPL), 349 landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP), 349 landing ship, tank (LST), 357, 362, 445, 471, 773 landing vehicle, tracked (LVT), 443 Lang, U.S. destroyer, 783 Langley, U.S. carrier, 269, 376, 404, 516, 519, 557, 714, 754, 764 Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm, 238, 342, 446, 446 – 447, 629 – 631 Larson, Harold O., 784 Larssen design torpedo boats, 131 – 132 Lascar Catargia, Romanian monitor, 518 L’Audacieux, French destroyer, 497 Laurence, Noel F., 352 Laval, Pierre, 66, 219 Laver, A. F., 180 – 181 Layton, Sir Geoffrey, 123 Lazaretteshiffe, German hospital ship, 354 LCI. See landing craft, infantry LCM. See landing craft mechanized LCP. See landing craft personnel LCPL. See landing craft personnel large LCS(L). See landing craft, support [large] LCT. See landing craft, tank

907

908

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Index

LCVP. See landing craft vehicle personnel Le Fantasque class, contre-torpilleurs, 185, 282 Le Fantasque destroyer, 7 Le Malin, French destroyer, 7, 185 Le Terrible, French destroyer, 7, 185 Leach, J., 606 League of Nations, 598 Leahy, William Daniel, 447 – 449 Leander, New Zealand cruiser, 428, 560, 623 Leclerc, Philippe, 743 Lee, Willis Augustus “Ching,” 328, 329, 334, 339, 449 – 450, 459, 689 Legion, British destroyer, 146 Legnani, Antonio, 389 Leigh Light, 97 – 98, 450 – 451 Leipzig, cruiser, 109 LeMay, Curtis, 711 Lemp, Fritz-Julius, 57 Lend-Lease, 21 – 22, 52, 414, 425, 451 – 454, 569, 625, 703, 704, 763, 819 Leonard Wood, U.S. Coast Guard attack transport, 773 Leonardo da Vinci, Italian midget submarine, 724 Leopold III (king), 416 Les Sept Iles, action off, 96 – 97, 454 – 456 Leviathan, U.S. ship, 304 – 305 Lexington, U.S. carrier, 131, 199, 200, 201, 260, 261, 269, 420, 456, 501, 662, 705, 714, 735, 770, 791, 816 – 817 Lexington class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 19, 456 – 457 Leygues, Georges, 281 Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 11, 68, 76, 159, 184, 286, 337, 339, 394, 412, 419, 422, 430, 433, 436, 437, 439, 457 – 463, 464, 487, 517, 519, 535, 543, 564, 574, 575, 577, 578, 580, 594, 595, 662, 668, 669, 697, 705, 750, 755, 761, 767, 776, 781, 813 Leyte landings, 463 – 464 Libeccio, Italian destroyer, 739 Liberty ships, 225, 410, 465 – 466, 525, 787 Lifeguard League, 468 Lighthouse Service, 772

Ligurian Sea, Battle of the, 466 – 467, 495 Limbourne, British escort destroyer, 455 Lindemann, Ernst, 108 Lingayan Gulf, 593, 596 Liscombe Bay, U.S. escort carrier, 309 Little, U.S. destroyer-transport, 417 Littorio, Italian battleship, 99, 478, 491, 679, 682, 739 Littorio class, Italian battleships, 534 Lively, British destroyer, 100, 279 Liverpool, British heavy cruiser, 152 LMA airborn parachute ground mine, 509 Lockwood, Charles Andrew Jr., 467 – 468 Locotenent Lepri Remus, Romanian gunboat, 633 Lofoten Islands, Norway, 178 – 179 Lofoton Strait, Battle of, 417 Lombok, Battle of, 404, 468 – 469, 557 London Conference (1930), 209, 210, 809 London Naval Conference, 230, 529, 735 London Naval Treaty, 534 Long Island, U.S. escort carrier, 253 Long Lance torpedo, 232, 400, 545, 546, 549, 578, 588, 648, 738 Looe, British Q-ship, 224 Lookout, British destroyer, 466 Loomis, D. W., 484 Lord Middleton, British armed trawler, 189 Lorraine, French battleship, 166, 282 Louisville, U.S. heavy cruiser, 626, 768 Low, Francis S., 746 Loyal, British destroyer, 310 LST. See landing ship, tank Lucas, John, 665 Ludlow, British destroyer, 162 – 163 Luftwaffe, 23, 25, 52, 117, 187, 207, 301, 366, 407, 567, 615, 658, 673, 683, 749, 775 Luigi di Savoia, Italian light cruiser, 149 Lunga Point, U.S. destroyer escort, 413 Lürssen, Yugoslav fast attack boats, 264 Lütjens, Günther, 106 – 107, 469 – 471, 483 Lützow, German battleship, 52, 188, 238, 301, 548 Luzon Campaign, 395, 413, 422, 463, 575, 593, 594, 697, 776 LVT. See landing vehicle, tracked

Index Lyme Bay, Battle of, 471 – 472 Lyster, Sir Arthur Lumley St. George, 739 MAC (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) ships, 71, 138, 473 – 474 MacArthur, Douglas, 36 – 37, 88, 104, 109 – 111, 159, 169, 246, 247, 346, 422, 443, 457, 459, 463, 542 – 543, 562, 578, 593, 594, 613, 661, 678, 693, 696, 698, 725, 766, 776, 779 Mack, P. J., 659 Mackraig-Jones, W. T., 204 Madagascar, 518, 690 Maddox, U.S. destroyer, 161 Madoera Strait, Battle of, 404, 474 – 475, 557 Maetsuyker, Dutch hospital ship, 356 MAGIC British intelligence, 177 Magnificent, Canadian light aircraft carrier, 144 Maiale, midget submarines (human torpedo), 319, 357, 611, 724 Maikaze, Japanese destroyer, 756 Main Fleet to Singapore force, British, 605 Maine, U.S. battleship, 624 Majuro atoll, 484, 607 Makassar Strait. See Balikpapan, Battle of Makin Atoll, 170, 307, 308, 607, 756, 769 Makinami, Japanese destroyer escort, 157 Malacca Strait, 337 Malaya, 123, 378, 403, 431, 556, 580, 592, 599, 604 Malaya, British battleship, 94 – 95, 135, 795 Malayan Emergency, 125 Malocello, Italian destroyer, 478 Maloy, U.S. destroyer escort, 174 Malta, 100 – 101, 146, 151 – 152, 155, 191, 204, 215, 306, 319, 475 – 477, 490 – 493, 518, 545, 590, 659, 676, 681, 682, 690 Malta Convoy Battles, 99 – 100, 136, 477 – 480 Manchester, British light cruiser, 156, 265, 591 MANDIBLES, Operation, 241 MANHATTAN Project, 349 Manila Naval Defense Force, 395 Mannerheim, Carl Gustav, 268

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Manshu, Japanese patrol vessel, 733 Manunda, Australian hospital ship, 355 Maori, British destroyer, 146 Marblehead, U.S. light cruiser, 1, 82, 404, 474, 557 Marco Polo, Italian transport, 626 Marcus destroyer, 11 Marcus Islands, 184 Mariana Archipelago, 170, 668 Mariana Islands Campaign, 11, 17, 78, 132, 158 – 159, 400, 457, 480 – 482, 517, 543, 562, 596, 678, 711, 715, 758, 761, 767 Marine et Résistance (Muselier), 528 Marinefährprähme (MFP) barges, 6, 113 Maritime Commission, U.S., 22, 464 The Maritime History of Massachusetts (Morison), 522 Mark IV torpedoes, 116 Marlborough, British battleship, 794 Marne, British destroyer, 478 Marschall, Wilhelm, 29, 205, 482 – 483, 622, 639, 799 Marseille Defense Zone, 527 Marshall, George C., 235, 421, 445, 704 Marshall Islands Naval Campaign, 3, 169, 307, 308, 309, 480, 483 – 486, 517, 562, 574, 678, 707, 756, 767, 768, 790, 816 Marsuinul, German U-boat, 633 Martin, William, 507 Maryland, U.S. battleship, 95, 423 MAS. See motobarca armata siluranti; Motoscafo Armato Silurant Masami Takemoto, 239 Massachusetts, U.S. battleship, 94, 162, 163, 164, 349 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 46, 176 Massawa, 622 – 623 Matapan, Battle of, 391, 492, 795 Matchless, British destroyer, 478 Mathews, Vera Laughton, 322 Matsuoka Yosuke, 566, 818 Maunder, British Q-ship, 224 Maury, U.S. destroyer, 783 Maxwell, James Clerk, 614

909

910

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Index

Maya, Japanese heavy cruiser, 429, 459 Mayrant, U.S. destroyer, 162 Mayuzumi Haruo, 644 McAfee, Mildred, 804 McCain, John Sidney, 461, 486 – 487 McCormick, U.S. destroyer, 274 McDonough, U.S. destroyer, 161 McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert, 488 McInerney, Francis, 427 McLean, John B., 104 McManes, Kenmore M., 104 McMorris, Charles Horatio “Soc,” 27, 353, 429, 489 McVay, Charles, III, 344, 375 Meade, U.S. destroyer, 330 Mediterranean Fleet, British, 4, 100, 146, 151 – 152, 155, 204, 214, 312, 319 – 320, 351, 492, 493, 547, 603, 611, 658, 690, 739, 752 Mediterranean Sea, naval operations in, 5 – 8, 54, 100 – 102, 125 – 127, 135 – 136, 146 – 147, 153 – 157, 193, 207 – 208, 214 – 216, 305 – 306, 324, 392, 467, 475 – 479, 490 – 496, 507 – 508, 518, 541, 545, 550, 560, 590 – 592, 622 – 624, 658 – 660, 670 – 671, 712 – 714, 726 – 727 Méduse, French submarine, 163 Mei An, Japanese Standard Oil barge, 584 Mei Hsia, Japanese Standard Oil barges, 584 Mei Ping, Japanese Standard Oil barge, 584 Melchoir-Treub, Dutch hospital ship, 356 MENACE, Operation, 496 – 498 merchant aircraft carriers. See MAC MERCURY, Operation, 207 Mercy, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Merrill, Stanton A., 256 Mers-el-Kébir, Battle of, 165, 166, 185, 219, 278, 282, 283, 314, 387, 490, 497, 498 – 500, 690, 713, 751 Meteor, British destroyer, 466 – 467 MFP. See Marinefährprähme barges MGBs. See motor gun boats Michel, German commerce raider, 297, 298 Michishio, Japanese destroyer, 469 Micmac, Canadian Tribal class destroyer, 143 Middleton, British destroyer escort, 478

Midway, Battle of, 2, 13 – 15, 16, 27 – 28, 53, 56, 168, 170, 199, 253, 273, 290, 296, 338, 353, 395, 422, 430, 431, 437, 438, 456, 500 – 504, 531, 546, 579, 615, 624, 664, 667, 668, 678, 693, 708, 737, 766, 772, 807, 816 Midway class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 21 Midway Invasion Force, 431 Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romanian monitor, 518 Mikasa, Japanese battleship, 293, 343 Mikawa Gunichi, 504 – 505, 649, 650, 686 Mikazuki, Japanese destroyer, 343 Mikuma, Japanese heavy cruiser, 728 Milan, French destroyer, 162, 163 – 164 Miles, Milton Edward, 176, 505 – 506 Mills, W. H., 180 – 181 Milwaukee, U.S. light cruiser, 423 Mimosa, French corvette, 642 MINCEMEAT, Operation, 361, 506 – 508 Mindanao, 575, 593 mine warfare vessels, 84, 514 – 516 Minensuchboote, German minesweeper, 514 Minerva, British cruiser, 287 mines, sea, 45, 68, 125 – 126, 312, 317, 508 – 510, 634 – 635, 711 – 712, 750 minesweeping and minelaying, 45, 68, 82, 83 – 85, 103, 114, 166, 174 – 175, 300, 446, 466, 508 – 509, 510 – 514, 569, 572, 593, 633, 711 – 712, 717, 718, 720, 721, 728 Minneapolis, U.S. heavy cruiser, 740, 756, 791 Minnesota, U.S. battleship, 161, 708 Mississinewa, U.S. tanker, sinking of, 358, 411 Mississippi, U.S. battleship, 11, 95, 708 Missouri, U.S. battleship, 288, 291, 339, 384, 385, 386, 387, 487, 506, 543, 562 MIT. See Massachusetts Institute of Technology Mitscher, Marc Andrew, 133, 159, 170, 368, 395, 430, 459, 461, 480, 485, 487, 516 – 517, 596 – 598, 746, 755, 777, 779 Mitsubishi A6M Reisen, Japanese, 643 Mitsubishi A6M5 Zero 52, Japanese, 16 Mitsubishi CSM2, Japanese, 474

Index Mitsubishi F1M2, Japanese, 12 Mitsubishi G3M, Japanese, 474, 769 Mitsubishi G4M, Japanese, 474, 626, 770 Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company, 337, 432 Moale, U.S. destroyer, 577, 578 Moberly, U.S. frigate, 345 Mogador, French destroyer, 231, 499 Mogami, Japanese heavy cruiser, 564, 728 Mohawk, British destroyer, 658 – 660 Mohr, German human torpedo, 358 Mohr, Ulrich, 64 Moku Daihatsu landing craft, 444 Molch, German midget submarine, 724 Molotov, Italian MTB, 113 Monitor, U.S. monitor, 517 monitors, 362, 517 – 519. See also specific monitors Monssen, U.S. destroyer, 327, 328, 649 Montagu, Ewen, 507 Montecuccoli, Italian light cruiser, 222, 478 Montgomery, Alfred Eugene, 361, 362, 519 – 520 Montgomery, Bernard I., 72 – 73, 551, 665, 676 Montgomery, U.S. destroyer, 706 Montpelier, U.S. light cruiser, 256, 257, 626 Moosbrugger, Frederick, 783 Morazzini, A., 466 Moreell, Ben, 520 – 521, 655 Morgan, John Pierpont, Jr., 304 Morgenthau, Henry, 789 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 521 – 522, 650 Morrison, U.S. destroyer, 608 Morton, Dudley W., 572 motobarca armata siluranti (MAS) fast attack boats, 263 motor gun boats (MGBs), 264 – 265 motor torpedo boats, German (S-boats), 471 motor torpedo boats (MTBs), 6 – 7, 112 – 113, 115, 174, 264, 389, 819 Motoscafo Armato Silurant (MAS), Italian torpedo armed motorboat, 151 motosiluranti (MS) fast attack boats, 264 Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas, 180, 407, 416, 523 – 524, 610 MS. See motosiluranti MTBs. See motor torpedo boats

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mulberries, 408, 424 – 527, 551, 553, 600 Munitions Assignment Board, 625 Munro, Douglas A., 773 Münsterland, German blockade runner, 455 Murakumo, Japanese destroyer, 148 Murasame, Japanese cruiser, 327 Murmansk, 566 Murphy, British light cruiser, 162 Murphy, Robert, 219 Murray, George D., 746 Murray, Leonard W., 143 Muru Muru, Japanese hospital ship, 356 Musashi, Japanese battleship, 95, 430, 437, 458, 459, 534, 535, 761, 811, 813 – 814 Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré, 527 – 528, 642 Mussolini, Benito, 34, 100, 136, 141, 167, 362, 366, 389, 392, 393, 494, 629, 645 Mutsu, Japanese battleship, 353, 734 MX-modified mine, 514 Myoko, Japanese heavy cruiser, 256 Nachi, Japanese heavy cruiser, 429 Nadiejda, Bulgarian torpedo gunboat, 131 Nagano Osami, 293, 394, 529 – 530, 644 Nagara, Japanese light cruiser, 326, 327, 329, 734 Nagasaki, 543 Nagato, Japanese battleship, 292, 343 Nagumo Chu¯ichi, 53, 56, 123, 253, 290, 320, 377, 378, 404, 481, 501, 503, 530 – 532, 557, 588 – 589, 807 Naka, Japanese cruiser, 82, 376 Napoleonic Wars, 568 Narvik, Naval Battles of, 103, 213, 532 – 534 National Security Act (1947), 449 National Service Act (1944), 425 Natori, Japanese light cruiser, 285, 728 Natsugumo, Japanese destroyer, 148 Navajo, U.S. tug, 626 Naval Aeronautics Bureau, 383 Naval Air Forces, U.S., 269 naval armament, 534 – 538 Naval Aviation Department, 576 Naval Communications School, 353 Naval General Staff, Japanese, 426, 438, 571, 581, 669, 755, 761 Naval Group North, German, 186, 188

911

912

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Index

Naval Gun Factory, 132, 418 naval gunfire, shore support, 116, 158 – 161, 348, 538 – 540, 620 – 621 Naval Historical Foundation, 421 Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, 561 naval strategy, Allied, 540 – 544, 583, 611 – 612 naval strategy, Axis, 544 – 547, 611 – 612 naval strengths, Allied, 182 naval strengths, Atlantic Theater, 548, 759 – 760 naval strengths, Pacific Theater, 68 – 69, 168 – 171, 548 – 550, 693 – 694, 759 – 760 Naval War College, Japanese, 394, 663, 729, 733, 737 Naval War College, U.S., 4, 118, 130, 184, 269, 273, 338, 340, 348, 379, 418, 420, 422, 426, 431, 438, 489, 504, 563, 571, 574, 662, 709, 710, 742, 754, 758 Navy Air Group Joint Task Force 1, U.S., 706 Navy Construction Battalions, U.S. See Seabees Navy Nurses Corps, 804 Neger, German midget submarine, 724 Nelles, Percy, 143 Nelson, British battleship, 534, 547, 591 Neosho, Japanese oiler, 200 NEPTUNE, Operation, 35, 88 – 89, 89, 144, 173 – 175, 354, 408, 472, 525, 550 – 554, 601, 620 – 621, 676, 725, 765, 786 Netherlands, navy, 1, 122 – 125, 554 – 556 Netherlands East Indies, Japanese invasion of, 1, 244, 341, 356, 403, 406, 417, 431, 468, 474, 542, 543, 549, 555, 556 – 558, 563, 580, 592, 593, 594, 643, 669, 677, 684, 694, 695, 734, 736, 759 NEULAND, Operation, 558 – 560 Neutrality Act, 628 Nevada, U.S. battleship, 274, 303, 742 New England Shipbuilding, 465 New Georgia Campaign, 784 New Guinea campaigns, 36, 158, 168, 169, 199, 206, 266, 320, 456, 594, 613, 662, 678, 696, 697, 732, 735

New Jersey, U.S. battleship, 384, 386, 756, 757 New Mexico, U.S. battleship, 273 New Orleans, U.S. heavy cruiser, 740, 741, 756 New York, U.S. battleship, 87, 418, 548, 574 New Zealand, navy, 122 – 125, 549, 560 – 561 New Zealand Expeditionary Force to the Middle East, 560 Newcastle, British light cruiser, 156 Newfoundland, 143, 527 Newfoundland, British hospital ship, 310 Newman, A.C., 640 Nicholas, U.S. destroyer, 427 – 428, 436 Nicobar Islands, 124 Nicolson, H., 153 – 154 Niger, British minesweeper, 189 Nigeria, British cruiser, 591 Niizuki, Japanese destroyer, 436 Nimitz, Chester William, 131, 169, 200, 246, 253, 271, 275, 304, 333, 375, 382, 421, 459, 462, 463, 480, 483, 501, 502, 503, 542 – 543, 561 – 563, 589, 594, 650, 660, 677 – 678, 686, 693, 708, 709, 712, 742, 766, 768, 770, 778, 780, 791 Nippon Teikoku Kaigun. See Imperial Japanese Navy ¯ nishi Takijiro¯, 575 – 577, 761 O Nishimura Shoji, 82, 437, 458, 563 – 564, 575, 688 Nisshin, Japanese first cruiser, 343 Nitto Maru, Japanese picket boat, 747 Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam, 352, 488, 564 – 565 Noguès, Charles, 66 Nomura Kichisaburo, 565 – 566 Non-Aggression Pact, 126 Nootka, Canadian Tribal class destroyer, 143 Norfolk, British battleship, 103, 106, 567 – 568, 653 Norge, Norwegian armored defense ship, 569 Normandy Landings (1944), 34, 35, 62, 89, 129, 173, 212, 423, 471, 518, 538 North African Campaign, 306, 307, 348, 371, 538, 559 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 281, 570

Index North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Baltic Command, 435, 449 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Forces Southern Europe, 267 North Cape, Battle of, 52, 103, 186 – 190, 566 – 568, 653 North Carolina, U.S. battleship, 333, 625, 649, 764, 797 North Carolina class, U.S. battleships, 168 – 169 North Pacific Force, 422, 742 Northampton, U.S. heavy cruiser, 740, 741 Northeastern Escort Force, 414, 627 Northern Fleet, Soviet, 195, 702 – 703 Northern French naval forces, 4 Northern Patrol, 125 – 127 Northhampton, U.S. cruiser, 161, 768, 769 Northland, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 772 Norway, invasion of, 31, 172, 194, 212, 231, 299, 569, 798 Norway, navy, 532 – 533, 568 – 570 Norwegian Campaign, 17, 28 – 29, 76, 213, 216, 277, 283, 352, 441, 532, 657, 786 Norwegian Nazi Party, 569 Norwegian Resistance, 745 Novorossiisk, Soviet battleship, 439 – 440 Nowaki, Japanese destroyer, 756, 757 Nubian, British destroyer, 310, 658 Nullo, Italian destroyer, 623 Nünberg, German light cruiser, 653 Oahu, USS, 584 O’Bannon, U.S. light cruiser, 327, 784, 785 Obara Yoshio, 4 Odoardo Somigli, 645 Oerlikon, Swiss gun, 537 Office of Strategic Services for the Far East, 505 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 423, 468, 506 Office War Mobilization, U.S., 305 Ohio, British tanker, 590 – 591 Oikawa Koshiro, 69, 571 – 572 O’Kane, Richard Hetherington, 572 – 573 Okinawa, Battle of. See ICEBERG, Operation Oktyabrsky, Filip Sergeyevich, 573 – 574 Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett, 459, 461, 564, 574 – 575

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Oliver, G. N., 72 OLYMPIC, Operation, 246, 758 Omaha Beach, 539, 553 Omaha Beach Gooseberry, 525 – 526 Omori Sentaro, 256, 257 Onami, Japanese destroyer escort, 157, 417 Onslaught, British destroyer, 174 Onslow, British destroyer, 752 Ontario, Canadian cruiser, 144 Operation MO, 3, 199 Operation Shoestring, 331 operational amphibious warfare, 34 – 35 Operational Intelligence Centre, RCN, 143 Ophir, Dutch hospital ship, 356 Oranje, Dutch hospital ship, 356 Oregon, U.S. battleship, 447 Organization Todt, 550 Oriani, Italian destroyer, 478 Oribi, British escort, 186 Orion, British vanguard cruiser, 150 Orion, German commerce raider, 297 Orkney Islands, 342 Ormoc Bay, Battle of, 577 – 578, 595 Oruku Peninsula, 579 Orzel, Polish submarine, 602 Oshima Hiroshi, 644 Oshio, Japanese destroyer, 417 OSTFRONT, Operation, 103 Osugi Morikazu, 256 Ouragan, French torpedo boat, 527 Outer South Seas Force, 504 OVERLORD, Operation, 35, 129, 212, 248, 259, 283, 362, 445, 526, 538, 551, 554, 570, 765, 773 The Oxford History of the American People (Morison), 522 Oxfordshire, British hospital ship, 355 Oxlip, British corvette, 189 Ozawa Jisaburo, 123, 170, 339, 378, 426 – 427, 430, 437, 458, 460, 461, 579 – 581, 596 – 597, 755 Pacific Campaign, 48 – 49, 481, 666 Pacific Fleet, British, 320, 368, 381, 543, 546, 650 Pacific Fleet, Soviet, 382, 439, 703 Pacific Fleet, U.S., 709, 742, 754, 765, 766 Pacific Military Council, 693 Pacific Ocean Area, 709, 754, 779

913

914

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Index

Pacific Theater, 259, 536 Pact of Steel, 167 Palang, Iranian sloop, 87 Palau Islands, attack on, 116 Palermo, 362, 478 Panama Canal, 400, 506, 583 – 584, 693, 705, 759 Panama Canal Force, 693 Panay incident, 584 – 585 Panserskipsdivisjon, 569 Pantelleria, Battle of, 222 Panzerschiffe cruisers, 85, 299 Paris, French battleship, 165, 166 Paris Peace Conference (1946), 184, 379, 565 Parker, U.S. destroyer, 130 Parkman, Francis, 522 Parrott, U.S. destroyer, 82 Partridge, British destroyer, 478, 479 Pas de Calais area, 552 Pasadena (U.S. submarine), 276 Patch, Alexander M., Jr., 249 Patrick Henry, U.S. Liberty ship, 464 patrol torpedo (PT), 265, 460, 564, 574, 575 Patterson, Robert P., 280 Patterson, U.S. cruiser, 649 – 650 Patton, George S., 348, 361, 362, 676 PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation, 224, 558, 585 – 587 Paul Jones destroyer, 11, 82 Paynter, British trawler, 186 PBY Catalina, U.S. seaplane, 74, 221, 253 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 2, 13, 16, 69, 76, 92, 93, 119, 137, 168, 198, 199, 221, 269, 271, 286, 290, 296, 300, 320, 338, 344, 382, 386, 394, 401, 403, 415, 416, 421, 423, 425, 430, 433, 438, 456, 483, 504, 529, 541, 542, 546, 550, 561, 566, 572 – 573, 574, 576, 587 – 590, 592 – 593, 604, 615, 624 – 625, 642, 667, 693, 705, 710, 742, 746, 761, 764, 765 – 766, 768, 775, 778 – 779, 780, 790, 801, 809 Peary, U.S. destroyer, 221 PEDESTAL, Operation, 476, 590 – 592 Pegaso, Italian torpedo boat, 794 Pegasus, British seaplane, 604, 637

Peleliu, Battle of, 11, 158 – 160, 487, 776 Penelope, British light cruiser, 100 – 102, 533 Pennsylvania, U.S. battleship, 95, 266 Pensacola, U.S. heavy cruiser, 740 PERCUSSION, Operation, 310 Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military and Air Questions of the League of Nations, 598 Permanente Foundation, 409 Permanente Metals Corporation, 465 Perry Ilsand, 486 Persée, French submarine, 497 Persian Gulf, 86 Persian Gulf War (1991), 95, 386 Perth, HMAS, 1, 67, 404, 406, 557, 695, 727, 728 Perth class, Australian cruiser, 730 Phelps, U.S. destroyer, 456 Philadelphia, U.S. cruiser, 310 Philby, Kim, 671 Philippine Island Campaign, 368, 543, 562, 572, 576, 594 – 596, 669 Philippine Islands, Japanese Invasion, 231, 341, 403, 431, 463, 556, 592 – 594, 643, 677, 695, 734, 736, 775 Philippine Sea, Battle of the, 78, 170, 261, 292, 337, 375, 401, 411, 430, 433, 439, 458, 481, 487, 519, 580, 581, 596 – 598, 608, 705, 709, 755, 781, 813 Philippines, 168, 403, 556, 766 Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan, 123, 320, 598 – 600, 605 Phony War (1940), 192 Pickard, P., 111 Piet Hein, Dutch destroyer, 417, 469, 474 Pinguin, German commerce raider, 297 Piorun, Polish ship, 129, 174 Pipe Line under the Ocean. See PLUTO Pipe Line Underwater Transport of Oil. See PLUTO Pisa, Italian armored cruiser, 99 Plan Orange, 168, 379, 542, 543, 766, 767 Plattsburg, U.S. troop transport, 118 PLUTO (Pipe Line under the Ocean), 600 – 601

Index Po, Italian hospital ship, 355 Pohl, Hugo von, 55 Pola, Italian heavy cruiser, 149 – 150, 155 Pola Flotilla, 55 Poland, 83, 126 Poland, navy, 83 – 85, 547, 601 – 602 Polaris Ballistic Missile Program, 133 Pope, U.S. destroyer, 82 Porpoise class, U.S. submarines, 719 Port Arthur, siege of, 529 Port Lyautey Field, assault on, 289 Port Moresby, invasion of, 3, 206, 383, 500 – 501, 550 – 551, 562, 643, 696, 735, 766, 770 Porter, U.S. destroyer, 647 Portland, U.S. battle cruiser, 209 – 210, 326, 327, 328 Potsdam Conference, 449, 576, 730 Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers, 187 – 188, 215, 599, 602 – 603, 677 Power, Manley L., 337 Pownall, Charles A., 308 POWs. See prisoner of war Premuda, Italian destroyer, 478 President class, U.S. transports, 625 Preston, U.S. cruiser, 329 Pridham-Wippell, Henry D., 149 – 150 Prien, Günther, 603 – 604, 637 – 638 Primauguet, French light cruiser, 162, 164 Prince of Wales and Repulse, sinking of, 76, 92 – 94, 108, 123, 320, 350, 431, 470, 599, 603, 604 – 605, 766 Princess Beatrix, British troop ship, 178 Princeton, U.S. aircraft carrier, 24, 163, 460, 606 – 608 Principessa Giovanna, Italian hospital ship, 355 Prinz Eugen, German heavy cruiser, 106, 172, 173, 178, 211, 301, 351, 470, 822 Prinz Eugen class, German battle cruisers, 210 prisoner of war (POWs), 346 Prize Regulations, 63 Procione, Italian torpedo boat, 683 Provence, French battleship, 93, 165, 166, 282, 499, 752 proximity fuse, 40 – 41, 608 – 609, 616

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Prunella, British Q-ship, 224 PT. See patrol torpedo Puget Sound Navy Yard, 177 Punta Stilo, Battle of, 135 Pye, William S., 791 Pyke, Geoffrey Nathaniel, 609 – 610 Pykrete ship, 610 Qingdao, Japanese capture of, 426 Q-Ships. See Decoy Ships Quadrant Conference (1943), 613 Quebec, 525 Quebec Conference, 603 Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service, 355 Queen Elizabeth, British battleship, 44, 121, 123, 319, 358, 392, 493, 724, 795 Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, sinking of, 611 – 612, 725 – 726 Queen Elizabeth class, British ships, 93, 94, 95, 794 – 795 Queen Emma, British troop ship, 178 Quentin, British destroyer, 683 Quiberon, British destroyer, 683 Quincy, U.S. cruiser, 649 Quisling, Vidkun, 569 Rabaul, 15, 110, 130 – 131, 157 – 158, 169, 199, 200, 290, 296, 308, 331, 334, 373, 383, 419, 422, 456, 504 – 505, 542, 607, 613 – 614, 649, 686, 696, 732, 770 radar, 61, 97 – 98, 111 – 112, 142, 148, 150, 186 – 187, 196 – 197, 326, 359, 372, 391, 427, 435, 451, 466, 481, 545, 614 – 616, 666, 690, 740, 764, 770, 780 – 782, 803 Radford, U.S. destroyer, 436 Radiation Laboratory, U.S., 615 Raeder, Erich, 105 – 106, 178, 181, 243, 299 – 301, 470, 483, 544, 548, 616 – 618, 629, 656 – 658, 749, 797 – 799, 821 RAF. See Royal Air Force RAINBOW, Operation, 301 Rainbow Plans, 618 – 620, 693, 710, 759 – 760

915

916

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Index

Ralph Talbot, U.S. destroyer, 649, 650 Ramb I, Italian auxiliary cruiser, 560 Ramillies, British battleship, 155 – 156, 239, 240, 388, 547 Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home, 250, 361, 551, 553, 620 – 621, 665, 690, 792 RAN. See Royal Australian Navy Randolph (CV-15), U.S. carrier, 260, 762 Ranger, U.S. aircraft carrier, 487, 519, 548 Raubgraf boat, 197 Rauenfels, German ammunition ship, 533 Räumboote, motor minesweeper, 512, 516 Ravenc class, U.S. minesweeper, 515 Rawalpindi, loss of, 126, 621 – 622 Rawlings, Sir Bernard, 128, 368, 381 RCN. See Royal Canadian Navy RCT. See Regimental Combat Team Rechinul, German U-boat, 633 Red Navy, 439, 573 Red Sea, naval operations in, 86 – 87, 560, 622 – 624, 726 – 727 Redfish, U.S. submarine, 781 Reeves, Joseph Mason, 624 – 625 Refuge, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Regele Ferdinana, Romanian destroyer, 633 Regele Ferdinand class, Romanian destroyer, 633 Regia Marina. See Italy, navy Regimental Combat Team (RCT), U.S., 486 Regina Maria, Romanian destroyer, 633 Registration of Employment Order (1941), British, 322 Reichs Luft Ministerium, 23 Reina Mercedes, U.S. training ship, 338 Relief, U.S. hospital ship, 356 – 357 Rennell Island, Battle of, 334, 625 – 627, 689 Reno, U.S. destroyer, 608 Renown, British battle cruiser, 155, 209, 312, 447, 488, 547, 630, 794 Renown class, British battle cruisers, 90, 123 – 124 Repose, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Socialist Republic or RSI), 388 Repulse, British aircraft carrier, 203, 209, 277, 320, 547, 604, 637 Repulse class, British battle cruisers, 90 – 91 Rescue, U.S. hospital ship, 357

rescue motor launches (RMLs), 26 Resolution, British battleship, 93 – 94, 278, 497, 498, 499, 547 RETRIBUTION, Operation, 714 Reuben James, sinking of, 415, 627 – 682, 764 Revenge, British battleship, 547 Revenge class, British battleship, 636 Rex, Swedish ship, 312 Reykjavik, Iceland, U.S. Fleet Air Base, 295, 325 Reynaud, Paul, 634 – 635 Reza Shah, 86 Rhind, U.S. destroyer, 162 RHINE EXERCISE, Operation, 106, 470 RHN. See Royal Hellenic Navy Riccardi, Arturo, 223, 628 – 629 Richelieu, French battleship, 94, 162, 165, 166, 282, 497, 547 Richelieu class, French battleship, 535 Richmond, U.S. light cruiser, 429 Richmond Shipbuilding Corporation, 465 Rigault de Genouilly, French sloop, 500 RIN. See Royal Indian Navy Río de la Plata, Battle of, 182, 211, 238, 342, 446, 447, 535, 560, 629 – 631 River class, RCN frigate, 143 RMLs. See rescue motor launches RNR. See Royal Navy Reserve RNVR. See Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve RNZN. See Royal New Zealand Navy Ro 28, Japanese submarine, 734 Ro 68, Japanese submarine, 734 Robert E. Peary, U.S. Liberty ship, 409, 465 Roberts, British monitor, 518 Roberts Commission, 625 Rochefort, Joseph J., 677 Rocket, British destroyer, 455 Rodman, Hugh, 380 Rodney, British battleship, 94, 107, 108, 277, 350, 534, 547, 752 Rogge, Bernhard, 63 – 64, 69, 631 – 633 RO-Go Operation, 426 – 427 Roma, Italian battleship, 92, 309, 545 Romania, 633 Romania, navy, 112 – 115, 131 – 132, 518 – 519, 632 – 634 Romanian Danube Division, 633

Index Rommel, Erwin, 342, 416, 476, 492, 539, 550 – 551, 676 Rooks, Albert H., 728 Roope, Gerard Broadmead, 312 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 1, 48, 118 – 119, 130 – 131, 137, 219, 234 – 235, 241, 280, 325, 347, 360, 370, 375, 385, 414 – 415, 418, 421, 423, 424, 425, 447, 452 – 454, 457, 463, 522, 524, 542, 543, 550, 561, 566, 585, 587, 594, 605, 606, 628, 710, 743, 746, 747, 759, 763, 772, 778, 789, 810 ROUNDUP, Operation, 550 Rowan, British destroyer, 162 Royal Air Force (RAF), 241, 250, 511, 744 – 745 Royal Air Force Bomber Command, 635 Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 67, 206 Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), 142 Royal Hellenic Navy. See Greece, navy Royal Indian Navy (RIN), 374 ROYAL MARINE, Operation, 634 – 635 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), 636 Royal Navy Plans Division, 603 Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), 635 Royal Navy volunteer services, 635 – 636 Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, 404 Royal Netherlands Navy, 555, 556, 684 Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), 560 Royal Oak, HMS, sinking of, 547, 605, 636 – 638, 651 Royal Romanian Navy (RRN), 632 – 633 Royal Sovereign, British battleship, 135, 547 Royal Yugoslavian Navy, 6, 819 RRN. See Royal Romanian Navy RSI. See Repubblica Sociale Italiana Rube. See Reuben James Rubin, Soviet guard ship, 189 Rundstedt, Karl Gerd von, 250, 539, 550 Russell, British battleship, sinking of, 215 Russian Civil War, 439, 527 Russo-Japanese War, 293, 343, 529, 565, 729, 808, 814 Ryan, Thomas, 427 Ryder, R.E.D., 640 Rylades, HMS, 724

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Ryujo, Japanese aircraft carrier, 296, 332, 378, 593, 687, 727 Ryu¯yo¯, Japanese aircraft carrier, 457 Saalwächter, Alfred, 639 – 640 Saburo Akeida, 239 SACO. See Sino-American Cooperative Organization Sagona, Norwegian tanker, 611 Saint Matthias Islands, 613 Saint Nicholas, German U-boat, 558 Saint-Lô, 539 Saint-Nazaire, raid on, 640 – 641 Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French seizure of, 641 – 642 Saipan, Battle of, 170, 171, 480, 481, 531, 596, 597, 663, 737, 758, 776 Saito¯ Yoshitsugu, 481 Sakai Saburo, 643 Sakaibara Shigematsu, 792 Sakamaki Kazuo, 725 Sakito Maru, Japanese merchant cruiser, 429 Sakonji Naomasa, 643 – 644 Saladin, British destroyer escort, 472 Salerno, 183, 215, 348, 494, 538, 665, 676 Salt Lake City, U.S. heavy cruiser, 148, 353, 429, 768, 769 Samaritan, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Samidare, Japanese destroyer, 104, 784 Samuel B. Roberts, U.S. destroyer escort, 461 Samurai! (Sakai), 643 San Bernardino Strait, 437, 458, 459, 460, 461, 596, 813 San Francisco, U.S. cruiser, 137 – 138, 148, 326, 327, 489, 791 San Juan, U.S. cruiser, 648, 649 Sanctuary, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Sansonetti, Luigi, 155, 223, 645 – 646 Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the, 2, 16, 42, 53, 76, 333, 422, 431, 439, 646 – 648, 688, 817 Santa Fe, U.S. cruiser, 286 Saphir class, French submarines, 717 Saratoga, U.S. cruiser, 201, 253, 254, 269, 273, 308, 332, 338, 413, 456, 457, 505, 516, 613, 625, 649, 660, 688, 706, 754, 791

917

918

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Index

Sardinia, 494, 507, 590 – 591 Saumarez, British destroyer, 174, 337 Savannah, U.S. cruiser, 310 Savo Island, Battle of, 68, 147, 213, 303, 326, 331, 334, 504, 536, 649 – 651, 686, 688 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 torpedo bomber, 12 – 13 Saxafrage, British corvette, 189 SBD. See Scout Bomber Douglas SBD Dauntless, 13, 75 S-boats. See motor torpedo boats, German; Schnellboote Scapa Flow, 29, 178, 204, 312, 482, 518, 604, 636 – 637, 651 – 652 Scarpe, French dispatch boat, 527 Scharnhorst, German battleship, 94, 103, 106, 126, 172, 173, 182, 204 – 205, 277, 287, 301, 316, 482 – 483, 534, 548, 567, 568, 617, 621 – 622, 653, 704, 798, 799 Scharnhorst class, German battleships, 29, 52, 178, 652 – 653 Schepke, Joachim, 654 Scherbius, Arthur, 671 Schleicher, Kurt von, 288 Schlesien, German battleship, 145, 639 Schnellboote (S-boats), 264 Schuhart, Otto, 204 Schulze-Hinrichs, Alfred, 188 – 190 Scimitar, British destroyer, 471, 472 Scire, Italian submarine, 121, 611 – 612 Scorpion, British destroyer, 214 Scott, Norman, 137, 147, 326, 333, 688 Scout Bomber Douglas (SBD), 253 scout/dive-bombers, 13 Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet, 130 – 131, 340, 470, 489 SEA LION, Operation, 300, 443, 656 – 658 Sea of Azov Flotilla, Soviet, 315 The Sea Power of the State (Gorshkov), 316 Seabees, 521, 654 – 656, 762 SEAC. See South-East Asia Command Sealion, U.S. submarine, 433, 781 search-and-rescue missions, 12, 764, 773 Second Fleet, Japanese, 343, 394, 404, 426, 430, 431, 437, 504, 593, 663, 755, 814

Seehund, German midget submarine, 724 Seenotdienst ASR units, Germany, 25 Selfridge, U.S. destroyer, 784, 785 Sendai, Japanese light cruiser, 256, 328, 373 Seraph, British submarine, 507 Service Force Pacific Fleet, 767 Seventh Fleet, U.S., 88, 161, 266, 339, 422, 437, 459, 463, 594, 595, 779 Sfax, action off, 658 – 660 ¯ -1 Plan. See Leyte Gulf, Battle of SHO ¯ -2 Plan, 669 SHO ¯ -3 Plan, 669 SHO ¯ -4 Plan, 669 SHO Shafroth, John F., 693 Shah, U.S. escort carrier, 337 Shanghai, Battle of, 176, 343, 564 Sheffield, British light cruiser, 156, 567 Sherman, Forrest Percival, 267, 660 – 661 Sherman, Frederick Carl, 661 – 663 ¯ -GO (VICTORY ONE), Operation, SHO 437, 458, 464, 595 Sho¯ho¯, Japanese Navy Cruiser, sinking of, 3, 200, 201, 501 Shidehara Kijuro, 815 Shigure, Japanese destroyer, 104, 460, 564, 783, 784 Shikari, British ASDIC-equipped destroyer, 792 Shikinami, Japanese destroyer, 104 Shima Kiyohide, 459, 575 Shimada Shigetaro¯, 530, 663 – 664, 733 Shimushu class, Japanese ships, 45, 398 Shinano, Japanese aircraft carrier, 22, 76, 664, 781, 811 SHINGLE, Operation, 495, 665 – 666 Shinyo Maru, Japanese ship, 347 ship’s combat information center, 666 – 668 Shiratsuyu, Japanese destroyer, 104 Shirayuki, Japanese destroyer, 728 Sho¯kaku, Japanese aircraft carrier, 200 – 202, 253, 254, 333, 501, 530, 588, 597, 646, 647, 688, 734, 735, 781, 817 Sho¯kaku class, Japanese aircraft carriers, 20, 53, 668 Shoho, Japanese aircraft carrier, 662, 735 Shonan Maru, Japanese trawler, 756 Shoreham, sloop, 86 – 87

Index Short, Walter C., 119, 588, 742 Sho¯ Plans, 668 – 669 Sibert, Franklin C., 463 Sibuyan Sea, Battle of, 459 Sicilia, Italian hospital ship, 355 Sicilian Campaign, 371 Sicilian Channel, 494 Sicily, 155, 491, 507, 541, 545, 590, 676 Sicily, invasion of, 17, 183, 212, 215, 348, 423, 506, 518, 538, 550, 620, 765. See also HUSKY, Operation Sidi-Abdallah, 527 Sidon, engagement off, 185, 302, 670 – 671 SIGINT. See signals intelligence signals intelligence, 51, 62, 100 – 102, 106 – 107, 117 – 118, 129 – 130, 146 – 147, 178 – 179, 195, 196, 255, 313, 562, 671 – 679, 803 – 804 Sikh, British destroyer, 146 Siluro a Lenta Corsa class, midget submarines, 724 Simmons Victory, SS, 787 Simpson, Roger R., 783 Sims, William S., 130 Singapore, 1, 40, 320, 524, 542, 604 – 605 Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), 176, 506 Sino-Japanese War, 53, 343, 370, 576, 733 Sirius, British light cruiser, 683 Sirte, First Battle of, 149 – 151, 366, 493, 679 – 681 Sirte, Second Battle of, 100, 279, 366, 477 – 479, 493, 681 – 682, 786 SIZILIEN, Operation, 704 Skagerrak, raid of, 283 Skates, Ray, 247 Skerki Bank, battle near, 590, 682 – 684 skip-bombing, 12 Skipjack, U.S. submarine, 561 SLAPSTICK, Operation, 72 SLC. See slow-moving torpedo Slessor, John C., 98 slow-moving torpedo (SLC), 392 Smith, Holland M., 236, 480, 484 SNLF. See Special Landing Forces snorkel, 555, 684 – 685 Snowflake, British corvette, 189

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Sokrushitelni, Soviet destroyer, 186 Solace, U.S. hospital ship, 356 Solomon Islands Naval Campaign, 2, 11, 15, 36, 68, 109 – 111, 132, 137, 147 – 148, 157 – 158, 161, 168, 199, 296, 320, 331, 370, 395, 417, 426, 433, 500, 517, 531, 613, 643, 662, 678, 686 – 690, 694, 758, 770, 775, 779, 801, 812 – 813 Somers, U.S. destroyer, 231 Somers class, U.S. battleship, 231 Somerville, Sir James Fownes, 123, 135, 155 – 156, 166, 278, 306, 318, 376, 377, 498, 690 – 691 sonar, 46, 142, 345, 451, 545, 691 – 692, 764, 780 – 782, 803 – 804 Sonsonetti, Luigi, 149 Soryu Class, Japanese aircraft carriers, 19 South Dakota, U.S. battleship, 94, 328, 450, 481, 648, 764 South Dakota class, U.S. battleships, 169 South East Asia Treaty Organization, 715 South Pacific Area and Force, U.S., 303 Southampton, British light cruiser, 156 South-East Asia Command (SEAC), 523, 524 Southeast Pacific Theater, 91, 211 – 212, 422, 427 – 428, 436, 542, 613, 647 – 648, 692 – 694 Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 505, 580 Southern Force, Japanese, 458 – 459, 575, 695 Southwest Area Fleet, 505, 644, 736 Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 613, 694 – 698 Southwest Pacific Command, 137, 459, 594 Southwest Pacific Force, 161, 456 Southwest Pacific Theater, 87 – 88, 104 – 105, 109–111, 132–133, 147–149, 157–158, 211 – 212, 542, 656, 693, 694 – 699, 740 – 741 Soviet Union, 10, 83, 212 Soviet Union, navy, 33, 83 – 85, 112 – 115, 262 – 265, 315 – 316, 439 – 440, 510, 548, 573 – 574, 699 – 704, 718, 749 Spanish Civil War, 145, 177, 222, 351, 434, 439, 482, 604, 610, 672

919

920

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Index

Spanish-American War, 340, 424, 447, 592 Sparks, William, 180 – 181 Spartan, British cruiser, 310 Sparzani, Giuseppe, 389 Special Landing Forces (SNLF), 578, 579, 791 Spence, British ship, 157 Spencer, U.S. Coast Guard cutter, 49, 773 Sperrbrechers, German minesweeper, 514 Spitsbergen, 704 – 705 Sprague, A.F., 707 Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick, 460, 461, 705 – 706 Sprague, Thomas Lamison, 460, 464, 595, 706 – 707 Spruance, Raymond Ames, 158, 169, 236, 308, 368, 480 – 481, 484, 502, 503, 517, 596 – 597, 708 – 709, 755, 769, 777, 779 Spruance class, U.S. destroyers, 709 So¯ryu¯, Japanese fleet carrier, 404, 501, 503, 557, 588, 807 St. Lô, U.S. destroyer escort, sinking of, 412, 461 St. Louis, U.S. cruiser, 428, 435 Stack, U.S. destroyer, 783 Stalin, Josef, 407, 439, 454, 550, 675, 699 Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty,” 235, 379, 423, 709 – 711, 759 Stark, John, 710 STARVATION, Operation, 711 – 712 Sterrett, U.S. light cruiser, 327 Stevenson, Adlai E., 425 Stevenstone, British escort destroyer, 455 Stewart, U.S. destroyer, 460, 474 Stier, German commerce raider, 297 Stilwell, Joseph W., 454 Stimson, Henry L., 424 Stokes, G. H., 146 Stork, British sloop, 793 The Story of Dr. Wassell film, 475 Strait of Gibraltar, 590, 712 – 713. See also Gibraltar Strait of Sicily, 713 – 714. See also Sicily Straits of Dover, 172, 317 Straits of Messina, 362 Straits of Sicily, 545

Strasbourg, French battle cruiser, 90, 93, 165, 166, 282, 499, 547, 752 Strategic Plans Division, 133 Stratton, Dorothy C., 773 Stresa Front, 39 Stump, Felix Budwell, 714 – 715 Sturges, Robert, 387 Stygian submarine, 128 submarines, 27, 83, 106 – 107, 121 – 122, 139 – 140, 145, 169, 176 – 177, 317, 340, 343 – 344, 391, 398 – 399, 414 – 415, 420, 434 – 435, 441, 467 – 468, 541, 542, 555, 583, 589, 684 – 685, 715 – 723, 780 – 782. See also specific submarines submarines, midget, 121 – 122, 723 – 726, 732, 745. See also specific midget submarines Suez Canal, 81, 122 – 125, 390, 490, 622 – 623, 726 – 727 Suffolk, British battleship, 106 Suffren, French heavy cruiser, 166, 527, 744 Sugiura Kaju, 784 Sulina Naval Detachment, 633 Sumatra, 404, 557 Sumatra, Dutch cruiser, 556 Sumner class, U.S. destroyers, 577 Sunda Strait, Battle of, 1, 67, 68, 404, 473 – 474, 556, 557, 695, 727 – 729 Surcouf, French submarine, 166, 282, 642, 717 – 718 Surigao Strait, 94 – 95, 422, 437, 459, 460, 535, 564, 575 Sutlej, Indian sloop, 374 Suwannee, U.S. escort carrier, 626 Suzukaze, Japanese destroyer, 436 Suzuki Kantaro¯, 729 – 730, 815 Suzuya, Japanese naval cruiser, 2 Swanson, British destroyer, 162 – 163 Sweden, 83 – 84 Swordfish torpedo bombers, British, 92, 107, 716 SWPA. See Southwest Pacific Area Sydney, Australian cruiser, 67, 153 – 154, 730 – 731 Sydney, Japanese raid on, 732 Syfret, Edward Neville, 278, 387, 591 ¯ ta Minoru, 578 – 579 O

Index Tachibana Maru, Japanese hospital ship, 356 tactical amphibious warfare, 35 – 36 Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC), 667 Taiho¯, Japanese carrier, 597, 781 Taisho (emperor), 736 Takagi Sokichi, 733 – 734 Takagi Takeo, 200, 245, 405, 406, 734 – 735 Takahashi, Ibo¯, 593, 735 – 736 Takamatsu Nobuhito, 733, 736 – 737 Takanami, Japanese destroyer, 741 Takao, Japanese cruiser, 128, 328, 726, 734 Takasago Maru, Japanese hospital ship, 356 Take, Japanese escort destroyer, 577, 578 Talbot, Paul H., 82 Talybont, British escort destroyer, 455 Tama, Japanese light cruiser, 429, 571, 663 Tanaka Raizo, 253, 333, 406, 687, 688, 738, 740 Tang, U.S. submarine, 572 – 573 Tangier, U.S. seaplane tender, 705, 791 Tanikaze, Japanese destroyer, 436 Taranto, attack on, 5 – 8, 17, 76, 92 – 93, 99, 135, 156 – 157, 168, 214, 318 – 319, 366, 477, 491, 646, 681, 739 – 740 Taranto Naval Command, 628 Tarawa Atoll, 170, 308, 484, 539, 607, 714, 756, 776 Tarigo, Italian destroyer, 659 – 660 Tarpon, U.S. submarine, 298 Tartar, British flagship, 129, 174 Task Force (TF), 128 Task Group (TG), 777 Tasman, Dutch hospital ship, 356 Tassafaronga, Battle of, 334, 667, 689, 738, 740 – 742 de Tassigny, Jean de Lattre, 249 Tatsuta, Japanese light cruiser, 791 Tattnall, British destroyer, 693 TBD-1 Devastator, 13, 75 TE-class, U.S. escort, 233 Tedder, Arthur, 361 Tehran Conference (1941), 385, 550 Tempete, French destroyer, 466 Tenedos, British destroyer, 605

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TEN-GO, Operation, 394, 810 TEN-ICHI (HEAVEN NUMBER ONE), Operation, 430 Tennessee, U.S. battleship, 95 Tenryu¯, Japanese light cruiser, 649, 735, 791 Tentative Landing Operation Manual (1935), 443, 775 Terror, British monitor, 518, 538 Teruzuki, Japanese destroyer, 327, 648, 738 Tesei, Teseo, 357 Tevere, Italian hospital ship, 355 Texas, U.S. battleship, 95, 548 TF. See Task Force TF 5, 82 TF 8, 489, 768 TF 16, 333, 422, 662, 746, 747 TF 17, 200, 768 TF 18, 626, 627 TF 23, 380 TF 38, 159, 339, 381, 459, 461 – 462, 487, 517, 777, 779 TF 39, 256 TF 44, 206 TF 50, 308 TF 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force), 368, 484 TF 52, 715 TF 54, 308 TF 58, Fast Carrier, 159, 170, 368, 384, 430, 480, 481, 485, 517, 596, 662, 756, 777 – 778 TF 64, 147 TF 67, 740 TF 67.4, 137 TF 124, 304 TFCC. See Tactical Flag Command Center TG. See Task Group TG 23, 295 TG 34, 162 TG 34.2, 163 TG 38.3, 608, 662 TG 77.4, 707 To¯go¯ Shigenori, 729 Theobald, Robert Alfred, 27, 742 – 743 Thierry d’Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie, 743 – 744 Third Fleet, Japanese, 343, 566, 580, 663, 736

921

922

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Index

Third Fleet, U.S., 339, 381, 430, 437, 438, 458, 459, 463, 464, 551, 581, 594 – 595, 777, 786 Thor, German commerce raider, 297 Thurston, George, 432 Ticonderoga (CV-14), U.S. carrier, 260, 764 Tiger, British battle cruiser, 209 TIGER, Exercise, 471, 472 Tillman, British destroyer, 162 Tinian Islands, 170, 171, 480, 481, 758, 776 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 108, 616 Tirpitz, attacks on, 22, 41, 43, 52, 84, 92, 106, 107 – 109, 188, 640, 704, 744 – 746 To¯ jo¯ Hideki, 383, 482, 571, 663, 733, 737, 815 Tobruk, 232, 355, 492, 493, 659 Tokyo Express, 232, 333, 334, 687, 738 Tokyo Raid, 183, 338, 500, 517, 708, 746 – 748, 771, 777, 817 Tone, Japanese cruiser, 382, 644, 647 Tonkin, battle at, 285 TORCH, Operation, 32, 34, 144, 162, 167, 214, 219, 232, 278, 283, 289, 306, 307, 319, 331, 349, 379, 494, 522, 550, 559, 570, 620, 682, 713, 727, 765 torpedo boats, 366, 466, 494, 551, 564, 569, 628, 710 torpedo bomber, 13, 17, 337, 392, 503, 583, 626, 687, 750, 757 Torpedo School, Japanese, 353, 580 torpedoes, 45, 48, 59, 62, 82, 96 – 97, 116, 124 – 125, 146 – 147, 157 – 158, 176 – 177, 205 – 206, 263, 332 – 333, 414 – 415, 455, 471, 502, 513, 532, 542, 572, 589, 722, 731, 748 – 751, 780. See also Long Lance torpedo Toscana, Italian hospital ship, 355 Toscano, A., 146, 147 Toschi, Elios, 357 Tothill, J.A.W., 670 Toulon, scuttling of French fleet at, 66, 165, 167, 442, 494, 499, 751 – 752 Tourville, French heavy cruiser, 166 Tovey, Sir John Cronyn, 187, 277, 350, 752 – 753 Towers, John Henry, 381, 660, 753 – 754

Toyoda Soemu, 56, 394, 427, 430, 438, 457 – 458, 480, 571, 581, 663, 669, 754 – 756 Trafalgar, Battle of, 739 Tranquility, U.S. hospital ship, 357 Trans-Siberian Railway, 119 Treaty of Utrecht (1714), 306 Treaty of Versailles. See Versailles Treaty Trenchant submarine, 128 Trento, Italian heavy cruiser, 149, 155, 478, 739 Tribal class destroyer, RCN, 143 – 144, 786 Tribals, Canadian Tribal class destroyer, 143 Trieste, Italian cruiser, 149, 155 Trincomalee, Japanese raid on, 377 Trinidad, 558, 574 Trinidad, British light cruiser, 186 – 187 Tripartite Pact, 235, 426, 566, 571, 814, 818 Tripoli, 153, 493 Tripolitania, 491 Triton, U.S. nuclear submarine, 365 Trombe, Italian destroyer, 390 Tromp, Dutch light cruiser, 404, 469, 474, 555, 557 Truk, raid on, 159, 161, 169, 383, 485, 542, 574, 613, 707, 709, 756 – 757 Truman, Harry S., 133, 281, 449, 661 Truman Doctrine, 661 Truscott, Lucian, Jr., 249 Tsiolkovski, Soviet freighter, 189 Tsukahara Nishizo, 576 Tsurumi, Japanese oiler, 579 Tsushima, Battle of, 293, 343, 397, 808 Tulagi, 273, 758 Tulcea Tactical Group, 633 Tuna, British submarine, 180 TUNGSTEN, Operations, 43 Tunisia, Allied occupation of, 494, 496, 506, 676, 682 Turing, Alan, 117, 673 Turkey, 8 Turkish-Italian War, 645 Turnage, A. H., 256 Turner, Richmond Kelly, 170, 236, 308, 331, 333, 368, 480, 484, 649, 686, 757 – 758 Tuscaloosa, U.S. heavy cruiser, 162, 163 – 164

Index Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act (1940), 168, 760, 763 Two-Ocean Navy Program, 259, 759 – 760 Tynedale, British destroyer, 640 Type VIIB submarines, German, 604 UDTs. See underwater demolition teams Ugaki Matome, 761 – 762 Uganda, British lightcruiser, 144, 310 Ulithi, 160, 358, 762 – 763, 777 The Ultra Secret (Winterbotham), 118, 672 ULTRA signal intercepts, 106, 117, 177, 187, 195, 207, 246, 313, 352, 391, 493, 567, 676 – 677 Umezu Yoshijiro, 755 Unbroken, British submarine, 591 Underhill, U.S. destroyer escort, sinking of, 358, 411 underwater demolition teams (UDTs), 34, 36, 160 United States, navy, 1, 90 – 91, 93 – 95, 122 – 125, 176 – 177, 190 – 194, 202 – 203, 420 – 421, 424 – 425, 449, 500 – 503, 510, 548, 549, 585 – 586, 718 – 719, 759 – 760, 763 – 768, 804 – 805 United States, SS, 305 United States carrier raids, 130 – 131, 456 – 457, 768 – 772 United States Coast Guard, 772 – 774, 789, 805 United States Marine Corps, 331 – 332, 774 – 777 United States Navy carrier raid against Japan, 777 – 778 United States Pacific Fleet, 184, 198, 417, 459, 467, 483, 520, 546, 778 – 779 United States Shipping Board, 304 United Victory, SS, 787 Unrug, Jozef, 601 Unryo¯, Japanese battleship, 781 Upholder, British submarine, 279, 794 Uranami, Japanese destroyer, 104 U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japanese shipping, 48 – 50, 400 – 401, 467 – 468, 572 – 573, 780 – 782 Ushijima Mitsuru, 368 – 369

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Utah Beach Gooseberry, 525 – 526 Uzuki, Japanese destroyer-transport, 157 V Amphibious Force, 170, 236, 480 V-1 buzz bombs, 89 Vågsøy Island Raid. See ARCHERY, Operation Valiant, British battleship, 73, 121, 123, 150, 278, 319, 358, 392, 493, 499, 724, 795 Valmy, French destroyer, 302, 670 Vampire, British destroyer, 377, 605 Van Ghent, Dutch destroyer, 474 Van Hook, Clifford E., 693 Vandegrift, Alexander A., 331 Vanguard, British battleship, 93 Vanguard Group, 2, 56 variable time (VT) fuse, 41, 609 Vasillissa Olga, Greek destroyer, 310 Vella Gulf, Battle of, 232, 436, 783 – 784 Vella Lavella, Naval Battle of, 784 – 785 Vendegrift, Frank J., 686 Venus, British destroyer, 337 de Verde Leigh, Humphrey, 451 Verify, British destroyer, 604 Versailles Treaty (1919), 38 – 39, 210, 230, 231, 237, 238, 532, 544, 629, 719, 749, 821 Verulam, British destroyer, 337 Vestry, Arthur, 89 Vian, Sir Phillip Louis, 30, 72, 128, 477, 478, 553, 679, 681, 785 – 786 Vichy French forces, 162, 441, 496 – 497, 498, 641, 713 Vichy French government, 5, 65, 166, 318, 387, 527, 590, 642, 743, 751 Vickers Wellington medium bombers, 98 Victor Emmanuel III (king), 100, 645 Victorious, British carrier, 591, 745 VICTORY ONE, Operation. See SHO-GO, Operation Victory ship, 787 – 788 Vietnam War, 95 Vigilant, British destroyer, 337 VIGOROUS, Operation, 477, 478, 590 VII Amphibious Force, U.S. Navy, 36 Vincennes, U.S. cruiser, 649, 650 Virago, British destroyer, 337

923

924

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Index

Virgilio, Italian hospital ship, 355 Viribus Unitas, Yugoslav midget submarine, 723 Vittorio Veneto, Italian battleship, 92, 99, 149 – 150, 155, 156, 491 Vivaldo, Italian destroyer, 478 Voelcker, G.A.W., 455 Voltaire, French battleship, 527 Vought OS2U Kingfisher, 12 VT. See variable time Waesche, Russell Randolph, 772, 773, 789 – 790 Wagner, Herbert, 309 Wahoo, U.S. submarine, 572 Wainwright, U.S. destroyer, 162 Wake Island, Battle for, 2, 33, 174, 184, 217, 269, 273, 383, 456 – 457, 766, 770, 775, 790 – 792 Walke, U.S. destroyer, 329 Walker, Frank R., 784 Walker, Frederick John, 792 – 793 Walker, Harold T.C., 337 Walter, Hellmuth, 685 Wampanoag, U.S. cruiser, 208 Wanganella, Australian hospital ship, 356 Wanklyn, Malcolm, 793 – 794 war against commerce. See guerre de course War Cabinet, 165, 634 War Plans Office, 303, 660, 758 War Plans Section, of Bureau of Navigation, 87, 423 War Production Board, U.S., 305 Warburton-Lee, A. W., 532, 533 Warrior, Canadian light aircraft carrier, 144 Warspite, British battleship, 73, 94 – 95, 103, 135 – 136, 150, 208, 213, 310, 317, 533, 794 – 796 Washington, U.S. battleship, 94, 328, 330, 395, 450, 764 Washington Naval Conference (1922), 209, 293, 397, 565 Washington Treaty (1922), 19, 22, 54, 90, 108, 203, 209 – 210, 230, 534, 624, 796 Wasp, U.S. aircraft carrier, 253, 260, 332, 476, 649, 660, 688, 705, 765, 796 – 797

Wasser-Pionieren, German landing craft, 443 WATCHTOWER, Operation, 331, 686 Watson-Watt, Sir Robert, 614 Wavell, Sir Archibald, 1, 404, 557 WAVES. See Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service Weimar Republic, 446 Welchman, Gordon, 673 Wenneker, Paul, 63, 69 Wensleydale, British escort destroyer, 455 WESER, Operation, 657 WESERÜBUNG, Operation, 31, 299, 312, 532, 639, 797 – 800 West Coast Fleet, 520 West Indies, 166, 498 – 499, 547 West Virginia, U.S. battleship, 423, 574, 587 Western Approaches Tactical Unit, 143, 312 Western Naval Task Force, 553 Western Sea Frontier, 380, 575, 714 Weygand, Maxime, 4, 66 Wheeling, U.S. gunboat, 705 Whitehead, John, 748 Whitworth, William J., 533 Wichers, Jan J., 684 Wichita, U.S. heavy cruiser, 162, 626 Wilder, German commerce raider, 297 WILFRED, Operation, 312 Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and Goya, sinking of, 85, 195, 354, 532, 701, 800 – 801 Wilhelm Heidkamp, German ship, 532 Wilhelm II (kaiser), 616 Wilhelmshaven Dockyards, 238, 653 Wilk, Polish submarine, 602 Wilkes, British destroyer, 162 – 163 Wilkinson, Theodore Stark “Ping,” 801 – 802 Willemstad, German U-boat, 556 Willis, Algernon V., 72, 361 Willoch, Off Isaachsen, 532 Willoughby, Charles, 246 Wilson, U.S. destroyer, 649 Winter War, 268 Winterbotham, F. W., 118, 672 Wireless Experimental Centre at Delhi, 117 Wisconsin, U.S. battleship, 384, 387 Wolf Pack (Rudeltaktik), 44, 58, 138 – 139, 414, 654, 674, 802 – 804

Index Wolfgang Zenker, German destroyer, 532 Wolverine, British destroyer, 604 Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), 804 – 805 Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, 89 Women’s Reserve, 773 Woolsey, British destroyer, 162 Wright, Carlton H., 689, 738, 740, 741 Wright, U.S. airship tender, 705 WRNS. See Great Britain, Women’s Royal Navy Service Wyle, Joseph C., 667 Wyoming, U.S. auxiliary ship, 450, 548 “X” MAS Light Flotilla, 121 – 122 XCV, U.S. Navy projects, 21 XX Bomber Command, 595 Yahagi, Japanese light cruiser, 430, 811 Yamaguchi Tamon, 53, 807 – 808 Yamamoto Isoroku, 199, 253, 254, 292, 296, 383, 394, 426, 438, 500, 501, 529, 530, 546, 576, 588 – 589, 747, 761, 770 – 772, 808 – 810, 812, 814 Yamashiro, Japanese battleship, 95, 460, 564, 736 Yamashita Tomoyuki, 395, 396, 463, 595 Yamato, suicide sortie of, 56 – 57, 95, 254, 272, 369, 394, 430, 437, 458, 460, 501, 534, 535, 536, 549, 755, 761, 810 – 811 Yamato class, Japanese battleships, 40, 41, 365, 400, 437, 664, 809, 811 – 814

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Yang Dom Koum, attack at, 285 Yangtze Patrol of the Asiatic Fleet, 584 Yarra, Iranian sloop, 86 – 87 Yokoi Tadao, 69 Yokosuka Naval Station, 296, 343, 426, 430, 571, 576, 668, 755 Yonai Mitsumasa, 383, 733, 814 – 815, 818 York, British heavy cruiser, 152 Yorktown, U.S. cruiser, 131, 199, 200, 201, 216, 260, 261, 273, 338, 456, 501, 502, 705, 735, 768, 770, 807 – 808, 815 – 816 Yorktown class, U.S. aircraft carriers, 20, 260, 815 – 818 Yoshida Zengo, 818 – 819 Yubari, Japanese light cruiser, 649, 791 Yudachi, Japanese destroyer, 326, 327, 328, 417 Yugiri, Japanese destroyer-transport, 157 Yugoslavia, 6, 8 Yugoslavia, navy, 4 – 8, 819 – 820 Yugumo, Japanese destroyer, 784, 785 Yukikaze, Japanese cruiser, 327 Yunagi, U.S. destroyer, 649 Yura, Japanese cruiser, 755 Z Plan, 181, 299, 544, 821 – 822 Zahm, John, 577 Zara, Italian heavy cruiser, 149 – 150 Zeppelins. See Imperial Naval Air Service Zuiho¯, Japanese carrier, 333, 646, 647, 688 Zuikaku, Japanese fleet carrier, 200, 201, 253, 254, 458, 501, 530, 588, 646, 647, 668, 734, 735, 817

925